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GLOBAL POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
Global Crisis
Theory, Method and
the Covid-19 Pandemic
Nadine Klopf
Global Political Sociology
Series Editors
Dirk Nabers, International Political Sociology, Kiel University, Kiel,
Germany
Marta Fernández, Institute of International Relations, Pontifical
Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Chengxin Pan, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Deakin
University, Waurn Ponds, Australia
David B. MacDonald, Department of Political Science,
University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada
This new series is designed in response to the pressing need to better
understand growing complex global, transnational, and local issues that
stubbornly refuse to be pigeon-holed into clearly-defined established
disciplinary boxes. The new series distinguishes its visions in three ways:
(1) It is inspired by genuine sociological, anthropological and philo-
sophical perspectives in International Relations (IR), (2) it rests on an
understanding of the social as politically constituted, and the social and
the political are always ontologically inseparable, and (3) it conceptual-
izes the social as fundamentally global, in that it is spatially dispersed and
temporarily contingent. In the books published in the series, the hetero-
geneity of the world’s peoples and societies is acknowledged as axiomatic
for an understanding of world politics.
Nadine Klopf
Global Crisis
Theory, Method and the Covid-19 Pandemic
Nadine Klopf
Research Group on International
Political Sociology
Kiel University
Kiel, Germany
ISSN 2946-5559 ISSN 2946-5567 (electronic)

Global Political Sociology
ISBN 978-3-031-25139-9 ISBN 978-3-031-25140-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25140-5
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Cover illustration: © Dennis Cox/Alamy Stock Photo
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
For Tom Neblung
Acknowledgments
This book benefited from my graduate studies and the early phase of
my doctoral research at the Research Group on International Political
Sociology at Kiel University. It largely presents a revised and extended
version of my master thesis. I wish to thank Anca Pusca and Hemapriya
Eswanth at Palgrave Macmillan as well as the series editors Dirk Nabers,
Marta Fernández, Chengxin Pan, and David B. MacDonald for making
this publication possible.
My colleagues in the Research Group on International Political
Sociology deserve particular acknowledgment for providing an always
supportive but equally critical environment. I am therefore grateful to
Merve Genç and Jan Zeemann as well as Frank A. Stengel for his critique
on early theoretical arguments and his continuing mentoring. Malte
Kayßer provided sophisticated and much appreciated feedback on large
parts of the book. I would also like to thank Paula Diehl for her support
during my position as her research assistant at Kiel University.
Moreover, I benefited from presenting and discussing my research at
the 2022 ISA Annual Convention in Nashville, TN and the 2022 EISA
Pan-European Conference on International Relations in Athens. My grat-
itude therefore extends to Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Erica Resende
whose feedback as chairs and discussants helped me to refine my argu-
ments. I would also like to express my gratitude to Soian and Alex for
their support and endurance in seemingly endless discussions about social
theory and struggles in everyday academic life.
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am indebted to Dirk Nabers for his continuous support throughout

the last years. I thoroughly enjoyed our theoretical discussions, which
were of invaluable worth for advancing the theoretical arguments
presented in this book and developing an academic rigor that has hope-
fully become visible in my approach to dislocation. I benefited hugely
from Dirk’s always kind but equally merciless critique. Notwithstanding
his academic ruthlessness, I met Dirk as an empathetic and understanding
person and I am thankful for his always considerate advice.
Finally, this book is dedicated to my partner Tom Neblung who
deserves my greatest appreciation. I would not have finished this book
without his love and support both in times of academic inspiration and
personal struggle. Thank you for being the miracle that completes my
dislocated identity.
Kiel Nadine Klopf

Introduction
It seems as if our world is shaped by crises that unravel habitual patterns

of behavior, disrupt ingrained social practices and institutions, and thus
enable us to question established political practices as well as our own
actions. Imagining a world without crises appears more like a paradisi-
acal conjecture, with crises being perhaps the most loyal companion that
persistently confronts us. Crises never seem to vanish but, quite the
contrary, regardless of how stable social orders are thought to be they
are sooner or later overtaken by crises. That is, crises are not merely
exceptional phenomena but characterize a permanent state of society. It
is therefore not surprising that crisis has always been a subject of research
in various disciplines, yet with different and sometimes controversial
perspectives as to what is actually meant by the term.
Already in the early days of crisis research within International Rela-
tions (IR), Charles Hermann declared that “only the vaguest common
meaning appears attached to the concept” (Hermann 1969, 410), which
has not been resolved during the last decades but, on the contrary, as
Colin Hay and Tom Hunt note almost 50 years later, “[i]t is clear that
the language of crisis has, if anything, been cheapened” (Hay and Hunt
2018, 6) such that it can rightly be concluded that crisis “remains one of
the most illusive, vague, imprecise, malleable, open-ended and generally
unspecified concepts” (Hay 1996, 421). It seems that what prolifer-
ates in particular is the observation of the contested nature of crisis, as
despite notable contributions that have advanced our understanding of
ix
x INTRODUCTION
the term, we have not yet arrived at the point where it becomes possible
to thoroughly theorize the specificity of crisis. What remains absent is a
systematization that enables us to disentangle the diverse dimensions that
crises are considered to be located at.
Traditional approaches are particularly interested in how the behavior
of decision-makers is altered during a crisis in contrast to periods of
non-crisis whereby crises are restricted to ephemeral occurrences that
only temporarily destabilize an otherwise stable social order (Brecher
and Wilkenfeld 1982; Hermann 1969). Nevertheless, already these early
approaches put forward that “decision-makers behave according to their
interpretation of the situation, not according to its ‘objective’ character”
(Hermann 1972, 12). While still cleaving to an individualist perspective
on foreign policy behavior, decision-making approaches open the way
towards an understanding of crises that do not regard the latter as mere
natural occurrences.
This becomes more accentuated in subsequent constructivist research
that foregrounds the socially constructed character of crisis, arguing that
crises are particularly “what we make of them” (Hay 2013, 23). Notable
contributions depart from specifying crises only as temporary occur-
rences and are explicitly concerned with the structural underpinning that
provides the basis for subsequent crisis constructions. Jutta Weldes, for
instance, defines crises as socially constructed threats to state identities
that are rooted in existing antagonistic relationships which shape how
crises are constructed (Weldes 1999, 41). She thus prominently unveils
how the Cuban missile crisis can only be understood with recourse to
established U.S.–Soviet relations that rendered possible the construction
of these events as a threat to U.S. identity (Weldes 1999, 219). Colin Hay
also emphasizes a structural dimension of crises when defining the latter
as moments of decisive intervention that are made in response to an accu-
mulation of contradictions which, however, merely present the structural
precondition for crisis and cannot be equated with crisis as such (Hay
1999, 324).
Bob Jessop’s recent critical realist research foregrounds this struc-
tural dimension as he stresses that these emerging contradictions stem
from an underlying ontological dimension that comprises the interac-
tion of causal mechanisms that might potentially develop towards crisis
(Jessop 2015, 239). Whereas Jessop remains concerned with an inde-
pendently existing materiality as the structural precondition for a crisis,
Dirk Nabers’ discourse theoretical approach puts forward how a crisis
INTRODUCTION xi
must be understood as a constitutive structural feature of society, without,

however, falling back on any form of independent materiality. He concep-
tualizes structural crisis through the Laclauian notion of dislocation and
relates crisis to the “constantly disrupted structure of society or even the
very impossibility of society” (Nabers 2019, 265) whereby dislocation is
understood as the failure of social structures “to achieve constitution”
(Laclau 1990, 47). Instead of treating these varying approaches as utterly
incompatible, the emphasis should instead be on how the development
of crisis research points towards the conceptualization of crisis as a multi-
layered concept. The following question thus becomes inevitable and
provides the starting point for developing a multidimensional framework
of global crisis: How is it possible to systematize crisis?
In an increasingly interconnected world, it has become obvious that
crises cannot be restricted to the national domain. Ecological threats,
climate change, and biological hazards cannot be stopped at national
borders, but also more traditional matters of crisis theorizing such as
military conflicts, economic adversity, and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction might well affect the world at large. However, it is not
only global interdependence that requires an analysis of the global char-
acter of crises, but every social structure must in principle be approached
as partially global. The central argument is that international, transna-
tional, national, and regional social structures partake in a potentially
infinite global structure. Communities, nations, regions, and international
organizations are historically contingent constructs; they are formed from
a global structure that constitutes the social realm. Nabers and Stengel
therefore rightly mention that the social must be approached as funda-
mentally global as it is “spatially dispersed and temporarily contingent”
(Nabers and Stengel 2019, 14). This is not meant to downplay the
significance of non-global relations, but conceptualizing politics as funda-
mentally global highlights that meaning remains partial and interminable.
The infinitude of the social hence stresses how it is impossible for any
identity to be utterly determined and unalterable. This does not release
us from analyzing boundaries as every social group requires demarca-
tions to stabilize its identity. However, as boundaries remain subject to
contestation and transformation, we have to accept an essential impos-
sibility of final closure, the contestability of meaning, and the potential
instability of every articulated identity. Nonetheless, a pure global struc-
ture does not exist, but it is always partially embedded in international,
xii INTRODUCTION
transnational, national, and regional relations. The global character of

crises hence relates to the mutual penetration of global and non-global
social structures.
Structure of the Book

The book aims at developing a theoretical framework that allows to
systematize global crises. In order to do so, established conceptualiza-
tions of crisis are first scrutinized which renders visible the positioning of
crisis on different dimensions during the development of crisis research
(Chapter 1). Against this background, Nabers’ approach to crisis as dislo-
cation is combined with an ontological differentiation of dislocation. This
makes it possible to advance a multidimensional framework of crisis as
dislocation. As dislocation does not operate as an isolated concept, it
first becomes necessary to conceptualize the discursive structures that
make up the social realm and provide the basis for theorizing disloca-
tion (Chapter 2). Building on this discursive reading of the social, three
levels of crisis are discerned in the subsequent chapters, theorizing crisis
at a permanent, recurring, and ephemeral level.
Following Heidegger’s differentiation between ontology and ontics,
this temporal dimension is supplemented with ontological considera-
tions, leading to the differentiation of permanent ontological, recurring
ontic, and ephemeral ontic crisis. The permanent ontological dimension
is concerned with the potential structural makeup of society and resonates
with Nabers’ definition of crisis as dislocation. Permanent ontological
dislocation thus presents a structural characteristic of society, depicting
the latter’s impossibility to acquire complete constitution (Chapter 3).
This ontological dimension cannot be encountered directly, but it must
become manifest at an ontic level. As ontological dislocation is a neces-
sary feature of every society, the latter remains a precarious construct
which becomes visible in recurring attempts to acquire stable identities
and, accordingly, in the recurring establishment of antagonistic relation-
ships that are constructed as sources of instability. Even if one antagonistic
relationship was successfully destroyed, antagonism would merely recur
in the construction of different antagonistic others, such that identity
remains recurringly destabilized. Dislocation must hence be delineated
at a permanent ontological and recurring ontic level whereby the latter
presents particular manifestations of the former (Chapter 4).
INTRODUCTION xiii
Lastly, the existence of temporary crises, which prominently shape

established crisis research, is in no way disregarded. As Weldes has already
put forward, the construction of ephemeral crises must be traced back to
how societies are constituted, which again leads us to an understanding
of crisis as dislocation. However, it is not only observed that something
is constructed as a crisis but by developing a distinct process of crisis
construction, it becomes possible to scrutinize how ephemeral crises are
constructed. This is achievable by advancing an ephemeral ontic dimen-
sion of dislocation, which relies on both its permanent and recurring
dimension (Chapter 5). Dislocation can thus be crystallized in a discursive
framework that distinguishes between permanent dislocation, its mani-
festation in recurring dislocation, and the construction of ephemeral
dislocation.
Every analysis must take this multidimensional character of dislocation
into account. The theoretical framework is therefore linked to methodical
considerations that render it possible to utilize dislocation as a frame-
work for practical analyses (Chapter 6). The multidimensionality of crises
is finally analyzed in the discourse around the so-called Coronavirus Crisis
in the United States which has been constructed as disrupting entrenched
social structures to an almost unprecedented degree. The findings show
how a multidimensional approach to crises reveals the impact of natural-
ized social structures, entrenched identities, and established antagonistic
relations on crisis constructions. It does not restrict our understanding
to the immediate period of crisis construction, but a multidimensional
approach sheds light on preexisting deficiencies and structural inequali-
ties as well as on the tasks ahead which politics is burdened with in its
continued endeavors to achieve stability (Chapter 7).
References
Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1982. “Crises in World Politics.”
World Politics 34 (3): 380–417.
Hay, Colin. 1996. “From Crisis to Catastrophe? The Ecological Pathologies of
the Liberal-Democratic State Form.” The European Journal of Social Science
Research 9 (4): 421–34.
Hay, Colin. 1999. “Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Inter-
rogating the Process of Change.” British Journal of Politics and International
Relations 1 (3): 317–44.
xiv INTRODUCTION
Hay, Colin. 2013. “Treating the Symptom Not the Condition: Crisis Definition,
Deficit Reduction and the Search for a New British Growth Model.” British
Journal of Politics and International Relations 15 (1): 23–37.
Hay, Colin, and Tom Hunt. 2018. “Introduction: The Coming Crisis, The Gath-
ering Storm.” In The Coming Crisis, edited by Colin Hay and Tom Hunt,
1–10. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hermann, Charles F. 1969. “International Crisis as a Situational Variable.” In
International Politics and Foreign Policy, edited by James N. Rosenau, 409–
21. New York: Free Press.
Hermann, Charles F. 1972. “Some Issues in the Study of International Crisis.”
In International Crisis: Insights from Behavioral Research, edited by Charles
F. Hermann, 3–17. New York: Free Press.
Jessop, Bob. 2015. “The Symptomatology of Crises, Reading Crises and
Learning From Them: Some Critical Realist Reflections.” Journal of Critical
Realism 14 (3): 238–71.
Laclau, Ernesto. 1990. “New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time.” In
New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, edited by Ernesto Laclau,
3–85. London: Verso.
Nabers, Dirk. 2019. “Discursive Dislocation: Toward a Poststructuralist Theory
of Crisis in Global Politics.” New Political Science 41 (2): 263–78.
Nabers, Dirk, and Frank A. Stengel. 2019. “International/Global Political
Sociology.” The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, 1–28.
Weldes, Jutta. 1999. Constructing National Interests: The United States and the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Contents
1 From Crisis Decision-Making to Discourse Theory 1

