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Junuguru Srinivas

Future of the BRICS and the Role of

Russia and China
Junuguru Srinivas
Political Science, School of Liberal Arts and Humanities, Woxsen
University, Hyderabad, Telangana, India

ISBN 978-981-19-1114-9 e-ISBN 978-981-19-1115-6

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1115-6

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive

license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

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Dedicated to
My family
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my
supervisor. Prof. Anuradha M. Chenoy, whose keen supervision, able
guidance, and steadfast support have made this work a success. I am
incredibly grateful to her for the utmost care, and enormous trust
bestowed on me. I owe solemn gratitude to all of my Center for Russian
and Central Asian Studies teachers, JNU, for their solicitous nature,
amicability guidance during my research, and their critical role in
inculcating in me a great interest in this beautiful and dynamic area of
study.
Though only my name appears on the cover, many grateful people
have contributed to its production. Their valuable assistance and
adequate guidance have aided in completing the thesis. A special thanks
to University Grant Commission (UGC) for providing Fellowship for five
years and the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) for
granting financial support for the field trip. I want to express my
heartfelt thanks to Vera Nikolaevna, International Department, Institute
of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University (MSU), for
providing accommodation at MSU hostel during the field trip in
Moscow, Russia.
I want to thank all the experts who have validated the field survey
for my research. Professor Eugenia Vanina, Institute of Oriental Studies,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Prof. Alexander Sergunin, School
of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University, Nikolai
Fedorov, Associate Professor, American Studies Department, School of
International Relations, St. Petersburg State University, Alexei D.
Voskressenski, Dean, School of Political Affairs, Moscow University of
International Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr.
Ekaterina Koldunova, Associate Professor, Deputy Dean, School of
Political Affairs, Senior Expert, ASEAN Centre, Moscow University of
International Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Andrey
Sushentsov, Associate Professor, Department of Applied Analysis of
International Problems, School of Political Science, Moscow University
of International Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Anna
Kireeva, Deputy Dean, Associate Professor, Department of Asian and
African Studies, School of Political Affairs, Moscow University of
International Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prof.
Tatiana Shaumyan, Head of the Center for Indian Studies, Institute of
Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Prof. Aleksandra
Sergeeva, Department of Political Science, Moscow State University,
Institute of Asian and African Studies, Prof. Lena Kutovaya, Department
of Political Science, Moscow State University, Institute of Asian and
African Studies, and Liya Kravchenko, expert at Russian International
Affairs Council, Member of International Political Science Association,
not only for their valuable time, insightful comments, and precious
suggestion but also for the tricky question which incented me to widen
my research form various perspective. The validation field survey could
not have been successful without their passionate participation and
input.
I want to express my sincere thanks to the JNU library staff and the
Institute of Defense and Strategic Analysis (IDSA) library for providing
exceedingly worthy materials adding enrichment. I also extend my
special thanks to my friends Naresh, Sudhakar, Naveen, Kishore, Eswar,
Raju, Vijay et al. I’m gratefully indebted for their contribution.
Last but not least, I am pleased to express my heartfelt appreciation
to all my family members, especially my mother Laxmi and father
Banaiah. They are the most incredible soul of inspiration to me. Words
cannot express how grateful I am to Praveen-Thriveni, Swaroopa-
Rajalingu, Kavitha-Poshetti, Vamshi, Nikhil, Vaishnavi, Varshini,
Hemalatha, Thoka Manishi, Navaneeth, Shreyansh, Sujatha, Swaranjali,
and Rajkumar, also to my in-laws Mallaiah-Mallu Bai, Chinna Poshanna-
Poshavva for their endless love, affection, support, encouragement, and
motivation doing the work, a success. Finally, I must express my
profound gratitude to my beloved wife, Haritha, and my dear son, for
their understanding, unfailing support, continuous encouragement,
patience, and unwavering love throughout years of studying and
writing the book. This accomplishment would not have been possible
without them.
Having been privileged in receiving such support and sympathy, I
own responsibility for all the errors or omissions that might have crept
into the book.
Abbreviations
ABM Ballistic Missile Treaty
AE Advanced Economies
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India, and China
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, and China
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CPC Communist Party of China
CSTO The Collective Security Treaty Organization
EMDE Emerging Markets and Developing Economies
EU European Union
EurAsEC The Eurasian Economic Community
FPC Foreign Policy Concept
G-7 Group of Eight Countries
G-8 Group of Eight Countries
G-20 Group of Twenty Countries
G-77 Group of Seventy-Seven Countries
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IBSA India, Brazil, and South Africa
IMF International Monetary Fund
IR International Relations
MD Military Doctrine
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC National Security Concept
OECD The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
POCOM Pacific Command
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
RIC Russia, India, and China
SAARC South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
SADC South African Development Community
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SU Soviet Union
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO World Trade Organization
Contents
1 Introduction and Conceptual Framework
2 The Evolution of Brics and the International System
3 Russia and BRICS
4 China and BRICS
5 Russia and China in BRICS:​Convergences and Divergences
6 Conclusion
Index
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 BRICS map (Source www.mapsofworld.com/.../brics-countries-
map.html)

Fig. 2.2 Share of World population, 2018 (Source BRICS Joint Statistical
Publication 2020, p. 17)

Fig. 2.3 Share of world territory, 2018 (Source BRICS Joint Statistical
Publication 2020, p. 17)

Fig. 2.4 BRICS percentage share of public expenditure on education to

GDP (%) (Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020, p. 82)

Fig. 2.5 Projected structure of the global economy (2014–2060) (Source

Economic Outlook No. 95: Long-term-Baseline Projections Dataset,
Organization for Economic Cooperation for Development [OECD], May
2014. The data is calculated in percentile)

Fig. 2.6 BRICS references to international institutions, 2008–2012,

percentage share of references made (Source Larionova 2012, BRICS in
the System of Global Governance, p. 42)

Fig. 4.1 World Bank lending to China for investment on multiple sectors
(in percent) (Source The World Bank Simadatabase, data was taken till
July 15, 2003 [World Bank, “Data and Statistics 2003”, 2003,
http://www.worldbank.org/data/datatopic/GDP_PPP.pdf])
Fig. 5.1 Number of Materials in the Western press, by country, 2013–
2014 (Source Marakhovsky [2015], ‘BRICS in the Western Media’, pg.
137)
List of Tables
Table 2.​1 Annual GDP growth rates of dominant countries between
1000 and 1998

Table 2.​2 The Military spending of the great powers in peacetime 1870–
1913 and 1920–1938

Table 2.​3 World trade volumes of goods and services (during the global
financial crisis) (annual percent change)

Table 2.​4 Selected countries GDP growth rate

Table 2.​5 Merchandize trade volume and real GDP, 2015–2021 (Annual
percentage change)

Table 2.​6 Overview of the World Economic Outlook-2021 projections

Table 2.​7 Real GDP projections for 2021 and 2022 (%, year on year)

Table 2.​8 Estimated foresight on polarity

Table 2.​9 General information on BRICS as per data available in 2020

Table 2.​10 BRICS population, health and environment data by 2014

Table 2.​11 Selected data on the labor force of the BRICS countries

Table 2.​12 Value of imports and exports of goods and commercial

services (million US$)

Table 2.​13 Age structure and dependency ratio of the BRICS population

Table 2.​14 Inflows of FDI (million US$)

Table 2.​15 Outflows of FDI (million US$)

Table 2.​16 The historical and projected annual growth rate of GNP per
capita, %

Table 2.​17 BRICS in the World Economy for 2000–2018 (percentage of

Global Indicators)

Table 2.​18 Foreign exchange reserves (million US$)

Table 3.​1 Russian Federation Annual GDP growth rate of 1990–1993

Table 3.​2 Russia's total exports and share of arms exports

Table 3.​3 Russian defense budget, billion USD in current prices

Table 3.​4 Russia's trade with BRICS countries from 2007–2015
(US$Billions)

Table 3.​5 Russia's trade with the BRICS members

Table 3.​6 NDB financial help to the Russian Federation from 2016 to
2020 (in US $million)

Table 4.​1 China’s net receipts from all donors between 1980 and 2000
(US$million)

Table 4.​2 Foreign direct investment into China's economy between

2000 and 2014 ($millions)

Table 4.​3 Deconstructing China's growth:​1950–2007

Table 4.​4 GDP rate of China, United States, and Japan since 2010 to till
2020

Table 4.​5 Share of countries in gross world product (at PPP, %)

Table 5.​1 BRICS Priorities in 2008–2012, percentage share of subjects

Table 5.​2 UN peacekeeping forces

About the Author
Dr. Junuguru Srinivas is currently working as an Assistant Professor
in the School of Liberal Arts & Humanities, Woxsen University, Kamkole,
Sadashivpet, Sangareddy, Hyderabad, Telangana. Previously Dr. Srinivas
worked in the GITAM School of Humanities and Social Sciences, GITAM
(Deemed to be University), Visakhapatnam, India. He got awarded Ph.D.
in 2018 from the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School
of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He
completed his MPhil from the same center in 2013. He did his Master's
Degree with a political science specialization in International Relations
at Jawaharlal Nehru University in 2011. He presented many papers in
national and international seminars in cities like New Delhi, Cuttack,
Pondicherry, Russia, Canada, Turkey, and Nepal. He chaired one session
at the University of Geneva (Switzerland) during the summer school in
2017. I attended the UNCTAD Summer School 2020 on Globalization
and Development Strategies, jointly organized by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Institute of
New Economic Thinking Young Scholars Initiative (YSI) held virtually
from August 15–23, 2020. Dr. Srinivas has published articles in various
national, and international UGC and SCOPUS indexed Journals, and also
his book is going to be published by Palgrave Macmillan. On October 24,
2018, Dr. Srinivas organized a one-day national seminar on Indian
foreign policy and UN roles. Further, Dr. Srinivas organized two
Webinars recently on China and COVID-19. He did six MOOC Courses
from the University of London, National Research University Higher
School of Economics, Russia, University of Hong Kong, University of
New South Wales, and the University of California, US. He published
articles in various reputed national, and international SCOPUS indexed
Journals. Srinivas was awarded Junior Research Fellowship (JRF),
conducted by UGC in International relations, 2011. He was also
awarded Data Collection Fellowship from ICSSR in 2017.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
J. Srinivas, Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1115-6_1

1. Introduction and Conceptual

Framework
Junuguru Srinivas1
(1) Political Science, School of Liberal Arts and Humanities, Woxsen
University, Hyderabad, Telangana, India

Junuguru Srinivas
Email: sreenujnu@gmail.com

Keywords BRICS – Global south – Global order – International

relations

Introduction
Over the last three decades, the global economy has been transformed
with several countries like Brazil, India, China, Indonesia, Mexico, and
South Africa in the post-globalization era. Countries in the European
Union (EU) have faced stagnation and recession, while several southern
countries have shown high growth and economic development levels.
Russia leveraged its oil sales and export of weapons to induce its
transition following the Soviet disintegration of 1991. The fast-growing
economies of China, India, and Brazil have stood out and have
accelerated their growth. This trend catalyzed several changes within
the international system. Following the end of the Cold War1 between
the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and America in the mid-
twentieth century, the United States of America (USA) emerged as a
dominating player in international politics. It faced political resistance
from Russia and China, who sought to construct a new economic
structure of several global powers. It has resulted in what is termed as a
‘multipolar’2 political and economic system, challenging the earlier
‘bipolar’ model that was based on a duality between the East and the
West.
Despite an economic crisis in the traditional Superpower countries,
which include the EU and the United States, have continued to
hegemonize international forums and institutions around the world, for
instance, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
G-8,3 and G-20,4 which were largely West-dominated. It has led to the
need for new formations, and the ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa)5 was thus conceptualized and established in 2009.
The aim of BRICS was evident at the outset: the reform of the
international financial and political system through such a parallel new
forum (First BRIC Summit declaration 2009). In a 2014 meeting at the
Brazil Summit, BRICS took essential steps to create an ‘Infrastructural
and new development bank’6 (Fortaleza BRICS Summit declaration
2014). Russia and China had a particular interest in BRICS, mainly
because they believed it would differ from the G-8 and G-777 groups. It
provided them with the opportunity to take positions that could help to
enhance both Russian and Chinese foreign policy interests in
international relations.

