(eTextbook PDF) for Understanding

Public Policy 15th Edition

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/etextbook-pdf-for-understanding-public-policy-15th-ed
ition/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

eTextbook 978-1259315411 Business and Society:

Stakeholders Ethics Public Policy 15th Edition

https://ebookmass.com/product/etextbook-978-1259315411-business-
and-society-stakeholders-ethics-public-policy-15th-edition/

Understanding Cultural Policy 1st Edition, (Ebook PDF)

https://ebookmass.com/product/understanding-cultural-policy-1st-
edition-ebook-pdf/

Understanding Human Sexuality, 15th 15th Edition Janet

Shibley Hyde

https://ebookmass.com/product/understanding-human-
sexuality-15th-15th-edition-janet-shibley-hyde/

American Public Policy: An Introduction 11th Edition,

(Ebook PDF)

https://ebookmass.com/product/american-public-policy-an-
introduction-11th-edition-ebook-pdf/
Public Policy Praxis 3rd Edition

https://ebookmass.com/product/public-policy-praxis-3rd-edition/

Understanding and Managing Public Organizations

(Essential Texts for Nonprofit and Public Leadership
and Management) 5th Edition – Ebook PDF Version

https://ebookmass.com/product/understanding-and-managing-public-
organizations-essential-texts-for-nonprofit-and-public-
leadership-and-management-5th-edition-ebook-pdf-version/

Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives 6th

Edition, (Ebook PDF)

https://ebookmass.com/product/public-policy-politics-analysis-
and-alternatives-6th-edition-ebook-pdf/

American Public Policy: Promise and Performance 11th

Edition, (Ebook PDF)

https://ebookmass.com/product/american-public-policy-promise-and-
performance-11th-edition-ebook-pdf/

(eBook PDF) Readings for Writers 15th Edition

https://ebookmass.com/product/ebook-pdf-readings-for-
writers-15th-edition/
Preface

P
olicy analysis is concerned with “who gets In short, this volume is not only an introduc-
what” in politics and, more important, tion to the study of public policy but also an intro-
“why” and “what difference it makes.” We duction to the models the political scientists use
are concerned not only with what policies gov- to describe and explain political life.
ernments pursue, but why governments pursue
the policies they do, and what the consequences New to this Edition
of these policies are.
The fifteenth edition of Understanding Public Pol-
Political Science, like other scientific disciplines,
icy focuses on the policy issues confronting Pres-
has developed a number of concepts and models to
ident Barack Obama in his second term in the
help describe and explain political life. These mod-
White House.
els are not really competitive in the sense that any
President Obama has made income inequal-
one could be judged as the “best.” Each focuses on
ity a major political issue. The rise of inequality
separate elements of politics, and each helps us un-
in recent years is described and analyzed in a re-
derstand different things about political life.
vised chapter entitled “Welfare and Inequality:
We begin with a brief description of eight an-
the Search for a Rational Strategy.” But despite
alytic models in political science and the potential
rising inequality, America remains the land of
contribution of each to the study of public policy:
opportunity. Income mobility—people moving
Process model Group model up and down the income ladder—characterizes
Institutional model Elite model American society. Studies reveal that over half of
Rational model Public choice model the poorest Americans can expect to move up the
Incremental model Game theory model income scale in less than a 10-year period.
Most public policies are a combination of Obamacare remains the signature political
rational planning, incrementalism, competition achievement of the Obama administration. So
among groups, elite preferences, public choice, far it has survived various challenges, including
political processes, and institutional influences. the important question of the constitutionality
Throughout this volume we employ these mod- of the individual mandate. Chapter 8 describes
els, both singly and in combination, to describe the complex reasoning of Chief Justice John Rob-
and explain public policy. However, certain chap- erts, who held that the mandate and penalty was
ters rely more on one model than another. The really a “tax” and therefore within the constitu-
policy areas studied are: tional power of Congress to levy taxes. This de-
cision, opposed by the Attorney Generals of 26
Criminal justice Energy and states, paved the way for the implementation of
Welfare and environment
Obamacare. Initially implementation went badly
inequality Civil rights
Health care Defense policy with computer glitches obstructing enrollment;
Education Homeland security later it was revealed that millions of existing
Economic policy International trade plans were canceled for failure to meet new fed-
Tax policy and Immigration eral requirements. The President’s promise “if

vii
viii Preface
you like your healthcare plan, you can keep your
healthcare plan” was broken.
According to national polls, the economy
remains the most important issue facing Amer-
ica. Chapter 11 describes the near collapse of the
banking industry in 2008–09 and the govern-
ment’s unprecedented efforts to avert another
Great Depression. It attributes much of the near
disaster to the federal government’s policies in-
cluding the actions of government corporations
“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” The chapter
traces the long, slow, incomplete recovery—the
“Great Recession.” The federal government’s debt
now amounts to about $18 trillion, an amount
in excess of $50,000 for every man, woman, and
child in the nation. The economic policy chapter
also describes that proposals to reduce annual
deficits. A new section shows America’s ranking
on the Economic Freedom Index to be dropping.
Despite years of seeming neglect, federalism
appears to be experiencing a revival in the Amer-
ican institutional structure. The states are leading
the way in medicinal use of marijuana, in same-
sex marriage, and banning racial preference. All
three issues are covered in separate chapters.
Crime is down from its historic highs, partially
as a result of law enforcement initiatives taken
in states and cities in the 1980s and 90s, although
now pressures have arisen to lessen sentences
and hard-nosed police practices. In education, the
federal government has granted waivers to most
states from the controversial No Child Left Be-
hind Act. The states have come together through
the National Governors Association to construct a
“common core” of desired educational outcomes.
Tax policy issues have severely divided the
Congress. The standoff between the President
and the Democratic-controlled Senate, and the
Republican-controlled House is described in de-
tail, including the sequestration and temporary
shutdown of the federal government in 2013.
President Obama succeeded in placing the blame
on the House Republicans, and he succeeded in
getting a raise in the top marginal income tax
rates back to 39.6 percent. Despite the president’s
rhetoric about income inequality, no change was
made in capital gains tax and dividends taxation,
which remain less than half of the rates on wage
income.
Comprehensive immigration reform passed
the Democratic-controlled Senate but failed to get
to a vote in the Republican-controlled House. The
elements of immigration reform are discussed in
Chapter 12 and contrasted with current immigra-
tion policy of the United States. The United States
has failed to enforce border controls and allowed
10–12 million undocumented immigrants to live
in the country as second-class non-citizens. Spe-
cial interests who gain from low-wage labor have
been successful so far in preventing comprehen-
sive immigration reform or even full implemen-
tation of current immigration laws. By executive
order, President Obama ordered the non-deporta-
tion of children brought to the United States by
their parents (in effect enacting the Dream Act
which had been defeated in Congress). One re-
sult was an influx of children across our Mexican
border.
Climate change is given new extensive cover-
age in Chapter 13 “Energy and the Environment:
Externalities and Interests.” “Cap and trade”
proposals are described as well as the efforts of
the Environmental Protection Agency to enact
rules previously rejected by the Congress. A new
revolution in energy production—“Fracking”—
promises to reduce United States dependence
on foreign oil and gas, as well as reduce carbon
emissions. Fracking was developed by the pri-
vate market, not government, which continues to
heavily subsidize “renewable” energy sources.
President Barack Obama’s drawdown of U.S.
military forces is described and assessed in a re-
vised defense policy chapter. The chaotic conclu-
sions to America’s participation in the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars are described as far as possible
through our date of publication. The new drone
war is also described. Obama’s statements on
the key question of when to use military force

are contrasted with earlier statements by General
Colin Powell and by Presidents Reagan, George
W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. The final chapter on
homeland security discusses the trade-offs be-
tween security and liberty, including surveillance
by the National Security Agency, the activities of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FICA)
Court, and the status of “enemy combatants”
held at the United States prison and Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba.
Thomas R. Dye
Available Instructor Resources
The following resources are available for instruc-
tors. These can be downloaded at http://www
.pearsonhighered.com/irc. Login required.
Preface ix
• PowerPoint—provides a core template of the
content covered throughout the text. Can eas-
ily be expanded for customization with your
course.
• Instructor’s Manual and Test Bank— includes
a description, in-class discussion questions,
and a research assignment for each chapter.
Also included in this manual is a test bank of-
fering multiple-choice, true/false, and essay
questions for each chapter.
• MyTest—an electronic format of the Test
Bank to customize in-class tests or quizzes.
Visit: http://www.pearsonhighered.com
/mytest.
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 1
Policy Analysis
What Governments Do, Why They
Do It, and What Difference It Makes

Expanding the Scope of Public Policy President Barack Obama signs the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act in the East Room of the White House, March 30, 2010. This health care reform bill greatly expands the
scope of public policy in America. (© Brooks Kraft/Corbis News/Corbis)

1.1: What Is Public
Policy?
This book is about public policy. It is concerned
with what governments do, why they do it, and
what difference it makes. It is also about political
science and the ability of this academic discipline
to describe, analyze, and explain public policy.
1.1.1: Definition of Policy
Public policy is whatever governments choose to
do or not to do.1 Governments do many things.
1
2 Chapter 1

They regulate conflict within society, they orga- in scope to encompass just about every sector of
nize society to carry on conflict with other soci- American life.
eties, they distribute a great variety of symbolic Throughout most of the twentieth century,
rewards and material services to members of government grew in both absolute size and in re-
the society, and they extract money from society, lation to the size of the national economy. The size
most often in the form of taxes. Thus, public pol- of the economy is usually measured by the gross
icies may regulate behavior, organize bureaucra- domestic product (GDP), the sum of all the goods
cies, distribute benefits, or extract taxes—or all of and services produced in the United States in
these things at once. a year (see Figure 1–1). Government spending
amounted to only about 8 percent of the GDP at
1.1.2: Policy Expansion and the beginning of the last century, and most gov-
ernmental activities were carried out by state and
Government Growth local governments. Two world wars, the New Deal
Today people expect government to do a great programs devised during the Great Depression of
many things for them. Indeed there is hardly the 1930s, and the growth of the Great Society pro-
any personal or societal problem for which some grams of the 1960s and 1970s all greatly expanded
group will not demand a government solution— the size of government, particularly the federal
that is, a public policy designed to alleviate per- government. The rise in government growth rela-
sonal discomfort or societal unease. Over the tive to the economy leveled off during the Reagan
years, as more and more Americans turned to presidency (1981–1989). The economy in the 1990s
government to resolve society’s problems, gov- grew faster than government s­ pending, result-
ernment grew in size and public policy expanded ing in a modest decline in the size of government

Figure 1–1 The Growth of Government

The size of government can be measured in relation to the size of the economy. Total federal, state, and local
government spending now exceeds 37 percent of the GDP, the size of the economy.
*Estimate from Budget of the United States Government, 2015.

50
1944
Percentage of Gross Domestic Product

Great
40 Society

World
War II Total
30
Government
Expenditures

20 World
War I Obama
Federal
10 Government
Expenditures

0
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 1995 2005 2015*
1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2000 2010
Year
 Policy Analysis 3

r­ elative to the economy. Federal spending was less
than 20 percent of the GDP.
The Obama Administration brought about a
dramatic increase in federal spending, much of it
in response to the “Great Recession” of 2008–2009.
Federal spending in 2009 soared to 25 percent of
the GDP; this spending included a “stimulus”
package designed to jump–start the economy (see
­Chapter 10). Under President Barack Obama, fed-
eral spending was kept close to 24 percent of the
GDP. The nation’s 50 state governments and 90,000
local governments (cities, counties, towns and
townships, school districts, and special districts)
combined to account for over 13 percent of the GDP.
Total government spending—federal, state, and
­local—now amounts to about 37 percent of GDP.
1.1.3: Scope of Public Policy
Not everything that government does is reflected
in governmental expenditures. Regulatory activ-
ity, for example, especially environmental regula-
tions and health insurance requirements, imposes
significant costs on individuals and businesses;
these costs are not shown in government budgets.
­Nevertheless, government spending is a common
indicator of governmental functions and priorities.
For example, Figure 1–2 indicates that the federal

Figure 1–2 Public Policy: What Governments Do

Government spending figures indicate that Social Security and Medicare consume the largest share of federal spending,
while education is the largest item in state and local government spending.
SOURCES: Budget of the United States Government, 2015; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2013.

