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Effective Governance
Designs of Food Safety
Regulation in the EU
Do Rules Make the
Difference?
Giulia Bazzan
Effective Governance Designs of Food Safety
Regulation in the EU
Giulia Bazzan
Effective Governance
Designs of Food
Safety Regulation
in the EU
Do Rules Make the Difference?
Giulia Bazzan
Department of Food and Resource Economics
University of Copenhagen
Copenhagen, Denmark
ISBN 978-3-030-82792-2 ISBN 978-3-030-82793-9 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82793-9
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To Davide, and the inspirational women who supported me along
this journey
Preface
This book is the result of a challenging and inspiring three-year research

conducted at the Network for the Advancement of Social and Political
Studies at the University of Milan and enriched by a research stay at the
Centre of European Governance at the University of Exeter. It draws from
my doctoral dissertation and reflects my interest in regulation and gover-
nance effectiveness in the domains of food safety and in set-theoretic and
comparative methods. The research vision of this book is mainly driven by
my curiosity about policy and regulatory processes, governance, policy
capacity, and institutional theories.
This book is the result of many encounters and exchanges with scholars
and experts who supported me in confronting my research questions. I am
grateful to those who have read and discussed my work in the past years,
and inspired and stimulated my intellectual journey. I would like to espe-
cially thank Alessia Damonte for her guidance and training. I am also
grateful for the expert advice and intellectual inspiration of Claudio
Radaelli, Eva Thomann, Adrian Duşa, and Maria Stella Righettini. My
warm thanks also go to Carsten Daugbjerg and Jeroen Candel, who sup-
ported me into the final steps of my work.
Copenhagen, Denmark Giulia Bazzan
vii
Contents
1 Regulatory Governance, Policy Capacity, and Effectiveness

of Regulation 1
Introduction 1
Understanding Regulation and Its Governance 4
Quality of Regulatory Designs 7
Regulatory Effectiveness and Regulatory Failure 9
Policy Capacity 11
Risk Regulation and Its Governance 13
This Contribution 17
References 20
2 Institutional Analysis of Regulatory Designs 31

Introduction 32
The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework: A
Review 33
The Institutional Analysis of Food Safety Regulatory Designs 37
The Explanatory Model: Defining the Explanantes 38
Independence and Accountability of Risk Assessment 39
Institutional Separation of Regulatory Functions 43
Institutional Capacity of Risk Management 45
Conclusion 47
References 47
ix
x Contents
3 The Research Design: Ontological and Methodological

Questions 55
Introduction 56
Causal Mechanisms: Definitions and Theoretical Approaches 57
The Methodological Question 59
Qualitative Comparative Analysis: The Technique 62
Case Selection 64
Food Safety Regulatory Designs of the EU15 66
References 75
4 Gauging the Effectiveness of Food Safety Regulation 79

Introduction 80
What Is Effective Regulation? 81
The Effectiveness of Food Safety Regulation: Existing Dimensions
and Measures 82
Towards a Different Operationalization of Effectiveness 88
References 91
5 Gauging Differences in National Governance Designs 95

Introduction 95
Independence and Accountability of Risk Assessment 96
Institutional Separation of Risk Assessment from Risk
Management 98
Conclusion 110
References 111
6 Effective Governance of Food Safety Regulation113

Introduction 113
Calibration 114
Institutional Separation of Risk Assessment from Risk
Management 115
Formal Independence of Risk Assessment 115
Formal Accountability of Risk Assessment 116
Regulatory Effectiveness 118
Analysis of Necessity 119
Contents xi
Sufficient Conditions for Effective Governance of Food Safety

Regulation 119
Sufficient Conditions for Ineffective Governance of Food Safety
Regulation 123
Discussion of the Results 123
References 127
7 The Conjunction of Capacity and Quality of Regulatory

Designs: Lessons for Effective Governance Designs131
Introduction 131
Main Findings and Implications 132
On the Shoulders of the IAD Framework 132
Scope Conditions 134
Conceptual and Operational Responses 135
Future Research Agenda 136
References 138
Appendix141
Index145
About the Author
Giulia Bazzan is a political scientist who specializes in public policy. She

obtained a bachelor’s in political science and a master’s in communication
at the University of Padova, before completing her PhD in Public Policy
at the University of Milano in 2019. Her doctoral dissertation focused on
effective governance of food safety regulation in Europe, aiming at under-
standing under which institutional conditions food regulation is effective.
Since September 2019, she is a postdoctoral researcher, first at the Public
Administration and Policy group at Wageningen University and now at
the Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of
Copenhagen. She undertakes research on the institutional determinants
for implementation success of agri-environmental governance arrange-
ments across Europe. Throughout her career, Bazzan gained valuable
methodological skills in set-theoretic methods and Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA), as well as in comparative case-study analysis and process
tracing. She has published about food safety regulation and policy integra-
tion, amongst others, in the European Journal of Risk Regulation and the
International Review of Public Policy. Her research topics of interest
include food policy, agri-environmental governance, policy design, policy
capacity, and institutional theories.
xiii
Abbreviations
ACCRA Accountability of Risk Assessment

AESAN Spanish Food Safety and Nutrition Agency
AGES Austrian Agency for Health and Food safety
ANSES French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health
and Safety
ASAE Economy and Food Safety Standards Authority
BfR Federal Institute for Risk Assessment
BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
CAPRM Capacity of Risk Management
DG Directorate General
EC European Commission
ECJ European Court of Justice
EFET Hellenic Food Authority
EFF Effectiveness of food safety regulation
EFSA European Food Safety Authority
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EU European Union
EVIRA Finnish Food Safety Authority
FASFC Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
FBO Food Business Operator
FSA Food Standard Agency
FSAI Food safety Authority of Ireland
FSMS Food Safety Management System
FVO Food and Veterinary Office
GFL General Food Law
GMO Genetically Modified Organism
IAD Institutional Analysis and Development
xv
xvi Abbreviations
IGT Institutional Grammar Tool

INDRA Independence of Risk Assessment
IRA Independent Regulatory Agency
ISS Italian Health Institute
LV Swedish Food Agency
MS Member States
NVWA Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
QCA Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RASFF Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed
RoN Relevance of Necessity
SEP Risk Assessment Separated from Risk Management
WTP Willingness to Pay
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Levels of decision-making and outcomes of food safety action-

situations38
Fig. 6.1 Sufficient conditions for regulatory effectiveness 122
Fig. 6.2 Sufficient conditions for regulatory ineffectiveness 124
Fig. 6.3 An illustration of sufficient conditions for effective governance
of food safety regulation 125
xvii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 The explanatory conditions 46

Table 3.1 Food safety governance designs across the EU15 Member States 67
Table 3.2 Risk assessment function: distribution of regulatory tasks 71
Table 3.3 Risk management function: distribution of regulatory tasks 73
Table 4.1 Metrics of food safety delivered 85
Table 4.2 RASFF effectiveness operationalization 89
Table 4.3 Delivered food safety across EU15 Member States 90
Table 5.1 Coding of independence of the Austrian agency for food safety 99
Table 5.2 Coding of accountability of the Austrian agency for
food safety 105
Table 5.3 Independence and accountability indexes of EU15 Member
States107
Table 5.4 Institutional separation of risk assessment from risk
management in the EU15 108
Table 5.5 Institutional capacity of risk management in the EU15 109
Table 5.6 Conceptualization and operationalization of explanatory
conditions110
Table 6.1 Measurement and calibration 115
Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics 119
Table 6.3 Analysis of necessity 120
Table 6.4 Sufficient conditions for regulatory effectiveness 122
Table 6.5 Sufficient conditions for regulatory ineffectiveness 124
Table A.1 Coding of formal independence of risk assessment 141
Table A.2 Coding of formal accountability of risk assessment 142
Table A.3 Raw data 142
Table A.4 Calibrated data 143
xix
CHAPTER 1
Regulatory Governance, Policy Capacity,

and Effectiveness of Regulation
Abstract This chapter introduces the question of effective governance

designs of food safety regulation. It presents reasons why the new schol-
arly attention to food regulation constitutes an opportunity to investigate
a number of broader issues that have concerned regulatory governance
scholars, including effectiveness of regulation, the interplay between mon-
itoring and enforcement (and their consequences), quality of regulatory
designs, and the effects of policy capacity on regulatory outcomes. In
doing so, it introduces the main argument of the book, which is the com-
plementarity of policy capacity theories with regulatory governance theo-
ries in explaining successes and failures. By using food safety regulation as
an illustrative case, it identifies gaps in the literature, and it frames the
present contribution in the landscape of comparative public policy.
Keywords Regulatory governance • Policy capacity • Regulatory

designs • Regulatory effectiveness • Food safety regulation • Risk
regulation
Introduction
It has been 30 years since ‘doing a Gummer’ passed into slang. In 1990,
the British Minister of Agriculture John Gummer attempted to reassure
the public that British beef was safe—despite growing concerns over the
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2021
G. Bazzan, Effective Governance Designs of Food Safety Regulation
in the EU, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82793-9_1
2 G. BAZZAN
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) disease—trying to feed his