1.1 Crisis Decision-Making 1
1.2 Constructivism 7
1.3 Critical Realism 15
1.4 Discourse Theory 19
References 23
2 The Discursive Character of the Social 29
2.1 Foundations of Discourse Theory 30
2.2 Discourse and the Discursive 41
References 45
3 The Permanent Dimension of Dislocation 47
3.1 The Ontological Differentiation of Crisis 47
3.2 The Ambiguity of Dislocation 49
3.3 The Development of Permanent Dislocation 60
3.4 A Definition of Permanent Dislocation 66
References 71
4 The Recurring Dimension of Dislocation 79
4.1 The Development of Recurring Dislocation 79
4.2 A Definition of Recurring Dislocation 91
References 104
xv
xvi CONTENTS
5 The Ephemeral Dimension of Dislocation 107

5.1 Ephemeral Dislocation and Crisis 107
5.2 A Definition of Ephemeral Dislocation 112
5.3 The Construction of Ephemeral Dislocation 115
References 122
6 Discourse Analysis 125
6.1 Corpus Linguistics 129
6.2 Rhetorical Analysis 137
References 148
7 The Coronavirus Crisis 151
7.1 The Coronavirus Crisis as Ephemeral Dislocation 151
7.2 The Antagonistic Construction of the Coronavirus Crisis 169
7.3 Permanent and Recurring Dislocation
in the Coronavirus Crisis 175
References 210
Conclusion 213
Bibliography 217
Index 235
List of Figures
Fig. 7.1 Covid-19 in U.S. governmental statements,

01/2020–01/2021 153
Fig. 7.2 Frequent characteristics of the United States in U.S.
governmental statements, 01/2020–01/2021 160
xvii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Hjelmslev’s sign model 32

Table 2.2 Myth in Barthes’ sign model 37
Table 7.1 Frequent words in U.S. governmental statements,
01/2020–01/2021 (categorized) 152
xix
CHAPTER 1
From Crisis Decision-Making to Discourse

Theory
1.1 Crisis Decision-Making

While the concept of crisis has long been found in various disciplines,
including historical, sociological, medical, and psychological research, one
of the earliest theoretical engagements within International Relations
can be traced back to Charles F. Hermann, whose work has become
pioneering for subsequent crisis research. Hermann approaches crisis from
a decision-making perspective, being particularly interested in how the
behavior of decision-makers is altered during crisis in contrast to periods
of non-crisis. In his seminal definition, Hermann specifies crises as events
that are unanticipated, threaten major national values, and restrict the
time available for response before the situation evolves towards a direction
that is less favorable for the decision-makers involved (Hermann 1969,
414). Thus, crisis is seen as a certain type of event, defined by three
necessary characteristics which, in this combination, stimulate a decision-
making behavior that is different from confrontations with non-crisis
events (Hermann 1972b, 188).
It is not predetermined which events classify as crises since Hermann
emphasizes that “decision makers behave according to their interpreta-
tion of the situation, not according to its ‘objective’ character” (Hermann
1972a, 12). While Hermann assumes that the behavior of decision-makers
is immediately related to the events they confront, he does not confine
himself to a simplistic stimulus–response model that regards crises as
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
N. Klopf, Global Crisis, Global Political Sociology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25140-5_1
2 N. KLOPF
stimulating events, directly provoking certain decision-making responses.

Instead, crises only come into existence through the individual interpre-
tation of decision-makers which acts as an intermediary between event
stimulus and decision-making response (Hermann 1974, 237). Michael
Brecher later proposes a supplemented stimulus–response model that no
longer treats decision-makers’ interpretations merely as one-directional
processes, by considering feedback loops in the sense that crisis responses
influence decision-makers’ subsequent interpretations (Brecher 1977b,
56). Irrespective of these revisions, crises are seen as rooted in material
events, but they are only classified as crises through the interpretative
practices of decision-makers. In this way, Hermann already introduces
the distinction between a material and interpretative dimension which
permeates subsequent crisis theory.
Essential for Hermann’s definition of crisis is its conceptualization as
a foreign policy event which he specifies as an action a particular state
undertakes towards at least one foreign target (Hermann 1971, 310).
In this sense, crises are understood as deliberate actions initiated by a
foreign state towards major national values, such as physical survival,
territorial integrity, political sovereignty, economic welfare, and societal
stability (Brecher 1977b, 48; Hermann and Brady 1972, 297). Thus,
Hermann’s definition of crisis events not only restricts the phenomena
that are considered as crises, but his conceptualization of crisis events also
acts as a limitation. He emphasizes states as the initiators of crisis events,
even though he expands potential initiating actors to opposing forces
within a nation, international cartels, and terrorist groups in his later
work, without, however, ever losing his focus on states (Hermann 1978,
32–7). Hermann consistently identifies the origin of crises in deliberate
actions of human actors and only once mentions briefly the possibility
that crises may result from “acts of nature” (Hermann and Mason 1980,
191). Moreover, given his focus on state actors, crisis events are primarily
seen as exogenous to a particular state which, to a large extent, excludes
the possibility that crises arise from domestic difficulties, injustices, or
contradictions.
Although Hermann’s contribution to crisis research is characterized
by his definition of high threat to major national values, short time
for response, and non-anticipation, he adjusts this definition in his later
work, incorporating insights from Michael Brecher’s research on crisis
1 FROM CRISIS DECISION-MAKING TO DISCOURSE THEORY 3
decision-making. Whereas he already tentatively questions the dimen-

sion of non-anticipation in his earlier work (Hermann 1972b, 208), it
disappears in later crisis definitions (Hermann 1986, 67; 1988b, 122),
leading him to consider both crises that emerge suddenly, being unan-
ticipated by decision-makers, and crises that evolve over a protracted
period of time (Hermann and Mason 1980, 191–93). In a similar manner,
Boin and ‘t Hart replace Hermann’s category of non-anticipation with
uncertainty, arguing that crises do not suddenly appear, but they are a
“product of escalation” and emerge when “seemingly innocent factors
combine and transform into disruptive forces that come to represent an
undeniable threat to the system” (Boin and Hart 2007, 46, 49; also
Rosenthal et al. 2001, 6). Besides abandoning non-anticipation, Hermann
focuses on military hostilities in his later definitions. Following Brecher,
he asserts that military activities are perceived as more likely during a
crisis (Hermann 1986, 67) which leads him to define crises as “periods of
increased belief in the likelihood of war” (Hermann 1988a, 213). He thus
puts a strong focus on war, arguing that the likelihood of war is “what a
crisis is about” (Hermann 1986, 76) such that avoiding the escalation of
crisis to increased military hostility is one of the major purposes of crisis
management (Hermann 1978, 29).
With this development, Hermann already comes remarkably close
to Michael Brecher’s modified definition of crisis that has reached a
salient position in IR crisis research. For Brecher, crises denote situational
changes in a state’s internal or external environment that decision-makers
interpret as threatening to national values, which leaves only finite time
for response, and which is accompanied by a high probability of military
hostilities (Brecher 1977a, 1). Besides omitting non-anticipation, Brecher
puts a strong focus on military hostility, arguing that the “probability
of war is the pivotal definition of crisis” (Brecher and Geist 1980, 6).
Moreover, when considering situational change, the origin of crisis is no
longer bound to deliberate actions towards another target, but it might
also result from altered interstate relations, such as changes in belligerent
states or military resources (Brecher 1977b, 48), and domestic occur-
rences, e.g., strikes, demonstrations, riots, or sabotage (Brecher 1979,
449). Brecher explicitly regards crises as both external and internal to
states, something which has only been briefly touched upon in Hermann’s
work.
4 N. KLOPF
Thus, departing from Hermann’s account of events towards what

Brecher subsumes under situational change, that is, a “hostile act, disrup-
tive event or environmental change” (Brecher 1996, 127), broadens the
circumstances considered as crisis origins. However, even though crisis
triggers include a variety of phenomena, adversary states remain the
only crisis actors (Brecher et al. 1995, 376). Non-state actors, such as
international organizations, can merely have an intervening function in
crisis responses or may provide support for primary crisis actors (Brecher
1984, 259; James et al. 1988, 57). Nohrstedt and Weible, in turn, while
relying on a similar decision-making approach, depart from this traditional
focus on national crisis actors and contend that crises do not necessarily
confront states as a whole, but they might also emerge for certain regional
decision-makers (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010, 21).
Despite these differences, Brecher remains close to Hermann’s tradi-
tional definition. In his later work, however, Brecher becomes increasingly
interested in the relationship between decision-making and systemic
crises, i.e., crises of the international system. Already before Brecher’s
contribution, attempts were made to link Hermann’s decision-making
approach to systemic crises. James McCormick, for instance, argues that
crisis situations must be reflected on a decision-making as well as systemic
level. He adduces Hermann’s traditional definition but supplements it
with a systemic criterion, such that crises become visible within the
international system through “marked changes in the frequency and
intensity of behavior between nations” (McCormick 1975, 25). Whereas
such attempts remained fairly unsubstantial in analyzing the relationship
between decision-making and systemic crises, Brecher investigates this
link more thoroughly. He defines systemic crises as situational changes
that are characterized by increased disruptive interactions among states,
which are accompanied by changes within structural attributes of the
international system, such as power distribution or international rules,
actors, and alliances (Brecher and Yehuda 1985, 23). Again, Brecher
emphasizes military hostility, adding that disruptive interactions are spec-
ified by hostile activities and the probability of becoming involved in
war (Brecher et al. 1988, 3; 2000, 39). Even though his account of
crisis is tied to the probability of military hostility, he emphasizes that
crises do not necessarily escalate to war but decision-makers’ interpreta-
tions are “exacerbated by war” such that the “occurrence of war […]
intensifies disruptive interaction” (Brecher 1993, 6) between states in the
international system.
In proposing a two-dimensional definition of interstate crises, Brecher

reinforces his focus on state crisis actors. Whereas decision-making crises
focus on the perspective of one state, systemic crises regard the interna-
tional system as such. These dimensions are inextricably linked as systemic
crises only come into being through a previous decision-making crisis
which “serves as the precondition, and marks the beginning of an interna-
tional [systemic] crisis” (Brecher 2008, 9). When situational changes are
interpreted as a crisis by national decision-makers, certain crisis responses
are adduced which leads to behavioral changes between states. This, in
turn, results in a “further distortion in systemic interaction” (Brecher
2018, 48) which denotes a systemic crisis. Whereas Brecher assumes that
decision-making crises are necessarily reflected at a systemic level, Phillips
and Rimkunas argue that decision-making crises merely put decision-
makers in a state of alert that might potentially result in systemic crises
(Phillips and Rimkunas 1978, 268). Brecher’s approach, nevertheless,
amplifies the differentiation between an interpretative and material dimen-
sion of crisis. While decision-makers’ interpretations are based on material
changes in state environments, systemic crises comprise subsequent mate-
rial transformations of the international system and are thus argued to
have an ‘objective’ character (Brecher and James 1986, 26).
1.1.1 Summary and Critique

