Middle East Institute.

This article is for personal research only and may not be copied or distributed in any form without the permission of The Middle East Journal.

Irans 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue

Fariborz Mokhtari
Fifty-five years ago a coup dtat ended Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddeqs government in Iran on August 19, 1953. Numerous books and articles have analyzed the event but often have overlooked Irans domestic dynamics. What is presented is nearly always a conspiracy theory that suggests American and British masters of intrigue subverted Iran entirely through their shady operators. The picture portrays Iranians as little more than inanimate objects a nation of potted plants. Even now over half a century later, and three decades after the fall of Irans monarchy, misperceptions persist. A review of the coup and what precipitated it may offer some needed clarity.

Irans history during and after World War Two is rich with myths, disinformation,
misinformation, and unexpected policy consequences. One myth, that a popular, democratic government in full bloom was aborted by a US/UK coup in 1953, has been particularly persistent. The emotional and material devastation that foreign military occupation (1941-46) had caused made Irans political climate unstable. That history, real enough, became fertile grounds for mythmaking, while viewing Iranians as mere observers of the events that affected them. Russo-British meddling in the countrys affairs in the 19th century, Russian instigations to set up Soviet Republics in Iran in the 1940s, and subversive activities by the Iranian Tudeh Communist Party in the 1950s, had politicized the population and created discord, suspicion, and confrontation among societal factions. The Tudeh had organized much of the industrial labor and influenced the youth, the intellectuals, and the students, with aspirations of building a classless society under its tutelage. The upper middle class, the professionals, businessmen, and nationalists had joined a number of political parties in a loose parliamentary coalition called the National Front held together by a yearning for national independence that reached back to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq, a seasoned Member of Parliament, eloquently expressed the National Fronts longing for genuine sovereignty.1 Muslim clerics, particularly the activists lead by Ayatollah AbolQasem Kashani, influenced the traditional merchants, shopkeepers, lower middle class,
Professor Mokhtari teaches at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Opinions expressed in this article are the authors own and do not reflect the official policy or position of National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US government. The author is indebted to Dr. William J. Olson for reviewing the article and offering much appreciated comments.

1. The 1953 coup in Iran has been the subject of numerous opinions and interpretations, frequently favoring one side or the other in the conflict. This essay attempts to present the sequence of events as they occurred and were reported daily in the Iranian news media, and to leave the interpretation to readers themselves. The daily reports are cross-referenced with the journal of daily news reports compiled by Dr. Baqer Aqeli in Roozshomaar-e Trikh-e Iran az Mashrooteh ta Enqelaab-e Eslaami 1906-1979 [Chronology of Iran: 1906-1979], Vol. 1 and 2, first edition (Tehran: Goftar Publishing Co., 1990).
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL M VOLUME 62, NO. 3, SUMMER 2008 DOI: 10.3751.62.3.15

458 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Cast of CharaCters
Due to the large number of persons referred to in this article, the following Whos Who may be of use to readers.
Dean Acheson (1893-1971): US Secretary of State, 1949-1953. Hossein Ala (1882-1964): Prime Minister, March 12-April 30, 1951, immediately preceding Mossadeq. Princess Ashraf: Twin sister of Muhammad Reza Shah Ibrahim Hakimi (1869-1959): Prime Minister three times: May-June 1945; October 1945-January 1946; and December 1947-June 1948. Abdol-Hossein Hazhir (1899-1949): Prime Minister in 1948; served as cabinet minister numerous times, assassinated by Fadaiyan-e Islam in 1949. Loy Wesley Henderson (1892-1986): US diplomat who served as Minister to Iraq (1943-1945), Ambassador to India (1948-1951), and Ambassador to Iran (1951-1954). Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashani (1885-1961): Powerful Shia Ayatollah, known for anti-British and anti-communist stances. Nationalist. Founder of the Warriors of Islam in the Majlis. Ahmad Kasravi (1890-1946): writer and secular reformer, critic of the clergy, assassinated in 1946 by the Fadaiyan-e Islam. George Middleton: British Charg dAffaires. Abdollah Moazzemi: Speaker of the Majlis. Muhammad Mosaddeq (1882-1967): Leader of the National Front; Iranian Prime Minister 1951-1953. Ahmad Qavam (1876-1955): Prime Minister of Iran five times, in 1922, 1942, 1946-1948, and 1952. During his 1946-1948 term, he crafted the oil concession agreement with the Soviet Union that the Majlis rejected after Soviet occupation forces had left Iran. He replaced Mosaddeq in July 16, 1952, but was removed five days later on July 21 for Mosaddeq to return to office. Muhammad Reza Shah (1919-1980): Son of Reza Shah; ruled 1941-1979. Briefly fled the country in 1953; deposed 1979. Major General Haj-Ali Razmara (1901-1951): Appointed Prime Minister by the Shah in June 1950; assassinated March 7, 1951. Reza Shah (1878-1944): Shah of Iran from December 1925 to September 1941. Kermit Roosevelt (1916-2000): Grandson of Theodore Roosevelt. Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, CIA; organized the coup against Mosaddeq. Navab Safavi (1924-1955): Leader of the Fadaiyane Islam. Executed 1955. Khalil Tahmasebi: Assassin of Razmara. Member of the Fadaiyan-e Islam. Major General Fazlollah Zahedi (1897-1963): Iranian general who held several military and police commands and served as Interior Minister in Mossadeqs Cabinet. Apppointed Prime Minister Mosaddeq in August 1953 to replace Mossadeq, with British and American support. Served as Prime Minister 1953-1955.

Movements
Fadaiyan-e Islam: Sacrificers of Islam, an Islamist movement established in 1946 by Navab Safavi to fight secular trends. National Front: Mossadeqs movement; a reformist, nationalist party. Tudeh (Masses) Party: Soviet-backed Iranian Communist Party.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 459

and many others offended by the foreign domination of the nation. The armed forces in general, and the senior officer corps in particular, had maintained their admiration for the late King, Reza Shah a fierce nationalist and were loyal to the Crown. The upper classes, industrialists, and landowners supported the monarch, but vacillated back and forth between the National Front and the clerics. The constant jockeying for power and political dominance had poisoned the air, turning legitimate political disagreements into bitter personal attacks and lasting animosities. Iranian tribes, whose local exercise of power was traditionally inversely related to the strength of the central government, were rumbling. The uproar in Irans Parliament mirrored the greater chaos in the country. Political tension coupled with economic anxiety had afflicted the nation with fears of renewed foreign imperialist intentions. Yet the unfolding of the Cold War that had begun to change the international environment quickly drew Iran into global rivalries and politics that validated Iranians fears but took little heed of the countrys internal realities. Nevertheless, Iranians were far from mere bystanders in the events of 1953. Those events had their origins in circumstances brought to Iran in WWII, but also in a subterranean political disagreement that had plagued Iran for at least two centuries. The constitutionalist movement of 1906 brought together two groups with essentially different beliefs: nationalist modernists and religious traditionalists, both of whom had concluded that the Qajar dynasty had become an instrument for Irans foreign domination. Reza Shahs rule may have satisfied the nationalists, some of whom had clerical roots, but it alarmed the traditionalists.2 Dismantling Reza Shahs government, coupled with the economic and political consequences of WWII, made the fault-line between modernists and traditionalists noticeable again. Despite attempts at cooperation, the two groups did not wish a strong monarchy resembling Reza Shahs strong-man rule of 1925-1941. The result was a three-way divide, with some nationalist modernists and some religious traditionalists suspicious of the crown. The division is illustrated in Ahmad Kasravis critical essays on democracy and Islam and Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashanis Pan-Islamist ideology.3 By 1953, the fault-line had become a dividing gulf,
2. Reza Shahs regime asserted nationalism rather than religion, and citizenship rather than religious allegiance, as means of national identity. Many ardent supporters of Reza Shahs nationalist government were prominent Qajar figures and learned intellectuals with a clerical background. Sayyed Hassan Taqizadeh, Kazemzadeh Iranshahr, Ali Akbar Siasi, and Mostafa Adl all had clerical backgrounds. 3. Kasravi wrote: Love of freedom and hard work have disappeared from the fundamentals of Islam. The situation in Shia Iran is even worse. We, as Shias, do not serve our country, do not pay taxes, refrain from military service. We have sacrificed the essence of our religion to strengthen only its worldly symbols. Instead of creating a democratic state, our mullas encourage the people to pray to a super-national authority. Instead of participating in building a national economy, they urge the populace to make unnecessary pilgrimages to the Shia shrines. And worst of all, they preach an anti-democratic political theory, claiming that power and sovereignty belong to the Imam and not to the people. Kashani added several principles of his own to those produced by the Muslim League of Pakistan. Chief among them are: Political unification of all Muslim states in a confederation; cooperation among Muslim governments to assist in the liberation of Muslim countries under colonial rule; recognition of Arabic as the language of communication by member states; establishment of direct air, naval, and postal links among Muslim states; expanded economic, cultural and social relations; unification of all Muslim foreign policies; and neutrality between the East and the West, with no commitment to either camp. See Mohammad Hassan Faghfoory, The Role of the Ulama in Twentieth [Continued on next page]

460 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

realistically understood only in the context of the time.

OCCUPATION
British forces occupied Iran in concert with the Soviet Red Army on August 25, 1941 disregarding Irans declared neutrality in WWII and almost immediately arrested some 250 Iranians suspected of harboring anti-British and pro-German sentiments. Major General Fazlollah Zahedi and Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashani were among them.4 The invaders used the label pro-German liberally to arrest nationalist officers and civilians who aspired to rid their country of foreign domination.5 They arrested Major General Zahedi who commanded the Isfahan Garrison in 1941 and shipped him to Palestine as a prisoner. The British alleged that he headed a nationalist organization that with a German agent, Franz Mayr, had planned military operations against British forces.6 Zahedi had played an instrumental role in a military campaign to abort the secession of Irans oil-rich Khuzestan Province on the Persian Gulf in 1924. He had led 15,000 soldiers to Khuzestan against Shaykh Khazal, whom the British government had granted the GCIE decoration (Knight Grand Commander of the Indian Empire), British protection, and shares in the Anglo Persian Oil Company (later
[Continued from previous page] Century Iran, with particular reference to Ayatollah Haj Sayyed Abol-Qasim Kashani (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1978), pp. 87-88, 147. 4. Abol-Qasem Kashani was born in Tehran in 1882 and after making the Haj to Mecca with his father, moved to Karbala and Najaf to study Arabic and theology. His father Mostafa, born in Kashan in 1844, moved to Iraq at a young age to study theology in the centers of Shia learning in Najaf and Kazemain. With the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and British control over Iraq and much of Arab (Muslim) territories, the senior Kashanis actively opposed British influence in Iraq. In time, Abol-Qasem too gained a reputation for his knowledge of Islamic law, Arabic language, and poetry, and his anti-British sentiments. Both father and son were deeply involved in the Kut al-Amarah crisis in which it took British forces 140 days and 1,025 dead to subdue the town on April 29, 1916. The senior Kashani was killed, but the son managed to flee to continue anti-British activities among the tribes of the lower Euphrates. The Balfour Declaration and its implications for Palestinian Muslims added to the regions anti-British sentiments. He returned to Iran after residing with tribes along the Iran-Iraq border for a time when he was about 35 years old, perhaps in 1917-1919. His grandfather, Hossein Kashani, was known as a religious teacher in Kazemain in the 19th century. 5. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 255; Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 43. The arrests were undoubtedly influenced by the concerns of the war, German invasion of the Soviet Union, and clandestine operations to gain or deny control of petroleum resources in the Caucasus and the Persian Gulf, but settling old scores also may have been a factor. 6. The organizations name was stated as Nehzat-e Melliyoun-e Iran (Nationalist Movement of Iran). The arrest is widely reported to have occurred on a city street. Zahedis family and the local police report claim that John Gulet, the British Consul in Isfahan, had informed General Zahedi that a British general passing through the city wished to pay him a visit at his home. A general and a major arrived at the house in the afternoon and were ushered into the reception room. As Zahedi walked in to greet his visitors, the major pulled his sidearm and told Zahedi they had to go to the consulate immediately. Two truckloads of British soldiers had in the meantime appeared in front of the home. Zahedi was driven to an airfield and flown to Palestine. The major then returned to Zahedis home to search for documents. See Isfahan Police Report to Iranian Prime Ministers Office, Ahmad Ahrar, ed., Memoirs of Ardeshir Zahedi, Vol. 1 (Bethesda, MD: Ibex Publishers, 2006), pp. 53-56.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 461

renamed Anglo-Iranian) in 1917. Sir Shaykh Khazal surrendered and Zahedi was appointed governor-general of the province by the central government in short order.7 Major Fitzroy Maclean, who arrested Zahedi in 1941, proudly claimed that:
He was a really bad lot: a bitter enemy of the Allies, a man of unpleasant personal habits he found himself looking down the barrel of my Colt automatic Without further ado, I invited the General to put his hands up and informed him that I had instructions to arrest him and that if he made any noise or attempt at resistance, he would be shot.8