What the Federal Government Does What State and Local Governments Do

Defense Education
Social Security
and Medicare Welfare

Health, Inc. Medicaid Health

and Hospitals
Income Security, Inc.
Food stamps, welfare Highways
Transportation
Police and
Fire
Education, Training
Sanitation
Veterans

Interest Prisons

Natural Resources
Justice and Environment
Natural Resources
and Environment All Other*

All Other*

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Percentage of Total Federal Percentage of All State–Local
Spending for Various Functions Spending for Various Functions
*Includes science, energy, agriculture, housing, *Includes housing and community development,
community development, international affairs, parks and recreation, governmental administration,
and general government. and interest.
4 Chapter 1
government spends more on senior citizens—in
­Social Security and Medicare outlays—than on
any other function, including national defense.
Federal welfare and health programs account for
substantial budget outlays, but federal financial
support of education is very modest. State and ­local
governments in the United States bear the major
burden of public education. Welfare and health
functions consume larger shares of their budgets
than highways and law enforcement do.
1.2: Why Study Public
Policy?
Political science is the study of politics—the study
of “who gets what, when, and how?”2 It is more
than the study of governmental institutions, that
is, federalism, separation of powers, checks and
balances, judicial review, the powers and duties
of Congress, the president, and the courts. And
political science is more than the study of political
processes, that is, campaigns and elections, vot-
ing, lobbying, legislating, and adjudicating.
Political science is also the study of public
­policy—the description and explanation of the causes
and consequences of government activity. This focus in-
volves a description of the content of public policy;
an analysis of the impact of social, economic, and
political forces on the content of public policy; an
inquiry into the effect of various institutional ar-
rangements and political processes on public pol-
icy; and an evaluation of the consequences of public
policies on society, both intended and unintended.
1.3: What Can Be
Learned from Policy
Analysis?
Policy analysis is finding out what governments
do, why they do it, and what difference, if any, it
makes. What can be learned from policy analysis?
1.3.1: Description
First, we can describe public policy—we can
learn what government is doing (and not do-
ing) in welfare, defense, education, civil rights,
health, the environment, taxation, and so on.
A factual basis of information about national
policy is really an indispensable part of every-
one’s education. What does the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 actually say about discrimination
in employment? What did the Supreme Court
rule in the Bakke case about affirmative action
programs? What do the Medicaid and Medicare
programs promise for the poor and the aged?
What is actually mandated in the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act—"Obamacare"—
and what has the Supreme Court said about it.
What agreements have been reached between
the United States and Russia regarding nuclear
weapons? How much money are we paying
in taxes? How much money does the federal
government spend each year, and what does it
spend it on? These are examples of descriptive
questions.
1.3.2: Causes
Second, we can inquire about the causes, or de-
terminants, of public policy. Why is public pol-
icy what it is? Why do governments do what
they do? We might inquire about the effects of
political institutions, processes, and behaviors
on public policies (Linkage B in Figure 1–3).
For example, does it make any difference in
tax and spending levels whether Democrats or
Republicans control the presidency and Con-
gress? What is the impact of lobbying by the
special interests on efforts to reform the federal
tax system? We can also inquire about the ef-
fects of social, economic, and cultural forces in
shaping public policy (Linkage C in Figure 1–
3). For example: What are the effects of chang-
ing public attitudes about race on civil rights
policy? What are the effects of recessions on
government spending? What is the effect of an
 Policy Analysis 5

Figure 1–3 Studying Public Policy, Its Causes and Consequences

This diagram (sometimes referred to as the “systems model”) classifies societal conditions, political system
characteristics, and public policies, and suggests possible linkages between them.

Society Political System Public Policy

Institutions,
processes,
behaviors
A B
E F

Social and C Public

economic policies
conditions D

Including: Including: Including:

Wealth and income Federalism Civil rights
Inflation, recession, unemployment Separation of powers Educational policies
Educational achievement Checks and balances Welfare policies
Environmental quality Parties Health care policies
Poverty Interest groups Criminal justice
Racial composition Voting behavior Taxation
Religious and ethnic make-up Bureaucracy Spending and deficits
Health and longevity Power structures Defense policies
Inequality, discrimination Congress, president, courts Homeland security

Linkage A: What are the effects of social and economic conditions on political and governmental
institutions, processes, and behaviors?
Linkage B: What are the effects of political and governmental institutions, processes, and behaviors
on public policies?
Linkage C: What are the effects of social and economic conditions on public policies?
Linkage D: What are the effects (feedback) of public policies on social and economic conditions?
Linkage E: What are the effects (feedback) of political and governmental institutions, processes, and
behaviors on social and economic conditions?
Linkage F: What are the effects (feedback) of public policies on political and governmental institutions,
processes, and behaviors?

increasingly older population on the Social
Security and Medicare programs? In scientific
terms, when we study the causes of public pol-
icy, policies become the dependent variables,
and their various political, social, economic,
and cultural determinants become the indepen-
dent variables.
1.3.3: Consequences
Third, we can inquire about the consequences,
or impacts, of public policy. Learning about the
consequences of public policy is often referred
to as policy evaluation. What difference, if any,
does public policy make in people’s lives? We
might inquire about the effects of public policy
on ­political institutions and processes (Linkage
F in Figure 1–3). For example, what is the effect
of continuing high unemployment on Republi-
can party fortunes in Congressional elections?
What is the impact of economic policies on the
president’s popularity? We also want to exam-
ine the impact of public policies on conditions
in society (Linkage D in Figure 1–3). For ex-
ample, does capital punishment help to deter
crime? Does existing unemployment benefits
discourage people from seeking work? Does in-
creased educational spending produce higher
6 Chapter 1
student achievement scores? In scientific terms,
when we study the consequences of public ­policy,
­p olicies become the independent variables,
and their political, social, economic, and cul-
tural ­i mpacts on society become the dependent
­variables.
1.4: Policy Analysis
and Policy Advocacy
It is important to distinguish policy analysis from
policy advocacy. Explaining the causes and con-
sequences of various policies is not equivalent
to prescribing what policies governments ought
to pursue. Learning why governments do what
they do and what the consequences of their ac-
tions are is not the same as saying what govern-
ments ought to do or bringing about changes in
what they do. Policy advocacy requires the skills
of rhetoric, persuasion, organization, and ac-
tivism. Policy analysis encourages scholars and
students to attack critical policy issues with the
tools of systematic inquiry. There is an implied
assumption in policy analysis that developing
scientific knowledge about the forces shaping
public policy and the consequences of public pol-
icy is itself a socially relevant activity, and that
policy analysis is a prerequisite to prescription, ad-
vocacy, and activism.
It must be remembered that policy issues are
decided not by analysts but by political actors—
elected and appointed government officials,
interest groups, and occasionally even voters.
Social science research often does not fare well
in the political arena; it may be interpreted, mis-
interpreted, ignored, or even used as a weapon
by political combatants. Policy analysis some-
times produces unexpected and even politically
embarrassing findings. Public policies do not al-
ways work as intended. And political interests
will accept, reject, or use findings to fit their own
purposes.
1.5: Policy Analysis
and the Quest for
Solutions to America’s
Problems
It is questionable that policy analysis can ever
“solve” America’s problems. Ignorance, crime,
poverty, racial conflict, inequality, poor housing,
ill health, pollution, congestion, and unhappy
lives have afflicted people and societies for a long
time. Of course, this is no excuse for failing to
work toward a society free of these maladies. But
our striving for a better society should be tem-
pered with the realization that solutions to these
problems may be very difficult to find. There are
many reasons for qualifying our enthusiasm for
policy analysis.
1.5.1: Limits on Government
Power
First, it is easy to exaggerate the importance,
both for good and for ill, of the policies of gov-
ernments. It is not clear that government pol-
icies, however ingenious, can cure all or even
most of society’s ills. Governments are con-
strained by many powerful social forces—pat-
terns of family life, class structure, child-rearing
practices, religious beliefs, and so on. These
forces are not easily managed by governments,
nor could they be controlled even if it seemed
desirable to do so. Some of society’s problems
are very intractable.
1.5.2: Disagreement over the
Problem
Second, policy analysis cannot offer solutions
to problems when there is no general agree-
ment on what the problems are. For example, in
­educational policy some researchers assume that

raising achievement levels (measures of verbal
and quantitative abilities) is the problem to which
our efforts should be directed. But educators often
argue that the acquisition of verbal and quantita-
tive skills is not the only, or even the most import-
ant, goal of the public schools. They contend that
schools must also develop positive self-images
among pupils of all races and backgrounds, en-
courage social awareness and the appreciation of
multiple cultures, teach children to respect one
another and to resolve their differences peace-
fully, raise children’s awareness of the dangers of
drugs and educate them about sex and sexually
transmitted diseases, and so on. In other words,
many educators define the problems confronting
schools more broadly than raising achievement
levels.
Policy analysis is not capable of resolving
value conflicts. If there is little agreement on what
values should be emphasized in educational pol-
icy, there is not much that policy research can con-
tribute to policymaking. At best it can advise on
how to achieve certain results, but it cannot deter-
mine what is truly valuable for society.
1.5.3: Subjectivity in
Interpretation
Third, policy analysis deals with very subjective
topics and must rely on interpretation of results.
Professional researchers frequently interpret the
results of their analyses differently. Social science
research cannot be value-free. Even the selection
of the topic for research is affected by one’s values
about what is important in society and worthy of
attention.
1.5.4: Limitations on Design
of Human Research
Another set of problems in systematic policy
analysis centers around inherent limitations
in the design of social science research. It is
Policy Analysis 7
not really possible to conduct some forms of
controlled experiments on human beings. For
­example, researchers cannot order children to go
to overcrowded or underfunded schools for sev-
eral years just to see if it adversely impacts their
achievement levels. Instead, social researchers
must find situations in which educational depri-
vation has been produced “naturally” in order
to make the necessary observations about the
causes of such deprivation. Because we cannot
control all the factors in a r­ eal-world situation,
it is difficult to pinpoint precisely what causes
educational achievement or nonachievement.
Moreover, even where some experimentation
is permitted, human beings frequently modify
their behavior simply because they know that
they are being observed in an experimental sit-
uation. For example, in educational research it
frequently turns out that children perform well
under any new teaching method or curricular
innovation. It is difficult to know whether the
improvements observed are a product of the
new teaching method or curricular improve-
ment or merely a product of the experimental
situation.
1.5.5: Complexity of Human
Behavior
Perhaps the most serious reservation about pol-
icy analysis is the fact that social problems are so
complex that social scientists are unable to make
accurate predictions about the impact of proposed
policies. Social scientists simply do not know enough
about individual and group behavior to be able to give
reliable advice to policymakers. Occasionally policy-
makers turn to social scientists for “solutions,” but
social scientists do not have any. Most of society’s
problems are shaped by so many variables that a
simple explanation of them, or remedy for them,
is rarely possible. The fact that social scientists
give so many contradictory recommendations is
an indication of the a­ bsence of reliable scientific
8 Chapter 1
knowledge about social problems. Although some
scholars argue that no advice is better than con-
tradictory or inaccurate advice, policymakers still
must make decisions, and it is probably better that
they act in the light of whatever little knowledge
social science can provide than that they act in the
absence of any knowledge at all. Even if social sci-
entists cannot predict the impact of future policies,
they can at least attempt to measure the impact
of current and past public policies and make this
knowledge available to decision makers.
1.6: Policy Analysis as
Art and Craft
Understanding public policy is both an art and a
craft. It is an art because it requires insight, cre-
ativity, and imagination in identifying societal
problems and describing them, in devising pub-
lic policies that might alleviate them, and then in
finding out whether these policies end up making
things better or worse. It is a craft because these
tasks usually require some knowledge of eco-
nomics, political science, public administration,
sociology, law, and statistics. Policy analysis is re-
ally an applied subfield of all of these traditional
academic disciplines.
Summary: Policy Analysis
There are a variety of definitions of public policy.
But we say simply that public policy is whatever
governments choose to do or not to do.
1. Policy analysis is finding out what govern-
ments do, why they do it, and what differ-
ence it makes.
2. The scope of public policy has expanded as
governments do more things and grow in
size.
We doubt that there is any “model of choice”
in policy analysis—that is, a single model or
method that is preferable to all others and that
consistently renders the best solutions to public
problems. Instead we agree with political scientist
Aaron Wildavsky, who wrote:
Policy analysis is one activity for which
there can be no fixed program, for pol-
icy analysis is synonymous with creativ-
ity, which may be stimulated by theory
and sharpened by practice, which can be
learned but not taught.3
Wildavsky goes on to warn students that
solutions to great public questions are not to be
expected:
In large part, it must be admitted,
knowledge is negative. It tells us what
we cannot do, where we cannot go,
wherein we have been wrong, but not
necessarily how to correct these errors.
After all, if current efforts were judged
wholly satisfactory, there would be little
need for analysis and less for analysts.
There is no one model of choice to be found in
this book, but if anyone wants to begin a debate
about different ways of understanding public
­policy, this book is a good place to begin.
3. A systems model relates societal conditions
to political institutions and processes, and to
policy outcomes.
4. Policy analysis is often limited by disagree-
ments over the nature of societal problems,
by subjectivity in the interpretation of re-
sults, by limitations to the design of policy
research, and by the complexity of human
behavior.
Chapter 2
Models of Politics
Some Help in Thinking
About Public Policy