Background
The disintegration of the Soviet Union (SU) in 1991 is considered a
watershed moment in contemporary world politics. It paved the way
for the end of the Cold War and triggered a unipolar8 moment in
international politics under the US hegemony. The United States
became the sole Superpower in global politics within every domain—
military, economic, and socio-cultural. While it signaled an end to bloc
politics, it unchained many Third World countries from the constraints
imposed by the Cold War and gave these countries the scope to exercise
autonomy within foreign policies. With rapid economic growth,
expanding international trade, and technological revolutions, the world
order became more complex, and interdependence and inter-
connectedness deepened. While the United States remains highly
powerful, alternate power centers have emerged to contribute to world
politics significantly.
The equation between these power centers came closest to the
system of multiple powers, unlike the bipolar dominance during the
Cold War period that had characteristics of ‘Pax Americana and
Sovietica.’ Wohlforth (1999) remarked that even the nineteenth-
century Victorian period was not just ‘Pax Britannica,’ but from 1815 to
1853, it was ‘Pax Britannica et Russia.’ From 1853 to 1871, there was no
concept of ‘pax.’ Between 1871 and 1914, it was ‘Pax Britannica et
Germanica.’ In other words, several states were powerful and balanced
each other out and vied for retaining and expanding their colonies.
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the structure of the
international system has been continuously changing with multiple
dimensions. The current world is highly interconnected. There are
various sources of interaction between states, businesses, and people.
In such a scenario, a single actor cannot achieve the long-term goals of
sustainable economic development and make it the winner of global
politics because diverse resources and competencies play a crucial role
in becoming a global actor. That is the way countries will go for a
collaborative mood with other like-minded states to enhance their
position in international relations collectively.

Regionalization and Decentralization

A severe political clash between the Eastern bloc (led by USSR) and the
Western bloc (led by the United States) created a bipolar world order in
a post-Cold War atmosphere. The ‘Bipolar System,’ also emerging out of
two ideological extremities defined by these two polar power centers,
was a phenomenon based on what is known as a ‘Eurocentric’ vision
(Waltz 1993). During this phase, the global south solidarity emerged
with the evolution of the Non-Alignment Movement. After
decolonization and solidarity groupings like the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), the rise of the global south led to a contestation
through independent positions. Because of this, the military role has
been depleted despite the peak of the bipolar interpretation of the
world. This Cold War of ideology partially ended only with the
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. The end of the bipolar
system of international relations started transiting toward a new
approach in world affairs. The drive to retain Western hegemony
continued as well. It has also led to the rise of the regionalization of
global politics.
With a growing localization and regionalism in international politics
from 1991 onwards, functional theorists like David Mitrany and K.
Deutsch (1957) formulated a theory of ‘integration,’ which they
described, would be the basis for regulating normative world politics in
the times to come. They argued that:

An increasing role and influence of international organizations

and agencies will ensure stronger international ties and
interdependence.

As mentioned above, the states that establish strong relations with

other like-minded states also benefit both countries. It has been
reflected in post-Cold War period international relations. Prof. Tatiana
Shaumyan (2017), Head of the Center for Indian Studies, Institute of
Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, stated that the process
of integration of the world started in the twenty-first century. From
then onwards, many countries form regional, inter-regional, and global
groups for mutual benefits. They integrate with the world to share their
concerns on a common platform for urgent solutions. Therefore, Russia
is also participating in the change and accepting the changing trend of
world politics.
The best example is the BRICS. The BRICS group countries are
considered to be the largest emerging markets in contemporary
international relations. The BRICS is gradually taking a geopolitical role
that stimulates a global shift in international relations power politics
(Sheresheva 2020). Apart from that, southern world countries like
China, India, Brazil, and several others have played a significant role in
international relations. These countries have been cooperating and
taking positions on many global issues. In the process, these countries
have been actively cooperating in international relations. With this
trend, the world has become more integrated and interconnected.
According to Ivanov (2013), the world has shifted toward more
interdependence during the last twenty years. In this global integration
process, the modern world transformed extensively, and international
relations accelerated so rapidly that global culture, societal, scientific,
and political developments significantly impacted. Currently, it is
possible to say that no country is so strong in the present world that it
is more self-sufficient than any other or that it can solve all its problems
on its own. The isolationism once practiced by numerous countries is
now seen as a dead-end. The consequences of such a non-inclusive
approach could lead a nation to stagnation, backwardness, or inevitable
decline.
In this context, Russia undertook a mission to initiate and support a
multilateral dialogue of cultures, civilizations, and states in
international relations to enhance Russia's relations. Russia took this
initiative due to various historical and sociological reasons. Karaganov
(2016) observed that while economic, scientific, and technological
factors massively influence world politics, regional and global power
politics also greatly influence. We are witnessing today the rapid
expansion of international relations. In the process, Russia and China
have also played a significant role in transforming global politics. This is
why it is essential to contextualize Russian and Chinese foreign policy
within the BRICS, with a relatively high level of strength and stake. The
reason for Russia and China is their participation and involvement in
surfacing the global south voice in international relations because they
have a chequered history with the Western world.
Putin on October 24, 2014, at Sochi (Russia), while speaking at the
‘Meeting of the International Discussion, Valdai, said the following:

Fundamental changes are occurring in international affairs, with

an increasing loss of control. The numerous changes mean we
need a new global consensus of responsible forces. Thus, it
should be possible to rule out any local deal or division of
spheres in classical diplomacy's spirit and anybody's complete
domination over that consensus. One more reason for this is the
strengthening and growth of individual regions on the planet.
This gives rise to an objective need to institutionalize such
extreme poles, create a powerful regional organization, and
develop the rules on their interaction. Cooperation between
 such centers would be a serious factor of stability in global
security, politics, and economics.
This trend symbolized SCO,9 IBSA,10 BASIC,11 BRICS, etc. Kirabaev
(2015) stated that the member countries in these groups were
previously referred to as ‘peripheral’ and had begun to move to the fore.
The ‘code of behavior’ within the international relations sphere had
acquired new positive trends and had retreated from traditional biased
norms. Kirabaev (2015) also observes that regionalism and regional
integration accompany globalization, which became a significant force
for the emergence of macro-regions in various corners of the world.
Further, it managed to blur the categories between macro-regions and
sub-regions as the economic, social, and humanitarian contact between
them developed considerably. In this way, states became an integral
space. It is understood that states cooperation is the main instrument
to ensure political stability, security, economic growth, and social and
cultural development (ibid.).
While in earlier political history, control was usually sought through
the use of colonial force, such as in Europe, for example, during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (De Ouro-Preto 2013). Therefore,
the time has come for seeing the world in a multidimensional way.
Hence, there is the need for a multipolar world order in an increasingly
globalized world following the Cold War of the 1980s. It has led to laws
being created for closer integration of economies to facilitate the entry
of capital and technology (Rozanova 2003). However, not that it had
given negative consequences. But, Hirono (2010) argues that
globalization has both positive and negative effects. On the one hand,
there has been an improved global economic growth and structure, be
it industrial, developmental, or transitional. On the other hand, the
benefits of globalization have not been universal. Have benefited a few
countries and has concentrated capital in the hands of fewer people
than ever before.
Notably, unprecedented changes occurred in the global south
countries because of globalization. Further, the narrative that has
dominated international relations over the years is Realpolitik.12 There
is a greater emphasis on capital and material wealth with the advent of
globalization and capitalism in the 1990s. It was also the period that
saw the end of the Soviet dissolution when a fierce war on terror began
—through counter-insurgency struggles in the early 2000s (Wohlforth
2015). During this period, growth was reflected in economies such as
maritime, cyber, and other domains. Some emerging and developing
economies like China, India, and others gained and not traditional
economies. The emergence of such environments and sub-cultures
from the margins of the world's economy led scholars like Fareed
Zakaria to term the phenomenon the ‘Rise of the Rest’ (Zakaria 2008).
In this instance, by the mid-2000s, China joined approximately 66
international organizations, whereas France joined nearly 92. The
United States and the UK joined 77, Russia joined 71, and India joined
61 (Xu and Cai 2007). And yet, traditional scholars claimed that
emerging countries did not have adequate strength in the older global
institutions. In contrast, new scholars like Srikanth Kondapalli and
Priyanka Pandith (2016: 5) argue that emerging economies have
merely not been able to put forward a cohesive, comprehensive, and
universally acceptable international and regional order but also started
playing a significant role in emerging international relations.
That is why scholar Zhang Maorong (2011) defended establishing
the BRICS countries in international relations. Maorong says that when
the BRICS were trying to upgrade their economic profile, the US-led
Western powers registered negative consequences in the global
framework due to their financial crisis affecting these emerging
economies nations. International institutions also failed to stand by the
emerging nations when needed help. This was why a new group such as
the BRICS was crucially needed to be formed to sustain itself, i.e., Global
South countries. Thus, the formation of BRICS at Yekaterinburg in 2009
received worldwide attention. Nikolai Kodorov (2017) stated that:

The BRICS is a forum of regional powers, pretending for a more

significant role in world politics to bring change in global
governance, “alternative” to G7.

