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i
OX F O R D S T U D I E S I N E U RO P E A N L AW
Series Editors
PAU L C R A I G
Professor of English Law at St John’s College, Oxford
G R Á I N N E D E B Ú RC A
Professor of Law at New York University School of Law
EU Equality Law
EU Equality Law: The First Fundamental Rights Policy of the EU. Elise Muir © Elise Muir 2018. Published
2018 by Oxford University Press.
ii
OX F O R D S T U D I E S I N E U RO P E A N L AW
Series Editors:
Paul Craig, Professor of English Law at St John’s College, Oxford and
Gráinne de Búrca, Professor of Law at New York University School of Law
The aim of this series is to publish important and original research on EU law.
The focus is on scholarly monographs, with a particular emphasis on those
which are interdisciplinary in nature. Edited collections of essays will also be
included where they are appropriate. The series is wide in scope and aims to
cover studies of particular areas of substantive and of institutional law, historical
works, theoretical studies, and analyses of current debates, as well as questions
of perennial interest such as the relationship between national and EU law and
the novel forms of governance emerging in and beyond Europe. The fact that
many of the works are interdisciplinary will make the series of interest to all
those concerned with the governance and operation of the EU.
ot h er t itles in this se ries
Subnational Authorities in EU Law

Michèle Finck
Accessing Asylum in Europe
Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law
Violeta Moreno-Lax
National Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis
Resilience or Resignation?
Davor Jančić
Environmental Integration in Competition and Free-Movement Laws
Julian Nowag
EU Agencies
Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration
Merijn Chamon
Coherence in EU Competition law
Wolf Sauter
Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law
Joris Larik
Economic Governance in Europe
Comparative Paradoxes and Constitutional Challenges
Federico Fabbrini
Private Regulation and the Internal Market
Sports, Legal Services, and Standard Setting in EU Economic Law
Mislav Mataija
The EU Deep Trade Agenda
Law and Policy
Billy A. Melo Araujo
iii
EU Equality Law
The First Fundamental Rights Policy of the EU
ELISE MUIR
Associate Professor of EU Law, and head of the Institute for
European Law, KU Leuven
1
iv
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Elise Muir 2018
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2018
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
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address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Crown copyright material is reproduced under Class Licence
Number C01P0000148 with the permission of OPSI
and the Queen’s Printer for Scotland
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
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Data available
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Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
v
To Amélie, Hania, and Pawel
vi
Series Editors’ Preface
Almost two decades after the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights gained binding
force, Elise Muir’s book revisits the question whether and to what extent the EU
has an autonomous human rights policy. Muir does so through an analysis of EU
Equality law, which she argues has become the EU’s first fundamental rights policy.
Contrasting EU equality law and policy with other areas of EU policy such as
data protection, which has strong fundamental rights implications, she argues that
equality law and policy is different in that it is a human rights policy with its own in-
dependent legal basis, its own set of tools and instruments, and is intended to realize
specific fundamental rights rather than being part of another EU policy. She notes
the application of this area of law to both the public and the private sphere, which
she labels the ‘infrastructural’ and ‘transformative’ dimensions.
Muir cautions against the over-constitutionalization of EU equality law, in the
sense of tying its development and shape too closely to the EU treaties rather than
permitting the policy to be more flexibly developed and adapted. She argues that
some of the cases in which the Court has interpreted the constitutional contours of
EU equality law, in the shape of Treaty and Charter provisions and constitutional
principles, have established powerful supranational interventions into controversial
areas of domestic policy touching on important and nationally sensitive values, and
that EU legislative rather than constitutional guidance in such fields may be more
advisable.
Later chapters of the book examine the legislative process in the making of EU
equality law, and the use of other tools to shape and promote it. Chapter V con-
tains an interesting analysis of governance and enforcement within EU equality
law, including a comparison between the emerging fundamental rights fields of EU
data protection and equality law, noting in particular the difference in the way the
independent national enforcement authorities within these two fields are treated.
Indeed, a recurrent theme of the book is the importance of stimulating and sup-
porting legal innovation at the domestic level in the field of EU equality law, rather
than too much prescriptive intervention ‘from above’.
Overall, the book is an intelligent and welcome addition to the existing literature
on EU equality law, updating and providing some fresh perspectives on this im-
portant and constantly growing field, and will appeal to all those who are interested
in EU human rights, equality and non-discrimination law and policy.
Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca
ix
Acknowledgements
This book is the outcome of a research project financed by the Veni programme of
the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and hosted by the
Faculty of Law of the University of Maastricht between 2013 and 2017. I am most
grateful to both organizations for making it possible to write this monograph.
I owe special thanks to a number of individuals who have had a direct impact on
the content of the book. Mark Dawson gave me the appetite for a second mono-
graph and patiently read early chapters. Bruno de Witte, Marco Dani, and two
anonymous reviewers provided most valuable comments on aspects of the project
with which I had particular difficulties. Sacha Garben, Gillian More, and Katrien
Meuwissen have very kindly and equally helpfully shared their views on specific
sections. I am also indebted to the members of the Maastricht Centre for European
Law and to the members of the 2017 Edition of the Czech Mountain Seminar who
have spent time and energy reflecting along with me on draft chapters.
This manuscript would never have gone to press without the support of family and
friends. To begin with my academic family: Monica Claes, Mark Dawson, Mariolina
Eliantonio, Sacha Garben, Inge Govaere, Dominik Hanf, Claire Kilpatrick, Anne
Pieter van der Mei, Síofra O’Leary, Cristophe Radé, Séverine Saintier, Hildegard
Schneider, Takis Tridimas, Christian Valèze, Ellen Vos, Lisa Waddington, and
Bruno de Witte have provided healthy, caring, and stimulating intellectual homes
for the early stages of my academic life. I feel privileged to have received their sup-
port and words of advice.
This is as well as, of course, the friends of yesterday and tomorrow, Magali,
Estelle, Tristan, and Michaël, who are always available for a chat. My parents, with
their indefectible trust. My brothers, so warmly different and thereby so comple-
mentary to me. My grandparents, Geneviève, Jean-Luc, Hélène, Pierre and Marie-
Pierre, and Annie, acting affectionate intellectual compasses.
This book is dedicated to Amélie, Hania, and Pawel. Amélie and Hania were born
during and grew up alongside this project; their presence strengthened my deter-
mination to write this book. As for Pawel, he is behind each and every page.
xvi
Table of Cases
Abrahamsson See Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist
Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:140 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Achbita See Samira Achbita and Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen
en voor Racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV
Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:105. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 51, 66
Albert Ruckdeschel & Co and Hansa Lagerhaus Ströh & Co v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St
Annen; Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1977] ECLI:EU:C:1977:160. . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 62
Alimanovic See Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Nazifa Alimanovic and others
Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiën [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:126. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
AMS See Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT and others
Ana de Diego Porras v Ministerio de Defensa [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:683. . . . . . . . . 127, 128, 131
Angonese See Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA
António Fernando Maio Marques da Rosa v Varzim Sol—Turismo, Jogo e Animação, SA
[2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:844 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Antonio Muñoz y Cia SA and Superior Fruiticola SA v Frumar Ltd and Redbridge Produce
Marketing Ltd [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:497. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Asma Bougnaoui and Association de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (ADDH) v Micropole
SA [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:204. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Asociaţia Accept v Consiliul Naţional pentru Combatere a Discriminării [2013]
ECLI:EU:C:2013:275. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and others v Conseil des ministres
[2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 32, 35, 87, 96–8, 105, 106, 140
Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT and others [2014]
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 83, 113–16, 118, 130, 141
Athanasios Vatsouras and Josif Koupatantze v Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) Nürnberg 900
[2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:344 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Audiolux SA e.a v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL) and others and Bertelsmann AG and
others (Case C-101/08) [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:626. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Auditeur du travail v Yangwei SPRL [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:826. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127, 128
Autorità per le Garanzienelle Comunicazioni v Istituto Nazionale di Statistica—ISTAT and
others [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:608 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Barber See Douglas Harvey Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group
Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:493. . . . 69
BECTU (Case C-173/99) [2001] ECR I-488. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Belinda Jane Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:424. . . . . . . . . . . . 149, 152
Belov See Valeri Hariev Belov v CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD and others
Betriebsrat der Ruhrlandklinik GmbH v Ruhrlandklinik GmbH [2016]
ECLI:EU:C:2016:883. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126, 127
Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] ECLI:EU:C:1986:204. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
BNO Walrave and LJN Koch v Association Union cycliste international, Koninklijke
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Espanola Ciclismo [1974]
ECLI:EU:C:1974:140. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 80
xvi
xviii Table of Cases

Bougnaoui See Asma Bougnaoui and Association de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (ADDH)
v Micropole SA
Brey See Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey
Briheche See Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Education nationale
and Ministre de la Justice
Bruno See Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) v Tiziana Bruno and Massimo
Pettini and Daniela Lotti and Clara Matteucci
Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce v Salvatore Manni

ECLI:EU:C:2017:19. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Carlos Álvarez Santirso v Consejería de Educación, Cultura y Deporte del Principado de
Asturias [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:72. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127, 128
Carmela Carratù v Poste Italiane SpA [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:830. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123, 128, 131
Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV [2008]
ECLI:EU:C:2008:397. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172, 175, 190
Charlotte Rosselle v Institut national d’assurance maladie-invalidité (INAMI) and Union
nationale des mutualités libres (UNM) [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:339. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172, 175
CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [2015]
ECLI:EU:C:2015:480. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 74, 75, 128, 172, 173
Coleman (S) v Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:415 . . . . . . . . . . 128, 129, 157
Coloroll Pension Trustees Ltd v James Richard Russell, Daniel Mangham, Gerald Robert
Parker, Robert Sharp, Joan Fuller, Judith Ann Broughton and Coloroll Group plc [1994]
ECLI:EU:C:1994:348. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones v Administración del Estado [2008]
ECLI:EU:C:2008:143. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:35. . . . . 70
Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:125. . . . . . . . . . . 192–4, 200
Commission v Hungary ECLI:EU:C:2014:237 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194, 199
Commission v Republic of Austria [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:406. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192–4
Concetta Sagulo, Gennaro Brenca and Addelmadjid Bakhouche [1977] ECLI:EU:C:1977:131 . . . . . 155
Dai Cugini NV v Rijksdienst voor Sociale Zekerheid [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:223. . . . . . . . 127, 128, 132
Danfoss A/S and Sauer-DanfossApS v Skatteministeriet [1989] ECLI:EU:C:1989:383. . . . . . . . . 149
Dano See Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig
Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen [2016]
ECLI:EU:C:2016:278. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 35, 83, 85, 86, 116, 202
David L Parris v Trinity College Dublin and others [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:897. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
David Montoya Medina v Fondo de Garantía Salarial et Universidad de Alicante [2011]
ECLI:EU:C:2011:167. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Defrenne II See Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena
Del Cerro Alonso See Yolanda Del Cerro Alonso v Osakidetza-Servicio Vasco de Salud
Delège and Lehtonen (Cases C-51/96 &176/96) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Deutsche Post AG v Elisabeth Sievers and Brunhilde Schrage [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:76. . . . 10, 77
Deutsche Telekom AG v Lilli Schröder[2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:72. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 10, 77
Dieter Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECLI:EU:C:1993:125 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70, 158
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
and others and Kärtner Landesregierung and others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. . . . . . . . . 75
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and
others and Kärntner Landesregierung and others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. . . . . . . . . . 139
Dominguez See Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du
Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la région Centre
Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH [1997]
ECLI:EU:C:1997:413. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
xi
Table of Cases xix

Douglas Harvey Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990]
ECLI:EU:C:1990:209. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89–91, 98, 105
Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:322. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91, 94

Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig [2014]
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100, 101, 103
Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou
v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and
others[1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:254. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36, 61
Enderby (Dr Pamela Mary) v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for Health
[1993] ECLI:EU:C:1993:859 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 70, 82, 149
Erich Stauder v City of Ulm—Sozialamt [1969] ECLI:EU:C:1969:57. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
European Commission v Guido Strack [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:570. . . 85, 114, 117, 119, 120, 139
Fenoll See Gérard Fenoll v Centre d’aide par le travail ‘La Jouvene’ and Association
de parents et d’amis de personnes handicapées mentales (APEI) d’Avignon
Feryn See Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV
Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
FMC plc, FMC (Meat) Ltd, DT Duggins Ltd, Marshall (Lamberhurst) Ltd, Montelupo Ltd
and North Devon Meat Ltd v Intervention Board of Agricultural Produce and Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Francisco Javier Rosado Santana v Consejería de Justicia y Administración Pública de la Junta
de Andalucía [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:557. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126–8
Fransson See Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson
Frédéric Hay v Crédit Agricole Mutuel de Charente-Maritime et des DeuxSèvres [2013]
ECLI:EU:C:2013:823. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62, 173
Fries See Werner Fries v Lufthansa City Line GmbH
Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976]

ECLI:EU:C:1976:56 (Defrenne II) . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 7, 8, 70, 79, 80, 82–4, 90, 106–8, 137, 148
Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena (Defrenne III)
(Case 149/77) [1978] ECLI:EU:C:1978:130; [1978] ECR 1365 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 62, 95
García-Nieto See Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v Jovanna García-Nieto
and others
Gaskin v United Kingdom (App no 10454/83). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Geoffrey Léger contre Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des femmes et
Etablissement français du sang [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:288. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67, 85
Georg Badeck and others, interveners: Hessische Ministerpräsident and Landesanwalt beim
Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hesse [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:163. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Gérard Fenoll v Centre d’aide par le travail ‘La Jouvene’ and Association de parents
et d’amis de personnes handicapées mentales (APEI) d’Avignon [2015]
ECLI:EU:C:2015:200. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112, 114, 115, 117, 118, 130
Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:513. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155–6
Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70, 82
Glatzel See Wolfgang Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern
Graf (Case C-190/98) [2000] ECR I–493. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Grant See Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd
Grupo Norte Facility, SA v Angel Manuel Moreira Gómez [2017] OJ C30/21–22
(pending). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111, 120
H Lommers v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:183. . . . . . 91

Handels-og Kontorfunktionærernes Danfoss Forbund I Danmark v Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss [1989] ECLI:EU:C:1989:383 . . . . . . . . . . 28
x
xx Table of Cases
Handels-og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening,
acting on behalf of Danfoss [1989] ECLI:EU:C:1989:38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Hay See Frédéric Hay v Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime et des Deux-Sèvres
Helmut Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECLI:EU:C:1997:533. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v Dansk almennyttigt Boligselskab and HK
Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting
on behalf of Pro Display A/S [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:222 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v Dansk almennyttigt Boligselskab
(C-335/11) and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:222. . . . . 174
Impact v Minister for Agriculture and Food and others [2008]

ECLI:EU:C:2008:223. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123–6, 130, 131
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel [1970] ECLI:EU:C:1970:114. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36, 61
Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) v Tiziana Bruno and Massimo Pettini and
Daniela Lotti and Clara Matteucci [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:329. . . . . . . . . 125, 126, 128, 132
J Nold, Kohlen-und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities

[1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61–3
Jean Razanatsimba [1977] ECLI:EU:C:1977:193. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Jean Reyners v Belgian State [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:68. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
JN v Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:84. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Nazifa Alimanovic and others [2015]
ECLI:EU:C:2015:597. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101, 103, 105, 106
Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:131. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
John O’Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:206. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70, 82
Joseph Griesmar v Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie and Ministre
de la Fonction publique, de la Réforme de L’Etat et de la Décentralisation [2001]
ECLI:EU:C:2001:648. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
JP Jenkins v Kingsgate [1981] ECLI:EU:C:1981:80. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Julia Schnorbus v Land Hessen [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:676 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Jürgen Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2010:4251 . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 62
Kaba (Case C-356/98) (2000) 2 EJML 431 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Kalanke See Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen
Kamberaj See Servet Kamberaj v Istituto per l’Edilizia Sociale
della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES) and others
Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist [2000]
ECLI:EU:C:2000:367. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94, 95
Katharina Rinke v Ärztekammer Hamburg [2003]
ECLI:EU:C:2003:435. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85, 86, 120, 139
Kerly Del Rosario Martinez Silva v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) and
Comune di Genova ECLI:EU:C:2017:485. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
KHS (Case C-214/10) [2011] ECR I-11757. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Kücükdeveci See Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG
Land Oberösterreich v Čez [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:660. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska yggnadsarbetareförbund
etsavdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007]
ECLI:EU:C:2007:809. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 158
Leander v Sweden (App no 9248/81) (1987) 9 EHRR 433. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
xxi
Table of Cases xxi

Léger See Geoffrey Léger contre Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la
Santé et des Droits des femmes et Etablissement français du sang
Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:63. . . . . . . 58, 98, 104, 203
Macarthys Ltd v Wendy Smith[1980] ECLI:EU:C:1980:103. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co Ltd [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:331 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Mangold See Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm
María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:217. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99, 100
Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet
de la région Centre [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:559. . . . . . . . . 13, 86, 112–15, 117, 118, 130, 141
Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la
région Centre [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:559. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
Marschall See Helmut Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen
Martinez Silva See Kerly Del Rosario Martinez Silva v Istituto nazionale
della previdenza sociale (INPS) and Comune di Genova
Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commisioner [2015]
ECLI:EU:C:C2015:650. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190, 191, 194
Melloni See Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal
MG v United Kingdom (App no 39393/98). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Michel Trojani v Centre public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS)( Case-456/02) [2004]
ECLI:EU:C:2004:488. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Mohamed Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL, Fondo de Garantía Salarial, Ministerio Fiscal [2016]
ECLI:EU:C:2016:917. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Nazli (Case C-340/97) [2000] ECR I-957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Nicole Wippel v Peek & Cloppenburg GmbH & Co KG [2004]
ECLI:EU:C:2004:607. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121, 132
NW Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Orderneming van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland
Revenue Administration [1963] ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Odièvre v France (App no 42326/98) [2003] ECHR 86. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