Food Stamp Expansion The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), known as food stamps, is
America’s fastest growing welfare program. As recently as 2010, only 17 million people received food stamps. Today
over 50 million people do so. This “non-incremental” growth in a federal program challenges the notion that public
policies change slowly. (StockAB/Alamy)

2.1: Models for Policy plane, for e­ xample, or the tabletop buildings
that ­p lanners and ­a rchitects use to show how

Analysis things will look when proposed projects are

A model is a simplified representation of
some ­a spect of the real world. It may be an
actual physical representation—a model air-
­c ompleted. Or a model may be a diagram—a
road map, for ­e xample, or a flow chart that
­p olitical scientists use to show how a bill
­becomes law.
9
10 Chapter 2
2.1.1: Uses of Models
The models we shall use in studying policy
are c­ onceptual models. These are word models that
try to
• Simplify and clarify our thinking about poli-
tics and public policy.
• I d e n t if y i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t s o f p o l i c y
­problems.
• Help us to communicate with each other by
focusing on essential features of political
life.
• Direct our efforts to understand public policy
better by suggesting what is important and
what is unimportant.
• Suggest explanations for public policy and
predict its consequences.
2.1.2: Selected Policy Models
Over the years, political science, like other scien-
tific disciplines, has developed a number of mod-
els to help us understand political life. Among
these models are the following:
• Process model
• Institutional model
• Rational model
• Incremental model
• Group model
• Elite model
• Public choice model
• Game theory model
Each of these terms identifies a major conceptual
model that can be found in the literature of po-
litical science. None of these models was derived
especially to study public policy, yet each offers a
separate way of thinking about policy and even
suggests some of the general causes and conse-
quences of public policy.
These models are not competitive in the sense that
any one of them could be judged “best.” Each one
provides a separate focus on political life, and
each can help us to understand different things
about public policy. Although some ­policies ap-
pear at first glance to lend t­ hemselves to expla-
nation by one particular model, most policies are
a combination of rational planning, incremen-
talism, interest group activity, elite preferences,
game playing, public choice, political processes,
and institutional influences. Following is a brief
description of each model, with particular atten-
tion to the separate ways in which public policy
can be viewed.
2.2: Process
Policy as Political Activity
Political processes and behaviors are a cen-
tral focus of political science. Political science
studies the activities of voters, interest groups,
­legislators, presidents, bureaucrats, judges,
and other political actors. One of the main pur-
poses is to discover patterns of activities—or
­“ processes.” Political scientists with an inter-
est in policy have grouped various activities
­according to their relationship with public pol-
icy. The result is a set of policy processes, which
usually follow the general outline shown in
­Table 2-1.
The process model is useful in helping us to
understand the various activities involved in pol-
icymaking. We want to keep in mind that policy-
making involves problem identification (defining
problems in society that deserve public atten-
tion), agenda setting (capturing the attention of
policymakers), formulating proposals (devising
and selecting policy options), legitimating policy
(developing political support; winning congres-
sional, presidential, court approval), implement-
ing policy (creating bureaucracies, spending
money, enforcing laws), and evaluating policy
(finding out whether policies work, whether they
are popular).
 Models of Politics 11

Table 2-1 The Policy Process

• Problem Identification. The identification of policy problems through demand from individuals and groups for government
action.
• Agenda Setting. Focusing the attention of the mass media and public officials on specific public problems to decide what
will be decided.
• Policy Formulation. The development of policy proposals by interest groups, White House staff, congressional committees,
and think tanks.
• Policy Legitimation. The selection and enactment of policies through actions by Congress, the president, and the courts.
• Policy Implementation. The implementation of policies through government bureaucracies, public expenditures, regulations,
and other activities of executive agencies.
• Policy Evaluation. The evaluation of policies by government agencies themselves, outside consultants, the media, and the
general public.

of the Land” (Article VI). Its key structural

Processes: Applying
the Model
Political processes and behaviors are
considered in each of the policy areas studied
in this book. Additional commentary on the
impact of political activity on public policy is
found in Chapter 3, “The Policymaking Process:
Decision-Making Activities,” and Chapter 4,
“Policy Evaluation: Finding Out What Happens
After a Law Is Passed.”
2.3: Institutionalism
Policy as Institutional Output
Government institutions have long been a cen-
tral focus of political science. Political activities
generally center around particular government
institutions—Congress, the presidency, courts,
bureaucracies, states, municipalities, and so on.
Public policy is authoritatively determined, im-
plemented, and enforced by these institutions.
The Constitution of the United States es-
tablishes the fundamental institutional struc-
ture for policymaking. It is “the supreme Law
­components—­separation of powers and checks
and balances among the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of the national government—
together with ­f ederalism—dividing power be-
tween the nation and the states—were designed
by the Founders in part “to form a more perfect
Union.” These institutional arrangements have
changed significantly over more than two centu-
ries, yet no other written constitution in the world
has remained in place for so long. Throughout
this v­ olume we will be concerned with the effect
of these institutional arrangements on public pol-
icy. And, in Chapter 5, we shall explore in some
detail on the effect of federalism.
Federalism recognizes that both the national
government and the state governments derive
independent legal authority from their own citi-
zens (Figure 2-1): both can pass their own laws,
levy their own taxes, and maintain their own
courts. The states also have important roles in
the selection of national officeholders—in the
apportionment of congressional seats, in the al-
location of two U.S. senators to each state, and
in the allocation of electoral votes for president.
Most important, perhaps, both the Congress
and three-quarters of states must consent to any
changes in the Constitution itself.
12 Chapter 2
Figure 2-1 An Institutional Model: American Federalism
Governmental institutional arrangements affect public policy, including federalism—the distribution of money and power
among federal, state, and local governments. (Henryart/Fotalia)
FEDERAL SYSTEM
Federal government and
states derive authority
independently from the people.
Institutionalism:
Applying the Model
In Chapter 5, “Federalism and State Policies:
Institutional Arrangements and Policy
Variations,” we shall examine some of the
problems of American federalism—the
distribution of money and power among federal,
state, and local governments.
2.4: Rationalism
Policy as Maximum Social Gain
A rational policy is one that achieves “maximum
social gain”; that is, governments should choose
policies resulting in gains to society that exceed
costs by the greatest amount, and g ­ overnments
National Government
States
People
should refrain from policies if costs exceed
gains.
Note that there are really two important
guidelines in this definition of maximum social
gain. First, no policy should be adopted if its costs
exceed its benefits. Second, among policy alterna-
tives, decision makers should choose the policy
that produces the greatest benefit over cost. In
other words, a policy is rational when the differ-
ence between the values it achieves and the values
it sacrifices is positive and greater than any other
policy alternative. One should not view rational-
ism in a narrow dollars-and-cents ­framework, in
which basic social values are sacrificed for dollar
savings. Rationalism involves the calculation of
all social, political, and economic values sacrificed
or achieved by a public policy, not just those that
can be measured in dollars.
To select a rational policy, policymakers must
(1) know all the society’s value preferences and

their relative weights, (2) know all the policy
alternatives available, (3) know all the conse-
quences of each policy alternative, (4) calculate
the ratio of benefits to costs for each policy al-
ternative, and (5) select the most efficient pol-
icy alternative. This rationality assumes that
the value preferences of society as a whole can be
known and weighted. It is not enough to know
and weigh the values of some groups and not
others. There must be a complete understanding
of societal values. Rational policymaking also re-
quires information about alternative policies, the
predictive capacity to foresee accurately the conse-
quences of alternate policies, and the intelligence
to calculate correctly the ratio of costs to bene-
fits. Finally, rational policymaking requires a
­decision-making system that facilitates rationality
in policy formation. A diagram of such a system
is shown in Figure 2-2.
However, there are many barriers to rational
decision making, so many, in fact, that it rarely
takes place at all in government. Yet the model re-
mains important for analytic purposes because it
helps to identify barriers to rationality. It assists
in posing the question, Why is policymaking not
a more rational process? At the outset we can
­hypothesize several important obstacles to rational
policymaking:
• Many conflicting benefits and costs cannot
be compared or weighed; for example, it is
difficult to compare or weigh the value of
­individual life against the costs of ­regulation.
• Policymakers may not be motivated to make
decisions on the basis of societal goals but
instead try to maximize their own rewards—
power, status, reelection, and money.
• Policymakers may not be motivated to maxi-
mize net social gain but merely to satisfy de-
mands for progress; they do not search until
they find “the one best way”; instead they
halt their search when they find an alterna-
tive that will work.
Models of Politics 13
• Large investments in existing programs and
policies (sunk costs) prevent policymakers
from reconsidering alternatives foreclosed by
previous decisions.
• There are innumerable barriers to collect-
ing all the information required to know
all possible policy alternatives and the con-
sequences of each, including the cost of in-
formation gathering, the availability of the
information, and the time involved in its
­collection.
• Neither the predictive capacities of the so-
cial and behavioral sciences nor those of the
physical and biological sciences are suffi-
ciently advanced to enable policymakers to
understand the full benefits or costs of each
policy alternative.
• Policymakers, even with the most advanced
computerized analytical techniques, do not
have sufficient intelligence to calculate accu-
rately costs and benefits when a large num-
ber of diverse political, social, economic, and
cultural values are at stake.
• Uncertainty about the consequences of vari-
ous policy alternatives compels policymakers
Rationalism: Applying
the Model
Chapter 4, “Criminal Justice: Rationality
and Irrationality in Public Policy,” shows
that rational policies to deter crime—
policies ensuring certainty, swiftness, and
severity of punishment—have seldom been
implemented. The problems of achieving
rationality in public policy are also discussed
in Chapter 7, “Welfare and Inequality:
The Search for Rational Strategies,” and
in Chapter 8, “Health Care: Attempting a
Rational-Comprehensive Transformation.”
14

Figure 2-2 A Rational Model of a Decision System

The rational model assumes complete agreement on goals, knowledge of alternative policies, and the ability to calculate and select the policies with the
greatest benefits and least costs.

