Mind Association

A Definition of Abstract Systems

Author(s): Paul Henle
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 44, No. 175 (Jul., 1935), pp. 341-346
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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 IV. DISCUSSIONS.
A DEFINITION OF ABSTRACT SYSTEMS.'
THIS paper is concernedonly with abstract systems. That is to say,
it is concernedwith systemsin which the postulates and theorems
are schematic, not constitutingpropositions,but being merelythe
formsor,if one will,the skeletonsof propositions. A simpleexample
of such an abstractionis foundin the postulates forserial order,the
connexityand transitivity.2 In these
postulates of irreflexiveness,
postulates there is no explanation of what actually is the 'relation
involved,or what kind of elementsit relates; indeed,it is possibleto
point out many concreteinterpretationsof these postulates,dealing
with a variety of relations and diverse groups of elements. The
collection of positive integers,ordered by the relation " is greater
than," and any group of lineal descendants orderedby the relation
"is an ancestorof," are familiarexamples of such systemssatisfying
the postulates of serial order. But the postulates themselvesare
not concernedwith eitherof these relations,theyhave to do withthe
formcommonto them.
One of the mostimportantproblemsarisingin connectionwith
abstract systems,is the question of provingconsistency. When one
has assembled a group of abstract postulates, how shall he be sure
that it does not contain implicit contradictionssuch that contra-
dictorytheoremsmay be deduced ? From an aestheticpoint of view,
perhaps, a system which leads to contradictionsmay be just as
satisfactoryas one which is consistent,but it is generallyheld that
reality must be consistent,so that an inconsistentabstract system
can never be exemplifiedin the real world and is foreverdoomed to
remain a bare skeleton. From a utilitarian standpoint, therefore,
consistentsystemsare to be preferred.
This feelingthat realitymust be consistent,has givenrise to one of
the most commonlydiscussed modes of provingconsistency-that of
findingexamplesofconcreteindividualsand relationswhichexemplify
the postulates.3 The argumentunderlyingthis method of proving
and sincea part
is as follows: Sincerealityis consistent
consistency
of it has the formdescribedin the abstract system,that formitself
must be consistent. Thus the abstract' postulates for serial order
may be shown to be consistent by consideringa group of three
1PresentedbeforeThe EasternDivision'of the AmericanPhilosophical
Associationon 27thDecember,1934,and revised.
2 Cf.E. V. Huntington,
TheContinuum, p. 10.
Logic,p. 474n.; Lewisand Langford,
3Cf. R. M. Eaton,General Symbolic
Logic,p. 346 ff.

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842 PAUL HENLE:

instantsof time,say nine,ten and eleven o'clock this morning,

together withthe relation," is earlierthan". Here nineo'clockis
earlierthanteno'clock,nineo'clockis earlierthaneleven,and tenis
earlierthaneleven-in thesecases therelationholds,in all othersit
fails. All thepostulatesare satisfiedby thisexample,and the con-
sistencyofthepostulatesmaybe provedin thismanner.
Thisexampleis a sufficientproofofconsistency, butit is notneces-
saryto theproof. Anythreetimeswouldhave donejust as well,as
wouldsomeexampleswhichhave nothingto do withtime,say a
dollarbill,a two dollarbill and a fivedollarbill,considered in con-
nectionwiththe relation" is morevaluablethan". Here the five
dollarbillis morevaluablethanthetwo,thefivedollarbillis more
valuablethantheone,and thetwodollarbillis morevaluablethan
theone. In all othercasestherelationfails. Similarly manyother
examplesmightbe used.
Whenwe cometo inquireas to thecommoncharacter ofall these
examples,we findstrikingdiversityin the elementsand relations
withwhichtheyare concerned, butidentityas to form. In thecase
ofeveryexampleofthreeelementsusedto satisfythepostulatesfor
serialorder,the relation-whatever it may be-holds betweenone
elementand each ofthe others,takenin thatorderand, amongthe
lattertwo elements,the relationholdsbetweenone and the other.
In all othercases the relationfails. This,then,is the patternor
schemaofall theexamplesofthreeelements satisfyingthepostulates.
Whenwe considerthispattern,or schema,forits ownsake,how-
ever,whatwe are dealingwithis notany concreteexample,but an
abstractexample,in just thesamesensein whichpostulatesmaybe
abstract. It is a formof examples,capable of beingconsidered by
itself,apartfromanyconsideration as to whether ornotit is actually
exemplified in therealworld.
Whenwe cometo examineactual proofsof consistency as they
are mostoftengivenin postulatetheory,we find,moreover, that
theyemploynot concreteexamples,but abstractexamples.1 Con-
sistencyis assumedto have been provednot by reference to any
groupofactuallyexistingentitiesand relations, but by meansofan
abstractcounterpart of these. Thus the principleof provingcon-
sistencyby meansof exemplification is givenup, and theproblems
arise: Whatare therelations betweenthesetwosortsofabstractions
abstractpostulatesand abstractexamples? and, second: If the
consistency of postulatesets requiresproof,is not similarproof
requiredin the case of examples?
The secondquestion,as to theconsistency-of abstractexamples,is
easilyanswered. Fromtheirveryformit is apparentthatexamples
mustbe consistent.The abstractexample,we have seen,specifies
thattherelationholdsin thecase ofcertainpermutations ofelements
1 See, forexample,E. V. Huntington," A new set of postulatesforbe-
tweenness Trans.Amer.Math.Soc.,
withproofof completeindependence,"
vol. 26 (1934),pp. 257-282.