Othmar Michaeler, Subito GmbH and Ruth Volgger v Amt für sozialen Arbeitsschutz and
Autonome Provinz Bozen [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:248 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122, 132
P and S v Commissie Sociale Zekerheid Breda and College van Burgemeester en Wethouders
van de gemeente Amstelveen [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:369. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
P. v S. and Cornwall County Council (Case C-13/94) [1996] ECR I-2143 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Pedro Manuel Roca-Alvarez v Sesa Start Espana ETT SA [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:56. . . . . . . . . . 94
Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:565. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101, 103
Petya Milkova v Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia i sledprivatizatsionen
control [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:198 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 67, 85
R (on the application of Dany Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for
Education and Skills (Case C-209/03) [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:169. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission (Joined Cases 75/82 & 117/82 [1984] ECR 1509. . . . . . . . . 10
Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995]
ECLI:EU:C:1995:411. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Rewe-Zentralfnanze G and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland
[1976] ECLI:EU:C:1976:188 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Rinke See Katharina Rinke v Ärztekammer Hamburg
Roca-Alvarez See Pedro Manuel Roca-Alvarez v Sesa Start Espana ETT SA
Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA (Case C-281/90) [2000]
ECLI:EU:C:2000:296. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 80, 159, 161
xxi
xxii Table of Cases

Rosa María Gavieiro Gavieiro and Ana María Iglesias Torres v Consellería de Educación e
Ordenación Universitaria de la Xunta de Galicia [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:819 . . . . . . 127, 131
Rosanna Valenzaand others v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato [2012]
ECLI:EU:C:2012:646. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Rosselle See Charlotte Rosselle v Institut national d’assurance maladie-
invalidité (INAMI) and Union nationale des mutualités libres
S Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:415. . . . . . . . . . . . 128, 129, 157
Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984]
ECLI:EU:C:1984:153. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Samira Achbita and Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding
v G4S Secure Solutions NV [2016] ECLI:C:2016:382 [2017]
ECLI:EU:C:2017:203. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51, 53, 60, 172, 175
Satamedia See Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy
Schrems See Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commisioner
Schultz-Hoff and Others (Joined Cases C-350/06 & C-520/06) [2009] ECR I-179 . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2, 11, 13, 32, 35, 75, 77, 83–6, 106, 111–13, 115–19, 131–3, 136, 138, 139, 202
Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Education nationale and Ministre de la
Justice [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:574. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Servet Kamberaj v Istituto per l’Edilizia Sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES)
and others [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:233. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134–6, 173
Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and others v BPN—Banco Português de Negócios SA
[2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:149 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Sindicato Nacional dos Profssionais de Seguros e Afnscontre Fidelidade Mundial—
Companhia de Seguros SA [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2036. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:107 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50, 51
Strack See European Commission v Guido Strack
Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) and others v GlaxoSmithKline plc
and GlaxoSmithKline AEVE [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:333. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:179. . . . . . . 62

Teresa Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General [1991]
ECLI:EU:C:1991:333. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Test-Achats See Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-
Achats ASBL and others v Conseil des ministres
Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy [2008]
ECLI:EU:C:2008:727. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112, 138
Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef ) v

Georges Heylens and others [1987] ECLI:EU:C:1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club
liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de
football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:463. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 70, 80
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union
[1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:431 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Valeri Hariev Belov v CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD and others [2013]
ECLI:EU:C:2013:48. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172, 175, 188–90
Vera Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV [2017]
ECLI:EU:C:2017:851. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v Jovanna García-Nieto and others [2016]
ECLI:EU:C:2016:114. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101, 103, 105
xxi
Table of Cases xxiii

Werner Fries v Lufthansa City Line GmbH [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:513 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:709. . . . . . . . . 2, 11, 13, 32, 35, 62, 77,
86, 106, 111, 113, 131, 138, 202
Wippel See Nicole Wippel v Peek & Cloppenburg GmbH & Co KG
Wolfgang Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:350. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 67, 85
Xabier Ormaetxea Garai and Bernardo Lorenzo Almendros v Administración del Estado
[2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:780 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Yolanda Del Cerro Alonso v Osakidetza-Servicio Vasco de Salud [2007]
ECLI:EU:C:2007:509. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122, 125–7, 130, 131, 141
Z v A Government department and The Board of management of a community school [2014]

ECLI:EU:C:2014:159. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Zentralbetriebsrat der Landeskrankenhäuser Tirols v Land Tirol [2010]
ECLI:EU:C:2010:215. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126–8
Zoi Chatzi v Ypourgos Oikonomikon [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:534 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
xv
International Treaties and Conventions

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Art 6(2) �� 62, 67
European Union (CFEU)�� 22, 42, 43 Art 6(3) �� 36, 61
Art 8�� 139 Art 7�� 1, 14
Art 8(3) �� 186, 193, 198 Art 17�� 41
Art 16�� 52 Treaty on European Union (TEU Maastricht)
Art 20�� 62, 67, 76 Art F�� 67
Art 21�� 9, 11, 17, 28, 84, 120 Treaty on the Functioning of the
Art 21(1) �� 62, 63, 67, 76, 83, 113, 115 European Union (TFEU)�� 58
Art 21(2) �� 63, 67, 76 Art 2(2) �� 27, 72
Art 23��11, 63, 67, 76, 93 Arts 3–6�� 47
Art 27�� 113, 115 Art 4(1) �� 47
Art 31(2) �� 113, 114, 117–20 Art 8�� 3, 5
Art 51�� 84 Art 10�� 5
Art 51(2) �� 63 Art 16��17, 23, 45, 137–9
Art 52�� 139 Art 16(1) �� 137, 139
Art 52(5) �� 117, 119 Art 16(2) ��137, 139, 187, 193, 198
Community Charter of the Art 18��5, 8, 59, 82, 87, 104, 106, 134, 203
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers Art 18(1) ��63, 69, 99, 100, 104
Art 7�� 130 Art 195, 6, 11, 12, 16, 17, 23, 28, 29,
Art 10(1) �� 130 40, 56, 62, 66, 73–7, 83, 84, 87,
European Economic 96, 118, 127, 129, 155, 178, 202, 203
Community Treaty (TEEC) Art 19(1) �� 27, 60, 74, 99, 104, 106
Art 7(1) �� 63 Art 19(2) �� 180
Art 45(2) �� 5 Art 20�� 71, 88, 104
Art 100�� 108 Art 20(2) �� 100, 104
Arts 117–120�� 10 Art 21(1) ��69, 88, 100, 104
Art 119��5, 7, 10, 107, 108 Art 21(2) �� 71
Art 119(1) (now Art 157(1) TFEU) �� 107 Art 45�� 8, 81, 157
Art 155�� 108 Art 45(2) �� 69, 70
Art 235�� 108 Art 46�� 159
European Social Charter�� 130 Art 48�� 72
Treaty Establishing the Art 49(1) �� 69, 70
European Community (TEC) Art 56(1) �� 69, 70
Art 13�� 73 Art 59�� 71
Art 100a�� 16 Art 67(2) �� 134
Arts 136–143�� 10 Art 78�� 16
Art 137(2) �� 118 Art 79(1) �� 134
Art 141(3) �� 72 Art 79(2)(a)–(b)�� 134
Treaty on European Union (TEU) Art 114(2) �� 72
Recital (2)�� 63 Art 115�� 72
Art 1�� 3 Art 153�� 12, 72
Art 2�� 3, 67 Art 153(1)(b)�� 124
Art 3(3) �� 3 Art 153(2)(b)�� 124
Art 4(2) �� 3, 52, 53 Art 154�� 124
Art 5(3) �� 48 Art 154(3) �� 155
Art 6�� 67 Art 155�� 124
Art 6(1) ��36, 62, 63, 67, 119 Art 155(2) �� 12, 72
xvi
xxvi International Treaties and Conventions

Art 157��5, 8, 10–12, 16, 62, Art 168�� 22
72, 81, 90, 155 Art 169�� 22
Art 157(1) �� 7, 69, 70, 79–81, 83, 84, Art 267�� 188, 190, 192
86, 87, 90, 98, 99, 107, 108, 126, 137 Art 294�� 71
Art 157(2) �� 70 Art 352�� 72
Art 157(3) ��72, 87, 104, 180 Treaty of Lisbon�� 14, 17, 23,
Art 157(4) �� 70, 93, 95 36, 63, 67, 68, 73, 138, 152, 155, 184
xxvi
EU Secondary Legislation
Decisions Directive 93/16/EEC [1993] OJ L165/
Decision 2002/584/JHA [2002] 13 (Free Movement of Doctors) �� 85
OJ L190/1�� 50 Art 34(1) �� 86
Decision 2008/913/JHA [2008] OJ Directive 93/104/EC [1993]
L328/55�� 153 OJ 1993 L 30�� 141
Decision 2008/977/JHA [2016] OJ Directive 95/46/EC [1995] OJ
L119/89�� 17, 184, 185 L281/3 (Data Protection
Decision 252/2013 [2013] OJ L79/1 �� 179 Directive)�� 17, 137, 182, 184, 185, 195
Art 17(1) �� 139
Directives Art 23�� 154
Directive 75/117/EEC [1975] Art 25(6) �� 191
OJ L45/19 (Equal Pay Art 28��183, 192, 193, 197
Directive)��40, 72, 149, 153 Art 28(1) �� 180, 187, 193
Art 2�� 148 Art 28(3) �� 191
Directive 76/207/EEC [1976] OJ Art 28(2)–(4)�� 186
L39/40 (Equal Treatment Art 47�� 191
(Employment) Directive)40, 94, 132, 148 Directive 96/34/EC [1996] OJ L145/4
Art 2(4) �� 91, 93 (Parental Leave) �� 149
Art 6�� 148 Directive 96/97/EC [1997] OJ L46/20
Directive 79/7/EEC [1979] OJ L6/24 (Equal Treatment Directive)�� 90
(Equal Treatment (Social Security) Directive 97/80/EC [1998] OJ L14/6
Directive)��41, 72, 73, 146 (Sex Discrimination
Art 6�� 148 Directive)��28, 41, 70, 72, 82
Directive 86/378/EEC [1986] OJ Art 4�� 71, 149
L225/40 (Equal Treatment Directive 97/81/EC [1998] OJ L14/
(Occupational Social Security 9 (Part-time Work Directive
Schemes) Directive�� 40, 72, 89 1997(PTW)) �� 121, 128
Art 10�� 148 cl 4(1)��121, 122, 126, 132
Directive 86/457, Art 5(1) �� 86 cl 4(2)�� 121
Directive 86/613/EEC [1986] OJ cl 4(3)�� 121
L359/56 (Equal Treatment (Self Directive 1999/70 EC [1999]
Employed) Directive)�� 41, 72 OJ L175/43 (Fixed-Term
Art 9�� 149 Work Directive (FTW
Directive 89/552/EEC [1989] Directive))��120, 125, 128, 131, 141
OJ L298/23 (Television cl 3(2)�� 122
Broadcasting Activities) �� 14 cl 4(1)�� 126, 127, 130
Directive 90/364/EEC [1990] OJ L180/ cl 5�� 122
26 (Right of Residence) �� 100 Directive 2000/43/EC [2000]
Directive 90/365/EEC [1990] OJ OJ L180/22 (Racial Equality
L180/28 (Right of Residence for Directive)�� 15, 27, 41,
Employees and Self-employed)�� 100 54, 73, 134, 146, 181
Directive 90/366/EEC [1990] OJ L180/ Recital (13)�� 134
30 (Right of Residence for Recital (24)�� 181, 197
Students)�� 100 Art 1�� 197
Directive 92/85/EEC [1992] OJ L348/ Art 3(1) �� 29
1, Art 12�� 148, 149 Art 3(2) �� 134
xxvii
xxviii EU Secondary Legislation

Art 7�� 150, 151, 155 Recital (25)�� 181, 197
Art 7(1) �� 163 Art 5(2) �� 96, 97, 146
Art 7(2) �� 151, 152, 155 Art 8(1) �� 150, 163
Art 8�� 152 Art 8(2) �� 154
Art 9�� 152 Art 10�� 152
Art 13�� 181, 197 Art 11�� 164
Art 13(2) �� 163 Art 12��152, 180, 181, 197
Art 15�� 153 Art 12(2)(a)�� 163
Art 17(2) �� 164 Art 14�� 153
Directive 2000/78/EC [2000] OJ L303/ Directive 2006/54/EC [2006] OJ L204/
16 (Framework Employment 23 (Sex Equality in Employment
Directive)�� 40, 41, 51, 53, 54, 73, Directive) (recast)��40, 73, 146, 150
83, 85, 105, 112, 116, 129, 146, 198 Art 17(1) �� 163
Art 3(1) �� 74 Art 18�� 154
Art 6(1) �� 113 Art 20��152, 180, 181, 197
Art 9�� 150 Art 20(2)(a)�� 163
Art 9(1) �� 163 Art 20(2)(d)�� 163
Art 11�� 152 Art 21�� 164
Art 13�� 164 Art 24�� 152
Art 17�� 153 Art 26�� 163
Art 19(2) �� 164 Art 29�� 164
Directive 2002/14/EC [2002] OJ L80/ Directive 2008/104/EC [2008] OJ
29 (Information and Consultation L327/9 (Temporary Agency Work
Directive (IC))�� 113, 118 Directive (TAW))�� 123, 125, 127
Art 3(1) �� 113 Art 5�� 123, 133
Directive2002/21/EC [2002] OJ L108/ Art 5(2) �� 133
33 (Electronic Communications)�� 194 Art 5(4) �� 133
Directive 2002/73/EC (Equal Treatment Directive 2008/115/EC [2008]
Directive (amended))�� 3, 93 OJ L348/98�� 142
Directive 2003/86/EC [2003] OJ Directive 2009/22/EC [2009]
L251/12 (Family Reunification OJ L110/30 (Consumers
Directive)�� 15, 142 Injunction Directive), Art 2(1)�� 154
Art 14(1) �� 135 Directive 2009/50/EC [2009] OJ L155/
Directive 2003/88 [2003] OJ L299/9 17, Art 14(1) �� 135
(Working Time Directive Directive 2010/41/EU [2010]
(WT)) �� 112–14, 118, 141 OJ L180/1 (Equal Treatment
Art 7�� 113, 119 Directive)�� 40, 146, 181
Art 7(1) �� 113 Recital (22)�� 181
Directive 2003/109/EC [2004] OJ L16/ Art 9�� 150
44 (Long-Term Residents Directive) Art 9(1) �� 163
Art 11�� 75 Art 10�� 154
Art 11(1) �� 135 Art 11�� 152, 180, 197
Directive 2004/38/EC (Citizenship Art 11(2)(a)�� 163
Directive)�� 72, 100, 146 Art 11(2)(d)�� 163
Art 1(a) �� 102 Art 12�� 164
Art 7(1)(b)�� 100, 102 Art 15(2) �� 164
Art 14(4)(b)�� 100 Directive 2010/64/EU [2010]
Art 24(1) �� 100 OJ L280/1 �� 142
Art 24(2) �� 100 Directive 2011/95/EU [2011] OJ L337/
Directive 2004/113/EC [2004] OJ 9 (Qualification Directive)�� 16
L373/37 (Equal Treatment Directive 2011/98/EU [2011]
(Goods and Services) OJ L343/1, Art 12 �� 134
Directive)��41, 73, 140, 150, 181 Directive 2012/13/EU [2013] OJ L142/1��142
xi
EU Secondary Legislation xxix

Directive 2013/48/EU [2013] Regulation 45/2001/EC [2001] OJ L8/
OJ L294/1�� 142 1 (EDPS Regulation)�� 184, 194
Directive 2014/36/EU [2014] OJ L94/ Art 1(2) �� 184
375, Art 23�� 135 Art 41(2) �� 184
Directive 2014/54/EU [2014] Arts 41–8�� 184
OJ L128/8 (Workers Regulation 1/2003/EC [2003]
Directive)�� 72, 147, 156, 178, 182, 186 OJ L1/1 (rules on competition laid
Recital (15)�� 159 down in Articles 81 and 82 of the
Recital (17)�� 197 Treaty)�� 186, 189
Art 3�� 176 Art 11(6) �� 189
Art 3(1) �� 158, 163 Regulation 883/2004/EC [2004] OJ
Art 3(3) �� 163 L166/1 (Coordination of Social
Art 3(6) �� 158 Security Systems Regulation) �� 82, 102
Art 4�� 159, 181 Regulation 1922/2006/EC [2006]
Art 4(1)–(3)�� 160 OJ L4039 (Gender Equality)
Art 4(2)(b)�� 163 Art 3�� 180
Art 5�� 163 Art 4�� 180
Art 6(1) �� 164 Regulation 168/2007/EC [2007] OJ
Art 6(2) �� 160 L53/1 (establishing a European
Art 7(2) �� 160 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights)
Art 9�� 184 Art 2�� 179
Directive 2014/66/EU [2014] OJ L157/ Art 4(1) �� 179
1, Art 18�� 135 Regulation 492/2011/EU [2011] OJ
Directive 2014/67/EU [2014] OJ L159/ L141/1 (Freedom of Movement
1, Art 11�� 161, 176 Regulation), Art 7��72, 82, 157
Directive 2016/343/EU [2016] Regulation 1381/2013/EU
OJ L65/1�� 143 [2013] OJ L354/62 (Rights,
Directive 2016/680/EU (General Data Equality and Citizenship)
Protection Directive) �� 17 Art 3�� 165
Art 42(4) �� 198 Art 4�� 165
Regulation 2016/679/EU [2016]
Regulations OJ L119/1 (General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR))
Regulation 1612/68/EEC [1968] OJ ��17, 138, 140, 177, 185
L257/2 (Freedom of Movement for Art 1(1) �� 137
Workers) �� 72, 99, 146 Art 1(2) �� 137
Regulation 1408/71/EEC [1971] OJ Art 52�� 198
L149/2 (Social Security Schemes)�� 99 Art 58�� 191
Regulation 1035/97/EC [1997] OJ Art 99�� 138
L151/1 (Racism and Xenophobia) �� 179 Art 99(2) �� 185
xxi
Table of International Treaties and Conventions