Even though a decision-making perspective provides pioneering insights
into crisis research, it is primarily concerned with decision-making
behavior, leaving the conceptual specificity of crisis largely unaddressed.
Notably, the predominance of decision-making approaches has not been
diminished during the last decades but prevails largely unchallenged in
contemporary research. Although notable contributions have advanced
these traditional definitions, core aspects remain mostly untouched (Boin
et al. 2005; McConnell 2020; Wilkenfeld et al. 2005). The early work of
Charles Hermann and Michael Brecher offers systematic definitions, but
it mainly focuses on the effects of crisis, advancing crisis as a theoretical
variable for further analysis. In this way, the added value is in partic-
ular a methodical one that lacks a thorough theoretical conceptualization.
However, it is only fair to mention that decision-making approaches were
developed to analyze decision-making behavior where crisis appears as
an independent variable which necessitates the focus on decision-making
processes and omits the possibility that the character of crises is altered
6 N. KLOPF
by decision-makers instead of merely being recognized in their inter-

pretations. A discursive approach does not neglect the pioneering work
undertaken by decision-making theory and its insights into foreign policy
behavior, but it vindicates the position that crisis theory must be advanced
in a different direction.
It needs to be noted critically that decision-making approaches rely
on the individual interpretations of decision-makers for identifying events
that are classified as crises. This, however, presents an individualist
perspective that assumes that, while influenced by environmental factors,
decision-makers interpret crisis situations individually. It is not reflected
on how such interpretations emerge, which, in contrast, is highlighted
in constructivist and discourse theoretical approaches that emphasize the
socially, or discursively, constructed character of every individual inter-
pretation. Thus, interpretation must be replaced by a notion of crisis
construction, since crises can neither be approached independently from
the decision-makers that confront them nor from the society they are
located in. That is, crises cannot solely be approached as an indepen-
dent variable that decision-makers act upon, but the nature of crises is
constantly seized by social, and discursive, constructions (Hay 2016, 531;
Weldes 1999b, 38; Widmaier 2005, 557). Decision-making theory does
not escape one-directional crisis response models, although Brecher intro-
duces occasional feedback loops into decision-makers’ interpretations.
This does not account for the continuing impact that social structures
have on crisis constructions, which are therefore never static, but in prin-
ciple constantly altered. Decision-making approaches, nonetheless, open
the way for treating crisis as an interpretative phenomenon that does
not exist naturally without any interpretative, or constructing, practice.
This insight is expanded in later constructivist and discourse theoretical
research, but decision-making theory teaches us the valuable lesson that
we must not reduce crisis to materiality. Decision-making approaches are
henceforth advanced in three major directions:
(1) Discursive construction of ephemeral crises. Relying on construc-

tivist research, a discourse theoretical perspective regards temporary
crises as discursive constructions instead of individual interpreta-
tions. Ephemeral crises are thus not identified by their effects on
decision-makers but through a distinct process of crisis construc-
tion.
(2) Permanence of structural crisis. These constructions merely present

ephemeral moments of destabilization that are rooted in a
continuous structural crisis that permeates every society. Hence,
combining constructivist and critical realist insights, a differenti-
ation between ephemeral constructed and permanent structural
crisis is introduced, which renders it possible to theorize the process
of crisis construction.
(3) Abandonment of non-crisis. It becomes necessary to abandon the
sharp differentiation between crisis and non-crisis, which is usually
put forward by decision-making approaches. It is only in more
recent research on crisis management that so-called ‘transboundary
crises’ are recognized, which blurs the demarcation of distinct
crisis periods. Arjen Boin thus argues that “[w]hereas a tradi-
tional crisis has a clear beginning and an end, the transboundary
crisis cannot easily be pinpointed in time” since “[i]ts roots run
deep […] and its effects may be felt years down the road” (Boin
2009, 368). However, even this expansion limits crises to specific
events and does not acknowledge that society is confronted with a
permanent structural crisis that prevents it from reaching complete
stability. This lurking instability, however, often remains obscured
and merely becomes accentuated in times of ephemeral crisis. It is
in this sense that the traditional association of crisis with instability
must be understood: Illusions of stability are linked to non-crisis
periods when society appears to be relatively stable. This stability,
then, only becomes disrupted during constructed ephemeral crises,
which appear as the only type of crises we are confronted with.
1.2 Constructivism
The work of Jutta Weldes presents one of the first theoretical engage-
ments that are concerned with the socially constructed nature of crisis.
She highlights that crises cannot be understood independently from
the society that decision-makers are situated in since the same material
circumstances will be “constituted as different crises, or not as crises at
all, by and for states with different identities” (Weldes 1999b, 37). This
not only rules out the possibility that crises are ‘natural’ occurrences,
waiting to be discovered, but Weldes also shifts the focus from indi-
vidual interpretations to the social construction of crisis. She contends
8 N. KLOPF
that crises are always constructed in relation to a particular state iden-

tity since constructing certain events as crises challenges the state identity
in question (Weldes 1999b, 38). In her analysis of the Cuban missile
crisis, Weldes thus argues that the crisis was produced “as a serious threat
to the well-established cold war identity of the United States” (Weldes
1999a, 219) as a global superpower and preserver of freedom. Hence,
crisis can be specified as a threat to a particular state identity which is
not ‘objectively’ given but socially constructed (Weldes 1999b, 41). This,
however, does not renounce the material circumstances linked to crisis,
but taking the Cuban missile crisis as an example, Weldes notes that its
social construction does not “deny that missiles were indeed placed by
the Soviets in Cuba” but “any interpretation of ‘the missile crisis’, to be
plausible, must recognize and account for these missiles” (Weldes 1996,
286). However, this “reality constraint” (Weldes 1996, 286) does not
necessitate a particular construction of these occurrences but a variety
of constructions remains possible. Thus, while a constructivist approach
focuses on the socially constructed meaning of crisis, it does not deny the
physical existence of its associated material conditions.
Moreover, when events are constructed as crises, state identities are
not only threatened, but crises also provide the opportunity to repro-
duce and reinforce the threatened identity (Weldes 1999b, 38). Weldes
thus shows that “having defined a crisis into existence, responding to that
crisis enabled the performative reproduction of U.S. identity” (Weldes
1999b, 54) since it required a response from U.S. officials in which the
ingrained U.S. identity became reproduced. This is particularly impor-
tant as states are not linked to any inherent, or essential, identity but
state identity must constantly be reproduced in foreign policy practices
which crises provide opportunities for (Weldes 1999b, 59). During the
Cuban missile crisis, the United States was thus able to reinforce its
Cold War identity that had emerged from antagonistic relations towards
the Soviet Union. Whereas the latter was presented as totalitarian and
aggressive, which led to the construction of the Soviet missiles as neces-
sarily offensive, the United States was constructed in contrast to Soviet
totalitarianism, which in turn precluded the possibility that the missiles
played a defensive role or that the crisis was engendered by prior U.S.
aggression (Weldes 1999a, 128–29). Thus, the Cuban missile crisis was
constructed out of existing U.S.–Soviet relations and was tied to a partic-
ular U.S. identity which made an alternative construction of the missiles
“unintelligible from within the U.S. security imaginary” (Weldes 1999a,
136).
In contrast to decision-making approaches, Weldes’ analysis of the

Cuban missile crisis renders visible that the way decision-makers construct
crises cannot be understood without considering threatened state iden-
tities, and, at the same time, those antagonistic relations that these
identities are constructed against. This also shows that the Cuban missile
crisis was not merely about placing missiles in Cuba but these missiles
became a “metaphor for the U.S.-Soviet conflict” (Weldes 1999a, 219)
which became accentuated during the Cuban missile crisis. Weldes thus
concludes that resolving the crisis did not merely involve removing the
missiles but the United States was primarily concerned with “maintaining
or living up to the identity constructed for the United States” (Weldes
1999a, 219). It becomes clear that ephemeral crises, such as the Cuban
missile crisis, hint at a deeper destabilization that has already been present
through existing antagonistic relations which are constitutive of every
identity.
Similar approaches were also developed in the field of constructivist
International Political Economy. Mark Blyth, for instance, specifies crises
as situations in which actors are uncertain as to what their interests are
and how they can realize them (Blyth 2002, 9). Maintaining that crises
are not natural phenomena, he thus argues that crisis is to be understood
as an “act of intervention where sources of uncertainty are diagnosed
and constructed” (Blyth 2002, 10). The diagnosis of a particular crisis
is seized by existing ideas actors have, since interests are not naturally
given but they are a matter of social construction. Through ideas, actors
construct a particular crisis, that is, identify particular origins of uncer-
tainty, since ideas propose particular interests, and at the same time,
solutions to crises, which reduces the uncertainty of interests (Blyth 2002,
11). Thus, Blyth’s conceptualization of crisis regards temporary moments
of ideational contestation when the way forward becomes uncertain due
to actors’ struggle to construct their interests.
However, Colin Hay rightly criticizes that crises do not necessarily
lead to uncertainty about actors’ interests, but they might also “result
in the vehement reassertion, expression, and articulation of prior concep-
tions of self-interest” (Hay 2008, 69), which has been rendered visible
in Weldes’ analysis of the Cuban missile crisis that served to reassert the
existing U.S. identity. Crises neither present moments of radical uncer-
tainty nor complete certainty about actors’ interests, but they open a space
for contestation that might lead to the reinforcement or transformation of
existing social structures. Moreover, Hay rightly asks that if crises denote
10 N. KLOPF
radical uncertainty as to what actors’ interest are, “then how is it that

such situations are ever resolved” (Hay 2008, 70)? If ideas already exist
that provide actors with interests, situations might appear as utterly uncer-
tain since naturalized social practices might have become interrupted, but
these situations are in fact merely contested, since where would those
ideas come from that actors adduce to resolve the crisis if the situation
was completely uncertain and not framed by any ideas (Hay 2008, 70)?
Taking a similar perspective, Widmaier and Baglione define crises
as “events that are interpreted as legitimating the transformation of
prevailing understandings and interests” (Baglione and Widmaier 2006,
196). While keeping the focus on interests, Widmaier eschews Blyth’s
problematic conceptualization of uncertainty by emphasizing the poten-
tial of crises to challenge dominant understandings. Interests do not
become utterly uncertain during crises, but prevailing understandings, or
dominant ideas, are put into question, and it is these ideas that shape, and
potentially transform, interests in the first place (Widmaier 2003, 64).
Widmaier thus specifies crises through their effect of legitimizing
change. This becomes even clearer in his co-authored article with Mark
Blyth and Leonard Seabrooke where crises are defined more generally as
“events which agents intersubjectively interpret as necessitating change”
(Widmaier et al. 2007, 748). In this sense, crises are understood as events
that do not alter material relations as such but rather a “set of shared
understandings” (Widmaier 2003, 65) since actors cannot react directly to
material changes, but how actors respond is mediated through the partic-
ular meaning that material relations gain through social constructions.
Particular crisis responses are thus shaped by the socially constructed
meaning of crises (Widmaier et al. 2007, 748). However, Widmaier
emphasizes that this approach does not deny the materiality of crises but
“highlights the discourses which frame material change” (Widmaier 2007,
785). Even though this might bear a slight resemblance to decision-
making approaches that propose an interpretative intermediary between
event stimulus and decision-making response, Widmaier’s emphasis on
the socially mediated character of crises is not one-directional and does
not include occasional feedback loops. But he notes that intersubjective
understandings of crises are “sustained or transformed through ongoing
interaction” (Widmaier 2005, 557), such that the meaning of crises is
constantly seized by social practices.
Focusing both on institutional change and underlying destabilizing
structures within society, Hay’s work presents perhaps one of the most
sophisticated approaches to constructivist crisis theory. He defines crisis as

“a moment of decisive intervention in the process of institutional change”
(Hay 1999, 320), as during crisis, entrenched state structures may be
overcome and “a new projection of a future state regime is constructed”
(Hay 1999, 322). Thus, crisis is inextricably linked to the process of state
transformation since the state is rendered as in need of decisive interven-
tion, and, at the same time, a particular institutional trajectory is proposed
to resolve the crisis (Hay 1996b, 254). Importantly, the opportunity to
make decisive interventions is not naturally given through institutional
developments, but it is socially constructed as a “moment in which those
capable of making a response at the level at which the crisis is identi-
fied perceive the need to make such an intervention” (Hay 1996a, 424).
This intervention is made in response to state failure, that is, to an “accu-
mulation or condensation of contradictions” (Hay 1999, 324). However,
actors cannot respond directly to such failures, but the latter must be
mediated through social constructions which transforms failure into crisis
(Hay 1996a, 423). Thus, failure merely presents the structural precon-
dition for crisis to emerge and does not neatly correspond to crises that
are constructed based on an identified state failure, but the latter can
give rise to a variety of different crisis constructions (Hay 1995, 64).
Hence, the decisive interventions made to resolve crises depend on how
social constructions give meaning to state failure. This also means that
the way forward is not predetermined but a matter of contestation which
might result in the transformation of institutional structures, while crises
can also serve to reinforce existing structures, depending on which crisis
construction prevails (Hay 2013a, 49; 2013b, 24).
Against this definition, Hay develops a process of crisis and institu-
tional change. He proposes that crises emerge through an accumulation
of unresolved contradictions that eventually consolidate as state failure.
Thereby, varying contradictions are identified as symptoms of a generally
deficient state (Hay 1996b, 255). In this process, their specificity becomes
denied and they are constructed in a particular “abstracted and simplified
meta-narrative” (Hay 1996b, 267) of state failure. In this way, multiple
disparate events can be accommodated within the same crisis construc-
tion. This might also serve to reinforce a particular construction of state
failure since the “crisis diagnosis is conformed in each new ‘symptom’ that
can be assimilated within this metanarrative” (Hay 1995, 72). However,
Hay emphasizes that “there is no objective point at which a given weight
of contradictions will necessarily precipitate a crisis” (Hay 2010, 465) but
12 N. KLOPF
the identification of failure as crisis remains a matter of social construction.