Kashanis earlier anti-British activities in British-controlled Iraq had earned him a death sentence there in absentia as far back as 1919. He subsequently had fled to Iran and abstained from politics during Reza Shahs monarchy. The British forces that occupied Iran arrested Kashani in Shemiran, north of Tehran, on June 18, 1941.9 He readily admitted at his trial of having had contacts with German agents in Iran, pro-Axis Prime Minister Rashid-Ali al-Gailani of Iraq, and Hajj Amin al-Hussayni of Palestine. His overwhelming sentiment judged by his background reflected his objection to British imperialism a lot more than his admiration for Germany. British occupiers promptly exiled him first to Araak, a town in western Iran, then to Rasht on the Caspian Sea, where he remained confined without visitation by even his family members until 1945.10 In the decade before WWII, clerical influence in Iran, in part because of vigorous state action, had significantly subsided. The influence re-emerged as the Allied forces dismantled Reza Shah Pahlavis government, and burgeoned as the occupiers left the country in 1946. Chief among the activist clerics was Ayatollah Kashani, whose wellknown anti-British and anti-communist credentials enhanced both his popularity and political influence. Each political party or movement had its own footsoldiers that it

7. Cyrus Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 344. 8. Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949), pp. 271-77, as quoted in William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 776. Moir Ezri, Israels envoy to Iran from 1958-1974 refers to the arrest of the Iranian officers and dignitaries, their numbers, and the treatment they received in his memoirs. See Moir Ezri, Yadnameh [Memoir], Vol. I (Jerusalem: Self-published, 2000), p. 50. Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 13. 9. Khordad 28, 1320 of the Iranian Hejira solar calendar. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 260. Kashani was arrested in Golaab-Darreh of Shemiran, where he had sought refuge. The Iranian calendars 12 months and four seasons begin on the first day of spring (Norouz), often on March 20 or 21. Constituting spring are the months Farvardin, Ordibehesht, and Khordad. Summer follows with Tir, Mordad, and Shahrivar. Autumn brings Mehr, Aban, and Azar, followed by the winter months of Day, Bahman, and Esfand. 10. Abol-Qasems teachers in Najaf, Muhammad-Kazem Khorasani, Mirza Hassan Khalili-Tehrani, and Mirza Khalil Kamarehi instilled in him revolutionary activism. Abol-Qasem achieved the rank of Ejtehad at the age of 25, in 1907, and began advocating pan-Islamic ideas. His anti-British pro-German anti-imperialist sentiments may be traced back to Britains expanding influence in Iran and Mesopotamia on the one hand, and the German challenge to British imperialism on the other. The British denied his familys repeated requests to visit Kashani while in exile. See Faghfoory, The Role of the Ulama, pp. 115-124, 205-208. The British had reportedly acquired a list of names of pro-German Iranians.

462 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

called upon for street demonstrations. The Tudehs were better organized if not more numerous than the rest. The Fadaiyan-e Islam (Devotees of Islam), headed by the cleric Sayyed Mojtaba Mir-Louhi, a.k.a. Navab-Safavi, served as local activists and enforcers under Ayatollah Kashanis general guidance.11 Their alliance began upon Kashanis return from British exile to Tehran in 1945. Fadaiyan leader Navab Safavi, after a lengthy visit to Kashani, declared that I am prepared to stand by you and assist you in your holy struggle against British Imperialism.12 Kashanis first post-WWII foray in politics was to oppose Prime Minister Ibrahim Hakimis government over a press bill introduced to the Majlis by Minister of Education Dr. Abdol Majid Zangeneh in January 1945. The bill called for governmental authority to ban a journal if it denigrated the principles of Islam, insulted the institution of monarchy, or caused public unrest. The press opposed the bill and Kashani positioned himself at the forefront of the opposition to condemn the government for having sponsored the legislation. Ironically, Ahmad Kasravi, a noted journalist and publisher was assassinated in Tehran on March 11, 1946 for criticizing the Muslim clergy. Fadaiyan-e Islam acquired notoriety after murdering Kasravi and his assistant in a court of law at the Ministry of Justice.13 As protests escalated into public unrest, Hakimis government collapsed on June 6. Hakimi had been Irans seventh Prime Minister since the countrys invasion in August 1941. All governments since the invasion faced relentless opposition. Ten other administrations would follow Hakimis government before Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq would form his on March 12, 1951. Irans governments lasted on average a mere seven months in the decade of 1941-1951. Political leaders and elected members of Parliament were more likely to obstruct rather than help a Prime Ministers government. Forcing governments to fall was in this period more frequent than enabling them to weather the crises Iran faced. Kashani, having opposed Hakimis government, opposed the next one headed by Ahmad Qavam over establishing a Senate, as prescribed in the Constitution. As the controversy continued, security agents arrested Kashani on July 17, 1946 for having instigated a bloody confrontation in Semnan, a town to Tehrans east. The incident
11. Navab Safavi (1923-1956) was born to a poor family in Tehran, lost his father when he was in eighth grade at a German vocational school, dropped out to seek employment to support his family, and found a job with AIOC, but the inferior status of native employees so affected him that he quit. He left Iran for Iraq, where he was deeply politicized. The Fadaiyan grew from a small gathering in the poor areas of southern Tehran to a powerful political movement that at its peak claimed 7,000 members. The group targeted the countrys ruling elite and secular reformists whom they viewed as supported by the West, and thus irreligious traitors to Islam. Fadaiyan appealed to the lower classes, bazaar merchants, and the religious lower and middle classes. See Faghfoory, The Role of the Ulama, pp. 167-170, 183. 12. The Fadaiyan sought protection through Kashanis governmental power and influence after his election to Parliament. Kashani in turn assumed the role of mentor for the Fadaiyan. Kashanis mentoring brought the Fadaiyan into an alliance at least for a time not only with Kashanis supporters, but with Mosaddeq, the National Front, and even the communists. The assassination of Hassan al-Banna of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) of Egypt in 1949, and Israels independence in 1948, strengthened the alliance. Faghfoory, The Role of the Ulama, p. 189. 13. Esfand 20, 1324. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 276. Kasravi was also a scholar, historian, attorney, and critic of the Shia clerics. His criticism was particularly poignant for he had a clerical background, a theological education, and a comfortable command of both Arabic and Persian. Kasravi engaged the clerics in debate, criticized them in essays, and countered their theological rhetoric with well-founded Quranic interpretations.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 463

involved communist sympathizers whom Kashani opposed, and their opponents that he supported. Ayatollah Kashani was exiled to Qazvin, west of Tehran, but was subsequently elected to Parliament from Tehran. He returned to Tehran triumphantly and formed a parliamentary faction named Mojahedin-e Islam (Warriors of Islam) under the nominal leadership of his protg, Shams Qanatabady.14 Crises and confrontations energized ambitious political leaders who found political instability fertile ground for prescribing simplistic solutions to gain public support. Institutionally weak political parties resembled movements around, and dependent on, single personalities vying for political prominence. The resulting competition among numerous parliamentary factions manifested itself in frequent changes of government rather than in producing a permanent ruling coalition. Government policies were often reactive, preoccupied with new crises day by day, and annual budget appropriations often voted on for a month at a time.15 Forming a new government required four phases: nomination of a candidate by a simple majority of the lower House (the Majlis); royal appointment of the nominee as Prime Minister; introduction of the Prime Ministers cabinet to the House and the Senate where the Prime Minister would present the new governments plans and priorities; and finally confirmation of the new government by a parliamentary vote of confidence. Majlis representatives were all elected by popular vote, but of the 60 senators 30 were elected by voters and 30 appointed by the Crown.16 Weak parliamentary support and shifting alliances resulted in weak governments susceptible to downfall whenever they were faced with a crisis. World War II and occupation disrupted international commerce, reduced government revenue, caused inflation, and strained the nations capacity to feed the occupiers as well as itself, but most of all undermined the authority of the central government. Psychologically, the occupation deeply affronted the Iranians sense of independence, which they had regained in 1921 after years of Russo-British meddling through much of the 19th century.17 On June 13, 1948, Kashani organized a demonstration in Tehran at Baharestan Plaza facing the Parliament Gate to oppose Abdol-Hossein Hazhirs nomination by a parliamentary majority to form a government.18 Hazhir was said to be a champion of Westernization and a friend of Britain. He was accused of having initiated negotiation with AIOC or having the intention to do so. He also allegedly enjoyed the support of the Crown and Princess Ashraf, the Shahs twin sister. Fears that a Parliament dominated by the Crown would reduce clerical influence as had happened under Reza Shahs rule incensed activist clerics. Responding to the Parliament Speaker SardarFakher Hekmat who had suggested to reporters that the Ayatollah ought to convince
14. Faghfoory, The Role of the Ulama, pp. 210, 211. 15. The countrys economic uncertainty resulted in passing the government budget in one-twelfth increments, at times just before government employees salaries were to be paid. 16. The Senate, called for in the 1906 Constitution, was not convened until 1950. Of the 60 senators, 30 were appointed by the Crown (15 from Tehran and 15 from the provinces) and 30 elected (15 from Tehran and 15 from the provinces). 17. From Brigadier Reza Khans ascendance to power in 1921, the government asserted national sovereignty and countered foreign meddling in Iran, until the country was invaded in August 1941. 18. Mohammad Saed Maraghei and Baqer Aqeli, eds., Khaterat-e Siasi [Political Recollections] (Tehran: Namak Publishing, 1994), p. 240. Saed recalls that of the 120 Members of Parliament present at a closed session, 66 had voted in support of Hazhirs nomination.

464 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

the Majlis Deputies rather than cause commotion, Kashani openly opposed Hazhir with a blistering declaration on June 15, in which he attacked the representatives who had voted for him. Two days later, thousands of demonstrators, led by Fadaiyan leader Navab Safavi, responded to Kashanis declaration. Holding copies of the Quran on their heads, they demonstrated at Baharestan Plaza, denouncing Hazhir and his parliamentary supporters.19 The event ended in violence in which numerous demonstrators and security guards were injured. Despite Kashanis opposition, Hazhir sought a parliamentary vote of confidence and received it on June 29, 1948.20 He repeated his request once more on August 23, and received another vote of confidence with a greater margin.21 Yet, daily demonstrations paralyzed his government, forcing him and his cabinet to resign on November 6, 1948, irrespective of his overwhelming support in both Houses of Parliament.22 The next parliamentary elections in autumn 1949 were hotly contested but Kashanis supporters were not elected. The National Front, the Tudeh Party, and the Fadaiyan joined Kashanis supporters to successfully press the Shah to dismiss the election results and call for new elections. Then on February 4, 1949, the young King Muhammad Reza Pahlavi survived an assassination attempt at Tehran Universitys College of Law while attending a scheduled annual celebration. The assailant, Nasser Mirfakhraii, appeared to have been a member of the Tudeh Party and a photojournalist for Parcham-e Islam (Banner of Islam), a paper closely associated with Fadaiyan-e Islam.23 He fired a handgun at the Shah five times before a security guards return fire killed him. The Shah sustained minor injuries and reacted by asking the government to convene a constitutional convention. The convention was to amend the Constitution to enhance the monarchs powers, ostensibly to break continuous parliamentary logjams. The government reacted to the assassination attempt by outlawing the Tudeh Party and the Fadaiyan organization. Two days after the attempt on the Kings life, Ayatollah Kashani, who had condemned the government for Fadaiyans suppression was himself arrested and exiled first to Khorram-Abad in east-central Iran, and then to Lebanon.24 Although his political activities continued, Kashani bitterly blamed the Army Chief of Staff Major General Haj-Ali Razmara for his arrest and exile. The next month, in March 1949, Iran elevated its informal relations with Israel
19. The gesture, holding the Quran on the head, rather than waiving it over the head, has an emotional significance implying ones willingness to offer his head (thus life) in defense of Gods words. 20. Tir 8, 1327. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 297. Of the 96 members present, 88 voted for him. 21. Sharivar 1, 1327. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 298. This time 93 deputies voted for him. 22. Aban 15, 1327. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 298. 23. Bahman 15, 1327. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 299. In an emergency cabinet meeting the government declared the Tudeh Party illegal and ordered all its offices and clubs seized immediately throughout the country by law enforcement officers. Nasser Mir Fakhraie was said to have been a reporter for Parcham-e Islam, the organ of the Fadayan Organization. See Faghfoory, The Role of the Ulama, p. 184. 24. Majlis deputies visited the Shah at the royal palace on February 24, 1949 (Esfand 5, 1327) and received a tongue-lashing that might have marked a turning point in the monarchs relationship with the legislature. You bring and dismiss governments, yet I get shot at for it! I have determined to seek additional powers for myself. I have ordered the government to convene a constitutional council. Preparations to convene the council were announced four days later on February 28, 1949. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 227, 300.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 465