1. Establishment
of complete set of
Input operational goals
All resources with weights
needed for
pure rationality
process 4. Preparation of 6. Comparison of
complete set of net expectations
3. Preparation of predictions of 5. Calculation of and identification Output
complete set of benefits and net expectation for of alternative(s) Pure rationality
alternative policies costs for each each alternative with highest net policy (policies)
alternative expectation

All data
2. Establishment
needed for
of complete
pure rationality
inventory of other
process
values and of
resources with
weights

to stick as closely as possible to previous pol-
icies to reduce the likelihood of unanticipated
negative consequences.
• The segmentalized nature of policymaking in
large bureaucracies makes it difficult to coor-
dinate decision making so that the input of
all the various specialists is brought to bear at
the point of decision.
2.5: Incrementalism
Policy as Variations on the Past
Incrementalism views public policy as a con-
tinuation of past government activities with
only incremental modifications. Political sci-
entist Charles E. Lindblom first presented the
­incremental model in the course of a critique
of the rational model of decision making. 1
­A ccording to Lindblom, decision makers do
not annually review the whole range of existing
and proposed policies, identify societal goals,
research the benefits and costs of alternative
policies in achieving these goals, rank order of
Figure 2-3 The Incremental Model
The incremental model assumes that policymakers rarely examine past policy commitments, but rather focus their
attention on changes in policies and expenditures.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Models of Politics 15
preferences for each policy alternative in terms
of the maximum net benefits, and then make a
selection on the basis of all relevant information.
On the contrary, constraints of time, information,
and cost prevent policymakers from identifying
the full range of policy alternatives and their
consequences. Constraints of politics prevent the
establishment of clear-cut societal goals and the
accurate calculation of costs and benefits. The
incremental model recognizes the impractical na-
ture of ­“rational-comprehensive” policymaking,
and describes a more conservative process of de-
cision making.
Incrementalism is conservative in that exist-
ing programs, policies, and expenditures are con-
sidered as a base, and attention is concentrated
on new programs and policies and on increases,
decreases, or modifications of current programs.
(For example, budgetary policy for any gov-
ernment activity or program for 2017 might be
viewed incrementally, as shown in Figure 2-3.)
Policymakers generally accept the legitimacy of
established programs and tacitly agree to con-
tinue previous policies.
Policy
Increment
Past Policy
Commitments
2015 2016 2017
16 Chapter 2
They do this because they do not have the
time, information, or money to investigate all
the alternatives to existing policy. The cost of
collecting all this information is too great. Pol-
icymakers do not have sufficient predictive
­capacities to know what all the consequences of
each alternative will be. Nor are they able to cal-
culate cost–benefit ratios for alternative policies
when many diverse political, social, economic,
and cultural values are at stake. Thus, com-
pletely “rational” policy may turn out to be “in-
efficient” (despite the contradiction in terms) if
the time and cost of developing a rational ­policy
are excessive.
Moreover, incrementalism is politically expe-
dient. Agreement comes easier in policymaking
when the items in dispute are only increases or
decreases in budgets or modifications of existing
programs. Conflict is heightened when decision
making focuses on major policy shifts involving
great gains or losses, or “all-or-nothing,” “yes-
or-no” policy decisions. Because the political ten-
sion involved in getting new programs or policies
passed every year would be very great, past pol-
icy victories are continued into future years un-
less there is a substantial political realignment.
Thus, incrementalism is important in reducing
conflict, maintaining stability, and preserving the
political system itself.
But the incremental model may fail when
policymakers are confronted with crises. When
Incrementalism:
Applying the Model
Special attention to incrementalism is given
in the discussion of government budgeting in
Chapter 10, “Economic Policy: Challenging
Incrementalism.”
faced with potential collapse of the na-
tion’s financial markets in 2008, the presi-
dent, Congress, the Treasury Department,
and the Federal Reserve Board came together
to agree on an unprecedented, nonincremen-
tal expansion of federal power (see Chapter 7,
“Economic Policy: Challenging Incremental-
ism”). Overall, federal spending and deficits
increased dramatically, well beyond any levels
that might have been predicted by the incre-
mental model. The Treasury Department was
given unprecedented authority and $700 billion
to “bail out” the nation’s major financial institu-
tions. The Federal Reserve Board reduced inter-
est rates to their lowest in history and provided
unprecedented amounts of credit to the finan-
cial system. Congress itself passed a “stimulus
package,” the largest single spending bill in
the nation’s history. Incrementalism was aban-
doned.
2.6: Group Theory
Policy as Equilibrium in the Group
Struggle
Group theory begins with the proposition that in-
teraction among groups is the central fact of pol-
itics.2 Individuals with common interests band
together formally or informally to press their
demands on government. According to political
scientist David Truman, an interest group is “a
shared-attitude group that makes certain claims
upon other groups in the society”; such a group
becomes political “if and when it makes a claim
through or upon any of the institutions of govern-
ment.”3 Individuals are important in politics only
when they act as part of, or on behalf of, group in-
terests. The group becomes the essential bridge be-
tween the individual and the government. ­Politics
is really the struggle among groups to influence
 Models of Politics 17

public policy. The task of the ­political ­system is
to manage group conflict by (1) e­ stablishing rules
of the game in the group struggle, (2) ­arranging
compromises and balancing ­interests, (3) ­enacting
compromises in the form of public policy, and
(4) enforcing these ­compromises.
According to group theorists, public policy at
any given time is the equilibrium reached in the
group struggle (see Figure 2-4). This equilibrium
is determined by the relative influence of various
interest groups. Changes in the relative influence
of any interest group can be expected to result in
changes in public policy; policy will move in the
direction desired by the groups gaining influence
and away from the desires of groups losing influ-
ence. The influence of groups is determined by
their numbers, wealth, organizational strength,
leadership, access to decision makers, and inter-
nal cohesion.4
The whole interest group system—the politi-
cal system itself—is held together in equilibrium
by several forces. First, there is a large, nearly
universal, latent group in American ­society that
supports the constitutional system and pre-
vailing rules of the game. This group is not
always visible but can be activated to admin-
ister overwhelming rebuke to any group that
attacks the system and threatens to destroy the
equilibrium.
Second, overlapping group membership helps to
maintain the equilibrium by preventing any one
group from moving too far from prevailing val-
ues. Individuals who belong to any one group
also belong to other groups, and this fact mod-
erates the demands of groups who must avoid
offending their members who have other group
affiliations.
Finally, the checking and balancing result-
ing from group competition also helps to main-
tain equilibrium in the system. No single group
constitutes a majority in American society. The
power of each group is checked by the power
of competing groups. “Countervailing” centers
of power function to check the influence of any
single group and protect the individual from ex-
ploitation.

Figure 2-4 The Group Model

The group model assumes that public policy is a balance of interest group influence; policies change when particular
interest groups gain or lose influence.

Added Influence

Influence of Influence of
Group B Group A

Public
Policy

Alternative
Policy Policy
Positions Change

Equilibrium
18 Chapter 2

demands of “the people,” this may express the

Group Theory:
Applying the Model
Throughout this volume we will describe
struggles over public policy. In Chapter 9,
“Education: Group Struggles,” we will examine
group conflict over public policy in the
discussions of education and school issues.
In Chapter 11, “Tax Policy: Battling Special
Interests,” we will observe the power of interest
groups in obtaining special treatments in the
tax code and obstructing efforts to reform the
nation’s tax laws.
myth rather than the reality of American democ-
racy. Elite theory suggests that the people are
apathetic and ill-informed about public policy,
that elites actually shape mass opinion on policy
questions more than masses shape elite opinion.
Thus, public policy really turns out to be the pref-
erences of elites. P­ ublic officials and administra-
tors merely carry out the policies decided on by
the elite. ­Policies flow downward from elites to
masses; they do not arise from mass demands
(see Figure 2-5).
Elite theory can be summarized briefly as
follows:

• Society is divided into the few who have

2.7: Elite Theory
Policy as Elite Preference
Public policy may also be viewed as the prefer-
ences and values of a governing elite.5 Although
it is often asserted that public policy reflects the
power and the many who do not. Only a
small number of persons allocate values
for society; the masses do not decide public
­policy.
• The few who govern are not typical of the
masses who are governed. Elites are drawn

Figure 2-5 The Elite Model

The elite model implies that public policy does not flow upward from demands by the people, but rather downward from
the interests, values, and preferences of elites.

Elite

Policy Direction
Officials and
Administrators
Policy Execution

Mass

disproportionately from the upper socioeco-
nomic strata of society.
• The movement of nonelites to elite positions
must be slow and continuous to maintain sta-
bility and avoid revolution. Only nonelites
who have accepted the basic elite consensus
can be admitted to governing circles.
• Elites share consensus on behalf of the basic
values of the social system and the preserva-
tion of the system.
• Public policy does not reflect the demands of
masses but rather the prevailing values of the
elite. Changes in public policy will be incre-
mental rather than revolutionary.
• Active elites are subject to relatively little
­direct influence from apathetic masses. Elites
influence masses more than masses influence
elites.
What are the implications of elite theory for pol-
icy analysis? Elitism implies that public policy
does not reflect the demands of the people so
much as it does the interests, values, and pref-
erences of elites. Therefore, change and inno-
vations in public policy come about as a result
Elite Theory: Applying
the Model
Chapter 12, “International Trade and
Immigration: Elite–Mass Conflict,” expands
on the elite model by arguing that when elite
preferences differ from those of the masses, the
preferences of elites prevail. Chapter 11, “Civil
Rights: Elite and Mass Interaction,” portrays the
civil rights movement as an effort by established
national elites to extend equality of opportunity
to blacks. Opposition to civil rights policies is
found among white masses in the states.
Models of Politics 19
of redefinitions by elites of their own values.
Because of the general conservatism of elites—
that is, their interest in preserving the system—
change in public policy will be incremental
rather than revolutionary. Changes in the polit-
ical system occur when events threaten the sys-
tem, and elites, acting on the basis of enlightened
self-interest, institute reforms to preserve the sys-
tem and their place in it. The values of elites may
be very ­“public ­regarding.” A sense of noblesse
oblige may permeate elite values, and the welfare
of the masses may be an important element in
elite decision ­making. ­Elitism does not necessar-
ily mean that ­public ­policy will be hostile toward
mass welfare but only that the responsibility for
mass welfare rests on the shoulders of elites, not
masses.
2.8: Public Choice
Theory
Policy as Collective Decision Making
by Self-Interested Individuals
Public choice is the economic study of public
policymaking. Traditionally, economics stud-
ied behavior in the marketplace and assumed
that i­ndividuals pursued their private interests;
­p olitical science studied behavior in the pub-
lic arena and assumed that individuals pursued
their own notion of the public interest. Thus, sep-
arate versions of human motivation developed in
economics and political science: the idea of homo
economicus assumed a self-interested actor seek-
ing to maximize personal benefits; that of homo
politicus assumed a public-spirited actor seeking
to maximize societal welfare.
But public choice theory challenges the no-
tion that individuals act differently in politics
from the way they do in the marketplace. This
20 Chapter 2
theory assumes that all political actors—voters,
­taxpayers, candidates, legislators, bureaucrats,
interest groups, parties, and governments—seek
to ­maximize their personal benefits in politics as well
as in the marketplace. James Buchanan, the Nobel
Prize–winning economist and leading scholar in
modern public choice theory, argues that indi-
viduals come together in politics for their own
mutual benefit, just as they come together in the
marketplace; and by agreement (contract) among
themselves they can enhance their own well-
being, in the same way as by trading in the
marketplace.6 In short, people pursue their self-­
interest in both politics and the marketplace,
but even with selfish motives they can mutually
­benefit through collective decision making.
Government itself arises from a social contract
among individuals who agree for their mutual
benefit to obey laws and support the govern-
ment in exchange for protection of their own
lives, liberties, and property. Thus, public choice
theorists claim to be intellectual heirs to the En-
glish political philosopher John Locke, as well
as to Thomas Jefferson, who incorporated this
social contract notion into the American Decla-
ration of Independence. Enlightened self-­interest
leads individuals to a constitutional contract es-
tablishing a government to protect life, liberty,
and property.
Public choice theory recognizes that govern-
ment must perform certain functions that the
­marketplace is unable to handle; that is, it must
remedy certain “market failures.” First, govern-
ment must provide public goods—goods and ser-
vices that must be supplied to everyone if they are
supplied to anyone. The market cannot provide
public goods because their costs exceed their value
to any single buyer, and a single buyer would not
be in a position to keep nonbuyers from using it.
National defense is the most common example:
protection from foreign ­invasion is too expen-
sive for a single person to buy, and once it is pro-
vided no one can be ­excluded from its benefits.
So ­people must act collectively through govern-
ment to provide for the common defense. Sec-
ond, externalities are another recognized m ­ arket
failure and justification for government inter-
vention. An externality occurs when an activity
of one i­ndividual, firm, or local government im-
poses uncompensated costs on others. The most
common examples are air and water pollution:
the discharge of air and water pollutants imposes
costs on others. ­Governments respond by either
regulating the activities that produce externalities
or imposing penalties (fines) on these activities to
compensate for their costs to society.
Public choice theory helps to explain why po-
litical parties and candidates generally fail to of-
fer clear policy alternatives in election campaigns.
Parties and candidates are not interested in ad-
vancing principles but rather in winning elec-
tions. They formulate their policy positions to win
elections; they do not win elections to formulate
policy. Thus, each party and candidate seeks pol-
icy positions that will attract the greatest number
of voters.7 Given a unimodal distribution of opinion
on any policy question (see Figure 2-6), parties and
­candidates will move toward the center to ­maximize
votes. Only “ideologues” (irrational, ideologically
­motivated people) ignore the vote-­maximizing centrist
strategy.
Public Choice:
Applying the Model
The public choice theory is employed in
Chapter 13, “Energy and the Environment:
Externalities and Interests,” to aid in
recognizing environmental pollution as a
problem in the control of externalities in human
activity. Public choice theory also helps us
to understand the behavior of environmental
interest groups in dramatizing and publicizing
their cause.
 Models of Politics 21