Convention on Human Rights and Art 1(2) �� 64
Biomedicine, Art 11�� 84 Art 5�� 64
European Convention on Human Art 6�� 64
Rights and Fundamental Freedom Art 7�� 64
(ECHR)�� 44, 50, 146 Art 9�� 64
Protocol 12�� 59 Art 13�� 64
Art 14�� 59 Art 24�� 64
United Nations Convention on the Art 25�� 64
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Art 27�� 64
(UNCRPD)�� 59, 63–8 Art 28�� 64
Art 1(1) �� 64
xxxii
List of Abbreviations
GENERAL
AMS Association de Médiation Sociale

CFEU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/
391 (the Charter)
DPA Data Protection Authority
ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights)
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
EDPS European Data Protection Supervisor
EQUINET European Network of Equality Bodies
FRA Fundamental Rights Agency
FTW Directive Fixed-Term Work Directive 1999 (Council Directive (EC) 1999/70 of
28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work
concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1999] OJ L175/43)
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the pro-
cessing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1)
IC Directive Information and Consultation Directive (Directive (EC) 2002/14 of 11
March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and con-
sulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJ L80/29)
NGO non-governmental organization
NWO Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (Nederlandse
Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek)
PTW Directive Part-Time Work Directive 1997 (Council Directive (EC) 97/81 of 15
December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time
work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC [1998] OJ L14/9)
TAW Directive Temporary Agency Work Directive (Directive (EC) 2008/104 of 19
November 2008 on Temporary Agency Work [2008] OJ L327/9)
TEC Treaty establishing the European Community
TEEC European Economic Community Treaty
TEU Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/
01
TFEU Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union [2012] OJ C326/47 (the Treaty)
UNCRPD United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
WT Directive Working Time Directive (Directive (EC) 2003/88 of 4 November 2003
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ
L299/9)
xvxi
xxxiv List of Abbreviations

JOURNALS
CLJ Cambridge Law Journal

CLSR Computer Law & Security Review
CML Rev Common Market Law Review
CYELS Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies
EHRLR European Human Rights Law Review
EJIL European Journal of International Law
EJML European Journal of Migration and Law
EL Rev European Law Review
ELJ European Law Journal
EMIL European Migration and International Law
ERPL European Review of Private Law
EuConst European Constitutional Law Review
HHRJ Harvard Human Rights Journal
ILJ Industrial Law Journal
JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies
JEPP Journal of European Public Policy
MJ Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law
MLR Modern Law Review
OJLS Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
REALaw Review of European Administrative Law
Yale LJ Yale Law Journal
YEL Yearbook of European Law
1
1
Introduction
An intense debate was sparked in the late 1990s: should the EU become a ‘Human
Rights Organization’? The pressing need to reflect on the matter arose as the EU
became increasingly involved with justice and home affairs, thereby intervening
through legally binding tools in the fields of migration, justice, and police cooper-
ation, with direct implications on fundamental rights. The call for greater interven-
tion of the EU in matters concerned with fundamental or human rights1 had two
main facets: How could fundamental rights concerns be efficiently incorporated in
the daily functioning of the EU? Should human rights constitute new core policies
of the EU? The former focuses on an improved monitoring of fundamental rights’
compliance across existing EU policies. The latter is concerned with broadening the
mandate of the EU to cover human rights, either in the form of a new distinct policy
or in realizing fundamental rights through EU intervention across existing policies.
Twenty years, several treaty reforms, and one Charter of Fundamental Rights
later, in the midst of a migration, security, and economic crisis, the relevance of the
debate has been anything but tempered. While these questions taken together are
the subject of a book recently published by Dawson,2 the present monograph revisits
specific implications of the second question in the EU as we know it today. Despite
increasing attention being paid to fundamental rights in the daily functioning of
the EU, it is clear that no treaty revisions have given a broad mandate for the EU to
address fundamental rights protection across the Member States. That role remains
entrusted to the Member States themselves and to the Council of Europe, with the
notable exception of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). That provi-
sion sets out a procedure intended to empower the EU to monitor and possibly react
to a serious breach by a Member State of the values on which the EU is founded,
including respect for human rights. This is already the subject of much academic
attention.3
1 Please note that the notions of ‘fundamental rights’ and ‘human rights’ are used interchangeably
in this book.
2 Mark Dawson, The Governance of EU Fundamental Rights (CUP 2017).
3 Examples include: Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent Pech, ‘Better Late than Never? On the European
Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and its First Activation’ (2016) 54 JCMS 1062; Laurent Pech
and Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Poland and the European Commission, Part III: Requiem for the Rule of
Law’ (2017) Verf Blog.
2
2 1. Introduction
The focus of this book, which has been subject to far less analysis, is the pro-
gressive development of EU policies intended to realize specific fundamental rights.
Despite the clear rejection of a general mandate for the EU in this field, over the
past two decades EU competences have emerged explicitly—and at times almost
exclusively—to give shape to a given fundamental right. EU intervention in such
fields develops a legal and policy regime intended to promote the relevant funda-
mental right at domestic level. It is argued throughout this book that EU equality
law provides a particularly useful example of such a policy: it has developed since
the Amsterdam Treaty in reference to a legal basis that stands independently of the
internal market rationale common to most EU policies. Over the years it has gained
a particularly clear and forceful human rights connotation. And it has been encap-
sulated in a remarkably ambitious as well as homogeneous set of legislative instru-
ments combining both substantive guidance on the right itself, and a toolbox to
improve the effectiveness and governance of the said right in domestic spheres.
As such specific fundamental rights competences and relevant areas of law have
emerged despite the reluctance of the Member States to grant the EU a core human
rights policy, the constitutional setting in which they are embedded today warrants
investigation. What characterizes equality law today, as our key example, is twofold.
First, there is a strong trend towards the constitutionalization of equality law (ie
the narrative on equality law is very often couched in constitutional terms). This
is common in the dynamics of EU law and has often been criticized in the context
of internal market law-making. As a consequence, there is confusion on the rela-
tionship between the right to equal treatment as enshrined in legislation and the
constitutional version of the right protected by EU primary law. This confusion is
best illustrated by rulings such as Mangold,4 Kücükdeveci,5 Dansk Industri,6 or Test-
Achats,7 where the boundaries between two layers of EU norms are blurred. Second,
the equality law directives adopted from the year 2000 onwards have brought in a
very diverse set of rules intended to support a change in mentality from within do-
mestic legal and policy arenas. The infrastructure of EU law is therefore being used
to perform a transformative function of a particularly ambitious nature.
These two remarks on EU equality law as it stands today have one important
point in common: they both build on very well-known features of EU law. These are
a high level of constitutionalization and a supranational legal order highly integrated
in that of the Member States. In other words, a fundamental rights policy developed
through the medium of EU law, even if narrowly focused on a single fundamental
right as EU equality law is, carries the full strength of EU law. This may be obvious. It
is, however, worth investigating. Does the EU, in developing legislation that shapes
the content of a right deemed to be fundamental and that diversifies the tools for an-
choring that right in our societies, not have unique strengths as well as weaknesses?
4 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:709.

5 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:21.
6 Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen [2016]
ECLI:EU:C:2016:278.
7 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and others v Conseil des ministres [2011]
ECLI:EU:C:2011:100.
3
A. Equal Treatment as a Cornerstone 3
It is submitted that the use of EU law to define and promote a given fundamental
right, such as that to equal treatment, in the context of a competence specifically de-
voted to that purpose, creates a significant risk of over-constitutionalization. This risk,
which amounts to limiting political debate on the definition of fundamental rights,
is best understood after reviewing the main theoretical components of the debate on
law-making in the field of human rights (Chapter 2). This will allow for a demon-
stration of the implications of this risk actually materializing in the context of EU
equality law (Chapter 3) as well as the development of an argumentation to prevent its
spreading to other prongs of EU law (Chapter 4). The initial chapters of the book thus
call for the preservation of elements of flexibility inherent in legislative law-making
when the EU regulates the fundamental right to equal treatment. Building on this
approach, Chapter 5 suggests an understanding be drawn of the wide range of tools
created under the umbrella of EU law to support a human rights culture in domestic
arenas as the main added value of EU legislative intervention in the field. These tools
indeed plant the seeds from which societal change is most likely to emerge as they allow
for interactive as well as reflexive processes. Before engaging with the detail of the argu-
mentation supporting these theses, the focus on EU equality law is further explained.
A. Equal Treatment as a Cornerstone of European Integration
The principle of equality or non-discrimination8 constitutes one of the cornerstones

of the process of European integration. The pursuit of equality among the people
and states is a primary objective.9 This has long been perceived as a precondition to
progressing towards ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’10—to the
extent that the Union is actually ‘founded’ on the value of equality.11 References to
equality are therefore very diverse.12 Yet they all find a common origin in a ‘meta-
principle of equality’ defined by reference to the Aristotelian formula adjusted in
the context of EU law: compliance with the principle of non-discrimination re-
quires that comparable situations must not be treated differently, and that different
8 These notions are used interchangeably.

9 eg Articles 3(3), 4(2) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/
01 (hereafter TEU), Article 8 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union [2012] OJ C326/47 (hereafter TFEU).
10 Article 1 TEU. 11 Article 2 TEU.
12 The different functions of the principle of equal treatment as a fundamental right are explored
for instance by Sophia Koukoulis-Spiliotpoulos, ‘The Amended Equal Treatment Directive (2002/
73): An Expression of Constitutional Principles/Fundamental Rights’ (2005) 12 MJ 327, 331–32;
Takis Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 60. For a more general discussion
of the role of fundamental rights in such a context, see the exchange of views in Jason Coppel and Aidan
O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’ (1992) 29 CML Rev 669, 669; and
Joseph HH Weiler and Nicolas JS Lockhart, ‘ “Taking Rights Seriously” Seriously: The European Court
and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence—Part I’ (1995) 32 CML Rev 51, as well as ‘ “Taking Rights
Seriously” Seriously: The European Court and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence—Part II’ (1995)
32 CML Rev 579. For earlier writing on the issue, see also Manfred Zuleeg, ‘Fundamental Rights
and the Law of the European Communities’ (1971) 8 CML Rev 446, 450; and Judge Pescatore, ‘The
Protection of Human Rights in the European Communities’ (1972) 1 CML Rev 73.
4
4 1. Introduction
situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively
justified.13 This principle has been granted constitutional status and is frequently
referred to as a general principle of EU law.14
As such, the general principle of equality and its expressions in primary and sec-
ondary law serve as benchmarks15 to assess the soundness of decision-making by
EU actors16 as well as by the Member States acting within the scope of EU law.17
It demands that decision-makers be capable of explaining the legitimacy, appropri-
ateness, and necessity of specific distinguishing criteria and the negative impact of a
decision on certain categories of actors or products. It is thus a tool for good govern-
ance.18 Among the diverse references to non-discrimination are a number of expres-
sions of the principle that substantiate the meta-principle in the context of a specific
policy. What many of these references have in common is that they are primarily
driven by the goal of market-making for goods, services, and legal and natural per-
sons, as well as capital.19 In this context, the principle of equality is framed in terms
of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and is designed to erase boundaries
progressively for economic entities among the Member States.
Other references to equality are the expression of a more ambitious societal
goal: they constitute an example of what Walker has named ‘second-generation
rights’ in the context of EU law.20 These rights were developed after the original
framework defined the four freedoms and the necessary property rights and eco-
nomic freedoms.21 These latter provisions, which may be found in primary as well
as secondary law, belong to policies driven by the intent to further equality among
the people of Europe.22 Here non-discrimination is more than a principle regu-
lating the mechanics of institutional law or a tool to regulate the relationship among
13 Albert Ruckdeschel & Co and Hansa Lagerhaus Ströh & Co v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St Annen;
Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1977] ECLI:EU:C:1977:160, para 7. The first limb of this formula
is the most classic expression of the principle but the second limb is also of practical relevance, eg Zoi
Chatzi v Ypourgos Oikonomikon [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:534, paras 68–75.
14 Albert Ruckdeschel & Co and Hansa Lagerhaus Ströh & Co v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St Annen;
Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1977] ECLI:EU:C:1977:160, para 7. See also Land Oberösterreich
v Čez [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:660, para 91.
15 On the functions of the principle, eg Gillian More, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment: From
Market Unifier to Fundamental Right?’ in Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU
Law (OUP 2011) 517; Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Role of Equality in European Community Law’ in Alan
Dashwood and Siofra O’Leary (eds), The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law (Sweet & Maxwell
1997) 13.
16 Including the legislator, eg Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and others v
Conseil des ministers [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:100.
17 By analogy Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, paras 16–31.
18 Illustrating the implementation of fundamental rights for that purpose, see: Commission (EU),
‘2014 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ COM (2015) 191 final, 8
May 2015; and Council (EU), ‘Guidelines on Methodological Steps to be Taken to Check Fundamental
Rights Compatibility at the Council Preparatory Bodies’ 5377/15, 20 January 2015.
19 See also competition law and agricultural policy.
20 Neil Walker, ‘Human Rights in a Post-National Order: Reconciling Political and Constitutional
Pluralism’ in Tom Campbell, Keith D Ewing, and Adam Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on Human
Rights (OUP 2001) 137.
21 ibid 136.
22 Fritz W Scharpf, ‘Perpetual Momentum: Directed and Unconstrained?’ (2012) 19 JEPP 127,
132–33.
5
B. EU Equality Law as a Social Policy 5
national markets; it is one of the central constituents of a project for greater harmony
between, as well as within, the societies of the Member States. The identification of
the social function of equality is commonly illustrated by reference to the landmark
statement of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’) in Defrenne
II, according to which the principle of equal pay between men and women ‘forms
part of the social objectives of the [Union], which is not merely an economic union,
but is at the same time intended . . . to ensure social progress and seek the constant
improvement of the living and working conditions’.23 Today the EU is, for example,
expected to actively seek to combat discrimination on a variety of grounds,24 as well
as to combat it while defining and implementing its policies and activities,25 with
the emphasis on equal treatment between men and women.26
B. EU Equality Law as a Social Policy with

a Transformative Mandate
The pursuit of equality with this social connotation is both an ancient competence
and a particularly modern and dynamic EU policy. The Rome Treaty contained pro-
visions that have set the floor for a wealth of legislation and case law on equal treat-
ment in employment, with the prohibition of nationality discrimination against
workers from another Member State27 as well as sex discrimination as regards pay.28
This legal framework quickly developed through political initiatives and judicial
law-making.29 It was considerably broadened following the entry into force of the
Amsterdam Treaty. What is today Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) indeed empowers EU institutions to take appropriate
action also to combat discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, religion or
belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation, thus paving the way for a spectacular
broadening and modernization of EU equality law.
This set of references to equality is the focus of this book in so far as it is consti-
tutive of EU equality policy.30 Legislation giving flesh to the principle of equality
has also blossomed in the context of employment and migration law.31 EU equality
policy defined in that sense performs both ‘public and private’ functions.32 ‘Public’
is understood in terms of the law regulating relationships among public authorities
as well as between public authorities and private parties. The principle of equality as
a ‘public law’ principle has been designed to regulate the structures of the EU legal
23 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976]

ECLI:EU:C:1976:56, para 10.
24 eg Articles 18, 19, 157 TFEU. 25 Article 10 TFEU. 26 Article 8 TFEU.
27 Article 45(2) TEEC. 28 Article 119 TEEC.
29 Alec Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (OUP 2004) 147.
30 See also Elise Muir, ‘Pursuing Equality in the EU’ in Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers (eds),
The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP 2015).
31 As will be detailed in Chapter 4.
32 As developed in Elise Muir, ‘The Transformative Function of EU Equality Law’ (2013) 21
ERPL 1231.
6
6 1. Introduction
order in two ways. First, it asserts equality between states and prohibits discrimin-
ation on the grounds of nationality in order to advance the process of European (eco-
nomic) integration. (The prohibition of nationality discrimination has also gained
a more social dimension in recent years, as will be discussed further.33) Second, the
prohibition of discrimination on other grounds, such as sex or race/ethnic origin,
applies to EU and national institutions34 in order to ensure the soundness of EU
governance in its impact on individuals. The principle thereby performs a ‘funda-
mental rights’ function in the classic sense of the term, namely protecting individ-
uals against the arbitrariness of public authorities. In both contexts, the principle of
equality is a tool shaping the infrastructure of European societies. In other words,
it regulates the functioning of the institutions, whether they are European or na-
tional, and operates as a constitutional principle that at times is given shape through
legislation.
In addition to this ‘infrastructural’ function, the principle of equal treatment also
performs a private function when it is used to articulate interpersonal relationships.
In this ‘private’ sense, EU equality law is designed to transform society from the in-
side. For example, the recent directives adopted on the basis of Article 19 TFEU,
which give expression to the principle of equal treatment in employment and be-
yond, are instruments largely designed to ‘combat’ discrimination between private
persons (for example employee/employer, consumer/insurer). This ‘private’ func-
tion can be contrasted with the ‘public’ function of EU equality law as it is used to
pursue ‘inter-personal equality per se’.35 In so far as EU equality law seeks to regulate
both public and private relations and to impact on societal practices by identifying
‘bad attitudes’,36 it will be referred to as having a ‘transformative’ function.37
This book does not address the issue of whether EU equality actually succeeds
in transforming societal habits and eradicating discriminatory practices. A glance
at the work of the European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination
Field suffices to illustrate how much still needs to be done.38 Similarly, it is not de-
nied that domestic or international rules on the matter existed before the adoption
of the relevant EU instruments.39 Instead, the purpose of this book is to reflect on
the dynamics of today’s EU equality law. EU equality law has been shaped into a
tool designed to tackle a fairly clearly circumscribed yet vast array of unwanted soci-
etal practices; this is a remarkably ambitious programme for an EU policy. For this
33 See Chapter 3.
34 As well as bodies and agencies. The prohibition is only relevant within the scope of EU law.
35 Scharpf (n 22) 132–33.
36 Alexander Somek, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Antidiscrimination Law (OUP
2011) 16 and further 91.
37 The expression is borrowed from Alec Stone Sweet and Kathleen Stranz, ‘Rights Adjudication and
Constitutional Pluralism in Germany and Europe’ (2012) 19 JEPP 92, 96; see also Colm O’Cinneide,
‘The Constitutionalisation of Equality within the Legal Order of the EU: Sexual Orientation as a Testing
Ground’ (2015) 22 MJ 370.
38 European Network of Legal Experts in Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination, available at
<http://www.non-discrimination.net/> (accessed 1 February 2018).
39 eg ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No 100) (adopted 29 June 1951, entered into
force 23 May 1953). See further Catherine Hoskyns, Integrating Gender: Women, Law and Politics in the
European Union (Verso 1996) 53.
7
C. Equality Law: A Fundamental Rights Policy 7
purpose, the two functions of EU equality law, ‘infrastructural’ and ‘transformative’