The demand for a more democratic international order and a just

and equitable representation in global institutions intensified within
such a context. It led to the emergence of BRICS as a robust forum. In
this process, southern countries have been forming regional and inter-
regional groups to ensure their interests collectively. The quintessential
groups include BRICS, BASIC, RIC (Russia, India, China), and IBSA.
Among all these groups, BRICS is the most prominent because of its
transcontinental nature and the scope of the multilateral work that it
can carry out. Thus, BRICS displays a critical paradigm shift in world
politics. Cox (2012) says that the clout of the Western world in
international relations is now being sapped of its power rapidly. The
southern world has been rising since the early twenty-first century,
which the BRICS group is replacing. BRICS collectively defends the
reform of global institutions in promoting their economic and political
interests (De Ouro-Preto 2013). Therefore, the Western world regularly
negates the rise of the BRICS group in international politics. However,
apart from that, the West was forming policies to destabilize the BRICS
global role. One such policy was former US President Obama's strategy
for rebalancing Asia.

Obama's Pivot Asia: Seizing Global Security

Russia and China came together to intensify their strategic cooperation
over the period, notably after President Obama issued the ‘Pivot Asia’13
strategy in 2011. After the United State's rebalancing strategy, the
United States deployed 360,000 military personnel under the ‘Pacific
Command’ (PACOM). The POCOM positioned 200 ships, including five
aircraft carrier strike groups (Aneja 2014). Further, China’s 2020
research report on the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region
says that the United States has deployed 375,000 enlisted members of
its Indo-Pacific Command, 60 percent of the US Navy ships, 55 percent
of its Army, and two-thirds of its Marine Corps. And with 85,000
forward-deployed soldiers and a large amount of high-tech and new
weaponry. The report says that the US military has maintained its
absolute supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region over the years,
considering the growth of China and Russia’s military strength
(Xuanzun 2020).
Therefore, Russia and China have sought support from other
southern world countries like India and Brazil and mulled over
establishing a new collective security system and arrangement (Aneja
2014). The best opportunity for them in this regard seemed like it was
going to be through BRICS. The question now arises: how can Russia
and China cooperate in changing security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific
region to compete with the USA’s Asia pivot strategy? With whom else
can Russia and China focus the most on their worldly affairs? Even if
they go along with southern countries focusing on multipolarity, they
have ever contending objections on many global and regional issues. At
the same time, how would they receive highly competing powers like
India, Brazil, Japan, and some other states to play a vital role in global
affairs? And how would they promote the group of BRICS as their tool
to constrain a Western hegemonic order? And lastly, do they have the
intention to make the BRICS group more secure? The book will examine
some of these questions.

Rise of BRICS
Each BRICS countries have its own civilizations place and cultural
matrix, its view on development and security in international relations.
However, all the five BRICS countries cooperate across the old dividing
lines: East–West or North–South. The BRICS collaboration reflects the
‘concert of civilizations’ than the ‘clash of civilizations’ (Observer
Research Foundation 2017: 68).14
The political shaping of BRICS begun as early as 2006 during the UN
General Assembly Session in New York, United States. It was the first of
a series of high-level meetings among BRICS countries. Since then,
BRICS has evolved into a multilateral grouping. The first cooperation
among the BRICS group countries started with deputy ministers and
heads of government agencies.
The BRIC acronym was first created by the Goldman Sachs
economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 while projecting the growth rate of these
countries. He foresaw these countries to have the potential to overtake
other developed countries. O’Neill argued that the West should shift
their economic policies toward the BRIC countries region, as these
countries would have safety for advanced countries’ investments
(O’Neill 2001). Furthermore, the World Bank report ‘World
Development Indicators’ of 2021 claimed that China became the
second-largest global economy, India became the sixth largest global
economy, Russia became the eleventh largest global economy, and
Brazil became the twelfth largest global economy. South Africa became
the thirty-ninth largest economy (World Bank 2021). And that the
BRICS countries have 43.03 percent of the world's population, 18
percent of the nominal GDP, 25 percent of the GDP per capita, 25.91
percent of the planet's land area (Reis 2013).
Russian President Putin was the first person to take the initiative to
propel this group into a political group and coordinate the group to
work toward more democratic world order, with the multipolarity
concept in international relations (Akulov 2012). The first Summit was
held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009 (Mielniczuk 2013). South Africa
became an official member of BRICS during the Sanya Summit (Yan
2011). The tradition to hold an annual summit had been started in the
year 2009. Every Summit took place with a specific theme and mainly
stressed the prevailing global problems and lacunae in the international
system. Since then, there have been eight summits held so far. (The
thematic explanation of each Summit has been given below.) The first
Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009. The second Summit
was held in Brasilia, Brazil, in 2010, and the Third Summit was held in
Sanya, China, in 2011. During Sanya Summit, South Africa officially
became a member of the BRIC, and since then, the BRIC has become
BRICS. Likewise, the fourth Summit was held in New Delhi, India. The
fifth Summit was held in Durban, South Africa, in 2013. The sixth
Summit was held in Fortaleza, Brazil, in 2014. The Seventh Summit was
held in Ufa, Russia, in 2015, and the eighth BRICS summit at Goa in
2016. The ninth BRICS summit took place in Xiamen in 2017, China.
The tenth BRICS summit was held in Johannesburg in 2018, South
Africa. The eleventh BRICS summit took place in Brasilia in 2019, Brazil,
and the twelfth BRICS summit was supposed to be held in Russia in
2020 due to the Covid-19, but it got postponed and held in virtual
mode. The thirteenth BRICS summit happened in New Delhi, India.
During the 63rd UN General Assembly convened in 2008, the then
Brazilian president Lula Da Silva stated that Southern world countries
have stepped up their efforts to design a multipolar world order, such
as India, Brazil, and South African initiatives. The BRIC countries
asserted the alliances with the traditional developed world and
stressed that there would be no competition between the North and
South over global order (Lula Da Silva 2008). As far as current trends in
the East and West's relations are concerned, they are always in a
problem with one or the other. Nonetheless, change is inevitable, and
BRICS will remain a balancing factor for future international relations
between the southern and Western world (Grace Guerrero 2011).
On the one hand, BRICS plays the role of a united forum for
resistance against Western control. On the other hand, BRICS was a
beacon for Russian and Chinese foreign policy interests. Every year, the
BRICS meetings discuss new and existing global issues. For instance, in
2012, in New Delhi, the theme of the meeting was ‘BRICS Partnership
for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity,’ dealing with the Iranian
Nuclear issue and Afghanistan (Ministry of External Affairs of India
2012). In the Durban Summit in South Africa in 2013, for instance,
BRICS declared that the international community should reject further
militarization of Syria because the problem could be resolved through
formal dialogues (Department of International Relations and
Cooperation South Africa 2013). The recently held UN resolutions on
the Ukraine crisis to condemn Russian aggression on Ukraine and siege
the military operations, China and India abstained from all the voting. It
indicated that both China and India took positive neutrality.
Furthermore, BRICS countries started focusing on strategic affairs
too. Combating terrorism became one of the most critical issues. This
was intensified at the Goa summit, held in 2016 (Goa Summit
Declaration 2016). In this regard, on September 4, 2016, at the
sidelines meeting of the G-20 Hangzhou, the Russian foreign ministry
stated that BRICS countries had underlined the importance of further
strategic cooperation in the union. The Russian ministry also said that
BRICS leaders exchanged views on a wide range of important issues
concerning global politics, security, economics, and global management,
all of common concern. Further, it is stated that strategic cooperation is
based on openness, solidarity, equality, mutual understanding,
inclusivity, and collaboration (Guneev 2016). Likewise, on February 23,
2017, China's state councilor Yang Jiechi stated that the September
2017 BRICS summit would be about a strengthened partnership. That
is, ‘BRICS: Stronger Partnership for Brighter Future. He also said that
the objective of the Summit that China will focus on four aspects, which
include, strengthening of solidarity and collaboration among BRICS
members, the improving of global governance, deepening pragmatic
cooperation to achieve mutual benefit, increasing the number of
people-to-people exchanges, the enhancing of public support, and the
strengthening of institutional mechanism and improving collaborative
platform (The State Council, the Republic of China on February 24,
2017). The BRICS can be instrumental in shaping global governance
while filling the gaps. It includes reforming the multilateral
international institutions as there is a lot of hiatus between the
developed and developing countries. Further, there is a lack of
coordination between the regional institutions like trading blocks,
regional development banks, and regional financing arrangements.
There is no such mechanism in the global governance system at
present. Further, there is an acute need to expand reserve currencies
available in the global economy (Lissovolik 2020). For this, the BRICS
have a more prominent role to play as a balancing role in reforming the
ill-formed present international institutions.
Further, the Covid-19 pandemic severely damaged the liberal global
order. The majority of the countries have taken unilateral decisions to
contain the virus. Many Western organizations failed to bring the
collective fight on the common problem of the Covid-19. However,
scholar Suslov (2020) stated that the BRICS played a constructive role
during the pandemic. The critical point is that India and China also
tried hard to keep the antagonistic attitude aside. Another crucial
aspect of the BRICS is that no BRICS members cross redlines of the
group principles. For instance, due to the different views on the
Venezuela incidents in 2019 and Brazil’s continental leadership
ambitions, the Venezuela issue was left out of the BRICS final
declarations. That is how India and China border disputes also have no
place to be part of the BRICS discussions (Panova 2021). It indicates
that the bilateral contradictions may not hinder the progress of the
BRICS group. The BRICS group members signal that they do not want to
go away from the BRICS group.

Chinese Perspective on BRICS: Institutional, Not

Oppositional
The Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (2011), while responding to
questions from a reporter, claimed that the BRICS cooperation is open
and very inclusive and that the critical aspect of the group is that it
would cement North–South cooperation (Consulate General of the
Peoples Republic of China in San Francisco 2011). Further, a Chinese
foreign ministry affiliated think tank affirmed that ‘BRICS is an ad-hoc
political group and is not an anti-US bloc’ (Gordon 2011). While giving a
written answer to the media on March 28, 2012, the Chinese president
Hu Jintao stated that the ‘BRICS group is the defender and promoter of
the southern world countries in the coming period’ (Embassy of the
People's Republic of China in Republic of India 2012), BRICS has very
prominence position in Chinese foreign policy as it can diversify
economic development goals with other major developing countries.
Further, China would bolster its relations with these countries, unlike
earlier periods (Yue 2013).
According to Li Lianmin (2014), a research fellow of Russian Studies
at the Chinese Academy of Social sciences, BRICS should become a
strategic cooperative mechanism of greater binding power among
developing countries (Xinhua 2014). Scholar Cheng (2015) observed
that after the Cold War, the international relations system power was
configured by one superpower country and several major powers.
However, the global combat of terrorism and the 2008–2009 financial
crisis had reduced the predominance of the United States in
international relations. Further, the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq had
proved too costly to handle. So it is in this context the role of BRICS has
been defining factor of emerging international relations due to its
global approach. Hence China would like to use the BRICS platform to
enhance its position in world politics as all the countries share similar
views of global politics. While meeting with BRICS foreign ministers,
China president Xi Jinping on June 19, 2017, argued that the BRICS
countries should push forward with international order to develop in
more fair and global demand. And Xi prompted them to call for joint
efforts to create a new golden decade for the BRICS bloc (An Baijie et al.
2017). Further, China is mulling to expand the BRICS group and make it
more ‘BRICS Plus’ for greater South-South cooperation. Because, on
March 8, 2017, foreign minister of China, Wang Yi, during the press
conference for the fifth session of the 12th national People’s Congress
at the Beijing, China, ‘BRICS countries are like five fingers, short and
long if extended, but a mighty fist if clenched together.’ During this, Yi
underscored the point that China would work with other members of
the BRICS to make it ‘BRICS Plus’ for world peace and development
(Huaxia 2017). However, the critical part of China’s intention to make
the BRICS as ‘BRICS Plus,’ is consideration of the other major powers of
the group. Notably, India and Brazil. Otherwise, the future of the BRICS
will be a question mark. With this trend, BRICS has played a positive
role in Chinese foreign policy objectives. However, Ukraine crisis-like
incidents will have a more significant impact on the BRICS progress.
Because one of the critical players of the BRICS, Russia, is directly
involved in the crisis. Therefore, it is tough for the BRICS members to
stand and take positions.

