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Foundations of European Politics
Foundations of European
Politics

A Comparative Approach

Catherine E. De Vries
Sara B. Hobolt
Sven-Oliver Proksch
Jonathan B. Slapin
 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom

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Preface

The idea for this textbook goes back to a sunny afternoon in bustling Milan
in June 2017. The four of us were participating in the annual conference
organized by the European Political Science Association and we met in a
street café to exchange views about our ongoing research projects. The
conversation moved on to a more general discussion of teaching European
politics at our various universities. Each of us regularly teach classes on
European politics, albeit in four different countries, including general
introductions but also seminars and lectures focusing on elections and
voting behaviour, political institutions, and European Union politics. Over
the years, we had come to realize that existing textbook resources to teach
these classes had become increasingly difficult to use for two reasons.
First, explaining patterns in national politics in Europe without an
understanding of the developments at the European Union level was
becoming nearly impossible. Brexit may be the most obvious example, but
there are many other instances where EU politics matters increasingly for
national politics. For instance, the emergence of new political parties in
national elections may have roots in European level politics. Second,
explaining interactions at the European Union level between governments
and supranational actors is increasingly difficult without understanding the
domestic politics behind action at the European level. National parties, for
example, continue to play an important role in the political framework of
the European Union.
On that day, sitting in the Milan street café, we decided to write a new
textbook that bridges the national and European levels of government by
adopting a rigorous analytical approach in the hope that such a resource will
be useful for university teachers and students alike in learning about the
fundamentals of contemporary European politics. This book is the
culmination of our efforts.
In addition to providing the theoretical foundations necessary to
understand national and European political actors and institutions, the
textbook aims to expose students to various political data in Europe. The
book offers many data visualizations, as well as extensive online materials
that introduce major political science datasets currently being used by
academics to study European politics. The online materials allow students
to answer exercise questions using interactive data visualizations based on
these datasets. In combination, we hope that the book and the online
materials will be used by the next generation of scholars of European
politics.
This textbook would not have been possible without the help of
numerous scholars and colleagues. First, we like to thank Pit Rieger and
Jens Wäckerle for excellent research assistance along the way. Pit created
the many data visualizations found throughout this book. Jens has done an
outstanding job in developing the online materials, including all of the
interactive data exercises. Both Jens and Pit provided many helpful
suggestions to make the textbook even more approachable to students. The
book would not be what it is without their invaluable help.
In addition, many colleagues have read various chapters of this book,
and some even the entire manuscript, and they gave us valuable feedback
and comments. These intrepid souls include: Chitralekha Basu, Bruno
Castanho Silva, Michele Fenzl, David Fortunato, Daniel Kelemen, Lucas
Leemann, Lanny Martin, Stefan Müller, Verena Reidinger, Lennart
Schürmann, and Christopher Wratil. We also thank the numerous
anonymous reviewers who have furthermore helped us to be more concise
and precise with our arguments. We are grateful to Oxford University Press,
in particular Sarah Iles and Katie Staal, who have always believed in this
project and who have kept us (mostly) on schedule! Finally, we would like
to thank our many wonderful students over the years who have taught us so
much and inspired us to write this book. We dedicate this book to them and
the next generation of European politics scholars.
Catherine E. De Vries
Sara B. Hobolt
Sven-Oliver Proksch
Jonathan B. Slapin
February 2021
Brief Contents

Detailed Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Boxes
How to Use this Book
Guided Tour of the Online Resources
About the Authors

1 Introduction

PART ONE Theoretical Foundations

2 Democratic Politics
3 Multilevel Politics in Europe

PART TWO Citizens and Voters

4 Ideology and Issues
5 Voting Decisions

PART THREE Elections and Parties

6 Electoral Systems and Direct Democracy
7 Representation
8 Political Parties
9 Party Competition
PART FOUR Governments and Policy
10 Political Systems and Government Formation
11 Law-Making in Governments and Parliaments
12 Policy Outcomes in Europe

PART FIVE Rule of Law, Democracy, and Backsliding

13 Rule of Law and Judicial Politics
14 European Politics into the Future

Glossary
Bibliography
Index
Detailed Contents

List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Boxes
How to Use this Book
Guided Tour of the Online Resources
About the Authors

1 Introduction
1.1 Political Analysis as Model-Building
1.2 Democracy and Democratization
1.3 Citizenship and Participation
1.4 Our Approach and Scope
1.5 Plan for the Book

PART ONE Theoretical Foundations

2 Democratic Politics
2.1 A Model of Democracy: The Median Voter
2.2 Delegation and Representative Democracy
2.3 Principals and Agents in Representative Democracy
2.4 Multidimensional Politics
2.5 Summary
3 Multilevel Politics in Europe
3.1 Supranational Politics in Europe
3.2 Delegation and Pooling
 3.3 Subnational Politics in Europe
3.4 Federalism and Decentralization
3.5 Summary

PART TWO Citizens and Voters

4 Ideology and Issues
4.1 Ideology and Elections
4.2 New Political Issues and Multidimensional Politics
4.3 Populism and Anti-Elite Attitudes
4.4 Summary
5 Voting Decisions
5.1 Why Citizens Vote
5.2 How Citizens Vote
5.3 Stability of Vote Choices
5.4 Institutional Context and Second Order Elections
5.5 Summary

PART THREE Elections and Parties

6 Electoral Systems and Direct Democracy
6.1 Objectives of Electoral Systems
6.2 Majoritarian Systems
6.3 Proportional Systems
6.4 Mixed Systems
6.5 Electoral Systems and the Party System
6.6 Direct Democracy in Europe
6.7 Referendums on European Integration
6.8 Summary
7 Representation
7.1 Types of Representation
 7.2 Substantive Representation in Proportional and Majoritarian
Systems
7.3 Descriptive Representation and Gender Equality in Politics
7.4 Political Rhetoric and Signalling
7.5 Summary
8 Political Parties
8.1 The Origins of Parties: Stasis and Change
8.2 Party Families
8.3 Party Types and Organization
8.4 Niche, Populist, and Challenger Parties
8.5 Summary
9 Party Competition
9.1 Party Systems
9.2 Spatial Models of Party Competition
9.3 Issue Competition and Issue Entrepreneurship
9.4 Mobilizing the EU Issue
9.5 Valence Models of Party Competition
9.6 Responses of Mainstream Parties to Challengers
9.7 Summary

PART FOUR Governments and Policy

10 Political Systems and Government Formation
10.1 Institutional Variation of Democracy in Europe
10.2 The Political System of the EU: A Mixed System
10.3 Government Formation at the National Level
10.4 Types of Government Coalitions
10.5 Coalition Formation with Policy-Seeking Parties
10.6 The Role of Institutions in Government Formation
10.7 Choosing the EU Commission President
 10.8 Summary
11 Law-Making in Governments and Parliaments
11.1 Veto Players and Law-Making
11.2 Cabinet Ministers: Agenda-Setters for their Party
11.3 Enforcing Coalition Compromise Inside and Outside
Parliament
11.4 Why Minority Governments Work
11.5 Interest Groups and Informal Influences on Policy-Making
11.6 Law-Making in the European Union
11.7 Summary
12 Policy Outcomes in Europe
12.1 Policy Authority in a Multilevel Europe
12.2 Trade Policy
12.3 Immigration Policy
12.4 Environmental Policy
12.5 Health Policy
12.6 Summary

PART FIVE Rule of Law, Democracy, and Backsliding

13 Rule of Law and Judicial Politics
13.1 Why Obey the Law? A Theoretical Discussion
13.2 Politics, Law, and the Legal System
13.3 Power of Courts
13.4 Constitutions, Parliaments, and Judicial Review
13.5 European Law and a Changing European Judiciary
13.6 Rule of Law in the EU: Infringements and Compliance
13.7 Summary
14 European Politics into the Future
14.1 Political Fragmentation and its Impact on Governance
 14.2 Democratic Backsliding in EU Member States
14.3 Brexit and the Future of the EU–UK Relationship
14.4 The Democratic Deficit in the European Union
14.5 European Politics into the Future
14.6 Summary

Glossary
Bibliography
Index
List of Figures

1.1 Paths to Democracy for Several European Democracies

1.2 Map of Europe: Countries Covered in the Book
1.3 Thematic Overview of the Book

2.1 Policy Preferences on a Single Issue

2.2 A Two-Dimensional Policy Space
2.3 Indifference Curve Example
3.1 European Union Chain of Delegation
3.2 Widening of the European Union
3.3 Collective Action Problem: Prisoners’ Dilemma
3.4 Development of European Integration
3.5 Regional Authority within the EU

4.1 Voter Ideological Self-Placement on a General Left–Right Scale

4.2 Uni-dimensional Electoral Competition
4.3 Two-Dimensional Electoral Competition
4.4 Support for EU Membership across Europe
4.5 Support for Integration across Europe
4.6 Populist Attitudes across Twelve European Countries, 2019

5.1 Turnout in European and National Parliamentary Elections

5.2 Ideological Positions of Voter and Parties on a Single Dimension
5.3 Trends in Electoral Volatility in European and National Parliamentary
Elections in Europe
5.4 Electoral Performance of National Parties in European and National
Elections
 6.1 Varieties of Electoral Systems in Europe
6.2 Disproportionality of Elections in Europe
6.3 Relationship between Disproportionality and Effective Number of
Parliamentary Parties
6.4 Moving to Proportional Representation: The Electoral Threat Model
by Boix
6.5 Initiatives and Referendums in Europe
6.6 Referendums on European Integration

7.1 Congruence in the Italian Political System: 2018–2020

7.2 Spatial Model of Policy Responsiveness
7.3 Development of Female Representation in European Parliaments
7.4 Female Heads of Government or Heads of State in Europe, 2015–
2020
7.5 Female Ministers in Cabinets in Europe
7.6 Relationship between Female Representation in Parliament and in
Cabinet

8.1 Party Membership in Western Europe, 1945–2015

8.2 Party Attachment in Western Europe, 1975–2016
8.3 Party Family Vote Shares in Western Europe, 1919–2019
8.4 Party Family Vote Shares in Post-Communist European Countries,
1990–2019
8.5 Political Parties in Germany
8.6 Political Parties in Spain
8.7 Political Parties in the UK
8.8 Political Parties in Poland
8.9 Political Groups in the European Parliament, 2019
8.10 Types of Party Organizations

9.1 Polarized Party System

9.2 Downsian Model of Party Competition
 9.3 Eurosceptic Parties in National and European Elections

10.1 The Political System of the EU: Shared Executive Power

10.2 Government Types in Europe Following Parliamentary Elections,
1945–2019
10.3 Ideology and Coalition Formation in the Netherlands, 2017
10.4 Opportunity for Minority Government
10.5 Frequency of Majority, Minority, and Caretaker Governments in
Europe

11.1 Veto Players in Italy Following 2018 Election

11.2 Ministerial Autonomy and Compromise Model of Policy-Making
11.3 Variation of Parliamentary Policing Strength in Europe
11.4 The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in the EU
11.5 Number of Meetings between Interest Groups and the European
Commission (2014–2020)

