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Fantasy
Fantasy
How It Works
B R I A N ATT E B E RY
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Acknowledgments
Works Cited
Index
Introduction
Speaking of Fantasy
Fantasy is the lie that speaks truth. The lying part is easy to point to:
dragons, spells, places that never were. The question of how fantasy
tells truth is a little trickier, and more interesting. I will suggest three
ways. First, it can be mythically true: true to the traditional beliefs
and narratives through which people have long understood the world
and ourselves. Mythic stories not only delineate the universe but also
authorize social structures like clans, classes, and gender roles as
well as rites and religious obligations. They are tremendously
important whether we believe in them or not, but they often come
packaged in ways that signify the past rather than the present or the
future. They reside in books, covered in footnotes and dust, rather
than emerging from living performance: dance, ritual theater,
painting in sand or mud, stories recounted by elders. In Stories
about Stories (2014), I argued that fantasy is one of the main
techniques for reimagining our relationships with traditional myth—
for instance, trying to move a mythic idea out of what Raymond
Williams calls residual culture and into dominant or emergent culture
(Williams 1977, 122).
A second way fantasy can be true is metaphorically. A dragon
might not be a dragon but a human tyrant, or a desire to talk with
animals, or an uncontrollable force of nature like a tidal wave or a
volcano. Or all of those things at once, since a single text can
support more than one analogical reading. This is the kind of reading
that can look like allegory, but Tolkien warns us against equating the
two. Allegories set up a one-to-one correspondence between, say, a
historical event and a fantastic quest, and they are essentially closed
systems. But metaphors, according to George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson in Metaphors We Live By (1980), are ways of using one
entire realm of experience to puzzle out another, as when we
compare love to a battleground. They are open-ended: limited only
by our familiarity with what Lakoff and Johnson call the source
domain and our ability to imagine the target domain. Most
importantly, metaphors carry us across the gap between the known
and the unknown. Metaphor is a mode of thought, a way to
comprehend new experiences in terms of older ones without
claiming identity between them—even though the classic verbal
formula for a metaphor looks like a statement of identity: my love is
a rose, your boss is a pig, the day is on fire. All those metaphors
depend not only on our recognition of the aptness of the comparison
but also on the incompleteness of the equation: on the “not really”
implied in the “is.” If I actually fell in love with a flower or you truly
worked for a barnyard animal, there would be no shock of discovery.
Many of the core functions in fantasy—which is to say, the
magical operations—can be read as literalized metaphors. George
MacDonald, whose comments on fantasy and truth are quoted at the
top of this chapter, understood this very well. His most transparent
example is the tale “The Light Princess” (1864), in which the title
character lacks gravity, both literally and figuratively. The metaphor
is deftly sustained from the early scene in which the infant princess
is inadequately secured to her crib and nearly floats out the window
to the resolution in which love and sorrow finally anchor her to the
earth. Lightness and weight, levity and gravity, restriction and
freedom are running themes throughout, as MacDonald reminds us
that the linkage is already there in our language but that we forget
to imagine it concretely. He gives us back the living metaphor and at
the same time reminds us that the claim “Love is Gravity” is as
untrue as it is true, even according to the ground rules of his
fantastic tale. To literalize a metaphor is not to collapse it into a
tautology.