Russian Perspective: Self-Adoption of BRICS Model

Russia believes that its national government would eventually adapt to
the new system of global governance that BRICS also upholds. It would
ultimately contribute to making global institutions like the IMF, World
Bank, WTO15 (World Trade Organization), UNSC16 (United Nations
Security Council), as well as the international financial system more
fair, stable, and efficient (Toloraya 2014). According to the new Russian
Foreign Policy Concept (2013), Russia attaches excellent prominence to
the sustainable manageability of global governance. For that, collective
leadership by the central states of the world is required. This, in turn,
should be represented in geopolitical and civilizational terms. Scholars
Aleksandra Sergeeva (2017) and Lena Kutovaya (2017) of the Institute
of Asian and African Studies said that the Russian foreign ministry has a
separate department dealing with BRICS affairs. That shows how much
importance that Russia is giving to BRICS in its foreign policy
framework.
Furthermore, Alexei D. Voskressenski (2017), Dean, School of
Political Affairs, Moscow University of International Relations, Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believed that;

Russia has the alternate platform to stress upon its global reach.
With this kind of fora Russia builds it relations with emerging
nations in global politics. However, that does not mean that
BRICS completely negates the existing world order. However,
trying to make it a more democratic, representative, innovative
 and pragmatic world order. Due to these objectives of BRICS
Russia's objectives will also be fulfilled its global affairs
objectives.
And, ‘The Concept of participation of the Russian federation in
BRICS 2013,’ which is based on a new Russian federation constitution,
regarded that: ‘The establishment of BRICS reflects an objective trend
in global development, one towards the formation of a polycentric
system of international relations. This one is increasingly characterized
by the use of non-institutionalized global governance mechanisms,
network-based diplomacy, and growing economic interdependence of
states.’ The BRICS group can influence Russia to extend its foreign
policy multi-directional to expand language, culture, and information.
Thus, that BRICS challenges the Western world's hegemonic power.
Again, scholar Aleksandra Sergeeva (2017) and Lena Kutovaya (2017)
of Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University
stated,

RIC led to the establishment of the BRICS forum. BRICS has a

larger perspective and scope in present world politics. It is a
unique association for Russia's foreign policy. It is a reflection of
the objective reality of Russian foreign policy. BRICS is trying to
implement its decisions in international relations. However, it
focuses on cultural, social, and humanitarian aspects. So, Russia
will have a global role with it.

Another scholar Tatiana Shaumyan (2017), Head of the Center for

Indian Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of
Sciences, argued that:

According to the lens of Lenin, the future of humanity belongs to

Russia, China, and India. The process of world integration is
essential in present global politics for solving common social,
economic, political, and security issues. The RIC forum paved the
way for establishing BRICS. Every year, BRICS importance is
growing due to its global representation. BRICS is trying to bring
regional and international issues to the mainstream level. With
 this trend of BRICS, can Russia have space to build close
relations with these countries?
Scholar Ekaterina Koldunova (2017), Associate Professor, Deputy
Dean, School of Political Affairs, Senior Expert, ASEAN Centre, Moscow
University of International Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, believes that ‘Russia is the only country which is gradually
trying to make BRICS as a center of new global political clout.’
However, the Ukraine crisis will be a game-changer in emerging
international relations. The situation will have more considerable
repercussions. The Post pandemic world is threatened by oodles of
traditional and non-traditional security forces. The NATO's resources
have been exhausted. The developed world is indeed at a phase where
the idea of war saturates. The Ukraine crisis indicated that NATO has
some limitations. Thus, the securitization of BRICS seems to be
inevitable along with the BRICS Bank to defend the interest of
developing countries. However, many of the Russian scholars were
ambivalent about this idea; for example, Scholar Nikolai Fedorov
(2017) of St. Petersburg State University stated that,

Russia needs new partners in the sphere of international

security. Cooperation with India, Brazil, and South Africa is
possible, but only in fields where all BRICS states have
consensus (e.g., struggle with international terrorism, piracy etc.

Similarly, Professor Tatiana Shaumyan (2017), opined that when it

comes to the institutionalization of BRICS, it is not sure how Russia can
coordinate with other group members. Because India, Brazil, and South
Africa, as all these countries, have different opinions on BRICS's global
security role. However, scholar Deich (2013) argued that: ‘During the
past decade, Western countries have been curtailing their participation
in the UN peacekeeping/peacemaking operations, with the consequent
niche being filled by the rising states, including BRICS, which tends to
take the lead in these activities. But,’ Aleksandra Sergeeva (2017) and
Lena Kutovaya (2017) observed that Russia might not make BRICS a
NATO. However, it stresses upon BRICS global security role. BRICS is
improving upon its UN peacekeeping measures and reducing Western
control daily. Thus, BRICS's next step should be in thinking about how
systems in the southern countries could be resolved without any
intervention from the Western world. Further, the evolution of the
BRICS also caused for promotion of the multipolarity concept in
international relations.

Multipolarity: Russian and Chinese Perspectives

Multipolarity was conceptualized in Russia in 1993 (Ambrosio 2007)
when the first foreign minister of the new federation, Andrei Kozyrev
(1994) said that the twenty-first century would not be going toward
‘Pax Americana’ but toward multilateralism. Likewise, former Russian
president Boris Yeltsin argued (1997):

We are for a multipolar world… where there is no diktat by any

single country. Let the US be one pole, Russia another, Asia,
Europe, and several other poles. This is the base for the world to
stand on and ensure common security.

There are several reasons why Russia's proposal for a ‘multipolar’

world order emerged. The expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization), its consequent isolation of Russia and China, and its
attempts to create threat and insecurity were probably the first
triggers. But the US attacks on many of Russia's allies, like on
Afghanistan and Iraq, besides NATO's war with Yugoslavia, and the
overt attempt by the United States to gain clout in the southern region
fueled the need for multipolarity further. America's plans for a missile
defense system were opposed by both Russia and China (Ambrosio
2007). These incidents made Russia build alternative power centers in
global politics so that Russia could constrain the West's influence on
Russia and in international politics.
Jiang Zemin, the then-China president, officially incorporated
multipolarity (duojishijie) into Chinese foreign policy during the 14th
Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1992. This supported
China's stance that a fair, just, and peaceful world was possible only
through multipolarity (Lo 2008). In 1997, Chinese President Jiang
Zemin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin released a ‘Joint Declaration
on Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order’
(Lo 2002). Since then, the efforts of these two countries have been to
construct a new world order continuously. In 2000, Russia
incorporated multipolarity in its foreign policy. ‘Russia has two things
to focus on now, strengthening a political and economic situation of it …
and multilateral governance in the international system. It would strive
to create a multipolar world order’ (National Security Concept of
Russian Federation 2000). Since Jiang's leadership, Chinese foreign
policy has acknowledged that a singular and unchecked superpower
can be very dangerous, as exemplified by the US invasion of Iraq
without any UN sanction and the US/NATO actions in Kosovo (Grace
Guerrero 2011). The China–Russia 1997 Joint Statement strongly
emphasized that a fair and just society could only be possible in a
multipolar world and not in a unipolar one.
Furthermore, on March 26, 2007, Putin said during the opening
ceremony of the year of China in Russia that Russia and China both
share several positions in the international arena and are driven by the
same goals. ‘Our efforts are to maintain and strengthen the principles of
the multipolar setup to preserve the strategic balance in the world’
(Kremlin 2007). Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov (2012), wrote
an article titled ‘International Affairs’ and underlined that the BRICS
country's influence stems from Russian and Chinese inclusion in the UN
Security Council. And also, all its remaining members of the BRICS
group are the members of the leading international organizations and
entities such as the United Nations, G-20, the Non-Alignment, and the
group of 77. At the same time, these countries are also key players in
critical regional organizations. Russia is a member of CIS,17 CSTO,18 and
the EurAsEC.19 Russia and China are members of the SCO and APEC.
Likewise, Brazil is a member of the AU20 and SADC21; India is a member
of SAARC22 and SCO.
Russia cooperated with many states like China, Brazil, and India. So,
again, President Putin, at the G-20 meeting on September 6, 2013, in
Saint Petersburg, at the sideline meeting, while mentioning the
importance of the Eurasian Union, claimed that a multipolar world
emerges soon. Thus, Russia's foreign policy principle promotes
multipolarity in international relations to benefit from a great power
status or superpower status country. However, Russia has been
emphasizing China's partnership in its objective, thinking that China
historically is more critical of the existing global order than Russia. The
frequency of Russia–China state officials is higher than any other
country globally.
Later, on January 28, 2014, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cheng
Guoping and Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Denisov jointly held
a press conference. During the meeting, both the leaders stressed that
China and Russia should develop strategic cooperation in bilateral
cooperation and enhance the interaction in the practical sphere. They
must also cooperate in ensuring peace, stability, and the creation of
multipolar world order. These countries propelled themselves to
establish regional and inter-regional groups to foster their relations.
Groups like SCO, BRICS, RIC,23 and BASIC are prominent and influential
groups in present world affairs. But the evolution of BRICS has made
the idea of a multipolar world order more engaging due to its growing
clout in world affairs.