12.1 Policy-Making Powers of the European Union

12.2 Importance of the Immigration Issue for Party Families in Europe
12.3 Environmental Outcomes in EU Member States
12.4 Health Outcomes in Europe

13.1 Trust in the Judiciary and Other Political Actors

13.2 Preliminary Ruling Procedure Referrals over Time and by Member
State
13.3 Monitoring Compliance with EU Law: The Infringement Procedure
13.4 Infringement Cases in the EU, 2002–2018

14.1 The Volatility of Government Compositions in Europe

14.2 Democratic Decline in Poland and Hungary
14.3 Most Important Issue in the UK
List of Tables

3.1 Overview of European Treaties

6.1 Major Electoral System Reforms in Europe since 1945

6.2 Types of Referendums

7.1 Two Dimensions of Representation

7.2 Majoritarian and Proportional Visions of Democracy
7.3 Legislators’ Behavioural Incentives in Parliament

8.1 Summary of Main Cleavages

10.1 Political Systems in Europe

11.1 Parliaments in Europe

11.2 History of EU Decision-Making Rules from a Veto Players
Perspective

13.1 Constitutional Court’s Ability to Review Laws

List of Boxes

1.1 Methods and Measurement: Measuring Democracy

2.1 Case Study: Cyclical Majorities in Politics

3.1 Methods and Measurements: Using Game Theory to Analyse Politics

3.2 Case Study: The History of Qualified Majority Voting in the EU
3.3 Controversies and Debates: Theories and Explanations for European
Integration
3.4 Case Study: The Issue of Catalan Independence

4.1 Controversies and Debates: Converse on Belief Systems and

Ideology
4.2 Case Study: The French Revolution and the Origins of Left–Right
Politics
4.3 Methods and Measurement: Measuring Postmaterialism
4.4 Methods and Measurement: Measuring Eurosceptic Attitudes
4.5 Methods and Measurement: Measuring Populist Attitudes

5.1 Case Study: Voter Turnout and Postal Voting in Switzerland

5.2 Case Study: The Lack of Electoral Punishment of Corruption
5.3 Methods and Measurement: Measuring Electoral Volatility

6.1 Case Study: Presidential Elections in Europe

6.2 Controversies and Debates: The Complexity of District Magnitudes
in PR Systems
6.3 Case Study: The German Mixed-Member Proportional System
6.4 Case Study: The European Citizens’ Initiative
 7.1 Controversies and Debates: Do Parties Respond to Shifts in Public
Opinion?
7.2 Controversies and Debates: Is the European Union Responsive to
Voters?

8.1 Case Study: Left-Wing Parties in Poland and Hungary

8.2 Methods and Measurement: How to Measure Party Positions

9.1 Methods and Measurement: Party System Fragmentation and

Polarization

10.1 Controversies and Debates: Citizens’ Perceptions of Coalition

Compromise
10.2 Controversies and Debates: Policy Portfolios and the Spoils of
Government

11.1 Controversies and Debates: Is Policy Stability Good or Bad?

12.1 Case Study: Monetary Policy in the EU

12.2 Controversies and Debates: Is the EU a Regulatory State?
12.3 Case Study: European Responses to the Covid-19 Outbreak in 2020
12.4 Controversies and Debates: How to Classify Welfare States in
Europe?

13.1 Case Study: Cyber-Bullying in the UK

13.2 Case Study: Important European Court Cases in Establishing the EU
Legal System

14.1 Controversies and Debates: EU Enlargement and its Consequences

for EU Decision-Making
How to Use this Book

Methods and Measurement Boxes

Provide more detailed information about methodological concerns, or
examine questions about how to measure particular facets of politics.

Case Study Boxes

Case study boxes foreground particular examples in greater detail to
demonstrate a concept, or to show how it applies in real-world politics.

Controversies and Debates Boxes

Controversies and debates boxes highlight disagreements in the academic
literature about both theoretical concepts and empirical findings.

Glossary Terms
Key terms appear emboldened in the text and are defined in a glossary at
the end of the book, helping you to understand technical terms as you learn,
and acting as a useful prompt when it comes to revision.
Guided Tour of the Online Resources

For student Multiple-Choice Questions, Web Links, and lecturer

resources go to: www.oup.com/he/DeVries1e
For Dataset Descriptions and Exercises, go to:
www.foundationsofeuropeanpolitics.com

For Students

Multiple-Choice Questions
Self-marking multiple-choice questions for each chapter reinforces
students’ understanding of the key points of each chapter, and provide a
useful prompt for revision.

Web Links
Web links to further relevant information to help students take their learning
further.

Dataset Decriptions
An interactive guide to important datasets that can be used by students to
analyse European politics.

Interactive Data Exercises

Explore key concepts from each chapter with activities which encourage
you to manipulate and engage with data.

For registered adopters

Essay Questions
Ready-made essay questions for each chapter have been designed to use in
assessment, or to stimulate class debate.

Test-Bank Questions
A bank of multiple-choice questions to be used for assessment purposes, to
help test students’ understanding of the key concepts explored in each
chapter.

PowerPoint Slides
PowerPoint slides accompany each chapter, and can be used and tailored by
lecturers in their teaching.
About the Authors

Catherine E. De Vries is a Professor of Political Science at Bocconi

University. She is the author of several books on European politics,
including Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration (OUP,
2018) and Political Entrepreneurs (Princeton UP, 2020).

Sara B. Hobolt is the Sutherland Chair in European Institutions and

professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is
the author of four books on European politics, including Europe in Question
(OUP, 2009), Blaming Europe? (OUP, 2014) and Political Entrepreneurs
(Princeton UP, 2020).

Sven-Oliver Proksch is a Professor of Political Science and Chair in

European and Multilevel Politics at the University of Cologne. His research
interests include political representation, party politics, parliaments, and
political text analysis. He is co-author of the book The Politics of
Parliamentary Debates (CUP, 2015).

Jonathan B. Slapin is a Professor of Political Science and Chair in

Political Institutions and European Politics at the University of Zürich. His
current research focuses on European parliamentary and party politics, and
his most recent book is Roll Call Rebels (CUP, 2019).
 1 Introduction

On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom held a referendum in which the country
voted to leave the European Union (EU). At the time, few figures loomed
larger over British politics than Nigel Farage, the leader of the United
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Farage and UKIP had been
campaigning for the UK to leave the EU for many years. And ahead of the
general election of 2015, the threat of UKIP encouraged Conservative Prime
Minister David Cameron to commit to a referendum on EU membership.
Throughout the referendum campaign, Farage made regular appearances in the
media, including as a panellist on the BBC’s popular weekly political show
Question Time, and he continued to be a regular thorn in the side of the Prime
Minister. Ultimately, the campaign to leave the EU won the day. UKIP and its
charismatic leader were an important force in pushing the UK towards this
outcome.
Meanwhile, across the English Channel, another populist politician was
having similar success in France. In 2011, Marine Le Pen became leader of the
National Front (which is now known as the National Rally), a radical right
party. She took over the party helm from her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, who
had founded the party and led it since 1972. The elder Le Pen, in particular,
was known for his anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim views. Like UKIP, the
National Rally has opposed French membership in the European Union and
other international organizations. The party also strongly opposes immigration,
especially from outside of Europe. Marine Le Pen secured reasonably strong
political backing and managed to enter the second round of the 2017 French
presidential elections against Emmanuel Macron. Even though she eventually
lost, she put up a strong electoral showing.
Besides their similar positions and well-known public personas, Nigel
Farage and Marine Le Pen have something else in common. Their parties have
never performed particularly well in national parliamentary elections. UKIP
has only ever won one single seat in the British House of Commons—a seat
held by the formerly Conservative MP Douglas Carswell. Nigel Farage,
himself, has never won a seat in the House of Commons despite standing for
election seven times. Marine Le Pen has only done slightly better. In her fifth
attempt to become a deputy in the French National Assembly, she finally won
a seat in 2017. Her National Rally party, however, remains a fringe
phenomenon in the French parliament, holding only eight seats out of 577 in
the National Assembly following the 2017 election.
In contrast, both UKIP and the National Rally have performed exceedingly
well in the European elections that elect deputies to the European Parliament
(EP)—the directly elected parliament of the European Union. UKIP and its
successor party—the Brexit Party—finished as the largest British party in both
the 2014 and 2019 EP elections and the second largest in 2009. Nigel Farage
held a seat in the EP from 1999 until 31 January 2020, the day the UK left the
EU. During that time, he made a name for himself as someone prone to
outlandish speeches in which he would insult both European institutions and
politicians. Likewise, Le Pen’s party was the first-place finisher in the EP
elections in France in both 2014 and 2019, and, like Farage, Le Pen used her
role as a member of the European Parliament to project an image of herself as
someone willing to fight European institutions back in France.
Beyond the UK and France, the rest of Europe has also been experiencing
dramatic political change. Many smaller parties, sometimes holding radical
views, have come to national prominence, having had greater electoral success
at the European level than the national level. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
for example, the German Green party consistently polled better in European
elections than at home. Even when parties holding radical views first
experienced success nationally, this success was often validated in subsequent
European elections. The Five Star Movement, an Italian party founded by
comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, came to prominence by winning almost
26 per cent of the votes and becoming the second largest party in Italy
following the 2013 national elections. The party’s platform was very critical of
European integration, expressing support for holding a referendum to leave the
EU’s common currency, the Euro (although it has since softened its tone). In
the subsequent 2014 EP election, the party repeated its success, securing 21
per cent of the vote and again finishing as the second largest party.
In the 2019 EP election, smaller parties across many countries and at both
ends of the ideological spectrum continued their string of successes, winning a
record number of seats. In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany
(AfD) won 11 per cent of the vote, similar to their vote share in the previous
national election and more than double their vote share from the 2013 national
election; in Sweden, the Green Party likewise captured over 11 per cent, more
than doubling their previous national vote share; and in Greece, the Coalition
of the Radical Left (Syriza) won 23 per cent of the vote, finishing as one of top
two parties in every Greek election since 2010, when previously they had
tended to win less than 5 per cent of the vote. When these parties sustain their
European-level success at the national level, as the German AfD, the Italian
Five Star Movement, and the Greek Syriza have done, it creates particular
challenges for more moderate, traditional parties, who must decide how to
compete against these upstarts. The decisions they make impact voters’
choices at the ballot box. And the success of new parties nationally has
concrete consequences for the formation of governments. Most countries
across Europe use a form of parliamentary system, in which the formation of
government occurs within parliament after an election, and governments need
the support of a majority in parliament to make policy. New types of coalitions
have formed and governed, including an all-populist government in Italy
comprised of the Five Star Movement and the League Party (Lega), and a
novel coalition government in Austria of the centre-right Austrian People’s
Party and the Greens. Numerous governments haven been unable to muster
stable parliamentary majorities, including in Spain, the Czech Republic,
Belgium, and Ireland due to increasingly fragmented parliaments.
So why are some politicians prominent in national politics when the
national parties that they lead have never had much success at the national
level? Why do some parties experience relatively more, or earlier, success in
European Parliament elections? Why are parties able to generate electoral buzz
by criticizing the European Union or Brussels elites? What should mainstream,
established parties do when competing against these parties? And what are the
implications for government formation, policy-making, and political
representation?
 These questions touch on important themes that lie at the very heart of
European politics today. They get at the interplay between national and
European politics. They ask why populist and anti-EU views have become so
omnipresent in European politics. They even touch on why voters feel
disenfranchised or unrepresented by mainstream political parties and politics.
And they ask how parties compete in elections, especially when smaller parties
that challenge the system experience electoral success.
Given their importance, we must carefully consider how best to answer
these and many other similar questions surrounding European politics. That is
precisely what this book seeks to do. In addition to offering answers to these
questions and many others, this book aims to discuss the tools and approaches
necessary to understand politics systematically. That way, when new questions
about politics and policy arise, readers of this book will be able to answer
them even when this book does not. In other words, we hope to introduce
students to the research on European politics and the reasoning that underpins
that research so they can engage in research themselves. In doing so, our book
covers the foundations of European politics.
We argue that to understand European politics we must accept two
premises. First, we must take the interplay between European and national-
level politics seriously and study the two levels simultaneously. We would not
be able to understand the prominence of politicians like Nigel Farage and
Marine Le Pen, and thus important trends across European politics, without
understanding the interplay of national and European politics. Second, we
must take guidance from a theoretical model of politics. A theoretical model
helps us to make our assumptions about politics explicit, and ensures that our
arguments are logically consistent. A model allows us to zoom in on essential
parts of politics—e.g. how electoral systems work, how voters choose to
support political candidates and parties, how parties compete, and how laws
get made. Models provide us with an understanding of similarities and
differences across political systems and levels of government. They allow us
to make comparisons and to test arguments about how politics works. Such an
approach is more general than one that simply looks at the politics of
individual countries, e.g. France, Germany, Poland, or the United Kingdom.
Indeed, the examples so far show that similar patterns can occur in more than
one country and that we can learn about general phenomena through
comparison.
But why focus on Europe? Why read a whole book, or take a whole class
on European politics? Again, we believe there are two reasons related to the
stories we have just told. First, Europe is home to the largest number and
variety of democratic governments anywhere in the world. If we want to
understand democracy, its nuances, even its fragility in supposedly stable
systems, Europe is the place to look. And second, we can see EU integration
as an experiment in supranational governance—democratic governance above
the level of the nation-state—that requires explaining and understanding. Even
for students living in other areas of the world, understanding how European
democracy works is extremely important for understanding how the EU
influences world politics. It can provide insights into how democracy and
international integration work all over the world.
The remainder of this introductory chapter discusses our comparative
analytical approach to the study of European politics. It then introduces the
core concept of democracy, which is fundamental to our understanding
European politics, and discusses how democracy has developed across the
European continent over time, paying attention to theories that seek to explain
its development. Finally, we provide a road map for the remainder of the book
and explain its organization. In this chapter and throughout the book we will
take a theoretical and topic-based, rather than country-based, approach. But, of
course, we will repeatedly refer to politics in different countries across Europe
to offer examples of the concepts and ideas that we introduce.