Many metaphors, and especially the ones we find in tales like
MacDonald’s, come from folk tradition, as myths do. Traditional
riddles are based on unexpected metaphoric linkages: an egg is a
box with a golden secret inside, silence is the thing that can be
broken just by saying its name. Because such riddling is rare in
contemporary culture, we are less adept at thinking metaphorically
than our ancestors were. Folklorist Barre Toelken makes a strong
case for the sophisticated metaphoric cognition recorded within
traditional ballads such as “One Morning in May.” Traditional singers
and their audiences didn’t need scholars to tell them that a fiddle
and bow might stand for body parts, or that one could talk about
sex in terms of making hay or plucking cherries. As Toelken says of a
ballad in which a fiddle is smuggled out of Italy hidden in the
fiddler’s pants,
The flap of the pants does indeed conceal something, but it is perfectly clear
to everyone just what is being concealed. The concealment itself is not a
secret, nor is it a euphemism. It is a culturally meaningful way of playing
with what everyone knows is there. (19)
For the sound of his bell beat back the rune and the twilight for a little
distance all round. There he lived happy, contented, not quite alone,
amongst his holy things, for a few that had been cut off by that magical tide
lived on the holy island and served him there. And he lived beyond the age
of ordinary men, but not to the years of magic. (241)
Tolkien picked up on this contrast between mortal men, who long for
deathlessness, and elves, who long for an escape from
deathlessness. Yet in neither Tolkien nor Dunsany is it just a theme,
but rather a structuring device for plot and setting and sequence,
which are all of a piece. This is what M. M. Bakhtin means by
chronotope: the time that is also space, and a corresponding range
of possible character types (to occupy the space) and incidents (to
take up the time). Bakhtin’s chronotopes are features of genres, and
the representation of the structure of change is something the
fantasy chronotope does exceedingly well.
But what does it mean? How are we to take an inundation by
magic as a truth about our own lives? We are none of us elves; our
temptation is always going to be that of mortal beings rather than
weary immortals.
Again, we can look to myth and see similar world-remakings: the
Flood in Genesis; the succession of ages in Hindu myth from a
golden Time of Truth to Kali Yuga, the Age of Strife; the advent of
Ragnarök, the Norse Twilight of the Gods. Each of these
transformations can be taken as a literal representation of the
ancient past or a prophecy of end times, but it can also be seen as a
way of locating ourselves in time and in the universe. The
transformation is in the self as much as in the world, and fantasy
provides a way to depict the structures even of inner changes like
growth and desire and selfhood as well as more visible ones like the
building of a castle or the fall of a kingdom.
Here it is worth pointing out a fundamental difference between
form and structure. Form is evident on the surface, visible to the
naked eye. For instance, two kinds of wings—that of a dragonfly and
that of a bat—look equivalent in form and yet their inner anatomy
and evolutionary history are nothing alike. Two houses can have the
same profile and the same footprint on the ground, even be covered
with the same paint or plaster, and yet be radically different in
construction. Realism is very good at depicting form: social forms,
forms of selfhood. Fantasy is better at probing hidden structure:
fundamental building blocks and the way they articulate.
In another fairy tale by George MacDonald, The Princess and the
Goblin (1872/1893), Princess Irene lives in a building that is in a
perpetual state of transition: “a large house, half castle, half
farmhouse, on the side of another mountain, about half way
between its base and its peak” (1). Growing up, she is only aware of
the main floors, until one day she gets lost and comes across a
mysterious stairway leading to a tower where she meets a woman
who is both old and beautiful, who introduces herself as Irene’s
great-great-grandmother. None of the staff are aware of this
mysterious grandmother, who keeps a flock of pigeons as
messengers, has a lamp that shines through the walls like a beacon,
and spins a thread so fine as to be invisible—all forms of guidance
for the Princess and the young miner Curdie who comes to be her
friend and companion in adventure.
Beneath the house, by contrast, a gang of goblins has been
tunneling through the foundations with the intention of kidnapping
the Princess to be their prince’s bride. The goblins are crude and
impulsive, capable of violence but also comically inept. The place
they break through into the house, significantly, is the wine cellar,
where the butler is able to distract them by offering drink.