While there might emerge competing crisis constructions, a dominant
construction will eventually prevail that is linked to distinct decisive inter-
ventions, proposing a particular institutional trajectory which might either
reinforce or challenge existing institutional structures (Hay 1999, 331;
2014, 66). The success of dominant crisis constructions is not determined
by their accuracy to reflect material failures, but they are judged on their
“ability to provide a simplified account sufficiently flexible to ‘narrate’ a
great variety of morbid symptoms” (Hay 2001, 204).
Hay thus proposes a process of institutional transformation that alter-
nates between crises and periods of relative stability in which crises appear
as rare disruptions that destabilize an otherwise apparently stable society
before culminating contradictions result in another construction of state
failure. This crisis cycle is supplemented by Stuart Croft, who suggests two
alternative paths in case dominant institutional structures are challenged
by arising contradictions. As it has been put forward by Hay, when the
dominant institutional order becomes contested by emerging contradic-
tions, it is possible that state failure is constructed as crisis, leading to
decisive interventions and institutional restructuring. At the same time,
however, Croft emphasizes the possibility that the dominant order might
adapt to arising contradictions which only supports its further reinforce-
ment. Eventually then, it reaches the point where it cannot adapt to
further contestation, resulting again in crisis and potential institutional
transformation (Croft 2006, 272–74). This, however, in no way contra-
dicts Hay’s theorization of state transformation, but supplements it with
what has already been implicit in Hay’s work.

While constructivist research highlights how crises are socially
constructed, it generally remains unclear where those ideas come
from that give rise to crisis constructions in the first place. With the
notable exception of Weldes’ work that emphasizes how crises emerge
from existing antagonistic relations, it usually remains untold how we
come to understand social circumstances in one way rather than another,
that is, how we come to construct certain phenomena as a particular kind
of crisis or not as a crisis at all. These steps therefore become necessary:
(1) Discursive construction of ephemeral crises. A discourse theoretical

approach does not focus on the intersubjective construction of
crises but highlights their discursive construction, which serves as
a prerequisite for social constructions. Discourse theory as hence-
forth understood does not merely include linguistics but empha-
sizes how meaning is produced through a variety of linguistic utter-
ances, material conditions, visuality, social practices, etc. Discursive
structures produce us as subjects in the first place, and thereby also
our capability of intersubjective negotiations.
(2) Departure from actor-centrism. The construction of crisis is then
detached from the constructivist trend of focusing on a limited
number of actors who are capable of constructing crises. Not only
do traditional decision-making approaches restrict the interpreta-
tion of crisis to few national decision-makers, but constructivist
research is also frequently focused on the constructions of state offi-
cials (Weldes 1999b, 37), leaders (Widmaier 2007, 792), or actors
that are capable of making decisive interventions (Hay 1995, 64).
Although being a noteworthy development, this is also not reme-
died by approaches that broaden the scope to include both elites
and the mass public (Seabrooke 2007, 807; Widmaier et al. 2007,
749; also Weldes 1999b, 58). A discourse theoretical approach
renders visible how any form of intersubjectivity is always under-
pinned by discursive constructions which are thus given, at least
analytical, priority.
(3) Permanence of structural crisis. A discourse theoretical perspective
also reveals how every crisis construction emerges from an under-
lying structural dimension, which Hay’s work has already pointed
towards. Whereas Hay proposes an explicitly material underpin-
ning of constructed crises when discussing the accumulation of
structural contradictions, a discursive process of crisis construc-
tion does not start from the assumption of necessarily material
preconditions. This, however, does not deny the materiality of
crises since crisis constructions are not merely treated as linguistic
practices, but the differentiation between linguistic/extra-linguistic
or material/non-material is discharged in favor of inclusive discur-
sive constructions that regard both dimensions. Thus, discursive
constructions are not merely ‘ideational’ if the latter is to denote
linguistic constructions or processes of crisis construction taking
place ‘in our minds’. Against this background, Weldes’ work
14 N. KLOPF
becomes particularly important when it, too, hints at a struc-

tural underpinning of crisis constructions by emphasizing how the
Cuban missile crisis emerged from existing U.S.–Soviet relations.
In contrast to Hay, Weldes highlights the ideational dimension of
the antagonistic relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Even though she is particularly concerned with an
ideational dimension, her focus on antagonism already comes close
to a discursive perspective that highlights how ephemeral crisis
constructions emerge from an underlying structural destabilization,
which, however, can neither be regarded as merely material nor
linguistic but as explicitly discursive.
It is at this point that crisis can no longer solely be treated as a tempo-

rary occurrence that disrupts an otherwise stable society, but crisis must
be approached as a multidimensional phenomenon. Hay’s concern with
material contradictions and Weldes’ emphasis on antagonistic relations,
while focusing on different aspects, already denote a distinct structural
dimension of crisis. It thus becomes necessary to systematize crisis, differ-
entiating between ephemeral constructed and permanent structural crisis.
This stands in contrast to Hay’s argument that crises cannot be permanent
because “a perpetual crisis would be one that does not directly threaten
the stability of the system, one that does not result in decisive interven-
tion” since otherwise “the unresolved crisis would rapidly degenerate into
catastrophe – the collapse of the state” (Hay 1995, 63). Yet, we are indeed
confronted with a permanent structural crisis, which, however, is often
obscured such that societies appear to be stable despite being destabilized.
In this way, we are not sliding towards catastrophe and the annihilation
of institutional structures, but live in the guise of a relatively stabilized
social order.
Similarly, Hay remarks that crisis “is not some objective condition or
property of a system defining the contours for subsequent ideological
contestation” but it is only “brought into existence through narrative and
discourse” (Hay 1996b, 255). While it is certainly right that ephemeral
crises only emerge through constructions, crisis can indeed be regarded
as a condition of a system, yet not an ‘objective’ one if the latter is to
be understood as linked to some sort of ‘natural’ unmediated materiality.
Rather, crisis characterizes a constitutive structural feature of every society
that only becomes accentuated during temporary constructed crises.
Conceptualizing crisis as a permanent structural characteristic of society
and, at the same time, through ephemeral constructions is not mutu-

ally exclusive, but it requires a multidimensional approach. Recent critical
realist crisis theory has developed towards a similar direction, differen-
tiating crisis on distinct ontological dimensions, which thus provides a
point of departure for further systematization.
1.3 Critical Realism

Bob Jessop’s work presents perhaps the most sophisticated approach to
critical realist crisis theory. He proposes a process-based approach that
explores “transformative phenomena that unfold over space–time” (Knio
and Jessop 2019, 7) before eventually culminating in crisis. From this
perspective, crisis is not seen as an instantaneous phenomenon, but Jessop
is concerned with the trends leading towards crisis. This also stands in
contrast with traditional decision-making approaches since crises are not
utterly unanticipated but interwoven in more complex crisis dynamics
that, theoretically, might be recognized in advance. These crisis dynamics
can be located in what Jessop regards as the ‘objective’ dimension of
crisis that comprises the material preconditions for every ‘subjective’
construction (Jessop 2012a, 19). While this assumption provides the
basis for Jessop’s multilayered approach, it certainly contradicts previously
discussed constructivist research. However, even though his focus on an
independent materiality must be viewed critically, Jessop’s work proves
nonetheless fruitful for advancing towards a further systematization of
crisis.
Jessop does not merely propose a differentiation between materiality
and construction but develops a more nuanced conceptualization of crisis
based on Bhaskar’s tripartite ontology, distinguishing ‘real’ mechanisms
from ‘actual’ events and ‘empirical’ observations (Jessop 2015c, 239; see
also Bhaskar 2008, 47). Although the general differentiation between
an ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ dimension of crisis somehow resonates
with this three-dimensional approach, since the ‘real’ and ‘actual’ layers
comprise materiality, Jessop does not assume particular material condi-
tions as the starting point for theorizing crisis. Rather, he stresses potential
material circumstances leading to crisis by rooting the latter in a ‘real’
dimension that circumscribes a variety of entities connected by potential
causal mechanisms that might tendentially develop towards crisis. In this
sense, Jessop contends that crisis becomes manifest “in specific condi-
tions of an abstract possibility of crisis where the balance between crisis
16 N. KLOPF
tendencies and counter-tendencies tips in favour of crisis” (Jessop and

Knio 2019, 270). Thus, the ‘real’ layer encompasses the constant interac-
tion of causal mechanisms, or tendencies, which might develop towards
an ‘actual’ material crisis. Jessop thereby introduces an explicitly struc-
tural underpinning since the tipping point towards crisis is reached when
“contradictions and crisis tendencies can no longer be managed, displaced
or deferred” (Jessop 2013b, 12), that is, when ‘antagonisms’ develop
that are grounded in specific structural mechanisms (Jessop 2019, 53).
These antagonisms become apparent when “accepted views of the world”
(Jessop 2012b, 24) are disrupted and social relations “cannot be repro-
duced […] in the old way” (Jessop 2015a, 486). Crises can thus be
traced back to causal mechanisms that give rise to particular triggering
events which reveal exactly these underlying structural factors, that is,
contradictions that are unable to be managed within the existing social
order.
However, Jessop emphasizes that crises cannot be reduced to this
material dimension since a “crisis is never a purely objective, extra-
semiotic event” (Sum and Jessop 2014, 396), but actors first have to
make sense of material occurrences and their underlying structural mech-
anisms. Yet, as it is impossible to completely observe these mechanisms,
constructions of particular crises necessarily remain partial and are thus
open to contestation (Jessop 2015c, 240). While emerging from material
crises, constructions cannot simply be derived from them such that no
specific construction is predetermined by its underlying causes. Neverthe-
less, some constructions still reflect more adequately causal mechanisms
than others. However, even more inadequate constructions might have
“constitutive effects” (Jessop 2019, 62) in the sense that they can shape
discourses by acting upon crisis constructions of others and by affecting
the transformation of political institutions. The detection, observation,
and construction of particular crises is encompassed in what Jessop
regards as the ‘empirical’ dimension of crisis. Importantly, however,
constructions must always be rooted in material conditions in order to be
legitimately referred to as crisis. Otherwise, we would be confronted with
‘manufactured’ crises that are merely constructed phenomena without any
material foundation (Sum and Jessop 2014, 396).
Critical realist theory is thus particularly concerned with an indepen-
dently existing materiality that is supposed to explain the emergence of
crisis, stressing that the existence of crises “must be independent from
how we perceive them” (Knio 2019, 42). At the same time, it is acknowl-
edged that crises cannot remain unmediated, but actors give varying
meanings to crises through social constructions which not only shape
how material crises are understood, but how crises are constructed also
influences which decisions are made in response (Jessop 2015a, 487).
This prevalent position of materiality is also reflected in how Jessop
conceptualizes the process of crisis construction that he subdivides
into three stages from an initial plethora of different constructions to
the eventual retention of a particular construction and its institutional
implementation. Initially stable structures become destabilized through
the emergence of material crises which give rise to a multiplicity of
varying crisis constructions that enable the “(re-)politicization of sedi-
mented discourses and practices” (Jessop 2013a, 238). However, only
some of these constructions get selected, while others disappear or
become marginalized. Eventually, one dominant construction prevails
and disrupted social structures become re-sedimented, leading again to
a seemingly stable society. Jessop highlights that in this process, both
materiality and construction remain co-present. Yet, whereas construc-
tion is particularly important during the initial phase, materiality becomes
prevalent along the way to retention (Jessop 2013a, 238), since only
those constructions “that grasp key emergent and extra-semiotic features
of the social and natural world are likely to be selected and retained”
(Jessop 2015b, 99). Nevertheless, there is always the possibility that
dominant constructions become contested by oppositional and marginal-
ized discourses that remain present in the relative stability of the dominant
social order (Jessop 2015b, 110).