1.1 Political Analysis as Model-Building

We have said that our approach to European politics will be comparative in
nature, but that means that we require a basis for comparison. For that we
require theory. Theory offers a simplified version of reality—we can think of
it as a model—that allows us to tell a logically consistent story about how
different social and political factors relate to one another. It involves making
assumptions about the world. A generalizable theory, or model, provides a
basis for comparison across different cases and for the testing of different
ideas, or hypotheses, about how politics works. With a comparative model-
based approach, we can explore political phenomena by comparing people’s
actions within and across countries and political systems.
To better understand why we require a model, we must first consider the
purpose that models serve. We can start by imagining a visit to a shop where
we purchase a kit of a model airplane. The model plane may resemble a real
plane in some ways, but diverge from it in others. Some model kits seek to
precisely replicate to scale the visual aspects of a plane, but the model may not
fly. Other kits may be less true in scale and detail while enabling the model to
actually fly. All of these representations of airplanes fulfil a particular function
for understanding aspects of a real plane, but the process of simplification
means that some aspects are lost. None of the airplane models is wrong, but
they are useful for different purposes—the first for understanding what an
airplane looks like and the second for understanding flight. With our model in
hand, we could go to an airport and observe actual airplanes. If we have a
flying model, we could compare our model to the actual airplanes to help us
understand what makes real planes fly. If we have a scale model, we could use
our model to identify different parts of a plane and compare across airplane
types.
Political scientists are much like model builders constructing a model
plane. They build models of decision-making within societies to understand
the nature of politics. Politics can be conceived as a subset of human
behaviour in which a set of individuals uses power to influence decisions that
affect both themselves and society as a whole. Many political interactions are
strategic, meaning how one person behaves influences the choices and actions
of others in society. These interactions can become very complex, so we need
to create models to simplify reality and better understand various facets of
these relationships. Political science model builders, just like model airplane
builders, seek to construct models that preserve the most important aspects of
the world as they see it, and they strip away the parts that are less necessary to
answer the questions they wish to ask. And different models can help to
answer different questions.
Once a particular model has been developed, it can be used to understand
politics in many different settings and environments. Using models allows us
to take a comparative approach. We can examine how the model fits in some
contexts, and how it might need to be tweaked in others. This book will first
introduce a theoretical model of democracy and democratic government, and
we will then apply the model repeatedly to understand different aspects of
democracy in different settings across Europe. The model will discuss the
basic linkages between voters and politicians. In particular, we will assume a
delegation model of democracy, in which citizens possess ultimate political
authority, but delegate decision-making authority to politicians by electing
them to office, who in turn delegate authority further to specific politicians
holding positions in governments, the bureaucracy, or to the EU. The process
of delegation is determined by institutions—the rules and norms that shape
social interactions—such as those that govern elections or that determine the
relationships between the branches of government. This process is often
organized and guided by political parties. In other words, we view democracy
as a chain of delegation that links voters to the political decision-making
process. But the precise details of how the chain of delegation works differ
across countries and political systems. It is these differences that make
European politics so interesting, and we explore them throughout this book. In
the next chapter, we present the main theoretical tools that we will use,
together with our model of democracy, but we first discuss the nature of
democracy and its development across Europe.

1.2 Democracy and Democratization

Democratic governance lies at the heart of European politics, but there is no
single agreed-upon definition of democracy. We can, however, distinguish
between two basic conceptualizations: a minimalist conceptualization and a
maximalist one. Minimalist conceptualizations of democracy focus on the
presence of free and fair elections and electoral turnover. Schumpeter, an early
proponent of this view, considers democracy as “free competition for a free
vote” (Schumpeter, 1942, 271). Maximalist definitions, such as the one put
forward by Dahl (1971), do not dismiss electoral competition, but additionally
stress participation, broad inclusion in political processes, guarantees of basic
rights, and the rule of law.
From a minimalist perspective, electoral democracy is a form of
government in which ultimate authority, at least in theory if not always in
practice, lies with citizens who then empower politicians to make decisions on
their behalf. The principles of electoral competition and the legitimacy of a
political opposition separate democracy from autocracy at the most
fundamental level. Empirically, countries can be considered a democracy from
this perspective if the chief executive is elected, the parliament is elected, there
is more than one party competing in elections, and there has been alternation
in power under identical electoral rules (Cheibub et al., 2010).
Maximalist conceptualizations of democracy require more from a
political system before calling it a democracy. Notions of liberal democracy
come into play; these include guarantees regarding civil rights, minority
protection, equality before the law, associational rights, and the ability of the
judiciary to constrain the executive. Politicians must protect the basic human
rights of citizens, including those of the people who did not vote for them as
leaders. Citizens must also be able to participate freely in politics, usually by
electing leaders in free and fair elections, but also through protest and speech.
Moreover, elected politicians are supposed to represent the views of citizens.
There are many different forms that representation can take, which will be
discussed in detail in subsequent chapters, in particular in Chapter 7.
Politicians may seek to determine the will of voters and turn it into policy, they
may make decisions that they feel are in the best interest of all voters, or they
may represent voters merely by the fact that they come from a similar
background to the voters who elected them. Liberal democracy has recently
been challenged in Europe, with a few countries experiencing democratic
backsliding. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in a speech in July 2014
talked of turning Hungary into an ‘illiberal state’, while Poland’s president has
engaged in attacks on the judiciary (see Chapter 14.2). For now, though, we
simply wish to ask how, when, and why basic features of democracy arose in
Europe in the first place. This, of course, is no small question.
Discussions of democratization often focus on the interaction between
politics and economics (e.g. Lipset, 1959; Acemoglu et al., 2019), and the
gradual development of the nation-state (e.g. Tilly, 1990; North and Weingast,
1989). Many have argued that the ability of citizens to restrain political leaders
and to exert control over would-be dictators lies at the heart of both economic
and democratic development. Ruling over a country comes with a tremendous
amount of power; if rulers are to produce economic growth for their country,
they must be able to reliably promise not to confiscate property and to protect
property rights. Citizens must feel that their wealth is safe if they are to have
an incentive to generate more wealth and to invest in a country. As Olson
(1993) has famously written, democratic institutions can offer a mechanism to
governments for creating credible commitments—reliable promises that
citizens can believe—offering citizens the security that they need to invest,
safe in the knowledge that the government will not expropriate their wealth.

Box 1.1 METHODS AND MEASUREMENT:

Measuring Democracy
To understand how democratization has progressed, we must measure levels
of democracy over time. This is not an easy task and there is no single,
correct method for doing so. Different political scientists have taken
different approaches. To measure democracy, we must first decide how to
conceptualize it. Some scholars, most notably Przeworski et al. (2000),
conceive of democracy as binary—an either/or prospect. Either a country is
a democracy or it is not. Often this judgement is made on the basis of a
minimalist definition. There is a set of countries that most observers would
agree are democratic, and another set that most would agree are not. Of
course, there are some cases that truly lie in the middle, which makes a
classification difficult. Moreover, the binary classification can be criticized
for glossing over important details.
In contrast to Przeworski and his colleagues, other scholars seek to
measure the degree of democracy, not just its presence. A project dedicated
to measuring the degree and depth of democracy—the V-Dem project—asks
country experts to rate their country on different aspects of democracy. The
V-Dem project also seeks out experts on the historical development of
countries to gain insights back in time. This approach can produce rich,
fine-grained information on democracy. However, these measures require us
 to believe that experts are able to accurately judge democracy levels on
these specific indicators going back over many decades.
Lastly, there are other projects run both by academics and think tanks
that seek to use coders to code levels of democracy on the basis of set
criteria. The Polity project is an example of such a project run by academics
and Freedom Scores are produced by the Freedom House think tank. For
these scores to be accurate, different experts must apply the same rubric to
very different countries in the same manner. In sum, there are many
different ways of conceiving of democracy and measuring it, and there is no
definitive answer as to which approach is best.