by establishing diplomatic representation in Tel Aviv. De facto recognition followed in 1950, ostensibly to protect property rights of Iranian citizens in Palestine. Eight months later on November 4, 1949, a Fadaiyan-e Islam assassin killed former Prime Minister Abdol-Hossein Hazhir at the Sepahsalar Mosque adjacent to the Majlis compound.25 The assassin, Hossein Emami, readily confessed to having carried a gun for two months in anticipation of a chance to kill Hazhir. New parliamentary elections to replace the one dismissed in the fall of 1949 were held the same month.26 The country was in a downward spiral and nearing chaos. As the crisis deepened, the Soviet-backed Tudeh Partys influence soared. The Soviet Union continued meddling in Irans affairs through threatening demands, hostile radio broadcasts, and the refusal to return 20 tons of Iranian gold bullion reserve that it had looted during the occupation.27 When the election results were announced in May 1950, all National Front candidates and Ayatollah Kashani (still in exile in Lebanon) had won parliamentary seats. At Prime Minister Ali Mansours invitation Kashani returned to Tehran on June 10, 1950 amidst welcoming crowds of clerics, members of the National Front (a coalition of parties headed by the Majlis Representative Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq), trade associations, and bazaar merchants.28 Eight days later on June 18, Dr. Mosaddeq, in keeping with the newly forged political alliance, read a statement by Ayatollah Kashani at an open session of Parliament. The statement declared that: 1) Irans oil belonged to Iranians; 2) those who had exiled him had to be punished; 3) the death of Mirfakhraii (killed by a guard after having shot the Shah) had prevented identification of a traitorous conspiracy; 4) Iranians would not accept dictatorship; and 5) the decisions of the recent Constitutional Convention (called after the Kings attempted assassination) were invalid. The welcome Kashani received reflected the emergence of a dominant, although not cohesive, political coalition consisting of activist Muslim clerics and their followers, bazaar merchants, shopkeepers, trade associations, middle class professionals, several political parties, and the communists. The coalition was united in support of wresting Irans oil industry from British control through parliamentary means if possible, and extra-parliamentary manipulation or bullying if necessary. In a constitutional monarchy the King is the head of the state, the Parliament through a majority block supports and sustains a Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister is the head of government. One does not expect open rifts among these three institutions under normal circumstances. But Irans conditions were not normal. On June 26, 1950, the Shah appointed Major General Haj-Ali Razmara Prime Minister. Razmara had distinguished himself during the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946 (in which a Sovietbacked attempt to detach the province from Iran had failed).29 Razmara was not above
25. Hazhir had been recently appointed the Minister of the Imperial Court. 26. Faghfoory, The Role of the Ulama, p. 212. 27. The Soviet Union finally returned 11 tons of the gold on June 1, 1955, and agreed on August 1, 1955 to deliver an additional $8.75 million worth of goods gradually to settle the debt. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 347-348. 28. Khordad 20, 1329. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 311. Prime Minister Mansours telegram stated: I am honored to communicate to you His Imperial Majestys respect and my own. Since your absence has become longer than expected and your immediate return is desired by the nation, I hereby would like to extend to you my invitation to return home. See Faghfoory, The Role of the Ulama, p. 213. 29. After the Shah had personally flown over secessionist forces to determine their strength, Iranian army units commanded by Razmara entered Tabriz in triumph on December 15, 1946. The So[Continued on next page]

466 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

meeting with and listening to the lowliest of petitioners. Although an energetic professional soldier, he was interested in cultural matters and was very close to his brotherin-law, Irans leading man of letters at the time, Sadeq Hedayat, and Hedayats numerous literary friends.30 Prime Minister Razmara attempted to introduce his cabinet to Parliament on June 27, but confronted relentless shouting and heckling orchestrated by Representatives Muhammad Mosaddeq, Mozaffar Baqaii, Hossein Makki, Abdolqader Azad, Allahyar Saleh, Mahmoud Nariman, and Ali Shaygan. The opposition saw Razmara as too closely associated with the armed forces and the Royal Palace. Razmara was also known as a friend of the West, favoring Irans secularization and modernization. Nationalization of the oil industry had become a source of confrontation, and Razmara was accused of collaboration with the British for having opposed immediate nationalization. He also was portrayed as a bitter foe of Kashani and the Fadaiyan.31 Despite the commotion, during which Mosaddeq passed out while screaming and had to be carried out of the chamber to be revived, the new cabinet was introduced. Ayatollah Kashani and the National Front both issued public statements denouncing the new government on the same day. Prime Minister Razmara asked for and received a vote of confidence in the Majlis on July 4, 1950, but as 93 of the 107 representatives present voted for him, the opponents in the legislative chamber smashed their seats and desks in protest and frustration. Razmara then requested and received a vote of confidence from the Senate on July 10, despite Senators Dr. Ahmad Matin-Daftari,32 Muhammad Taddayon, Hossein Dadgar, Dr. Mahmoud Hesabi, and Abdol-Hossein Nikpours strong objections.33 On December 17, 1950 the Parliamentary Petroleum Commission (composed of Mosaddeq, Baqaii, Makki, Azad, Saleh, Nariman, Shaygan, Abolhassan Haerizadeh, Mirsayyed-Ali Behbahani, Abbas Eslami, and Kazem Shaibani) recommend nationalization of the countrys oil industry.34 Ayatollah Kashani issued a fatwa in support of nationalization and called for a grand gathering at the Kings Mosque
[Continued from previous page] viet Ambassador visited the Shah to demand the immediate withdrawal of the forces not to endanger the peace of the world. The Shah reportedly replied that the peace of the world had indeed been threatened until a few days ago, but no longer. He then showed the ambassador the telegram in which the secessionists had offered their unconditional surrender. The ambassador, stunned, stormed out speechless. See Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission For My Country (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), pp. 117-118; Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 52. 30. Peter Avery, Modern Iran (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 402, 414, 415. According to Avery, On becoming Prime Minister Razmara promptly issued a press release underlining the plans for reform His first public utterances seemed so full of promise for the future His plans touched upon so many powerful interests and, if achieved, would be so detrimental to them that it seemed at once probable that one or other of the groups who would be affected would plot his downfall. 31. Kashani blamed Razmara for his own arrest and exile following the attempt to assassinate the Shah in February 1949. Kashani and Fadayan were united in their hatred of Razmara. See Faghfoory, The Role of the Ulama, pp. 185-187. 32. Matin-Daftary, a close relative of Mosaddeq, had a pro-German reputation. At the outbreak of WWII, Reza Shah had tasked his cabinet ministers to write an analysis to project the wars outcome. Matin-Daftary, a junior cabinet minister, had argued that Germany would be victorious, and that Iran should position itself to protect its national interest at the wars end. Reza Shah named him Prime Minister on October 26, 1939, but removed him on June 25, 1940. See Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 224, 228. 33. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 311, 312, 313. Of the 49 senators present 35 voted for him. 34. Azar 26, 1329. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 317.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 467

on December 22 at which pro-nationalization speakers addressed a crowd of several thousand.35 At a closed session of Parliament two days later, Prime Minister Razmara expressed his reservations. He reasoned that Iran did not have the industrial capacity to explore its oil independently, nor did it have the ability to market it internationally. He warned that immediate nationalization of the oil industry in such circumstances was the greatest treason.36 The following week, on December 29, 1950, thousands demonstrated at Baharestan Plaza at the invitation of Ayatollah Kashani, as speaker after speaker attacked the government, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Treasury for opposing immediate nationalization.37 Similar demonstrations appeared throughout the country on the same day. Demonstrations continued nearly every week, but two gatherings, both at the Kings Mosque in Tehran one at the invitation of Kashani on January 26, 1951, and another sponsored by the Fadaiyan-e Islam on March 3, 1951 stood out for their vitriolic personal attacks on Razmara, and the absolute insistence on immediate nationalization.38 Razmara appealed to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) to address the points most criticized in the Majlis. They included inspecting the companys books (Iran owned 20% of the AIOC), supplying oil for Irans domestic consumption at cost, and informing Iran where the oil was sold. The US Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee appealed to the British Foreign Office to accept Razmaras requests, but without success. The British thought Irans oil was by right British oil, and found the Iranian demand to reclaim it outrageous. They were convinced that the oil was theirs because the British had discovered, exploited, refined, transported, and marketed it. That the oil had been under Iranian soil was of little consequence in the minds of most British politicians.39 The refinery on the offshore island of Abadan was Britains largest overseas asset, the largest installation of its kind in the world, and a source of British pride. It was also obscenely profitable. Winston Churchill boasted that:
The aggregate profits, realized and potential, of this investment may be estimated at a sum not merely sufficient to pay all the programme of ships, great and small of that year and for the whole pre-war oil fuel installation, but are such that we may not unreasonably expect that one day we shall be entitled also to claim that the mighty fleets laid down in 1912, 1913, and 1914, the greatest ever built by any power in an equal period, were added to the British Navy without costing a single penny to the taxpayer.40

Even Anthony Eden, who had studied Persian at Oxford and had developed a
35. The fatwa was published in the national evening daily Ettelat on December 21, 1950. Other fatwas by leading religious figures, e.g., Ayatollahs Muhammad Taqi Khonsari, Mahmoud Hossaini Qomi, Abbas Ali Shahrudi, and Baha-eddin Mahallati, followed asserting the necessity of Muslims to control their property. See Faghfoory, The Role of the Ulama, pp. 220-221. 36. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 317 37. Day 8, 1329. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 317 38. Bahman 6, 1329 and Esfand 12, 1329 respectively. 39. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 731. Louis quotes Sir Donald Ferguson, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Fuel and Power, who expressed such convictions. 40. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. 1 (New York: Scribners, 1923), p. 140, quoted in Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, pp. 774-775.