It must be noted critically that Jessop’s process of crisis construction
assumes as its starting point a sedimented, seemingly stable discourse
where social structures have become naturalized and are taken for
granted. This apparent stability then becomes disrupted through a crisis
which re-politicizes that discourse and opens up the field for the trans-
formation of social structures that become re-sedimented after the crisis
is resolved. Even though Jessop cites the categories of sedimentation and
re-politicization from the Laclauian work of Howarth and Glynos (Jessop
2013a, 235), Laclau is particularly concerned with the co-presence of
both aspects such that we are never confronted with an un-politicized
18 N. KLOPF
discourse (Laclau 1990, 35). While it is certainly right that social struc-
tures generally appear to be stable, sedimentation and re-politicization
cannot be broken down into a linear process but must be approached
as co-present. Accordingly, crisis must not be restricted to the tempo-
rary disruption of sedimented discursive structures, but it must also be
approached as a permanent structural feature of every society since the
point of complete sedimentation cannot be reached.
Nevertheless, the general process of crisis construction from prolif-
eration to retention cannot be renounced from a discourse theoretical
perspective, even though the theorization of each step remains problem-
atic, not least due to Jessop’s emphasis on materiality throughout the
construction process. His ontological differentiation of crisis is grounded
in an independent materiality, consisting of natural causal mechanisms
that serve to explain the emergence of crises. Despite this problematic
foundation of Jessop’s theory, he offers valuable insights that will be a
point of departure for developing a discursive framework of global crises:
(1) Discursive construction of ephemeral crises. While it is certainly

correct that ephemeral crises are rooted in complex social struc-
tures that are seized by destabilizations, crises cannot be seen as
the culmination of prior contradictions, as some sort of devel-
opment towards the point where such contradictions cannot be
integrated into the existing social order. Rather, while being consti-
tuted within an inherently, and permanently, destabilized structure,
the emergence of ephemeral crises does not depict the disintegra-
tion of this order, but it renders visible its permanent underlying
destabilization. That is, ephemeral crises temporarily reveal the
constitutive structural crisis at the heart of every society. Jessop,
nonetheless, paves the way towards an understanding of ephemeral
crises that are rooted in an underlying structural dimension, even
though the latter will be largely rethought.
(2) Permanence of structural crisis. Jessop further introduces an
Althusserian notion of antagonism in order to explain the conden-
sation of contradictions which, despite carrying the same problem
of an independent materiality, cannot be completely renounced but
rather must be advanced towards a discourse theoretical under-
standing of the term. As long as crisis is understood through
Althusserian antagonism, that is, as the culmination of contra-
dictions that cannot be managed within an existing social order,
crisis remains located at a given point in time, even if pre-

crisis dynamics are considered in its emergence. However, if crisis
is to be understood as a permanent structural characteristic of
society, antagonism must be rethought, which becomes possible
by departing towards a Laclauian account of antagonism that,
nevertheless, remains derived from Althusser. Antagonism then
becomes a permanent feature in the constitution of every society
and, at the same time, renders it inherently destabilized. Through
a Laclauian understanding of antagonism, it thus becomes possible
to conceptualize crisis both as constructed ephemeral instances
and as a permanent characteristic of society that makes ephemeral
constructions possible in the first place.
(3) Discursivity of crisis. This includes the departure from an inde-
pendent materiality as the precondition for structural destabi-
lization, which, however, does not leave us with mere linguistic
constructions, but a discursive approach dissolves the differenti-
ation between materiality and linguistics in favor of an inclusive
perspective that considers material and linguistic aspects as equally
meaningful entities in the discursive construction of crisis. The crit-
ical realist rejection of constructivist approaches thus becomes at
least partly softened, because it criticizes constructivist research for
treating crises as an “exclusively discursive object” (Rycker and
Mohd Don 2013, 5) which, however, assumes a purely linguistic
understanding of discourse which is explicitly renounced from a
Laclauian perspective. The critique that ignoring the independent
materiality of crisis would have as its consequence that “just any
arbitrary event or sequence of events is socially constructed into
crisis” such that crisis becomes a “vacuous signifier” (Rycker and
Mohd Don 2013, 20) can hence be refuted by introducing an
inclusive discourse theoretical approach that conceptualizes the
specificity of crisis constructions against the backdrop of permanent
structural crisis.
1.4 Discourse Theory

Dirk Nabers’ work provides pioneering insights into a discourse theo-
retical conceptualization of structural crisis that emphasizes how crisis
cannot be reduced to ephemeral moments of destabilization but must be
understood as a permanent constitutive feature of society. By introducing
20 N. KLOPF
the Laclauian notion of dislocation into crisis theorizing, he renders it

possible to explore the conceptual specificity of crisis, both as ephemeral
instances and as a permanent structural feature. At the same time, dislo-
cation provides the theoretical background that is necessary for linking
these dimensions. Following Laclau, dislocation generally characterizes
the inherent incompleteness of society, its failure to achieve stability, and
thereby also the ongoing disruption that prevents society from being
completely constituted or stable. In this sense, Laclau defines disloca-
tion as the failure of social structures “to achieve constitution” (Laclau
1990, 47). Thus, social structures remain inherently incomplete and
unstable since dislocation never vanishes but remains as constitutive for
every society. Along these lines, Nabers conceptualizes structural crisis as
dislocation and argues that “crisis is related to the constantly disrupted
structure of society or even the very impossibility of society” (Nabers
2019, 265). Hence, seemingly stable social structures remain essentially
destabilized since those practices, norms, rules, and institutions that are
taken for granted by large parts of society, that is, what has been insti-
tutionalized or has become sedimented, is in fact constantly dislocated,
even if it appears to be stable. In this sense, Nabers foregrounds that, in
the first place, dislocation refers to the dislocation of “sedimented prac-
tices” (Nabers 2017, 422). Hence, dislocation is closely related to the
always contested and thus potentially changing character of society and
highlights that society is an essentially precarious construct that cannot
be approached as a fixed entity.

It remains problematic that the tension between an ephemeral and a
permanent dimension of dislocation has never been resolved in Laclau’s
work and continues to permeate Nabers’ research. Thus, even though
he decisively highlights structural crisis as a “permanent and necessary
feature of society” (Nabers 2015, 3) and opposes the assumption that it
can be defined as “some momentary condition that surfaces from time to
time” (Nabers 2015, 2), the differentiation between a permanent and an
ephemeral perspective seems to be blurred at times.
Emphasizing that dislocation circumscribes the failure of society to be
ultimately constituted or stable, Nabers defines crisis as “a lack, deficiency,
or failure in the social fabric” (Nabers 2015, 3) but shortly afterwards
links society to its “constitutive lack, manifold crises, and voids” (Nabers
2015, 4), which raises the question how lack, crisis, and void can be
aligned if crisis as such is already specified as lack. Moreover, mentioning
‘manifold crises’ suggests that there must be multiple crises of some sort
that are conceptually different from crisis as a permanent attribute of
society, since how would crisis as the mere quality of lack, deficiency, or
failure be multiple in nature? Along these lines, he describes crisis as “a
lack, a void, or gap within the social fabric” (Nabers 2015, 118) but,
at the same time, states that dislocations “produce voids” (Nabers 2015,
100) in the first place, which, again conflates the notion of crisis and
void and urges to assume that dislocation does not merely point towards
the ontological quality of lack or failure. This becomes even clearer when
Nabers argues that “crises or dislocations […] must be seen as constant
political constructions” (Nabers 2015, 27). However, a permanent crisis
as such cannot be equated with discursive constructions, even though it
certainly needs to be constructed in one way or another for it to acquire
meaning and to be acted upon.
Despite resemblances to the general differentiation between struc-
tural permanent and constructed ephemeral crisis, Nabers’ work does
not merely reproduce this demarcation, but it indicates that perma-
nent dislocation itself must be subdivided into two distinct dimensions.
It is this multidimensionality that explains Nabers’ seemingly confusing
conceptualization of dislocation. Two steps must thus be taken:
(1) Multidimensionality of crisis. Dislocation cannot just be delineated

at an ephemeral and permanent level, but we must differentiate
between an ephemeral, a permanent as well as a recurring dimen-
sion of dislocation. Permanent dislocation can be specified as the
incompleteness of society, or its failure to achieve stability. It
is this dimension which is confused with repeated occurrences
of particular deficiencies in the social fabric. However, perma-
nent dislocation must become manifest in ever-new deficient social
structures, that is, in recurring dislocation. Only in its recurring
dimension can dislocation be continuous and multiple. It is finally
in constructed ephemeral dislocations that the constitutive struc-
tural destabilization of society eventually becomes visible. Nabers’
work must thus not be seen as generally inconsistent, but it instead
renders visible the complexity of dislocation that has yet to be
systematized.
22 N. KLOPF
(2) Relationality of crisis. Nabers remains particularly concerned with

a permanent dimension of dislocation, such that the relation
between permanent and ephemeral dislocation is not always
entirely clear. He states, for instance, that “[i]n the event of dislo-
cation, competing political forces will endeavor to hegemonize the
gap between purity and distortion” (Nabers 2017, 422), that is,
between the alleged stability of society and its anticipated disrup-
tion. This, however, urges to assume that dislocation is not always
used strictly to refer to an underlying quality of society, but it
appears to denote anticipated ruptures, which points towards an
ephemeral perspective on dislocation. Similarly, Nabers argues that
dislocation entails some sort of intensity, stating that there are
“bigger and smaller dislocations” (Nabers 2015, 27) and “the more
far-reaching the dislocation of a discourse is, the fewer principles
will still be in place after the crisis” (Nabers 2015, 126). This lays
bare that dislocation is not merely used to describe a permanent
structural feature of society, but this use of dislocation hints at
some sort of discursive construction. This becomes more explicit in
his later work where he links “crises of different degrees” (Nabers
2019, 267) to their construction through discursive practices that
“perform the crisis ‘into existence’” (Nabers 2019, 267) in the first
place. It will hence be necessary to clarify the link between the
different dimensions of dislocation, which leads us to systematizing
three distinct but interrelated dimensions of the term.
Nabers, nevertheless, offers an intriguing perspective on crisis as dislo-

cation and decisively foregrounds an understanding of dislocation as a
permanent attribute of society, which becomes particularly clear in his
analysis of the events on September 11, 2001 when he argues that “the
event of ‘9/11’ was not a crisis in itself, but laid bare the fundamentally
dislocated character of the American […] society” (Nabers 2015, 107).
Yet, the occasional inconsistencies in Nabers’ references to dislocation
hamper a systematization of crisis into distinct dimensions. Regardless
of this ambiguity, his work is fundamental for a genuine theoretical
engagement with crisis and provides a point of departure for advancing
a discourse theoretical framework that conceptualizes crisis on three
dimensions.
Following Nabers’ account of dislocation, crisis must first be under-
stood as a constitutive characteristic of society that denotes its general
impossibility to achieve stability. It thus becomes equivalent with a