To understand how a government’s ability to make credible commitments

can lead to economic growth, consider the following story. Imagine a
monarch, a ruler with absolute power, who commands a strong military and
seeks to conquer more territory abroad. The monarch will need money to pay
for his wars—he must buy weapons, transport his troops, and pay them their
wages—and this gives him an incentive to steal wealth from his citizens.
Indeed, there is a strong relationship between the development and
transformation of the state and war, as outlined by Tilly (1990): state
institutions, including a bureaucracy, taxation system, and conscription,
developed as a consequence of the need to fund expensive warfare.
Moreover, as an absolute dictator, the monarch has the power to confiscate
wealth. If he tries to promise his citizens that, if they just help him out, he will
not to take more of their wealth, they will not believe him. They know that he
needs as much money as he can get and he has the power to take whatever he
wants. In turn, they have an incentive to hide any wealth that they possess, or
simply to not create any in the first place, as they know that it will just end up
in the monarch’s hands. In other words, it is not enough for a powerful
monarch to say that he will not steal wealth from his citizens; he has to make
them believe him. If citizens have reason to believe the government, the
government may be better able to raise revenue through taxation and
borrowing because citizens do not fear that the government will steal their
wealth. Instead, citizens can expect a return on their investment in the state
through the provision of public infrastructure, or repayment of their loans with
interest.
So how can a monarch credibly commit to not stealing citizens’ wealth?
Something must happen to reduce the power of the monarch relative to the
citizenry. North and Weingast (1989) have argued that just such a transition
occurred in England during the seventeenth century following the English
Civil War and the Glorious Revolution. The House of Stuart took control of
the English crown with the coronation of King James I in 1603, but
immediately faced financial difficulties and trouble repaying debts incurred
during previous wars. Eventually the crown, after effectively trying to steal
wealth from citizens, faced an uprising. The resulting English Civil War led to
the beheading of King Charles I and the ‘Republican Period’ under the
leadership of Oliver Cromwell. Following Cromwell’s death from natural
causes, the monarchy was restored, first under Charles II and then James II.
However, James II was himself overthrown in 1688 in the Glorious
Revolution, leading parliament to put William III and Mary II on the throne,
but with stricter limits on the power of the monarch, making the monarch
subordinate to a ruling class represented in parliament.
North and Weingast argue that, after the Glorious Revolution, William and
Mary were much more successful at raising money and could borrow at much
lower interest rates than monarchs before them. Presumably, the fact that two
of the three previous monarchs had been executed or forced into exile would
have given William and Mary pause before attempting to exert too much
power. In other words, according to North and Weingast, it took decades of
political upheaval, executions, civil war, and the threat of exile to create a form
of restricted monarchy capable of credibly committing to not usurping wealth.
Gradually, this form of government would transform into the British
democracy we know today.
The North and Weingast story suggests that the presence of political
institutions that create credible commitments (and at least move in the
direction of democracy) lead to conditions conducive to wealth creation.
Indeed, there is now substantial evidence that democracy leads to increased
wealth across countries (see e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2019). However, the story
also suggests that increased wealth may have helped solidify England’s new
democratic institutions. The development of a wealthy English middle class,
represented in parliament, is key to understanding how credible commitments
and institutions eventually led to the establishment of democracy. Democracy
may help lead to wealth creation, but wealth also seems to be a requirement for
democracy to flourish.
Indeed, another set of literature suggests that the causal arrow runs from
wealth to democracy, as well. In his book on the social origins of dictatorship
and democracy, Moore (1966) argued that the existence of a middle class is a
prerequisite for the emergence of democracy. Succinctly and memorably,
Moore wrote ‘No Bourgeoisie, No Democracy’. He quite simply meant that
democracy cannot emerge in societies without a stable, wealthy middle class.
Power divided across a stable middle class with the ability and incentive to
rein in autocratic leaders is necessary for democracy to flourish.
Modernization theory, first posited by Lipset (1959), also suggests that
democracy can only take hold in a society that is sufficiently wealthy, urban,
and educated. Only in such a society do citizens have the ability and time to
pay attention to and become informed about politics. Democracy requires
knowledgeable citizens who can hold political elites to account, and who have
enough wealth and leisure time that they are no longer solely concerned with
surviving, giving them time to pay attention to politics.
Arguably, many of these conditions only appeared in Europe during the
late nineteenth century following the Industrial Revolution. Some of the major
political parties across Europe, as well as other political institutions, can trace
their origins to this time. The German Social Democratic Party, for example,
traces its roots to 1863, while the UK Labour Party was founded in 1900.
These parties grew out of efforts to organize labour in the factories. The
Industrial Revolution brought working classes together into the same spaces,
where labour activists could inform and organize them, forming nascent
parties and political organizations.
Research on democracy and wealth—regardless of whether we conceive of
wealth causing democracy or democracy leading to wealth—suggests that
stable democracy takes time to develop. Support for democracy and
democratic attitudes among citizens must develop and grow. As a result,
researchers have made a distinction between consolidated and
unconsolidated democracy (see Rustow, 1970; Linz and Stepan, 1996;
Svolik, 2008). When countries first transition to democracy, we may assume
that their democracy is unconsolidated. The possibility that the country could
slip back into an authoritarian regime is still reasonably high. Over time, as
democracy takes hold in a country, the likelihood of the country slipping back
into autocracy diminishes. Democratic norms become entrenched among the
citizens and political elites. We can say that these countries have become
consolidated democracies.
Democracy first began to emerge across Europe during the late nineteenth
century. While the path to democracy was relatively smooth in some places, it
was much rockier in others. The United Kingdom, along with Denmark, the
Netherlands, and Sweden, followed a rather straightforward path, steadily and
incrementally increasing rights of citizens. Other countries experienced more
ups and downs, with some movement towards democratization and then
movement back in the other direction. Germany is perhaps the most notable
example, having had several years of democratic governance during the
interwar years—a period known as the Weimar Republic—before the rise of
the Nazi party and Hitler’s dictatorship responsible for starting the Second
World War and for the Holocaust, the genocide of European Jews. But
Germany is not alone in following this pattern. Indeed, Italy, France, Greece
followed an uneven path towards democratic government. Many central and
eastern European countries, such as the Baltic states, Hungary, and Poland,
also experienced some aspects of democracy during the interwar years, only to
fall under the Soviet Communist umbrella after the Second World War.
We can plot these different paths to democracy using data on levels of
democracy over time. Figure 1.1 uses data from the V-Dem project, based on
surveys of country experts, to show democratization in several European
countries including France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Higher values indicate higher levels of
democracy. Each panel shows a different trajectory towards democracy. The
upper-left quadrant shows the linear path followed by Sweden and the UK.
The upper right shows the rapid democratization of France and Germany
following the Second World War. The bottom left panel depicts the rockier
paths followed by Greece and Spain, with Greece experiencing periods of
military government, and Spain not fully democratizing until the death of the
long-term dictator Francisco Franco. Finally, the lower right depicts Hungary
and Poland, rapidly democratized following the collapse of Communism, but
which have recently experienced backsliding, a pattern that we will discuss in
more depth in the final chapter of the book.

Figure 1.1 Paths to Democracy for Several European Democracies

Inspired by these disparate patterns of democratic development, Ziblatt

(2017) has argued that the path that countries followed was, in part, due to the
development of political parties, and in particular the success of the
conservative right in organizing electorally successful parties. When the
societal elites, who were most likely conservative and seeking to protect their
privileged position, were able to organize electorally successful parties and
had confidence that they could maintain power via electoral politics, even as
more people were allowed to vote, democracy fared well. Where this did not
happen, democracy faced a harder road.
Although many European nations developed fledgling democracy in the
wake of the First World War, their democracy was largely unconsolidated, and
the Second World War snuffed out much of that progress. But in the aftermath
of the war, with the financial and military support of the US, democracy
emerged across much of western Europe. Nevertheless, authoritarian regimes
still held sway in Portugal and Spain; Communist regimes took hold across
eastern and southeastern Europe; and Greece suffered a military coup and
military government from 1967 to 1974. But by the mid-1980s, democratic
government had arrived in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. And the collapse of
Communism, starting in 1989, led to a spread of democratic regimes across
central and eastern Europe.
The EU has played a particularly important role in fostering democracy. In
the late 1980s, even as cracks began appearing in many countries’ Communist
facades, few people anticipated the depth and breadth of change that the
autumn of 1989 and its aftermath would bring. In November 1989, the Berlin
Wall, which had divided East Berlin from West Berlin for nearly thirty years,
and which had symbolized the divisions between Communist central and
eastern Europe and the democratic free-market societies of western Europe,
came crashing down. West and East Germany reunified in 1990, and by 1992,
post-Communist countries from across central and eastern Europe were
adopting democratic institutions (with varying degrees of success), clamouring
for access to western European markets, and hoping to join the EU. The EU
saw its appeal to these newly democratic countries as a carrot that it could use
to entice them to fully embrace democratic change.
This was not the first time that the EU had seen itself a force for bringing
democracy to European countries. Arguably, the entire raison d’être of
European integration, since its inception following the Second World War, has
been to secure peace and democracy in Europe, through the process of
economic and political integration. But even putting aside the grand visions of
the ‘founding fathers’ of European integration, European institutions had
found themselves previously dealing with the fall of authoritarian regimes in
their own backyard, even if not on such a scale. Greece first applied for
membership in the fledgling European Economic Community (EEC)—the
precursor organization to the EU—in 1959, and signed an association
agreement in 1961. But cooperation between the EEC and Greece was put on
hold during the period of Greece’s military dictatorship from 1967 until 1974.
Following the restoration of democracy, Greece eventually joined the EU on 1
January 1981. Likewise, Spain and Portugal were not allowed into the ‘club’
until they fully embraced democracy. With the collapse of the authoritarian
Franco and Salazar regimes in Spain and Portugal, both countries joined the
European Community on 1 January 1986. The EU viewed the prospect of
membership for these countries as a mechanism to entice them to fully
embrace democratic change.
The assumption among academics and non-academics alike is that the
European integration has been a force for fostering and consolidating
democracy across Europe, both in western Europe, and across the post-
Communist countries of central and eastern Europe. Indeed, the European
Union as an organization won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 and the EU’s
official stance is that ‘The prospect of membership is a powerful stimulus for
democratic and economic reforms in countries that want to become EU
members’ (European Commission, 2020a). For western European countries
that developed or revived democratic institutions in the immediate aftermath
of the Second World War, European integration has helped to increase wealth,
which has likely led to a quicker consolidation of democracy. For countries
looking to join the EU, the EU sets out requirements for democratic
governance that prospective member states must meet. These requirements
were formalized after the fall of Communism and before the newly free states
of central and eastern Europe could join. They are known as the Copenhagen
Criteria because they were decided at a summit meeting of member state
governments in Copenhagen in 1993 and they include:

1. Political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule

of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities;
2. Economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope
with competition and market forces;
3. Administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the
acquis (the entire corpus of EU law) and ability to take on the obligations
of membership.