The Princess’s house is thus arranged in tiers by class, upstairs-
downstairs fashion, but also by virtue or wisdom. At the very top is
the great-great-grandmother, wise and magical; at the bottom are
the animalistic goblins, below even the servants in the kitchen;
Princess Irene lives in between and is the only one who can move
between the ranks, threatened by the goblins but protected by her
ancestor. It is tempting—though anachronistic—to read the whole
set-up as a Freudian allegory. Down in the depths is the id; up top is
the superego; in between is Irene the ego, negotiating between
primal appetites and societal constraints. But we don’t need Freud to
find symbolism in this edifice; MacDonald was trained as a minister
but also educated in science; he attended lectures in medicine at the
University of Edinburgh, where theories of the unconscious were
being worked out before Freud. He was quite aware both of the
power of symbols and of the tricks the brain can play upon itself,
and many of his stories incorporate striking symbols of the psyche:
the Golden Key that leads Mossy and Tangle on a lifelong quest in
the story with that title (1867); the animal hooves and paws that
Curdie is able to perceive under the hands of evildoers in the sequel
to Princess; and especially the egglike space—essentially a sensory
deprivation chamber—to which the title character of Lilith (1895)
retreats to contemplate her own ego.
If we think of the self as a house, other forms of literature than
fantasy are better at showing us its outward aspects. Realism
confronts us with the daily travails, the emotions, the economic and
social exchanges that we might think are the whole story. But
fantasy can do something quite different. It looks at the soul from
high above the roof, from deep in the foundations, from inside the
walls themselves. By renouncing surface fidelity, a fantastic tale can
reveal fundamental patterns of stress and support. It shows us the
laying of foundation stones. It shows us where fatal cracks will
appear, and what might crawl out of the ruins. Edgar Allan Poe’s
“The Fall of the House of Usher” (1839) is a perfect example of that
last, and it is no accident that “House of Usher” is an ambiguous
phrase, designating both the physical building and the family that
erected it and will ultimately collapse with it.
In Poe’s tale, the Usher family has come down to two individuals.
Twins Roderick and Madeline are locked in a love-hate relationship
that eventually results in their mutual murders. Roderick prematurely
buries a catatonic Madeline, who rises from the tomb to strangle him
and thus to bring down house and House. Essentially brother, sister,
and dwelling share a single soul. This is one of the ways fantasy
represents a complex selfhood: by dividing it among different
entities, each of which stands for a single faculty or facet of the
whole.
Another example of this sort of distributive psyche is the triad of
Queen Orual, the goddess Ungit, and Orual’s sister Psyche in C. S.
Lewis’s Till We Have Faces (1956). The text is full of indications that
each is a part of the other, and all of a greater self. “I am Ungit,”
says Orual (276). “You also are Psyche,” Orual is told by the voice of
the god (308). And “We’re all limbs and parts of one Whole,” says
the memory or vision of her tutor; “Hence, of each other. Men, and
gods, flow in and out and mingle” (300–1).
Less explicitly, there is The Lord of the Rings, which Ursula K. Le
Guin reads, in an essay titled “Science Fiction and Mrs. Brown,” as
an exploration of a divided self, with not only Gollum and Sméagol
(who share a body) but also Frodo and Samwise as aspects of a
single complex character. Le Guin points out that the technique
comes out of traditional storytelling:
he’s there inside my head, and my mother too, and ten million ancestors,
human, proto-human, remote beyond imagining. What difference did 4,000
more make? Everyone had to carve a life out the same legacy: half
universal, half particular; half sharpened by relentless natural selection, half
softened by the freedom of chance. I’d just had to face the details a little
more starkly. (227)
What does realism look like from the vantage point of fantasy? It
might appear surprisingly familiar, like an unknown relative. We tend
to think of realist and fantastic fictions as a contrasting pair, but then
there are many possible counterparts to realism. Fredric Jameson
names a few:
realism vs. romance, realism vs. epic, realism vs. melodrama, realism vs.
idealism, realism vs. naturalism. (bourgeois or critical) realism vs. socialist
realism, realism vs. the oriental tale, and, of course, most frequently
rehearsed of all, realism vs. modernism. (2)
Courses and textbooks characterize the children’s and young adult novel as
“fantasy” or “realism,” regarding realism as a grab bag of all nonfantasy.
Books are praised for their realism, condemned as unrealistic. Realism
becomes a criterion for good literature, although it is rarely defined when
used in this way.” (9)
As Hirsch suggests, realism can hardly stand as a criterion for
judgment when readers don’t agree on what counts as real, either in
fiction or in life.