468 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

soft spot for Persian culture, had denounced the Iranians in 1951 for stealing British property. Thus Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrisons characteristic contempt for non-Europeans was typical. Morrison took the lead to teach Iranians a lesson by planning to launch an attack to seize Abadan after Iran nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on May 2, 1952. An armada of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, and the British Army were thus assembled under the code name Buccaneer. Interestingly, the US objection to the plan stopped Buccaneer dead in its tracks. Prime Minister Clement Attlee, whose own Labour government was dedicated to nationalization in Britain, told his Cabinet that We could not afford to break with the United States on an issue of this kind.41 The British attitude towards Iranian national sovereignty was affected by the view of the Iranian as an inferior human being.42 The British disposition and the psychological reaction it caused among Iranians weighed heavily on every segment of negotiation between them.43 Mosaddeqs popularity was to a great extent related to the genuine distaste Iranians held for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Companys conduct.44 Finally, after the Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) announced in January 1951 a contract granting Saudi Arabia 50% profit, the British softened their position in late February to re-open negotiations with Iran.45 The British change of heart came too late as a Fadaiyan assassin struck Prime Minister Razmara at Ayatollah Qomis funeral in the Soltani Mosque on March 7, 1951, before the deal could have been announced.46 The assassin, Khalil Tahmasebi, proudly stated: I killed Razmara because he was a traitor. The following day, March 8, 1951, Ayatollah Kashani declared the murderer a national hero [monji-e mellat] at a press conference, and the murder a religious requirement [vajeb]. That afternoon, at yet another demonstration at Baharestan Plaza, and in a surrealist atmosphere, Majlis representatives Hossein Makki and Mozaffar Baqaii congratulated the nation for the Prime Ministers demise.47 Thus the elected members of government publicly celebrated the murder of the governments Prime Minister.48 A week after Razmaras assassination, on March 15, 1951 at an open meeting of the Majlis at which the representatives had to stand up to announce their votes in public, the nationalization bill passed unanimously.49 A foreign correspondent reported:
If a secret ballot had been possible, the vote probably would have gone against immediate nationalization. But the members had to stand up and be counted with the eyes of Fadaiyan-Islam upon them. A spectator in the gallery shouted,

41. Cabinet Minutes Vol. 60, No. 51, September 27, 1951, CAB 128/20, quoted in Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 736. 42. The Iranians knew that the British regarded them as inefficient, even incompetent even, perhaps, as inferior human beings. This was a psychological reality that bore as much on the actual negotiations as did the abstract debate about the validity of the 1933 agreement and the practical amount of compensation to be paid to the company. See Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 754. 43. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, pp. 731, 735-736, 754, 756, 760. 44. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 739. 45. Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 83. 46. Esfand 16, 1329. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 319. 47. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 317-320. 48. The event reflected Irans domestic crisis and had little to do with British, Russian, or American intrigue. 49. Esfand 24, 1329. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 320.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 469 Eight grains of gunpowder has brought this about.50

As celebratory demonstrations were held throughout the country, another Fadaiyan assassin killed Dr. Majid Zangeneh, Dean of Tehrans Universitys College of Law. Zangeneh had served in Ibrahim Hakimis Cabinet as Minister of Education.51 Sadeq Hedayat wrote to Peter Avery a noted British scholar of Iranian history and literature after his brother-in-laws assassination that the vileness and political obscenity of Tehran had become intolerable. There was no hope any longer that political freedom or decency might prevail, and he was leaving never to return. A few months later he committed suicide in Paris in despair.52 On March 20, 1951, the Shah appointed Hossein Ala Prime Minister. Ala was known to be a nationalist, moderate, pro-Western statesman with parliamentary support. As Ambassador to the United States, Ala had heroically presented Irans case at the United Nations Security Council against the USSR after Stalin had refused to withdraw the Red Army from Iran in 1946. He introduced his cabinet to Parliament promptly, but faced with overwhelming pressure to quickly transfer the oil industry assets from AIOC to the government, resigned less than two weeks later.53 In an open session of the Majlis the day after Alas resignation on April 28, 1951, Representative Jamaal Emami nominated Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq to replace Ala. Mosaddeq accepted the candidacy immediately, and of the 100 representatives present, 79 supported the nomination.54 In the days between Alas resignation and Mosaddeqs appointment, Kashani issued a declaration calling Mosaddeq the only legitimate candidate for the premiership, and urged parliamentary colleagues to join the National Front to support his appointment. The Fadaiyan-e Islam organization pulled out all the stops, actively seeking and gathering support for Mosaddeq on the streets. By the time the Shah appointed Mosaddeq Prime Minister on April 30, 1951, the Fadaiyans influence had reached its peak, prompting its leaders to seek a power-sharing arrangement in the new administration. Kashani had approved Fadaiyans terrorist activities for as long as it had suited his political aims, but the demand to share governmental power signaled that his control had slipped. Fadaiyans number two, Abdol-Hossein Vahedi, accompanied by several others in the organizations leadership, visited Kashani at his residence to discuss power-sharing the day after the nationalization bill had passed into law. Kashani

50. Yousof Mazandi and Edwin Muller, Government by Assassination: The story behind the headlines about Iran, The Readers Digest, September 1951, p. 30. Peter Averys description is similar: the majles approved the nationalization proposal of Dr. Musaddiqs Oil Commission without any appreciable show of opposition, for who was going to risk being shot? See Avery, Modern Iran, p. 418. 51 Esfand 24, 1329. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 320. 52. Avery, Modern Iran, p. 449. 53. The external pressure was from the British government that owned 80% of Anglo-Iranian (later British Petroleum) Oil Company with its lucrative concessions. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 320, 322. Faghfoory provides the dates of appointment and resignation as March 11 and April 27, 1951. 54. Ordibehesht 7, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 322. Mosaddeq had been offered the office on November 12, 1944 (Aban 21, 1322) and received in the Royal Palace on November 14 (Aban 23), but declined unless assured of the condition that he would be returned to Parliament after premiership. His condition could not be met. See Aqeli, Chronology, p. 263. Some have alleged that Emami nominated Mosaddeq anticipating that he would decline once again.

470 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

rejected the demand but promised to help free Fadaiyan members in custody. His visitors left dissatisfied, feeling used and furious. The threads that had bound Kashani and his parliamentary faction to the National Front, Mosaddeq, and the Fadaiyan as subsequent events showed had suddenly begun to fray.

MOSADDEQS GOvERNMENT
Prime Minister Mosaddeq announced in the Majlis two weeks later on May 13, 1951 the formation of a Committee of Expropriation (khal-e yad) composed of Muhammad-Ali Varasteh, Mehdi Bazargan,55 Abdol-Hossein Aliabady, Muhammad Bayat, and Kazem Hasibi, to wrest from Britain the control of Irans oil industry.56 At the same Majlis meeting, Mosaddeq claimed that a (Fadaiyan) conspiracy had been afoot to kill him and announced that he would not leave the premises to asure his own safety. Two days later, on May 15, 1951, the Prime Minister, in an executive order to all governmental agencies, declared the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company irrevocably dissolved.57 To convince Mosaddeq that he had not had a part in the threat against him, Kashani openly broke with the Fadaiyan and criticized it for having strayed from the right path. The Fadaiyan responded by denouncing both Kashani and Mosaddeq, accusing them of being foreign tools and threatening them with the same treatment given Razmara. When police arrested the Fadaiyan leader Safavi on June 4, 1951, he had in his pocket a list naming those the group had marked for assassination. The list included Kashani, Mosaddeq, Princess Ashraf, and Dr. Manuchehr Eqbaal (a former Interior Minister), among others. A Fadaiyan statement issued two days after his arrest warned: if a single hair is shed from Navab Safavis head, we will kill a lot of people!58 Ayatollah Kashani, in a public expression of support for Mosaddeq on June 5, 1951, threatened a jihad against the British if assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were not surrendered to Irans government voluntarily and at once.59 However, the Tudeh Party used the occasion to incite oil workers to strike for better working conditions, creating a new problem for the government at that critical time. Since Mosaddeq had assumed control of the oil industry, the Tudeh instigation would at the very least destabilize the government. Kashani moved quickly to help Mosaddeq by successfully appealing to the workers to end the strike. To fortify domestic clerical support for his government and tap into Arab anti-British sentiments, Mosaddeq recalled Irans envoy from Israel.60 The split between the Fadaiyan and Kashani on the one hand, and Tudeh and Mosaddeq on the other, hinted at the inherent weakness of the earlier grand alliance. Parliamentary opposition to Mosaddeqs policies reflected his weakened coalition. To stifle opposition to Mosaddeqs policies, Ayatollah Kashani declared September 30, 1951 a public holiday and exhorted the nation to demonstrate support for the
55. Bazargan became the Islamic Republics first post-Revolution Prime Minister in 1979 but resigned after nine months. 56. Ordibehesht 22, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 324. 57. Ordibehesht 24, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 324. 58. Faghfoory, The Role of Ulama, pp. 183, 188, 192, 194, 198. 59. Khordad 14, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 326. 60. The concession made him popular, particularly in Egypt and Syria, but did not produce lasting goodwill among Arab governments.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 471

prime minister, and disgust for his parliamentary opponents.61 Mosaddeq led a delegation to New York on October 7, 1951 to address the UN Security Council on October 11.62 Iran had ignored a World Court injunction not to repossess the oil industry. Iran successfully argued that the 1933 agreement had been between the Iranian government and a private company (AIOC), and thus Iranian courts held exclusive jurisdiction in the matter. The World Court upheld Irans position in July 1952. Britain then appealed to the UN Security Council without success.63 While Mosaddeq was in the United States, George McGhee, the US Assistant Secretary of State, came up with an ingenious formula64 to resolve the dispute. Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, supported McGhees proposed solution. In their meetings with Mosaddeq (in New York and Washington), the two American politicians persuaded him to accept the proposal and he acquiesced. When Acheson personally suggested the deal to Anthony Eden however, the British Foreign Secretary dismissed it out of hand.65 The crux of the dispute was what George Middleton, who had served as Charg dAffaires at the British Embassy in Tehran in 1952, called the sanctity of treaties. The British could not afford to admit the imposition of past unequal treaties, for doing so would invite nationalists to abrogate all British concessions around the world. Acheson was later moved to state, Never had so few lost so much so stupidly and so fast.66 Negotiations in New York and Washington ultimately failed and the Prime Minister returned home to face a financial crisis. National bonds were issued in the name of patriotism to fund the governments mounting deficit, and Iranians, to their credit, stepped up to purchase the promissory notes in large numbers. On the day of the issue, December 23, 1951, the Shah purchased two million rials of the bonds. Mosaddeq, an aristocrat from the former Qajar dynasty and one of the richest feudal landowners in the country, purchased 250,000 rials.67 When election results for the 17th Parliament were announced on January 24,
61. Mehr 7, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 328. Authors emphasis. 62. Mehr 14, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 328. He traveled to Washington on October 23 and while accompanied by Irans Ambassador Abdollah Entezam met with US President Harry S. Truman. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 324, 326, 328, 329. 63. The oil concession was originally granted in 1901 to William Knox DArcy, a British subject. The British government became a major shareholder when the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) was formed in 1909. A refinery was built in Abadan in 1913, but Iran cancelled the 1909 concession in 1932. A new concession in 1933 limited the area of concession, guaranteed a minimum royalty and a specified tax payable to Irans national government through 1993. 64. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), p. 510. The formula, described by Dean Acheson as ingenious included compensation based on current market prices, recognition of Irans sovereignty over its oil resources, and nationalization. On the other hand, the nationalization would not include the Abadan refinery which could be operated by a neutral company (the Dutch were mentioned). The British (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) would then get oil for export on the 50/50 basis already in effect in the Persian Gulf. Mosaddeq would not agree to the British demand of compensation for future profits, nor accept the validity of the 1933 concession. 65. Homa Katouzian, Mosaddeqs Government, in Mark Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. 7. 66. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 753; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 503. 67. Day 1, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 331.