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 A DEFINITION OF ABSTRACT SYSTEMS. 343

and failsin others. Thus the schematicexampleof thoseelements

satisfyingthepostulatesforserialordermaymosteasilybe statedby
assigningpropernames,say " 1," " 2," and " 3," to the elements.
The examplemay thenbe formulated in the following terms: The
relationholdsin the case of the orderedcouples12, 13 and 23. It
failsforthe couples11, 21, 22, 31, 32, 33. Sincethereis onlyone
statement abouteach permutation of elementsno chanceforincon-
sistencyarises; and an exampleis necessarily consistent, just as is a
groupof singularpropositions providedno two of themhave the
same subjectmatter. Therecan be no question,then,as to the
consistency ofabstractexamples.
This accountof an abstractexampleas dealingwitha groupof
elements, withtheholdingor failingspecified foreach permutation,
opensup interesting possibilities.If we knowthe numberof ele-
mentsinvolvedand thedegreeoftherelation,we can determine all
the exampleswhichcan possiblybe constructed.Thus, given a
singleelementin theexampleand a dyadicrelation, therecan be two
and onlytwoexamples,theone in whichthe relationholdsand the
one in whichthe relationfails. Withtwo elementsaud a dyadic
r,elationtherearefourpermutations ofelements takentwoat a time;
and therewillbe sixteenpossibleexamples,varying fromthecase in
whichthe relationholdsforeach permutation, to the case in which
the relationfailsforeach permutation.These are all the possible
examplesfor two elementsand a single dyadic relation. When
dealingwithcardinalities of two or greater,some of the examples
willbefoundtohaveidenticalproperties; butthesecanbe determined
in termsofthenatureofthepermutations ofelements, and duplicate
examplesmaybe eliminated fromthelist.1
In a similarmanner,all theexamplesconsisting ofthree,four,and
n elementsand a singledyadic relation,may be conceived,and
duplicateseliminated. Similarly, thisprocedure maybe extendedto
transfinitecasesandwemayimaginesetoutbefore us all theexamples,
ofwhatever cardinality,
involving a singledyadicrelation. We may
referto thisaggregateas thefieldofa singledyadicrelation. In an
analogousfashion,we mightspeak of fieldsof triadic,tetradic,one
dyadicand one triadic,two dyadicrelations, etc.
1 To givean instance,theexampleofthreeelements in whichtherelation
holdsforthecouples13,21 and 23 and failsforthe couples11, 12,22, 31,
32, 33 has identicalpropertieswiththeexamplequotedabove. The only
difference betweenthe two is that the elementnamed " 1 " in the first
examplehas beennamed" 2 " in the secondand viceversa. This maybe
seen by interchanging the names" 1 " and " 2 " in the secondexample:
then the two exampleswill be seen to be identical. Since the names
assignedto elementsareirrelevant forconsistencyproofs,thetwoexamples
have the same properties. In general,two exampleswill have the same
propertieswhenand onlywhenany systematicinterchange of names of
elementsin oneyieldsa statement identicalwiththestatement oftheother.
In such cases, the two statementswill be taken as different means of
designating the sameexample.