daughter a beef burger, and taking a large bite himself, saying it was ‘abso-
lutely delicious’. That episode became emblematic of the social and politi-
cal tensions surrounding the governance of food safety in Europe at that
time, particularly between public authorities and public opinion, market
and consumer protection. Ready access to safe and nutritious food is a
basic human right (The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World
2020 2020) and food safety is recognized as crucial for protecting public
health. Yet every year in Europe, 23 million people fall ill after eating con-
taminated food.1 Unsafe food inhibits socioeconomic development, over-
loads healthcare systems, and precludes economic growth and trade. Food
safety threats cause an enormous burden on economies from disruptions
or restrictions in global and European agri-food trade, loss of food and
associated income, and waste of natural resources. Food safety policy is
defined as the set of goals, rules, and structures that are designed to ensure
food quality and address the risk of food contamination in order to pro-
mote and protect the health of humans, animals, and plants. To tackle the
problems related to the safety of the food products, food safety policies
must govern the whole production and supply chain for food, including
production, processing, storage, transportation, retail, and sale (Phillips &
Wolfe, 2001; Robson, 2013; Thomann, 2018). These governance arrange-
ments consist of a set of normative objectives and standards (standard
setting), processes for detecting deviations (monitoring), and mechanisms
for reproving noncompliant behaviour (enforcement) (Thomann, 2018).
They involve public regulators who are responsible for these functions,
and ‘regulatees’ whose task is to adopt the rules and comply with them
(Thomann, 2018; Verbruggen, 2016). Against this background, food
safety regulation has become a key instrument within the European Union
(EU). It intervenes on a wide range of domains, from animal health to
chemical residues in agriculture, labelling, novel food, genetically modi-
fied organisms (GMOs), traceability of the food chain, and thus exerting
a remarkable impact on public health as much as on the functioning of the
agri-food market.
Since the BSE crisis, a large number of food scares dominated media
reports across Europe, and recent trends show that alerts have not dimin-
ished. While the limited capacity of state institutions in this area became
1
Source: https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/402989/50607-
WHO-Food-Safety-publicationV4_Web.pdf (Last accessed: March 2021).
1 REGULATORY GOVERNANCE, POLICY CAPACITY, AND EFFECTIVENESS… 3
visible, there has been a concomitant increase in the expectations towards

the nation states on one hand and the European institutions on the other
to regulate food safety. Unsurprisingly, the issue has compelled a common
response at the level of the European Union to reform the procedures and
the governance for improving food safety. The reform, introduced in
2002, strengthened the EU food safety legislation and established the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), to provide the European
Commission and Member State authorities with scientific advice on food-
related risks. Nevertheless, the European countries display differences in
their effectiveness to tackle food safety problems. Member States differ
notably in how they design, govern, and enforce food safety requirements,
resulting in diverse domestic governance solutions: they rely on different
degrees of information, wealth, and institutional capacity to ensure coher-
ence in the application of food safety rules. At the domestic level, national
ministries and food safety agencies set and govern food safety regulations,
and the national food safety agencies are either independent regulatory
agencies or the executive service of a ministry (Abels & Kobusch, 2015;
Thomann, 2018; Verbruggen, 2016).
The new attention to food regulation constitutes an opportunity to
investigate a number of broader issues that have concerned regulatory
governance scholars, including effectiveness of regulation, the interplay
between monitoring and enforcement (and their consequences), quality
of regulatory designs, and the effects of policy capacity on regulatory out-
comes. The question of achieving effectiveness of regulatory instruments
has always concerned regulatory governance and design scholars, and
institutional theories suggest that institutional structures and governance
arrangements significantly shape regulation and its effectiveness.
Specifically, the institutional design theory identifies in information asym-
metries the main regulatory failure-mechanism, and several scholars iden-
tify in the quality of regulatory design the response to this effectiveness
challenge (Gilardi, 2008; Levi-Faur, 2010; Maggetti, 2007). Debates
about quality of regulatory designs bring together discussion of indepen-
dence and accountability (Biela & Papadopoulos, 2014; Busuioc, 2009;
Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Gilardi, 2002, 2005, 2008; Hanretty & Koop,
2012; Koop & Hanretty, 2018; Maggetti, 2007, 2009; Maggetti &
Gilardi, 2011; Majone, 1999; Quintyn & Taylor, 2007). Recent design
literature extensively discussed policy capacity, and highlighted its funda-
mental nature to produce effective outcomes (Bullock et al., 2001;
4 G. BAZZAN
Considine, 2012; Howlett & Ramesh, 2014, 2016; Peters et al., 2018;
Rotberg, 2014; Wu et al., 2010, 2015).
Against this background, this book adopts an institutional design’s
approach to study effectiveness of food safety regulation, drawing upon
the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD), developed
by Elinor Ostrom (1986, 2005, 2009, 2011). Specifically, it investigates
differences in effectiveness of food safety regulation across European
countries and explains them by differences in domestic governance
designs.
I will now discuss the landscape in which this contribution situates and
introduce the question of effective governance designs of food safety
regulation.
Understanding Regulation and Its Governance

Much of the academic debates about regulation nowadays deal with the
concept of governance of regulation and identifies effectiveness as one of
its major challenges (Levi-Faur, 2010). Regulatory governance as a con-
cept refers to the complex interplay of regulatory actors, and involves both
the design and implementation tasks of regulatory and control instru-
ments. The idea of governance is indeed associated with multiple logics of
control (Lodge & Wegrich, 2011: 90) and with the rise of the regulatory
state (Majone, 1994). As to the latter, the development of regulation as
fundamental tool of governance led to its emergence and consolidation.
The claim that we are living in a regulatory state has become widely
accepted, and regulation has risen the academic agenda to become both a
field of study in its own and a source of new perspectives on the agendas
of established disciplines.
However, according to Koop and Lodge (2017), the question of what
is meant by ‘regulation’ is still contested. Baldwin and colleagues argue
that there are three main conceptions: (1) Regulation as the promulgation
of an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by some mechanism for mon-
itoring and promoting compliance with these rules. (2) Regulation as all
the efforts of state agencies to steer the economy. (3) Regulation as all
mechanisms of social control—including unintentional and non-state pro-
cesses (Baldwin et al., 2012; Baldwin et al., 1998: 3–4; Jordana & Levi-
Faur, 2004: 2–4). In this book, I draw upon Levi-Faur’s definition of
regulation, which includes continuous action of monitoring and enforce-
ment of rules: ‘the promulgation of prescriptive rules as well as the
monitoring and enforcement of these rules by social, business, and politi-

cal actors on other social, business, and political actors’ (Levi-Faur,
2010: 9).
In explaining how regulation arises, develops, and changes, one of the
broadest theoretical approaches is the institutionalism, which ranges from
emphasizing the importance of formal rules in shaping behaviour, to the
political rules of the games, and the social context in which all human
action is embedded. Institutionalists agree on the notion that the institu-
tional structure and its arrangements significantly shape regulation. Three
main approaches can be detected: rational-choice (Calvert et al., 1989;
Matthews, 1986; Ostrom, 1986; Williamson, 1975), historical (Hancher
& Moran, 1989; Sanders, 2008; Thelen, 1999), and sociological (March
& Olsen, 1984; Powell & Di Maggio, 1991). According to the rational
choice approach, actors are rational utility-maximizers, and their behav-
iour is shaped and constrained by institutions, defined as rules of the game.
Institutions are the result of deliberate design, and their shape is deter-
mined by the benefits they can provide to the relevant actors. The histori-
cal approach draws on insights of both theories, adding to them by having
a marked historical view of institutions and recognizing the influence of
institutions over the preferences of actors, by focusing on macro-context
and the combined effects of institutions and processes. Finally, the socio-
logical approach is grounded in organization theory and conceptualizes
institutions as not only formal rules and procedures, but also norms, hav-
ing a strong symbolic dimension. This book follows the strand interested
in inter-institutional relations (specifically, institutional design questions)
and in designing institutions and institutional relations to avoid specific
problems associated with regulatory processes (capture). In so doing, it
focuses attention on the rules of the game, and on how these affect success
and failure.
Regulation studies have always been concerned with achieving effec-
tiveness and efficiency in the sets of regulatory instruments adopted by
governments to solve problems (Peters et al., 2018). Regulation is an
identifiable mode of governmental activity (Baldwin et al., 2012: 2), and
as such it has been widely conceptualized as the traditional instrument of
government (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998). According to Bemelmans-
Videc and colleagues, the defining property of regulation is the authority
of the relationship, meaning that the controlled persons or groups are
obliged to act in the way stated by the controllers (Bemelmans-Videc
et al., 1998: 10). This notion entails both command and control:
6 G. BAZZAN
prescriptive rules (command) on one hand and monitoring and enforce-

ment of these rules (control) on the other. Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and
Vedung conceptualize regulatory instruments as made of a certain action
content—which specifies what to do and how to behave—and a certain
authoritative force—intended as the constraints on the behavioural alter-
natives of individuals and organizations (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998:
227). Regulatory tools are intended to change behaviour and often origi-
nate in the legislative and administrative spheres of government. In the
traditional literature, regulation as a tool mostly referred to command and
control systems that mainly were concerned with regulating private firms
to correct types of market failures. Regulation as a tool has expanded from
that original definition to include other regulatory activities like social
regulation, specifically intended to improve public wellbeing through reg-
ulating behaviours that affect public health and safety (May, 2003).
When speaking of instruments, literature distinguishes between sub-
stantive and procedural. The substantive component is a set of alternative
arrangements potentially capable of resolving or addressing some aspects
of a policy problem, while the procedural component is a set of activities
related to securing some level of agreement among those charged with
formulating, deciding on, and administering that alternative (Howlett &
Lejano, 2013: 360). Against this background, regulatory instruments can
be understood as both substantial and procedural instruments: substantial
regulation is designed to affect the behaviour of those who are regulated,
while procedural regulation is the procedure of decision-making for sub-
stantive regulation, together with the manner in which substantive regula-
tion unfolds. The procedural dimension of regulation is aimed at setting
down, defining, or refining actor positions; adding actors to the field of
implementation; changing access rules and influencing the pay-off struc-
ture for actors; and sanctioning certain types of behaviours (Ostrom,
1986, 2005, 2011). Regulatory tools usually contain four components:
rules that specify the desired behaviour, standards for compliance, sanc-
tions for noncompliance, and an administrative system to enforce the rules
and deliver sanctions (May, 2003). Drawing upon this notion, this book
tackles food safety regulation as a regulatory instrument that has both
command-and-control dimensions—prescribing behaviours on one hand
and providing for monitoring and enforcement on the other.
Quality of Regulatory Designs