Figure 2-6 Public Choice: A Vote-Maximizing Model of Party Competition

Public choice theory assumes that individuals and organizations seek to maximize their own benefits in politics; for
example, parties and candidates whose policy views may be distinctly liberal or conservative move to the center at
election time to win the most votes.
Party A Party B

Numbers of Voters

Liberal Conservative
Policy Position

2.9: Game Theory or a national ­government—indeed, anybody with

Policy as Rational Choice in
Competitive Situations
Game theory is the study of decisions in situa-
tions in which two or more rational participants
have choices to make and the outcome depends
on the choices made by each.
The idea of “game” is that rational deci-
sion makers are involved in choices that are
­interdependent. “Players” must adjust their con-
duct to reflect not only their own desires and abil-
ities but also their expectations about what others
will do. Perhaps the connotation of a “game” is
­unfortunate, suggesting that game theory is not re-
ally appropriate for serious conflict situations. But
just the opposite is true: game theory can be applied
to decisions about war and peace, the use of nuclear
weapons, international diplomacy, bargaining and
coalition building in Congress or the United Na-
tions, and a variety of other important political sit-
uations. A “player” may be an individual, a group,
well-defined goals who is capable of rational action.
Consider the game of “chicken.” Two adoles-
cents drive their cars toward each other at a high
speed, each with one set of wheels on the center
line of the highway. If neither veers off course
they will crash. Whoever veers is “chicken.” Both
­drivers prefer to avoid death, but they also want
to avoid the “dishonor” of being “chicken.” The
­outcome depends on what both drivers do, and
each driver must try to predict how the other will
behave. This form of “brinkmanship” is com-
mon in international relations (see Table 2-2).
­Inspection of the payoff matrix suggests that it
would be better for both drivers to veer in order
to minimize the possibility of a great loss (−10).
But the matrix is too simple. One or both players
may place a different value on the outcomes than
is suggested by the numbers. For example, one
player may prefer death to dishonor in the game.
Each player must try to calculate the values of the
other, and neither has complete information about
22 Chapter 2

Table 2-2 A Game-Theoretic Matrix for the Game of Chicken

Game theory suggests that policymakers, or “players,” adjust their conduct to reflect not only their own preferences but
also the likely choices of opponents.
The game theorist himself or herself supplies the numerical values to the payoffs. If Driver A chooses to stay on course
and Driver B chooses to stay on course also, the result might be scored as –10 for both players, who wreck their
cars. But if Driver A chooses to stay on course and Driver B veers, then Driver A might get +5 (“courage”) and Driver
B –5 (“dishonor”). If Driver A veers but Driver B stays on course, the results would be reversed. If both veer, each is
dishonored slightly (–1), but not as much as when one or the other stayed on course.

DRIVER A’S CHOICES

Stay on Course Veer
Stay on Course A: −10 A: −5
B: −10 B: +5
DRIVER B’S CHOICES
Veer A: +5 A: −1
B: −5 B: −1

the values of the opponent. Moreover, bluff-
ing or the deliberate misrepresentation of one’s
values or resources to an opponent is always a
­possibility. For example, a possible strategy in
the game of chicken is to allow your opponent to
see you drink heavily before the game, stumble
drunkenly toward your car, and mumble some-
thing about having lived long enough in this rot-
ten world. The effect of this communication on
your opponent may increase his or her estimate
of your likelihood of staying on course, and hence
provide incentive for your opponent to veer and
allow you to win.
An important component of game theory is
the notion of deterrence. Deterrence is the effort to
prevent an opponent from undertaking an action
by inspiring fear of the consequences of the action.
Players engage in deterrence when they threaten
their opponents with retaliatory actions that
promise to impose costs on their opponents that
are far in excess of any benefits their opponents
might envision by taking these actions. Deterrence
is really a psychological defense: it tries to prevent op-
ponents from undertaking a particular action by creat-
ing in their minds the fear of costly retaliation.
The success of deterrence depends on the
credibility of the retaliatory threat and on the
r­ ationality of the opponent. Opponents must
truly believe that their actions will result in re-
taliatory responses that inflict unacceptable costs
on themselves, their people, or their nation. Op-
ponents who do not really believe a retaliatory
attack will occur are not deterred. Moreover, op-
ponents must be rational—opponents must weigh
the potential costs and benefits of their actions
and choose a course of action that does not result
in costs that exceed gains. Opponents who are ir-
rational—who do not consider the costs of their
actions to themselves, or their people, or their
­nation—are not deterred.
Game Theory:
Applying the Model
Game theory is frequently applied in
international conflicts. We will explore the
utility of game theory, especially the notion of
deterrence, in Chapter 15, “Defense Policy:
Strategies for Serious Games.” We will also
explore the weakness of deterrence in defending
against terrorism in Chapter 16, “Homeland
Security: Terrorism and Nondeterrable Threats.”

2.10: Models
How to Tell if They Are Helping
or Not
A model is merely an abstraction or representa-
tion of political life. When we think of political
systems or elites or groups or rational decision
making or incrementalism or games, we are ab-
stracting from the real world in an attempt to
simplify, clarify, and understand what is really
important about politics. Before we begin our
study of public policy, let us set forth some gen-
eral criteria for evaluating the usefulness of con-
cepts and models.
2.10.1: Order and Simplify
Reality
Certainly the utility of a model lies in its ability
to order and simplify political life so that we can
think about it more clearly and understand the
relationships we find in the real world. Yet too
much simplification can lead to inaccuracies in
our thinking about reality. On the one hand, if a
concept is too narrow or identifies only superfi-
cial phenomena, we may not be able to use it to
explain public policy. On the other hand, if a con-
cept is too broad and suggests overly complex
relationships, it may become so complicated and
unmanageable that it is not really an aid to under-
standing. In other words, some theories of politics
may be too complex to be helpful, while others
may be too simplistic.
2.10.2: Identify What Is
Significant
A model should also identify the really sig-
nificant aspects of public policy. It should di-
rect attention away from irrelevant variables
or circumstances and focus on the real causes
and significant consequences of public policy.
Models of Politics 23
Of course, what is “real,” “relevant,” or “signifi-
cant” is to some extent a function of an individ-
ual’s personal values. But we can all agree that
the utility of a concept is related to its ability to
identify what it is that is really important about
politics.
2.10.3: Be Congruent with
Reality
Generally, a model should be congruent with
­reality—that is, it ought to have real empirical
referents. We would expect to have difficulty
with a concept that identifies a process that does
not really occur or symbolizes phenomena that
do not exist in the real world. However, we must
not be too quick to dismiss unrealistic concepts
if they succeed in directing our attention to why
they are unrealistic. For example, no one con-
tends that government decision making is com-
pletely r­ ational—public officials do not always
act to maximize societal values and minimize
societal costs. Yet the concept of rational decision
making may still be useful, albeit unrealistic, if
it makes us realize how irrational government
decision making really is and prompts us to in-
quire why.
2.10.4: Provide Meaningful
Communication
A concept or model should also communicate
something meaningful. If too many people dis-
agree over the meaning of a concept, its utility in
communication is diminished. For example, if no
one really agrees on what constitutes an elite, the
concept of an elite does not mean the same thing
to everyone. If one defines an elite as a group of
democratically elected public officials who are
representative of the general public, one is com-
municating a different idea in using the term than
one who defines an elite as an unrepresentative
minority that makes decisions for society based
on its own interests.
24 Chapter 2
2.10.5: Direct Inquiry and
Research
A model should help to direct inquiry and re-
search into public policy. A concept should be
operational—that is, it should refer directly to
real-world phenomena that can be observed,
measured, and verified. A concept, or a series
of interrelated concepts (which we refer to as a
model), should suggest relationships in the real
world that can be tested and verified. If there is
no way to prove or disprove the ideas suggested
Summary: Models of Politics
Political science uses a variety of conceptual mod-
els to help explain political life and public policy.
1. The process model views policymaking as a
series of political activities.
2. The institutional model focuses attention on
the effects of political and governmental in-
stitutions on public policy.
3. A rational model implies that government
should choose policies that maximize societal
gains and minimize costs.
4. An incremental model views public pol-
icy largely as a continuation of past government
activities with only incremental modifications.
by a concept, the concept is not really useful in
developing a science of politics.
2.10.6: Suggest Explanations
Finally, a model should suggest an explanation of
public policy. It should suggest hypotheses about
the causes and consequences of public policy—
hypotheses that can be tested against real-world
data. A model that merely describes public policy
is not as useful as one that explains public policy,
or at least suggests some possible explanations.
5. Group theory views public policy as the out-
come of the struggle among societal groups.
6. The elite model views public policy as the
preferences and values of the nations govern-
ing elite.
7. Public choice theory applies economic analy-
sis to the study of public policy.
8. Game theory portrays policy as the outcome
of interaction between two or more rational
participants.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
[179] Details about the exact drawing-up of the second line and reserves seem
impossible to discover. I have only accurate notes as to the position of the front
line and some of the cavalry and the 1st Division.

[180] For doing this Jourdan criticized Soult for over-caution, and wasting of time,
describing this measure as timid and unnecessary. Mémoires, p. 443.

[181] Donaldson of the 94th. Recollections, p. 179.

[182] The 4th Division formed the infantry rearguard on the southern road, the
Light Division that on the central road.

[183] Colonel James Willoughby Gordon seems not to have been a success as
quarter-master-general. Very soon after his arrival we get notes in the earlier part
of the Salamanca campaign that intelligent officers ‘thought he would not stop long
with the Army.’ Cf. Tomkinson, p. 224: ‘Nothing could equal the bad arrangements
of the Quartermaster-General—the cavalry all retired by one road, allowing that of
the enemy to follow our infantry’ [of the central column on November 18]—which
was not covered, all the horse having gone on the western or left road. Wellington
had a worse accusation against him than mere incapacity (of this more will be
found in chap. iii of sect. xxxv)—that of sending letters home which revealed
military secrets which got into the English papers. In September he made up his
mind that Gordon must not see his dispatches, and must be ‘kept at as great
distance as possible’ (Supplementary Dispatches, vii. pp. 427-8). He was sent
home before the next campaign.

[184] D’Urban’s diary.

[185] See Foy, Vie militaire, p. 190. He was a witness to the conversation. And cf.
Espinchel, Mémoires, ii. p. 73, who gets the hour too late and exaggerates the
contact of the armies. He says that 12 of Hill’s guns opened on the French light
cavalry. Cf. also Joseph to Clarke of December 20.

[186] Espinchel, ii. p. 73.

[187] Joseph to Clarke, in a long dispatch of December 20. Ducasse’s

Correspondance du Roi Joseph, ix. pp. 119-20.

[188] See above, p. 126.

[189] For the curious adventures of Captain v. Stolzenberg commanding this little
party, and of the horde which he shepherded, see Schwertfeger’s History of the
K.G.L., ii. pp. 262-3.

[190] Mémoires of Béchaud, quoted above, p. 101.

[191] Foy, Vie militaire, pp. 189-90.

[192] Soult to King Joseph, Matilla, 16th November 1812.