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 844 PAUt HENLE!

By meansofthisconception ofa field,it is possibleto treatabstract

systems in extension in a mannerstrictly analogousto thetreatment
ofclasses. An abstractsystemmaybe defined as a classofexamples
belonging to the same field. In thistreatment an examplecorres-
pondsto an individual,the fieldof examplesto theuniverseof dis-
course,an abstractsystemto a class,a theoremof the systemto a
oftheclass,and theset ofpostulatesforthesystemto
characteristic
thedefining characteristic ofa class.
Since an abstractsystemis ordinarily conceivedas a groupof
postulatesand theorems, it mustbe shownfirstofall thattheabove
viewgivessomeplace to postulates. According to the view of an
abstractsystemas a class of examples,postulatesare the defining
characteristicof the class, and the problemis to shQwthat it is
possibleto formulate a set of postulates,i.e., give a defining char-
acteristic,
in thecase of everysystem. Thisproblem is analogousto
theproblemof finding an intension foranyclassdefined in extension.
In thecase ofa singleexampleoffinitenumber-of elements, there
is no difficulty
in finding a postulatewhichis satisfied bytheexample
and by no otherexampleof the field. All that is requiredis the
substitutionof apparentvariablesfor the singularpropositional
functionsof the exampleand the specification of the numberof
elements.1Withany finitenumberofsuchexamples,a disjunction
ofthepostulatesforeach examplewillconstitute a postulatesatisfied
bythatsystemand thatsystemonly. In thecase ofexamplescon-
tainingan infinity of elements, or a systemcontaining an infinityof
examples, thecaseis moredifficult.Herepostulates ofinfinite length
wouldseemto be required, and postulateswhichbeginat oneendof
a blackboardand go on foreverare the stuffof whichlogicians'
nightmares are made.
This difficultyof postulatesof infinite length,is, however,more
apparentthanreal)sinceeveryexamplein whichanyonewouldbe
interestedcan be describedby postulatesof finitelength. The
reasonforthisliesin theobviousfactthat,in an infinite example,the
holdingsor failingsof the relationforeach permutation of elements
cannotbe enumerated.The examplemustbe givenin someother
way; generally by postulateswhichit alone satisfiesor by rulesof
construction fromwhichpostulatesmay be derived. Thereis an
analogueto thissituationin thecase ofclasses. If Zermelo'saxiom
be granted, thereare someclasseswhosedefining characteristic must
be of infinitelength,but no one is interested in these,and all the
classes withwhichone wishesto deal are describablein a finite
numberof words. Similarly,thoughthe rule forformulation of
postulatessuggestedabove may requireinfinite postulatesin some
cases,theseare notpostulatesby meansof whichone willbe called
uponto deducetheorems.
1 Thus the postulateuniquelysatisfiedby the three-element
example
given above is:
(abc) .. a $ b. b $ c. a t c: Rab. Rac. Rbc. ,Raa.t Rba.
-RWb.E Rca. Rcc: (d). d = a. v. d = b. v. d = c

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 A DEFINITION OF ABSTRACT SYSTEMS. 345