as just described, coexist and are complementary. The transformative function of
EU equality law relies heavily on the existence of an infrastructural role for such a
policy to eliminate the bias of public structures; yet the transformative function of
EU equality law reaches beyond the realm of EU public law by also requiring private
actors to adjust their societal habits. In fact, EU equality law has now developed
into a largely—although admittedly not fully40—autonomous fundamental rights
policy, thus breaking new boundaries in EU law.
C. EU Equality Law as an (Autonomous) Fundamental Rights Policy
The function of the principle of equality in European law evolved greatly in the early
years of the European integration project. The European Economic Community
Treaty (TEEC) was primarily understood as an international law instrument which
would restructure relationships between the states of Europe. One of its central
tools to achieve that was the prohibition of nationality discrimination. It was meant
to weigh on the European public order and set powerful constitutional dynamics
designed to address—in the long term—structural imbalances in relations between
states as well as between states and their people. The Treaty of Rome also included
a reference to the (very narrowly defined) principle of equal pay for equal work be-
tween men and women enshrined in Article 119 TEEC (now Article 157(1) TFEU).
That principle was initially only understood as a structural instrument, ancillary to
the building of the internal market; it was intended to prevent distortions of com-
petition due to diverging domestic legislation on the wages of female employees.41
From the 1960s onwards, the story is well known. The Court distinguished the
nature of the European project from that of a traditional international legal order: the
EU has a unique legal system integrated into those of the Member States, owing to
the principles of primacy and direct effect. European law was thus capable of cre-
ating rights and obligations for private parties directly.42 This allowed individuals to
enforce infrastructural rules of the EU legal order against their own institutions. The
specificity of the EU legal order was taken one step further when the Court, despite
the reluctance of the Member States,43 asserted that treaty provisions were not only
capable of vertical, but also of horizontal direct effect in the Defrenne II case.
It is perhaps unsurprising that private litigants sought to rely on the principle of
equal pay for equal work enshrined in Article 119 TEEC, as in Defrenne II, in order
to challenge an unbalanced private contractual arrangement.44 The very notion of
40 See further Chapter 3 section A.3.b.

41 On the history of that provision, see further Hoskyns (n 39) Ch 3.
42 NW Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Orderneming van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue
Administration [1963] ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 English special edition 1.
43 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas Brunell, ‘Constructing a Supranational Constitution’ and Alec
Stone Sweet and Rachel Cichowski, ‘Sex Equality’ in Alec Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of
Europe (OUP 2004) Chs 2 and 4 respectively.
44 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976]
ECLI:EU:C:1976:56, paras 38–39. Exploring the background of the dispute, Hoskyns (n 39) 60–77.
8
8 1. Introduction
equal pay for equal work planted the seeds of EU regulation of private employment
contracts. As pointed out already, the rationale for this novel jurisdictional approach
was the understanding that the principle of equal pay had a social dimension besides
its internal market rationale.45 The Court soon further stressed that the elimination
of discrimination on the grounds of sex forms part of the observance of fundamental
rights, which the EU has a duty to ensure.46
Building on this innovative approach to the role of European law, the Court
progressively expanded the possibilities for individuals to rely on the principle of
equality as asserted in the Treaty against other individuals, starting from the 1970s
and culminating in the late 1990s. Perhaps the clearest example of the transformative
function of the principle is to be found in the wording of the Angonese case, which
related to nationality discrimination.47 In that case the Court made it clear that:
Article [45 TFEU] lays down a fundamental freedom and . . . constitutes a specific applica-
tion of the general prohibition of discrimination contained in [Article 18 TFEU]. In that
respect, like Article [157 TFEU], it is designed to ensure that there is no discrimination on
the labour market . . . Consequently, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nation-
ality laid down in Article [45] of the Treaty must be regarded as applying to private persons
as well.48
From Defrenne II to Angonese, the Court thus departed from the narrow wording
of the Treaty on the prohibition of sex and nationality discrimination as market
unifiers, and revealed the dormant transformative function of EU equality law.
This function is now considered to exist alongside the internal market objectives of
EU law.49
It is common to refer to this judicial transformation of the role of EU equality law
as a transition from an economic understanding of the prohibition of discrimination
to that of a social approach, or at least to a new approach combining both.50 This
should not be misunderstood: this transition is about much more than simply set-
ting high standards of social protection at the expense of a deregulatory approach to
free trade. Special emphasis will be placed in this book on the fact that the standards
45 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976] ECLI:EU:
C:1976:56, paras 8–12.
46 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1978] ECLI:EU:
C:1978:130, paras 26–27.
47 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:296, paras 33–36.
See also BNO Walrave and LJN Koch v Association Union cycliste international, Koninklijke Nederlandsche
Wielren Unie and Federación Espanola Ciclismo [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, para 17; and Union royale
belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc
Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995]
ECLI:EU:C:1995:463.
48 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:296, paras 35–36.
49 The social function of EU sex equality law is predominant over its internal market function,
Deutsche Telekom AG v Lilli Schröder[2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:72, paras 56–57; EU internal market
policy must be balanced against the objectives pursued by EU social policy, Laval un Partneri Ltd
v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundetsavdelning 1, Byggettan and
Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para 105.
50 This second approach has been forcefully argued throughout Mark Bell, Anti-Discrimination
Law and the European Union (OUP 2002).
9
hereby heralded are the expression of a fundamental right,51 the right is thus highly
moralized.52 The prohibition of sex and nationality discrimination was considered,
from the late 1980s, to form part of the ‘acquis materiel fondamental’ of the EU.53
The understanding of EU equality law as being the expression of a fundamental
right (see section C.1) and the importance of the interaction between equality le-
gislation and the fundamental right to equal treatment (see section C.2) deserves
elaboration at the outset. It will be argued that EU equality law can in many ways
be understood as the ‘first’ fundamental rights policy of the EU (see section C.3).
1. EU equality law gives expression to the fundamental right

to equal treatment
Although it is difficult for obvious practical reasons to perform an exhaustive search,
one can find examples of academic legal texts analysing EU equality law as the ex-
pression of fundamental rights from the late 1980s to the early 1990s.54 In 1991, for
instance, Docksey authored an article entitled ‘The Principle of Equality between
Women and Men as a Fundamental Right under Community Law’ and pointed out
the ‘necessity to embody [this] fundamental right in EC legislation’.55
Nevertheless, until fairly recently, a significant part of academia perceived EU
law as not having a fundamental rights ‘policy’; let alone, of course, being a funda-
mental rights organization as such. Established observers of the evolution of EU
law have remarked on this, such as Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère in 2004: ‘the
Community treaties do not contain any special reference to fundamental rights of
individuals: their substantive provisions are entirely devoted to the determination
of competences in the area of the four freedoms, to competition and the common
policies’.56
The fundamental rights dimension of EU equality policy has only been fully
asserted in recent years. By the early years of the new millennium it had become
unquestionable. Admittedly, the Court has long asserted that the right not to be dis-
criminated against on grounds of sex is one of the fundamental human rights whose
51 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391, Article 21.
52 For a thoughtful overview of the evolution of the rationale of EU equality law, see also Sacha
Prechal, ‘ “Non-Discrimination Does Not Fall Down from Heaven”: The Context and Evolution of
Non-Discrimination in EU Law’ (2009) Eric Stein Working Paper No 4/2009, 10.
53 José Luis da Cruz Vilaça and Nuno Piçarra, ‘Y a-t-il des limites matérielles à la révision des traités
instituant les Communautés européenne?’ (1993) 23 Cahiers de Droit Européen 3, 29.
54 The preamble to the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (adopted
9 December 1989) states that ‘it is important to combat every form of discrimination, including dis-
crimination on grounds of sex, colour, race, opinions and beliefs’.
55 Chris Docksey, ‘The Principle of Equality between Women and Men as a Fundamental Right
under Community Law’ (1991) 20 ILJ 258, 259. See also More (n 15) 517 and Sacha Prechal, ‘Equality
of Treatment, Non-Discrimination and Social Policy: Achievements in Three Themes’ (2004) 41 CML
Rev 533, 547 et seq.
56 Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, ‘The EU and the Individual: Fundamental Rights in the Draft
Constitutional Treaty’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 345, 345; see also her word of caution on sex equality law at
347. See also, although written a little earlier, AG Toth, ‘The European Union and Human Rights: The
Way Forward’ (1997) 34 CML Rev 491, 499.
10
10 1. Introduction
observance the Court has a duty to ensure.57 Yet, it was not until 2000 that the Court
went further to assert that Article 157 TFEU on sex equality in employment actually
‘constitutes the expression of a fundamental human right’58 (emphasis added). Indeed,
in the Deutsche Post cases, the Court set out its reasoning in three stages:
55. . . . the Court has stressed that Article 119 TEC forms part of the social objectives of the
Community, which is not merely an economic union but is at the same time intended, by
common action, to ensure social progress and seek constant improvement of the living and
working conditions of the peoples of Europe, as is emphasized in the Preamble to the Treaty.
That aim is accentuated by the insertion of Article 119 into the body of a chapter devoted to
social policy whose preliminary provision, Article 117 TEC (Articles 117 to 120 TEEC have
been replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC), marks the need to promote improved working
conditions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their har-
monization while the improvement is being maintained (Defrenne II, paragraphs 10 and 11).
56. However, in later decisions the Court has repeatedly held that the right not to be dis-
criminated against on grounds of sex is one of the fundamental human rights whose obser-
vance the Court has a duty to ensure (see, to that effect, Case 149/77 Defrenne III [1978]
ECR 1365, paragraphs 26 and 27, Joined Cases 75/82 and 117/82 Razzouk and Beydoun v
Commission [1984] ECR 1509, paragraph 16, and Case C-13/94 P. v S. and Cornwall County
Council [1996] ECR I-2143, paragraph 19).
57. In view of that case-law, it must be concluded that the economic aim pursued by Article
119 of the Treaty, namely the elimination of distortions of competition between under-
takings established in different Member States, is secondary to the social aim pursued
by the same provision, which constitutes the expression of a fundamental human right.59
(emphasis added)
In paragraphs 55, 56, and 57 of the Deutsche Post ruling, the Court thus moved
from (i) an analysis of ex-Article 119 TEEC on sex equality in matters of salary as
forming part of the social objectives of the Community; (ii) to the reassertion of the
right not to be discriminated against on grounds of sex as one of the fundamental
human rights, observance of which the Court has a duty to ensure; and finally (iii)
to upgrading the social purpose of ex-Article 119 TEEC on sex equality to its first
function. This final and innovative upgrade has been legitimized by reference to the
fact that ex-Article 119 TEEC constitutes the expression of a fundamental human
right. The nuance in the wording constitutes more than a linguistic twist:60 it il-
lustrates a shift in the perception of this field of law in the late 1990s–early 2000s
towards understanding EU equality law as a fundamental rights ‘policy’, namely a
set of policy tools designed to put into effect a fundamental right.
As argued by Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, the formula by which ex-Article 119
TEEC is understood as constituting the expression of a fundamental human right
57 Paraphrasing Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1978]
ECLI:EU:C:1978:130, paras 26–27.
58 Deutsche Post AG v Elisabeth Sievers and Brunhilde Schrage [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:76, paras
55–57; see also Deutsche Telekom AG v Lilli Schröder [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:72, paras 55–57.
59 Deutsche Post AG v Elisabeth Sievers and Brunhilde Schrage [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:76,
paras 55–57.
60 See also Prechal (n 55) 548.
1
in paragraph 57 of the Deutsche Post ruling applies to any EU gender equality pro-
vision.61 In fact, it can now be assumed that the formula applies to any provision of
EU equality legislation as identified above.62 The Court indeed applied it to legis-
lation adopted on the basis of Article 19 TFEU in Mangold63 from 2005. This was
confirmed in 2010 in the Kücükdeveci case in the following terms:
Directive 2000/78 merely gives expression to, but does not lay down, the principle of equal
treatment in employment and occupation, and that the principle of non-discrimination on
grounds of age is a general principle of European Union law in that it constitutes a specific ap-
plication of the general principle of equal treatment (see, to that effect, Mangold, paragraphs
74 to 76).64 (emphasis added)
Although the Court has so far declined invitations to use the same expression and
approach for principles given specific expression in directives outside the scope of
equality law,65 there is no reason why it should not prevail when individuals seek to
invoke the other Article 19 TFEU criteria given expression to in directives adopted
precisely on the basis of the said Article 19 TFEU.66 Indeed, Article 19 TFEU man-
dates the EU legislator to combat discrimination on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic
origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation, without distinguishing
between them. Sex equality legislation adopted on the basis of Article 157 TFEU
would a fortiori (in the light of the Deutsche Post ruling) also be deemed to constitute
an expression of the fundamental right to equal treatment.
The timing of both sets of jurisprudential developments on sex equality and the
Article 19 TFEU directives is perhaps no coincidence, occurring in a period when
Article 19 TFEU was inserted into the EU Treaties by the Treaty of Amsterdam
(which entered into force in 1999) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union (CFEU or ‘the Charter’) was proclaimed (2000) and gained
binding force (2009).67 Article 19 TFEU indeed constitutes the first (ever) legal
basis for the adoption of fundamental rights legislation in EU law. This legal basis
stands alone, without the legislator having to prove a link with other—more
traditional—hobby horses of the EU, such as internal market policy. It also al-
lows for the adoption of legislation covering a fairly wide range of discrimination.
Meanwhile Article 21 CFEU68 prohibits any discrimination on the grounds covered
by Article 19 TFEU as well as others in the field of application of EU law.69 Both
articles thus suggest that the EU has a stronger mandate to protect the fundamental
61 Koukoulis-Spiliotpoulos (n 12) 330. 62 See further Chapter 3.

63 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:709, paras 74–76.
64 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:21, para 50.
65 eg Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT and others [2014]
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2, paras 41–49. See further Chapter 4, section A.
66 See, for instance, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Jürgen Römer v Freie und Hansestadt
Hamburg [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2010:4251, paras 125 et seq; as well as Opinion of Advocate
General Tanchev, Vera Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV [2017]
ECLI:EU:C:2017:851, paras 42–45.
67 The Amsterdam Treaty also amended what is today Article 157 TFEU to turn it into a legal basis
for the adoption of legislation on equal treatment between men and women in employment.
68 See also Charter Article 23 on sex equality.
69 Article 21 TFEU provides for an open-ended list of grounds.
12
12 1. Introduction
right to non-discrimination both at the primary and secondary law levels than it had
in the past.
2. Why does understanding EU equality law as a fundamental

rights policy matter?
Understanding EU equality law as giving expression to a fundamental right and thus
constituting a fundamental rights policy as such has three main implications, which
this book further elaborates.70
First, the provisions of the TFEU enabling EU political institutions to legislate—
ie to develop a policy to combat discrimination—have institutional dynamics that
are distinct from the provisions on economic integration, on the one hand, and social
rights and policy, on the other. Article 19 TFEU provides the legal basis for the adop-
tion of legislation to combat discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic
origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation and stands separately
from internal market provisions and flanking policies. It can be found in Part Two
of the Treaty, which is specifically devoted to ‘Non-Discrimination and Citizenship
of the Union’. Article 157 TFEU, which is more specifically concerned with equal
treatment on grounds of sex in employment, forms part of the specific title on ‘Social
Policy’ but is singled out within this title because the rules on decision-making
through social dialogue and collective bargaining do not apply to it.71 Furthermore,
and importantly, the provisions of the Charter on ‘Equality’ (Title III) are clearly
distinct from those on ‘Solidarity’ (Title IV), which are concerned with social rights
and principles. Overall, the latter are worded in less compelling terms and several
Member States have expressed reservations on their justiciability.72 No similar re-
servations have been expressed with regard to the justiciability of the provisions on
‘Equality’.73 As a consequence, EU equality law may pursue social objectives but is
today primarily understood as giving expression to the fundamental right of equal
treatment for institutional purposes, thus triggering the need for specific legal tools
and mechanisms. The provisions on nationality discrimination belong to a more
complex institutional setting, which will be discussed later in this book.74
Second, because EU equality legislation is deemed to be the expression of the
fundamental right to equal treatment, its status has been constitutionalized or
70 Exploring these implications, see also Koukoulis-Spiliotpoulos (n 12) 331–32.