Russian and Chinese Foreign Policy, a New Vision

and Scope
Historically, Russia has had to fight various wars to remain a great
power in international relations. Again, right after the Soviet
disintegration, Russia's power capability declined substantially. It lost
one-sixth of its territory, its economy shrank by around fifty percent,
and the state was divided by influential individuals (Wallander 2003;
Tsygankov 2010). Three essential security documents of the Russian
Federation originated in the 1990s. They are National Security Concept
(NSC),24 Foreign Policy Concept (FPC),25 and Military Doctrine (MD),26
which cued that Russia was to emerge as a great power and crucial
actor country in the international arena (De Haas 2010). But, Russia
was sidelined throughout the entire period of the last decade of the
twentieth century. The National Security Concept of the Russian
Federation (2000) declared:

Several states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia

politically, economically, militarily, and in other ways. Attempts
to ignore Russia's interests when resolving significant issues in
international relations, including conflict situations, can
 undermine global security and stability and inhibit the positive
changes occurring in international relations.
After the Yugoslavian breakup and conflict,27 Russian policymakers
changed their policy structure significantly. Russia and China settled
their long-standing border issue of 4300 km (De Haas 2010). Further, a
more pragmatic and assertive foreign policy emerged since Putin's
reign. Putin emphasized southern world countries like China, India, and
Iran through political, economic, and military tools, especially ‘pariah’
states like North Korea and Cuba (ibid.). The Russian Constitution
clearly stated that it was ‘reviving the sovereign statehood of Russian
federation and asserting the firmness of its democratic basis of world
politics’ (Russian Federation Constitution 1993).
In August 2008, when Russian forces invaded and occupied large
parts of Georgia, Russia gave the impression to the international
community that it was back as a powerful country (De Haas 2010). The
foreign policy of Medvedev also underscored that their primary focus
would be the Troika states, i.e., India and China. Russia became more
powerful in the later part of Putin's regime in the Kremlin. At the same
time, the Arab crisis, the predominantly Syrian crisis,28 Iran's nuclear
issues, and the Ukraine crisis29 plunged Russian and Western relations
to the nadir level (Akulov 2013a).
Likewise, the rise of China as a great power with huge ambitions
had started since World War II, after the collapse of Germany and
Russia (Robinson and Shambaugh 1994). But throughout the history of
the Cold War period, China was in search of its destiny with several
internal and external problems and remained a mere supporter of the
USSR till the early 1960s. However, China's foreign policy was changed
after the USSR demolition in 1991. In 1991, Qian Qichen stated that
Chinese foreign policy would be guided by five principles: non-aligned
movement, mutual respect for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression,
non-interference, equality, and peaceful coexistence.
Later, over some time, China emerged as a robust global economy.
With the rise of the Chinese economy, China's emergence as a
significant economic, political, and military power is now a reality due
to its economic, military, and political clout (Zhu 2008). However,
recent trends in US foreign policy compelled China and Russia to re-
check their military expenditure and foreign policy objectives and
aspirations. The US encirclement of the Eurasian region, coupled with
the NATO expansion toward legitimate Russian territory, and the ‘Asia
pivot,’ or the re-balance of Asian strategy to counter China has created
concern. Nazemroaya (2012) said Pentagon seems to be encircling the
‘Eurasian Triple Entente’ consisting of China, Russia, and Iran … and
argued that neither one among these countries would sit idly.
According to the changes in US foreign policy, Russia–China is also
building its economic, political, and military strength over time.
Indeed, the United States has become a common threat to the
Russian and Chinese foreign policymakers. Russia and China are
enhancing their military expenditure to become secure if war occurs.
According to Akulov (2013b), who claimed that the spending of China
and Russia on military equipment increased gigantically, ‘Emerging
military superpowers China and Russia sharply increased military
expenditures in 2012, while spending by the United States and most
NATO-aligned European countries contracted’ (Akulov 2013b).
Furthermore, according to a 2013 report by Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which is an independent think tank,
military investment of Russia and China along with other developing
nations was increasing, whereas, in the developed world like in the
United States and other NATO members, it was decelerating. Further,
the think tank said, the US share of the world's military spending in
2012 lessened below 40 percent. This has happened for the first time in
US history since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. China and
Russia raised their expenditure sharply, with China from 7.8 percent or
$7.8 billion to $166 billion in 2012. Likewise, Russia mushroomed its
spending by 16 percent, from $12.3 billion to $90.7 billion (ibid.).
Again, according to the same think tank 2016 report, Russia's share on
military spending from its GDP is 5.3, whereas the US share from its
GDP on military spending is 3.3 percent only (Nantian et al. 2017).
Further, the SIPRI 2020 report says that total military expenditure rose
to US$1981 in 2020. It is an increase of 2.6 percent in real terms from
2019. The five biggest spenders United States, China, India, Russia, and
the UK, accounted for 62 percent of global military expenditure. The
more interesting facet of the report is that China’s military spending
grew for the 26th consecutive year. It is estimated that China has spent
US$252 billion in 2020, representing an increase of 1.9 percent over
2019 and 76 percent over the decade 2011–2020. Likewise, Russia’s
military expenditure increased by 2.5 percent in 2020 to reach US$61.7
billion. However, there is a slight shortfall in Russia’s military spending
from its military budget compared to previous years (SIPRI 2021).
Russian and Chinese cooperation, therefore, increased ever before,
with their state representatives meeting frequently. Russian
presidential aide Yuri Ushakov, on June 22, 2016, during Putin's visit to
Beijing, stated that Russia and China would adhere to similar or close
potions literally on all critical issues of world affairs. Russia and China
cooperate at the international sites, prominently, United Nations,
BRICS, and SCO (Metzel 2016). So, in the twenty-first century, two
intrinsic factors will affect Russia and China's foreign policy. First is
continuing economic globalization, and second is a gradual decline of
Western power. In economic globalization, these two countries will
continue to seek to preserve a regional and global power status by
creating new alliances in international relations. However, what was
earlier a soft model of an exclusive military club in international
relations will now be an inclusive model driven by countries’ specific
economic and political needs (Tsygankov 2010). However, the big
question is, how will the other emerging countries react to the Russian
federation and China's. That is the way the Ukraine crisis is a crucial
phase of emerging international relations.

References
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Akulov, Andrei. 2013a. Obama Says No to Moscow Summit: Wise Decision or Foreign
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Akulov, Andrei. 2013b. US Fields New Weapons. Strategic Culture Foundation, [Online:
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Footnotes
1 It can be termed as war of ideology started after the end of World War II between
USSR and the United States and continued till the disintegration of Soviet Union in
1991.

2 Having or relating to multiple powers at the same time.

3 It was established in 1975 with six members. It is a group of highly industrialized

countries. The group consists of UK, United States, France, Germany, Canada, Japan,
and Russia. However, Russia withdrew its membership from the G-8.

4 The group G-20 was formed in 1999. It is an international forum that brings
together the world’s industrialized and emerging economies, and consists of 85
percent of the world’s GDP and two-thirds of the global population.

5 It was formed in 2009 in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Earlier, it was known as BRIC

before South Africa became a member.

6 The process of establishing BRICS new development bank started in 2012 New
Delhi BRICS summit and it was materialized in 2014 BRICS Fortaleza summit and
established formally in 2015 with authorized capital of US$100 billion. But, the
initial capital shall be US$50 billion equally shared by all its founding members. The
basic objective of the BRICS new development is to provide infrastructure and
sustainable developmental aid to the BRICS countries and other emerging countries
as well.

7 It was established in 1964, on June 15, by 77 developing countries. These countries

are the signatories of the ‘Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing
Countries,’ issued at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development in Geneva, abbreviated as UNCTAD.

8 Having or relating to single pole or kind of polarity.

9 SCO is an inter-governmental organization, established in 2001, and consisting of

six members, which includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. It is a political, economic, and military alliance of these countries.