472 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

1952, Kashani had been re-elected, having received the second highest number of votes from Tehran.68 Hossein Makki, a colorful member of the previous Majlis, had received the highest.69 The total number of ballots cast in Tehran, however, seemed too low, suggesting that many eligible voters may have declined to vote.70 On February 15, a member of Fadaiyan-e Islam struck again, seriously injuring Dr. Hossein Fatemi, a newly elected Member of Parliament and a newspaper publisher. The assassination attempt had been planned by Fadaiyans second in command, Abdolhossein Vahedi, and carried out by a teenager.71 On April 27 the Shah inaugurated the 17th Majlis by delivering a customary Royal Address that Prime Minister Mosaddeq had conspicuously chosen not to attend. When the government submitted its resignation to the new Majlis in keeping with parliamentary tradition (to allow the new legislature to either express confidence in the government or nominate a new Prime Minister), 52 of the 65 representatives present voted to re-install Prime Minister Mosaddeq. The Senate on the other hand postponed its vote, awaiting the governments program also a parliamentary tradition. Rather than submit his program, Mosaddeq resigned in defiance on July 7 and accused the Senate of obstruction. Senators reacted on July 9, when 22 of the 36 Senators present withdrew their support from Mosaddeqs government. On July 10, Ayatollah Kashani harshly condemned the Senate for having withdrawn its support.72 The Senators felt threatened enough to reconsider their decision the same day and voted to confirm the Prime Minister despite not having received his governments program. Emboldened by his victory, Prime Minister Mosaddeq escalated the crisis on July 13 by requesting unprecedented extraordinary powers from the Majlis to enforce government bills by decree before they were enacted into law. Then on July 16 he demanded to wrest the control of the armed forces from the King the Commanderin-Chief.73 When the Shah declined, Mosaddeq resigned in protest. In a closed session

68. Bahman 3, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 331. 69. Makki was an effective orator. A former non-commissioned officer, he called himself Sarbaaz-e vatan [Soldier of Motherland] and repeatedly claimed he would trade all he owned for a stick of rock candy (yek shaakhe nabaat), to highlight that he was not wealthy or corrupt. Yet some considered him a manipulating political operator. Once he confronted a wealthy land-owning representative in the Majlis and accused him of having so much that he could not care about the countrys well-being. The wealthy representative replied that on the contrary, because he owned so much of the country he worried about its future constantly, whereas Makki who had nothing could afford to be oblivious to national interest! The wealthy representative was Ali Amini, who became Ambassador to the US and later Prime Minister. Makki would invite and accept contributions from his supporters. Once an advertisement appeared in newspapers asking contributions destined for Hossein Makki to be mailed to a new address. The new address, as it turned out, belonged to another man by the same name another Hossein Makki unrelated to the Majlis representative. 70. Official records reported Tehrans population at 1,010,000 in 1949. The number of votes cast in Tehran in the 1952 election, despite the politicized atmosphere, was 143,163. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 331. 71. Bahman 25, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 331-332. Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 66. Dr. Hossein Fatemi was a newspaper publisher who did not hesitate to attack his opponents venomously in his paper, Bakhtar-e Emrouz. He openly accused those opposed to oil nationalization of treason. He later became Foreign Minister in Mosaddeqs Cabinet. His assailant was Mehdi Abd-Khodaii, a 14-year-old boy. 72. Tir 19, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 336. 73. Tir 25, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 336.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 473

of Parliament the next day, 40 of the 42 representatives attending nominated Ahmad Qavam to replace Mosaddeq, and he was named Prime Minister the next day on July 18, 1952.74 On July 19 the nation found its major cities in convulsion. Twenty-eight Majlis deputies declared Mosaddeq the only acceptable prime minister, and the National Front called for a nationwide strike on July 21 in his support.75 Qavam asked the Shah for emergency powers and dissolution of the Parliament. The King denied both requests, and the National Fronts strike day turned bloody, claiming 79 lives.76 The Crown and Parliament dismissed Qavam and reinstated Mosaddeq the following day. Despite appearances of spontaneity, the anti-Qavam demonstrations were well planned and coordinated with the Tudeh Party. The British Charg dAffaire, George Middleton, wrote in his notes the next day that:
It seems clear to me that the bloody riot of 21st July was a highly organized affair

The National Front demagogues, notably Kashani, gave an outward appearance of a spontaneous popular surge of feeling to these riots. But in fact I believe these were almost certainly organized by the Tudeh. Reports reaching me are that the demonstrations were as much anti-monarchical as anti-imperialist Moreover there was a cold determination and ruthlessness behind the manifestations which is typically communist.77

A string of bizarre developments followed as the pace of events quickened and the national mood became increasingly charged. Mosaddeq sent a message to the King, handwritten on the inner back-cover of a copy of the Quran that: I will be the enemy of Quran if I act contrary to the Constitution, and to accept the presidency if the Constitution is compromised and the countrys regime altered.78 The message was delivered to the Imperial Court on July 23, 1952, the day that Mosaddeq had ordered the Kings brothers and sisters to leave the country.79 Four days later, Deputy Premier Baqer Kazemi introduced the new Cabinet to Parliament and announced that Prime Minister Mosaddeq had assumed the duties of the Minister of National Defense himself.80 The next day the Majlis gave the government a unanimous vote of confidence and passed the bill granting it extraordinary powers. A week later a bill introduced in the Majlis called Ahmad Qavam a corruptor on earth for having been instrumental

74. Tir 27, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 337. 75. Tir 30, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 337. 76. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 748. The Shahs reasons for refusing Qavams requests may have been one or several of the following: a) he did not want Qavam to have dictatorial powers such as Mosaddeq had sought; b) he simply did not like or trust Qavam; c) he was politically too weak to involve himself without endangering the Crown; or d) he wished to remain true to the Constitution he had sworn to uphold. 77. Minute by Middleton, July 22, 1952, FO 248/1531, as quoted in Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, pp. 749-750. 78. This message reflects a tradition of recording a compact with God as witness. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 338. 79. Mordad 1, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 338. Expelling the Shahs relatives may have been done to isolate the young king, thus making him more susceptible to manipulation. 80. The name of the Ministry of War (vezaarat-e Jang) thus had changed to the Ministry of National Defense (vezarat-e Defa-e Melli).

474 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

in the massacre of 30th of Tir and armed rebellion against the nation.81 Qavam had become a subject of controversy for he was Mosaddeqs political rival. The bill required the confiscation of Qavams entire property, including his personal belongings. Four days later on August 7, 1952, Ayatollah Kashani, then Speaker of the Majlis, showed a thaw in his relations with the Fadaiyan when he introduced a bill to free Khalil Tahmasebi (Razmaras assassin) and to absolve him of all charges with triple urgency.82 The bill stated that Since Haj-Ali Razmaras treason and support for foreigners is certain, Khalil Tahmasebi, even if alleged to have been Razmaras murderer, is in the eyes of the nation innocent and not guilty.83 On August 11, the Senate passed the bill to grant Mosaddeq the extraordinary powers he had sought on July 13, but a month later on October 17, rejected the bills to pardon Khalil Tahmasebi and seize Qavams property. The Senates rejections enraged the lower House. It retaliated within ten days by passing a bill on October 23, 1952 to reduce the Senatorial term of office from four to two years in effect dismissing the Senate while in session.84 When senators attempted to meet on October 26, 1952, they found the Senate doors locked.85 That day Dr. Hossein Fatemi, the controversial newspaper publisher who had become Foreign Minister on October 11, 1952, wrote a blistering article in his newspaper Bakhtar-e Emrouz in which he called the senators servants of the British Foreign Office.86 On November 15, Khalil Tahmasebi was freed from prison.87 Tahmasebi, after a brief visit to the shrine of Hazrat Abdolazim in Ray on the outskirts of Tehran, rushed to Ayatollah Kashanis home to pay his respects. On January 8, 1953 Mosaddeq asked the Majlis to renew his extraordinary powers for an additional year.88 Despite objections by numerous representatives, including Mosaddeqs ardent supporters Hossein Makki, Abolhassan Haerizadeh, Mozaffar Baqaii, and most significantly Ayatollah Kashani (who called the bill unconstitutional), it passed on January 13 with double urgency.89 The legislation marked the end of Kashanis cooperation with Mosaddeq, and more significantly the alliance that had once made Mosaddeqs coalition a formidable force.90
81. July 21, the National Fronts day of national strike against Qavam. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 337. The charge corruptor on earth was used repeatedly after the Iranian Revolution to execute opponents in 1979, the former Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda among them. 82. Mordad 16, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 340. 83. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 340. 84. Aban 1, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 342. 85. Aban 3, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 342. 86. Mehr 19, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 341. One of Fatemis early decisions as Foreign Minister was to re-open the charges of alleged embezzlement and illegal conduct against Abdol-Hossein Sardari, the diplomat stationed in Paris throughout WWII, known for having saved numerous Jewish families during the German occupation of France. 87. Aban 24, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 345. 88. Day 18, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 344. 89. Day 23, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 344; Fakhreddin Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq: The Configuration and Role of domestic Forces, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 57. Azimi has argued that although Kashani had disapproved of numerous decisions by Mosaddeq after the July 21, 1952 uprising that had toppled Qavam, he had denied any friction between them. However, when in December 1952 Mosaddeq sought the renewal of extraordinary powers for a year, Kashani tried to block him and their differences became public. 90. Faghfoory, The Role of the Ulama, pp. 199, 200. The development reflected Irans internal dynamics.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 475

Mosaddeqs supporters claim that the delegated powers he secured were not dictatorial. The powers, they charitably argue, were delegated to him for a brief period to implement reforms. They reason that even democratic countries (such as Britain in World War II) have on occasion suspended their constitutions.91 That line of reasoning overlooks that it had been Mosaddeqs government that conducted the elections for the 17th Majlis, and it had been that very legislature that had confirmed Mosaddeq and his cabinet by a vote of confidence and overwhelming support. It also turns a blind eye to Mosaddeqs parliamentary manipulation. Aside from his request for extraordinary powers, he introduced a bill in late December 1952-January 1953 to increase the number of Majlis representatives from 136 to 172. Yet at election time he delayed balloting in over 50 electoral districts. Thus the 17th Majlis convened with only about 80 elected representatives. Two of Mosaddeqs closest associates, Dr. Karim Sanjabi, a founder of the National Front and Minister of Education and Dr. Gholam-Hossein Sadiqi, the Minister of the Interior advised against dissolving the Majlis and holding a referendum. Both argued that the Majlis had supported Mosaddeq and that it had been the King who had appointed Prime Ministers since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 subject to parliamentary approval. Without the Majlis, the Shah would be free to oust the Prime Minister and appoint another. Mosaddeqs reply to both had been the same: Shah jorat-e in kar ra nadarad [The Shah would not dare].92

A COvERT OPERATION
The United States had gradually concluded by late 1952, particularly after the upheaval that ousted Qavam, that Mosaddeqs government could not resolve the oil dispute and that its policy of excessive deficit financing had endangered the nation. Viewing matters from the perspective of the Cold War events in Czechoslovakia and Korea, the United States feared Iran to be at risk of falling behind the Iron Curtain.93 Concerned, in March 1953, the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked the Central Intelligence Agency (headed by his brother Allen Welsh Dulles) to devise a plan to facilitate Mosaddeqs removal. Yet the United States insisted that Britain accept the reality that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would not be returned to it.94 The British government, bitter at having lost the lucrative oil concession, was nevertheless delighted at the US governments new determination.95 The plan to be carried out by the CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) after consultation with the US

91. Katouzian, Mosaddeqs Government, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp. 12-13. 92. Sanjabi and Sadiqi recollections, as well as Kashanis son Sayyed Mahmoud Kashani are quoted in Ahrar, ed., The Memoirs of Ardeshir Zahedi, pp. 282-283. 93. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, pp. 756, 757, 758, 730, 736. 94. Donald N. Wilber, Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953, The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953, National Security Archives Electronic Briefing Book No. 28, p. 17. See http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB.NSAEBB28/ index.html. The New York Times first published excerpts in its April 16 and June 18, 2000 editions and posted them on its website at http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/Mideast/041600iran-cia-index. htm; Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 758. 95. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, p. 1.

476 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Ambassador to Iran was completed by June 10, 1953. The US envoy to Iran, Ambassador Loy Wesley Henderson, had conveniently arrived in Washington for an extended visit on June 3, and the plan was presented to the Secretary of State on June 19.96 The architects of the covert operation were distinguished intellectual scholars Ann K.S. (Nancy) Lambton, Robin Zaehner, and Donald Newton Wilber the former two from England and the latter from the United States. The affair ultimately forged a compact among Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, President Dwight Eisenhower, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the one hand, and with Irans King Muhammad Reza Pahlavi on the other. Yet the Kings involvement in the affair code named TP-AJAX, but now commonly known as Ajax was limited. At a meeting at the US Secretary of States office on June 25, 1953, CIA Director Allen Dulles, US Ambassador to Iran Henderson, Under Secretary of State Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, and several others heard the CIA Chief of the Near East and Africa Division admit that no one had been able to confer on the matter with the Shah. Subsequently, the Shah proved reluctant to dismiss Mosaddeq without a parliamentary recommendation. Thus considerable pressure had to be applied before two Royal Orders Farmans to dismiss the Prime Minister and appoint another were signed on August 15.97 The plotters thought the Shahs twin sister, Princess Ashraf, was capable of persuading him to sign the decrees. A top British AIOC official, Gordon Sumerset, and SIS representative Norman Matthew Darbyshire met with Princess Ashraf on the Riviera on July 16 to request that she assure her brother of American and British support against Mosaddeq. She agreed to fly to Iran to do so, but warned that her arrival would precipitate a strong reaction by the Prime Minister. She flew to Tehran on a commercial flight on July 25, but her unauthorized return home infuriated not only Mosaddeq but also the Shah. She forwarded a note to her brother, but he refused to see her until the evening of July 29, hours before her departure for Europe on July 30.98 Brigadier General Norman Schwarzkopf, who had served as the head of US Military Mission to Irans Gendarmerie from 1942 to 1948 and gained the Shahs respect, was asked on June 26, 1953 to intervene to obtain the desired Royal Orders. To avoid suspicion, Schwarzkopf embarked on a cover mission to tour Lebanon, Pakistan, and Egypt, making his Tehran visit to appear to be a mere stop-over. He left the United States for Lebanon on July 21 and finally met with the Shah on August 1, two days after Princess Ashraf had left Iran. The Shah declined to sign the decrees, but told Schwarzkopf that should Mosaddeq dissolve the Majlis as he already had threatened, the Head of the State would then have the constitutional authority to replace the Prime Minister.99
96. Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 12. Roosevelt has suggested that the Dulles brothers had already decided to support the plan, thus objections were generally muted. 97. Roosevelt, Countercoup, pp. 12, 19; Wilber, Clandestine Service History, pp. x, 5, 732. The Shahs reluctance to dismiss Mosaddeq without a parliamentary recommendation was consistent with his reluctance to grant Qavams request in July 1952. Western critics have accused the Shah of vacillation and indecisiveness while others have insinuated weakness and conspiracy with foreign interests. It is reasonable not to dismiss the obvious possibility that he might have tried to act within his constitutional authority. 98. Roosevelt, Countercoup, pp. 145, 146. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, pp. 22, 23, 24; Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 783. 99. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, pp. 25-30.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 477