71 See Articles 153, 155(2) TFEU; contrast in particular Article 153(1)(i) TFEU on the EU sup-
porting and complementing the activities of the Member States with Article 157(3) TFEU in ensuring
the application of the principle of equal treatment. The wording of Article 157(3) TFEU seems much
more powerful and is not covered by the measures on collective bargaining introduced by Article 155(2)
TFEU read in conjunction with Article 153 TFEU. See further Bell (n 50) 128–31.
72 eg Protocol (No 30) on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom [2008] OJ C115/313.
73 Reflecting on the relationship between the provisions of the Charter on ‘Equality’ and those on
‘Solidarity’, see Vojtech Belling, ‘Supranational Fundamental Rights or Primacy of Sovereignty? Legal
Effects of the So-Called Opt-Out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 18 ELJ 251,
255, and 261.
74 See Chapter 3.
13
‘ossified’.75 In the rulings already mentioned, Mangold and Kücükdeveci, the Court
applied EU equality legislation, giving expression to the fundamental right to equal
treatment. The Court thus granted the authority of primary law to the substantive
content of the legislation giving expression to the fundamental right to equal treat-
ment.76 While this approach consolidates the level of protection afforded to the
said fundamental right and may enhance its justiciability,77 it also leads to more
ambiguous consequences. As a result of this constitutionalization process, a whole
policy area is seemingly removed from the daily decision-making process of the
EU.78 In so far as the substance of the legislation is merged into and its effects are
derived from primary law, changes to any of these aspects may not simply result
from ordinary political processes and may instead have to be triggered and medi-
ated through ‘constitutional’ avenues. This warrants that attention be paid to the
legal and political implications of the atypical constitutional framework in which
EU equality law is currently developing. Fundamental rights may indeed perform a
‘unifying ideal’ as much as they may be ‘divisive’ and differ from polity to polity.79
The strengths and weaknesses of the institutional setting together with the tension
between constitutionalization and politicization of a supranational fundamental
rights policy ought therefore to be identified and analysed.80
Third, and importantly, the drive towards a fundamental rights policy at EU level
comes with a significant methodological shift. Von Bogdandy pointed out, in his
reflection on the desirability (or lack thereof ) of the EU becoming a human rights
organization, that devoting policy tools to enhance the protection of fundamental
rights implies moving away from text-based science for fundamental rights protec-
tion towards policy formation and implementation.81 This methodological shift in
the analysis of systems of fundamental rights protection places emphasis on political
processes shaping a fundamental rights policy and has been much less explored than
tensions created by constitutional adjudication on fundamental rights matters. Too
little attention is indeed paid to the role of legislatures in shaping laws that have fun-
damental rights implications.82
This book seeks to address this asymmetry in the debate on EU fundamental
rights law83 through a detailed analysis of EU equality law and law-making. In add-
ition to emphasizing the role of the EU legislature in the field of fundamental rights
75 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre

Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la région Centre [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:559, para 157.
76 In these cases, the primary norm involved was a general principle of EU law.
77 Elise Muir, ‘Of Ages in—and Edges of—EU Law’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 39.
78 See also Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human
Rights and the Core of the European Union’ (2000) 37 CML Rev 1307, 1313.
79 See Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On Standards and
Values in the Protection of Human Rights’ in Nanette A Neuwahl and Allan Rosas (eds), The European
Union and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995) 51; von Bogdandy (n 78) 1308.
80 As will be done in Chapter 2 of this book. 81 von Bogdandy (n 78) 1310.
82 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999).
83 This asymmetry in the context of EU fundamental rights law has been observed in particular by
Philip Alston and Joseph HH Weiler, ‘An “Ever Closer Union” in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The
European Union and Human Rights’ (1999) Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No 1/1999, 8–10.
14
14 1. Introduction
protection as a complement to the heavy focus on the role of the Court in that
respect, this book provides a test case to assess the challenges raised by the develop-
ment of a fundamental rights policy at EU level.
3. EU equality law as the ‘first’ fundamental rights policy of the EU

In developing this fundamental rights policy, the EU institutions have created a new
field of EU law. EU equality law is, from a historical perspective, the first area of
EU intervention to have been shaped and developed as a fundamental rights policy.
There is much to learn for those wondering about the role of a supranational organ-
ization in enhancing fundamental rights protection. One could thus expect fruitful
interactions with other (emerging) EU fundamental rights policies.
There has been much discussion on what constitutes the advantages or disadvan-
tages of the EU developing a general human rights policy. In particular, in the late
1990s, after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and during the period of
reflections on the Charter, policy-makers,84 as well as prominent authors, expressed
divergent views on the matter.85 We will come back to some of the components
of this debate in Chapter 2. For now it suffices to stress that although the EU has
a stronger constitutional mandate to ensure human rights protection than it had
in the past (see, for instance, the mechanism enshrined in Article 7 TEU and the
binding nature of the Charter since the Lisbon Treaty), the Treaties do not allow
the EU to ‘protect against human rights violations per se’.86 The EU legal order still
falls short of providing for a ‘coherent, forceful and forward-looking human rights
policy’.87
Despite the absence of a general human rights policy at EU level,88 several com-
petences allow the EU legislator to intervene for the purpose of enhancing the pro-
tection of specific fundamental rights.89 EU secondary law increasingly includes
fundamental rights clauses and mechanisms as ancillary or non-autonomous aspects
of a different policy objective.90 Also, in a number of situations, especially in the
more recent fields of competence of the EU in the context of the area of freedom,
security, and justice, the very purpose of legislation is strongly endowed with a ra-
tionale based on the protection of fundamental rights, despite a legal basis which
84 eg Commission (EC), ‘For a Europe of Civic and Social Rights’ (1996) Report by the Comité des
Sages chaired by Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo.
85 See in particular exchanges between Alston and Weiler (n 83); and von Bogdandy (n 78).
86 Toth (n 56) 497. 87 von Bogdandy (n 78) 1310.
88 The Charter has not changed this observation: Lord Goldsmith, ‘The Charter of Rights—a Brake
Not an Accelerator’ (2004) 5 EHRLR 473, to be read in conjunction with Roy W Davis, ‘A Brake? The
Union’s New “Bill of Rights” ’ (2005) 5 EHRLR 449.
89 See also Elise Muir, ‘The Court of Justice: A Fundamental Rights Institution among Others’ in
Mark Dawson, Elise Muir, and Bruno de Witte (eds), Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice
(Edward Elgar 2013) 76–101.
90 It is important to stress that examples of this type of measure existed several years ago; eg Council
Directive (EEC) 89/552 of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting
activities [1989] OJ L298/23, Article 22. See further Piet Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights and the Federal Question’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 945, 983.
15
contains other policy objectives. These instruments may be distinct from simple
forms of fundamental rights mainstreaming. While the latter are merely concerned
with asserting the incidental fundamental rights implications of EU acts, the former
seek to actually address fundamental rights issues through positive rights and mech-
anisms. Instruments impacting on fundamental rights protection while achieving
another central policy aim are also distinct from EU equality law. EU equality law is
exclusively designed to enhance fundamental rights while these other instruments
do not—or at least not explicitly and clearly—have such protection as their primary
purpose.
These distinctions between the various fundamental rights implications of dif-
ferent pieces of legislation are not hermetic91 and will not be discussed in further
detail in this book. The point being made here is merely that although EU legislative
intervention can affect fundamental rights protection to a significant—if not spec-
tacular (as is the case for instance in the context of EU migration law92)—extent,
the design for such legislative intervention can be distinguished from that of an au-
tonomous fundamental rights policy specifically concerned with achieving a higher
degree of protection of the said right.93 The legislator may indeed devote specific
attention to ensuring compliance with and a high level of protection of fundamental
rights as well as to developing mechanisms designed to enhance the protection of the
relevant fundamental right.
EU equality law constitutes one branch of EU law by which EU institutions
do seek to actively ‘combat discrimination’,94 ‘with a view to putting into effect in
the Member States the principle of equal treatment’.95 Such law is geared towards
developing concepts and tools to protect and promote the fundamental right to
equal treatment. In so far as EU equality law thereby seeks to achieve ‘inter-personal
equality per se’96 and to ‘change democratic societies’ instead of just protecting indi-
viduals against threats to the said fundamental right or limiting European interven-
tion that may affect such rights, it can be labelled as a fundamental rights policy.97
91 The author fully acknowledges that certain acts may be difficult to classify in one category instead
of another. The categories proposed, however, remain conceptually useful in characterizing the tensions
between the EU judiciary and EU political institutions in the various contexts. See also Eeckhout (n
90) 984–85.
92 Council Directive (EC) 2003/86 of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification
[2003] OJ L251/12 (hereafter ‘Family Reunification Directive’), Preamble, Recital (6) is an instrument
of EU migration policy that actually overlaps with the implementation of a given fundamental right. It
explicitly seeks, to a certain extent, to ‘protect the family and establish or preserve family life’.
93 On the distinction between positive and negative integration in the field of fundamental rights
protection, see Alston and Weiler (n 83) 8–9 as discussed later; on the possible scope, depth, and impact
of EU fundamental rights policies, see Eeckhout (n 90) 990. Note that this is distinct from the ‘offen-
sive/defensive’ dichotomy used by Coppel and O’Neill (n 12) 669. This dichotomy relates to the use
of the fundamental rights discourse primarily by the Court, with very limited insight into the role of
political institutions in shaping such a discourse.
94 Article 19 TFEU.
95 eg Council Directive (EC) 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment between per-
sons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22, Article 1.
96 Scharpf (n 22) 132–33.
97 Paraphrasing von Bogdandy (n 78) 1308. Note, however, that this policy is not unlimited, as will
be discussed in Chapter 3 A.3.b.
16
16 1. Introduction
An important feature of such a policy at EU level is that it seeks to address problems
that are ‘not . . . intrinsic to a transnational context’ (emphasis in original).98 Unlike
most provisions of EU law that have implications for fundamental rights protec-
tion, an EU fundamental rights policy does not need to be related to transnational
questions.
In 1999, Alston and Weiler had already pointed out that EU gender equality law was
one of the limited examples where the EU had actually moved from—what they coin
by analogy to the process of market integration as—‘negative’ to ‘positive’ integration
for the purpose of human rights protection.99 The existence of a self-standing legal basis
for equal treatment100 after Amsterdam, as well as the adoption of several directives on
the basis of what is now Article 19 TFEU and the modernization of EU gender equality
law, make it clear today that EU equality law is the first area where the EU has explicitly
engaged in active policy-making to enhance fundamental rights protection.
A few other policies, such as EU data protection law and EU asylum law, could
be deemed to constitute fundamental rights policies as defined herein. For instance,
Article 78 TFEU on asylum empowers the EU legislator to adopt legislation in
order to:
. . . develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection
with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring inter-
national protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This
policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol
of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.101
On this basis, the so-called Qualification Directive102 aims at laying down ‘stand-
ards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as benefi-
ciaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted’.103
Yet, neither the wording of the Treaty nor that of the Directive are as clear-cut as EU
equality law is when it comes to asserting its fundamental rights function and its
autonomy from other EU substantive policies. EU asylum policy does not appear to
result from a reflection on how to promote a specific fundamental right, it is (still)
more concerned with ensuring the consistency of EU intervention with the require-
ment to protect refugees in a transnational context than in actively promoting the
right to refugee status.104
Another example is EU data protection law. Although its initial legal basis was
to be found in internal market treaty provisions,105 the objectives of the Directive
98 Somek (n 36) 9. Also observing the autonomy of the so-called ‘Article 13 TEC Directives’,
Charilaos Nikolaidis, The Right to Equality in European Human Rights Law: The Quest for Substance in
the Jurisprudence of the European Courts (Routledge 2015) 130.
99 Alston and Weiler (n 83) 8–9. 100 Acting as a complement to Article 157 TFEU.
101 Article 78(1) TFEU.
102 Directive (EU) 2011/95 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eli-
gible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted [2011] OJ L337/9.
103 ibid Article 1. 104 Arguing along similar lines, see Eeckhout (n 90) 985.
105 Then Article 100a of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC).
17
D. Equality Law Breaking New Boundaries? 17
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data (or the Data Protection Directive)106 combine a
fundamental right and an internal market approach. Indeed, Article 1 of the Data
Protection Directive states as follows:
1. In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the fundamental rights
and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to
the processing of personal data.
2. Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal data between
Member States for reasons connected with the protection afforded under paragraph 1.107
Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty inserted a new legal basis for the adoption of le-
gislation on data protection that features in the title on ‘Provisions having General
Application’ and is currently being used in the context of a large-scale reform of EU
data protection law.108 Although the tone of the new instrument has a yet stronger
fundamental rights dimension than its predecessor,109 the new Article 16 TFEU, on
which the reform is based, combines an internal market and a fundamental rights
rationale, as can be seen from the reference to the free movement of data. This means
its autonomous status at this stage is still unclear. Nevertheless it may be the policy
that is the closest to EU equality law in terms of fundamental rights dynamics, and
so some comparisons will be drawn and avenues opened up for further research.110
EU equality law thus stands out in terms of the autonomous mandate it is given
by the EU Treaties.111 This book explores the constitutional implications of this au-
tonomy. Parallels will be drawn now and then with different fields of EU law that are
particularly strongly intertwined with EU equality policy and fundamental rights
in general.
D. Equality Law Breaking New Boundaries as an

Autonomous EU Fundamental Rights Policy?
Fifteen to twenty years after the adoption and entry into force of the key
instruments—in particular what are now Article 19 TFEU, Article 21 CFEU, and
the so-called ‘Article 19 TFEU Directives’—one can examine the extent to which
106 Directive (EC) 95/46 of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31.
107 ibid Article 1.
108 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/
46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1; and Directive (EU) 2016/680 of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by com-
petent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA [2016] OJ L119/89.
109 As argued for instance by Antonella Galetta and Paul de Hert, ‘The Proceduralisation of Data
Protection Remedies under EU Data Protection Law: Towards a More Effective and Data Subject-
Oriented Remedial System?’ (2015) 8 REALaw 125.
110 See Chapters 4 and 5. 111 Also singling out EU equality law, Eeckhout (n 90) 985.
18
18 1. Introduction
EU equality law may be understood as breaking through new boundaries as a funda-
mental rights policy of the EU. The following questions may be asked: What char-
acterizes the relationship between EU institutions as well as domestic and EU actors
on the matter? Can lessons be drawn for the development of specific fundamental
rights policies at the EU level?
1. Approach and structure of the book

By asserting that EU equality law not only performs a social function but also gives
expression to a fundamental right, EU institutions have engaged in developing the
‘first’ fundamental rights policy of the EU: in other words, a policy that is largely
understood as independent from the internal market as well as from social policy
concerns. To the extent that this field can be understood as autonomous, it can be
treated as a laboratory for the development of further fundamental rights policies in
the EU. An investigation into the dynamics of this field of law is most instructive in
shaping our understanding and approach to further developments of a similar kind
at the EU level.
Our departure point is the dual observation that EU equality law is highly con-
stitutionalized and that EU equality law has developed innovative tools to support
implementation and policy formation at the domestic level. In order to be able to
critically examine the high level of constitutionalization of EU equality law, this
book starts by examining constitutional questions raised by the transfer of a funda-
mental rights competence to the EU level (Chapter 2 ‘Checks and Balances in the
Process of Fundamental Rights Law-Making in the EU’). While such constitutional
questions have been raised in relation to the creation of a fully fledged EU funda-
mental rights policy or in relation to other legal orders, the relevant conceptual tools
are useful in order to understand and analyse what is happening in the field of EU
equality law. Emphasis will be placed here on the importance of allowing for polit-
ical debate at the EU level on the content of fundamental rights.
The book then examines the dynamics of EU equality law. The purpose here is
less to provide an exhaustive or textbook overview of the current state of the law in
that field than to reflect on challenges created by the fundamental rights status of the
underlying rights. In so far as the EU seeks actively to protect the fundamental right
to equal treatment through the adoption of specific pieces of legislation, EU insti-
tutions reshape the contours as well as the content of EU equality law. The interplay
between equality legislation and the fundamental right to equal treatment is thus
particularly complex and sensitive (Chapter 3 ‘EU Equality Law at a Constitutional
Crossroads’). It will be stressed that EU equality law is at risk of becoming over-
constitutionalized and being taken out of the realm of political debate, precisely
where it should primarily be located.
The book subsequently examines the extent to which other areas of EU law may
be facing the same risk of over-constitutionalization (Chapter 4 ‘Distinguishing
Legislation giving Expression to Fundamental Rights: Lessons from EU Equality
Law’). To that effect, general features of EU equality law are identified that may
19
explain its over-constitutionalization and the extent to which such features can
be found elsewhere is considered. It will be argued that isolated equal treatment
clauses enshrined in EU employment and migration law should be treated dif-
ferently from the core of EU equality policy—and thereby be protected against
over-constitutionalization. It will also be noted that EU data protection law is a
field where at least some of the challenges identified in Chapter 3 in relation to EU
equality law may reoccur.
These earlier chapters having warned against relying too heavily on a constitu-
tional narrative to address the protection of fundamental rights in the EU, the book
finally turns to the potential for EU equality law to genuinely make a difference at
domestic level. It will be argued that this can be best achieved by using the full poten-
tial of the political dimension of EU equality law to establish innovative governance
tools (Chapter 5 ‘The Legislative Embedding of the Governance of EU Equality
Law’). The main added value of EU intervention may indeed lie precisely in sup-
porting societal change from within through dynamic legal processes stimulated by
EU legislative intervention. The final section therefore concludes with a detailed
examination of the instruments developed in the context of EU equality law to ef-
ficiently enhance equal treatment in the EU and looks at the way they have actually
been used since their adoption to stimulate policy formation domestically. Specific
attention is devoted to examining the extent to which such tools could be transposed
to similar fields of EU law, as well as the extent to which EU equality law may benefit
from comparisons with developing fundamental rights legislation, for example with
the legislation in the context of data protection.
2. Relationship to existing literature on EU equality law