Regulatory governance and design theories have always been concerned
with achieving effectiveness in regulatory instruments, and several scholars
identify in the quality of regulatory design the response to this effective-
ness challenge (Gilardi, 2008; Levi-Faur, 2010; Maggetti, 2007).
When speaking of regulatory designs, the main institutional manifesta-
tion of the regulatory state is independent regulatory agencies (IRAs)
(Gilardi, 2008). The rise of regulation as a policy instrument has been
interpreted as a major shift in the way governments intervene in the econ-
omy, with implications for both policies and institutions. Specifically, the
difference between the positive and the regulatory state lies in the instru-
ments used. While the action of the positive state depends on taxing and
spending, that of the regulatory state lies on the production of rules,
which is not subject to the same budget constraints (Gilardi, 2008: 19).
The literature on the regulatory state has focused on Europe, but some
scholars have emphasized the global nature of this trend (Gilardi, 2008;
Jacint Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004; Levi-Faur, 2005): the rise of regulation
as a mode of governance characterizes countries in all regions of the globe.
Independent regulatory agencies can be defined as public organizations
with regulatory powers that are neither elected by the people, nor directly
managed by elected officials (Gilardi, 2008: 21–22; Thatcher & Sweet,
2002: 2). IRAs are part of the agencification trend that has characterized
the OECD countries and they constitute a key regulatory tool in several
sectors, from telecom to food safety, from environmental protection
to energy.
Recent efforts in the field of regulation and agencification have focused
on assessing the establishment of regulatory agencies, their institutional
designs, and their impact on democratic governance. These studies have
mostly focused on OECD and EU countries and have mainly analysed
single dimensions, with independence (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Gilardi,
2002, 2005, 2008; Hanretty & Koop, 2012; Maggetti, 2007, 2009,
2010; Maggetti & Gilardi, 2011) and accountability (Biela &
Papadopoulos, 2014; Busuioc, 2009; Koop & Hanretty, 2018; Majone,
1999; Quintyn & Taylor, 2007) most commonly discussed. Several schol-
ars investigated legitimacy and accountability of non-elected experts,
together with the credibility of scientific expertise and the role of science
within the policy process (Gilardi, 2002, 2005, 2008; Maggetti, 2007,
2009; Maggetti & Gilardi, 2011). Several authors have also stressed the
8 G. BAZZAN
need for regulators to be accountable as well as independent (Busuioc,

2009; Koop & Hanretty, 2018; Majone, 1999; Quintyn & Taylor, 2007).
As to independence, it has been widely explored and discussed
(Christensen & LæGreid, 2007; Edwards & Waverman, 2004; Elgie &
McMenamin, 2005; Gilardi, 2002, 2005, 2008; Jacint Jordana et al.,
2009; Maggetti, 2007, 2009, 2010; Maggetti & Gilardi, 2011; Majone,
1994; Thatcher, 2002; Thatcher & Sweet, 2002; Wonka & Rittberger,
2010). Many scholars distinguished between formal and de facto indepen-
dence, accounting for implication of one dimension towards the other. In
this book, I will focus on formal independence, defined as the degree to
which there are statutory provisions that decrease the possibility for politi-
cians to influence agency decisions before they are made (Koop &
Hanretty, 2018: 42). The rationale behind the delegation of regulatory
tasks to autonomous agencies lies in the ‘Two Logics of Delegation’, for-
mulated by Majone (1999), according to which when uncertainty about
future events rises, so does the incentive to delegate. This is mainly because
the agent can react more flexibly and efficiently to changing the status
quo. To this increase of delegation corresponds an intensification of the
control mechanisms, and thus the necessity of accountability. Koop and
Hanretty improved our knowledge of independence (Hanretty & Koop,
2009, 2012, 2013; Koop & Hanretty, 2018), by looking at it as a matter
of degree rather than as a quality that is present or absent, and taking
explicitly into consideration accountability, as property that matters for
performance (Koop & Hanretty, 2018: 40). Indeed, regulatory agencies
may be tempted to misuse and abuse their public authority, if these activi-
ties are associated with worse performance, and if accountability mecha-
nisms may provide incentives not to engage in these activities, we shall
expect higher degrees of accountability to be associated with better per-
formance (Koop & Hanretty, 2018: 46).
As to accountability, it has been widely investigated (Bovens, 2005,
2007, 2010; Bovens et al., 2014; Busuioc & Lodge, 2016; Busuioc, 2009,
2012; Busuioc & Schillemans, 2014; Jordana et al., 2015; Maggetti,
2010; Schillemans & Bovens, 2014). The concept finds its origins in the
delegation theory, according to which ‘an agent is accountable to a prin-
cipal if the principal can exercise control over the agent, and delegation is
not accountable if the principal is unable to exercise control’ (Lupia, 2003:
35). As highlighted by Bovens (2010), much of the academic literature on
accountability is rather disconnected, as many authors propose their own
specific definition of the concept. According to Bovens (2010), it is
possible to distinguish between the American discourse—mostly focused

on normative issues (Considine, 2002; Klingner et al., 2002; Koppell,
2005; O’Connell, 2005; Wang, 2002)—and the British, Australian,
Canadian, and continental European scholarly debates—mostly focused
on accountability as a mechanism (Mark Bovens, 2007; Day & Klein,
1987; Goodin, 2003; Mulgan, 2003; Philp, 2009; Scott, 2000). As to the
former, accountability is used as a normative concept, a set of standards for
the behaviour of actors, a virtue—referring to substantive norms for the
behaviours of actors. As to the latter, accountability is approached as a
specific social relation or mechanism that involves an obligation to explain
and justify conduct (Bovens, 2010: 951). Both notions are related to the
legitimacy debate, and public accountability in the sense of transparent,
responsive, and responsible governance is meant to assure public confi-
dence in government and to bridge the gap between citizens and repre-
sentatives and between the governed and government (Aucoin &
Heintzman, 2000: 49–52; Bovens, 2010: 954). This book draws upon the
definition of accountability as ‘the ability to provide information on, and
explanation of, one’s conduct’ (Koop & Hanretty, 2018: 44). Against this
background, an agency is formally accountable to politicians to the extent
that politicians can require the agency to provide information on, and
explanation of, its conduct on the basis of statutory provisions (Koop &
Hanretty, 2018: 44).
Regulatory Effectiveness and Regulatory Failure

Scholarly attention has been paid both to effectiveness of regulation and
to its failure: regulation is successful insofar as it achieves the goals that
regulators set out to achieve, while it is unsuccessful when it does not.
Literature concerned with ‘better regulation’ identified five key principles
for effective regulation: legislative authority supports the regulatory inter-
vention, there is an adequate accountability mechanism, procedures are
fair and accessible, regulators rely on sufficient expertise, and the regula-
tory instrument is efficient (Baldwin et al., 2012). These arguments sug-
gest that regulators fail when they do not produce (at reasonable costs)
the outcomes that are stipulated in their mandates (Baldwin et al., 2012:
68), or when they achieve results inefficiently, or when they lack account-
ability, fairness, and the necessary expertise.
According to Baldwin et al. (2012), regulatory failure can be explained
by different kinds of accounts. Public interests accounts draw upon the
10 G. BAZZAN
idea that regulators pursuit some conception of the public interest and
different interpretations of what the public interest might be and how is to
be achieved are contested, leading to competing conceptions and, thus, to
ineffective delivery of outcomes or confused procedures. A second account
ascribes regulatory failure to bounded rationality (Simon, 1991) that
affects individual and organizational decision-making, resulting in limited
information, uncertainty, and ambiguity of knowledge. According to
Simon’s account, rationality is limited when individuals make decisions:
indeed, bounded rational agents experience limits in formulating and solv-
ing complex problems and in processing information (Simon, 1991: 129).
Much of the existing literature focusing on regulatory failure has pointed
to the self-interested behaviour of key actors engaged in the regulatory
process, while ideas-based approaches have emphasized the role played by
ideological conservatism in producing under-performance, either by fail-
ing to adapt ideas to new circumstances, or by rejecting information that
challenges existing dominant understandings. A fourth account is pro-
vided by institutional theories, which suggest that institutional structures
and arrangements, as well as social processes, significantly shape regula-
tion. Failures, from such perspective, can be seen as the effects of inter-
and intra-institutional pressures, as well as the effects of the spread of
regulation across layers of government and types of organization.
Recently, effectiveness has been defined as the creation of a frame for
action that may shape a range of regulatory responses and it can be under-
stood at three levels of analysis. The first is at the level of what includes an
effective formulation environment that leads to effective design; the sec-
ond concerns how effective instrument mixes can be effectively con-
structed to address complex objectives; the third focuses on what
constitutes the effectiveness of particular types of instruments (Peters
et al., 2018: 21). The governance turn encouraged much of the academic
discussion about effectiveness in design at the level of instruments of the
market and the state, as well as the dichotomous governance styles such as
hierarchies and markets (Michael Howlett, 2004; Peters et al., 2018). This
orientation entails the idea that the nature of the overall design space can
have a significant bearing on how effectively intended design activities take
place and, therefore, on the effectiveness of regulatory designs that emerge
from them (Peters et al., 2018: 22).
Literature on European regulation attempted to assess whether a cer-
tain combination of substantive and procedural regulatory instruments
reflects good regulation or not. Particular attention has been paid to the
extent to which the EU has the capacity of taking political decisions in a