But even before 1993, it was clear that member states had to be
democracies with free-market economies. In central and eastern Europe, the
assumption has been that the allure of membership in a ‘rich nations’ club like
the EU led governments to undertake democratic reforms and to do what was
necessary to gain entry. Many scholars of EU expansion have argued that the
EU provides both carrots and sticks to potential member states to undertake
reforms that foster democracy, and that these have largely worked (Vachudová,
2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).
The EU has developed tools for punishing countries that do not meet these
standards, although many question their effectiveness. It has the power to
sanction governments that fail to live up to democratic standards and can even
suspend them from participation in European-level government. However, no
member has ever actually been suspended. Austria was briefly sanctioned by
other EU states in 2000 after the far-right Freedom Party, led by Jörg Haider,
joined a coalition government as a junior partner with the main centre-right
Austrian People’s Party. Haider was known for his tendencies towards neo-
Nazi, anti-immigrant, and anti-Muslim rhetoric. But the sanctions were lifted
after a few months.
While the EU has developed legal mechanisms to punish member states
for engaging in undemocratic behaviour, in practice, sanctioning members is
difficult. Suspension of a member state’s voting rights in the Council requires
the unanimous consent of all other remaining member states. If the rogue
member state has just one ally, that ally can block any sanctions. In short, it is
much easier for the EU to wield power over candidates for membership than
over member states. Once a state becomes a member, it can backslide or
engage in undemocratic actions, and it is difficult for other member states to
punish the offending government (Kelemen, 2017). Indeed, we have witnessed
some backsliding in some states in central and eastern Europe, most notably
Hungary and Poland. We will discuss the issues with democracy in these and
other countries throughout the book, and return to questions on the future of
democracy in Europe in the concluding chapter.

1.3 Citizenship and Participation

One of the key features of democracy is the right of citizens to participate in
politics, in particular through voting. Who has the right to vote in elections and
when they achieve this right is a core question in the development of
democratic government. In many nascent nineteenth-century democracies,
only a small percentage of male landowners were considered citizens with the
right to vote. Over time, the franchise, or right to vote, was often granted first
to all men, and then to women. In the early nineteenth-century United
Kingdom, the franchise was primarily limited to wealthy, male landowners. By
the late nineteenth century the voter rolls had expanded significantly, and
many more citizens were eligible to vote. Still many potential voters remained
excluded from politics, including all women. Universal suffrage for all adults
was finally established in 1928 in Britain.
In 1906, Finnish women became the first European women to gain the
right to vote and to stand for parliament, at least at a national level. Denmark,
Norway and several other countries followed soon after. Women in both
Germany and the UK (but only those over the age of 30 and meeting certain
property qualifications in the case of the UK) were given suffrage rights in
1918. However, women in some other parts of Europe had longer to wait. In
France, women first gained the right to vote in 1944, and women in
Switzerland were not allowed to participate in federal elections until 1971. In
one Swiss canton, Appenzell Innerrhoden, women were not permitted to
participate in local elections until 1991 when the Swiss constitutional court
finally forced the canton to allow women to take part. While today we find the
notion that women would be excluded from voting or politics unacceptable,
there are still many arguments about who should be a citizen and, therefore,
also have the right to vote, for example second-generation immigrants.
Much like issues surrounding gender, issues of identity and culture,
especially regarding citizenship and voter participation, often tap an emotive
reaction in people. These issues raise questions about whether people who
look, act, and speak differently than a majority group have a right to
participate. These are fundamental questions about democracy—can societies
exclude people from public services or politics based upon heritage, ethnicity,
or race? In some instances, exclusionary policies may be supported by a
substantial majority of voters, but they clearly trample on the rights of
minorities. Moreover, while some policies may be unambiguously racist and
illegal, other policies may fall into a grey area. For example, many countries in
Europe (e.g. Austria, Denmark, and France among others) have had public
debates over banning clothing and veils worn by some Muslim women,
including the so-called Burqa bans. Such policies are often couched in general
terms around public safety, saying that no one, Muslims and non-Muslims
alike, may wear clothing in public which conceals one’s face as it may
interfere with law enforcement. But, of course, the effects of such policies fall
disproportionately on certain communities, namely Muslim women.
More generally, who has a duty to pay taxes and a right to receive the
benefits of state services? Who can be a citizen of a country? Many would
decry policies that exclude entire classes of people from political participation
or access to public services on the basis of race, religion, gender, or culture as
wrong, discriminatory, and anti-democratic. Nevertheless, such policies have a
long and odious history in many countries around the world, including many
European countries, perhaps most notably, and insidiously, during Nazi
Germany culminating in the genocide of European Jews.
The European Union today is based on common values that include the
respect for human rights and dignity as well as the principles of equality and
non-discrimination, incorporated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union. At the same time, people are excluded from political
participation and public services on the basis of citizenship all of the time.
Such exclusion is perfectly legal and few people are particularly upset by it.
Nor are such practices viewed as particularly undemocratic. People who are
not deemed to be citizens of a country often cannot participate in politics even
if they reside in the particular region. New immigrants to a country, for
example, are rarely eligible for citizenship immediately, and depending upon
the country, citizenship can be very difficult to attain. Even children born in
the country where their parents currently reside may not be automatically
eligible for citizenship. Countries across Europe now provide paths to
citizenship for immigrants, but the process can be difficult. Often it requires
one to demonstrate an understanding of the local culture and language through
citizenship tests or interviews, as well as many years of residence in the
country. Thus, the citizenship process is also about building new national
identities and attempting to ensure integration into the community. There is a
direct link between the legal concept of citizenship (and therefore the right to
participate), and culture, religion, ethnicity, language, race, and identity.
The process of European integration has begun to change notions of
citizenship and rights for participation. Since 1993, the notion of European
Union citizenship has existed in addition to, but not as a replacement of,
national citizenship. Citizens of any EU member state have the right to live
and work in any other EU member state, with the same access to benefits and
state services as citizens of that state. They may also participate in local and
European, but not national, elections. Thus, EU citizens have some
participatory rights all across European Union member states regardless of
which European citizenship they hold.