permanent dimension of dislocation. Second, this permanent crisis-ridden
nature of society becomes manifest in recurringly deficient attempts to
stabilize any meaning—irrespective of whether this concerns identities
or the meaning of more abstract concepts like freedom or democracy.
Processes of meaning construction are ultimately futile endeavors that
represent the recurring dimension of crisis. Lastly, ephemeral crises are
rooted in exactly these precarious constructions and can thus only be
theorized thoroughly when paying attention to the underlying structural
dimensions of crisis. Nabers’ research will hence be advanced towards
a multidimensional approach to crisis that systematically scrutinizes its
permanent, recurring, and ephemeral dimension. In order to do so, the
ambiguity in the concept of dislocation must be overcome which can be
achieved by examining the development of dislocation in Laclau’s work.
In this way, dislocation is revealed as a multilayered concept that provides
the basis for developing a discursive framework of crisis as dislocation.
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Another random document with
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Nachdem wir einen Hügel passiert hatten, erblickten wir ein
großes, offenes Feld, und in der Mitte desselben glänzte der Boden
gelb — es war die gesegnete, herrliche Oase A l t i m i s c h - b u l a k !
Mit ihren durch ständiges Leben im Freien geschärften Augen
hatten Abdu Rehim und Melik sogleich eine am Ostrande weidende
Kamelherde erblickt — ich konnte die Tiere kaum mit dem Fernglase
erkennen. Jetzt übernahm der erfahrene Kameljäger die Führung
und gab der Karawane Anweisung, einen Umweg hinter einem
niedrigen Bergrücken herum zu machen. Abdu Rehim und
Tschernoff eilten nach dem Kamischfelde der Oase; ich folgte ihnen,
um mir den Verlauf der Jagd als passiver Zuschauer anzusehen. Wir
kreuzten das Bächlein der „sechzig Quellen“, wo, wie unser
Wegweiser schon vor einem Monate richtig prophezeit hatte, noch
große schöne Eisschollen lagen (Abb. 81) und gingen dann in das
Schilf und die Tamarisken hinein.
Auch diese Herde bestand aus einem großen dunkeln Bughra
und fünf hellen Kamelen; vielleicht war es dieselbe, die wir schon
gesehen hatten. Das alte und eines der Jungen weideten eifrig, die
übrigen lagen, die Köpfe uns zugewandt. Wir waren 300 Schritt von
ihnen entfernt und der Wind kam gerade von ihnen, weshalb weder
Gehör noch Geruch sie warnen konnte; für uns war es das
Wichtigste, uns nicht sehen zu lassen. Eigentlich war es feige, sich
auf diese Weise an die edeln Tiere heranzuschleichen und sie aus
dem Hinterhalte zu überfallen.
Mich interessierte es am meisten, möglichst viel von ihren
Bewegungen und Gewohnheiten im Freien zu sehen, aber ich wollte
den Männern nicht das Schießen verbieten, denn dies würde in der
Karawane Unzufriedenheit und Ärger erweckt haben, die
verdrießliche Folgen haben konnten. Dazu kam, daß Abdu Rehim
Kameljäger von Beruf war. Die Muselmänner besitzen keine Spur
von Gefühl für die Leiden eines Tieres und hätten das Verbot
sicherlich als einen gegen sie selbst gerichteten launenhaften Einfall
aufgefaßt. Für einen Jäger mußte auch die Jagd auf ein solches Tier
ein Fest sein, das sah man unseren Schützen an; sie sahen und
hörten nichts anderes, wenn sie Kamele beschlichen, und ihre
Augen strahlten vor leidenschaftlicher Freude. Ich aber seufzte
erleichtert auf, wenn sie fehlten, denn meine Sympathien waren
ganz auf seiten der Kamele. Diesmal stand es jedoch in den Sternen
geschrieben, daß ein unschuldiges Leben erlöschen sollte.
Abdu Rehim bat uns, dort, wo wir uns befanden, zu warten,
während er einen großen Umweg machte, um ungesehen an einer
Lücke im Dickicht vorbeizukommen. Lautlos und unsichtbar wie ein
Panther glitt er durch die Büsche; wir konnten weder sehen noch
hören, wo er blieb. Mittlerweile hatte ich vortreffliche Gelegenheit,
die Bewegungen der Tiere zu beobachten. Die beiden Weidenden
gingen mit gesenktem Kopfe, erhoben ihn manchmal, wenn das
Maul voll war, kauten langsam und kräftig, so daß das dürre
Kamisch zwischen den Zähnen knisterte, und ließen den Blick über
den offenen Horizont gleiten. Sie zeigten keine Spur von Unruhe und
hatten keine Ahnung von dem, was ihnen bevorstand.
Jetzt krachte Abdu Rehims Flinte, und fünf Kamele liefen in
langsamem Trab auf unsere Büsche zu; doch wahrscheinlich hielten
sie den Punkt für verdächtig, denn sie machten plötzlich kehrt und
rannten in wildem Laufe bergauf, gerade gegen den Wind. Dies war
eine ebenso kluge wie natürliche Strategie, denn gegen den Wind
wittern sie die Gefahr, während in der entgegengesetzten Richtung
alle möglichen Fallstricke verborgen sein können.
Das jüngere weidende Kamel hatte eine Kugel in den Bauch
erhalten und bekam eine zweite in den Hals, als es sich erhob, um
sich den anderen zuzugesellen.
Als wir es erreichten, lag es auf allen vier Knien und kaute an
dem, was es noch zwischen den Zähnen hatte. Manchmal erhob es
sich auf den Hinterfüßen, fiel dann aber, weil ihm die Vorderbeine
den Dienst versagten, auf die Seite. Der Blick war ruhig und
resigniert, ohne Furcht oder Verwunderung; nur wenn man ihm über
die Nase strich, versuchte es zu beißen. Es glich auffallend den
zahmen Kamelen aus Singer und hatte gerade angefangen, Wolle
zu verlieren. Nachdem es von verschiedenen Seiten photographiert
worden war (Abb. 82), öffnete ihm Abdu mit einem kräftigen Schnitte
die Adern am Halse; das Blut spritzte in einem dicken Strahle
heraus, es folgten einige Todeszuckungen, und dann ging dieser
Sohn der Wüste, der noch vor ein paar Minuten so friedlich und ruhig
in dieser einsamen Gegend geweidet, in die ewigen Weidegründe
ein. Die anderen waren unseren Blicken schon entschwunden. Abdu
Rehim war selig, seinen alten Vater nun mit einem großen Vorrate
von Kamelfleisch überraschen zu können.
Das erlegte Kamel war ein etwa vierjähriges Männchen. Wie bei
den zahmen, kann man bei den wilden Kamelen das Alter mit
ziemlich großer Sicherheit am Aussehen der Vorderzähne erkennen.
Daß es bei einer Herde weilte, in der ein Bughra das Szepter führte,
läßt sich dadurch erklären, daß es ein für allemal durch einen
scheußlichen Biß in den Nacken gezüchtigt worden und überdies
noch so jung war. Sonst weiden Bughrakamele nur während des
Sommers friedlich zusammen, in der Brunstzeit duldet keines ein
anderes Männchen in seiner Nähe.
Die Kamele aus Singer wurden nachts angebunden und tags
bewacht, sonst wären sie heimgelaufen. Ihr Ortssinn ist scharf
entwickelt, und sie würden sich selbst dann dorthin finden, wenn
man sie in eine ihnen ganz unbekannte, dreißig Tagereisen von
Singer entfernte Gegend führte. Abdu versicherte, es seien die
Kamele gewesen, die uns im Dunkeln an jenem Abend, als wir in der
Steinwüste lagerten, direkt nach Altimisch-bulak geführt hätten, und
sie würden sicher weitergegangen sein und die Quelle gefunden
haben, wenn ich nicht Halt kommandiert hätte.
Der Reichtum an wilden Kamelen am Fuße des Kurruk-tag
wechselt in verschiedenen Jahren sehr. Werden sie in der Gegend
von Luktschin sehr von Jägern bedrängt, so begeben sie sich
hierher und umgekehrt. In diesem Jahre waren sie zahlreich. Läßt
man sie in Ruhe, so besuchen sie die Quellen alle drei Tage. Eine
Herde von acht Kamelen kam von Süden her an die unterste
Eisscholle, um Eis zu kauen. Die Männer kamen mit ihren Flinten
erst dorthin, als die Tiere schon wieder fort waren.
101. Jugend am Ufer des Tarim. (S. 254.)
102. Malenki und Maltschik. (S. 254.)

103. Dünen auf dem rechten Tarimufer. (S. 258.)
104. Gewaltige Sanddünen am rechten Tarimufer. (S. 258.)

Einundzwanzigstes Kapitel.
Der frühere See Lop-nor.
U nsere Zelte wurden zwischen Tamarisken und Schilf unmittelbar