certain area, these decisions are actually implemented and complied with
at the national level, and the regulations in question achieve their intended
objectives (problem-solving capacity) (Knill & Lenschow, 2003).
Accordingly, European studies claimed that the capability of EU institu-
tions and Member State governments to take a regulatory decision is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for effective regulation. This latter
depends not only on legislative decisions, but also on the degree to which
these decisions are actually implemented and complied with. It is generally
argued that obligatory regulation has a higher potential for effective
implementation, as the force of law can be used to impose the fixed stan-
dards or objectives (Baldwin et al., 2012: 35; Knill & Lenschow, 2003:
226). Indeed, the primary steering mechanism of regulatory standards is
coercion, and behaviour modification is to be achieved by hierarchical
means of command and control. However, according to Knill and
Lenschow (2003), effective decision-making and implementation are not
sufficient to ensure effective problem solving. With respect to the general
aspects that affect the quality of regulatory design, they identify adjust-
ment flexibility, danger of capture, context responsiveness, and predict-
ability of outcomes. Yet, high-quality regulatory designs cannot result in
effectiveness unless regulation is effective, which involves both high-
quality commands and high-quality control. Indeed, the level of control is
acknowledged as the most fundamental determinant of the effectiveness
of regulation in meeting policy objectives (OECD, 2002: 74).
Policy Capacity
Policy capacity is a core concept in governance studies and has attracted
considerable attention over the years (Painter & Pierre, 2005; Peters,
2015; Rayner & Howlett, 2009; Wu et al., 2015). As governments have
to address increasingly complex problems, concerns about capacity have
arisen. Indeed, the increasing complexity of many contemporary policy
issues together with rising expectations of the public presents unprece-
dented challenges to the capacity of governments to make and implement
effective policies (Wu et al., 2015). The terms ‘policy capacity’, ‘gover-
nance capacity’, ‘administrative capacity’, and ‘institutional capacity’ have
often been used interchangeably (Rayner & Howlett, 2009). Most schol-
ars define policy capacity as ‘affecting government’s ability to make intel-
ligent choices’ (Painter & Pierre, 2005; Wu et al., 2015: 2), to scan the
12 G. BAZZAN
environment and set strategic directions (Howlett & Lindquist, 2004), to

weigh and assess the implications of policy alternatives (Bakvis, 2000), and
to make appropriate use of knowledge in policymaking (Parsons, 2004).
Wu, Ramesh, and Howlett define capacity as ‘the set of skills and
resources – or competences and capabilities – necessary to perform policy
functions’ (Wu et al., 2015: 2).
Recent work on policy capacity has outlined the fundamental nature of
these skills and resources that governments need to effectively perform
policy functions (Bullock et al., 2001; Howlett & Ramesh, 2014, 2016;
Rotberg, 2014; Wu et al., 2010): analytical, operational, and political.
These exist at three levels: individual, organizational, and systemic (Wu
et al., 2015). At the individual level, technical expertise (analytical capac-
ity), leadership and managerial expertise (operational capacity), and politi-
cal judgement (political capacity) play a crucial role in determining how
well various tasks and functions are conducted (Wu et al., 2020). At the
organizational level, we find information mobilization capacities and
administrative, human, and financial resource management capacities. At
the system level, institutions and opportunities for knowledge creation
and use need to exist alongside arrangements for accountability and secur-
ing political legitimacy. Against this background, policy capacity is the
combination of skills and resources (Wu et al., 2018: 5). Analytical capaci-
ties contribute to attainment of policy goals through sound technical
grounds; operational capacities allow resources to be aligned with inter-
ventions such that they can be implemented in practice; political capacities
sustain the political support for policy actions (Rotberg, 2014; Tiernan &
Wanna, 2006; Wu et al., 2010, 2015, 2018, 2020). Despite being inter-
connected, these capacities are governed in different ways and their con-
tributions to success (or failure) are separable, as they may not all be
required for particular actions to succeed (Wu et al., 2018: 5). Yet, policy
capacity scholars agree on its fundamental nature to produce effective
outcomes.
Against this background, this book focuses on the institutional dimen-
sion of policy capacity, and the interplay across the analytical and opera-
tional dimensions. The acknowledged principles of accountability,
accessibility, and expertise for ‘good regulation’ has increased the impor-
tance of information systems (analytical capacity), while the level of inter-
government and inter-agency coordination is determinant for operational
capacity. In Wu et al. policy capacity framework (Wu et al., 2015, 2018,
2020), at the system level operational capacity refers to the system of
controls over public sector agencies (Wu et al., 2018: 12). On the one
hand, operational capacity enables public agencies the discretion to carry
out their functions; on the other hand, it provides controls on their discre-
tion to ensure good governance.
Risk Regulation and Its Governance

Risk is understood in this book as an uncertain consequence of an event or
an activity (Klinke & Renn, 2010: 9) and it always refers to a combination
of the likelihood of potential consequences and the severity of conse-
quences of human activities, natural events, or a combination of both.
Risk is distinguished from hazard, which describes the potential for harm
that may never even materialize if, for instance, people are not exposed to
the hazard. Hazard characterizes the inherent property of the risk and
related processes, whereas risk describes the potential effects that this haz-
ard is likely to cause on specific targets. The most complex questions arise
when we look at how society and its various actors actually handle risks.
Apart from the decision-making structure—the people and organizations
that share responsibility for governing risk—the need for sufficient capac-
ity to create the necessary knowledge and implement the required actions,
the political and cultural norms, rules and values within a particular soci-
etal context, and the subjective perceptions of individuals and groups must
also be considered.
Risk governance translates the core principles of governance to the con-
text of risk and risk-related decision-making. Risk governance has been
defined as ‘the complex process by which risks are identified, assessed,
communicated, and managed’ (Renn & Walker, 2008: xxiii) but extends
beyond the three conventionally recognized elements of risk analysis (risk
assessment, risk management, and risk communication), including matters
of institutional design and role, institutional capacity, stakeholder involve-
ment, collaborative decision-making, and political accountability. Indeed,
risk governance includes not only a multifaceted, multi-actor risk process
but also institutional arrangements (the regulatory and legal framework
that determines the relationship, roles, and responsibilities of the actors)
and political culture, including different perceptions of risk.
In the governance of risk, one of the most controversial activities is
delineating a judgement about the tolerability and the acceptability of a
given risk (Klinke & Renn, 2010). The term ‘tolerable’ refers to an activity
that is seen as worth pursuing, yet it requires ‘additional efforts for risk
14 G. BAZZAN
reduction within reasonable limits’ (Klinke & Renn, 2010: 17) The term
‘acceptable’ refers to an activity where ‘the remaining risks are so low that
additional efforts for risk reduction are not seen as necessary’ (Klinke &
Renn, 2010: 17). The process of judging the tolerability and acceptability
of a risk can be structured into two distinct components: risk characteriza-
tion and risk evaluation. The former determines the evidence-based com-
ponent for making the necessary judgement on the tolerability and
acceptability of a risk, while the latter determines the value-based compo-
nent for making this judgement (Klinke & Renn, 2010). This separation
of evidence and values is functional, and not necessarily organizational.
However, the European regulatory system tends to favour an organiza-
tional separation, in the food area as well as in chemical regulation (Klinke
& Renn, 2010; Lofstedt & Vogel, 2001).
When considering risk handling in modern society, many influential
factors come into play. One major aspect of risk governance concerns
national culture, political traditions, and social norms that influence the
mechanisms and institutions for integrating knowledge and expertise in
the policy arenas. Each country and different risk domain within the same
country may pursue different pathways for dealing with risk, with regard
to inclusion and selection of rules, interpretative frames, and action plans
for dealing with evidence. Criteria of good governance have been dis-
cussed extensively and in many different contexts (Baldwin et al., 2012;
Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004; Knill & Lenschow, 2003). Central issues are
sound scientific expertise, adequate inclusion of public concerns, consis-
tency and coherence in making trade-offs between risks and benefits, non-
discrimination and proportionality in designing risk management options,
and assurance of thorough monitoring and independent oversight during
implementation. Moreover, governance structures should reflect criteria
of transparency, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, sustainability,
equity, and respect for the rule of law (Klinke & Renn, 2010). The White
Paper on European Governance of the European Commission identifies
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence as key
elements of good governance.2
Many approaches to risk have been developed over the past decades. As
recalled by Hood et al. (2001), the best known is the work of Beck (1992):
according to Beck, we live in a risk society. As well as a risk society, we are
2
Source: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_01_10 (Last
accessed: March 2021).
also said to live in regulatory state (Majone, 1994). According to Hood