10 IBSA is a coordinating mechanism among three emerging multi-ethnic and multi-

cultural democracies. These are India, Brazil, and South Africa. It was established in
June 2003.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
to about two hundred young priests and theological students on “The
Personal Qualifications for a Minister of Religion.” The address was
in no important respect different from that which would be suitable on
the same subject for an audience of theological students in England
or the United States; nor did its reception and appropriation seem
any less thorough and sincere.
After inspecting the work in drawing and water-colours of which—so
the posted notice read—“An Exhibition is given in honour of ——,”
Mrs. Ladd returned to Tokyo; but I remained to carry out my purpose
of spending a full day and night among my priestly Buddhist friends.
In our many confidential talks while we were in the relations of
teacher and pupil, the latter had avowed his life-work to be the moral
reform and improved mental culture of the priesthood of his sect. It
had then seemed to me a bold, even an audacious undertaking. But
seeming audacity was quite characteristic of the youth of all those
very men who now, in middle life and old-age, are holding the posts
of leadership in Japan in a way to conserve the best results of the
earlier period of more rapid change. Besides, I knew well that my
pupil had the necessary courage and devotion; for he was not only a
priest but also a soldier, and had been decorated for his bravery in
the Chino-Japanese war. And again, toward the close of the Russo-
Japanese war, when he had been called out with the reserves, he
had once more left the position of priestly student and teacher to
take his place at arms in the defence of his country.
How wholesome and thoroughly educative of their whole manhood
was the training which was being given to these young temple boys,
I had abundant reason to know before leaving the Nichiren College
at Osaki. After tea and welcome-addresses by one of the teachers
and two of the pupils, followed by a response by the guest, an
exhibition of one side of this training was given in the large dining-
hall of the school. For as it was in ancient Greece, so it is now in
Japan; arms and music must not be neglected in the preparation to
serve his country of the modern Buddhist priest. Sword-dancing—
one of the chants which accompanied the action being Saigo’s
celebrated “death song”—and a duet performed upon a flute and a
harp constructed by the performer out of split bamboo and strings of
silk, followed by banzais for their guest, concluded the
entertainment.
Of the nine who sat down to dinner that evening in a private room
belonging to another building of the school, four besides the host
were priests of the Nichiren sect. They constituted the body of the
more strictly religious or theological instructors; the courses in
literature and the sciences being taught for the most part by
professors from the Imperial University or from the private university
founded by Japan’s great teacher of youth, the late Mr. Fukuzawa.
Of the priests the most conspicuous and communicative was proud
to inform me that he had been the chaplain of General Noghi at the
siege of Port Arthur. With reference to the criticisms passed at the
time upon that great military leader he said with evident emotion that
General Noghi was “as wise as he was undoubtedly brave.” This
same priest had also interesting stories to tell of his experiences in
China. In speaking of the ignorance of the teachers of religion in that
country he declared, that of the hundreds of Tâoist priests he had
met, the vast majority could not even read the Chinese ideographs
when he wrote them; and none of the numbers he had known could
make any pretence to scholarship. They were quite universally
ignorant, superstitious, and physically and morally filthy. Among the
Buddhist priests in China, however, the case was somewhat better;
for perhaps three or four in every ten could make some pretence of
education; and there were even a very few who were real scholars.
But neither Tâoists nor Buddhists had much influence for good over
the people; and “priest, priest,” was a cry of insult with which to
follow one. As to their sincerity, at one of the Tâoist temples he had
asked for meat and wine, but had been told that none could be had,
because they abstained religiously from both. But when he replied
that he had no scruples against either, but needed them for his
health and wished to pay well for them, both were so quickly
produced he knew they could not have come from far away. (I may
remark in this connection that if the experiences and habits of the
Chinese in Manchuria resemble at all closely the experiences and
customs of the Koreans in their own country, the unwillingness to
furnish accommodations to travelling strangers is caused rather by
the fear of having them requisitioned without pay than to any
scruples, religious or otherwise, as to what they themselves eat and
drink or furnish to others for such purposes).
The same subject which had been introduced at the priests-house,
on occasion of the all-night festival at Ikegami, was now brought
forward again. What had been my impressions received from the
spectacle witnessed at that time? When to the inquiry I made a
similar answer,—namely, that only a portion of the vast crowd
seemed to be sincere worshippers, but that with the exception of a
few rude young men in the procession, who appeared to have had
too much saké, I saw no immoral or grossly objectional features—all
the priests expressed agreement with my views. Where the
superstitions connected with the celebration were not positively
harmful, it was the policy of the reforming and progressive party of
the sect to leave them to die away of themselves as the people at
large became more enlightened.
After a night of sound sleep, Japanese fashion, on the floor of the
study in my pupil’s pretty new home, we rose at six and hastened
across the fields to attend the morning religious services in the
chapel of the school. Here for a full half-hour, or more, what had
every appearance of serious and devout religious worship was held
by the assembled teachers and pupils. All were neatly dressed in
black gowns; no evidences of having shuffled into unbrushed
garments, with toilets only half-done or wholly neglected, were
anywhere to be seen, nor was there the vacant stare, the loud
whisper, the stolen glance at newspaper or text-book; but all
responded to the sutras and intoned the appointed prayers and
portions of the Scriptures, while the time was accented by the not too
loud beating of a musical gong. Certainly, the orderliness and
apparent devotion quite exceeded that of any similar service at
“morning prayers” in the average American college or university.
A brief exhibition of judo, (a modified form of jiujitsu), and of
Japanese fencing, which was carried on in the dining-room while the
head-master was exchanging his priestly for his military dress, in
order to take part in a memorial service to deceased soldiers, at
which General Noghi was expected to be present, terminated my
entertainment at this Buddhist school for the training of temple boys.
As we left the crowd of them who had accompanied us thus far on
the way, and stood shouting banzais on the platform of the station,
there was no room for doubting the heartiness of their friendly feeling
toward the teacher of their teacher; although the two, while sharing
many of the most important religious views, were called by names
belonging to religions so different as Christianity and Buddhism.
The impressions from these two visits to Ikegami regarding the
changes going on in Buddhistic circles in Japan, and in the attitude
of Buddhism toward Christianity, were amply confirmed by
subsequent experiences. At Kyoto, the ancient capital and religious
centre of the empire, I was invited by the Dean of the Theological
Seminary connected with the Nishi Honwangi to address some six
hundred young priests of various sects on the same topic as that on
which the address was given at the Nichiren College near Ikegami. It
should be explained that this temple is under the control of the Shin-
shu, the most numerous and probably the most wealthy sect in the
Empire. The high priest of this sect is an hereditary count and
therefore a member of the House of Peers. He is also a man of
intelligence and of a wide-spreading interest in religion. At the time of
my visit, indeed, the Count was absent on a missionary tour in
China. This address also was listened to with the same respectful
attention by the several hundred Buddhist priests who had gathered
at the temple of Nishi Honwangi. Here again Mrs. Ladd and I were
made the recipients of the same courteous and unique hospitality.
Before the lecture began, we were entertained in the room which
had been distinguished for all time in the estimate of the nation by
the fact that His Majesty the Emperor held within its walls the first
public reception ever granted to his subjects by the Mikado; and after
the lecture we were further honoured by being the first outsiders ever
invited to a meal with the temple officers within one of the temple
apartments.
Later on at Nagoya, further evidence was afforded of the important
fact that the old-time religious barriers are broken down or are being
overridden, wherever the enlightenment and moral welfare of the
people seem likely to be best served in this way. Now Nagoya has
hitherto been considered one of the most conservative and even
bigoted Buddhist centres in all Japan. Yet a committee composed of
Buddhists and of members of the Young Men’s Christian Association
united in arrangements for a course of lectures on education and
ethics. This was remarked upon as the first instance of anything of
the sort in the history of the city.
When we seek for the causes which have operated to bring about
these important and hopeful changes in the temper and practises of
the Buddhism which is fast gaining currency and favour in Japan, we
are impressed with the belief that the greatest of them is the
introduction of Christianity itself. This influence is obvious in the
following three essential ways. Christian conceptions and doctrines
are modifying the tenets of the leading Buddhistic thinkers in Japan.
As I listened for several hours to his exposition of his conception of
the Divine Being, the divine manner of self-revelation, and of his
thoughts about the relations of God and man, by one of the most
notable theologians of the Shin Shu (the sect which I have already
spoken of as the most popular in Japan), I could easily imagine that
the exponent was one of the Alexandrine Church-Fathers, Origen or
Clement, discoursing of God the Unrevealed and of the Logos who
was with God and yet who became man. But Buddhism is also giving
much more attention than formerly to raising the moral standards of
both priests and people. It is sharing in the spirit of ethical quickening
and revival which is so important an element of the work of Christian
missions abroad, but which is alas! so woefully neglected in the so-
called Christian nations at home. Japanese Buddhism is feeling now
much more than formerly the obligation of any religion which asks
the adherence and support of the people, to help the people, in a
genuine and forceful way, to a nobler and better way of living.
Hitherto in Japan it has been that peculiar development of Confucian
ethics called Bushidō, which has embodied and cultivated the nobler
moral ideals. Religion, at least in the form which Buddhism has taken
in Japan, has had little to do with inspiring and guiding men in the life
which is better and best, here and now. But as its superstitions with
regard to the future are falling away and are ceasing practically to
influence the body of the people, there are some gratifying signs that
its influence upon the spiritual interests of the present is becoming
purer and stronger.
That Buddhism is improving its means of educating its followers, and
is feeling powerfully the quickening of the national pulse, due to the
advancing strides in educational development, is obvious enough to
any one able to compare its condition to-day with its condition not
more than a score of years ago. There are, of course, in the ranks of
all the Buddhist sects leaders who are ready to cry out against
heresies and the mischief of changes concealed under the guise of
reforms. The multitudes of believers are still far below the desirable
standard of either intelligence in religious matters, or of morals as
controlled by religious motives. But the old days of stagnation and
decay seem to be passing away; and the outlook now is that the
foreign religion, instead of speedily destroying the older native
religion, will have helped it to assume a new and more vigorous and
better form of life.
As the period of more bitter conflict and mutual denunciation gives
way to a period of more respectful and friendly, and even co-
operative attitude in advancing the welfare of the nation, the future of
both Buddhism and Christianity in Japan affords a problem of more
complicated and doubtful character. The nation is awakening to its
need of morals and religion,—in addition to a modern army and
navy, and to an equipment for teaching and putting to practical uses,
the physical sciences,—as never before. The awakening is
accompanied there, as elsewhere in the modern world, by a thirst for
reality. Whatever can satisfy this thirst, however named, will find
acceptance and claim the allegiance of both the thoughtful and the
multitudes of the common people; for in Japan, as elsewhere in the
modern world, men are not easily satisfied or permanently satisfied
with mere names.
 CHAPTER X
HIKONÉ AND ITS PATRIOT MARTYR

Among the feudal towns of Japan which can boast of a fine castle
still standing, and of an illustrious lord as its former occupant, there
are few that can rival Hikoné. Picturesquely seated on a wooded hill
close to the shores of Lake Biwa, with the blue waters and almost
equally blue surrounding mountains in full sight, the castle enjoys the
advantages of strength combined with beauty; while the lords of the
castle are descended from a very ancient family, which was awarded
its territory by the great Iyéyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa
Shōgunate, in return for the faithful services of their ancestor,
Naomasa, in bringing the whole land under the Tokugawa rule. They
therefore belonged to the rank of the Fudai Daimio, or Retainer
Barons, from whom alone the Roju, or Senators, and other officers of
the first class could be appointed. Of these lords of Hikoné much the
most distinguished was Naosuké, who signed the treaty with the
United States negotiated in 1857 and 1858. And yet, so strange are
the vicissitudes of history, and so influential the merely incidental
occurrences in human affairs, that only a chance visit of the Mikado
saved this fine feudal castle from the “general ruin of such buildings
which accompanied the mania for all things European and the
contempt of their national antiquities, whereby the Japanese were
actuated during the past two decades of the present régime.” Nor
was it until recent years that Baron Ii Naosuké’s memory has been
rescued from the charge of being a traitor to his country and a
disobedient subject of its Emperor, and elevated to a place of
distinction and reverence, almost amounting to worship, as a clear-
sighted and far-seeing statesman and patriot.
 “PICTURESQUELY SEATED ON A WOODED HILL”
However we may regard the unreasonableness of either of these two
extreme views of Naosuké’s character, one thing seems clear. In
respect to the laying of foundations for friendly relations between the
United States and Japan, we owe more to this man than to any other
single Japanese. No one can tell what further delays and resulting
irritation, and even accession of blood-shed, might have taken place
in his time had it not been for his courageous and firm position
toward the difficult problem of admitting foreigners to trade and to
reside within selected treaty-ports of Japan. This position cost him
his life. For a generation, or more, it also cost him what every true
Japanese values far more highly than life; it cost the reputation of
being loyal to his sovereign and faithful to his country’s cause. Yet
not five Americans in a million, it is likely, ever heard the name of
Baron Ii Kamon-no-Kami, who as Tairō, or military dictator, shared
the responsibility and should share the fame of our now celebrated
citizen, then Consul General at Shimoda, Townsend Harris. My
purpose, therefore, is two-fold: I would gladly “have the honour to
introduce” Ii Naosuké to a larger audience of my own countrymen;
and by telling the story of an exceedingly interesting visit to Hikoné, I
would equally gladly introduce to the same audience certain ones of
the great multitude of Japanese who still retain the knightly courtesy,
intelligence and high standards of living—though in their own way—
which characterised the feudal towns of the “Old Japan,” now so
rapidly passing away.
Baron Ii Naosuké, better known in foreign annals as Ii Kamon-no-
Kami, was his father’s fourteenth son. He was born November 30,
1815. The father was the thirteenth feudal lord from that Naomasa
who received his fief from the great Iyéyasu. Since the law of
primogeniture—the only exceptions being cases of insanity or bodily
defect—was enforced throughout the Empire, the early chances that
Naosuké would ever become the head of the family and lord of
Hikoné, seemed small indeed. But according to the usage of the Ii
clan, all the sons except the eldest were either given as adopted
sons to other barons, or were made pensioned retainers of their
older brother. All his brothers, except the eldest, had by adoption
become the lords of their respective clans. But from the age of
seventeen onward, Naosuké was given a modest pension and
placed in a private residence. He thus enjoyed years of opportunity
for training in arms, literature, and reflective study, apart from the
corrupting influences of court life and the misleading temptations to
the exercise of unrestricted authority—both of which are so injurious
to the character of youth. Moreover, he became acquainted with the
common people. That was also true of him, which has been true of
so many of the great men of Japan down to the present time. He
made his friend and counsellor of a man proficient in the military and
literary education of the day. And, indeed, it has been the great
teachers who, more than any other class, through the shaping of
character in their pupils, have influenced mankind to their good. It
was Nakagawa Rokurō who showed to Naosuké, when a young
man, the impossibility of the further exclusion of Japan from foreign
intercourse. It was he also who “influenced the future Tairō to make a
bold departure from the old traditions” of the country.
On the death, without male issue, of his oldest brother, Naosuké was
declared heir-apparent of the Hikoné Baronetcy. And on Christmas
day of 1850 he was publicly authorised by the Shōgunate to assume
the lordly title of Kamon-no-Kami. It is chiefly through the conduct of
the man when, less than a decade later, he came to the position
which was at the same time the most responsible, difficult and
honourable but dangerous of all possible appointments in “Old
Japan,” that the character of Baron Ii must be judged. On the side of
sentiment—and only when approached from this side can one
properly appreciate the typical knightly character of Japanese
feudalism—we may judge his patriotism by this poem from his own
hand:

Omi no mi kishi utsu nami no iku tabimo,

Miyo ni kokoro wo kudaki nuru kana;

or as freely translated by Dr. Griffis:—

“As beats the ceaseless wave on Omi’s strand

So breaks my heart for our beloved land.”

(Omi is the poetical appellation of Lake Biwa, on which the feudal

castle of the lords of Hikoné has already been said to be situated.)
How the sincerity of this sentiment may be reconciled with the act
which for an entire generation caused the baron to be stigmatised a
traitor is made clear through the following story told by the great
Ōkubo. In the troubled year of 1858, the Viscount, just before
starting on an official errand to the Imperial Court at Kyoto, called on
Baron Ii, who was then chief in command under the Shōgun, to
inform him of his expected departure on the morrow. He had
embodied his own views regarding the vexed question of foreign
affairs, on his “pocket paper,” in the form of a poem. This paper the
Viscount handed to the Baron and asked him whether his views
were the same as those of the poem. Having carefully read it Ii
approved and instructed Ōkubo to act up to the spirit of the poem,
which reads:
“However numerous and diversified the nations of the earth may be,
the God who binds them together can never be more than one.”
Whatever differences of view prevailed, between his political
supporters and his political enemies, as to the purity of Naosuké’s
patriotic sentiments, there was little opportunity for difference as to
certain other important elements of his character. He had
conspicuously the qualities needed for taking a position of dictatorial
command in times of turbulence and extreme emergency. Serious in
purpose, but slow in making up his mind, he had undaunted firmness
in carrying out his plans, such that “no amount of difficulties would
make him falter or find him irresolute.”
The burning question of foreign intercourse which the coming of
Commodore Perry had forced upon the Shōgunate in 1853, had
afterward been referred to the barons of the land. They favoured
exclusion by a large majority; and some of them were ready to
enforce it at the expense of a foreign war. But the recent experience
of China at the hands of the allied forces was beginning to teach the
Far East that lesson of preparedness by foreign and modern
education which Japan has since so thoroughly learned; and to the
fuller magnitude of which China herself is just awakening. To take
the extreme position of complete and final resistance to the demands
of the foreign forces seemed obviously to court speedy and
inevitable ruin for the country at large. Yet none of the barons,
except the Baron of Hikoné, had a plan to propose by which to
exclude alike the peaceful foreigner come to trade and the armed
foreigner come to enforce his country’s demand for peaceful
intercourse by the use of warlike means.
It is interesting to notice that Naosuké answered the question of the
Shōgunate in a manner to indicate the consistent policy of his
country from 1853 down to the present time. He did not, it is
probable, love or admire the personality of the foreign invader more
than did his brother barons; or more than does the average Chinese
official at the present time. On consulting with his own retainers, he
found the “learned Nakagawa” the sole supporter of his views. All the
clan, with the exception of this teacher and scholar, favoured
exclusion at any cost. “The frog in the well knows not the great
ocean,” says the Japanese proverb. And as to the Japanese people,
who at that time were kept “in utter ignorance of things outside of
their own country,” Count (now Prince) Yamagata said in 1887, with
reference to the superior foresight of Baron Ii: “Their condition was
like that of a frog in a well.”
In spite of the almost complete loneliness of his position among the
barons of the first rank, Naosuké advised the Shōgunate that the
tendencies of the times made it impossible longer to enforce the
traditional exclusiveness of Japan. But he also—and this is most
significant of his far-sighted views—advised the repeal of the law,
issued early in the seventeenth century, which prohibited the building
of vessels large enough for foreign trade; and this advice he coupled
with the proposal that Japan should build navies for the protection, in
future, of her own coasts. “Thus prepared,” he writes, “the country
will be free from the menaces and threatenings of foreign powers,
and will be able to uphold the national principle and polity at any
time.”
The division of opinion, and the bloody strifes of political parties, in
Japan, over the question of exclusion were not settled by the
Convention for the relief of foreign ships and sailors which followed
upon the return of the war-ships of the United States, and of other
foreign countries, in 1854. Quite the contrary was the truth. When
Mr. Townsend Harris arrived as Consul General in 1856, and began
to press the question of foreign trade and residence in a more
definite form, the party favouring exclusion was stronger, more bitter,
and more extreme than before. In their complete ignorance of the
very nature of a commercial treaty, the rulers of Japan quite
generally mistook the American demand to open Kanagawa, Yedo,
Osaka, Hiogo, and Niigata for an extensive scheme of territorial
aggression. This they were, of course, ready to resist to their own
death and to the ruin of the country. When the senators prepared a
memorial to the Imperial Cabinet, stating their difficulty and the
necessity of conforming to the foreign demand, and sent it to the
Imperial Capital by the hand of their president, Baron Hotta, they
were therefore instructed to delay, and to consult further with the
Tokugawa Family and with the Barons of the land, before again even
venturing to refer the matter to the Government at Kyoto. These
instructions were, under the circumstances, equivalent to a flat and
most dangerous refusal to allow the opening of the country at all.
It has not been generally recognised in his own country, how
extremely important and yet how difficult was the position of Mr.
Townsend Harris during the years, 1857-1858. Nor has he, in my
judgment, been awarded his full relative share of credit for laying in
friendly foundations the subsequent commercial and other forms of
intercourse between the United States and Japan. Mr. Harris’ task
was in truth larger and more complicated than that of Commodore
Perry. The factors of Japanese politics opposed to its
accomplishment were more manifold and vehement. Moreover, the
question of foreign intercourse was then complicated by two other
questions of the most portentous magnitude for the internal politics
and political development of Japan. These were, the question of who
should be the heir-apparent to the then ruling Shōgun; and the yet
more important, and even supremely important question of how the
Shōgunate should in the future stand related to the virtual—and not
merely nominal—supremacy of the Imperial House. The opposition
on both these questions was substantially the same as the
opposition to permitting foreign trade and residence in the land. If
then Commodore Perry deserves the gratitude of all for making the
first approaches, in a way without serious disruption and lasting
hatred, to begin the difficult task of opening Japan, Townsend Harris
certainly deserves no less gratitude for enlarging and shaping into
more permanent form the same “opening,” while quite as skilfully
and effectively avoiding the exasperation of similar and even greater
political evils.
His many embarrassments forced upon the somewhat too timid and
hesitating Shōgun the necessity of selecting some one man upon
whom the responsibility and the authority for decisive action could be
confidently reposed. Seeing this man in the person only of Ii Kamon-
no-Kami, Lord of Hikoné, he appointed him to the position of Tairō.
Now, this position of Tairō, or “Great Elder,” which may be
paraphrased by “President-Senator,” was one of virtual dictatorship.
Only the Shōgun, who appointed him, could remove the Tairō or
legally resist his demands. Naosuké was the last to hold this office;
for fortunately for Japan the Shōgunate itself soon came to an end;
but he will be known in history as Go-Tairō,—the dictator especially
to be honoured, because he was bold, clear-sighted, and ready to
die in his country’s behalf. On June 5, 1858, Baron Ii was installed in
the position which gave him the power to conclude the treaty, and
which at the same time made him responsible for its consequences
of weal or woe, to individuals and to the entire nation,—even to the
world at large. In this important negotiation the Japanese Baron
Naosuké, and the American gentleman, Harris, were henceforth the
chief actors.
It is not my intention to recite in detail the history of the negotiations
of 1858, or of the difficulties and risks which the Tairō had to face in
his conduct of them. While the Mikado’s sanction for concluding the
treaty with Mr. Harris was still anxiously awaited, two American men-
of-war arrived at Shimoda; and a few days later these were followed
by Russian war-ships and by the English and French squadrons
which had so recently been victorious in their war with China. It was
by such arguments that America and Europe clinched the consent of
reluctant Japan to admit them to trade and to reside within her
boundaries!
It seemed plain enough now that the Yedo Government could not
longer wait for permission from the Imperial Government to abandon
its policy of exclusion. Two of its members, Inouyé and Iwasé, were
forthwith sent to confer with the Consul General at Shimoda. When
Mr. Harris had pointed out the impossibility of continuing the policy of
exclusion, the dangers of adhering obstinately to the traditions of the
past, and had assured them of America’s friendly intervention to
secure favourable terms with the other powers of the West, the
commissioners returned to Yedo to report. But still the opposing
party grew; and still the Imperial Government delayed its consent.
Meantime the bitterness against Baron Ii was increased by the
failure of his enemies to secure the succession to the Shōgunate for
their favoured candidate. None the less, the Tairō took upon himself
the responsibility of despatching the same men with authority to sign
that Convention between the United States and Japan which, in spite
of the fact that it bore the name of the “Temporary Kanagawa Treaty”
and was subject to revision after a specified term of years, remained
unchanged until as late as 1895. This important event bore date of a
little more than a half-century ago—namely, July 29, 1858.
It is foreign to my purpose to examine the charges, urged against Ii
Kamon-no-Kami, of disobedience to the Imperial Government and of
traitorous conduct toward his country. The latter charge has long
since been withdrawn; and for this has been substituted the praise
and homage due to the patriot who is able to oppose public opinion,
to stand alone, to be “hated even by his relatives,” and to sacrifice
his life in his country’s behalf. That the Tairō did not obey the
Imperial command to submit again the question of exclusion to a
council of the Tokugawa princes and the Barons of the land is indeed
true. On the other hand, it is to be said that the Imperial Government,
by not forbidding the Treaty, had thrown back upon the Shōgunate
the responsibility for deciding this grave question; and that the
appearance of the foreign war-ships gave no further opportunity, in
wisdom, for continuing the policy of procrastination and delay. The
hour demanded a man of audacity, of clear vision into the future, and
of willingness to bear the full weight of a responsible decision. The
hour found such a man in the Japanese Naosuké, hereditary feudal
lord of Hikoné, but by providence in the position of Tairō, or military
dictator. It was fortunate, indeed, for the future relations of the United
States and Japan, and for the entire development of the Far East
under European influences, that an American of such patience,
kindliness, tactful simplicity, and sincere moral and religious
principle, met at the very critical point of time a Japanese of such
knightly qualities of honour, fearlessness, and self-centred force of