neben der Quelle aufgeschlagen. Nach der Wüstenwanderung
war dies ein reizender, einladender Lagerplatz, und ein Genuß war
es zu sehen, wie die Kamele und mein Pferd in der üppigen Weide
schwelgten und von Zeit zu Zeit an die Quelle kamen, um an der
Eisrinde zu knabbern. Hier wollten wir einige Zeit bleiben, um die
Tiere zu der bevorstehenden Wüstenreise nach Süden Kräfte
sammeln zu lassen. Wir selbst litten beinahe Mangel an
Nahrungsmitteln. Reis und Brot waren allerdings noch im Überfluß
vorhanden, aber bekommt man weiter nichts, so wird das Menü sehr
einförmig. Tschernoff und ich konnten uns nicht überwinden,
Kamelfleisch zu essen, das den Muselmännern jedoch gut
schmeckte.
Die Leute aus Singer sehnten sich nach Hause, aber es gelang
mir dennoch folgendes Übereinkommen mit ihnen zu treffen. Melik
und sein jüngerer Bruder sollten mit vier Kamelen in Altimisch-bulak
bleiben, während Abdu uns mit den übrigen vier Kamelen zwei
Tagereisen weit begleitete, um unseren Kamelen die Last zu
erleichtern und Säcke mit Eis zu transportieren. Weiter wagte er
nicht mitzukommen; er hatte riesigen Respekt vor der Wüste, die er
nicht kannte.
Vom 23.–27. März blieben wir in dieser wunderbaren Oase, der
herrlichsten, die ich je besucht hatte. Nach dem angestrengten
Marsche von Jardang-bulak hierher war es schön sich auszuruhen.
Die Atmosphäre war in Aufruhr, aber das genierte mich wenig; mein
Zelt war von undurchdringlichem Kamisch und Tamarisken
umgeben, und lieblich klang es, wenn der Wind durch das Dickicht
ringsum sauste und pfiff.
Unsere Jäger streiften nach Wildenten und Antilopen umher, aber
mit beiden Wildarten war es hier gleich schlecht bestellt. Ein
einsames Kamel kam von Nordwesten nach der Quelle herunter;
einige von Abdus Kamelen wurden, von ihren Packsätteln befreit,
auf den Sai getrieben und gingen dem wilden neugierig entgegen.
Es näherte sich vorsichtig, beobachtete unverwandt die unseren und
hatte entschieden die Absicht, sich zu ihnen zu gesellen. Dann aber
kam es auf andere Gedanken, kehrte um und verschwand im
Westen.
Nur ein Fuchs, der an der Kamelleiche geschmaust hatte, wurde
die Beute der Jäger. Er hatte ein großes Fleischstück im Maul und
wollte damit wohl in seinen Bau gehen, als er statt dessen ins Gras
beißen mußte.
Ich benutzte die Ruhetage zu einer astronomischen Beobachtung
in mehreren Serien und zum Lesen. Die Luft fing an, frühlingshaft zu
werden. Am 25. hatten wir mittags +17,2 Grad, obgleich die
Minimaltemperatur in der Nacht vorher auf −7,1 Grad
heruntergegangen war. Abdu Rehim bereicherte meine Kenntnisse
in der Geographie der Gegend und zählte die Namen aller Quellen,
die er kannte, auf, wobei er auch ihre Lage zueinander genau
beschrieb. Von der Zuverlässigkeit seiner Angaben erhielt ich ein
Jahr später deutliche Beweise. Er sagte mir nämlich, daß er nach
Osten hin nur drei namenlose Quellen in einer Entfernung von zwei
kleinen Tagereisen jenseits Altimisch-bulak kenne. Ich fand sie alle
drei, und sie retteten uns im rechten Augenblick aus einer kritischen
Lage. Ferner beschrieb er alle alten Wege, die er im Kurruk-tag
kannte. Sie werden durch Steinpyramiden bezeichnet, welche die
Singerleute „Ova“ (das mongolische Wort „Obo“) nennen. Ein
solcher Weg führte über Singer nach Südsüdwest und ist
wahrscheinlich mit dem alten Weg der chinesischen
Steuereinnehmer nach dem Lop-nor identisch.
Nachdem alle Vorbereitungen getroffen, ein großer Eisvorrat und
vier Tagare (Säcke) Kamisch beschafft worden waren, brachen wir
am Morgen des 27. März wieder auf.
Unsere Absicht war, die Lopwüste von Norden nach Süden zu
durchqueren und dabei einen klaren Überblick über die Ausdehnung
des früheren Sees und unwiderlegliche Beweise für das
Vorhandensein des Seebeckens zu erhalten. Schon durch den
Marsch im Bette des Kurruk-darja und die Feststellung, daß dieser
schließlich in einen See mündete, war die Richtigkeit der
chinesischen Karten, sowie der Ansichten v. Richthofens und meiner
eigenen in dieser geographischen Streitfrage bewiesen worden; es
blieb nur noch übrig, ein Profil der Gegend, wo der See sich früher
ausgedehnt hatte, zu erlangen.
Mit eigentlichen Gefahren war diese neue Wüstendurchquerung
nicht verknüpft. Die Entfernung nach dem Kara-koschun, wo wir Wild
und weiter westwärts auch Lopfischer finden sollten, ließ sich in
einer Woche zurücklegen, und selbst wenn der mitgenommene
Wasservorrat sich als unzureichend erwies, würden wir kaum vor
Durst verschmachten können. Die Tagare waren so dicht mit Eis
gefüllt, daß alle Ecken straff gespannt waren; doch wie wir sie auch
vor der Sonne zu schützen suchten, ein paar Eimer vertropften wohl
während des ersten Tagemarsches.
Wir zogen das Bett des Rinnsals von Altimisch-bulak hinunter
nach Ostsüdost. Der Quellbach verschwindet schon etwa 100 Meter
vom Lager unter Sand und Schutt. In einer gleich links liegenden
Rinne, wo auch eine kleine Quelle aufsprudelte, ließ sich gerade, als
wir dort vorbeizogen, eine Schar Enten nieder. Tschernoff schlich
sich mit der Doppelflinte dorthin und erlegte fünf Stück mit einem
Schusse; sie waren recht fett und eine willkommene Verstärkung
unseres mageren Proviants.
Die 30 Kilometer lange Tagereise führte uns vom Fuße des
Gebirges auf die ebene Wüste hinunter, wo Tonformationen drei
verschiedene Stockwerke bilden. Das unterste bilden die
Bodenfläche oder die Rinnen, in denen wir nach Südwesten
hinziehen, das mittlere die gewöhnlichen Jardang von 2 bis 3 Meter
Höhe, welche die Hälfte des ganzen Wüstenareales einnehmen; das
oberste besteht aus mächtigen Tischen, Türmen und Würfeln von
rotem Tone, die sich 15–20 Meter über den Boden erheben und
östlich von unserem Wege am zahlreichsten sind. Sie stehen hier in
langen Reihen und sehen Mauerruinen so täuschend ähnlich, daß
wir sie ein paarmal ganz nahe betrachten mußten, um uns vom
Gegenteil zu überzeugen.
Es ist beachtenswert, daß die Rinnen zwischen den
Jardangrücken in jeder Hinsicht den Bajiren der Tschertschenwüste
entsprechen. Beide eigentümliche Terrainformationen verdanken
ihre Entstehung dem Winde.
Nach Osten hin erscheint keine eigentliche Fortsetzung des
Kurruk-tag, sondern nur ein isolierter Bergstock. Ich hatte allen
Grund, die gewaltige Bergkette, die in dieser Richtung auf unseren
Karten des innersten Asien angegeben ist, schon jetzt als apokryph
zu betrachten.
Die Wüste ist gänzlich unfruchtbar, nicht einmal dürres Holz
kommt vor. Schnecken liegen hier und dort, aber nirgends so
zahlreich wie weiter westlich.
Während des Marsches am 28. veränderte sich das Aussehen
des Seebeckens. Schnecken wurden immer zahlreicher, und toter
Wald trat wieder ziemlich häufig auf. In den Tonablagerungen sind
noch zwei Stockwerke zu unterscheiden. Sie lassen verschiedene
Perioden und den verschiedenen Wasserstand in dem früheren See
erkennen und enthalten auch Schneckenschalen. In dem Maße, wie
der Wind an dem Tone frißt und zehrt, fallen die Schnecken heraus,
und der Boden ist oft ganz weißpunktiert von ihnen. Eine dünne
Sandschicht, selten einen Fuß dick, bedeckt stellenweise den
Boden. Eine kleine eiserne Tasse wurde gefunden, und Scherben
von Tongefäßen sind so häufig, daß wir ihnen gar keine
Aufmerksamkeit mehr schenken. Darüber steht toter Wald in einem
Gürtel, den man deutlich nach beiden Seiten verfolgen kann und der
eine wichtige, lange bestehende Uferlinie des Lop-nor bezeichnet.
So schritten wir zwischen den Tonrücken hin, während das
Wasser in beunruhigender Weise aus den Eistagaren tropfte. Es war
erst 3 Uhr, als Tschernoff und Ördek, die zu Fuß vorausgingen, um
den besten Weg auszusuchen, stehenblieben und uns zu sich riefen.
Sie hatten die Ruinen einiger Häuser gefunden!
Die Rinne, der wir gefolgt waren, hatte uns gerade zu dieser
merkwürdigen Entdeckung hingeführt; wären wir einige hundert
Meter westlicher oder östlicher in die Wüste hineingezogen, so
hätten wir die Ruinen nicht sehen können, um so mehr als sie dem
gewöhnlichen toten Walde so sehr glichen, daß man dicht davor
stehen mußte, um zu erkennen, was es war: menschliche
Wohnungen am Nordufer des Lop-nor!
Natürlich schlugen wir sofort das Lager auf und sahen uns den
Platz erst flüchtig an, um einen allgemeinen Überblick zu gewinnen.
Drei Häuser hatten hier gestanden, aber ihre mächtigen Balken und
Pfosten, ihre Dächer und Bretterwände waren eingestürzt, arg von
der Zeit und den Stürmen mitgenommen und teilweise im Sande
begraben. Die Grundbalken hatten jedoch ihre Lage noch
beibehalten, so daß ich leicht einen Grundriß der Häuser zeichnen
und ihre Maße nehmen konnte.
Ein Umstand, der sogleich ein recht bedeutendes Alter angab,
war, daß die Gebäude auf Tonsockeln (Abb. 83) standen, die 2½
Meter hohe Hügel bildeten, an Areal und Form gleich der unteren
Fläche der Häuser. Ursprünglich waren diese auf ganz ebenem
Boden erbaut gewesen, welcher aber, nachdem er ausgetrocknet,
vom Winde so ausgehöhlt und abgefeilt worden war, daß nur die von
den Häusern geschützten Teile stehenblieben. Scherben von
Tongefäßen und kleine irdene Tassen, wie sie noch heute vor den
Buddhabildern oder an anderen heiligen Orten hingestellt werden,
lagen massenweise umher. Auch einige chinesische Münzen und ein
paar eiserne Äxte wurden gefunden.
Bei dem östlichsten dieser drei Häuser fanden wir beim Graben
verschiedene merkwürdige Holzschnitzereien, die zur Verzierung
seiner Wände gedient hatten. Darunter war das Bild eines Königs
mit einer Krone auf dem Kopfe und einem Dreizacke in der Hand,
sowie ein Mann mit einem Kranze, außerdem allerlei Muster und
Ornamente, Gitter und Lotosblumen, alles kunstfertig geschnitzt,
aber sehr von der Zeit mitgenommen. Von den verschiedenen
Mustern wurden Proben beiseite gelegt, die um jeden Preis
mitgenommen werden mußten.
In Südosten erhob sich ein Tora, das wir besuchen mußten, um
nachzusehen, ob auch dort Entdeckungen zu machen wären. Es war
kuppelförmig und teilweise eingestürzt; wahrscheinlich war es ein
Weg- oder Signalzeichen gewesen (Abb. 84). Drei andere
ebensolche bildeten mit dem ersten dieselbe Figur wie die vier
Hauptsterne im Sternbilde des Löwen; die Entfernungen zwischen
ihnen betrugen 5–7½ Kilometer. Weitere Spuren von alten Häusern
trafen wir nicht. Die Nacht hatte schon ihren dunkeln Schleier über
die Wüste gebreitet, als wir nach dem großen Signalfeuer des
Lagerplatzes zurückkehrten, müde und erschöpft von dreistündiger
Wanderung auf ungünstigem Terrain, denn alle die unzähligen
Jardang mußten unter rechten Winkeln gekreuzt werden.
Indessen hatten wir so durch eine glückliche Fügung die
Fortsetzung des Kömur-salldi-joll gefunden, jenes alten Weges, der
von Korla am Nordufer des Lop-nor entlang nach Sa-tscheo und
Peking führte.
Abdu Rehim sollte uns jetzt verlassen und seine Bezahlung
erhalten. Sein Lohn belief sich auf 1½ Jamba, was allerdings viel
war, aber durch seine vortrefflichen Dienste und die unschätzbaren
Aufklärungen, die er mir gegeben hatte, mehrfach aufgewogen
wurde. Chodai Kullu erhielt den Auftrag, ihn nach Altimisch-bulak
und Singer zu begleiten und sich von dort mit den Holzschnitzereien
auf irgendeine Weise nach Tura-sallgan-ui zu begeben. Er entledigte
sich seines Auftrages wie ein ganzer Mann und erreichte das
Hauptquartier lange vor uns. Als er dort ankam, erzählte er, er habe
in Altimisch-bulak ein Kamel getötet, wurde aber gehörig ausgelacht,
da man dies für erlogen hielt; keiner von uns hatte ihn auch nur
einen Hasen töten sehen. Er hatte jedoch später Gelegenheit, nicht
nur zu beweisen, daß er die Wahrheit gesprochen, sondern auch,
daß er ein sehr guter Schütze war.
Am folgenden Morgen zogen die beiden Männer nach Norden.
Sie sollten versuchen, in einem Tage nach Altimisch-bulak zu
kommen, denn sie erhielten keinen Tropfen aus unserem Vorrat, der
schon so klein war, daß ich leider nicht noch einen Tag an dieser
interessanten Stelle bleiben konnte. Die Karawane war jetzt noch
mehr zusammengeschmolzen. Ich hatte nur Tschernoff, Faisullah
und Ördek, vier Kamele, ein Pferd und zwei Hunde bei mir.
Wir brachen sehr spät auf, denn der halbe Tag ging mit
verschiedenen Nacharbeiten bei den Ruinen hin. Einige Einzelheiten
wurden abgezeichnet, ein paar Ansichten aufgenommen und die
Maße gemessen.
Das kleinere Haus, das, seiner Ausschmückung und dem
Vorkommen der Opfertassen nach zu urteilen, ein Tempel gewesen
war, maß an den Seiten 5,6 und 6,6 Meter.
Das größere Haus hatte in seinem Grundriß die Dimensionen
52,4 × 18 Meter; seine Längsrichtung war Südwest nach Nordost.
Seine Grundbalken waren über den Hügel, an dem der Wind ständig
zehrt, vorgeschoben. Das Haus war in mehrere Zimmer von
verschiedener Größe geteilt gewesen. Wie der Sand das Bauholz
konserviert, sah man leicht daran, daß verschüttete Teile sehr gut
erhalten, die freiliegenden aber übel zugerichtet, porös und oft an
den Enden besenförmig aufgesprungen sind. An viereckigen
Löchern in Balkenrahmen (Abb. 85), in welche vertikale Eckpfosten
hineinpaßten, sah man sogar die Striche des Stiftes, mit dem die
Form der Löcher einst aufgezeichnet worden war. Mehrere solche
Pfosten waren hübsch verziert und so rund gedrechselt, daß sie
einer Menge übereinandergestellter Kugeln und Scheiben glichen.
Einer der äußeren Räume hatte wahrscheinlich als Schafstall
gedient, denn dort lag eine fußdicke Schicht von Schafdung. Dieser
wird von den Chinesen zur Feuerung benutzt, aber in einer so
holzreichen Gegend, wie die Uferwälder des Lop-nor es gewesen
sind, wäre eine solche Sparsamkeit überflüssig gewesen. Alle
Dachteile lagen in je einem Haufen auf der Westseite der Häuser.
Der letzte Oststurm, dem sie nicht länger hatten widerstehen
können, hatte sie dorthin geschleudert. Alles Bauholz war
Pappelholz aus der unmittelbaren Nachbarschaft. Nach der
Bodengestalt zu urteilen, hatten diese beiden Gebäude und ein
drittes, das beinahe zerstört war, auf einer Halbinsel in einem See
oder auf einer Landenge zwischen zwei Seen gelegen. Man hat
allen Grund zu der Vermutung, daß der Verlauf der Uferlinie beim
Lop-nor ebenso unregelmäßig und launenhaft gewesen ist wie beim
Kara-koschun.
Man wird fragen, welchen Zweck diese Häuser erfüllt und was für
Leute sie erbaut und dort gelebt haben. Mein erster Eindruck war,
daß sie eine „Örtäng“ oder größere Poststation auf der Straße nach
Dung-chan (Sa-tscheo) gebildet haben. Eingehenderes darüber
behalte ich mir für ein späteres Kapitel vor.
Während ich und Tschernoff mit Messungen beschäftigt waren,
hatten die beiden anderen Männer von frühmorgens an die
Umgegend abgestreift, ohne noch mehr Entdeckungen zu machen.
Daher wurden die Kamele beladen, und wir zogen nach Südwesten,
in einer durch die Lage der Jardang mit absoluter Notwendigkeit
vorgeschriebenen Richtung; wir mußten den zwischen ihnen vom
Winde ausgemeißelten Furchen sklavisch folgen. Die Schwellen
werden jedoch allmählich niedriger, und unausgebildete Dünen
treten auf. Toter Wald ist sehr häufig, aber er steht in Gehölzen, die
sicher Inseln in dem alten See gewesen sind. Welch ein Unterschied
gegen den Kara-koschun, an dem es jetzt keine einzige Pappel gibt.
Milliarden von Schnecken liegen umher, und die harten, scharfen
Kamisch- und Binsenstoppeln sind nicht gut für die Fußschwielen
der Kamele. Solche Kamischstoppeln werden auch stehenbleiben,
wenn der Kara-koschun einst austrocknet.
Darauf hört der Sand wieder auf; es war nur ein erster Gürtel,
den wir eben gekreuzt hatten. Alles ist tot und öde, erstickt und
verdorrt in dieser Gegend, die früher so reich bewässert und so reich
an üppiger Vegetation war.
Nach einer Wanderung von 20 Kilometer blieben wir in einer
unbedeutenden Bodensenkung, wo ein paar lebende Tamarisken
wuchsen und wir also Hoffnung hatten, an das Grundwasser zu
kommen. Als aber der Brunnen gegraben werden sollte, stellte sich
heraus, daß der Spaten bei den Ruinen vergessen worden war.
Ördek, der sich diese Nachlässigkeit hatte zuschulden kommen
lassen, erbot sich sofort, ihn zu holen.
Ich hatte großes Bedenken, ob ich ihm erlauben sollte, allein
einen so weiten Gang zu machen, noch dazu in einer Jahreszeit, wo
man nie vor Sandstürmen sicher ist; da aber unser Wasservorrat
gering war und der Spaten für uns alle noch von unschätzbarem
Nutzen sein konnte, sagte ich ihm, er solle sich aufmachen und
unseren Spuren folgen. Doch sollte er sich erst durch ein paar
Stunden Schlaf stärken, und ich ermahnte ihn, wenn er uns nicht
wiederfände, nur gerade nach Süden zu gehen, da er dann früher
oder später das Ufer des Kara-koschun erreichen würde. Wir selbst
konnten nicht auf ihn warten, um ihm aber seine Aufgabe zu
erleichtern, gab ich ihm das Pferd. Nach einem tüchtigen
Abendessen ritt er um Mitternacht durch die Wüste nach Norden
zurück.
Was ich gefürchtet hatte, trat schon gegen 2 Uhr morgens ein;
ein halber Sturm aus Nordost weckte mich und hielt den ganzen Tag
mit Sandgestöber und Staubnebel an. Man sah nicht weit vor sich,
und die Spuren konnten nicht lange erhalten bleiben. Ich hoffte
jedoch, daß Ördek bei Beginn des Sturmes so klug gewesen sei,
den Spaten seinem Schicksal zu überlassen und sofort umzukehren.
Uns, die wir nach Südwesten weiterzogen, war der Sturm
willkommen; er schob uns, erleichterte das Gehen und nahm einen
Teil der stechenden Glut der Mittagssonne fort. Die Wüste wurde
jetzt immer öder; sogar der tote Wald hörte fast ganz auf, der Sand
wurde zusammenhängend und nur selten von kleinen Bajiren
unterbrochen, die Dünen waren aber nur noch 5 Meter hoch. Von
ihnen aus sieht man, daß der Sand gegen Westen und Südwesten,
wohin der Wind ihn beständig trägt, immer höher wird. Das tote
Kamisch, an dem wir dann und wann vorüberziehen, ist vom Winde
nach Südwesten niedergeschlagen, als sei es mit einer
Riesenbürste nach dieser Seite niedergebürstet worden.
An einem Punkte, wo wir ein paar Holzstücke fanden, wurde das
Lager Nr. 18 aufgeschlagen. Während wir noch damit beschäftigt
waren, stellte sich der prächtige Ördek wieder ein; er brachte den
Spaten mit und führte das Pferd, das, wie er selbst, von dem 60
Kilometer weiten anstrengenden Ritte auf schlechtem Terrain vor
Müdigkeit beinahe umfiel. Das Allermerkwürdigste aber war die
wichtige Neuigkeit, die Ördek, nachdem er sich eine Weile ausgeruht
hatte, zu erzählen wußte.
Er hatte sich während des Sturmes verirrt, unsere Spuren
verloren und einen Tora erreicht, in dessen Nähe er die Ruinen
mehrerer reich mit geschnitzten Planken verzierter Häuser gefunden
hatte (Abb. 86, 87). Dort hatten auch irdene Tassen, Spieße, Beile,
Metallstücke, Münzen und dergleichen gelegen, von denen er
einiges mitgenommen hatte und uns nun zeigte. Er hatte auch zwei
geschnitzte Planken mitgenommen, und zwar die besten der
vorhandenen, und dann das Suchen nach der ersten Ruinenstelle
fortgesetzt, die zu finden ihm schließlich auch gelungen war.
Vergebens hatte er die Bretter auf das Pferd zu binden versucht;
dieses scheute so davor, daß er sie schließlich selbst hatte tragen
müssen. Seine Schultern waren noch blutig von den Stricken. Als er
unser Lager Nr. 17 erreicht hatte, versuchte er wieder, seine Last
dem Pferde aufzubürden, dieses riß sich aber los und ging durch.
Nach vielen Bemühungen gelang es ihm, das Pferd wieder
einzufangen; er war aber so müde, daß er die Bretter liegen ließ und
uns aufsuchte.
Daß diese Nachricht das Programm für das nächste Jahr
umgestalten würde, war mir sofort klar. Zunächst wurde der arme
Ördek beauftragt, den zurückgelassenen Fund am nächsten Morgen
zu holen, welcher Auftrag schon ausgeführt war, bevor wir
aufbrachen. Die Planken waren sehr gut erhalten und mit
geschnitzten Blumen und Girlanden verziert. Ich hatte jetzt sehr
große Lust zum Umkehren, was jedoch eine Torheit gewesen wäre,
da unser Wasservorrat nur noch für ein paar Tage reichte und die
warme Jahreszeit mit großen Schritten nahte.
105. Sandsturm auf dem Beglik-köll. (S. 263.)
106. Die Fähre sitzt auf dem Tuwadaku-köll im Schilfe fest. (S. 261.)
107. Frauen und Kinder in Tscheggelik-ui. (S. 273.)