et al. (2001), the two ideas of risk society and regulatory state could be
linked in so far as risk and safety is often held to be one of the major drivers
of contemporary regulatory growth, for example, in the development of
EU regulation (Beck, 1992; Scharpf, 1997). Substantial variation can be
observed in the way regulation works and even neighbouring states may
take very different approaches to regulating risks (Hood et al., 2001).
Well-known examples include the conflict between the EU’s precaution-
ary approach to regulate food-related issues and the US more resilient
regulatory approach to such risks, and the ban on exports of UK beef by
the EU during the BSE crisis while the product was permitted for sale
within the UK. Some of the variations we can observe across risk regula-
tion domains involve different approaches to standard setting. Some
domains are dominated by a cost-benefit analysis culture, in which the
costs of additional measures are weighted against benefits using explicit
value-of-life calculations. Various forms of quantified risk assessment cul-
ture, in which risks are expressed in elaborated numbers but the costs and
benefits of regulation are not, dominate some others. By contrast, other
risks are handled by a culture of inter-agency bargaining, or of qualitative
approaches.
The design of institutions and boundaries for risk regulation also vary
considerably from one domain to another. Some risks and hazards are
handled by state agencies staffed by specialists in risk management, with
expert monitoring arrangements and dedicated specialist enforcers. More
generalist agencies, self-regulatory arrangements, or the law courts regu-
late others. In some cases, one agency monopolizes the entire risk domain,
while in others domain is divided among a multiplicity of players for dif-
ferent stages or aspects of the regulatory task, amounting to a control
system made up of multiple regimes. Accordingly, Hood et al. (2001)
developed the idea of risk regulation regimes, connoting the overall way
risk is regulated in a particular policy domain. Their approach is institu-
tional, focusing on the characterization of institutions and formal rules,
and beyond. In this sense, the term ‘regime’ is used to denote the complex
of institutional geography, rules, practice, and animating ideas that are
associated with the regulation of a particular risk (Hood et al., 2001: 9).
Institutional geography can vary according to the territorial scale—from
international to local jurisdiction, the level of integration—from a single
agency handling all features of regulation to highly fragmented adminis-
tration and complex overlapping systems, and the level of
16 G. BAZZAN
specialization—from risk-specific expertise to general-purpose administra-

tion. Rules can vary in formality, from unwritten rules to statutory codes;
targets, and sanctions (Baldwin et al., 1998; Black, 2002; Hood et al.,
2001; Hood, 1983). The notion of regime has been similarly developed in
literature also to describe variety in systems of governance, in several fields
(Hood et al., 2001). Some institutional analyses that can be related to the
notion of regimes include taxonomies of different types of policy instru-
ments (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998; Eliadis et al., 2005; Hood, 1983;
Hood & Margetts, 2007; Howlett, 2000; McDonnell & Elmore, 1987;
Salamon, 2002; Schneider & Ingram, 1990), institutional types, and rule
types, such as Elinor Ostrom’s work on the Institutional Analysis and
Development framework (IAD) (Ostrom, 1986, 2005, 2011). Hood
et al. (2001) linked theoretically risk regulation and institutional analysis,
in the attempt of capturing the variety that is left out of other macroscopic
approaches—among others, the risk society sociologist approach (Beck,
1992)—and to achieve a broader perspective than of microscopic
approaches—for instance the single feature analysis of safety standard–set-
ting (Hood et al., 2001).
Debates about institutional design bring together discussion of value,
context, and instrumental alternatives and many different disciplines and
analytic approaches can evidently contribute to such debates (Hood et al.,
2001: 185). In their analysis of risk regulation regimes, Hood et al. (2001)
distinguish between two main dimensions of regulation: the three ele-
ments of control on one hand—standard setting, information gathering,
and behaviour modification—and the instrumental and institutional ele-
ments on the other. Much debate on risk regulation tends to focus on
standard setting, because it raises questions about the valuation of human
life, or the way one risk is weighed against another. However, according to
Hood and colleagues, information gathering and behaviour modification
are the components by which risk regulation can best be assessed (Hood
et al., 2001: 21). Risk regulation varies markedly from one domain to
another in structure, and it is possible to find multiple interlinked regula-
tory systems, as well as marked institutional diversity across control com-
ponents, with different sets of organizations involved in standard setting,
information gathering, and behaviour modification. In this latter, each
control component may involve a different pattern of administrative geog-
raphy, a separate pattern of regulatory capture, and different administra-
tive or technical cultures.
This Contribution
The area of food regulation and its governance has generated an extensive
body of work, drawing the attention of several scholars, from a wide range
of disciplines and perspectives. Over the years, political scientists and pol-
icy scholars have drawn their attention in studying food and agriculture
policy-making as a generative empirical example in the theoretical devel-
opment of policy studies (Daugbjerg & Feindt, 2017: 1566). These stud-
ies (Biesbroek & Candel, 2020; Candel & Biesbroek, 2018; Coleman
et al., 1996; Coleman & Grant, 1998; Daugbjerg, 2003; Daugbjerg &
Swinbank, 2012, 2015, 2016; Feindt, 2010; Feindt & Flynn, 2009;
Jackson & Deeg, 2012; Jordan et al., 1994; Kay, 2005; Lowe et al., 2010;
Marsh & Smith, 2000; Skogstad, 1998, 2008; Termeer et al., 2012, 2019;
Termeer & Dewulf, 2019) have contributed to theoretical developments
in public policy and political science within a number of research fields
concerned with the explanation of policy outcomes, policy stability, and
policy change (Daugbjerg & Feindt, 2017).
Recently, scholars have focused on how the resulting multiple and con-
flicting actor rationalities and the overlap of several regulatory roles affect
the effectiveness and legitimacy of the decision-making and implementa-
tion of food safety policy (Thomann, 2018). By highlighting issues such as
regulatory capture and deficient enforcement systems, Thomann (2018)
suggests that food safety governance increasingly shares the characteristic
of a wicked problem: indeed, hybridization of food safety governance
implies that the multiple actors involved often diverge in how they define
the problems and their strategic intensions. The globalization of both
public and private food safety regulations has also led to new modes of
accountability: from border public control to the direct responsibility of
suppliers for safe food, enforced through inspections by retailers and third-
party certifiers (Thomann, 2018; Thomann & Sager, 2017). A core issue
is the capacity of food safety governance structures to deal with multiple
frames, adjust actions to uncertain changes, and respond to changing
agendas and expectations. Literature recently underlined the need of fur-
ther investigating the conditions under which the regulatory structures
ensure effective food safety (Scharff et al., 2009; Thomann, 2018).
Previous evidence suggests that the conditions required to effectively pro-
tect the public interest include an overlap of norms, objectives, and inter-
ests of public and private regulation; effective monitoring and enforcing
the compliance of businesses; the potential for self-evaluation; compliance
18 G. BAZZAN
with due process standards; and information management and data shar-
ing (Havinga, 2006; Thomann, 2018; Verbruggen, 2013).
This book poses the question of effectiveness of governance of food
safety regulation, and develops an explanatory model, addressing three
intertwined sets of questions that food safety governance research has left
unanswered.
First, which institutional features do affect effectiveness of governance
of food safety regulation? Building on the Institutional Analysis and
Development framework (IAD), Chap. 2 models the governance of food
safety as a configuration of institutional elements that structure informa-
tion and create incentives to act or not to act—thereby imposing con-
straints on the range of possible behaviours (Ostrom, 2009). It identifies
the agencies that carry out monitoring and enforcement activities and
exert control over the information as units of analysis of this research. In
light of regulatory governance and capacity theories, it specifies indepen-
dence, accountability, and policy capacity as the main institutional ele-
ments relevant to address the question of effectiveness of food safety
regulation across Europe. Finally, it constructs the explanatory model by
involving precise assumptions about a limited set of explanatory condi-
tions and by deriving precise expectations about the result of combining
these conditions.
My empirical approach combines systematic cross-case comparison
with within-case analysis. Drawing upon the IAD assumption about the
configurational nature of institutions, this book applies Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA), a set-theoretic methodology that models
causal complexity on the basis of three features: equifinality, asymmetric
causation, and conjunctural causation (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; Schneider
& Wagemann, 2012). In Chap. 3, I outline the research design by tackling
both ontological and methodological questions, showing how food safety
regulation is an illustrative and likely case for assessing the impact that the
institutional features of monitoring and enforcement exert over regulatory
outcomes and, thus, effectiveness of regulation. I introduce the cases and
provide a brief overview of the regulatory context and governance designs
of each.
The food safety governance designs of the EU15 Member States anal-
ysed in this book are investigated through the collection of an original
dataset inclusive of measures of independence and accountability of the
domestic food safety agencies, as well as of policy capacity and of food
safety delivered (as measure of regulatory effectiveness).
Secondly, I tackle the question of how we can conceptualize and mea-

sure effectiveness of food safety regulation. To this end, Chap. 4 introduces
a conceptualization of regulatory effectiveness in the area of food safety
and proposes an innovative operationalization of food safety delivered that
draws upon the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF). Chapter
5 discusses in detail the conceptualization and measurement of the explan-
atory conditions, presenting data collection sources and detailing the cod-
ing. The measurements draw upon European and domestic regulations,
the statutory provisions of the national agencies involved in the gover-
nance of food safety regulation, and official documents and reports. The
chapter adds to the existing empirical literature by developing an original
measure of institutional capacity in the area of food safety and in gauging
formal independence and accountability of the domestic food safety agen-
cies of the EU15 countries under scrutiny. For these latter, I draw upon the
indicators developed by Gilardi (2002, 2005, 2008) and Hanretty and
Koop (Hanretty & Koop, 2009, 2012, 2013; Koop & Hanretty, 2018).
The third core question is: are regulatory governance and capacity the-
ories competing or complementary in explaining effective regulatory
responses? The analysis performed in Chap. 6 reveals the prominent role
of the institutional dimension of policy capacity in producing regulatory
effectiveness, especially in conjunction with an integrated model of distri-
bution of the regulatory tasks. This explanation of effectiveness reveals
that institutional capacity can unfold its effect only in conjunction with
other conditions. Finally, QCA allows for asymmetric causation, which
implies that regulatory effectiveness can have a different explanation than
regulatory ineffectiveness. On this latter, results show that when institu-
tional arrangements provide the agency carrying out risk assessment with
low formal independence or low accountability, in combination with low
institutional capacity, these produce ineffective regulatory responses.
Chapter 7 draws conclusion on the effects of the institutional dimen-
sion of policy capacity on regulatory effectiveness, allowing for conjunc-
tural causation and—thus—for complementarity of policy capacity theories
with regulatory governance theories of independence and separation of
regulatory tasks.
By drawing upon the Institutional Analysis and Development frame-
work (IAD) developed by Elinor Ostrom, the book also brings insightful
contribution to the development of institutional analysis, particularly focus-
ing on the role of monitoring and enforcement activities, since that ‘regu-
larities in actions cannot occur if rules are not enforced’ (Ostrom, 2011: 20).
20 G. BAZZAN
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CHAPTER 2
Institutional Analysis of Regulatory Designs
Abstract This chapter introduces the Institutional Analysis and