character. This point of turning for two political hemispheres, this
pivot on which swung the character of the intercourse between Far
East and Occident, owes more, I venture to think, to Townsend
Harris and to Ii Kamon-no-Kami than to any other two men.
The concluding of the Treaty did not allay the excitement of the
country over the intrusion of foreigners, or discourage the party of
the majority which favoured the policy of either risking all in an
immediate appeal to arms, or of continuing the effort to put off the
evil day by a policy of prevarication and temporising. Less than a
fortnight after its signing, the Shōgun became suddenly ill, and four
days later he died. Two days before his death, the three English
ships had anchored at Shinagawa, a suburb of the capital of the
Shōgunate; while the Russians had invaded the city of Yedo itself
and established themselves in one of its Buddhist temples.
Everything was now in confusion. The influence of the party for
exclusion—forceful, if necessary—was now greatly strengthened
among the Imperial Councillors at Kyoto; and intrigues for the
deposition of the Tairō and even for his assassination went on
apace. A serious and wide-spreading rebellion was threatened. The
resort of the Baron of Hikoné to force in order to crush or restrain his
enemies served, as a natural and inevitable result, to combine them
all in the determination to effect his overthrow—a result which his
opponents suggested he should forestall by committing harakiri, after
acknowledging his mistakes; and which his friends urged him to
prevent by resigning his office at Tairō.
Since Ii Kamon-no-Kami was not the man to retreat in either of these
two cowardly ways, he was destined to perish by assassination. On
March 25, 1860, one of the five annual festivals at which the princes
and barons of the land were in duty bound to present themselves at
the Shōgun’s Castle to offer congratulations, the procession of the
Tairō left his mansion at “half-past the fifth watch,” or 9 o’clock a. m.
Near the “Cherry-Field” gate of the castle, they were attacked by
eighteen armed men, who were all, except one, former retainers of
the Mito Clan, whose princes had been the most powerful enemy of
Baron Ii, but who had resigned from the clan, and become ronin, or
“wave-men,” in order not to involve in their crime the lord of the clan.
The suddenness of the attack, and the fact that the defenders were
impeded by the covered swords and flowing rain-coats which the
weather had made necessary, gave the attacking party a temporary
advantage. Baron Ii was stabbed several times through the sides of
his palanquin, so that when dragged out for further wounding and
decapitation, he was already dead. Thus perished the man who
signed the treaty with Townsend Harris, fifty years ago, in the forty-
sixth year of his age.
The motives of the two parties—that of the majority who favoured
exclusion and that of the minority who saw the opening of the
country to be inevitable—can best be made clear by stating them in
the language of each, as they were proclaimed officially to the
Japanese of that day. Fortunately, we are able to do this. So bitter
was the feeling against their feudal lord, even after his death, that it
seemed necessary, in order to prevent complete ruin from falling
upon the whole Clan of Hikoné, that all his official papers and
records should be burned. But Viscount Ōkubo, at no inconsiderable
danger to himself, managed “to save the precious documents”; for,
said he, “There will be nothing to prove the sincerity and unmixed
fidelity of Lord Naosuké, if the papers be destroyed. Whatever may
come I dare not destroy them.”
From one of these papers we quote the following sentences which
show why Baron Ii as Tairō signed, on his own responsibility, this
detested treaty with the hated and dreaded foreigners. “The question
of foreign intercourse,” it says, “is pregnant with serious
consequences. The reason why the treaty was concluded with the
United States was because of the case requiring an immediate
answer. The English and French Squadrons, after their victory over
China, were very soon expected to our coasts; and the necessity of
holding conferences with different nations at the same time might
cause confusion from which little else than war could be expected.
These foreigners are no longer to be despised. The art of navigation,
their steam-vessels and their military and naval preparations have
found full development in their hands. A war with them might result in
temporary victories on our part; but when our country should come to
be surrounded by their combined navies, the whole land would be
involved in consequences which are clearly visible in China’s
experience.... Trying this policy for ten or twelve years, and making
full preparation for protection of the country during that period, we
can then determine whether to close up or open the country to
foreign trade and residence.... If it were only one nation with which
we had to deal, it would be much easier; but several nations, coming
at this time with their advanced arts, it is entirely impossible to refuse
their requests to open intercourse with our country. The tendency of
the times makes exclusion an entire impossibility.”
But the assassins, on their part, before entering on their bloody
deed, had drawn up a paper which, as signed by seventeen, or all
except one of their number, they wished to have go down to posterity
in justification of their course. They, too, all met death either on the
spot, or subsequently by public execution, for their crime of
assassination. “While fully aware,” says this manifesto, “of the
necessity of some change in policy since the coming of the
Americans to Uraga, it is entirely against the interest of the country
and a shame to the sacred dignity of the land, to open commercial
relations, to admit foreigners into the castle, to conclude a treaty, to
abolish the established custom of trampling on the picture of Christ,
to permit foreigners to build places of worship of their evil religion,
Christianity, and to allow three Foreign Ministers to reside in the
land. Under the excuse of keeping the peace, too much compromise
has been made at the sacrifice of national honour. Too much fear
has been shown in regard to the foreigners’ threatening.”
This remarkable paper then goes on to charge the Tairō, Baron Ii,
with being responsible for so dishonourable an act of compromise.
He has assumed “unbridled power”; he has proved himself “an
unpardonable enemy of his nation,” a “wicked rebel.” “Therefore we
have consecrated ourselves to be the instruments of Heaven to
punish this wicked man; we have assumed on ourselves the duty of
putting an end to a serious evil by killing this atrocious autocrat.” The
assassins then go on to swear before Heaven and earth, gods and
men, that their act was motived by loyalty to the Emperor, and by the
hope to see the national glory manifested in the expulsion of
foreigners from the land.
At this distance of half a century, and considering the spirit of the
former age, we need not judge between Naosuké and his murderers
as regards the sincerity of their patriotism. But as to which of the two
parties followed the path of wisdom, there can be no manner of
doubt. Both Japan and its foreign invaders still owe a great debt of
gratitude and a tribute of wisdom, to Baron Ii Kamon-no-Kami. While
over all our clouded judgment hangs serene the truth of the
autograph of four Chinese characters with which, years afterwards,
the Imperial Prince Kitashirakawa honoured the book written to
vindicate the Tairō: “Heaven’s ordination baffles the human.”
How the memory of its former feudal lord is cherished in Hikoné, and
how his spirit still survives and in some sort dominates its citizens, I
had occasion to know during two days of early February, 1907. The
little city, headed by Mr. Tanaka, the steward of the present Count Ii,
by letter and then by a personal visit from the Christian pastor, Mr.
Sonoda, had urgently invited us to visit them, with the promise that
we should see the castle and other reminders of its former feudal
lord. I, on my part, was to speak to them on education and morality,
the two subjects about which the serious people of Japan are just
now most eager to hear. The same gentleman who had been the
medium of the invitation, was to be our escort from Kyoto to Hikoné.
But on the way, although the wind was piercing and light snow was
falling, we saw again the familiar objects of interest about the lower
end of Lake Biwa;—Miidera Temple, with its relics of the legendary
giant Benkei, such as the bell which he carried part way up the hill
and then dropped and cracked, and the huge kettle out of which he
ate his rice; then the wonderful pine-tree at Karasaki, the sail down
the lake and under the bridge of Seta; and, finally, the sights of
Ishiyama.
At a tea-house near the station here we were met by Mr. Tanaka,
who had come by train to extend the welcome of the city and who
emphasised this welcome by referring to the interest which we, as
Americans, in common with all our countrymen, must feel in the
place that had been the residence of the great Tairō. For had not he
“influenced the Shōgunate to open the country to the United States,
and lost his life for his advanced views?”
As the train conveyed us into the uplands, the snow began to fall
more heavily until it lay nearly a foot deep upon the plain and
wooded hill, crowned with its castle, of the ancient feudal town. Just
as the setting sun was making the mountains and the clouds aglow
with a rose colour, as warm and rich as anything to be seen in
Switzerland, we reached the station of Hikoné, and were at once
taken into its waiting-room to receive and return greetings of some
thirty of the principal citizens who had come out to welcome the city’s
guests. On account of the deep snow it was a jinrikisha ride of nearly
half an hour to the place where we were to be lodged—the Raku-
raku-tei, just beside the castle-moat, under its hill, and almost in the
lake itself. Here a beautiful but purely Japanese house, which was
built by the lord of the castle as a villa, stands in one of the finest
gardens of all Japan.
The fear that their foreign guests would not be entirely comfortable,
even if entertained in the best Japanese style, made it difficult for us
at first to discard or neglect the accessories especially provided, and
disport ourselves as though we were really cherishing, and not
feigning, the wish to be treated by them as their feudal lord would
have treated his friends at the beginning of the half century now
gone by. In the end, however, we succeeded fairly well in the effort to
merge ourselves, and our modern Western habits and feelings, in
the thoughts, ways and emotions of the so-called “Old Japan.”
Flags were hung over the quaint Japanese doorway of the villa; and
the manager, the landlord, and all the servants, were in proper array
to greet the long line of jinrikishas which were escorting the guests.
Our shoes removed, we were ushered through numerous rooms and
corridors, made attractive with the quiet beauty of choice screens
and the finest of mats, into the best apartment of the house. Here
bright red felt had been spread over the mats; a tall lacquer hibachi,
daimyo style, stood in the middle of the chamber; and large lacquer
or brass candlesticks, with fat Hikoné candles and wicks nearly a
half-inch thick, stood on either side of the hibachi and in each of the
corners of the room.
Thus far, the surroundings were well fitted to carry our imaginations
back to the time of Ii Kamon-no-Kami himself. But there were two
articles of the furnishing sure to cause a disillusionment. These were
a pair of large arm-chairs, arranged throne fashion behind the
hibachi, and covered with green silk cushions (or zabuton) which
were expected to contribute both to our comfort and to our sense of
personal dignity, while we were “officially receiving”—so to say.
Without offending our kind hosts, I trust, and certainly to the increase
of our own satisfaction, we begged permission to slip off from our
elevated position, so calculated to produce the feelings of social