[193] There is a good account of the skirmish in the Mémoires of Espinchel, ii. p.
73, who frankly allows that the French light cavalry were both outmanœuvred and
repulsed with loss. The returns of the three French regiments show 22 killed, no
wounded, and 25 missing—an odd proportion. Apparently the wounded must all
have been captured. The 1st Hussars K.G.L. had 7 wounded and 7 missing, the
rest of Alten’s brigade under 20 casualties. This brigade was now three regiments
strong instead of two, having had the 2nd Hussars K.G.L. from Hill’s Army
attached to it at Salamanca.

[194] Napier says that the column went through Tamames, but no 2nd, 3rd, or 4th
Division diary mentions that considerable town as passed—they all speak of
solitudes and oak-woods alone. Wellington’s orders on the night of November 16
(Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. p. 157) give ‘La Neja’ as Hill’s destination, and
this oddly spelt place is undoubtedly Anaya de Huebra.

[195] Memoirs of Donaldson of the 94th, pp. 181-2.

[196] See the Memoirs of Grattan of the 88th, and Bell of the 34th.

[197] See Wellington’s Marching Orders for the 17th in Supplementary

Dispatches, xiv. pp. 157-8, for the cavalry. A perverse reading of them might make
the cavalry start too early for ‘the brook which passes by La Maza and Aldehuela’,
where they are told to be at dawn. They are not actually directed to wait for the
infantry rearguard.

[198] There is a full account of his capture in the memoirs of Espinchel, ii. p. 77,
the officer whose men took Paget prisoner.

[199] The movements of this day are made very difficult to follow by the fact that
Wellington in his dispatches (ix. 464-5) calls Hill’s column the right, and the
Spanish column the left, of the three in which the Army marched. Vere’s Diary of
the Marches of the 4th Division does the same. But these directions are only
correct when the army faced about and stopped to check the French. On the
march Hill’s was the left column, and the Spaniards the right. For this reason I
have called them the southern and northern columns respectively.

[200] Soult to Joseph, November 17, from before San Muñoz.

[201] So the regimental histories (both good) of these corps. Napier gives one
more company of the 43rd.
[202] Napier, iv. p. 385.

[203] Autobiography of Green of the 68th, p. 127.

[204] British ‘missing’ one officer (General Paget) and 111 men, Portuguese
‘missing’ 66 men.

[205] Reminiscences of Hay, 12th Light Dragoons, p. 86.

[206] Espinchel commanded that which went farthest, to the bridge in front of
Santi Espiritus: he says that the whole road was lined with broken-down carts and
carriages, and strewn with dead men. About 100 British stragglers were gathered
in.

[207] The tale may be found with details, told from Wellington’s point of view, in
Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 494. The chief offender was W. Stewart, who
had succeeded to the command of the 1st Division on Paget’s capture the
preceding day. The others Wellington describes as ‘new-comers’ so they must
have been Oswald and Lord Dalhousie, for the other divisional commanders in this
column, Clinton and C. Alten, were not in any sense ‘new-comers’. I think,
therefore, that Mr. Fortescue is wrong in giving the names of the culprits as
Stewart, Dalhousie, and Clinton.

[208] See Napier, iv. p. 386. But cf. Fitzroy Somerset’s version in Greville
Memoirs, i. pp. 136-7.

[209] Donaldson of the 94th, p. 184. Grattan (p. 315) has a story of a Connaught
Ranger who ate, in addition to his rations, six ox-heads on six successive days,
and died of inflammation of the bowels.

[210] Grattan, pp. 303 and 305-6.

[211] Seventeen of the Chasseurs Britanniques were tried all together for
desertion in October 1812! They were mostly Italians. And for one man recaptured
and tried, how many got away safely?

[212] See Dispatches, ix. pp. 601-2.

[213] See Dispatches, ix. pp. 562 and 570.

[214] See the Life of Burgoyne, who was sent to look after the threatening
symptoms, vol. i. p. 246.

[215] The troops of the Army of Portugal began to march east as early as
November 20, long before Soult got back into touch with them. Jourdan to Clarke,
from Salamanca, November 20.

[216] The 1st Division seems to have been quartered about the upper Mondego
between Celorico and Mangualde, the 3rd in villages between Moimenta and
Lamego, the 4th about São João de Pesqueira, the 5th, Pack and Bradford, in the
direction of Lamego, the 6th and 7th on the lower Mondego and the Alva under the
Serra da Estrella, as far as I can make out from regimental diaries. There is no
general notice as to cantonments in the Wellington Dispatches to help. But see
General Orders for December 1, 1812, as to the post-towns for each division.

[217] Their cases are in General Orders for 1813, pp. 51-3. Each was
condemned to six months’ suspension, but the members of the court martial
petitioned for their pardon, on account of the privations of the time. Wellington
grudgingly granted the request ‘not concurring in any way in the opinion of the
court, that their cases in any way deserved this indulgence.’

[218] Bunbury, aide-de-camp to General Hamilton, referring to Wellington’s

memorandum, makes solemn asseveration that his troops got no distribution
whatever for those four days. The general himself had no bread. Acorns were the
sole diet.

[219] Private and unpublished diary of General D’Urban.

[220] Grattan of the 88th, p. 307.

[221] Tomkinson, p. 227.

[222] They had been ordered in May 1812, but had not been distributed by
November. See Dispatches, ix. p. 603.

[223] The figures may be found on pp. 170-1 of the Statistical ‘Ejércitos
Españoles’ of 1822, referred to in other places.

[224] See Tables in Appendix. The British battalions were 1/27th and a grenadier
battalion formed of companies of the regiments left in Sicily. The light battalion was
formed of companies from the 3rd, 7th, 8th Line of the K.G.L. and from de Roll and
Dillon. The Italians were ‘2nd Anglo-Italian Levy’. There was a field battery
(British), but only 13 cavalry (20th Light Dragoons).

[225] See p. 279, below.

[226] See Suchet, Mémoires, ii. p. 269.

[227] The best account is in Gildea’s History of the 81st Regiment, pp. 104-8.
[228] Dispatches, ix. p. 487.

[229] 161 of the 20th Light Dragoons, and 71 of the ‘Foreign Hussars,’ a newly
raised corps, mainly German, which did very creditably in 1813.

[230] Wellington to Lord Bathurst. Dispatches, ix, p. 535.

[231] Dispatches, ix. p. 545.

[232] See Wellington to H. Clinton (W. Clinton’s brother) on December 9

(Dispatches, ix. p. 614), and to Lord Bathurst (ibid., p. 616).

[233] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dispatches, ix. p. 573.

[234] These figures seem to represent about 1,400 prisoners at Rodrigo, 4,000 at
Badajoz, 300 at the Almaraz forts, 600 at the Salamanca forts, 7,000 at the battle
of Salamanca, 2,000 at the Retiro, 1,300 at Astorga, 700 at Guadalajara, with
2,000 more taken in smaller affairs, such as the surrenders of Consuegra and
Tordesillas, the combat on the Guarena, the pursuit after Salamanca, and Hill’s
operations in Estremadura.

[235] This looks a large figure, but over 150 guns were taken at Rodrigo, more
than that number at Badajoz, several hundred in the Retiro, and infinite numbers in
the Cadiz lines and the arsenal of Seville, not to speak of the captures at Astorga,
Guadalajara, Almaraz, and in the field at Salamanca, &c.

[236] Foy, Vie militaire, p. 193. Napoleon to Clarke, October 19, 1812.

[237] Report of Colonel Desprez to Joseph of his interview with the Emperor at
Moscow on October 19th. Correspondance du Roi Joseph, ix. p. 178.

[238] Ibid., p. 179.

[239] See above, vol. v, pp. 194-5.

[240] Napier’s statement that Napoleon was thinking of this project when he
declared Soult to be the ‘only military head in Spain’ is entirely unjustified by the
context from which he is quoting. The Emperor therein makes no allusion to the
Seville project. See Ducasse’s Correspondance, ix. pp. 178-9.

[241] See his letter quoted above, vol. v, pp. 255-6.

[242] Jones, Sieges of the Peninsula, ii. p. 430.

[243] Jones remarks that ‘we had to leave it to the valour of the troops to
surmount intermediate obstacles which in a properly conducted siege would be
removed by art and labour’ (Sieges, i. p. 163).

[244] See above, vol. v, p. 270.

[245] See above, vol. v, p. 316.

[246] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dispatches, ix. p. 574.

[247] Memorandum for Baron Alten, Madrid, 31st August 1812.

[248] The bad weather on the Tagus only began October 30th.

[249] See above, pp. 112-13.

[250] See above, p. 142.

[251] Not including 2/59th at Cadiz, but including the 1/6th, 20th, and 91st which
only landed in November, and the battalions of the 1st Foot Guards which had only
just joined during the Burgos retreat.

[252] The Portuguese infantry had suffered quite as heavily—cold being very
trying to them, though summer heat affected them less than the British. The 20th
Portuguese, starting on the retreat from Madrid with 900 men, only brought 350 to
Rodrigo.

[253] 4,400 for the infantry, 350 for cavalry, plus drafts for artillery, &c.

[254] Where the new Second Guards Brigade had a dreadful epidemic of fever
and dysentery, and buried 700 men. It was so thinned that it could not march even
in May, and missed the Vittoria campaign.

[255] Brigades were not always kept together, the regiments being a little
scattered. Individual battalions were in Baños, Bejar, Bohoyo, Montehermoso, &c.

[256] Jourdan, Mémoires, p. 449.

[257] See Correspondance du Roi Joseph, ix. p. 462.

[258] For a curious narrative of adventures in Madrid, November 4-10, by a party

of English prisoners who escaped in the confusion that followed the outmarch of
the French, see the Memoirs of Captain Harley of the 47th, ii. pp. 42-50.
[259] Fortunately for themselves most of King Joseph’s Spanish partisans, who
fled from Madrid in July to Valencia, were still under Suchet’s charge and had not
returned, or their lot would have been a hard one.

[260] Miot de Melito, iii. p. 258.

[261] The 2nd Division (see above, p. 90) had been taken from Soult and lent to
the Army of the Centre during the operation of November. It was never given back.

[262] A good picture of the state of Central Spain in January and February 1813
may be got from the Memoirs of d’Espinchel, of the 2nd Hussars, an officer
charged with the raising of contributions in La Mancha—a melancholy record of
violence and treachery, assassination by guerrilleros and reprisals by the French,
of villages plundered and magistrates shot. D’Espinchel had mainly to deal with
the bands of El Medico and the Empecinado. See his Souvenirs militaires, pp. 86-
110.

[263] Vide v. pp. 550-8.

[264] See Mina’s Life of himself, pp. 39-43. He declares that the French custom-
house at Yrun paid him 100 onzas de oro (£300) a month, for leave to pass goods
across the Bidassoa.

[265] The remains of Thomières’ unlucky division, cut to pieces at Salamanca—

the 1st, 65th, and 101st Line.

[266] 64th Line.

[267] Correspondance du Roi Joseph, ix. p. 224.

[268] Jourdan, Mémoires, p. 452.

[269] Clarke to King Joseph, Correspondance du Roi, ix. p. 186.

[270] See vol. ii, pp. 465-6.

[271] For text see Toreno, iii. p. 149.

[272] Wellington Dispatches, ix. p. 467.

[273] Ibid., pp. 474-5, October 5.

[274] Bathurst to Wellington, October 21. Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 462.

[275] See above, pp. 61-2.

[276] Roughly correct: the joint force of the Castilian and Estremaduran divisions
in October 1812 was 8,000 men with the colours—there were some 7,000 men in
dépôts and garrisons.

[277] In November the 3rd Army had about 5,000 men with the colours, 3,000 in
dépôt: the 2nd, 7,000, excluding the guerrilleros of the Empecinado and Duran.

[278] Two days later Wellington sent Carvajal a definite instance of this friction.
The Civil Intendant of Old Castile had collected a magazine for the benefit of the
garrison of Rodrigo. The Captain-General had seized it, and used it to support his
own staff. Dispatches, ix. p. 623.

[279] Wellington to Carvajal. Dispatches, ix. pp. 604-5.

[280] For the exact text of the reply see the Spanish Minister of War’s letter.
Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. pp. 170-1.

[281] See Supplementary Dispatches, vii. pp. 529-30 and 546.

[282] Wellesley to Castlereagh. Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 530.

[283] They were the Duke of Infantado, Admiral Villaviciencio, and Señors Ignacio
Rivas, Mosquera, and Villamil. The last two were reputed very anti-British.