Development framework (IAD), developed by Elinor Ostrom, as the main
theoretical foundation of the book. By establishing a connection between
the IAD and acknowledged regulation theories, it identifies the institu-
tional elements relevant to address the research question. By making use
of Ostrom’s conceptualization of the action-situation, it models the gov-
ernance of food safety as a configuration of institutional elements that
‘structure information and create incentives to act or not to act – thereby
imposing constraints on the range of possible behaviors’. It identifies the
institutions that carry out monitoring and enforcement activities and exert
control over the information as units of analysis of this research. In light
of regulatory governance and design theories, it specifies independence,
accountability, and the institutional dimension of policy capacity as the
main institutional elements affecting the effectiveness of food safety regu-
lation. Finally, it constructs the explanatory model by involving precise
assumptions about a limited set of explanatory conditions and by deriving
precise expectations about the result of combining these conditions.
Keywords Institutional analysis • IAD • Action-situation •

Independence • Accountability • Institutional capacity
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 31

Switzerland AG 2021
G. Bazzan, Effective Governance Designs of Food Safety Regulation
in the EU, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82793-9_2
32 G. BAZZAN
Introduction
Scholarly attention has been paid both to effectiveness of regulation and
to its failures, and a number of approaches can be adopted in explaining
how regulation develops, succeeds, or fails. Some accounts emphasize
external factors shaping regulation—such as the force of interest groups,
dominant ideas, or the nature of economy—while others emphasize
endogenous factors—such as institutional cultures. Effectiveness of regu-
lation has been explained by interest-based approaches, ideas-based
approaches, and institutional approaches (Baldwin et al., 2012). As to
these latter, institutional approaches range from those that emphasize the
importance of formal rules in shaping behaviours, to those stressing the
importance of political rules of the games, to those that regard all human
action as embedded in their social context (Baldwin et al., 2012: 53).
This study investigates differences in effectiveness of food safety regula-
tion across 15 Western European countries and explains them by differ-
ences in domestic institutional designs. The Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2005, 2011) inspired the focus
of this book: the institutional dimension of governance is the one that by
shaping individual actors’ strategies and behaviours can lead to the achieve-
ment of the desired outcome.
One of the main assumption of the IAD is that ‘regularities in actions
cannot occur if rules are not enforced’ (Ostrom, 2011: 20). A simplifying
assumption that is frequently made in analytical theories is that individuals
will take only those actions that are permitted or required. However, in
settings where a high investment is not made in monitoring the actions of
participants, considerable difference between predicted and actual behav-
iour can occur because of the lack of congruence between a model of
legitimate behaviour and the illegal actions that individuals take (Ostrom,
2011: 22). This is particularly true in the policy area of food safety, where
the spreading of new animal and human diseases, the use of harmful prod-
ucts for human and animal health, the increase of environmental pollu-
tion, and the deliberate adulteration of food products shed light on the
crucial role played by food safety regulation for the protection of public
health. Within this policy area, monitoring and enforcement of regulation
have a central stage, and the Institutional Analysis and Development con-
stitutes the theoretical framework that makes the strongest claims with
respect to the impact these activities exert over regulatory effectiveness, by
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Marchioness of Brinvilliers, the poisoner of the
seventeenth century
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Title: The Marchioness of Brinvilliers, the poisoner of the

seventeenth century
A romance of old Paris
Author: Albert Smith
Illustrator: John Leech
Release date: May 2, 2024 [eBook #73516]
Language: English
Original publication: London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1886
Credits: an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE

MARCHIONESS OF BRINVILLIERS, THE POISONER OF THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ***
THE MARCHIONESS
OF
BRINVILLIERS
THE POISONER OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
A Romance of Old Paris
By ALBERT SMITH
LONDON
RICHARD BENTLEY & SON, NEW BURLINGTON STREET
Publishers in Ordinary to Her Majesty the Queen
1886
The Escape of Lachaussée Prevented
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I.
The Mountebank of the Carrefour du Châtelet
CHAPTER II.
The Boat-Mill on the River
CHAPTER III.
The Arrest of the Physician
CHAPTER IV.
The Students of 1665
CHAPTER V.
Sainte-Croix and his Creature
CHAPTER VI.
Maître Glazer, the Apothecary, and his man, Panurge,
Discourse with the People on Poisons—The Visit of the
Marchioness
CHAPTER VII.
Louise Gauthier Falls into the Hands of Lachaussée
CHAPTER VIII.
The Catacombs of the Bièvre and their Occupants
CHAPTER IX.
The Revenge of Sainte-Croix—The Rencontre in the Bastille
CHAPTER X.
What further befel Louise in the Catacombs of the Bièvre
CHAPTER XI.
Maître Picard Prosecutes a Successful Crusade against the
Students
CHAPTER XII.
Exili Spreads the Snare for Sainte-Croix, who falls into it
CHAPTER XIII.
Gaudin Learns Strange Secrets in the Bastille
CHAPTER XIV.
The Château in the Country—The Meeting—Le Premier Pas
CHAPTER XV.
Versailles—The Rival Actresses—The Discovery
CHAPTER XVI.
The Grotto of Thetis—The Good and Evil Angels
CHAPTER XVII.
The Gascon Goes through Fire and Water to Attract
Attention—The Brother and Sister
CHAPTER XVIII.
The Rue de L’Hirondelle
CHAPTER XIX.
The Mischief still Thickens on all Sides
CHAPTER XX.
Two Great Villains
CHAPTER XXI.
The Dead-house of the Hôtel Dieu, and the Orgy at the Hôtel
de Cluny
CHAPTER XXII.
The Orgy at the Hôtel de Cluny
CHAPTER XXIII.
Sainte-Croix and Marie Encounter an Uninvited Guest
CHAPTER XXIV.
Louise Gauthier falls into Dangerous Hands
CHAPTER XXV.
Marie has Louise in her Power—The Last Carousal
CHAPTER XXVI.
Sainte-Croix Discovers the Great Secret sooner than he
expected
CHAPTER XXVII.
Matters Become very Serious for all Parties—The Discovery
and the Flight
CHAPTER XXVIII.
The Flight of Marie to Liége—Paris—The Gibbet of
Montfaucon
CHAPTER XXIX.
Philippe Avails himself of Maître Picard’s Horse for the
Marchioness
CHAPTER XXX.
The Stratagem at Mortefontaine—Senlis—The Accident
CHAPTER XXXI.
Philippe Glazer Throws Desgrais off the Scent
CHAPTER XXXII.
Offemont to Liége—An Old Acquaintance—The Sanctuary
CHAPTER XXXIII.
The End of Lachaussée
CHAPTER XXXIV.
The Game is up—The Trap—Marie Returns with Desgrais to
the Conciergerie
CHAPTER XXXV.
News for Louise Gauthier and Benoit
CHAPTER XXXVI.
The Journey—Examination of the Marchioness
CHAPTER XXXVII.
The Last Interview
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
The Water Question—Exili—The Place de Grêve
CHAPTER XXXIX.
Louise Gauthier—The Conclusion
ENDNOTES.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
WORKED FROM THE ORIGINAL ETCHINGS
By John Leech
1. The Escape of Lachaussée Prevented

