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G20 Rising Powers in
the Changing
International
Development
Landscape
Potentialities and Challenges
Edited by
Emel Parlar Dal
G20 Rising Powers in the Changing International
Development Landscape
“The G20 brings together the most important global actors. The club sharpens
the international development agenda. They all use development cooperation
as a soft power. That is why international development is always used as an
important instrumental approach to foreign policy. This timely reader is a crucial
contribution to better understanding the G20 in a highly dynamic and disruptive
global context.”
—Stephan Klingebiel, Chair of the Research Programme “International and
Transnational Cooperation” of the German Development Institute
“This edited work, connecting the role of the G20 with the changing develop-
ment landscape, is valuable in stretching our traditional understanding of these
dynamics. Originally elevated as a crisis committee in the context of the 2008
Global Financial Crisis, the G20 has struggled to widen its agenda. As well
mobilized by Emel Parlar Dal, the collection demonstrates both the will and
skill of select non-Western countries within the G20 to push the privileging of
South-South development cooperation and an alternative policy consensus more
generally. Although facing some structural limitations, the book is testimony to
the expansion of agency in an increasingly multi-polar world that needs to be
considered by both scholars and practitioners.”
—Andrew F. Cooper, University Research Chair,
Department of Political Science, and Professor, the Balsillie School of
International Affairs, University of Waterloo
Emel Parlar Dal
Editor
G20 Rising Powers

in the Changing
International
Development
Landscape
Potentialities and Challenges
Editor
Emel Parlar Dal
Marmara University
Istanbul, Turkey
ISBN 978-3-031-07856-9 ISBN 978-3-031-07857-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07857-6
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents
G20 Rising Powers in the Changing International

Development Landscape: An Introduction 1
Emel Parlar Dal
Distinct Trajectories of Development Cooperation Among
G20 Emerging Countries: Analyzing the Cases of China
and Brazil 17
Alexandre Cesar Cunha Leite, Leonardo Ramos,
and Samuel Spellmann
The Politics of Indonesia’s Development Cooperation:
Between Ideas, Institutions, and Structures 35
Miranda P. Tahalele
Assessing Mexico and Argentina’s Contributions
and Limitations in International Development: Economic
and Ideational Aspects 65
Nilay Tüzgen
G20 Rising Powers and South–South Development
Cooperation: Trends and Features 93
Samiratou Dipama
Locating South Africa and Turkey in International
Development Cooperation 115
Ferit Belder, Ayda Sezgin, and N. Birsen Baran Şener
v
vi CONTENTS
China and the Road to an Alternative Interstate Consensus 139

Ada Celsa Cabrera García and Giuseppe Lo Brutto
The Interplay Between Sustainable Foreign Policy
and SDG Implementation: A South Korean Perspective 169
Emel Parlar Dal and Samiratou Dipama
Index 191
Notes on Contributors
Baran Şener N. Birsen has a master’s degree from the Department

of International Political Economy at Marmara University. Her research
interests are globalization and migration, the relationship between devel-
opment and migration, and global governance.
Belder Ferit is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International
Relations at Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey. He received his M.Sc.
degree from SOAS, University of London in 2015 and his Ph.D. degree
from Istanbul University in 2019. In his Ph.D. thesis, he analyzed ultra-
orthodox political parties in Israel through the lens of the societal security
approach. His research interests include identity and security, Middle
Eastern Politics, Israeli Politics, Turkish Foreign Policy and Development
Assistance.
Cabrera García Ada Celsa studied a Ph.D. in Sociology at Instituto
de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades “Alfonso Vélez Pliego” (ICSyH-
BUAP), and she holds both master’s and bachelor’s degrees in Economics
from Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla.
Ada is a full-time Associate Professor in Facultad de Economia at
BUAP, in the area of historical thought for the bachelor’s degree
in economics, and International Cooperation for development in the
master’s degree program. She is a member of the Sistema Nacional
de Investigadores (SNI), level I, CONACyT, Mexico. She is also a
member of the registry of BUAP researchers and a collaborator in groups
vii
viii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
on economic analysis, BUAP-CA 130. She has recently applied to be part