The CIA Director, the Secretary of State, and the US President had approved TPAJAX on July 11, 1953 with authorizations to commence the operation in mid-August. The Director of SIS, the Foreign Secretary, and the British Prime Minister already had approved the operational plan ten days earlier.100 Winston Churchill, who had played a major role in persuading the British government to purchase the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the first place, relished direct involvement in the operation when Eden became ill. It was Churchill who authorized Operation Boot, the British term for Operation TP-AJAX, to proceed.101 Iran had been engulfed in a new wave of intimidation after January 8, 1953 when several leading legislators unsuccessfully had opposed Mosaddeqs request to renew his extraordinary powers.102 On February 13, Navab-Safavi, head of Fadaiyan-e Islam, was freed. Coercion through assassinations and mass demonstrations had cast a pall over the nation. Disruptive street demonstrations and invective-laden slogans had become daily occurrences in major cities. Textile workers in the industrial city of Isfahan would gather around the Shahs statue on the Statue Square Maydan-e Mojasameh every day after work to repeat slogans shouted out by their leaders for a couple of hours before mounting their bicycles to go home. Graffiti had covered almost every wall exhorting death to the Shah and much worse. Night letters appeared pasted on electricity poles and city light-posts listing the names of those who were to be hung from them. Rumors that military officers loyal to the Shah would be shot were also rampant.103 On February 25, 1953 Major General Fazlollah Zahedi and a number of others suspected of disloyalty to Mosaddeqs government were arrested. Many other officers already had been dismissed, adding to distrust over Mosaddeqs intentions. Prime Minister Mosaddeq visited the Royal Palace in Tehran on February 28, 1953 to bid farewell to the Shah and Queen Soraya on their way to a European vacation.104 While Mosaddeq was inside, a crowd gathered at the palace gate to urge the King not to leave the country. The increased influence of the Tudeh Party coupled with continued economic and political crises had finally frightened prominent religious leaders, merchants, and politically silent segments of the population. The perceived prospects of a Soviet domi-

100. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, pp. iii-vi. 101. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 775. 102. Both Makki and Kashani were persuaded to change their positions after a few days and expressed support for Mosaddeq, but Baqaii resigned from the National Front in protest. Makki had been the first to speak against the bill in Parliament, had submitted his resignation in the Majlis publicly, and had likened Mosaddeq to Hitler at a press conference. He announced he had changed his mind and would support Mosaddeq, on January 18, but the parliamentary coalition had irreparably cracked. See Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 341-345. 103. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, p. 54. A childs memory of those days is poignant. His mother had been alerted that a shop had stocked imported nylon children socks. At a time of shortages and particular dearth of imported goods, receiving a pair of brightly colored nylon socks was a major gift. The child had held the carefully wrapped socks in one hand while holding on to his mothers by the other on the way home when a despicable insult to the King appeared painted on a wall. The mother tried to wipe it by her hand and her handkerchief without success. Mother and childs eyes met as they looked at the little package. Their country deserved better no words were necessary. The child offered his precious socks. The mother used the package to rub off the insult. The socks were shredded, but the child understood the sacrifice had been worth making. A personal recollection. 104. Esfand 9, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 346.

478 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

nated Peoples Republic of Iran, or worse, an Iranistan Soviet Republic had indeed cast a dark cloud over the nation.105 As the crowd milled at the gate, Ayatollah Muhammad Behbahani and several others arrived to ask the Shah not to leave. Even Ayatollah Kashani asked the public to prevent the kings departure. When the Prime Minister attempted to leave the palace he faced a dangerously hostile crowd. He was scurried away by the palace guards and sent off to safety through a different gate. Finally the Shah stepped out to address the demonstrators. He announced to the cheering crowd that he had heard their request, and that he had cancelled his trip abroad. As the crowd gradually dispersed, another began to gather around Mosaddeqs home. Calling to see the Prime Minister, some finally scaled the walls into his residence in the evening. Mosaddeq fled from the rooftop to the US Point-4 office next door in nightclothes and escaped to the army headquarters and finally to the Majlis compound to seek refuge. Violent demonstrations in support of and in opposition to the Prime Minister continued through the following day in Tehran and other cities. The government reacted by arresting numerous dignitaries, including retired flag officers. Major General Zahedi, who had been arrested on February 25 and later released, was detained yet again. Some have asserted that Mosaddeq had counseled the King against the European trip. The Shah had insisted on it to seek medical treatment for Queen Sorayas infertility, but asked that the departure date to remain a secret. Mosaddeq, it is argued, suspected treachery when the departure date appeared to be public knowledge on February 28, and that Kashani and Behbahani gave the impression that Mosaddeq had been pushing the Shah out. Kashani is quoted as having appealed to the public to stop the Kings departure, saying that if the Shah goes, everything we have will go with him.106 The February episode, some have alleged, destroyed the last vestige of trust Mosaddeq had in the Shah. Blaming the Shah and the Court for deceiving him, he subsequently refused any audience with the Shah.107 On March 2, Zahedi and Mozaffar Baqaii were ordered arrested again, this time charged with conspiracy in the murder of the National Police Chief Brigadier Muhammad Afshartoos, whose body had just been found after a mysterious disappearance a week earlier. To avoid arrest, House Speaker Ayatollah Kashani helped Zahedi to arrive at the Majlis where he granted him protection. In the same chaotic days, and at American insistence, Britain reluctantly offered a final proposal to settle the Anglo-Iranian dispute, but Mosaddeq rejected it on March 10.108 The open session of Parliament on May 8, 1953 illustrated the rising tension in Iran as a heated debate between supporters and opponents of Mosaddeqs government degenerated into a shouting match followed by a fist-fight.109 On May 11, on the Prime
105. The newly arrived Soviet Ambassador to Tehran was Anatol Lavrentiev, noted for having staged the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948. Whether coincidence or conspiracy, Iranians perceived a sinister correlation. 106. Katouzian, Mosaddeqs Government, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp. 14-15. 107. Fakhreddin Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq: The Configuration and Role of Domestic Forces, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 81. Mosaddeq already had snubbed the King at the opening of the 17th Parliament on April 27, 1952 by not attending the Royal Address. See Aqeli, Chronology, p. 334. 108. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 773. 109. Khordad 17, 1332. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 347-348. The partisan divisions were calmed for awhile as a new trade agreement with the USSR was being negotiated. The government and [Continued on next page]

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 479

Ministers order, all Crown properties were turned over to the government in return for 60 million rials annual payment to the Imperial Organization for Social Services. It has been argued that Mosaddeq demanded the Shah restrict himself to a government-designated budget without access to the revenues of the Imam Reza Shrines endowment of which the King was the trustee, give up Crown properties to the state, transfer command of the armed forces to the Prime Minister, decline audiences with the governments opponents, and earmark the revenue from the Crown properties for public welfare. The Shah seemed amenable; he also offered to take a vacation abroad, which Mosaddeq initially rejected but later approved.110 As the country faced one crisis after another, Mosaddeqs coalition came irreparably apart when Ayatollah Kashani lost the Speakers gavel to Dr. Abdollah Moazami on July 1, 1953.111 Moazami had received 41 votes against Kashanis 31, but 40% of the House had supported neither of them. Two weeks later at Mosaddeqs instruction, 52 Members of Parliament representing the much weakened National Front coalition resigned to make a legislative quorum impossible. Mosaddeq told an associate, Kazem Hasibi, in late July 1953 that he feared the Majlis would topple his government. Some scholars have opined that dissolving the Majlis through a referendum, justifiably described as Mosaddeqs political masterpiece, was an ingenious countermeasure adopted by him to deprive his opponents of a quasi-legal vehicle for his ouster.112 Yet, the dissolution was unconstitutional for only the Head of State the King had the authority to dissolve the legislature. The maneuver was thus to avoid the governments dismissal, and to call for new elections in pursuit of a more accommodating Parliament.113 In the meantime Major General Zahedi, who had gradually gained recognition as a credible Mosaddeq opponent, agreed at the new House Speaker Moazamis mediation to leave the Majlis where he had found sanctuary since March. The next day on July 21, 1953 the Tudeh Party and Mosaddeqs supporters displayed a show of force to commemorate the Thirtieth of Tir Massacre the anniversary of the toppling of Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam on July 21, 1952.114 The anniversary demonstrations of July 21, 1953 shocked the nation, including many of Mosaddeqs supporters. The spectacle of the Tudeh demonstrators in much greater numbers than the National Front loyalists had a sobering effect. The Tudeh, having outnumbered the National Front coalition, reflected the strength of the communists in Mosaddeqs coalition a reality that the populace clearly grasped.115 Kermit Roosevelt, Chief of the Near East and Africa Division of the CIA in charge of TP-AJAX, had entered Iran on July 19 under an assumed name and may have per[Continued from previous page] Majlis insisted on June 11, 1953 (Khordad 21, 1332) that the Soviet Union return Irans 20 tons of gold bullion. 110. Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq, p. 79. This account contradicts the previous assertion by Homa Katouzian, Mosaddeqs Government in Iranian History, pp. 14-15. Both appear in the same volume by Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. 111. Tir 10, 1332. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 349. 112. Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq, p. 95. 113. Mark J. Gasiorowski, The 1953 Coup, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 248. 114. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 349. 115. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, p. 26.