EU equality law has been explored in several important academic publications. One
category of these publications examines EU equality law as a branch of equality
law and a specific expression of the principle of equal treatment. It investigates the
potential of EU equality law to (genuinely) transform European societies in a way
that will ensure access to and the use of social goods as well as the ability of all mem-
bers of society to participate in political life on an equal basis. A good illustration
of this category is the work of Fredman.112 A subcategory of the former devotes
particular attention to how the EU legal order is or could be used to advance an
‘equality agenda’. This is notable and clear through the works of Waddington and
Bell,113 and can also be seen in de Búrca’s reflections on the hybrid model of EU
anti-discrimination law.114
112 eg Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008)
in particular 53–58 and 159–66.
113 eg Mark Bell, Racism and Equality in the European Union (OUP 2008); Lisa Waddington, ‘Future
Prospects for EU Equality Law: Lessons to be Learnt from the Proposed Equal Treatment Directive’
(2011) 36 EL Rev 163.
114 eg Gráinne de Búrca, ‘EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model’ in Gráinne de Búrca and
Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing 2006) 97–120.
20
20 1. Introduction
Another category of these publications examines EU equality law from an alternative
perspective to that of ‘equality’ per se. For these academics, EU equality law serves as a
case study to consider broader legal and political developments. Some authors investi-
gate the limits of the principle of equality in addressing broad societal imbalances. For
Somek, equality policy lacks substantive norms and thus is an insufficient social tool.115
Heavy reliance on this mechanism at the EU level threatens to deprive domestic re-
distribution policies of their content. Several other academics have been interested in
how EU equality law-making illustrates the institutional dynamics of the process of
European integration. Stone Sweet demonstrates this approach,116 which emphasizes
the proactive role of the Court in the building of an EU equality policy.
The present book belongs to the second category of literature to the extent that it
does not examine EU equality law as a branch of equality law. However, it does not
look at the contribution of EU equality law to a normative model of social redistri-
bution or examine it solely from an institutional perspective. Instead, the dynamics
of EU equality law are considered as a test case for the development of fully fledged
or autonomous fundamental rights policies at EU level. The book provides an in-
tegrated analysis of equality law, as tackled by EU institutions and the EU toolbox,
in order to give flesh to a self-standing (ie detached from internal market concerns)
fundamental rights policy. It critically analyses EU equality law as the first117—and
in several ways most accomplished118—fundamental rights policy of the EU and
seeks to draw lessons for other emerging EU fundamental rights policies.
The examination of an EU fundamental rights policy can fall into a third cat-
egory of literature on the ‘social model of European citizenship’.119 This model
emerged in the 1990s. It supports the view that a stronger set of EU social rights
would enhance European integration by putting flesh on the bones of the concept
of European citizenship.120 In the early 2000s, Bell, in particular, provided useful
reflections on the extent to which EU anti-discrimination law indeed contributes
to such a model by contrast to the ‘market integration model’, on which the pro-
cess of European integration is largely based.121 Although reference will be made
to the ‘social model of European citizenship’ or related concepts that indeed shed
light on the dynamics of EU equality law from the 1990s onwards, this book does
not seek to further tie EU equality law to this model for a number of reasons.122
115 Somek (n 36); in reaction to these views, see also Colm O’Cinneide, ‘Completing the
Picture: The Complex Relationship between EU Anti-Discrimination Law and “Social Europe” ’ in
Nicola Countouris and Mark Freedland, Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis (CUP 2013) 118–37.
116 Alec Stone Sweet and Rachel Cichowski, ‘Sex Equality’ in Alec Stone Sweet (ed), The Judicial
Construction of Europe (OUP 2004) Ch 4.
117 This is understood from a historical perspective.
118 This is the case pending developments on the right to private life and the protection of
personal data.
119 Commission (EC), ‘For a Europe of Civic and Social Rights’ (n 84) 25, 33; see also Bell (n 50) 12.
120 eg Commission (EC), ‘For a Europe of Civic and Social Rights’ (n 84) 25–26; see also Siofra
O’Leary, ‘The Relationship between Community Citizenship and the protection of Fundamental
Rights in Community Law’ (1995) 32 CML Rev 519.
121 Bell (n 50).
122 The reasons listed below build on nuances introduced by Mark Bell at the end of his book in
2002: Bell (n 50) 194–95 and also 205. While he suggested bridging the gap between the market
21
As made clear in the introduction, and as will be elaborated upon in this book,
the way EU equality law has developed over the past fifteen years has significantly
(although admittedly not entirely) departed from its origins in both EU internal
market and EU social policies.123 This field of law is developing along related
but distinct lines. In fact, it may be precisely because anti-discrimination is not
a traditional social policy tool that its rapid development at EU level has been
possible.124 Second, the development of EU equality law, as it was shaped in the
post-Amsterdam era, has actually been made with little reference to the concept
of citizenship outside academic circles. In contrast, there has been heavy reliance
on the fundamental rights discourse. Third, EU equality law largely applies to EU
and non-EU citizens alike, thus making it difficult to assimilate its development
with that of EU citizenship.
3. Equality and non-discrimination in EU law

Before launching into a substantive analysis, it is important to clarify at the
outset that specialists in this field often distinguish between equality and non-
discrimination—with discrimination being a symptom, and equality a more am-
bitious aim.125 From this point of view, eliminating discrimination (or formal
inequalities) does not necessarily allow the elimination of deeply enshrined in-
equalities (hence a substantive understanding of equality). Pursuing equality thus
requires going beyond the elimination of discrimination126—which focuses on a
negative understanding of equality127—and may even at times legitimize certain
forms of discrimination. In the quest for a substantive understanding of equality,
Nikolaidis defines equality as covering both the ‘need for freedom from arbitrary
or irrational treatment’ and a human right to equality that ‘should be understood
as aiming . . . to uphold the basic capabilities that are necessary for the maintenance
of equal opportunity; thus the individual should be free from social oppression in
the form of prejudice, stereotyping and failures to accommodate difference’.128 Yet,
EU institutions and the Court itself do not make a clear distinction129 between
equality and non-discrimination. EU law thus uses both expressions alternately.
As this book is less an essay on equality law than an enquiry into the way a supra-
national organization such as the EU develops a fundamental rights policy, it will
also treat these expressions as equivalent.
integration and social citizenship model by reference to the market participation model (196–97), I ad-
dress it in more simple terms by reference to fundamental rights (detached from social policy as such).
123 See Chapter 3, section A.3.b.
124 Relying on this point to highlight the shortcomings of EU anti-discrimination policy, see Somek
(n 36).
125 eg Alexander Somek, ‘A Constitution for Antidiscrimination: Exploring the Vanguard Moment
of Community Law’ (1999) 5 ELJ 243, 243; Aileen McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law
(Hart Publishing 2014) 14–37.
126 eg Koukoulis-Spiliotpoulos (n 12) 335. 127 Nikolaidis (n 98) 29. 128 ibid 9.
129 See also Tridimas (n 12) 64.
2
2
Checks and Balances in the Process
of Fundamental Rights Law-Making in the EU
EU equality law is an EU policy characterized by the coexistence of three types of

norms: (i) written law which has constitutional value (the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union or CFEU and treaty rights); (ii) unwritten law with
constitutional value (general principles); and (iii) written secondary law (legisla-
tion). The existence of principles as well as rights enshrined in constitutional law
distinguishes this policy from numerous other policies that depend entirely on the
existence of EU legislation.1 Meanwhile, the existence of rights entrenched in specif-
ically related legislation also distinguishes this fundamental right (the fundamental
right to equal treatment) from many other fundamental rights only protected in EU
law at the constitutional level or incidentally through ad hoc provisions isolated in
legislation.2
This area of law therefore includes a broad set of norms that range from ‘prin-
ciples’ to ‘rights’. While a principle constitutes the ‘medium through which moral
values infiltrate a legal system’,3 the language of ‘rights’, which is very much present
in the field of EU equality law, allows the stating of general premises of law as well
as the expression of a particular conclusion of the law.4 It contributes to putting the
principle into practice. An enquiry into ‘the nature and character of the legal rules
which concern the conferment of legal rights’5 under EU law will shed light on the
specificities of the rights thereby protected and thus set the stage for an enquiry into
the specificities of EU equality law. To that effect, this chapter elucidates and reflects
on the general characteristics of the rules that constitute EU fundamental rights law.
The existence of a multilayered set of legal norms for the design of a system of
fundamental rights protection triggers important questions on what the appro-
priate institutional framework for fundamental rights protection in an integrated
supranational legal order may be. The challenge originates in the novelty of the
phenomenon by which political institutions adopt legislation giving expression
1 Such as consumer protection policy (Article 169 TFEU) or public health policy (Article 168 TFEU).
2 See also Chapter 1, section C.
3 Charilaos Nikolaidis, The Right to Equality in European Human Rights Law: The Quest for Substance
in the Jurisprudence of the European Courts (Routledge 2015) 14.
4 Donald Neil MacCormick, ‘Rights in Legislation’ in PMS Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds), Law,
Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (Clarendon Press 1977) 191.
5 ibid 191.
23
A. Within a Supranational Legal Order 23
to a fundamental right in the EU. It was primarily triggered by Article 19 of the

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU or ‘the Treaty’) and taken
one step further with Article 16 TFEU, inserted in the EU Treaties respectively
by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon. While Article 19 TFEU relates to anti-
discrimination and was promptly used to enable the adoption of anti-discrimination
legislation, Article 16 TFEU relates to data protection and has recently been relied
upon in the context of a broad reform of EU data protection law.6
The phenomenon by which EU institutions can and do legislate specifically and
explicitly in order to enhance the protection of a fundamental right is therefore
fairly recent. This opens up a new era after a period in which the focus had been on
elevating fundamental rights beyond the realm of ordinary politics (see section A).
The constitutional implications of this new setting emerge from the tension thereby
created between political institutions and constitutional adjudication (see section
B). These questions are particularly intense in the context of the EU legal order
where the interplay between domestic and European legal orders adds to the com-
plexity of the matter (see section C). Each of these aspects will be examined in turn.
It will be emphasized that the ability of a supranational organization such as the EU
to legislate in order to enhance the protection against discrimination is unique in its
technical complexity as well as in the multitude of legitimacy questions that it raises.
A. Legislating on Fundamental Rights within

a Supranational Legal Order
Before investigating the tensions among EU institutions as well as between domestic

and EU legal orders on matters of fundamental rights protection, it is important to
understand the role that legislation plays in shaping systems of fundamental rights
protection in European legal orders. Is it common to enhance fundamental rights
protection through legislative tools? How does such a trend fit in the broader context
of the evolution of fundamental rights protection at the international level and how
do these observations apply to the EU?
1. Three stages in the regulation of (fundamental) rights

If one looks at contemporary history, three generations of mechanisms of individual
rights protection at domestic and international level may be distinguished. First,
political and social rights were treated as ordinary rights, the protection of which was
entrusted to the state through ordinary laws. Second, selected rights were constitu-
tionalized and internationalized: ‘uploaded’ to higher legal spheres for protection
from the dangers of ordinary politics. Third, legislation is being adopted in order
to give expression to some of these fundamental rights, thus downloading them
and bringing them back into the political sphere. These stages will now be briefly
6 See also Chapter 1, section C.3.

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der ihm alle seine geliebten Freiheiten anstandslos beläßt.
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Charakters dieser Massassileute bis jetzt nichts gemerkt; wer mit mir
in Berührung gekommen ist, hat sich ebenso freundlich benommen
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ich habe mich mit aller Energie, der ich fähig bin, in die Arbeit
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eigenen Ohren gehört habe.
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vielversprechend. Die Missionsstation Massassi liegt eine kleine
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Strohhütten der Mission in einer riesigen Wand in die Höhe, um
oben, 940 Meter hoch, in einer flachen Kuppe zu endigen. Herr
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erlaubte, ging der Zug aus der Barrabarra dahin, um in der Höhe des
Mtandi links abzuschwenken. Am Fuße des Berges blieben die
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aller Europäer mit der Verbesserung lederner Gehwerkzeuge
befasse. Bruder Wilhelm hat denn auch eine ganz herrliche
Doppelreihe schwerer Alpennägel an meine Stiefel gesetzt, und ich
habe ein Paar von ihnen am ersten Marschtage von Lindi aus
getragen, — aber dann nicht mehr! Sie zogen die Füße wie Blei zur
Erde, und zudem zeigte sich, daß der schwere Beschlag auf der
feinsandigen Barrabarra absolut überflüssig war. Später habe ich zu
meinen leichten Leipziger Schnürschuhen gegriffen, die das
Marschieren zum Vergnügen machen. Hier auf den scharfen Graten
des Mtandi taten mir die so schnöde behandelten Bergstiefel
indessen ausgezeichnete Dienste.
Unsere
Mtandibesteigung
nach der
Zeichnung von
Juma (s. S. 96).
Ich will die Schilderung meiner Gefühle bei jenem Aufstieg lieber
übergehen! Es wurde heller und heller; wir kamen höher und höher;
aber ein Vergnügen war dieses Kraxeln, einer hinter dem anderen,
von Fels zu Fels und von Baum zu Baum wenigstens für uns beiden
sehr behäbigen und wohlgenährten Europäer keineswegs. Wir
haben uns denn auch damit begnügt, nicht die alleroberste Kuppe zu
erreichen, sondern in einem etwas niedrigeren Vorsprung das Ziel
unserer Wünsche zu sehen. Dies war verständig, denn von der
erwarteten großartigen Aussicht war keine Rede; Nebel in der Höhe,
Nebel auch über das ganze weite Land hin, so daß selbst die
längste Expositionszeit so gut wie nichts auf meine
photographischen Platten brachte.
Dieser sonst so erfolglose Aufstieg hat wenigstens ein hübsches,
kleines Denkmal afrikanischer Kunst gezeitigt: eine zeichnerische
Wiedergabe der kraxelnden Karawane. Umstehend ist sie. Die
Steilheit des Berges deutet der schwarze Künstler ganz richtig durch
die senkrechte Stellung der Weglinie an. Das Gewirr von Kreisen
und Kurven am unteren Ende der Linie stellt die Missionsstation
Massassi mit ihren Gebäuden dar: dem Fundament einer Kirche,
die, wenn sie jemals fertig werden sollte, sämtliche bekehrten
Heiden Afrikas und der umliegenden Erdteile aufzunehmen
vermöchte, so riesenhaft sind die Abmessungen; dem ehemaligen
Kuhstall, in dem die beiden alten Reverends nach der Zerstörung
ihrer schönen, alten Gebäude durch die Majimaji ihre primitive
Unterkunft gefunden haben; der Mädchen- und der Knabenschule,
beides ein paar große Bambushütten im Eingeborenenstil, und den
Wohngebäuden für das schwarze Lehrerpersonal und die Schüler.
Das Rankengewirr am obern Ende der Linie stellt den Gipfel des
Berges mit seinen Gneisblöcken dar. Die beiden obersten der
kraxelnden Männer sind der Kirongosi, der landeskundige Führer,
und einer unserer Leute; der dritte ist Herr Ewerbeck, der vierte bin
ich. Der kaiserliche Bezirksamtmann ist kenntlich an seinen
Achselstücken mit den beiden Hauptmannssternen; sie gehören zum
Dienstanzug dieser Beamtenklasse. Von allen Attributen der Weißen
imponieren sie den Schwarzen sichtlich am meisten, denn überall,
wo z. B. Offiziere auf den in meinem Besitz befindlichen
Eingeborenenzeichnungen erscheinen, ist ihr Dienstgrad
unweigerlich und stets ganz richtig durch die Sterne angegeben
worden. Auch in der Zahl der Chargenwinkel auf den Ärmeln der
weißen und der schwarzen Unteroffiziere irren sich die schwarzen
Künstler niemals.
Buschbrand auf dem Makonde Plateau.
Was doch eine volle Figur macht! Ewerbeck, Seyfried und ich
sind etwa gleichaltrig und verfügen auch über ungefähr dieselben
Körperdimensionen. Dieser Umstand muß wohl die Veranlassung
gewesen sein, daß die Einwohnerschaft von Lindi und später auch
die des Innern mich ohne weiteres ebenfalls zum Hauptmann
avancieren ließ; in Lindi war ich einfach der Hoffmani mpya, der
neue Hauptmann. Auf dem wiedergegebenen Kunstblatt ist der
Beweis für meine Beförderung zu sehen: auch mir hat der Künstler
die Achselstücke verliehen. Die Figuren hinter uns beiden Europäern
sind belanglos; das ist eben der Rest unserer Begleitung.
Doch nun kommt das psychologisch Seltsame: ich bin zweimal
auf dem Bilde; einmal klettere ich mühselig den Berg hinan, das
andere Mal stehe ich bereits in stolzer Pose oben und banne mit
dem Momentverschluß in der Hand die Gefilde Afrikas auf meine
Platte. Der Dreibein oben ist nämlich mein 13 × 18-Apparat; die
Zickzacklinien zwischen dem Stativ sind die Verfestigungs-
Messingleisten; die lange Schlangenlinie ist der dünne
Gummischlauch der Momentauslösung, von der ich allerdings bei
dem Nebel keinen Gebrauch machen konnte; der Photograph bin,
wie gesagt, ich. Die Männer hinter mir sind meine Leibdiener, denen
für gewöhnlich die zerbrechlicheren Teile des Apparates anvertraut
werden.
Die zeichnerische Wiedergabe dieser Bergbesteigung ist ein
ebenso anspruchsloses Geisteserzeugnis des Negerintellekts wie
alle anderen; aber sie ist bei alledem ein sehr wichtiges Dokument
für die Anfänge der Kunst im allgemeinen und für die
Auffassungsweise des Negers im besonderen. Gerade für den
Volksforscher ist auch das Unscheinbarste nicht ohne Bedeutung.
Und deswegen fühle ich mich so unendlich glücklich, selbst einmal
eine ganze Anzahl von Monaten in einem solchen Milieu hoffentlich
recht ungestört und nach Herzenslust arbeiten zu können.
Ihren vorläufigen Abschluß hat unsere Mtandibesteigung in
einem solennen Frühstück gefunden, zu dem uns die beiden
Reverends freundlichst eingeladen hatten. Der Engländer lebt ja
anerkanntermaßen zu Hause ausgezeichnet; doch auch in der
Fremde, und sei es im Innern irgendeines Erdteils, weiß er sich zu
helfen. Ich gewann denn auch gerade hier den Eindruck, als sei
Massassi eine „sehr nahrhafte Gegend“, wie Wilhelm Raabe sagen
würde. Nur Sekt gab es heute nicht; den hatte Reverend Carnon uns
schon am Vortage kredenzt, und zwar in einem riesigen
Wasserkruge. Sektgläser habe er nicht, meinte der freundliche
Geistliche. Es ging auch so.
Das Lustigste des ganzen Mtandiunternehmens war indessen
der Abschluß. In dichtem Haufen trabte die Schar der
Missionszöglinge bei unserem Heimritt neben uns her. Die kleinen
Kerle sahen recht kriegerisch aus; alle trugen Bogen und Pfeile und
schrien lustig um die Wette. Ich konnte mir zunächst kein klares Bild
von dem Sinn des ganzen Tuns machen; zu Hause, d. h. bei
unserem Polizeiposten angekommen, verstand ich allerdings sehr
bald, daß die Leutchen nichts anderes beabsichtigten, als mir ihre
gesamte kriegerische Ausrüstung für meine ethnographische
Sammlung zu überlassen! Doch beileibe nicht etwa als hochherziges
Geschenk; für Schenken ist der Neger nicht; darin gleicht er
unserem Bauer. Im Gegenteil, die jungen Leute verlangten geradezu
phantastische Preise für ihre doch eigens für den merkwürdigen
Msungu, der allen Negerplunder kauft, gefertigten Schießzeuge. Ich
habe später von dem Kram erworben, was mir tauglich schien, habe
es im übrigen aber doch für nötig gehalten, die Leerausgehenden
vor einer Enttäuschung zu bewahren, indem ich jedem ein paar
Kupfermünzen aus meinem berühmten Hellertopf zukommen ließ.
Vorher habe ich jedoch erst noch ein ganz nettes Experiment
gemacht, mir und meiner Wissenschaft zum Nutzen, der
Negerjugend von Massassi aber zur höchsten Lust: die
Veranstaltung eines wirklichen und wahrhaftigen Schützenfestes
mitten im ernsten Afrika.
Die vergleichende Völkerkunde hat sich seit langem bemüht, alle
technischen und geistigen Tätigkeiten des Menschen zu
klassifizieren und zu analysieren. So hat der Amerikaner Morse
schon vor Jahrzehnten festgestellt, daß die Menschheit, soweit sie
mit Bogen schießt oder je geschossen hat, sich ganz bestimmter
Spannweisen bedient. Es gibt etwa ein halbes Dutzend
verschiedene Arten, die über den Erdball derartig verteilt sind, daß
hier und da ganz große Provinzen einer einheitlichen Spannmethode
feststellbar sind, während anderswo die schärfsten Unterschiede von
Volk zu Volk und von Stamm zu Stamm bestehen.
„Aber, Herr Professor,“ höre ich in diesem Augenblick im Geiste
einen meiner Leipziger Hörer einwerfen, „Bogenspannen ist doch
Bogenspannen; was sollen denn da für Unterschiede bestehen?“
„Hier, mein Herr,“ antworte ich, „bitte schießen Sie einmal, aber
mit Vorsicht; bringen Sie Ihren Nachbar nicht um und sich selbst
auch nicht!“ Wie oft schon habe ich während meiner Dozentenzeit
dieses Experiment gemacht, und wie übereinstimmend ist jedesmal
das Ergebnis gewesen! Man kann tausend gegen eins wetten, daß
jeder Deutsche — die Engländer und Belgier nehme ich aus; diese
Völker schießen heute sportmäßig und mit Verständnis mit dem
Bogen und wissen eine gute Spannweise wohl von einer schlechten
zu unterscheiden —, wenn er den Bogen in die Linke genommen hat
und mit der Rechten Pfeil und Sehne erfaßt, das untere, mittels der
Kerbe auf der Sehne ruhende Pfeilende zwischen Daumen und
Zeigefinger ergreift und nunmehr die Sehne erst indirekt mittels des
Pfeiles zurückzieht. Das ist dieselbe Methode, mit der wir als
Knaben den Flitzbogen gespannt haben. Diese Spannweise ist die
denkbar schlechteste. Davon kann sich jeder, der die anderen
Methoden ebenfalls beherrscht, bei jedem Schuß überzeugen. Es
liegt ja auch nahe, daß der Pfeil den Fingern bei stärkerem
Zurückziehen entgleiten muß. Der beste Beweis für die
Minderwertigkeit gerade dieser Spannart ist ihre geringe Verbreitung
innerhalb desjenigen Teils der Menschheit, der den Bogen noch als
wirkliche und wehrhafte Waffe, sei es zum Krieg, sei es zur Jagd,
benutzt. Diese Völker und Stämme handhaben ihre Waffen ganz
anders. Nur wo der Bogen zu einem Überlebsel geworden ist wie
z. B. bei uns, d. h. wo er aus dem Kranz der Manneswehr durch
vollkommenere Waffen verdrängt worden ist, und wo er seine
ehemalige Berechtigung nur noch als Spielzeug bei dem
konservativsten Teil unserer Spezies, beim Kinde, dartut, da ist diese
zum wirksamen Schuß gänzlich unbrauchbare Spannweise aus
Unkenntnis einer bessern im Gebrauch.
Wäre ich gezwungen, die Missionsjugend von Massassi als
Kulturmaßstab zu betrachten, so müßte ich sagen: auch beim Neger
ist der Bogen ein Überlebsel, denn von dem ganzen großen Haufen
schossen neun Zehntel in derselben Weise wie unsere Knaben.
Doch mit einem Unterschiede: wir halten unseren Flitzbogen
wagerecht, die Negerknaben hielten ihn senkrecht; der Pfeil lag links
vom Bogen und lief zwischen Zeige- und Mittelfinger hindurch. Nur
das restliche Zehntel schoß mit anderer Spannung; es waren
bezeichnenderweise lauter ältere Zöglinge, die also augenscheinlich
noch eine bestimmte Dosis altafrikanischen Konservativismus mit in
ihr Christentum hinübergerettet hatten.
Bei meinem Preisschießen kam es mir weniger auf die
Treffergebnisse an als auf die Beobachtung der Spannmethoden;
trotzdem, muß ich sagen, zogen sich die kleinen Schützen ganz gut
aus der Affäre. Zwar schossen sie nur auf geringe Entfernungen;
auch war mein Ziel nicht gerade klein, bestand es doch aus einer
Nummer der „Täglichen Rundschau“, aber die Mehrzahl blieb doch
innerhalb der rasch auf diese improvisierte Scheibe gemalten Ringe.
Und stolz waren sie auch, die kleinen Schützen; wenn ich einen
besonders guten Schuß laut über das Blachfeld hin lobte, blickte der
schwarze Held triumphierend im Kreise umher.
„Nun bitte, Herr Professor, die anderen Spannmethoden!“ höre
ich wieder meine getreuen Schüler mir zurufen. In Leipzigs Hörsälen
muß ich in solchen Fällen natürlich sofort Rede und Antwort stehen.
Afrika ist in dieser Beziehung toleranter; hier blüht mir die Freiheit,
vom Recht des Forschers Gebrauch zu machen und an der Hand
vieler anderen Beobachtungen Material zu sammeln. Ich antworte
also mit höflicher Bestimmtheit: „Wenn ich die ganze Ebene nördlich
vom Rovuma abgegrast haben werde und dann schließlich auf dem
kühlen Makondeplateau die Muße finde, auf meine so vielseitigen
Studien zurückzublicken, dann will ich mich ernsthaft bemühen, Ihre
Wißbegier auch in dieser Richtung zu befriedigen. Also auf
Wiedersehen, meine Herren!“
Wanyassa-Jäger mit Hund. Nach Zeichnung von Salim Matola (s. S.
452).
Siebentes Kapitel.
Einleben ins Volkstum.
Massassi, Ende Juli 1906.
Jeder normale Mensch ist ein wandelnder Beweis für die