of the PRODEP program “Nuevo PTC.” She is a member of the South-
South Cooperation and regional integrations Research Group of the Red
Española de Estudios del Desarrollo (GICSS-REEDES).
Dipama Samiratou is a faculty member in the Department of Political
Science and International Relations at Tokat Gaziosmanpaşa Univer-
sity. She holds a Ph.D. in EU Politics and International Relations and
a master’s degree in International Relations from Marmara University
(Turkey). She graduated with her bachelor’s degree in Law and Political
Sciences from University Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso). She published
various articles in indexed journals and edited books, on “G20 Rising
Powers’ Status-Seeking Through Social Creativity: The Case of South-South
Development Cooperation,” “The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality
as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion by the EU: Case Studies of
Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, and Niger,” “Assessing Turkey’s Development Aid
Policy towards Africa: A Constructivist Perspective,” and on “Normative
Power in EU’s Democracy Promotion Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa:
A Critical Assessment from Zimbabwean and Ivory Coast Cases.” She also
published an article on “Assessing the Turkish ‘Trading State ‘in Sub-
Saharan Africa’ ” and on “A Comparative Analysis of China and Turkey’s
Development Aid Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in an edited book.
Her research interests include Turkish-African relations, EU-African rela-
tions, democracy promotion, EU foreign policy, development aid policies,
development cooperation, global governance, rising powers, and security
studies.
Leite Alexandre Cesar Cunha is an Associate Professor, Graduate
Program of International Relations, PPGRI/UEPB (Paraíba State
University), Brazil. Graduate Program of Public Management and
International Cooperation, PGPCI/UFPB (Paraíba Federal University),
Brazil.
Lo Brutto Giuseppe holds a Ph.D. in political economy of
development from Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla
(BUAP), has a master’s degree in Economic Development and
International Cooperation (Universidad de Murcia, España), and
received his undergraduate degrees in Italy (Universitá degli Studi di
Milano, Laurea specialistica in Relazioni Internazionali e Diplomatiche;
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ix
y Universitá degli Studi diPalermo, Laurea in Relazioni Internazionali).

https://buap.academia.edu/GiuseppeLoBrutto.
Parlar Dal Emel is Full Professor at Marmara University’s Department of
International Relations. She received her B.A. from Galatasaray University
in 2001, her M.A. degrees respectively from Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
University (2002) and Paris 3 Nouvelle Sorbonne University (2003).
She received her Ph.D. degree on International Relations from Paris 3
Sorbonne Nouvelle University (2009). She conducted research at the
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva
during the 2010–2011 academic year thanks to Swiss Government schol-
arship. In 2013, she was an academic visitor at St. Anthony’s College
Middle East Centre, Oxford University. During 2015–2016, she worked
as the coordinator of a TUBITAK-SOBAG research project on the contri-
bution of Turkey and the BRICS to global governance. Her recent publi-
cations have appeared in Third World Quarterly (SSCI), Global Policy
(SSCI), Contemporary Politics, International Politics (SSCI), Turkish
Studies (SSCI), International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy
Analysis (SSCI), and Perceptions. Her most recent works are Middle
Powers in Global Governance: The Rise of Turkey (ed.), Palgrave 2018;
Rising Powers in International Conflict Management, Special Issue (guest
editor), Third World Quarterly, 2019, and Status Competition and Rising
Powers, Special Issue (guest editor), Contemporary Politics, 2019, Russia
in the Changing International System (ed. With Emre Erşen), Palgrave
2019, and Turkey’s International Political Economy in the Twenty-First
Century (ed.), Palgrave 2019. She has been awarded by the EU Commis-
sion Jean Monnet Chair on the EU and Emerging Powers in the Evolving
Multilateralism (2020–2023) and Jean Monnet Center of Excellence
on the EU’s sustainability in Global Governance for 2022–2025. She
received two different research grants respectively from the Academy
of Korean Studies (2020–2022) and NATO Public Diplomacy Division
(2020–2021).
Ramos Leonardo is an Associate Professor, Graduate Program of Inter-
national Relations PPGRI/PUCMINAS (Pontifical Catholic University
of Minas Gerais), Brazil.
Sezgin Ayda is a graduate student at Marmara University, Department
of International Political Economy. She completed her undergraduate
education at Istanbul University, Department of Political Science and
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
International Relations. She is studying on the security-development