480 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

sonally witnessed the Tudehs display of strength on the 21st. The CIA-Tehran Station had not contacted Zahedi directly before July 21, although his son Ardeshir may have served as a conduit since April.116 By the end of July many National Front partners, the Toilers Party, the SUMKA, and the Pan Iranist Party, had left making the already weakened coalition anemic. To make matters worse, influential supporters including Baqaii, Makki, Kashani, and their followers also had parted ways with the Prime Minister. Mosaddeqs colleagues and ministers have been blamed for lacking the initiative to save his government and criticized for having been mere administrators rather than statesmen. The criticism overlooks Mosaddeqs self-centered, dismissive attitude that in many ways resembled that of Qavams both were wealthy Qajar princes with royal pedigree who found it difficult to bow to anyone they considered a lesser being regardless of status.117 It is not likely that Mosaddeqs cabinet ministers could have mustered enough free-wheeling authority to have acted without his consent.118 Whether the July mass resignation of Parliament deputies was to force new elections or not, having rid himself of the Senate, Mosaddeq may have resolved to dismiss the remaining troublesome Members of Parliament. That the Constitution had reserved that authority for the Head of State has not concerned Mosaddeqs supporters. His solution for having squandered the governments parliamentary majority was a national referendum on July 25.119 Yet the immediate result of the mass resignation in the Majlis was to deny the government its parliamentary legitimacy. The Tudeh Party also overplayed its hand. By flexing its muscle through threatening demonstrations and its challenge to security forces that culminated in a bloody confrontation on August 9, 1953, it compelled the population to react.120 Mosaddeqs supporters have claimed that the mass resignation had been inspired by his opponents to abort his reforms. Yet the claim is not consistent with the reality that pro-Mosaddeq deputies had had enough clout to replace House Speaker Kashani with Moazami and to secure extraordinary powers for
116. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 781; Wilber, Clandestine Service History, p. 4. Ardeshir Zahedi denies claims by Roosevelt and Wilber that he had been an intermediary between his father and the CIA. He claims he was the one who contacted the three people he knew at the US Embassy from the days he had worked for the Point-4 program in Tehran. They were Rocky Stone, Alex Gagarin, and Eric Pollard. A meeting with a political officer was arranged at a house on Darband Street, but when Ardeshir arrived, no one opened the door. He called Pollard and a second meeting was arranged on the Old Shemiran Road several days later, but again no one from the embassy showed up. He called Pollard an aviator naval officer again. Pollard apologized and stated that Joe Goodwin, the political officer, would contact him to arrange a meeting. Goodwin called Ardeshir later, but only to say that he would not be able to meet him. See Ahrar, ed., The Memoirs of Ardeshir Zahedi, pp. 180-183. 117. Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 87. Interview by author with a Mosaddeq relative and former diplomat. 118. According to Acheson, Mosaddeq would not negotiate in the presence of his own associates, ministers, and ambassadors, an oddity that Nitze, Harriman, and McGee had noticed independently. Another of Mosaddeqs marked characteristics was his distrust of his own countrymen; he would never talk with any of them present. See Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 504. 119. The result of the referendum whether the current Majlis should remain or be dismissed was predictable. Voting was in separate for and against booths, with reports of the intimidation of anyone with anti-Mosaddeq sentiments. Over two million ballots supported dissolving the Majlis, only 1,200 retaining it. See Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 151; Aqeli, Chronology, p. 350. 120. Mordad 18, 1332. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 350.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 481

their leader.121 Although some have nostalgically portrayed the era as one of liberty, the nations parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy had in reality been transformed to a chaotic political mix through mob mobilization, political manipulation, public intimidation, and repeated assassination. A prominent scholar has stated that It is characteristic of Iranian history that the fall of an absolute and arbitrary ruler has resulted in rebellion and chaos, and persisting chaos has ended up in the return of absolute and arbitrary government Until very recent times what most educated Iranians both conservative and radical understood by dictatorship was arbitrary rule, and by democracy, the traditional Iranian chaos.122 Two days after the bloody confrontation of Tudeh mobs and security forces on August 11, 1953, Mosaddeqs government arrested a large number of its opponents again.123 On August 13, the Monarch and Queen Soraya flew to Ramsar on the Caspian Sea where the Shah finally signed orders to dismiss Prime Minister Mosaddeq, and to install General Zahedi as the new head of government.124 The Shah had been reluctant to dismiss Mosaddeq and to appoint Zahedi without formal parliamentary recommendations.125 The combination of considerable internal and external pressures and the reality that the Parliament had been disemboweled finally forced his hand. He signed the two Royal Orders (Farmans) on August 15, but Mosaddeqs Chief of Staff General Taqi Riahi received word of the Farmans that very afternoon.126 Riahi had, by 6:008:00 PM, alerted the First Armored Brigade in Tehran and ordered troop detachments placed at strategic points throughout the Capital. The Tudeh Party newspaper, Besuy-e Ayandeh [Towards Future] already had predicted a coup and had warned against it ever since August 13, 1953. When Colonel Nematollah Nasiri, Commander of the Imperial Guard, accompanied by two truckloads of soldiers, drove to Mosaddeqs residence to deliver the Farman of dismissal on August 16 at about 1:00-2:00 AM, Mosaddeq was prepared.127 He had Nasiri arrested, then declared that a military coup against his government had been foiled.128 Radio Tehran went on the air at 5:45 AM to announce a
121. Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq, in Gasriorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 83. 122. Homa Katouzian, Mosaddeqs Government in Iranian History, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 2. 123. Mordad 20, 1332. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 350. 124. Mordad 22, 1332. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 350. 125. It is believed that Queen Soraya was the one who finally convinced the Shah to sign the orders. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, pp. 38, 39, 40, 47. 126. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, p. x. 127. Mordad 25, 1332. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 350-51; Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 783. Mosaddeq had reportedly called a late night cabinet meeting at his home expected to end at 11:30 PM. When Nasiri requested to meet Mosaddeq upon arrival, he was kept waiting for an hour. He finally asked a guard to deliver the Farman and return with a receipt. The guard returned with a receipt addressed to the Shah in Mosaddeqs handwriting. Shortly after the receipt was delivered to Nasiri, he was detained. Mosaddeq at his train claimed that he had assumed the Farman had been a forgery, and that Nasiri had intended to arrest him. Quoted in Ahrar, ed., The Memoirs of Ardeshir Zahedi, p. 163. 128. Nassiri was promoted to brigadier general after the coup and rose to become a general and director of Saazeman-e Etellaat va Amniat-e Keshvar (SAVAK), National Information and Security Organization. His last assignment was to be ambassador to Pakistan. He was recalled to Tehran in the last days of the monarchy and detained. He was shown on national television of the Islamic Re[Continued on next page]

482 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

special government communiqu. Mosaddeq already had called a cabinet meeting for 6:00 AM and was in the meeting for a good part of the morning. Radio Tehran aired the communiqu again at 7:30 that morning and called for Zahedi to surrender at 10:30, but the Royal Farmans were not mentioned.129 The Shah and Queen Soraya, upon hearing of Mosaddeqs defiance, flew to Iraq unexpectedly. Foreign Minister Hossein Fatemi lost no time in ordering Iranian diplomats abroad not to welcome, visit, or receive the Shah, whom he declared deposed. That day, Irans King and Queen were welcomed by Iraqs King Faysal at Baghdad Airport while Irans Ambassador to Iraq Mozaffar Alam stayed away. In quick succession Mosaddeqs government rounded up a large number of military officers, charged them with involvement in the coup, declared the Majlis dissolved, and disarmed the Imperial Guard units all before the days end. On the very same day the Shahs portraits were removed from government offices, royal statues pulled down in cities, and employees of the Imperial Court detained. On Foreign Minister Fatemis orders, the Royal Palaces were locked and sealed. Ambassador Henderson finally returned to Iran the following day on August 17 and the Prime Ministers son Dr. Gholam Hossein Mosaddeq welcomed him upon arrival. In the meantime the Tudeh Party cadre began renaming streets and replacing street signs as the partys newspapers demanded a democratic republic to replace the monarchy. The Tudeh leadership had allegedly made that decision at a meeting on August 18, the text of which was read interestingly enough on Radio Moscow the same day exactly as published in a party newspaper Shojaat [Bravery] earlier that morning.130 Mossadeq was reportedly moving toward asking the Shah to abdicate or put an end to the Pahlavi Dynasty, while preparing for a national referendum to determine the political future of the country.131 Foreign Minister Fatemi amplified the same sentiment in an editorial in his own newspaper and repeated it in a fiery speech at a rally at Baharestan Plaza that afternoon. The editorial, remarkable for its malicious language against the King and his father Reza Shah, was read in its entirety on Radio Tehran on the following day at 5:30 PM prime-time. On August 18, 1953 the royal couple landed in Rome on a commercial flight from Baghdad, but Irans Ambassador to Italy Nezam-Sultan Khajehnoori refused to meet them.132 A junior diplomat, Abdollah Khosravi, defied the ambassadors directive and accompanied a group of Iranian residents of Rome to greet the King and the Queen.133 One of the Iranians
[Continued from previous page] public, severely beaten, in pain with a loose bandage wrapped around his neck and hardly capable of speaking. He was executed with numerous other military officers on February 16, 1979, less than a week after the fall of Shapour Bakhtiyars government. 129. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, pp. 44-47, 53. 130. Maziar Behrooz, The 1953 Coup in Iran and the Legacy of the Tudeh, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 120; Wilber, Clandestine Service History, pp. 56, 60, 62. 131. This took place around August 18/19. Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp. 87-88. 132. Mordad 26, 1332. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 351. 133. That compassionate man of principle had helped save the lives of a number of Jews with passports and visas. He was arrested. He returned to Rome after the war and later married. He lived with his Italian wife and their two daughters when he was kidnapped and murdered after the Iranian Revolution. The murder apparently has remained unsolved.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 483

Hossein Sadeq, son of Mostashar al-Molk Sadeq, a member of the Qajar nobility covered the royal couples hotel bill, for the Shah did not have the funds to do so. On the same day, Mosaddeq directed all military units to remove the Shahs name from their traditional morning and evening prayers. The Associated Press cabled a message by Zahedi in which the general had urged Iranian officers to prepare for sacrifice to protect the nations independence, monarchy, and religion all threatened by the Communists. By 4:00 PM the principal political officers at the US Embassy and Washington had given up hope, and Kermit Roosevelt had been ordered by cable to leave Iran at the earliest opportunity.134 That the CIA-SIS-backed attempt had failed is substantiated by the Tudeh Party leaders decision to demobilize their street mobs, their party members, and their sympathizers on August 18. It is helpful to recall that the Tudeh demonstrators had been instrumental in toppling Qavam and reinstating Mosaddeq in July 1952, and that the Tudeh leadership had openly sought a democratic republic since August 16. Had the Tudeh not been convinced of victory, it would not have demobilized voluntarily at that most critical moment of its existence. The news of Mosaddeqs dismissal and Zahedis appointment, reported in a number of Iranian newspapers, gradually reached the populace on August 17.135 The reaction was electric.136 On August 18, Ayatollah Kashani in a note to Mosaddeq recommended that It would be better if you step down diplomatically.137 Mosaddeq replied defiantly that, I have the peoples support.138 Ambassador Henderson cabled Washington at 10 PM that he had met with Mosaddeq that evening for an hour and inquired about the Farmans to remove him and appoint Zahedi as Prime Minister. Mosaddeq replied that he had never seen such a decree, and if he had it would have made no difference. To confirm what he had heard Henderson asked if he was correct to understand that a) he had no official knowledge that the Shah had issued a Farman removing him as Prime Minister, and b) that even if he had, he would have considered it invalid? Mosaddeq answered: Precisely.139 The public mood seemed to have changed in the days leading to the morning of August 19.140 Demonstrators were out in force again, but the pro-Shah groups outnumbered their opponents. Military personnel also joined the demonstrators in the streets, refusing to obey Mosaddeqs orders. Neither of the above, given the politically charged

134. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, pp. 51, 58, 60, 61, 64. 135. The government controlled radio broadcasts and had printing presses under surveillance, making information dissemination almost impossible. An early cable to New York by an AP correspondent helped, by allowing the news to make its way back to Iranian newspapers. See Wilber, Clandestine Service History, p. 45. 136. The author recalls the news reached a gathering at a jovial dinner party. Several military officers among the guests sprang up, straightened their uniforms, and rushed out in lightening speed, muttering Zahedi Aamad! [Zahedi has come!] 137. Mordad 27, 1332. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 351. 138. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 350-351. 139. The Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, No. 347, 788.00/8-1853Telegram, SECRET, NIACT, Tehran, August 18, 1953, in John P. Glennon, ed. Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, Vol. 10, Department of State Publication No. 9690 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989) pp. 748-752. 140. Mordad 28, 1332. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 351; Wilber, Clandestine Service History, pp. 52, 67-68.