One way to avoid such critical misfirings is to accept that realism
and fantasy can coexist in the same text, and that such blended
texts are neither inherently superior nor inferior to stories made up
primarily of one mode or the other. Both C. S. Lewis and J. R. R.
Tolkien took up the question of realism’s place in fantasy, with Lewis,
in his 1961 An Experiment in Criticism formulating the idea of a
“realism of presentation” not dependent on “realism of content” (57–
9). Tolkien went even further in his lecture “On Fairy-stories,”
claiming “That the images are of things not in the primary world…is
a virtue, not a vice. Fantasy (in this sense) is, I think, not a lower
but a high form of Art…” (47).
We are dealing with incommensurables here. More realistic does
not necessarily mean less fantastic, nor the converse. Furthermore,
realism can be executed well or badly, as can fantasy, and a single
text may do both at once magnificently or incompetently. To get
back to examples, I’d like to look at a family story in which a bit of
fantasy is embedded within a predominantly realistic frame and one
in which a realistic text is transformed into a magical episode. The
first is the next-to-last of Enright’s Melendy family books, Then There
Were Five (1944). The second is Eager’s The Time Garden (1958).
In an article about Enright as exemplar of the family story, I
proposed five key components of her novels that are typically found
throughout the subgenre, though any given work may not
demonstrate them all. They are the most common “family
resemblances,” to use Wittgenstein’s term for the markers that allow
us to see groups of instances as a single category, though no one
defining feature may be shared by all members of the category. Here
is my proposed set of features:
She was a little awed by the story herself, it came and came, like thread off
a spool, and it was a wonderful story, all about an unknown volcano, near
the North Pole, which was so warm that its sides were covered with
flowering forests and warm streams, though it rose in the midst of a glacial
waste of snow and ice. (Enright 1944 (Then), 205)
With Oliver’s encouragement, Randy gives her characters names and
occupations: “Queen Tataspan, King Tagador, and Tatsinda, the
heroine.…Also Tatsinda was a wonderful ice skater.…She used to go
skating on the Arctic Ocean, on skates made of pure gold.”
However, at this point Oliver falls asleep and the story ends
abruptly—only to be continued almost two decades later as a stand-
alone book. The characters still include Tataspan, Tagador, and
Tatsinda, but they are joined by others: Prince Tackatan, a seeress
and magic-worker named Tanda-Nan, and an invading giant named
Johrgong. (That last name offers a bit of a relief from all the Ta-
names of people and Ti- names of animals that Enright uses to set
her fantasy world apart from reality.) We don’t see the title character
ice-skating, but everything else in Tatsinda develops from Randy’s
story, including the veins of gold that attract the giant’s attention
and complicate the plot.
There may be an explanation among Enright’s papers or
correspondence for this unusual bit of intertextuality. I don’t know
why she decided to develop this one incident into a full-blown
narrative. It could be that she was drawing on her own juvenilia,
using and then reusing something she invented in childhood. Or she
might have become intrigued by the unfinished tale and decided to
flesh it out. As indicated above, I don’t think Tatsinda works as well
as Enright’s family stories. The very factors that make it believable
as the invention of an eleven-year-old—repetitive naming patterns,
emphasis on decorative elements such as the gold, simple
characterizations including a too-perfect heroine—make it less
satisfactory as the work of an experienced adult novelist. Enright
does throw in thematic elements that weren’t in Randy’s tale, such
as Tatsinda’s being ostracized because she differs from everyone else
in having brown eyes and golden hair instead of blue eyes and ice-
white hair, and she works out the invasion plot neatly, using the folk
motif (also found in The Hobbit) of trolls being vulnerable to
sunlight. Tatsinda demonstrates Enright’s craftsmanship at the level
of sentences and descriptive passages. It fits into a tradition of
playful literary fairy tales, such as George MacDonald’s The Light
Princess (1864) and James Thurber’s The White Deer (1945). Yet I
think the main interest in the book is the light it casts on Enright’s
other work.