[284] This Act had been a great demonstration of the ‘Liberales’, and they were
desirous of punishing certain canons and bishops who had refused to read it
publicly in their cathedrals; an odd parallel to the case of James II and the Seven
Bishops in English history.

[285] Including the presentation of a thundering letter from the British Prince-
Regent: see H. Wellesley to Wellington, July 28, Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p.
160 and ibid., p. 188.

[286] See especially below the difficulties with the Galician army as to
ammunition, and the Andalusian reserve as to transport and magazines.

[287] Dispatches, x. pp. 211-12.

[288] See Dispatches, x. p. 181, when Wellington writes in March: ‘There is not a
single battalion or squadron fit to take the field, not in the whole kingdom of Spain
a dépôt of provisions that would keep one battalion for one day—not a shilling of
money in any military chest.’

[289] Wellington Dispatches, x. p. 199.

[290] See above, vol. iii. pp. 193, 415-17, and iv. p. 71. The best sketch of the
personalities of the Portuguese regency is that in Lord Wellesley’s Memorandum
respecting Portugal, in Wellington Dispatches, Suppl., vii. pp. 199-204, a very
interesting document.

[291] Now Marquis de Borba by his father’s death in 1812.

[292] See e. g. Wellington Dispatches, x. pp. 37 and 106-7.

[293] See e. g. the cases dealt with in Wellington Dispatches, Suppl., vii. pp. 240
and 316.

[294] e. g. Wellington Dispatches, x. p. 129, and another case accompanied by

the murder of a soldier, x. p. 117.

[295] See Wellington Dispatches, x. pp. 131, 191, and 201.

[296] See Wellington Dispatches, x. p. 88 and ix. p. 615.

[297] See Wellington to Forjaz, Dispatches, ix. p. 353.

[298] See Wellington to Bathurst, ibid., ix. pp. 461-2.

[299] Wellington to the Prince-Regent of Portugal, Dispatches, x. pp. 284-7.

[300] Wellington to Stuart, ibid., x. pp. 342, &c.

[301] See Meneval’s Mémoires, iii. p. 317.

[302] It was generally known in London next day. See Sir G. Jackson’s Memoirs,
iii. p. 447.

[303] Liverpool to Wellington. Supplementary Dispatches, vii. pp. 502-3.

[304] Lord Liverpool doubted whether Prussia or Austria would move. Prussia
might stir, if only she was sure that Austria would support her. But ‘the councils of
Vienna at this time are abject.’

[305] Though on February 17 Wellington heard of the departure northward of the

7th (Polish) Lancers, and some squadrons of Gendarmerie belonging to the Army
of the North. But this was too small a move to serve as the base of a deduction.
Dispatches, x. p. 125.

[306] Wellington to Bathurst. Dispatches, x. p. 177.

[307] Ibid., p. 207, March 17.

[308] By an intercepted letter from the King to Reille, dated March 14, now in the
‘Scovell Cyphers,’ which mentions both facts.

[309] Wellington to Graham, April 7. Dispatches, x. p. 270.

[310] In the ‘Scovell Cyphers,’ like the dispatch quoted above.

[311] Wellington to Bathurst, January 26. Dispatches, x. p. 39; cf. ibid., p. 256.

[312] Supplementary Dispatches, vii. pp. 601-2, April 7.

[313] Wellington to Bathurst. Dispatches, x. p. 307.

[314] For details see Schwertfeger’s History of the K.G.L., vol. i, pp. 500-50.

[315] See letters in von Wacholz’s Diary, pp. 311-12. It is doubtful if the men,
largely waifs and prisoners of all nations, felt the same zeal as the officers.

[316] See vol. i, pp. 371, &c.

[317] Supplementary Dispatches, vii. pp. 449-50.

[318] Henry Wellesley to Wellington. Supplementary Dispatches, x, pp. 571-3.

[319] Bathurst to Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. 577, and

Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart, ibid., p. 586, March 3, 1813.

[320] See above, vol. v, pp. 342-7.

[321] Wellington to Bathurst. Dispatches, x. pp. 384-5.

[322] For this forgotten raid in December 1813, see Études Napoléoniennes,
1914, p. 191. For the Genoa affair see C. T. Atkinson in the R.U.S.I. Journal, 1915.

[323] See Wellington to Torrens, May 28, 1812. Dispatches, ix. p. 182. Yet
Wellington, unconsulted though he had been, expresses his thanks to the Duke for
fixing upon a successor to Murray.

[324] Creevey Papers, i. p. 173.

[325] Supplementary Dispatches, vii. pp. 427-8.

[326] Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p, 457.

[327] Oddly enough, Wellington wanted the Duke of York to take the initiative and
odium, by appointing Gordon to a home post. The Duke refused, holding that
Wellington must take the responsibility.

[328] Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 499.

[329] Ibid., p. 527.

[330] See examples on page 138, above.

[331] See above, pp. 151-2.

[332] See Wellington to Torrens, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. pp. 494-5.

[333] Ibid., p. 486.

[334] Wellington Dispatches, ix. p. 592.

[335] Wellington to Bathurst, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 484.

[336] Duke of York to Bathurst, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. pp. 516-17.

[337] He was bothering Lord Bathurst for a peerage, which he was not yet
destined to obtain. Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 515. He was put off with the
colonelcy of a cavalry regiment.

[338] Bathurst to Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. pp. 538-9.

[339] Ibid., vii. pp. 577-8.

[340] The 2nd, 20th, 51st, 68th, 74th, 77th, 94th Regiments.

[341] The 9th, 11th, 24th, 27th, 30th, 34th, 39th, 44th, 47th, 53rd, 58th, 66th, 81st,
83rd, 87th, as also Chasseurs Britanniques and Brunswick-Oels.

[342] 2nd, 2/24th, 2/30th, 2/31st, 2/44th, 51st, 2/53rd, 2/58th, 2/66th, 68th, 2/83rd,
94th.

[343] 1st Prov. Batt. = 2/31st and 2/66th; 2nd = 2nd and 2/53rd; 3rd = 2/24th and
2/58th; 4th = 2/30th and 2/44th.

[344] e.g. the 51st and 68th. Wellington Dispatches, ix. p. 609.

[345] The Duke to Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. pp. 524-5.

[346] Wellington to Torrens, Dispatches, x. pp. 77-8.

[347] The Duke to Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 553, February
17.

[348] Ibid., vii. pp. 581-3.

[349] The 2/30th and 2/44th.

[350] The 51st, 68th, 2/83rd, and 94th.

[351] 2nd, 2/24th, 2/31st, 2/53rd, 2/58th, 2/66th.

[352] 7th, 10th, 15th, 18th Hussars.

[353] 2/59th (from Cadiz), 2/62nd, 76th, 77th (from Lisbon garrison), 2/84th, 85th.

[354] On all this the reader interested in military finance will find excellent
commentaries in chap. i of vol. ix of Mr. Fortescue’s History of the British Army,
which appeared three months after this chapter of mine was written.

[355] See Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. p. 212.

[356] Ibid., vii. pp. 539-41.

[357] He was captured by a raiding party, while watching the enemy from too
short a distance, on August 31.

[358] So Clarke to the King, Corresp. du Roi Joseph, vol. ix. p. 189.

[359] Jourdan, Mémoires, p. 452.

[360] See Corresp. du Roi Joseph, ix. p. 187.

[361] See account in the Memoirs of Patterson of the 50th, pp. 303-5.

[362] See dispatch in Girod’s Vie militaire du Général Foy, pp. 386-7. The whole
is written in a boastful and unconvincing style, unworthy of such a good soldier.
Colonel Harrison’s report is singularly vague and short. He only says that the
enemy made off, leaving their dead behind.

[363] Desprez to Joseph, from Paris, January 3, Corresp. R. J. ix. pp. 180-2.

[364] Nap. Corresp. xxiv, no. 19411.

[365] See vol. v. pp. 538-9.

[366] Miot de Melito, iii. pp. 263-4.

[367] See above, pp. 215-16.

[368] Two regiments which had only two battalions in February 1813 got cut down
to one apiece.

[369] A brigade not a division, since the Hessian regiment perished at Badajoz.

[370] He had also later to give up the 22nd, a weak one-battalion regiment of 700
bayonets.

[371] See above, p. 188.

[372] Even the 2nd Dragoons, the first regiment scheduled, though it started in
March, shows casualties at Vittoria, so did not get away.

[373] See Joseph to Suchet, Correspondance, ix. p. 200.

[374] See Mémoires du Roi Joseph, ix. p. 134.

[375] Clarke to Joseph, Correspondance, ix. p. 193 (February 2).

[376] Ibid. (February 12), pp. 194-5.

[377] Clarke to Joseph, February 12. Ibid., pp. 197-9.

[378] See above, p. 219.

[379] Correspondance du Roi Joseph, ix. p. 290, written just before Clarke got
news of Wellington’s start.

[380] See above, pp. 190-91.

[381] Dispatch of February 26, Correspondance du Roi Joseph, ix. p. 206.

[382] See vol. iv. p. 472.

[383] Mémoires, iv. p. 202.

[384] ‘Au lieu de les poursuivre, de les inquiéter, d’aller au devant de leurs
entreprises, on attendait la nouvelle de leurs tentatives sur un point pour s’y porter
soi-même: on agissait toujours après l’événement.’ Clarke to Clausel,
Correspondance du Roi Joseph, ix. p. 210.

[385] Clarke to Clausel, March 9, Correspondance du Roi Joseph, ix. 209-12—a

very long and interesting dispatch, of which this is only a short précis.
[386] For a long account of the Combat of Poza, see Vacani, vol. vi. pp. 228-33.

[387] Martinien’s lists show casualties in the 3rd, 52nd, and 105th Line and 10th
Léger of Abbé’s division on this day, so he had clearly gone out in force.

[388] The interesting dispatch of Leguia, the captor of Fuenterrabia, will be found
in the Appendix to Arteche, vol. xiii.

[389] Mina’s claim to have annihilated these unfortunate troops is sustained by

Martinien’s lists, which show 8 officers killed and 23 wounded in the 25th Léger
and 27th Line, at Lerin, March 31. There would not be more than 40 or 45 officers
present with two battalions.

[390] Expressed at some length in the great guerrillero’s Memoirs.

[391] Who has a long and interesting narrative of the expedition in his vol. vi. pp.
240-50.

[392] Vacani’s statement that the Italian division lost this day only 110 men, is
made absurd by the lists in Martinien, which show that the 4th, 6th, and 2nd
Ligeros lost that day 3 officers killed and 16 wounded—which implies a total
casualty list of at least 350.

[393] In Martinien’s lists there are five officer-casualties given for this fight, but
they do not include all the names of officers mentioned as killed by Vacani in his
narrative.

[394] Not the 24th as in Vacani and Belmas. See Girod de l’Ain’s Life of Foy, p.
260.

[395] Figures in Belmas are (in detail) Foy’s own division (10 battalions) 5,513
men, Palombini’s (5 battalions) 2,474, artillery 409, Sarrut’s division about 4,500.
Foy left behind Aussenac’s brigade about 1,500, and the garrison of Bilbao about
2,000.

[396] For horrid details of mishandlings of both sexes see Marcel (of the 6th
Léger) in his Campagnes d’Espagne, pp. 193-4. Marcel is a raconteur, but Belmas
bears him out (iv. p. 566).

[397] Napier says the Spanish loss was 180—which seems more probable. The
British ships lost one officer and sixteen men wounded, by Bloye’s report. As to the
French loss, we have the names of 3 officers killed and 6 wounded during the
operation—which looks like 150 to 180 casualties.

[398] See above, vol. ii. p. 341.

[399] 1/10th, 1/27th, 1/58th, 1/81st, and 2/27th which came in time for Castalla,
also a battalion of grenadier companies of units in Sicily.

[400] 4th and 6th Line battalions, and a light battalion composed of the light
companies of 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and of De Roll and Dillon.

[401] Three companies of De Roll and four of Dillon—the whole making up a

battalion 800 bayonets and the Calabrese Free Corps.

[402] 1st and 2nd Italian Levy, and two battalions of Sicilian Estero Regiment.

[403] Those of Villacampa, Mijares, and Sarsfield.