relation in her thesis.
Spellmann Samuel is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Post-Graduate Program
of International Relations PPGRI/PUCMINAS (Pontifical Catholic
University of Minas Gerais), Brazil.
Tahalele Miranda P. is a Faculty Member in the Department of Inter-
national Relations—Faculty of Humanities, Bina Nusantara (BINUS)
University, Jakarta, Indonesia. She holds a Ph.D. in Anthropology (Devel-
opment Studies) from the Australian National University (ANU). She has
a Master of Arts in Peace Studies (Conflict Resolution) from the Univer-
sity of Bradford, the UK, and a Bachelor of International Relations from
Parahyangan Catholic University. She has previously worked as a develop-
ment practitioner with UNDP, the Search for Common Ground (SFCG),
and the Centre for East Indonesian Affairs (CEIA), and as a development
cooperation consultant for the Ministry of National Development Plan-
ning (BAPPENAS) and the Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child
Protection (MOWE-CP) of the Government of Indonesia.
Tüzgen Nilay got her Ph.D. in 2021 from the Department of Interna-
tional Relations of Marmara University, Istanbul. She received her B.A.
degree from Istanbul University, Political Science and International Rela-
tions in 2015, and her M.A. degree from Marmara University in 2017.
Her research focuses on rising/emerging powers, R2P, international
political economy, international organizations, and norms.
List of Figures
Assessing Mexico and Argentina’s Contributions and

Limitations in International Development: Economic and
Ideational Aspects
Fig. 1 Mexico’s and Argentina’s GDP growth between 2000
and 2020 (annual percentage) (Source The World Bank n.d.) 72
Locating South Africa and Turkey in International

Development Cooperation
Fig. 1 Proportion of humanitarian aid within Turkey’s total ODA
(Source OECD Statistics) 129
xi
List of Tables
Assessing Mexico and Argentina’s Contributions and

Limitations in International Development: Economic and
Ideational Aspects
Table 1 Mexico and Argentina’s implementation of the SDG’s 74
Table 2 2014–2016 Mexico’s and Argentina’s average contribution
for UN for funding development and humanitarian
activities (in $ thousands) 78
Table 3 Mexico and Argentina’s 2017–2019 average contribution
for UN for funding development assistance and operational
activities (in $ thousands) 78
Table 4 Mexico’s and Argentina’s net official development
assistance and official aid received (in $ million) 79
Table 5 Key concepts for development during Mexico
and Argentina’s G20 presidency 82
Table 6 Mexico and Argentina’s instruments in international
development 87
G20 Rising Powers and South–South Development

Cooperation: Trends and Features
Table 1 Estimates of development assistance flows (USD $ millions) 102
Table 2 Estimates of funds disbursed multilaterally: non-OECD
providers of development assistance beyond the DAC
(2011–2013 three-year average, $ million, current prices) 106
xiii
xiv LIST OF TABLES
Table 3 G20 rising powers’ 2014–2016 average contribution

for UN development-related operational activities, in $
thousands 108
Table 4 2014–2016 average ratio GDP/contribution for UN
development-related operational activities (in %) 109
China and the Road to an Alternative Interstate Consensus

Table 1 Major multilateral organizations in which China participates 153
G20 Rising Powers in the Changing
International Development Landscape:
An Introduction
Emel Parlar Dal
Introduction
Since the mid-2000s, the world has increasingly witnessed the emergence
of new poles of powers from the Global South challenging the long-
prevailed global distribution of power among the immediate post-Cold
War era’s winning Western countries. These new powers are generally
referred to as “rising powers” in the literature in opposition to the so-
called “traditional” or “great” powers. These rising powers share some
commonalities, such as their impressive economic growth, their increasing
use of soft power at the international level to enhance the legitimacy of
their status and their growing involvement in international affairs. Indeed,
before the emergence of rising powers, the conduct of international poli-
tics was mainly concentrated in the hands of traditional great powers,
since developing countries remained largely focused on domestic poli-
tics. This trend has sharply changed since the 2008 financial crisis, which
revealed the limits of traditional great powers to drive global politics and
E. Parlar Dal (B)

Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: emelparlar@yahoo.com
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
E. Parlar Dal (ed.), G20 Rising Powers in the Changing International
Development Landscape,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07857-6_1
2 E. PARLAR DAL
economics efficiently. The last decade also witnessed the emergence of