Wahrheit der Anpassungstheorie; ich bin noch kaum zwei Monate im
Lande Afrika und nur erst den Bruchteil eines Monats im Innern, und
doch fühle ich mich hier schon ganz heimisch. Was blieb mir auch
anderes übrig! Schon am 21. Juli, also nach einem Zusammenleben
von nur wenigen Tagen, ist Herr Ewerbeck in aller Herrgottsfrühe
und unter dem Schein einer durch das Dunkel der Tropennacht
vorangetragenen Laterne von dannen marschiert, um daheim in
Lindi der höhern Pflicht des Empfangs der acht
Reichstagsabgeordneten obzuliegen, von deren kühnem Reisemut
unsere Tagespresse seit Monaten widerhallt.
Als einziger Rest europäischer Kultur ist nur Nils Knudsen
zurückgeblieben. Schon der Name besagt, daß wir es mit einem
nordischen Recken zu tun haben; Nils ist denn auch in der Tat der
hochblonde Nachkomme der alten Wikinger. Der Expedition hatte er
sich hinzugesellt, ohne daß ich viel von der Anwesenheit eines
dritten Europäers gemerkt hätte. Während Ewerbeck und ich stolz
und kühn an der Spitze unserer langen Karawane marschierten oder
ritten, hielt Nils Knudsen sich meist an deren Ende auf; im Lager
aber blieb er bescheiden im Hintergrunde. Jetzt, im Standort
Massassi, ist er von Amts wegen in den Vordergrund gerückt
worden; er soll hier nach dem Rechten sehen und den schwarzen
Lokalbehörden etwas auf die Finger passen. Ob das nötig ist, kann
ich einstweilen nicht entscheiden, da ich in die Schwierigkeiten der
innern Verwaltung eines so großen Bezirks, wie es der von Lindi ist,
noch keinerlei Einblick habe; aber die Maßnahme wird schon richtig
sein, sonst hätte ein so alter Landeskenner wie Ewerbeck sie nicht
getroffen. Einstweilen habe ich Knudsen veranlaßt, den Wohnsitz in
seinem Zelt, das, nach seinem ehrwürdigen Äußern zu urteilen,
schon Vasco da Gama bei seiner Landung an der Ostküste Afrikas
benutzt und wegen Schadhaftigkeit zurückgelassen hat, aufzugeben
und zu mir in das Rasthaus zu ziehen. Jetzt haust er mit seiner
kümmerlichen Habe, die aus zwei anscheinend nicht einmal ganz
gefüllten, alten Blechkoffern besteht, auf der einen Seite des großen
Raumes, während ich mit meiner fürstlichen Ausstattung auf der
andern residiere. Dafür ist aber das Herz des blonden Norwegers
um so goldener und sein Gemüt um so reicher.
Das Vorleben Knudsens ist abenteuerlich genug; es erinnert mich
einigermaßen an das Schicksal jenes englischen Matrosen, der vor
100 Jahren unter die Eingeborenen Süstostaustraliens verschlagen
wurde und als Wilder unter Wilden leben mußte. Ganz so schlimm
ist es zwar mit meinem blonden Nachbar nicht gewesen, aber Zeit
zum Vernegern hätte er doch schon genug gehabt. Soweit ich mich
bisher über seine Personalien habe unterrichten können, ist
Knudsen vor fast einem Jahrzehnt von einem Kauffahrteischiff, wo er
als Schiffsjunge amtierte, in einem Hafen Madagaskars ausgerissen,
hat sich dann einige Jahre lang auf dieser großen Insel
umhergetrieben und ist schließlich an die gegenüberliegende
Festlandsküste in das Hinterland von Lindi verschlagen worden. Ein
eigentliches Handwerk hat er nach seiner eigenen Aussage nicht
erlernt, er rühmt aber von sich, alles zu können, mauern und
zimmern, schnitzen und bauen, tischlern und schlossern. Tatsächlich
hat er alle Gebäude des Bergbaufelds Luisenfelde weit im Süden in
der Nähe des Rovuma, zu dem ich vielleicht auch noch einmal
kommen werde, gebaut, war dort überhaupt Faktotum, und auch die
Kommune Lindi hat ihn der Anstellung als Leiter der
Handwerkerschule für würdig erachtet. In dieser Stellung befindet
sich Knudsen augenblicklich; er ist nur beurlaubt.
Meine Lebensweise ist hier, im Zustande der Ruhe, natürlich eine
wesentlich andere als auf dem Marsch. Jedes Marschleben ist
reizvoll, um wieviel mehr ein solches innerhalb einer fremdartigen
und vordem ungekannten Natur. Das meinige ist zudem bisher ganz
ungetrübt verlaufen. In unsern afrikanischen Reiseschilderungen
beginnt fast jede Expedition mit tausend Schwierigkeiten; der
Abmarsch ist auf eine bestimmte Stunde festgesetzt, aber es ist kein
Träger da; und hat der Expeditionsleiter seine Leute schließlich mit
Mühe beisammen, so haben diese noch hunderterlei Verrichtungen
und sind schon am ersten Abend den Blicken des Reisenden von
neuem entschwunden. Der Abschied von der Bibi, der Frau, der
Geliebten, ist ja auch zu schwer. Bei mir hat der Betrieb vom ersten
Tage an funktioniert; die viertelstündige Verspätung beim Aufbruch
von Lindi fällt niemand als mir selbst zur Last, der ich mich beim
Frühstück verspätet hatte. Am Morgen des zweiten Marschtages
ging es dann mit dem Zusammenlegen des Zeltes seitens der Askari
noch nicht so recht; auch konnte Moritz die Tippelskirchsche
Reiselampe mit dem besten Willen nicht in ihren allerdings sehr
knapp bemessenen Behälter verpassen; aber seitdem haben wir
Reisenden uns alle benommen, als wenn wir schon seit Monaten
unterwegs gewesen wären.
Wer etwa nach englischer Sitte schon in der Morgenfrühe ein
substanzielles Mahl einzunehmen gewohnt ist, soll in Afrika nicht auf
die Reise gehen. Um 5 Uhr hat man das Wecken angeordnet.
Pünktlich ruft der Posten sein leises: „Amka, bwana, wach auf, Herr“
in das Zelt; mit beiden Füßen schnellt man sich elastisch über den
hohen Rand des trogförmigen Feldbettes hinüber und fährt in sein
Khaki. In der kalten Nacht der tropischen Trockenzeit ist das Wasser,
welches Kibwana, der das Amt des Stubenmädchens versieht,
fürsorglich schon am Abend vor dem Zelt bereitgestellt hat, zu einem
erfrischenden Naß abgekühlt; scharf hebt sich die Silhouette des
Europäers bei der Toilette im Schein der brennenden Lampe von der
Zeltwand ab. Doch diese Lampe leuchtet nicht ihrem Herrn allein;
ringsum treffen ihre Strahlen braune, glänzende Gesichter. Das sind
die Träger und die Askari, von denen jene eifrigst bemüht sind, ihre
Last für den Marsch zusammenzuschnüren, während die Soldaten
sich auf das Zelt stürzen wie der Tiger auf seine Beute, sobald der
Weiße fertig gekleidet ins Freie tritt. Im Nu ist es zusammengelegt;
kein Wort fällt dabei, und kein überflüssiger Handgriff wird dabei
getan; es ist Arbeitsteilung im besten Sinn und in tadellosester
Durchführung. Unterdessen steht der Weiße an seinem
zusammenlegbaren Tisch; in Hast und Eile nimmt er einen Schluck
Tee oder Kakao, oder was sonst sein Leibgetränk ist, kaut dazu ein
Stück selbstgebackenen Brotes und steht nun marschbereit da.
„Tayari, fertig?“ schallt seine Frage laut über den Platz; „bado, noch
nicht“, ertönt es unweigerlich zurück. Und es sind immer dieselben
Faulen oder Ungeschickten, deren Munde dieses Lieblingswort
jedes afrikanischen Bediensteten entströmt. Der Anfänger im Reisen
läßt sich wohl dadurch beirren; nach ein paar Tagen kehrt er sich
nicht mehr an das bado; er ruft sein „Safari!“ (wörtlich „Reise“), oder,
wie ich es sehr bald eingeführt habe, sein „Los!“ über die Schar
seiner Mannen hin, schwingt seinen Wanderstab unternehmend
durch die Luft, dadurch den beiden Spitzenaskari die Marschrichtung
andeutend, und das Tagewerk hat begonnen.
Ich weiß nicht, wie andere Stämme und Völkerschaften sich im
Moment des Aufbruchs verhalten; meine Wanyamwesi sind in
diesem Augenblick außer Rand und Band. Mit sichtlicher Mühe hat
jeder seine Last auf den Kopf oder die Schulter hinaufgebracht;
gebückt von ihrer Schwere, steht jeder an seinem Platz. Da ertönt
jenes Kommando „Safari“, und nun erhebt sich ein Lärm und
Getöse, das jeder Beschreibung spottet; was aus der Kehle heraus
will, hallt in den schweigenden Urwald hinaus; wild und regellos
schmettern derbe Stöcke gegen die Reisekisten und leider auch
gegen die Blechkoffer, die einen nur zu guten Resonanzboden
abgeben. Es ist ein Höllenspektakel; aber er ist ein Ausbruch der
Lust und der Freude; es geht vorwärts, und Wandern und
Marschieren ist nun einmal das Lebenselement des Mnyamwesi.
Schon nach kurzer Zeit kommt Ordnung in das Chaos der
Lärmgeräusche; die Leute haben einen unendlich feinen Sinn für
Takt und Rhythmus, und so löst sich das Getöse alsbald in eine Art
getrommelten und gesungenen Marsches auf, der auch die Beine
der Askari, die in ihrer vornehmen Reserve sich natürlich an solch
kindischem Tun nicht beteiligen, in seinen Bann zwingt.
Studienbummel in der lichten Baumgrassteppe.
Ach, und schön ist der frühe Tropenmorgen. Es ist mittlerweile