The definition of an abstractsystemas a class of examples,then,

givesa placeto postulatesby showingthatforeverysystemthereis
a set of laws satisfiedby that systemand that systemalone. It
remainsto showthat theoremsare possible,that is, to showthat
systemsas heredefinedare deductive. To do this,it is necessary to
show that all the laws of a systemare deduciblefromthe laws
satisfiedby thatsystemand thatsystemalone.
At this pointit is necessaryto introducean hypothesiswhich
seemsplausible,but forwhichthereseemsto be no proof. The
hypothesis is as follows: If any law ofan abstractsystem-andby
law is meanteithera postulateor a theoremor a groupofthese-is
consistent,it is a law ofsomeexampleofits field.
While no formalproofof this hypothesisseems possible,the
following considerations mayserveto makeit plausible. Everylaw
imposesa requirement on someor all ofa groupofelements. Thus
thepostulateofreflexiveness requiresthatin thecase ofany element
of a groupobeyingthe postulate,the relationholds betweenthat
elementand itself. Now if the requirement made by a postulateis
a possiblerequirement, thereoughtto be someconceivablegroupof
elementswhichobeyit. But thefieldofa relationcontainsall con-
ceivablegroupsof elementshavingto do withthat relation. And
sincea possiblerequirement wouldappearto be the same thingas
one whichis self-consistent, this may justifythe assumptionthat
everyconsistent law is a law ofsomeabstractexample.
Suppose,then,P be any consistentset of postulateswhichis
satisfiedbyall theexamplesofa systemand byno others. Suppose,
furthermore, thereis somelaw ofthesystemQ whichis notsatisfied
by all examplesof the field. To provethatQ is deduciblefromP.
A simplereductio ad absurdum fortheproof. SupposeQ
is sufficient
is not deduciblefromP, thenP mustbe consistent withnot-Qand
so " P and not-Q" must be self-consistent.By the previous
hypothesisthere must be an example satisfying" P and not-Q ".
This example, since it satisfiesnot-Q cannot satisfyQ, and since Q
was given as a law of the system,the example which does not satisfy
it cannot belong to the system. But the example which satisfies
" P and not-Q " must also satisfyP, and P was given as a set of
postulates satisfied only by examples of the system. Hence this
exaamplemust belong to the system. Thus the same example does
and does not belong to the system,and this absurdityis sufficient
ground forrejectionof the suppositionthat Q is not deducible from
P. Hence any law of the systemis deduciblefromthe postulates,and
the deductive characterof abstract systemsis established.'
1 A completeformulationof the concept" deducibility" is beyondthe
scopeofthepresentpaper. The above theoremhas beenstated,therefore,
onlyforthecases in whichP is not an impossiblepostulateand Q is not a
tautologoustheorem,to avoid disputesas to whetheran impossibilityim-
plies anythingand anythingimpliesa tautology. Whetheror not the
theoremholdsin the remainingcases is not a matterof greatimportance.

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346 PAUL HENLE: A DEFINITION OF ABSTRACT SYSTEMS.

Havingshownthatthedefinition ofan abstractsystemas a class

of examplesis in accordwithordinary usageconcerning the deduc-
tive characterof systems,it remainsto enumeratebrieflya few
advantagesofthisdefinition.
(1) Consistency proofsmay be justifiedon the principlethat
abstractexamplesare necessarilyconsistent, and that, therefore,
a systemsatisfied byan example,is a classofexamplescontaining at
least one consistently definedmember. Hence its definingchar-
acteristic,i.e., its set of postulates,mustbe consistent.It is thus
possibleto explainconsistency proofswithoutrecourseto concrete
exemplification, and so to justifymethodscommonlyemployedin
postulatetheory.
(2) Independence proofs,involving as theydo a proofofconsistency,
maybe explainedsimilarly.
(3) System'smay be geneticallydefined,by givingrulesforthe
construction of the examplesof a systemratherthan by stating
theircharacteristics.That suchprocedure is possibleis of coursea
fact,butit seemsdifficult to justifythispossibility on anyotherview
ofabstractsystems.
(4) A set of postulatesis commonly held to be completeor cate-
goricalwhenat least one of everypair of contradictory laws con-
cernedwiththe same variablesas the postulatesis deduciblefrom
them.' In termsof the suggesteddefinition of abstractsystems,
thisreducesto therequirement thatthesystemcontainat mostone
example.2 Thuscompleteness maybe accountedforin termsofthe
definition,and a modeof establishing completeness, howeverdifficult
of application,is suggested. More important,it is possible to
accountforone interesting formof partialcompleteness-thatin
whichthe systemis completeexceptfor the specification of the
numberof elementsit contains. This reducesto the requirement
thatit containat mostone exampleofany givencardinality.
1 Cf.Lewisand Langford, Logic,p. 351.
Symbolic
2 For everyexample,it has been shown,thereis some law whichis
satisfiedby it alone. Supposethena set ofpostulatesdefininga systemof
at least two examplesand let a and b be two of these. Let A be thelaw
satisfieduniquelyby a. Then - A is satisfiedby b. NeitherA nor A
can be deduciblefromtheset ofpostulates,forifA werededucible,b could
not belongto the system,and if A werededuciblea could not belong.
Hence no systemof morethanone examplecan be complete.
That everysystemof a singleexampleis completedependson the fact
thatan examplesatisfiesone ofeverypairofcontradictory laws,just as an
individualis a memberofone ofeverypair ofcomplementary classes.
PAUL -HENLE.

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