2. The Physician and Mountebank
3. The Capture
4. The Students Enlightening Maître Picard
5. Sainte-Croix Upbraiding the Marchioness
6. Louise Claiming Sanctuary
7. Bras D’acier and Lachaussée Outwitted
8. Le Premier Pas
9. The Duel
10. The Good and Evil Angels
11. Sainte-Croix Surprised by Exili
12. The Death of Sainte-Croix
13. The Arrest of Exili
14. ‘Then, Madame, you are mine at last!’
15. The Marchioness going to Execution
THE MARCHIONESS OF
BRINVILLIERS
CHAPTER I.
THE MOUNTEBANK OF THE CARREFOUR DU CHÂTELET
One hundred and eighty years ago, on a sunny spring evening in the
year of grace 1665, the space of ground which extended from the
front of the Grand Châtelet in Paris to the rude wooden barrier which
then formed the only safeguard between the public road and the
river, at the northern foot of the Pont au Change, was crowded with a
joyous and attentive mass of people, who had collected from their
evening promenade to this spot, and now surrounded the temporary
platform of an itinerant charlatan, erected in front of the ancient
fortress.
Let us rest awhile on the steps of the Pont au Change, to become
acquainted with the localities; for little of its ancient appearance now
remains. The present resident at Paris, however well versed he
might be in the topography of that city, might search in vain for even
the vestiges of any part of the principal building, which rose, at the
date above spoken of, on the banks of the River Seine. The Pont au
Change still exists, but not as it then appeared. The visitor may call
to mind this picturesque structure, with its seven arches crossing to
the Marché aux Fleurs from the corner of the Quai de la Megisserie.
In 1660 it was covered with houses, in common with most of the
other bridges that spanned the Seine, with the exception of the Pont
Neuf. These were now partly in ruins, from the ravages of time, and
frequent conflagrations. Lower down the river might be seen the
vestiges of the Pont Marchand—a wooden bridge, which had been
burnt down nearly forty years before, some of whose charred and
blackened timbers still obstructed the free course of the river. It had
stood on the site of the Pont aux Meuniers—also a wooden bridge—
to which six or seven boat-mills were attached; and these, in
consequence of the flooding of the Seine, dragged the whole
structure away in the winter of 1596.
The Grand Châtelet stood at the foot of the Pont au Change; its
ground is now occupied by a square, and an elegant fountain. The
origin of the Châtelet has been lost in antiquity. It had once been a
strong fortress; and its massive round-towers still betokened its
strength. Next it was a prison, where the still increasing city rendered
its position of little value in guarding the gates; and afterwards it
became the Court of Jurisdiction pertaining to the Provost of Paris.
Part of its structure was now in ruins; wild foliage grew along the
summits of its outer walls, and small buildings had been run up
between the buttresses, occupied by retailers of wine and small
merchandise. It was a great place of resort at all times; for a dark
and noisome passage, which ran through it, was the only
thoroughfare from the Pont au Change to the Rue St. Denis, and this
was constantly crowded with foot-passengers.
The afternoon sunlight fell upon the many turrets and spires, and
quivered on the vanes and casements of the fine old buildings that
then surrounded the carrefour. Across the river the minarets of the
Palais de Justice rose in sharp outline against the blue sky, glowing
in the ruddy tint; together with the campanile at the corner of the
quay, and the blackened towers of Notre Dame, farther in the Ile de
la Cité, round which flocks of birds were wheeling in the clear spring
air, who had their dwellings amidst the corbels, spouts, and belfries
of the cathedral. There was not an old gray gable or corroded spire
which, steeped in the rays of the setting sun, did not blush into light
and warmth. And the mild season had drawn all the inhabitants of
the houses who were not abroad to their windows, whence they
gazed upon the gay crowd below, through pleasant trellises of
climbing vegetation, which crept along the pieces of twine latticing
the casements. Humble things, indeed, the plants were,—hops,
common beans, wild convolvuli, and the like, spreading from a rude
cruche of mould upon the sill; but the beams of the sun came
through them cheerfully; and their shadows danced and trembled on
the rude tiled floor as sportively as on the costly inlaid parquets of
the richer quarters of the city.
The Carrefour du Châtelet was at this period, with the Pont Neuf,
the principal resort of the people of Paris, then, as now, ever
addicted to the promenade and out-of-door lounging. A singularly
varied panorama did the open place present to any one standing at
the cross which was reared in the centre, and gazing around him. He
might have seen a duel taking place between two young gallants on
the footpath, in open contest. Swords were then as quickly drawn
forth as tempers; no appointments were made for the seclusion of
the faubourgs beyond the walls which occupied the site of the
present boulevards; and these quarrels often ended fatally, though
merely fought for the possession of some courtesan who, in common
with others, blazed forth in her sumptuous trappings on the bridges
during the afternoon. But the guards never interfered, and the
passengers looked on unconcernedly until the struggle was, one way
or the other, decided.
The beggars were as numerous then as now, perhaps more so; for
the various Cours des Miracles, the ‘Rookeries’ of Paris, if we may
be allowed the expression, which abounded all over the city, offered
them a ready colony and retreat. Here were counterfeiters of every
disease to which humanity is liable, dragging themselves along the
rude footpath; there, beggars of more active habits, who swarmed,
cap in hand, by the side of the splendid carriages which passed
along the quays, to and from the Louvre. The thieves, too,
everywhere plied their vocation; and the absurd custom of carrying
the purse suspended at the girdle, favoured their delinquencies;
whence certain of them acquired the title of coupe-bourse, as in
England the pick-pockets were formerly termed cut-purses.
Crowds of soldiers, vendors of street merchandise, and charlatans
of every description filled the carrefour. Looking to the tableau
offered by the public resorts of Paris at the present time, the Champs
Elysées for instance (in 1665, consisting only of fields, literally in
cultivation), it is curious to observe how little the principal features of
the assembly have altered from the accounts left us by accurate and
careful delineators of former manners.
But, besides all these, the mere idlers, of both sexes, were
numerous and remarkable; an ever-changing throng of gay habits,
glittering accoutrements, and attractive figures and faces. The
license of the age, unbounded in its extent, permitted appointments
of every kind to be made without notice. Every kind of dissipation
was openly practised, and therefore the world winked at it, as under
such circumstances it always does, even if the place of an illicit
assignation or conference (and in the reign of Louis XIV. they were
seldom otherwise) were a church, as indeed was most frequently the
case. The generally licentious taste extended to the dress and
conversation; hence, from the crowds of gallants who thronged the
carrefour, salutations and remarks of strange freedom were
constantly addressed to the handsome women who, in the
prodigality of their display of dazzling busts and shoulders, invited
satire or compliments; nay, to such a pitch was that negligee attire
carried, that some might be seen walking abroad in loose damask
robes merely confined at the waist by a cord of twisted silk.
The platform round which the laughing crowd had assembled was
formed on a light cart that had its wheels covered with some coarse
drapery. There were two occupants of this stage. One of them was a
man who might have numbered some forty years; but his thin
furrowed cheeks and sunken eye would have added another score
to his age, in the opinion of a casual observer. He was dressed
entirely in faded black serge, made after the fashion of the time, with
full arms, and trunks fastened just above the knee. Some bands of
vandyked lace were fastened round his wrists; and he wore a collar
of the same material, whilst his doublet was looped together but a
little way down his waist. A skull-cap of black velvet completed his
attire.
Yet few who looked at him took much notice of his dress: the
features of this man absorbed all attention. His face exactly
resembled that of a condor, his cap adding to the likeness by being
worn somewhat forward; from beneath which his long black hair fell
perfectly straight down the back of his neck. His brows were
scowling: his eyes deep-set and jet-black: but they were bloodshot,
and surrounded by the crimson ridges of the lids. His cheeks were
pallid as those of a corpse; and his general figure, naturally tall, was
increased in appearance of height by his attenuated limbs. He took
little notice of the crowd, but remained sitting at a small table on the
carriage, upon which there was a small show of chemical glasses
and preparations: leaving nearly all the business of his commerce to
his assistant.
This was a merry fellow, plump, and well-favoured, in the prime of
life. He was habited in a party-fashioned costume of black and white,
his opposite arms and legs being of different colours; and his doublet
quartered in the same style. Round his waist he carried a pointed
girdle, to which small hawk-bells were attached; and he wore the red
hood of the moyen âge period, fitting closely to his neck and head,
and hanging down at the top, to the extremity of which a larger bell
was fastened His face had such a comic expression, that he only
had to wink at the crowd to command their laughter. And when to
this he added his jests, he threw them into paroxysms of merriment.
‘Ohé! ohé! my masters!’ he cried, ‘the first physician of the
universe, and many other places, has come again to confer his
blessings on you. He has philtres for those who have not had
enough of love, and potions for those who have had too much. He
can attach to you a new mistress when she gets coy, or get rid of an
old one when she gets troublesome. And if you have two at once,
here is an elixir that will kill their jealousies.’
‘Send some to Louis!’ cried one of the bystanders.
A roar of laughter followed the speech, and the crowd looked
round to see the speaker. But, although bold enough to utter the
recommendation, he had not the courage to support it. However, the
cue had been given to the crowd, and the applause and laugh of
approbation continued.
‘Give it to La Vallière!’ exclaimed another of the citizens.
‘Or Madame de Montespan,’ cried a third.
‘Or, rather, to her husband!’ was ejaculated in a woman’s voice.
‘Respect his parents,’ exclaimed a bourgeois, with mock
solemnity, who was standing at the foot of the bridge, and pointing to
a group of three figures in bronze relief, which adorned a triangular
group of houses close to where he was stationed. They were those
of Louis XIII., Anne of Austria, and the present King when a child.
‘Simon Guillain, the sculptor, was a false workman!’ shouted the
bystander who had first spoken. ‘Where is the fourth of the family?’
The mountebank, who had been endeavouring to talk through the
noise, found himself completely outclamoured by the uproar that now
arose. He gave up making himself heard, and remained silent whilst
the crowd launched their sallies, or bandied their satirical jibes from
one to the other.
‘Where is the fourth?’ continued the speaker.
‘Ask Dame Perronette, who nursed him!’ was the reply from the
other side of the carrefour.
‘Ask Saint-Mars who locked on his iron mask.’
‘Who will knock and ask at Mazarin’s coffin!’ shouted another, with
a strength of lungs that ensured a hearing. ‘He ought to know best.’
The name of Anne of Austria was on the lips of many; but, with all
the license of the time, they dared not give utterance to it. And,
besides, as the last speaker finished, a yell broke forth that drowned
every other sound; and showed by its force, which partook almost of
ferocity, in what manner the memory of the Cardinal was yet held.
The instant comparative silence was obtained a fellow sung, from a
popular satire upon the late prime minister—
‘He trick’d the vengeance of the Fronde,—