informal groupings in the international system as a new way of engaging
in international cooperation; this in turn led to the emergence of rising
powers, which began to position themselves as an effective platform
whereby international issues could be tackled more efficiently than via
established formal grouping platforms like the UN. Among these informal
groupings, the G20 stands out as the most well-known, informal plat-
form gathering together both rising and great powers. The importance
of the G20 became particularly evident amid the 2008 financial crisis,
as the organization contributed actively through its members and poli-
cies to overcome and contain the effects of the crisis. Although rising
powers are active in multiple sectors, international development remains
by far the top sector in which they are the most active at the international
level. Indeed, great powers from the Global North were hit severely by
the 2008 financial crisis and this considerably limited the scope of the
resources they were capable of allocating to international development
issues. Thus, it became imperative to share the financial burden of devel-
opment cooperation with the new emerging powers by recognizing the
legitimacy of their status.
In this context, the involvement of rising powers in international
development has been considered opportune and even necessary to
support global development projects. At the same time, rising powers
see their active involvement in international development as an instru-
ment to raise the legitimacy of their status and to play an active role
in the production of global norms related to international develop-
ment. It is worth mentioning that rising powers, through their entrance
into international development, have introduced a new form of inter-
national development cooperation, namely South-South development
cooperation, which they consider an alternative to the so-called “failed”
North–South model of development cooperation. Most rising powers are
convinced that their activeness in international development will consid-
erably help tackle development challenges in developing countries due
to the specific features of their development cooperation model and the
history of aid recipient countries. The UN Agenda 2030, which elaborates
17 interrelated, sustainable development goals (SDGs) to be achieved by
2030, further acknowledges the potential of rising powers to contribute
to the attainment of the SDGs globally.
Given that the rising powers’ potential (especially G20 rising powers)
in global development is being increasingly acknowledged, it is imperative
G20 RISING POWERS IN THE CHANGING … 3
to analyze, in-depth, the G20 rising powers’ perspective on international

development, their development cooperation policies and the instruments
they use to effectively grasp their potential and eventual limits. Despite the
existence of various scientific works examining the role of rising powers
in international development, few of these studies focus on the specific
case of G20 rising powers or adopt a comprehensive approach in their
framework of analysis.
Against this backdrop, this book will aim to explore and contextualize
G20 rising powers’ increasing role in international development from a
comprehensive and multidimensional perspective. This book will scruti-
nize the G20 rising powers’ evolving role as international development
actors around two research questions: (1) How do we contextualize and
locate G20 rising powers as emerging actors in international develop-
ment? (2) What are the main contributions, trends and limits of G20
rising powers in South-South Cooperation? (3) Does G20 rising powers’
active involvement in international development support their foreign
policy objectives and challenge the international development order?
Based on these three, interrelated research questions, this edited book
is structured as follows: the first part, elaborated under the first research
question, focuses on the historical development and current dynamics of
(G20) rising powers’ evolving actorness in international development to
assess their main motivations, ambitions and instruments. The second
part examines the main contributions, trends and limits of G20 rising
powers in South-South Cooperation. The third part delves into an assess-
ment of the linkage between G20 rising powers’ active involvement in
international development and their foreign policies.
Contribution to the Literature

This book mainly aims to analyze and assess G20 rising powers’ role in
international development to elaborate on their tools, instruments, pref-
erences and capacities in international development and to highlight their
potential and limitations as global actors in international development. In
the last decade, a significant number of studies analyzing the role of rising
powers in international politics have emerged in the literature. Yet most
of these works have focused on the potential of rising powers to challenge
and reshape the new international order.
First, regarding the role of rising powers in international develop-
ment, extensive works have been done; most have focused on comparing
4 E. PARLAR DAL
the rising powers’ model of development cooperation with that of tradi-