1.4 Our Approach and Scope

In addition to taking a theoretical approach, this book also seeks to understand
European politics through the use of data. We draw on data about the attitudes
that voters hold, the positions that parties take on issues, and who wins seats in
parliament following elections to name just a few examples. In fact, we have
already used data in this chapter to compare trajectories of democratization
across several countries. Whenever possible, we will seek to visualize politics
using data, which we believe will lead to deeper understanding of political
phenomena. Using data in this manner also follows directly from our
comparative approach. However, this means that we have to decide on which
countries to present data for and which not.
Europe is a large continent without clearly defined borders, especially on
its eastern edge. To take just one example, some would consider Turkey a part
of Europe, while others would not. Turkey clearly straddles two continents no
matter how one looks at it—geographically, culturally, and politically. It
borders Greece and its largest city, Istanbul, is split down the middle by the
Bosporus Strait, often considered the geographic dividing line between Europe
and Asia. Its history is deeply intertwined with that of western Europe, but
today, in contrast to western Europe, its primary religion is Islam, and it holds
much in common culturally with Middle Eastern countries. It has experienced
periods of democratic governance and aspects of electoral democracy, but it
has also experienced military coups and authoritarian regimes.
Nor is Turkey the only borderline case—we could also ask similar
questions about Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and many other countries.
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 To this man was sent the first heavenly call, which ended in
bringing in the Gentiles to the knowledge of the truth revealed by
Jesus. After having fasted all day, he was employed in his regular
devotions, at the usual hour of prayer, (three o’clock in the
afternoon,) when his senses were overwhelmed by a vision, in which
he had a distinct view of a messenger of God, in shining garments,
coming to him; and heard him call him by his name, “Cornelius!”
Looking at him as steadily as he was able in his great alarm,
Cornelius asked, “What is it, Lord?” The heavenly visitant replied, in
words of consolation and high praise, “Thy prayers and thy alms
have come up in remembrance before God. And now send men to
Joppa, and call for a man named Simon Peter, lodging with Simon, a
tanner, whose house is by the sea-side. He, when he comes, shall
tell thee what it is right that thou shouldst do.” When the surprising
messenger had given this charge, he departed; and Cornelius,
without delay, went to fulfil the minute directions he had received. He
called two of his domestics, and a devout soldier of the detachment
then on duty near him, and having related to them all that he had just
seen and heard, he sent them to Joppa, to invite Peter according to
the order. The distance between the two places is about thirty-five
miles, and being too great to be easily traveled in one day, they
journeyed thither during a part of two days, starting immediately
when they received the command, though late in the afternoon.
While they were continuing their journey, the next day, and were now
near to the city of Joppa, Peter, without any idea of the important
task to which he was soon to be summoned, went up, as usual, to
the Alijah, or place of prayer, upon the house-top, at about twelve
o’clock, mid-day. Having, according to the usual custom of the Jews,
fasted for many hours, for the sake of keeping the mind clear from
the effects of gross food on the body, and at length becoming
sensible that he had pushed himself to the utmost limits of safe
abstinence, he wished for food, and ordered his dinner. While the
servants were preparing it, he continued above, in the place of
prayer, where, enfeebled by fasting, and over-wrought by mental
effort, he fell into a state of spiritual excitement, in which the mind is
most susceptible of strong impressions of things beyond the reach of
sense. In this condition, there appeared to him a singular vision,
which subsequent events soon enabled him fully to interpret. It
seemed to him that a great sheet was let down from the sky, to
which it was fastened by the four corners, containing on its vast
surface all sorts of animals that were forbidden as food by the
Mosaic law. While the apostle gazed upon this vast variety of
animals, which education had taught him to consider unclean, there
came a voice to him, calling him by name, and commanding him to
arise, kill, and eat. All his prejudices and early religious impressions
were roused by such a proposal; and, resisting the invisible speaker
as the agent of temptation to him in his bodily exhaustion, he replied,
in all the pride of a scrupulous and unpolluted Jew, “By no means,
Lord, because I have never eaten anything improper or unclean.”
The mysterious voice again said, “What God hath cleansed, do not
thou consider improper.” This impressive scene having been twice
repeated, the whole was withdrawn back into heaven. This
remarkable vision immediately called out all the energies of Peter’s
mind, in its explanation. But before he had time to decide for himself
what was meant by it, the messengers of Caesarea had inquired out
the house of Simon, and, coming to the outside door, they called to
learn whether Simon, who was surnamed Peter, lodged there. And
while the mind of Peter was still intently occupied with the vision, he
received an intimation from the unerring spirit, that his presence was
required elsewhere. “Behold! three men are seeking thee, but rise up
and go with them, without hesitation; for I have sent them.” Thus
urged and encouraged, Peter went directly down to the men sent by
Cornelius, and said, “Behold! I am he whom ye seek. What is your
object in coming here?” They at once unfolded their errand.
“Cornelius, a centurion, a just man, fearing God, and of good repute
among all the Jews, was instructed by a holy messenger, to send for
thee to his house, that he may hear something from thee.” Peter,
already instructed as to the proper reception of the invitation, asked
them in, and hospitably entertained them till the next day, improving
the delay, no doubt, by learning as many of the circumstances of the
case as they could give him. The news of this remarkable call was
also made known to the brethren of the church in Joppa, some of
whom were so highly interested in what they heard that evening, that
they resolved to accompany Peter the next day, with the
messengers, to see and hear for themselves the details of a
business which promised to result so fairly in the glory of Christ’s
name, and the wide enlargement of his kingdom. On the next day,
the whole party set out together, and reached Caesarea, the second
day of their journey; and going straight to the house of Cornelius,
they found quite a large company there, awaiting their arrival. For
Cornelius, expecting them, had invited his relations and his intimate
friends, to hear the extraordinary communications which had been
promised him, from his visitor. The kindred here alluded to were,
perhaps, those of his wife, whom, according to a very common
usage, he may have married in the place where he was stationed;
for it is hardly probable that a Roman captain from Italy could have
had any of his own blood relations about him, unless, perhaps, some
of them might have enlisted with him, and now been serving with him
on this honorable post. His near friends, who completed the
assembly, were probably such of his brother officers as he knew to
possess kindred tastes with himself, and to take an interest in
religious matters. Such was the meeting that Peter found sitting in
expectation of his coming; and so high were the ideas which
Cornelius had formed of the character of his visitor, that, as soon as
he met him on his entrance into the house, he fell down at his feet,
and paid him reverence as a superior being;――an act of
abasement towards the inhabitant of a conquered country, most rare
and remarkable in a Roman officer, and one to which nothing but a
notion of supernatural excellence could ever have brought him, since
this was a position assumed not even by those who approached the
emperor himself. Peter, however, had no desire to be made the
object of a reverence so nearly resembling idolatry. Raising up the
prostrate Roman, he said, “Stand up: for I myself am also a man.”
Entering into familiar discourse with him, he now advanced into the
house, and going with him to the great room, he there found a
numerous company. He addressed them in these words: “You know
how unlawful it is for a Jew to be familiar, or even to visit, with one of
another nation; but God has taught me to call no man vulgar or
unclean. Wherefore, I came at your summons, without hesitation.
Now, then, I ask with what design have you sent for me?” And
Cornelius said, “Four days ago, I was fasting till this hour; and at the
ninth hour I was praying in my house;” and so having gone on to
narrate all the circumstances of his vision, as given above,
concluded in these words, “For this reason I sent for thee, and thou
hast done well in coming, for we are all here, before God, to hear
what has been imparted to thee, from God.” And Peter began
solemnly to speak, and said, “Of a truth, I perceive that God is no
respecter of persons; but that in every nation, he that fears him and
does what is right, is approved by him.” With this solemn profession
of a new view of this important principle of universal religion, as a
beginning, he went on to satisfy their high expectations, by setting
forth to them the sum and substance of the gospel doctrine, of
whose rise and progress they had already, by report, heard a vague
and partial account. The great and solemn truth which the Spirit had
summoned him to proclaim, was that Jesus Christ the crucified was
ordained by God the judge of both living and dead, and that through
him, as all the prophets testified, every one that believed should
have remission of sins. Of his resurrection from the dead, Peter
declared himself the witness, as well as of his labors of good will
towards man, when, anointed with the Spirit of God, he went about
doing good. Thus did Peter discourse, excited by the novel and
divinely appointed occasion, till the same divine influence that moved
his heart and tongue was poured out on his charmed hearers, and
they forthwith manifested the signs of change of heart and devout
faith in Christ, as the Son of God and the judge of the world; and
made known the delight of their new sensations, in words of
miraculous power. At this display of the equal and impartial grace of
God, the Jewish church-members from Joppa, who had
accompanied Peter to Caesarea, were greatly amazed, having never
before imagined it possible for the influences of the divine spirit to be
imparted to any who had not devoutly conformed to all the rituals of
the holy law of old given by God to Moses, whose high authority was
attested amid the smoke and flame and thunder of Sinai. And what
change was this? In the face of this awful sanction, these believing
followers of Moses and Christ saw the outward signs of the inward
action of that Spirit which they had been accustomed to
acknowledge as divine, now moving with the same holy energy the
souls and voices of those born and bred among the heathen, without
the consecrating aid of one of those forms of purification, by which
Moses had ordained their preparation for the enjoyment of the
blessings of God’s holy covenant with his own peculiar people.
Moved by that same mysterious and holy influence, the Gentile
warriors of Rome now lifted up their voices in praise of the God of
Israel and of Abraham,――doubtless too, their God and Father,
though Abraham were ignorant of them, and Israel acknowledged
them not; since through his son Jesus a new covenant had been
sealed in blood, opening and securing the blessings of that merciful
and faithful promise to all nations. On Jehovah they now called as
their Father and Redeemer, whose name was from
everlasting,――known and worshiped long ere Abraham lived.
Never before had the great partition-wall between Jews and Gentiles
been thus broken down, nor had the noble and equal freedom of the
new covenant ever yet been so truly and fully made known. And who
was he that had thus boldly trampled on the legal usages of the
ancient Mosaic covenant, as consecrated by the reverence of ages,
and had imparted the holy signs of the Christian faith to men shut out
from the mysteries of the inner courts of the house of God? It was
not a presumptuous or unauthorized man, nor one thoughtless of the
vastly important consequences of the act. It was the constituted
leader of the apostolic band, who now, in direct execution of his
solemn commission received from his Master, and in the literal
fulfilment of the prophetic charge given therewith at the base of
distant Hermon, opened the gates of the kingdom of heaven to all
nations. Bearing the keys of the kingdom of God on earth, he now, in
the set time of divine appointment, at the call of his Master in
heaven, so signally given to him both directly and indirectly, unlocked
the long-closed door, and with a voice of heavenly charity, bade the
waiting Gentiles enter. This was the mighty commission with which
Jesus had so prophetically honored this chief disciple at Caesarea
Philippi, and here, at Caesarea Augusta, was achieved the glorious
fulfilment of this before mysterious announcement;――Simon Peter
now, in the accomplishment of that divinely appointed task, became
the Rock, on which the church of Christ was, through the course of
ages, reared; and in this act, the first stone of its broad Gentile
foundation was laid.

On duty about him.――This phrase is the just translation of the technical term
προσκαρτερουντων, (proskarterounton,) according to Price, Kuinoel, Bloomfield, &c.

Of all the honors with which his apostolic career was marked,
there is none which equals this,――the revolutionizing of the whole
gospel plan as before understood and advanced by its
devotees,――the enlargement of its scope beyond the widest range
of any merely Jewish charity,――and the disenthralment of its
subjects from the antique formality and cumbrous ritual of the Jewish
worship. And of all the events which the apostolic history records,
there is none which, in its far-reaching and long-lasting effects, can
match the opening of Christ’s kingdom to the Gentiles. What would
have been the rate of its advancement under the management of
those, who, like the apostles hitherto, looked on it as a mere
improvement and spiritualization of the old Mosaic form, to which it
was, in their view, only an appendage, and not a substitute? Think of
what chances there were of its extension under such views to those
far western lands where, ages ago, it reached with its benign
influences the old Teutonic hordes from whom we draw our
race;――or of what possibility there was of ever bringing under the
intolerable yoke of Jewish forms, the hundreds of millions who now,
out of so many lands and kindreds and tongues, bear the light yoke,
and own the simpler faith of Jesus, confessing him Lord, to the glory
of God the Father. Yet hitherto, so far from seeing these things in
their true light, all the followers of Christ had, notwithstanding his
broad and open commission to them, steadily persisted in the notion,
that the observance of the regulations laid down by Moses for
proselytes to his faith, was equally essential for a full conversion to
the faith of Christ. And now too, it required a new and distinctly
repeated summons from above, to bring even the great chief of the
apostles to the just sense of the freedom of the gospel, and to the
practical belief that God was no respecter of persons. But the whole
progress of the event, with all its miraculous attestations, left so little
doubt of the nature of the change, that Peter, after the manifestation
of a holy spirit in the hearts and voices of the Gentile converts,
triumphantly appealed to the Jewish brethren who had accompanied
him from Joppa, and asked them, “Can any one forbid the water for
the baptizing of these, who have received the Holy Spirit as well as
we?” Taking the unanimous suffrage of their silence to his challenge,
as a full consent, he gave directions that the believing Romans
should be baptized in the name of the Lord, as Jesus in his parting
charge had constituted that ordinance for the seal of redemption to
every creature, in all the nations to whom the gospel should be
preached. Having thus formally enrolled the first Gentile converts, as
the free and complete partakers of the blessings of the new
covenant, he stayed among them several days, at their request,
strengthening their faith, and enlarging their knowledge by his
pastoral instruction; which he deemed a task of sufficient importance
to detain him, for a while, from his circuit among the new converts,
scattered about in other places throughout Palestine, and from any
immediate return to his friends and converts at Joppa, where this call
had found him.

Meanwhile, this mighty innovation on the established order of

sacred things could not be long unknown beyond the cities of
Caesarea and Joppa, but was soon announced by the varied voice
of rumor to the amazed apostles and brethren at Jerusalem. The
impression made on them by this vague report of their great leader’s
proceedings, was most decidedly unfavorable; and there seem to
have been not a few who regarded this unprecedented act of Peter
as a downright abuse of the dignity and authority with which the
special commission of his Master had invested him. Doubtless, in
that little religious community, as in every other association of men
ever gathered, there were already many human jealousies springing
up like roots of bitterness, which needed but such an occasion as
this, to manifest themselves in decided censure of the man, whose
remarkable exaltation over them might seem like a stigma on the
capacities or merits of those to whom he was preferred. Those in
whose hearts such feelings had been rankling, now found a great
occasion for the display of their religious zeal, in this bold movement
of their constituted leader, who herein seemed to have presumed on
his distinction and priority, to act in a matter of the very highest
importance, without the slightest reference to the feelings and
opinions of those, who had been with him chosen for the great work
of spreading the gospel to all nations. And so much of free opinion
and expression was there among them, that this act of the chief
apostle called forth complaints both deep and loud, from his
brethren, against this open and unexplained violation of the holy
ordinances of that ancient law, which was still to them and him the
seal and sign of salvation. Peter, at length, after completing his
apostolic circuit among the churches, of which no farther account is
given to us, returned to Jerusalem to meet these murmurs with the
bold and clear declaration of the truth. As soon as he arrived, the
grumblers burst out on him with open complaints of his offensive
violations of the strict religious exclusiveness of demeanor, which
became a son of Israel professing the pure reformed faith of Jesus.
The unhesitating boldness with which this charge of a breach of
order was made against Peter by the sticklers for circumcision, is a
valuable and interesting proof, that all his authority and dignity
among them, did not amount to anything like a supremacy; and that
whatever he might bind or loose on earth for the high sanction of
heaven, he could neither bind the tongues and opinions, nor loose
the consciences of these sturdy and free-spoken brethren. Nor does
Peter seem to have had the least idea of claiming any exemption
from their critical review of his actions; but straightway addressed
himself respectfully to them, in a faithful detail of his conduct, and the
reasons of it. He distinctly recounted to them the clear and decided
call which he considered himself to have received from heaven, by
which he was summoned as the spiritual guide of the inquiring
Gentiles. And after the honest recital of the whole series of incidents,
and of the crowning act of the whole, the imparting to them the
outward sign of inward washing from their sins, he boldly appealed
to the judgments of his accusers, to say whether, in the face of such
a sanction, they would have had him do otherwise. “When the Holy
Ghost fell on them, as on us at the beginning, then remembered I the
word of the Lord, how that he said,” (when parting from us, on the
top of Olivet, to rise to the bosom of his father, prophetically
announcing a new and holy consecration and endowment for our
work,) “John indeed baptized with water, but ye shall be baptized
with the Holy Ghost.” This peculiar gift thus solemnly announced, we
had indeed received at the pentecost, and its outward signs we had
thereby learned infallibly by our own experience; and even so, at
Caesarea, I recognized in those Gentiles the same tokens by which I
knew the workings of divine grace in myself and you. “Forasmuch,
then, as God gave them the like gift as to us, who believed on the
Lord Jesus Christ, what was I, that I should withstand God?”――This
clear and unanswerable appeal silenced the clamors of the bold
assertors of the inviolability of Mosaic forms; and when they heard
these things, they held their peace, and, softened from their harsh
spirit of rebuke, they, in a noble feeling of truly Christian triumph,
forgot all their late exclusiveness, in a pure joy for the new and vast
extension of the dominion of Christ, secured by this act, whose
important consequences they were not slow in perceiving. They
praised God for such a beginning of mighty results, and laying aside,
in this moment of exultation, every feeling of narrow Jewish bigotry,
they acknowledged that “to the Gentiles also, God had granted
repentance unto life.”