stark auf 6 Uhr gegangen; die dunkle Nacht ist schnell der kurzen
Dämmerung gewichen; glänzende Strahlen der rasch
emporsteigenden Sonne huschen über das leichte Gewölk am
Firmament; unversehens steigt die Scheibe des Tagesgestirns in
wunderbarer Majestät über den Horizont empor. In rüstigem,
ausgiebigem Schritt, noch eng aufgeschlossen, eilt der Zug durch
das taufeuchte Pori dahin; vorn, wie auf einem Kriegsmarsch, zwei
Soldaten als Spitze; in einigem Abstand dahinter wir Europäer;
unmittelbar nach uns die Leibdienerschaft mit Gewehr, Reiseflasche
und Reisestühlchen; dann der Haupttrupp der Soldaten; dahinter der
lange Zug der Träger und Askariboys; am Schluß endlich, zur
Aufmunterung für alle Säumigen, doch auch zur Unterstützung
etwaiger Maroder, zwei Soldaten als Nachspitze. Eine
bewunderungswürdige Erscheinung ist der Mnyampara, der
Trägerführer. Er bekleidet eigentlich eine Art Ehrenstellung, denn er
bekommt keinen Heller mehr als der letzte seiner Untergebenen.
Vielleicht ist dieser Ausdruck auch nicht einmal richtig; primus inter
pares sollte man ihn lieber nennen. Der Mnyampara ist überall; er ist
an der Spitze, wenn der Herr ihn ruft, und er ist weit hinten am
äußersten Ende des mit jeder Marschstunde länger werdenden
Zuges, wenn dort ein Kranker seiner Hilfe benötigt. Den stützt er; er
nimmt ihm ganz ohne weiteres die schwere Last ab, um sich selbst
damit zu beladen; er bringt ihn sicher ins Lager. Mit meinem Pesa
mbili scheine ich einen besonders glücklichen Griff getan zu haben.
Er ist jung wie die allergrößte Mehrzahl meiner Leute, vielleicht 23
bis 25 Jahre, tiefschwarz in seiner Hautfarbe; mit katzenhaft
funkelnden Augen im ausgeprägten Negroidengesicht; nur
mittelgroß, aber ungemein sehnig und kräftig; er spricht ein
schauderhaftes Suaheli, weit schlechter als ich, und noch dazu so
rasch, daß ich ihm kaum zu folgen vermag; aber er ist bei alledem
ein Juwel. Nicht bloß, daß er ein unvergleichlicher Sänger ist,
dessen angenehmer Bariton niemals ruht noch rastet, ob wir lagern
oder marschieren, nein, auch in der Organisation des Lagerlebens,
der Aufteilung und Anstellung seiner Leute ist er ein Meister.
Der Anforderungen gibt es genug, die an einen solchen
Reisemarschall am Schluß des Tagesmarsches gestellt werden.
Längst ist die herrliche Morgenkühle einer recht fühlbar hohen
Temperatur gewichen; der Europäer hat seinen leichten Filzhut oder
die noch leichtere Reisemütze mit dem schweren Tropenhelm
vertauscht; die nackten Leiber der Träger aber überziehen sich mit
einer glänzenden Politur. Sie, die schon von 4 Uhr an am Lagerfeuer
fröstelnd den warmen Tag herbeigesehnt haben, haben jetzt dies
Ziel ihrer Wünsche im vollsten Maße erreicht; ihnen ist sehr warm,
und der Weiße tut jetzt sehr wohl daran, nicht in oder hinter der
Karawane zu marschieren; er möchte sonst mehr, als ihm angenehm
sein würde, Gelegenheit zu Studien über den Rassengeruch finden.
Nach 2 oder 2½ Stunden erste Rast. „Kiti kidogo, den kleinen Stuhl“,
ruft der Europäer nach hinten. Blitzschnell hat der Leibpage das
nette, zierliche Gerät, das äußerlich einem kleinen Sägebock gleicht,
das aber unter seiner obern, abknöpfbaren Sitzfläche noch eine sehr
sinnreich erdachte andere, länglichoval durchbrochene Zeugfläche
aufweist, die die Benutzung dieses nützlichen Möbels auch im
verschwiegenen Urwalde gewährleistet, dem Europäer
untergeschoben; langsam wälzt sich jetzt auch die lange Schlange
der Lasten heran, um schwer von Kopf und Schulter der Leute zu
Boden zu sinken. Des weißen Herrn harrt jetzt ein keineswegs
opulentes Frühstück von ein paar Eiern, einem Stück kalten
Fleisches, oder ein paar Bananen; die Schwarzen aber, die ganz
nüchtern aufgebrochen sind, fasten auch jetzt noch unentwegt
weiter. Man begreift nicht, wie die Leute die immerhin beträchtliche
Arbeitsleistung eines vielstündigen Marsches unter einer 60 bis 70
Pfund schweren Last bei solcher Anspruchslosigkeit zu leisten
vermögen; doch sie verlangen es gar nicht anders. In den spätern
Marschstunden tritt zwar eine merkliche Ermüdung ein; der Schritt
wird langsamer und kürzer, die Lasten bleiben auch mehr und mehr
hinter der unbepackten Suite der Weißen zurück, doch wenn sie
schließlich an den Lagerplatz herankommen, so sind die Leute noch
ebenso vergnügt und fröhlich wie am frühen Morgen. Derselbe Lärm,
dasselbe Getöse, doch jetzt ein ganz anderer Wortlaut aus den
Kehlen der Sänger — alles das rasselt auf den längst dasitzenden
Europäer hernieder. Meiner Truppe scheint es das Zentralmagazin
zu Daressalam angetan zu haben; dort sind sie in meine Dienste
getreten, und dieses weitläufige Gebäude feiern sie nunmehr auch
im Schlußgesang ihres Tagemarsches.
Das Ende des Marsches bedeutet noch längst nicht den
Abschluß der Obliegenheiten meiner Leute, weder der Boys, noch
der Askari, noch der Träger. Prüfend hat sich der Expeditionsführer
nach einem Zeltplatz umgeschaut. Ihn gut zu treffen, ist, glaube ich,
eine Sache des Talents und der Begabung. Als Grundregeln sind
dabei zu beachten: die Nähe trinkbaren Wassers und Abwesenheit
schädlicher Insekten wie Rückfallfieberzecken, Moskitos und
Sandflöhe. Sekundär, aber doch auch wichtig, ist die Festlegung der
Zeltachse zur Sonnenbahn und eine möglichst anzustrebende Lage
im Schatten belaubter Bäume. Ich zeichne der Einfachheit halber
den Zeltgrundriß auf den sorgsam gesäuberten Sandboden, wobei
ich die gewünschte Lage der Zelttür durch Unterbrechung der
Linienführung andeute. Das genügt meinem kommandierenden
Gefreiten vollkommen. Kaum sind die beiden Unglücklichen, deren
Schultern das schwere Tippelskirchzelt drückt, herangekeucht, so
sind auch schon die Lasten aufgerollt; im Nu hat jeder Krieger
seinen Platz eingenommen; eins, zwei, drei stehen die beiden
Tragpfähle senkrecht; dann hallen auch bereits die Schläge auf die
Zeltpflöcke. Währenddem ergötzen sich Moritz und Kibwana, die
beiden Boys, an meinem Bett. Diese Betätigung muß für die Neger
den Himmel auf Erden bedeuten. Sie werden und werden damit
nicht fertig; Schelte und selbst angedrohte Prügel nützen nichts; es
ist, als ob das auch sonst schon so schwerfällig arbeitende Hirn der
schwarzen Gentlemen sich hier ganz einlullte. Mechanisch bauen
sie das Gestell auf; mechanisch breiten sie Korkmatratze und
Decken aus; ebenso stumpf und dumpf errichten sie schließlich den
Kunstbau des Moskitonetzes. Die Soldaten sind längst von dannen
geeilt; da erst schleppen meine Herren Diener das Schlafgerät ins
Zelt hinein.
Auch meinen Trägern ist inzwischen noch allerlei Arbeit erblüht.
Wasser muß für die ganze Karawane geholt werden, Feuerholz für
die Küche; schließlich muß auch noch jene verschwiegene
Baulichkeit errichtet werden, die im Kisuaheli den Namen Choo führt.
Es ist weit über Mittag geworden, da endlich kommen auch die
Träger zu ihrem Recht; sie sind nunmehr Herren ihrer Zeit und
können sich für ein paar kurze Stunden selbst leben. Auch jetzt
schwelgen sie nicht. Der Süden Deutsch-Ostafrikas ist sehr wildarm,
zudem habe ich zum Jagen keine Zeit; Fleisch ist also etwas kaum
Gekanntes in dem Speisezettel meiner Leute. Ugali und immer
wieder Ugali, d. h. Tag für Tag den steifen, zu einer glasigen
Konsistenz eingekochten und schließlich mittels des Rührlöffels zu
einer Art Puddingform zurechtgeklopften Brei aus Hirse, Mais oder
Maniok, das ist das Normalgericht, um mit Oskar Peschel zu reden,
auf das sich die Lebenshaltung unserer schwarzen Brüder stützt.
Lager in Massassi.
Hier in Massassi hat sich das Blatt gewendet; jetzt haben es
meine Leute gut, während ich kaum eine Minute aus der Arbeit
herauskomme. Meine Schutztruppe wohnt sehr vornehm; sie hat die
Barasa, die auf Pfeilern ruhende Beratungshalle links von meinem
Palais, bezogen und nach Negerart ausgebaut. Der Neger liebt
keinen gemeinsamen Raum; er kapselt sich gern ein. Das ist schnell
geschehen; ein paar Horizontalstangen als Baugerüst rings um die
geplante Kabine; dann eine dichte Lage hohen afrikanischen Strohs
daran gebunden, und ein netter, bei Tag kühler, bei Nacht warmer
Raum ist für jeden einzelnen geschaffen. Die Träger dagegen haben
sich auf dem weiten Platz vor meinem Hause Hütten gebaut, einfach
und nett, doch zu meinem maßlosen Erstaunen ganz im Massaistil.
Nichts von Rundhütte und nichts von Tembe, sondern wirklichen und
wahrhaftigen Massaistil. Über die Rundhütte und ihre Eigenart werde
ich mich später genugsam äußern können; wer aber nicht wissen
sollte, wes Art eine Tembe ist, dem sage ich: das ist eine Bauart, die
man sich am besten vergegenwärtigen kann, wenn man zwei oder
drei oder vier gedeckte Güterwagen unserer Eisenbahnen
rechtwinklig aneinanderstellt, so daß sie ein Rechteck bilden mit den
Türen nach innen. Verbreitet ist diese Tembe über große Teile des
Nordens und des Zentrums von Deutsch-Ostafrika, von Unyamwesi
im Westen bis in die küstennahen Landschaften im Osten, und vom
abflußlosen Gebiet im Norden bis nach Uhehe im Süden. Der
Wohnbau der Massai endlich läßt sich am besten einem
Rohrplattenkoffer mit seinen abgerundeten Vorder- und Hinterkanten
vergleichen. Während nun die Massai bekanntermaßen baumlange
Kerle sind, sind ihre Hüttchen, die ganz im Sinne ihrer Erbauer als
eines Volkes von Viehzüchtern par excellence nett und geruchvoll
mit Kuhdung beworfen werden, so niedrig, daß auch ein normal
gewachsener Mensch in ihnen nicht stehen kann. Solches tun auch
meine Wanyamwesi in ihren leichten Strohbauten nicht; dafür liegen
und lungern sie den ganzen Tag faul auf ihren Strohschütten herum.
Um so fleißiger bin ich. Der Tropentag ist kurz, er mißt jahraus
jahrein nur 12 Stunden; deshalb heißt es, ihn ausnutzen. Um
Sonnenaufgang, also 6 Uhr, ist schon alles auf den Beinen; rasch ist
das Frühstück erledigt; dann gehts ans Tagewerk. Es beginnt kurios
genug. Wohl jeder Führer einer Afrika-Expedition hat die Erfahrung
gemacht, daß die Landeskinder in ihm einen der Heilkunst kundigen
Helfer sehen; in langer Reihe stehen denn auch bei mir
allmorgendlich die Patienten da. Zu einem Teil gehören sie der
Schar meiner eigenen Leute an, zum anderen sind es Einwohner
aus der näheren und weiteren Umgebung von Massassi. Einem
meiner Träger ist es schlimm ergangen. Die beliebteste Form der
Trägerlast ist in Ostafrika die amerikanische Petroleumkiste. Das
sind leichte, aber festgebaute Holzbehälter von etwa 60 cm Länge
und 40 cm Höhe bei 30 cm Breite. Ursprünglich haben sie zwei
sogenannte Tins mit amerikanischem Petroleum enthalten, sehr
stattliche Blechgefäße von quadratischem Querschnitt, die jenen
Kisten längst entfremdet sind, um im Haushalt der Suaheli ein
hochgeachtetes Dasein als Gebrauchsgefäße für alles zu spielen. In
der Tat steht die Küstenkultur offenkundig unter dem Zeichen dieses
Blechgefäßes; Tins überall, in der Markthalle, auf den Straßen, vor
den Hütten und in den Hütten; selbst das Klosett für die Farbigen auf
unserem Dampfer „Rufidyi“ enthielt als wesentlichsten Bestandteil
lediglich einen solchen Tin.
Am traulichen Herd. Hütteninneres in der Rovuma-Ebene.
Nur eine meiner Kisten war noch ihrer ersten Bestimmung treu
geblieben; in ihrem Bauche wanderten zwei bis an den Rand mit
Petroleum gefüllte Blechgefäße auf der Schulter des Mnyamwesi
Kasi Uleia (zu deutsch etwa „er nimmt Arbeit beim Europäer“) von
der Küste ins Innere. Rüstig schreitet der Wackere vorwärts. „Es ist
warm,“ denkt er, „ich fange an zu schwitzen. Na, das schadet weiter
nichts, das tun die andern auch.“ — „Ach, es ist doch wirklich sehr
warm,“ sagt er nach einiger Zeit halblaut vor sich hin, „selbst mein
mafuta ya uleia, mein Petroleum, fängt an zu riechen.“ Es riecht
auch immer weiter; der Träger wird naß und nässer. Schließlich ist
der Tagemarsch zu Ende, und Kasi Uleia setzt seine duftige Last mit
einem doppelten Gefühl der Erleichterung zur Erde. Leicht ist ihm
einmal durch die Erlösung von dem sogar für eine Negernase
starken Geruch; sodann ist auch seine Last selbst im Laufe des
mehr als sechsstündigen Marsches seltsamerweise immer leichter
geworden. Endlich dämmert dem guten Schwarzen und seinen
Freunden die Wahrheit auf; es ist nur gut, daß sie keine
Streichhölzer besitzen; wäre eins von ihnen in Kasi Uleias Nähe

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EU Equality Law: The First

Fundamental Rights Policy of the EU

EU Law Beyond EU Borders The Extraterritorial Reach of

EU Law Beyond EU Borders: The Extraterritorial Reach of

EU Procedural Law (Oxford European Union Law Library)

EU Health Law & Policy: The Expansion of EU Power in

The EU Treaties And The Charter Of Fundamental Rights:

The Evolution of EU Law 3rd Edition Paul Craig

The Evolution of EU Law 3rd Edition Paul Craig (Editor)

EU Administrative Law 3rd Edition Paul Craig

ot h er t itles in this se ries

Subnational Authorities in EU Law

To Amélie, Hania, and Pawel

Series Editors’ Preface

xviii Table of Cases

Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce v Salvatore Manni

Table of Cases xix

Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:322. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91, 94

Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976]

H Lommers v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:183. . . . . . 91

Impact v Minister for Agriculture and Food and others [2008]

J Nold, Kohlen-​und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities

Kaba (Case C-​356/​98) (2000) 2 EJML 431 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Land Oberösterreich v Čez [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:660. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Table of Cases xxi

Macarthys Ltd v Wendy Smith[1980] ECLI:EU:C:1980:103. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Nazli (Case C-​340/​97) [2000] ECR I-​957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Odièvre v France (App no 42326/​98) [2003] ECHR 86. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

xxii Table of Cases

Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:179. . . . . . . 62

Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef ) v

Table of Cases xxiii

Z v A Government department and The Board of management of a community school [2014]

International Treaties and Conventions

xxvi International Treaties and Conventions

xxviii EU Secondary Legislation

EU Secondary Legislation xxix

Table of International Treaties and Conventions

AMS Association de Médiation Sociale

xxxiv List of Abbreviations

CLJ Cambridge Law Journal

4 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:709.

A. Equal Treatment as a Cornerstone 3

A. Equal Treatment as a Cornerstone of European Integration

The principle of equality or non-​discrimination8 constitutes one of the cornerstones

8 These notions are used interchangeably.

B. EU Equality Law as a Social Policy 5

B. EU Equality Law as a Social Policy with

23 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976]

C. Equality Law: A Fundamental Rights Policy 7

purpose, the two functions of EU equality law, ‘infrastructural’ and ‘transformative’

C. EU Equality Law as an (Autonomous) Fundamental Rights Policy

40 See further Chapter 3 section A.3.b.

C. Equality Law: A Fundamental Rights Policy 9

1. EU equality law gives expression to the fundamental right

C. Equality Law: A Fundamental Rights Policy 11

61 Koukoulis-​Spiliotpoulos (n 12) 330. 62 See further Chapter 3.

2. Why does understanding EU equality law as a fundamental

70 Exploring these implications, see also Koukoulis-​Spiliotpoulos (n 12) 331–​32.

C. Equality Law: A Fundamental Rights Policy 13

75 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre

3. EU equality law as the ‘first’ fundamental rights policy of the EU

C. Equality Law: A Fundamental Rights Policy 15

D. Equality Law Breaking New Boundaries? 17

J Nold, Kohlen-und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities

Kaba (Case C-356/98) (2000) 2 EJML 431 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Nazli (Case C-340/97) [2000] ECR I-957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Odièvre v France (App no 42326/98) [2003] ECHR 86. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

The principle of equality or non-discrimination8 constitutes one of the cornerstones

1. EU equality law gives expression to the fundamental right

61 Koukoulis-Spiliotpoulos (n 12) 330. 62 See further Chapter 3.

2. Why does understanding EU equality law as a fundamental

70 Exploring these implications, see also Koukoulis-Spiliotpoulos (n 12) 331–32.

3. EU equality law as the ‘first’ fundamental rights policy of the EU

1. Approach and structure of the book

2. Relationship to existing literature on EU equality law

3. Equality and non-discrimination in EU law

1. Three stages in the regulation of (fundamental) rights