[404] For details see letter of February 22nd in Sir Samuel Whittingham’s
Memoirs, pp. 172-4. He says that Colonel Grant, commanding the 2nd Italian Levy,
had made himself cordially detested by his men by ‘employing the minute worry of
the old British School,’ and that Bourke of the 1st Italian Levy had much more
control over his men.

[405] Murray to Wellington. Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. p. 191.

[406] See his letter of March 19th, written after the skirmish: ‘Our army is
concentrating itself, and a few days I hope will bring on a general action, in which I
hope to play my part’ (Memoirs, p. 188).

[407] Murray to Wellington. Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. p. 200.

[408] Napier blames the British Government for having got things into such a
position of double command that Bentinck could withdraw from Spain troops which
he had sent there, and which had passed under Wellington’s authority (v. p. 54).
Wellington seems to have made no objection to this particular recall (Dispatches,
vii. p. 260), thinking (I suppose) that the risk of losing Sicily was much more
serious than the deduction of 2,000 men from the Alicante side-show. He wrote at
any rate to Murray to send them off at once, if he had not done so already. The
fault, of course, lay with Bentinck, for denuding Sicily before he was sure of the
stability of the new Constitution.

[409] Murray to Wellington, April 2. Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 605. The

6th K.G.L. was present at Castalla on April 13th.

[410] Wellington, Dispatches, x. p. 162.

[411] The best account of all this from the Spanish point of view is a dispatch
written by Colonel Potons y Moxica, Elio’s chief of the staff, in the Record Office,
‘East Coast of Spain’ file. It is equally valuable for the battle of Castalla.
[412] Consisting of 2/27th British, Calabrese Free Corps, 1st Italian Levy, and the
rifle companies of 3rd and 8th K.G.L.

[413] Two squadrons 20th Light Dragoons, the troop of Foreign Hussars, and
some of Whittingham’s Spaniards, two squadrons of Olivenza.

[414] I do not know who was commanding this division (3rd of the Murcian army)
in April: its divisional general, Sarsfield, was absent. It included Bailen, Badajoz,
America, Alpujarras, Corona, and Guadix: O’Ronan had it in the preceding
autumn.

[415] Potons y Moxica’s dispatch says that ‘la entrega del castillo provino de una
especie de sedicion en la tropa de Velez Malaga,’ which is conclusive. Why Napier
(v. 57) calls Velez Malaga ‘the finest regiment in the Spanish army’ I cannot
conceive. It was one of O’Donnell’s old regiments, cut to pieces at Castalla in the
preceding July, and hastily filled up with drafts. I suspect that Napier is
paraphrasing Suchet’s description of this corps as ‘mille hommes de belles
troupes.’ Except that they had been recently re-clothed from the British subsidy,
there was nothing ‘fine’ about them.

[416] In his own narrative he says that he sent in the 1st and 3rd Léger, 14th,
114th, and 121st Line—a big deployment of forces.

[417] The best account of the combat of Biar is that of the anonymous officer of
the 2/27th, quoted at length by Trimble in his History of the Inniskilling Regiment,
pp. 61-2. See also the less trustworthy Landsheit (of the ‘Foreign Hussars’), ii. pp.
86-9.

[418] De Roll-Dillon, 81st, and one of Whittingham’s Spanish battalions. They had
some casualties—the Spaniards 29, De Roll-Dillon probably 25: its total casualty
list for the days April 12-13 of 34 cannot be divided between the two actions.

[419] It is impossible to disentangle the losses of Adam’s brigade on April 12 and

April 13, given together in Murray’s report. But on the second day the 2/27th
regiment was the only unit seriously engaged. The total for both days was killed 1
officer and 56 men, wounded 10 officers and 231 men, missing 32 men: or a total
of 330. If we deduct 40 for assumed losses of the 2/27th on the second day, and
30 more for casual losses of the other units on April 13—they were engaged but
not seriously—and add 29 for losses in Whittingham’s battalion (he gives the figure
himself) and 25 (including 9 missing) for those in De Roll-Dillon (which was barely
under fire on the second day and lost 34 altogether), we must conclude that the
total was very close to 300.
[420] The light company 7th K.G.L., two newly arrived squadrons of Brunswick
Hussars, and two batteries.

[421] 2/27th, Calabrese Free Corps, 1st Italian Levy, two light companies K.G.L.

[422] 1/27th, 4th and 6th K.G.L., ‘Estero’ regiment (two battalions).

[423] 1/10th, 1/58th, 1/81st British, composite battalion of De Roll-Dillon, 2nd

Italian Levy.

[424] Cordoba, Mallorca, Guadalajara, 2nd of Burgos, 2nd of Murcia, 5th

Grenadiers.

[425] Chinchilla, Canarias, Alicante, Cazadores de Valencia, Voluntarios de

Aragon.

[426] Two squadrons each of Olivenza and Almanza.

[427] Napier, v. 58, quoting Donkin MSS., which are unpublished and unfindable.

[428] Landsheit, ii. p. 91.

[429] Suchet says that to support the voltigeurs he sent in only four battalions of
the 3rd Léger and 121st—but most undoubtedly the 114th attacked also, for it lost
four officers killed and nine wounded, as many as the 3rd Léger, and this means
250 casualties at least in the rank and file.

[430] Whittingham, Memoirs, p. 197.

[431] Mr. Fortescue (British Army, ix. p. 43) seems rather to lean to the idea that
the staff, or at any rate Catanelli, resolved to force Murray to fight despite of
himself. This may have been the case.

[432] Cordoba and 2nd of Burgos.

[433] Guadalajara.

[434] Murcia, Majorca, and 5th Grenadiers.

[435] 1st Léger, in reserve on the Cerro del Doncel.

[436] During which occurred the dramatic duel in front of the line between Captain
Waldron and a French Grenadier officer mentioned in Napier, v. p. 59. The
picturesqueness of the story induced some critics to doubt it. But there is no
getting over the fact that Waldron gave his opponent’s weapon, which was a sword
of honour presented by the Emperor, to the Quartermaster-General (Donkin), who
forwarded it to the Duke of York, and the Commander-in-Chief gazetted Waldron to
a brevet-majority in consequence. (See Trimble’s Historical Record of the 27th, p.
64.) It is extremely odd (as Arteche remarks) that Suchet in his short and insincere
account of Castalla tells a story of a French officer who killed an English officer in
single combat (Mémoires, ii. p. 308).

[437] I am inclined to think the latter, as it is doubtful whether, with the spur
between, Adam’s fighting-ground was visible from Whittingham’s.

[438] Taking Murray’s casualty list for comparison with Suchet’s, we find that he
had 4 officers killed and 16 wounded to 649 men at Biar and Castalla, i. e. 1 officer
to 32 men. But this was an exceptionally low proportion of officers lost. At such a
rate Suchet might have lost 2,000 men! I take 1,300 as a fair estimate.

[439] Cf. Wellington, Dispatches, x. pp. 354-5, in which Wellington asks what sort
of a victory was it, if Suchet was able to hold the pass of Biar, only two miles from
the battlefield, till nightfall?

[440] See Appendix on Castalla losses, English and French, at the end of the
volume.

[441] Six companies of Dillon came from Sicily, to replace the 2/67th at
Cartagena.

[442] Wellington to Dumouriez, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. 482-3, and to

Cooke, ibid. pp. 477-8.

[443] Wellington to Liverpool, November 23, 1812. Dispatches, ix. p. 572.

[444] Wellington to Graham, January 31. Dispatches, x. p. 67.

[445] Wellington to Bathurst. Ibid., p. 104.

[446] Dispatches, x. p. 464.

[447] Wellington to Henry Wellesley. Dispatches, x. p. 239.

[448] Wellington to Stapleton Cotton, ibid., p. 268, and to Bathurst, ibid. 295,
speaking of the extraordinary dry spring. Dickson notes in his Diary that for two
months before April 4 there had been no rain.
[449] See Dispatches, x. pp. 372-3.

[450] Wellington to Beresford, April 24. Dispatches, x. p. 322.

[451] See above, pp. 224-5.

[452] Wellington to Bathurst, Dispatches, x. 372.

[453] Wellington to Bathurst, May 6. Dispatches, x. p. 361.

[454] Algarve, and Hussars of Estremadura.

[455] Pontevedra and Principe.

[456] Castaños himself during the campaign acted more as Captain-General than
as Army-Commander—stationing himself at Salamanca and reorganizing the
districts just recovered from the French.

[457] Apparently not without reason, if we can trust King Joseph’s

correspondence, which contains notes of a treasonable intrigue in May, between
certain officers of the 3rd Army and General Viruez, an Afrancesado at Madrid.
See Correspondance du Roi, ix. pp. 130 and 466.

[458] Total force a nominal 15,000, but dépôts, hospitals, petty garrisons, &c.,
absorbed a full third—the cavalry was 441 sabres only.

[459] See Codrington to Wellesley, January 18, in Supplementary Dispatches, vii.

p. 569.

[460] Sarsfield with one of the two Catalan field divisions was normally operating
as a sort of guerrillero on the Aragonese side. Manso generally hung about the
Ampurdam with a brigade.

[461] The H.A. troops were ‘A’ Ross, ‘D’ Bean, ‘E’ Gardiner, ‘F’ Webber-Smith,
and ‘I’ Ramsay. The foot companies were those of Dubourdieu (1st Division),
Maxwell (2nd Division), Douglas (3rd Division), Sympher K.G.L. (4th Division),
Lawson (5th Division), Brandreth (6th Division), Cairnes (7th Division). Tulloh’s
Portuguese company was attached to the 2nd Division, Da Cunha’s to Silveira’s
division. The reserve was composed of Webber-Smith’s H.A. troop, Arriaga’s
Portuguese heavy 18-pounders, and Parker’s foot company. See Colonel Leslie’s
edition of the Dickson Papers, ii. p. 719.

[462] Long was now in charge of Hill’s cavalry vice Erskine, a general whose acts
have so often required criticism. This unfortunate officer had committed suicide at
Brozas during the winter, by leaping out of a lofty window while non compos
mentis. The moment he was removed Wellington abolished the ‘2nd Cavalry
Division’, and threw its two brigades into the general stock under Stapleton Cotton
for the campaign of 1813.

[463] Wellington to Hill, Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. pp. 206 and 216.

[464] 12th Dragoons, of Digeon’s division.

[465] This is Wellington’s own observation, Dispatches x. 397, to Graham from

Matilla.

[466] Wellington to Graham, Dispatches, x. 401.

[467] That the charges were not pushed home is shown by the casualties—10
wounded in the Royals, 1 killed no wounded in the 1st Hussars K.G.L.

[468] Creditable as was the conduct of Villatte’s infantry, it is hyperbole to say

with Napier (v. p. 98) that ‘the dauntless survivors won their way in the face of
30,000 enemies!’ For only 1,600 British horsemen were up, and the nearest allied
infantry was 6 or 8 miles away.

[469] Jourdan (Mémoires, p. 464) holds that Villatte was to blame, and ‘engagea
le combat mal à propos,’ but considers that he was ‘faiblement suivi’ by Fane and
Alten. He acknowledges the loss of some of Villatte’s guns, probably in error, for
Wellington speaks of captured caissons only in his report of the affair. Martinien’s
list of casualties shows hardly any officer-casualties on this day in Villatte’s
division.

[470] See the elaborate dispatch of June 28 (to Hill, Dispatches, x. pp. 402-4).

[471] See Jourdan’s Mémoires, p. 466.

[472] For all this see Wellington to Hill, Dispatches, x. pp. 402-4.

[473] There are some slips either in the original or the copy of the Marching
Orders printed in Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. pp. 215-16. For Carazedo, given
on the itinerary of the 1st Division, is many miles from it, though it is on the proper
line of the 5th Division, which was going to Outeiro and not to Braganza. Limão on
the itinerary of the 3rd Division should be Vinhas, if I am not mistaken.

[474] Another odd error in Marching Orders given in Wellington Dispatches, x. p.

368, had turned the Portuguese heavy guns into infantry ‘18th Portuguese
Brigade’ which should read ‘Portuguese 18-pounder brigade.’ There was no higher
numbered Portuguese infantry brigade than the 10th. This misprint has misled
many historians.