herod agrippa.

At this time, the monarch of the Roman world was Caius Caesar,
commonly known by his surname, Caligula. Among the first acts of a
reign, whose outset was deservedly popular for its numerous
manifestations of prudence and benevolence, forming a strange
contrast with subsequent tyranny and folly, was the advancement of
a tried and faithful friend, to the regal honors and power which his
birth entitled him to claim, and from which the neglectful indifference
at first, and afterwards the revengeful spite of the preceding Caesar,
Tiberius, had long excluded him. This was Herod Agrippa, grandson
of that great Herod, who, by the force of his own exalted genius, and
by the favor of the imperial Augustus, rose from the place of a
friendless foreign adventurer, to the kingly sway of all Palestine. This
extensive power he exercised in a manner which was, on the whole,
ultimately advantageous to his subjects; but his whole reign, and the
later years of it more particularly, were marked by cruelties the most
infamous, to which he was led by almost insane fits of the most
causeless jealousy. On none of the subjects of his power, did this
tyrannical fury fall with such frequent and dreadful visitations, as on
his own family; and it was there, that, in his alternate fits of fury and
remorse, he was made the avenger of his own victims. Among these
numerous domestic cruelties, one of the earliest, and the most
distressing, was the murder of the amiable Mariamne, the daughter
of the last remnants of the Asmonaean line,――

“Herself the solitary scion left

Of a time-honored race,”

which Herod’s remorseless policy had exterminated. Her he made

his wife, and after a few years sacrificed her to some wild freak of
jealousy, only to reap long years of agonizing remorse for the hasty
act, when a cooler search had shown, too late, her stainless
innocence. But a passionate despot never yet learned wisdom by
being made to feel the recoil of his own folly; and in the course of
later years this cruelty was equalled, and almost outdone, by a
similar act, committed by him on those whom her memory should
have saved, if anything could. The innocent and unfortunate
Mariamne left him two sons, then mere children, whom the
miserable, repentant tyrant, cherished and reared with an
affectionate care, which might almost have seemed a partial
atonement for the injuries of their murdered mother. After some
years passed in obtaining a foreign education at the imperial court of
Rome, these two sons, Alexander and Aristobulus, returned at their
father’s summons, to his court, where their noble qualities, their
eloquence and manly accomplishments, as well as the interest
excited by their mother’s fate, drew on them the favorable and
admiring regard of the whole people. But all that made them
admirable and amiable to others, was as powerless as the memory
of their mother, to save them from the fury of the suspicious tyrant.
Those whose interests could be benefited by such a course, soon
found means to make them objects of jealousy and terror to him, and
ere long involved them in a groundless accusation of conspiring
against his dominion and life. The uneasiness excited in Herod by
their great popularity and their commanding talents, led him to
believe this charge; and the miserable old tyrant, driven from fear to
jealousy, and from jealousy to fury, at last crowned his own
wretchedness and their wrongs, by strangling them both, after an
imprisonment of so great a length as to take away from his crime
even the shadowy excuse of hastiness. This was one of the last acts
of a bloody life; but ere he died, returning tenderness towards the
unfortunate race of Mariamne, led him to spare and cherish the
infant children of Aristobulus, the younger of the two, who left three
sons and two daughters to the tender mercies of his cruel father.
One of these was the person who is concerned in the next event of
Peter’s life, and whose situation and conduct in reference to that
affair, was such as to justify this prolonged episode. He received in
infancy the name of Agrippa, out of compliment to Marcus Vipsanius
Agrippa, the favorite and minister of Augustus Caesar, and the
steady friend of the great Herod. This name was exclusively borne
by this son of Aristobulus in childhood, nor was it ever displaced by
any other, except by some of the Jews, who, out of compliment to
the restoration of the Herodian line of kings, in place of the Roman
sub-governors, gave him the name of his royal grandfather, so that
he is mentioned only by the name of Herod in the story of the Acts of
the Apostles; but the Romans and Greeks seem to have known him
only by his proper name of Agrippa. The tardy repentance of his
grandfather did not extend to any important permanent provision for
the children of Aristobulus; but on his death a few years after, they
were left with the great majority of the numerous progeny of Herod,
to the precarious fortunes of dependent princes. The young Agrippa
having married his own cousin, Cypros, the daughter of a daughter
of Herod and Mariamne, sailed to Rome, where he remained for
several years, a sort of beggar about the court of Tiberius Caesar,
through whose favor he hoped for an advancement to some one of
the thrones in Palestine, which seemed to be prizes for any of
Herod’s numerous descendents who could best secure the imperial
favor, and depress the possessors in the Caesar’s opinion. Passing
at Rome and elsewhere through a romantic variety of fortune, this
adventurer was at last lucky in securing to himself the most friendly
regard of Caius Caesar, then the expected successor of the reigning
emperor. This afterwards proved the basis of his fortunes, which for
a while, however, were darkened by the consequences of an
imprudent remark made to Caius, expressive of a wish for the death
of Tiberias, which was reported to the jealous tyrant by a listening
slave, and finally caused the speaker’s close imprisonment during
the rest of the emperor’s life. The death of Tiberius, followed by the
accession of Caius Caesar to the throne, raised Agrippa from his
chains to freedom, and to the most intimate favor of the new
monarch. The tetrarchy of Iturea and Trachonitis, then vacant by the
death of Philip, was immediately conferred on him; and soon after,
Herod Antipas having been exiled, his territories, Galilee and
Peraea, were added to the former dominions of Herod Agrippa, and
with them was granted to him the title of king, which had never yet
been given to any of the descendents of Herod the Great. In this
state were the governments of these countries at the time of the
events last narrated; but Herod Agrippa, often visiting Rome, left all
Palestine in the hands of Publius Petronius, the just and benevolent
Roman president of Syria. In this state, affairs remained during all
the short reign of Caius Caligula Caesar, who, after four years mostly
characterized by folly, vice and cruelty, ended his days by the
daggers of assassins. But this great event proved no check to the
flourishing fortunes of his favorite, king Herod Agrippa; who, in the
course of the events which ended in placing Claudius on the throne,
so distinguished himself in the preliminary negociations between the
new emperor and the senate, sharing as he did the confidence and
regard of both parties, that he was justly considered by all, as the
most active means of effecting the comfortable settlement of their
difficulties; and he was therefore deemed well deserving of the
highest rewards. Accordingly, the first act of Claudius’s government,
like the first of Caligula’s, was the presentation of a new kingdom to
this favorite of fortune,――Judea being now added to the other
countries in his possession, and thus bringing all Palestine into one
noble kingdom, beneath his extensive sway. With a dominion
comprising all that the policy of his grandfather had been able to
attain during a long and active life, he now found himself, at the age
of fifty-one, one of the most extraordinary instances of romantic
fortune that had ever occurred; and anxious to enjoy something of
the solid pleasure of visiting and governing his great and flourishing
kingdom, he set sail from Rome, which had been so long to him the
scene of such varied fortune, such calamitous poverty and tedious
imprisonment,――and now proceeded as the proud king of
Palestine, going home in triumph to the throne of his ancestor,
supported by the most boundless pledges of imperial favor. The
emperor Claudius, though regretting exceedingly the departure of
the tried friend whom he had so much reason to love and cherish,
yet would not detain him from a happiness so noble and desirable,
as that of arranging and ruling his consolidated dominion. Even his
departure, however, was made the occasion of new marks of
imperial favor; for Claudius gave him letters by which all Roman
governors were bound to acknowledge and support him as the
rightful sovereign of Palestine. He arrived in Palestine shortly after,
and just before the passover, made his appearance in Jerusalem,
where he was received with joy and hope by the expecting people,
who hailed with open hearts a king whose interests would be
identified with theirs, and with the glory of the Jewish name. His high
and royal race,――his own personal misfortunes and the unhappy
fate of his early-murdered father, as well as his descent from the
lamented Mariamne,――his well-known amiability of character, and
his regard for the holy Jewish faith, which he had shown by exerting
and even risking all his favor with Caligula to prevent, in co-operation
with the amiable Petronius, the profanation of the temple as
proposed by the erection of the emperor’s statue within it,――all
served to throw a most attractive interest around him, and to excite
brilliant hopes, which his first acts immediately more than justified.
The temple, though now so resplendent with the highest
♦ achievements of art, and though so vast in its foundations and
dimensions, was still considered as having some deficiencies, so
great, that nothing but royal munificence could supply them. The
Jews therefore seized the fortunate occasion of the accession of
their new and amiable monarch to his throne, to obtain the perfection
of a work on which the hearts of the people were so much set, and
the completion of which would so highly advance the monarch in the
popular favor. The king at once benignantly heard their request, and
gladly availing himself of this opportunity to gratify his subjects, and
secure a regard from them which might some day be an advantage
to him, immediately ordered the great work to proceed at his
expense. The satisfaction of the people and the Sanhedrim was now
at the highest pitch; and, ♠ emboldened by these displays of royal
favor, some of the sage plotters among them hoped to obtain from
him a favorable hearing on a matter which they deemed of still
deeper importance to their religion, and in which his support was
equally indispensable. This matter brings back the forsaken narrative
to consideration.