All in the world, and those beyond.
A bas! à bas le Cardinal!
He trick’d the headsman by his death—
The devil, by his latest breath,
Who for his perjured soul did call,
But found that he had none at all,
A bas! à bas le Cardinal!’
The throng chorused the last words with great emphasis; and then
in a few minutes were once more tranquil. The charged cloud had
got rid of its thunder, and the storm abated.
The physician, who was upon the platform, took little notice of the
clamour. At its commencement, he glared round upon the assembly
for a few seconds, and then once more bent his eyes upon the table
before him. His assistant continued, as soon as he could make
himself audible—
‘Ohé! masters! a philtre for your eyes that will make them work
upon others at a distance. Here is one that will infect the spirit of the
other with sickness at heart; here is a second that will instil love also
by the glance of the eye that is washed with it.’
They were little phials containing a small quantity of coloured fluid.
The price was small, and they were eagerly purchased by the
multitude. But for every one of the second, they purchased a dozen
of the first.
‘Art thou sure of its operation?’ asked a looker-on.
‘Glances of love and malice shoot subtly,’ replied the fool; ‘and my
master can draw subtle spirits from simple things that shall work
upon each other at some distance. But your own spirits, with the aid
of this philtre, are more subtle than they.’
‘A proof! a proof!’ cried a young man at the extremity of the
carrefour.
‘The philtre is not for such as you,’ cried the mountebank. ‘You
have youth, and a well-favoured aspect; you have a strong arm, a
gay coat, and a trusty rapier. What would man require more?’
The crowd turned to look at the object of the clown’s speech. At
the end of the carrefour, two young men were gazing, arm-in-arm,
upon the assemblage. Both were of the same age; their existence
might have reached to some seven or eight-and-twenty years, and
they were attired in the gay military costume of the period; with rich
satin under-sleeves, and bright knots or epaulettes upon the right
shoulder.
One of them, to whom the mountebank had more particularly
addressed himself, was of a fair complexion, and wore his own light
hair in long flowing curls upon his shoulders. His face was well
formed, and singularly intelligent and expressive; his forehead high
and expansive, and his eyes deep set beneath the arch of the orbit,
ever bearing the appearance of fixed regard upon whatever object
they were cast. Still to the close observer there was a faint line
running from the edge of the nostril to the outer angle of the lip,
which, coupled with his retreating eye, gave him an expression of
satire and mistrust. But so varied was the general expression of his
face, that it was next to impossible to divine his thoughts for two
minutes together.
The other was dark—his face had less indication of intellect than
his companion’s, although in general contour equally good-looking.
Yet did the features bear a somewhat jaded expression, and the
colour on his cheek was rather fevered than healthy. His eyes too
were sunk, but more from active causes than natural formation; and
he gazed on the objects that surrounded him with the listless air of
an idler. His mind was evidently but little occupied with anything he
then saw. His attire was somewhat richer than his friend’s,
betokening a superior rank in the army.
‘A proof! a proof!’ cried the gayer of the two, repeating his words.
‘Where will you have it then?’ asked the mountebank, looking
about the square. ‘Ha! there is as fair a maiden as ever a king’s
officer might follow, sitting at the cross. Shall she be in love with
you?’
Again the attention of the crowd was directed by the glance of the
mountebank towards a rude iron cross that was set up in the
carrefour.
At its foot was a young girl, half sitting, half reclining upon the
stone-work which formed its base. She was attired in the costume of
the working order of Paris. Her hair, different from that of the higher
class of females, who wore it in light bunches of ringlets at the side
of the head, was in plain bands, over which a white handkerchief,
edged with lace, was carelessly thrown, falling in lappets on each
side. Her eyes and hair were alike dark as night, but her beautiful
face was deadly pale, until she found the gaze of the mob had been
called towards her. And then the red blood rushed to her neck and
cheeks, as she hastily rose from her seat, and was about to leave
the square.
‘A pretty wench enough,’ cried the cavalier with the black hair, as
he raised himself upon the step of a house to see her. She was still
hidden from his companion.
‘I doubt not,’ answered the other carelessly; ‘but I do not care to
look. No,’ he cried loudly to the mountebank, ‘I have no love to spare
her in return, and that might break her heart.’
The girl started at his voice, and looked towards the spot from
whence it proceeded. But she was unable to see him, for the
intervening people.
‘A beryl!’ cried the fool, showing a small crystal of a reddish tint to
the crowd. ‘A beryl! to tell your fortune then. Who will read the vision
in it? a young maiden, pure and without guile, can alone do it; are
there none in our good city of Paris?’
None stepped forward. The fair-haired cavalier laughed aloud as
he cried out:
‘You seem to have told what is past better than you can predict
what is to come. Ho! sirs, what say you to this slur upon the fair fame
of your daughters and sisters—will none of them venture?’
A murmur was arising from the crowd, when the physician, who
had been glancing angrily at the two young officers, suddenly rose
up, and shouted with a foreign accent—
‘If you will have your destinies unfolded, there needs no beryl to
picture them. Let me look at your hands, and I will tell you all.’
‘A match!’ cried the young soldier. ‘Now, good people, let us pass,
and see what this solemn-visaged doctor knows about us.’
The two officers advanced towards the platform. As they
approached it, the crowd fell back, and then immediately closed after
them with eager curiosity. The friends stood now directly beside the
waggon.
‘Your hands!’ said the physician.
They were immediately extended to him.
‘You are in the king’s service,’ continued he.
‘Our dresses would tell you that,’ said the darker of the two.
‘But they would not tell me that you are married,’ answered the
physician. ‘You have two children—a fair wife—and no friend.’
‘’Tis a lie!’ exclaimed the cavalier with the light hair.

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Effective Governance Designs of Food

Safety Regulation in the EU: Do Rules

European Union External Environmental Policy: Rules,

The EU Migration System of Governance: Justice on the

EU Law Beyond EU Borders: The Extraterritorial Reach of

The Birth Of Digital Human Rights: Digitized Data

Present Knowledge in Food Safety : A Risk-Based

Air Traffic Management: Economics, Regulation and

Nanotechnology Applications in Food: Flavor, Stability,

Digitalisation, Sustainability, and the Banking and

ISBN 978-3-030-82792-2 ISBN 978-3-030-82793-9 (eBook)

This book is the result of a challenging and inspiring three-year research

Copenhagen, Denmark Giulia Bazzan

1 Regulatory Governance, Policy Capacity, and Effectiveness

2 Institutional Analysis of Regulatory Designs 31

3 The Research Design: Ontological and Methodological

4 Gauging the Effectiveness of Food Safety Regulation 79

5 Gauging Differences in National Governance Designs 95

6 Effective Governance of Food Safety Regulation113

Sufficient Conditions for Effective Governance of Food Safety

7 The Conjunction of Capacity and Quality of Regulatory

Giulia Bazzan is a political scientist who specializes in public policy. She

ACCRA Accountability of Risk Assessment

IGT Institutional Grammar Tool

Fig. 2.1 Levels of decision-making and outcomes of food safety action-

Table 2.1 The explanatory conditions 46

Regulatory Governance, Policy Capacity,

Abstract This chapter introduces the question of effective governance

Keywords Regulatory governance • Policy capacity • Regulatory

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) disease—trying to feed his

visible, there has been a concomitant increase in the expectations towards

Understanding Regulation and Its Governance

monitoring and enforcement of these rules by social, business, and politi-

prescriptive rules (command) on one hand and monitoring and enforce-

Quality of Regulatory Designs

need for regulators to be accountable as well as independent (Busuioc,

possible to distinguish between the American discourse—mostly focused

Regulatory Effectiveness and Regulatory Failure

extent to which the EU has the capacity of taking political decisions in a

environment and set strategic directions (Howlett & Lindquist, 2004), to

Risk Regulation and Its Governance

also said to live in regulatory state (Majone, 1994). According to Hood

specialization—from risk-specific expertise to general-purpose administra-

Secondly, I tackle the question of how we can conceptualize and mea-

Busuioc, M. (2009). Accountability, control and independence: The case of

Hancher, L., & Moran, M. (1989). Introduction: Regulation and deregulation.

Jordan, G., Maloney, W. A., & McLaughlin, A. M. (1994). Characterizing agricul-

Lofstedt, R. E., & Vogel, D. (2001). The changing character of regulation: A

O’Connell, L. (2005). Program accountability as an emergent property: The role

Termeer, C. J. A. M., & Dewulf, A. (2019). A small wins framework to overcome

Institutional Analysis of Regulatory Designs

Abstract This chapter introduces the Institutional Analysis and

Keywords Institutional analysis • IAD • Action-situation •

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 31

Title: The Marchioness of Brinvilliers, the poisoner of the

Author: Albert Smith

Illustrator: John Leech

Release date: May 2, 2024 [eBook #73516]

Original publication: London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1886

Credits: an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE

A Romance of Old Paris

1. The Escape of Lachaussée Prevented

Copenhagen, Denmark Giulia Bazzan

1 Regulatory Governance, Policy Capacity, and Effectiveness

2 Institutional Analysis of Regulatory Designs 31

3 The Research Design: Ontological and Methodological

4 Gauging the Effectiveness of Food Safety Regulation 79

5 Gauging Differences in National Governance Designs 95

6 Effective Governance of Food Safety Regulation113

7 The Conjunction of Capacity and Quality of Regulatory

Table 2.1 The explanatory conditions 46