108. Stall in Tscheggelik-ui. (S. 273.)
Nein, der ganze Reiseplan mußte geändert werden. Nach den

Ruinen mußte ich zurückkehren, koste es was es wolle, aber den
Sommer über wollten wir nach Tibet gehen und uns im Winter dann
wieder nach dem Lop-nor begeben. Würden wir die Stelle in dieser
ebenen Wüste, wo das Auge vergebens nach einem einzigen
Anhaltspunkte sucht, auch wiederfinden? Ich zweifelte nicht daran,
denn ich vertraute fest auf meine Ortsbestimmungen. Wenn ich es
nur übernähme, den Weg nach Altimisch-bulak zu zeigen, so würde
Ördek, wie er fest behauptete, die von ihm so glücklich entdeckten
Ruinen ganz bestimmt wiederfinden. Schon jetzt sehnte ich mich
dorthin zurück, mußte mich aber noch acht Monate gedulden. Ich
segnete den Spaten, der vergessen worden war und dadurch
Veranlassung zu dieser großartigen Entdeckung gegeben hatte.
31. März. Die Temperatur ist nachts noch unter 0 Grad, bei Tage
aber steigt sie bedeutend. Der Sturm hatte aufgehört, und die Luft
war klar, der Himmel prunkte in der reinsten türkisblauen Farbe, die
grell gegen die trostlos graugelbe Wüste absticht. Der tote Wald hat
aufgehört; Bruchstücke, die sein ehemaliges Vorhandensein ahnen
lassen, kommen nicht mehr vor; wir haben das Vegetationsgebiet
des Lop-nor hinter uns gelassen. Ich gehe zu Fuß voraus und
gewinne dadurch Zeit; denn mein Vorsprung übt eine gewisse
Zugkraft auf die Karawane aus, und außerdem trage ich als Führer
die Verantwortung. Wir pflegten den Marsch barfuß anzutreten, aber
die Füße sind auf dem erhitzten Boden bald wie verbrannt, und man
muß wieder Schuhe anziehen. Abkühlung spürt man nur, wenn man
als letzter im Zuge in die Spuren der Kamele tritt, die den
nachtkalten Sand aufgewühlt haben.
Die Lopwüste ist öder als die Tschertschenwüste, denn dort
fanden wir wenigstens Weide und Brunnenwasser; hier hätte das
Graben nirgends Erfolg gehabt. Bei einer toten Tamariske lagerten
wir. Die Kamele sind müde und matt, denn seit fünf Tagen haben sie
nicht getrunken; am Morgen des 1. April aber erhielten sie jeder
einen Eimer Wasser, worauf der Vorrat nur noch einen Tag reichte.
Auch den letzten Kamischsack durften sie leer fressen. Wir mußten
nach dem Kara-koschun eilen, wohin es noch 60 oder 70 Kilometer
sein mußten. Wie gewöhnlich brach ich früher auf und ging direkt
nach Süden. Wüste Dünen auf allen Seiten, dieselbe trostlose
Wüstenperspektive, die ich schon so oft gesehen hatte.
So erreichte ich eine hohe Düne, auf der ich mich ermüdet
niedersetzte und den Horizont mit dem Fernglase absuchte. Lauter
Sandrücken. Doch was war dies! Im Südosten breiteten sich
zwischen Dünen und Jardangterrassen große Wasserflächen aus.
Wasser in dieser Wüste! Ich traute kaum meinen Augen; es mußte
eine Luftspiegelung sein!
Jetzt mußte ich mich sputen und eilte sofort dorthin. Nein, es war
richtig ein See mit den bizarrsten Einschnitten, Buchten, Inseln,
Holmen und Sunden, dem tollsten Gewirre von Wasserflächen, wie
sie nur auf ebenem Terrain zwischen Dünen und vom Winde
ausgearbeiteten Terrassen entstehen können. Außer ein paar jungen
Tamariskensprossen auf dem weichen sumpfigen Uferrande und
etwa 20 Kamischstengeln war die Gegend jedoch ebenso
unfruchtbar wie bisher.
Ich ging an dem gebuchteten Ufer entlang nach Südwesten. Der
See verengerte sich manchmal bedeutend, erweiterte sich aber bald
wieder zu größeren Flächen. Das Wasser hatte einen leichten Anflug
von Salz, wurde aber von allen Tieren gern getrunken. Darauf
wandte sich unser Ufer nach Norden, und wir mußten ihm dorthin
folgen, denn eine Furt fanden wir nicht, und die Kamele wären im
Schlamme versunken.
Der See streckte seine schmalen Buchten wie Finger nach
Nordosten aus, die uns ärgerliche Umwege verursachten. Der
Boden ist feucht und schwankt unter den ängstlichen Kamelen; er
geht auf und nieder, als sei eine Gummihaut über ein verborgenes
Wasser gespannt, und man hat das Gefühl, als bedürfe es nur eines
Loches darin, um die Karawane in den Fluten verschwinden zu
lassen.
Das Land ist gänzlich unfruchtbar. Der See zeigt einen
auffallenden Parallelismus mit Bajirmulden und Jardangterrassen,
mit Dünen, Dünentälern und Windfurchen; alles zieht sich von
Nordosten nach Südwesten, und ziemlich oft sieht man die
Jardangrücken unter dem Wasser.
Daß dies nicht der Anfang des Kara-koschun sein konnte, schien
mir keinem Zweifel zu unterliegen, denn sonst hätte es hier Kamisch
im Überflusse gegeben. Doch woher kommt dann dieses Wasser?
Sein geringer Salzgehalt zeigte, daß es ziemlich neu war. Wäre es
alt, so sähe man hier schon junges aufkeimendes Kamisch, das sich
so unglaublich schnell mit dem Wasser verbreitet. Ich vermutete,
daß der See von dem neugebildeten Arme von Schirge-tschappgan
herrührte.
So merkwürdig diese Entdeckung auch war, indem sie mich der
Lösung der verwickelten Lop-nor-Frage einen Schritt näher führte,
so hatten wir doch unter den gegenwärtigen Umständen wenig
Nutzen davon; wir bedurften jetzt vor allem der Weide für die Tiere
und der Lebensmittel für uns selbst, denn wir hatten nur noch Reis
und Tee, und bei so kärglicher Kost konnten wir nicht anders als
hungrig sein. Statt die Schritte rasch südwärts nach dem Kara-
koschun zu lenken, hatten wir uns von diesem unfruchtbaren See
aufhalten lassen — ein richtiger Aprilscherz!
Da der See sich immer weiter nach Westen hinzog, beschloß ich
Halt zu machen, um zu sehen, ob sich keine Furt würde entdecken
lassen. Wir standen augenscheinlich an einem ganz neuen
Wasserarme des Tarim und mußten hinüber. Eine Strömung war

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Global Crisis: Theory, Method and the

Covid-19 Pandemic Nadine Klopf

Communicating Science in Times of Crisis: COVID-19

Global Health, Humanity and the COVID-19 Pandemic:

Migrants and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Communication,

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic and

Bookshelves in the Age of the COVID-19 Pandemic Corinna

Pandemic Ethics: From COVID-19 to Disease X Julian

COVID-19 Pandemic: Lessons from the Frontline 1st

Pandemic Pedagogy: Teaching International Relations

ISSN 2946-5559 ISSN 2946-5567 (electronic)

Cover illustration: © Dennis Cox/Alamy Stock Photo

I am indebted to Dirk Nabers for his continuous support throughout

Kiel Nadine Klopf

It seems as if our world is shaped by crises that unravel habitual patterns

must be understood as a constitutive structural feature of society, without,

transnational, national, and regional relations. The global character of

Structure of the Book

Lastly, the existence of temporary crises, which prominently shape

1 From Crisis Decision-Making to Discourse Theory 1

5 The Ephemeral Dimension of Dislocation 107

Fig. 7.1 Covid-19 in U.S. governmental statements,

Table 2.1 Hjelmslev’s sign model 32

From Crisis Decision-Making to Discourse

1.1 Crisis Decision-Making

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

stimulating events, directly provoking certain decision-making responses.

decision-making. Whereas he already tentatively questions the dimen-

Thus, departing from Hermann’s account of events towards what

In proposing a two-dimensional definition of interstate crises, Brecher

1.1.1 Summary and Critique

by decision-makers instead of merely being recognized in their inter-

(1) Discursive construction of ephemeral crises. Relying on construc-

(2) Permanence of structural crisis. These constructions merely present

that crises are always constructed in relation to a particular state iden-

In contrast to decision-making approaches, Weldes’ analysis of the

radical uncertainty as to what actors’ interest are, “then how is it that

sophisticated approaches to constructivist crisis theory. He defines crisis as

the identification of failure as crisis remains a matter of social construction.

1.2.1 Summary and Critique

(1) Discursive construction of ephemeral crises. A discourse theoretical

becomes particularly important when it, too, hints at a struc-

It is at this point that crisis can no longer solely be treated as a tempo-

and, at the same time, through ephemeral constructions is not mutu-

1.3 Critical Realism

tendencies and counter-tendencies tips in favour of crisis” (Jessop and

1.3.1 Summary and Critique

(1) Discursive construction of ephemeral crises. While it is certainly

crisis remains located at a given point in time, even if pre-

1.4 Discourse Theory

the Laclauian notion of dislocation into crisis theorizing, he renders it

1.4.1 Summary and Critique

(1) Multidimensionality of crisis. Dislocation cannot just be delineated

(2) Relationality of crisis. Nabers remains particularly concerned with

Nabers, nevertheless, offers an intriguing perspective on crisis as dislo-

impossibility to achieve stability. It thus becomes equivalent with a

Brecher, Michael. 1979. “State Behavior in International Crisis: A Model.”

Hermann, Charles F. 1988a. “Crisis Stability in Soviet-American Strategic Rela-

102. Malenki und Maltschik. (S. 254.)

104. Gewaltige Sanddünen am rechten Tarimufer. (S. 258.)

U nsere Zelte wurden zwischen Tamarisken und Schilf unmittelbar

107. Frauen und Kinder in Tscheggelik-ui. (S. 273.)

Nein, der ganze Reiseplan mußte geändert werden. Nach den