♦ “achievments” replaced with “achievements”

♠ “emboldenened” replaced with “emboldened”

Herod Agrippa.――All the interesting details of this richly romantic life, are given in a
most delightful style by Josephus. (Antiquities, XVIII. v. 3,‒viii. 9. and XIX. i‒ix.) The same is
more concisely given by the same author in another place. (Jewish War, II. ix. 5,‒xi. 6.) The
prominent events of Petronius’s administration, are also given in the former.

the peaceful progress of the faith.

The apostles, after the great events last narrated, gave

themselves with new zeal to the work which was now so vastly
extended by the opening of the wide field of the Gentiles. Others of
the refugees from the popular rage, at the time of Stephen’s murder,
had gone even beyond the boundaries of Palestine, bringing into the
sphere of apostolic operations a great number of interesting
subjects, before unthought of. Some of the bold, free workers, who
had heard of the late changes in the views of the apostles,
respecting the characters of those for whom the gospel was
designed, now no longer limited their efforts of love to the children of
the stock of Abraham, but proclaimed the faith of Jesus to those who
had before never heard his name. The gospel was thus carried into
Syria and Cyprus, and thence rapidly spread into many other
countries, where Macedonian conquest and Hellenic colonization
had made the Greek the language of cities, courts, commerce, and,
to a great extent, of literature. The great city of Antioch soon became
a sort of metropolis of the numerous churches, which sprang up in
that region, beyond the immediate reach of Jerusalem, now the
common home of the apostles, and the center of the Christian, as of
the Jewish faith. Grecians as well as Jews, in this new march of the
gospel, were made sharers in its blessings; and the multiplication of
converts among them was so rapid as to give a new importance, at
once, to this sort of Christians. The communication of these events
to the apostles at Jerusalem, called for some systematic action on
their part, to confirm and complete the good work thus begun by the
random and occasional efforts of mere wandering fugitives from
persecution. They accordingly selected persons especially fitted for
this field of labor, and despatched them to Antioch, to fulfil the duties
imposed on the apostles in ♦ reference to this new opening. The
details of the operations of these new laborers, will be given in their
lives hereafter.

♦ “refereuce” replaced with “reference”

In performing the various offices required in their domestic and

foreign fields of labor, now daily multiplying, Peter and his associates
had continued for several years steadily occupied, but achieving no
particular action that has received notice in the history of their acts;
so that the most of this part of their lives remains a blank to the
modern investigator. All that is known is, that between the churches
of Syria and Palestine there was established a frequent friendly
intercourse, more particularly between the metropolitan churches of
Jerusalem and Antioch. From the former went forth preachers to
instruct and confirm the new and untaught converts of the latter, who
had been so lately strangers to God’s covenant of promise with his
people; while from the thriving and benevolent disciples of Antioch
were sent back, in grateful recompense, the free offerings of such
aid as the prevalence of a general dearth made necessary for the
support of their poor and friendless brethren in Jerusalem; and the
very men who had been first sent to Antioch with the commission to
build up and strengthen that infant church, now returned to the
mother church at Jerusalem, with the generous relief which gratitude
prompted these new sons to render to the authors of their faith.

roman tolerance.

These events and the occasion of them occurred in the reign of

Claudius Caesar, as Luke particularly records,――thus marking the
lapse of time during the unregistered period of the apostolic acts;
which is also confirmed by the circumstances of Herod Agrippa’s
reign, mentioned immediately after, as occurring “about that time;”
for, as has been specified above, Herod Agrippa did not rule Judea
till the reign of Claudius. The crucifixion of Jesus occurred three
years before the death of Tiberius; and as the whole four years of the
reign of Caligula was passed over in this space, it could not have
been less than ten years after the crucifixion, when these events
took place. This calculation allows time for such an advance of the
apostolic enterprise, as would, under their devoted energy, make the
sect most formidable to those who regarded its success as likely to
shake the security of the established order of religious things, by
impairing the popular reverence for the regularly constituted heads of
Judaism. Such had been its progress, and such was the impression
made by its advance. There could no longer be any doubt as to the
prospect of its final ascendency, if it was quietly left to prosper under
the steady and devoted labors of its apostles, with all the advantages
of the re-action which had taken place from the former cruel
persecution which they had suffered. For several years the
government of Palestine had been in such hands that the Sanhedrim
had few advantages for securing the aid of the secular power, in
consummating their exterminating plans against the growing heresy.
Not long after the time of Pilate, the government of Judea had been
committed by the emperor to Publius Petronius, the president of
Syria, a man who, on the valuable testimony of Josephus, appears
to have been of the most amiable and upright character,――wholly
devoted to the promotion of the real interests of the people whom he
ruled. On several occasions, he distinguished himself by his
tenderness towards the peculiarly delicate religious feelings of the
Jews, and once even risked and incurred the wrath of the vindictive
Caligula, by disobeying his commands to profane the temple at
Jerusalem by the erection of that emperor’s statue within its holy
courts,――a violation of the purity of the place which had been
suggested to his tyrannical caprice by the spiteful hint of Apion, of
Alexandria. But though Petronius, in this matter, showed a
disposition to incur every hazard to spare the national and devotional
feelings of the Jews so awful an infliction, there is nothing in his
conduct which would lead us to suppose that he would sacrifice
justice to the gratification of the persecuting malice of the Jews, any
more than to the imperious tyranny of Caligula. The fairest
conclusion from the events of his administration, is, that he regulated
his behavior uniformly by his own sense of justice, with hardly any
reference to the wild impulses, either of popular or imperial tyranny.
A noble personification of independent and invincible justice; but one
not beyond the range of the moral conceptions of a Roman, even
under the corrupt and corrupting rule of the Caesars;――for thus
wrote the great moral poet of the Augustan age, though breathing
the enervating air of a servile court, and living on the favor of a
monarch who exacted from his courtiers a reverence truly idolatrous:
 Justum et tenacem propositi virum,

Non civium ardor prava jubentium,

Non vultus instantis tyranni

Mente quatit solida. * * *

The moral energy of the Roman character made the

exemplifications of this fair ideal not uncommon, even in these latter
days of Roman glory. There were some like Petronius, who gave life
and reality to this poetical conception of Horace,――“A man just and
resolute, unshaken from his firm purpose alike by the wild impulses
of popular rage, and by the frown of an overbearing tyrant.” And
these were among the chief blessings of the Roman sway, to those
lands in which it ruled,――that the great interests of the country
were not subjected to the blind movements of a perverse public
opinion, changing with each year, and frustrating every good which
required a steady policy for its accomplishment,――that the majority
of the people were not allowed to tyrannize over the minority, nor the
minority over the majority;――and that a mighty power amenable to
neither, but whose interest and glory would always coincide with the
good of the whole, held over all a dominion unchecked by the
demands of popular caprice. But, alas! for the imperfections of all
human systems;――among the curses of that Roman sway, must be
numbered its liability to fall from the hands of the wise and amiable,
into those of the stupid and brutal; changes which but too often
occurred,――overturning, by the mismanagement of a moment, the
results of years of benevolent and prudent policy. And in this very
case, all the benefits of Petronius’s equitable and considerate rule,
were utterly neutralized and annihilated by the foolishness or
brutality of his successors, till the provoked irritability of the nation at
last broke out with a fierceness that for a time overcame the
securities even of Roman dominion, and was finally quieted only in
the utter ruin of the whole Jewish nation. But during the period of
several years following the exit of Pilate, its beneficial energy was
felt in the quiet tolerance of religious opinion, which he enforced on
all, and which was most highly advantageous to the progress of the
doctrine of Christ. To this circumstance may justly be referred that
remarkable repose enjoyed by the apostles and their followers from
all the interference with their labors by the Roman government. The
death of Jesus Christ himself, indeed, was the only act in which the
civil power had interfered at all! for the murder of Stephen was a
mere freak of mob-violence, a mere Lynch-law proceeding, which the
Roman governor would not have sanctioned, if it had been brought
under his cognizance,――being done as it was, so directly in the
face of those principles of religious tolerance which the policy of the
empire enforced every where, excepting cases in which sedition and
rebellion against their dominion was combined with religious
zealotism, like the instances of the Gaulanitish Judas, Theudas, and
others. Even Jesus himself, was thus accused by the Jews, and was
condemned by Pilate for his alleged endeavors to excite a revolt
against Caesar, and opposing the payment of the Roman
taxes,――as is shown by the statement of all the evangelists, and
more particularly by Pilate’s inscription on the cross. The persecution
which followed the murder of Stephen was not carried on under the
sanction of the Roman government, nor yet was it against their
authority; for they permitted to the Sanhedrim the punishment of
most minor offences, so long as they did not go beyond
imprisonment, scourging, banishment, &c. But the punishment of
death was entirely reserved to the civil and military power; and if the
Jewish magnates had ever formally transgressed this limitation, they
would have been instantly punished for it, as a treasonable
assumption of that supreme power which their conquerors were
determined to guard with the most watchful jealousy. The
Sanhedrim, being thus restricted in their means of vengeance, were
driven to the low expedient of stirring up the lawless mob to the
execution of these deeds of desperate violence, which their religious
rulers could wink at, and yet were prepared to disown, when
questioned by the Romans, as mere popular ferments, over which
they had no control whatever. So they managed with Stephen; for his
murder was no doubt preconcerted among the chief men, who
caused the formal preamble of a trial, with the design of provoking
the mob, in some way, to this act; in which scheme they were too
much favored by the fiery spirit of the martyr himself, who had not
patience enough with their bigotry, to conceal his abhorrence of it.
Their subsequent systematic and avowed acts of violence, it should
be observed, were all kept strictly within the well-defined limits of
their penal jurisdiction; for there is no evidence whatever that any of
the persecuted Hellenists ever suffered death by the condemnation
of the Sanhedrim, or by the sentence of a Roman tribunal. The
progress of these events, however, showed that this irritating and
harassing system of whippings, imprisonments and banishments,
had a tendency rather to excite the energies of these devoted
heretics, than to check or crush their spirit of innovation and
denunciation. Among the numerous instances of malignant assault
on the personal rights of these sufferers, and the cruel violation of
the delicacy due to the weaker sex, there must have been, also,
many occasions in which the ever-varying feelings of the public
would be moved to deep sympathy with sufferers who bore, so
steadily and heroically, punishments manifestly disproportioned to
the offense with which they were charged,――a sympathy which
might finally rise to a high and resistless indignation against their
remorseless oppressors. It is probable, therefore, that this
persecution was at last allayed by other causes than the mere
defection of its most zealous agent. The conviction must have been
forced on the minds of the persecutors, that this system, with all its
paltry and vexatious details, must be given up, or exchanged for one
whose operations should be so vast and sweeping in its desolating
vengeance, as to overawe and appal, rather than awaken zeal in the
objects of the punishment, or sympathy in the beholders. The latter
alternative, however, was too hopeless, under the steady, benignant
sway of Petronius, to be calculated upon, until a change should take
place which should give the country a ruler of less independent and
scrupulous character, and more disposed to sacrifice his own moral
sense to the attainment of favor with the most important subjects of
his government. Until that desirable end should be attained, in the
course of the frequent changes of the imperial succession, it seemed
best to let matters take their own course; and they accordingly