The scene in Then There Were Five shifts, once Oliver has fallen
asleep, to the artistic ambitions of his siblings. Randy, who has, up
to this point, envisioned other careers, thinks to herself, “Maybe I
better be a writer too.” This thought confirms Randy as Enright’s
textual stand-in. She is the Jo March of the Melendy books: the
budding writer destined to write the story we are reading.
The comparison to Louisa May Alcott is not accidental: Little
Women is an authorizing text for Enright’s family stories. In her 1967
essay on “Realism in Children’s Literature,” Enright cites Alcott as the
starting point of a new, more naturalistic body of fiction for children:
“Then in our grandmothers’ day there came Louisa May Alcott, that
sensible revolutionary who opened the windows in all the
overshuttered, overgimcracked, overplushed houses of children’s
literature. The boisterous air of life came in” (67). Like Alcott’s March
family, the Melendys number four, each clearly delineated and each
with interests that shape the family’s destiny. Like the March sisters,
the Melendys squabble and snipe at one another, but the love that
links them is constant. Both families delight in performance,
rehearsing and performing theatricals in an attic space that is their
own territory. Particular incidents in the Melendy books mirror those
in Little Women: little vanities and come-uppances, comic
misunderstandings, and the sacrifices the children make for a larger
good (the backdrop of the Melendy books is World War II, as that
for Little Women is the Civil War). Oliver’s fall into the well echoes
Amy March’s fall through the ice, and Randy, though not directly
responsible as Jo is, feels the same guilt:
She was never much good in a crisis, and this time all the mean things she
had ever done to Oliver came back to her. The times she had said, ‘No, you
can’t come with us, you’re too little. The times she had put things over on
him, played tricks, laughed behind his back, because he was too young to
know the difference. (203)
The temptation is to read Little Women as a simple record of Louisa
Alcott’s own upbringing, and there are plenty of autobiographical
elements in the book to support such a reading. Yet the novel is not
a memoir and the telling is not simple.
Nor is Randy Melendy’s story a transcription of Elizabeth Enright’s
childhood. For one thing, Enright was an only child, daughter of two
preoccupied artists who eventually divorced. To fill in her fictional
family, she drafted school acquaintances and cousins to form her
imagined quartet of siblings. As she said in an introduction to the
omnibus volume of the first three Melendy books, “It must be
admitted that such a family, made of flesh and blood, whom one
could touch, talk to, argue with, and invite to parties, does not
actually exist. Yet in other ways…each of these people is at least
partly real” (vii). Since her schoolmates were children of other
artists, and her extended family included her uncle Frank Lloyd
Wright, she had plenty of strong-willed and creative types to draw
on. Rush, for instance, was modeled on Ira Glackens, son of the
painter William Glackens. Ira, “the brother of my choice,” shows up,
instantly recognizable from his Melendy doppelganger, in a New
Yorker sketch called “The Shush Rush” (21). She describes Mona as
a composite of school friends and an unnamed favorite cousin who is
perhaps the actress Anne Baxter (1944, viii). Oliver, as mentioned
above, was based on one of her sons, and shared his name with
another. In other words, the Melendy household was a fantasy in the
non-genre sense: the kind of family Enright might like to have grown
up in. In generic terms, though, she stuck strictly to the terms of
realist fiction—or at least to the letter of the contract. A closer look
at the structure of the adventures in the Melendy books and the
later Gone-Away stories suggests a more complex negotiation at
work between fantasy and realism. To get to that, I will turn to
another writer who shared much of Enright’s literary lineage.
Enright’s contemporary Edward Eager made no secret of which
writers authorized his children’s stories. Every one of his books
includes a discussion of E. Nesbit’s fantasies, and L. Frank Baum is
mentioned almost as frequently. Eager considered it a duty to point
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leipää ei ollut varaa vieraalle tarjota, sillä oman perheen elatuksessa
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