484 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

national atmosphere, could have been exclusively due to US-British payments. Money was spent, of course, but Irans political machines had brought out street demonstrators in the past frequently enough not to be overwhelmed by mobs bought by CIA-SIS funds. That there was sufficient public concern to bring people into the streets is a reality not to be ignored. The National Front had collapsed, Kashani and Mosaddeq once allies had become adversaries, the Tudeh and its links to Moscow had frightened the populace into action, the Senate had ceased to exist, the Majlis had been dissolved, and the military strained to the breaking point. General Riahi informed Mosaddeq at 10:30 in the morning that he had lost control of the army. Mosaddeq asked him to hold on, but only one battalion loyal to Mosaddeq could be assembled to protect his residence.141 Supporters of the monarchy took control of the national radio station in Tehran at 2:12 in the afternoon by their sheer numbers and announced to the nation Zahedis royal appointment as Prime Minister. Mosaddeqs opponents then attacked his home, precipitating an exchange of fire with his security detail. Mosaddeq and a number of associates sought refuge in a neighbors home as their guards finally surrendered. Some 300 lives were reported lost in the struggle.142 Although the CIAs Tehran Station had been authorized in April to spend $1,000,000 in covert activities, and again on May 20 to spend one million rials ($1=90 rials) a week, the total expenditure reported by Roosevelt had altogether been $100,000.143 It is unfortunate that the word coup is applied loosely to the case. The term coup, properly understood, fits Mosaddeqs refusal to accept the legal order to remove him, but Zahedis assumption of the premiership not at all. The uprising of August 19, 1953, therefore, may indeed have been a popular reaction to the failed coup, contrary to the often unquestioned assertion to the contrary.144 Nancy Lambton had predicted that many if not most lawyers, journalists, physicians, educators, bankers, and businessmen, motivated by patriotism, would seek Mosaddeqs removal.145 To dismiss or even discount the widespread resentment of Mosaddeqs government is to claim that Iran had been devoid of internal national dynamics, and that Iranians had sold themselves mindlessly for a mere one hundred thousand dollars.146 Stalins death in March 1953 also may have been a factor in the outcome and at the very least a lucky break for the anti-communists involved in the Iranian crisis. Stalins death may have cast Tudeh adrift during the immediate post-Stalin power struggle in Moscow, leaving among other things a packing case of postage stamps overprinted with the words
141. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, p. 69. 142. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 784. 143. Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 166. The plan had budgeted $147,000 by the US and $137,000 by the UK, perhaps as part of the $1 million provided to the Tehran CIA Station in April 1953 and an additional $11,000 per week allowance from May 20. There is little evidence that the money was actually spent. See Gasiorowski, The 1953 Coup, Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 239; Wilber, Clandestine Service History, p. 71, Appendix B, London Draft, p. 1. 144. The conventional wisdom may have been no more than wisdom by convention; see The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/ index.html, particularly pp. 43-44, 47-49, 51, 53, 60-65, 68-69, 72, 74, 76. 145. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 770; Wilber, Clandestine Service History, p. 7. 146. The claim is self-congratulatory to some, glorifying to others, and dangerous for international relations for it suggests regime change is both easy and cheap!

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 485

Republic of Iran a reminder of what might have happened had the Soviet Union intervened.147
The coup cannot be blamed solely on foreign actors or, more specifically on the United States. The actions of the Tudeh Party and the National Front defectors during the preceding year were crucial in persuading U.S. officials to undertake the coup. Mosaddeq and his colleagues made strategic and tactical mistakes that very much facilitated it. The Shah and common Iranians made essential contributions.148

ZAHEDIS GOvERNMENT
Having succeeded to establish his government, Zahedi cabled the Shah on August 20 to return home. That afternoon, Muhammad Mosaddeq, Dr. Gholam-Hossein Sadiqi, Dr. Ali Shaygan, and Seifollah Moazami were arrested and after a brief stop at the police headquarters were taken to the Officers Club where Zahedi greeted Mosaddeq and Mosaddeq congratulated Zahedi in return. Zahedi paid a visit to Ayatollah Kashani on August 21, the day that the Shah and Queen Soraya returned to Tehran. The Shah thanked the nation in an emotional radio message that afternoon. Roosevelt arrived in London on August 25, having flown secretly to Bahrain and from there to England.149 Dr. Hossein Fatemi, in hiding since August 18, was finally arrested in Tajrish, north Tehran, six months later on March 13, 1954. A military court sentenced him to death on October 10. An appeals court declined to rescind the sentence on November 6, and he faced a firing squad four days later on November 10, 1954. Prime Minister Zahedi governed less than 20 months and stepped down at the Shahs request on April 6, 1955. The elder statesman Hossein Ala, a member of the Qajar nobility, was then named his successor.150 The events leading to the fall of Mosaddeq and its immediate aftermath as popularly reported are devoid of revealing nuances. For instance, that Zahedi had been Mosaddeqs Minister of Interior until they had had a falling out that resulted in Zahedis resignation on August 2, 1951 or that Mosaddeqs half-brother Abolfath Diba (known by his Qajar title of nobility, Heshmat al-Dowleh) had remained the Shahs advisor and confidant during Mosaddeqs premiership have been either played down to

147. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 778. 148. Gasiorski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp. 276-277. 149. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, p. 78. 150. Aqeli, Chronology, Vol. II, pp. 9-54. It is worthy of note that when the resolution to depose the Qajar dynasty was introduced in the Majlis on October 31, 1925, only four legislators opposed Reza Pahlavis ascendance to the throne. All four Sayyed Hassan Taqizadeh, Hossein Ala, Muhammad Mosaddeq, and Yahya Dowlatabadi praised him but no one said a word in support of the Qajars. Mosaddeq and Ala became legislators, diplomats, and Prime Ministers. Taqizadeh (1878-1969), born a preachers son in Tabriz, became an ardent nationalist elected to the Majlis repeatedly. He was excommunicated for his advocacy of modernism and Western values. He served as cabinet minister and envoy to France before WWII. Dowlatabadi (1862-1939) studied at theological seminaries in Esfahan, but was accused of apostacy and left to establish several secular primary schools in Tehran. He left Iran in 1927 and returned shortly before his death in 1939. See Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, pp. 369-371.

486 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

insignificance or ignored completely.151 Similarly, much is said of CIA-SIS anti-Mosaddeq propaganda, cartoons, and articles planted in the Iranian press, but the fact that the pro-Mosaddeq publications outnumbered them by five to one is not given much prominence. Of a total of 370 newspapers and journals published, 70 or one-fifth opposed Mosaddeq and his government.152 Yet that does not reflect the enormity of the pro-Mosaddeq media effect. The state-controlled national and provincial radio broadcasts were exceptionally effective. The departure of Mosaddeq for the meetings in New York in October 1951, for example, was broadcast live from the airport. After an emotional report of what was at stake and a farewell speech by the Prime Minister, the roaring sound of the engines were heard as the aircraft lifted off the tarmac. The reporters grave comments continued as the engines gradually became inaudible. The result was stunning in that in the absence of television those listening to the radio program could actually visualize, and indeed feel, the flight and the weight the Prime Minister carried on his tired shoulders. It is hard to imagine that anyone who heard that broadcast did less than wish the old man in ill health a safe and successful journey.153 On November 16, 1955, the terrorist group Fadaiyan-e Islam, nearly succeeded in claiming another life. As Prime Minister Ala entered the Soltani Mosque to attend a memorial service for Ayatollah Kashanis son, a gunman fired at him from pointblank range but the gun jammed.154 The gunman, Mozaffar-Ali Zolqadr, slammed the jammed handgun on the frail statesmans head in frustration. Prime Minister Ala was rushed to a hospital with a bleeding head wound and appeared at numerous official functions with a bandaged head. On November 23, Fadaiyans luck, it seemed, had run out as Mojtaba Navab-Safavi, the head of the group, and two others were arrested.155 On January 1, 1956, the Majlis revoked the law (passed by the 17th Majlis) that had freed Prime Minister Razmaras assassin. On January 18, 1956, Navab-Safavi, Khalil Tahmasebi, and Mozaffar Zolqadr were executed by firing squad.156 A month later on February 17, 1956, Ayatollah Kashani admitted to the army prosecutor investigating Razmaras murder that I issued the Fatwa to kill Razmara, for I was a qualified Mojtahed.157 He was detained for a while, then withdrew from politics and died at the age of 80 on March 13, 1962.

151. Gasiorski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp. 37, 71. 152. Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 98. 153. The author was in a tailors shop during the radio broadcast. Everyone, employees and customers alike, was frozen still listening to the live report. 154. Mostafa Kashani, son of Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashani, had been a Majlis representative. His death appeared suspicious, leading to the arrests of a number of suspects including Mostafas household staff and his political opponents. 155. After the coup of 1953 Navab had visited Jerusalem to take part in a conference on the future of Palestine and traveled to Egypt to meet Muslim Brotherhoods Sayyid Qutb. He tried to reactivate the Fadaiyan Islam group upon his return to Iran. 156. Day 27, 1334. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 62. 157. Bahman 27, 1334. Man fatvaay-e ghatl-e Razmara ra saader kardam, chon mojtahed-e jaameosharaayet boodam. See Aqeli, Chronology, p. 63. In a similar fashion, Ayatollah Muhammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi was quoted in 2006 as having declared: If anyone insults Islamic sanctities, Islam has permitted to spill his blood no court needed It does not matter what people think. People are ignorant sheep.

IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITED M 487

Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq, the former Prime Minister, was tried after the coup of 1953 and sentenced to three years home confinement on his property the village of Ahmadabad where he remained until his death on March 5, 1967. King Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, who had succeeded to the throne under the humiliating circumstances of his countrys foreign occupation that had forced his fathers abdication and exile after a decade of political impasse, instability, assassinations, and foreign subversion sought powers the 1906 Constitution had not granted the crown. Yet evidence suggests that he may have tried to reign within his constitutional mandate, despite the internal and external pressures he endured. His rule, however, orchestrated a period of astonishing national prosperity and aspirations to catch up with the industrial world. Weakened by the cancer that he had kept a state secret, surrounded by sycophants and devoid of competent elder statesmen as advisors, demoralized by the defections of those on whose support he had counted, and faced with escalating demonstrations that had begun in 1977, he left Iran on January 16, 1979, never to return. That both the Shah and Mosaddeq were Iranian patriots there should be no doubt. Both their mindsets had been forged by the experiences of their countrys repeated occupation and humiliation and near pathological suspicion of Russo-British imperial designs.158 By the time Muhammad Reza Shah died on July 27, 1980 in Cairo, the Islamic Republic had replaced the Pahlavi Monarchy. The stars of Irans August 1953 milestone, Kashani, Mosaddeq, Zahedi, Roosevelt, and the Shah, have long passed away. Yet a fair review of the political turmoil that led to the event points to internal dynamics more potent than any foreign influence. To be sure the United States and Britain played a role in the event, spent limited funds to hearten Mosaddeqs opponents, and encouraged political fence-sitters. Those involvements occurred in 1953, but Irans history did not begin in that year. The saga that made the 1953 upheaval possible had indeed begun at least as far back as 1941-45, if not earlier. To heap all responsibility for Mosaddeqs fall exclusively on a joint US-British conspiracy is to turn a blind eye to powerful driving forces within Iran itself. The same political alliances that had brought Mosaddeq to power brought him down when they collapsed. Two of the alliance factions re-emerged 25 years later activist clerics and left-leaning nationalists to overthrow the monarchy that had won the earlier contest in 1953. Similarities between the Islamic Republic that emerged in 1979 and the Islamic government that Ayatollah Kashani had advocated decades earlier are striking. The coalition that made Irans revolution succeed in 1979 broke apart soon after the Islamic Republics founding, as the cleric-revolutionaries and the intellectual-nationalists parted ways. The differences are reflective of a persistent conflict that has engulfed Iranians for at least two centuries. To put it bluntly, the clerics have expected Iran to serve Islam, and the nationalists have sought Islam to serve Iran. The conflict, rejuvenated in WWII, came to a head in 1953 without resolution and has persisted even in the Islamic Republic. Thus the coup of 1953 and the Revolution of 1979, properly understood, are not isolated incidents, nor are they conclusive events. The pendulumlike swings and counter-swings between nationalist-modernism and religious-traditionalism may have gravitated towards a final equilibrium. The traditionalists and the modernists both ought to welcome that equilibrium, as they run the risk of discrediting

158. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 742.

488 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

themselves if they dont. The conflict is thus fundamental, and must be resolved exclusively in the hearts and minds of Iranians themselves. Blaming others will only fan the flames of discontent and postpone ultimate resolution. A level-headed analysis would offer the sobering suggestion that an overt external intervention will do even worse. A speech delivered by Reza Shah on the occasion of a holy observance in early 1937 is illustrative of the persistent tension between nationalist modernizers and their religious critics.
A number of people make the mistake of thinking that the meaning of reform and progress in the world today is that they no longer need to observe the principles of religion and religious laws, or in other words, they see a contradiction between reform and progress on the one hand and religion on the other. The fact is that the great Law Giver of Islam, were he living today and confronted by the progress of the world, would himself demonstrate the conformity of the basic features of his laws with the conditions and forms of the present day civilization. Unfortunately during the course of centuries men have abused his fundamental and clear ideas, and as a result, they have pulled the country backwards so that for thirteen centuries, when each century should have been a great stride forward toward progress and perfection, it has remained backward and stagnant. We must now, frankly facing these defects, make amends for the intolerance of the past.159

159. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, p. 400; Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi, p. 180.