tional great powers in terms of instruments, motivations, priorities, and
potential to boost development in the developing world. For instance,
Emma Mawdsley in her study, “Development Geography 1: Coopera-
tion, Competition, and the Convergence between ‘North’ and ‘South,’”
examines two trends based on the international development regime in
2015, which is a turning point. The first is the consolidation of South-
South development cooperation (acknowledging the problematic nature
of this designation), materially, ontologically and ideationally. The second
is the response of the (so-called) “traditional” donors to the opportuni-
ties and challenges provided by the “rise of the South” in the context
of the uneven reverberations of the post-2007/8 global financial crisis.
Another study, “Emerging Economies and the Changing Dynamics of
Development Cooperation,” IDS Bulletin, Volume 49, Number 3, July
2018, by Jing Gu and Naohiro Kitano, notes the economic, political
and development trajectories of international development cooperation,
and explores how the changing dynamics affect the future of these part-
nerships. In their work titled, “Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The
Practical Limits to International Development Cooperation,” Journal of
International Development, Laurence Chandy and Homi Kharas explain
the factors that inhibit greater collaboration between Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) donors and non-DAC donors, arguing that the
problem is less about divergent values than about the incentives that
derive from the politics of today’s aid system and architecture, and from
different development experiences. The distinctive feature of the present
book is to go beyond the traditional/rising powers dichotomy to analyze
the dynamics within the rising powers group in terms of their role in inter-
national development cooperation and to fully grasp the past, present and
future of rising powers’ contribution to international development.
Second, other studies have investigated the risks and opportunities
linked with South-South and triangular models of development coop-
eration as well as the role of emerging powers in development finance,
without going deeper to investigate the place of foreign policy in rising
powers’ performance in international development. In illustration, in
their study, “Trilateral Development Cooperation: Power and Politics
in Emerging Aid Relationships,” Cheryl McEwan and Emma Mawd-
sley focus their framework of analysis on (re)emerging development
actors in the South and their role in setting agendas, challenging current
aid orthodoxies and rearticulating development cooperation relationships
between and within the North and South. In the same stance, Sebastian
Paulo in his study titled, “India as a Partner in Triangular Development
Cooperation: Prospects for the India-UK Partnership for Global Devel-
opment,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF) Working Paper, March
2018, analyzes India’s approach to triangular cooperation by focusing on
the India-United Kingdom partnership for global development, which
has been shaping an innovative model for India’s participation in trian-
gular cooperation in the past years. This is where the present book adds
its distinctive feature by examining the linkage between rising powers’
foreign policy objectives and their international development agenda to
find out whether rising powers follow a developmental foreign policy and,
if so, how efficient that developmental foreign policy is.
Third, a restricted number of studies have examined the link between
rising powers, informal groupings and international development to elab-
orate on how rising powers and informal groupings influence each other
in international development performance. Yet few studies integrate all
this in their framework of analysis to provide a more comprehensive
approach to the study of rising powers in international development.
For instance, Adriana Erthal Abdenur, in “Emerging Powers as Norma-
tive Agents: Brazil and China within the UN Development System,”
Third World Quarterly, Routledge, 2014, analyzes the behavior of two
emerging powers—Brazil and China—within the field of international
development and examines the key motivations, positions and initiatives
taken by Brazil and China with special reference to the UN development
system (UNDS). Another study, titled “China as a Development Actor in
Southeast Asia,” Institute of Development Studies, 2016, by Neil Renwick,
examines China’s foreign relations through the perspective of foreign
policy to contribute to Chinese and Southeast Asian policy deliberation,
formulation and implementation, intending to maximize the development
benefits accruing to the region from China’s engagement, while also mini-
mizing or avoiding potential costs. The present book addresses this issue
by examining how informal groupings such as the G20, compared to
formal groupings like the UN and its related agencies, contribute to or
limit the global actorness of rising powers in international development.
Fourth, with the adoption of UN Agenda 2030, several studies
have also started to analyze rising powers’ role in the achievement of
sustainable development. Yet most of these studies limit their analytical
framework to the efforts of rising powers to achieve SDGs domestically,
neglecting the role of rising powers in promoting the achievement of
6 E. PARLAR DAL
SDGs beyond their borders. In illustration, a working paper, “Under-

standing the Rising Powers’ Contribution to the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals,” Institute of Development Studies, Rapid Response Briefing,
Issue 9, March 2015, underlines that although the start of UN negotia-
tions had high expectations for the role of rising powers such as Brazil,
India and China in shaping the SDGs, this leadership has not materialized,
and a more nuanced understanding of these countries’ positions in the
post-2015 process is required. Katie Willis, in “Viewpoint: International
Development Planning and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),”
IDPR, 38 (2) 2016, argues that although the adoption of the SDGs
represents continuity in the model of an internationally agreed-upon set
of development goals and how these goals are to be achieved, there have
been significant changes in the move from the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) to the SDGs, most notably in terms of their ambition,
with targets to eliminate certain “development evils” and the inclusion of
many more targets in acknowledgment of the entwined and multidimen-
sional nature of development. The added value of the present book is that
it assesses the potential and limits of G20 rising powers and other middle
and rising powers in achieving the SDGs through an examination of their
capabilities, priorities, tools and preferences in issue-specific areas of the
SDGs.
All-in-all, the most distinctive feature of this book is to integrate all
these perspectives into the two main research questions mentioned above
through a multidimensional and comprehensive approach to the question
of the role of G20 rising powers in international development. The bene-
fits of this book are the efforts made to integrate historical perspectives
with current issues through an analysis of the entrance of rising powers
into the international development landscape from an evolving historical
perspective to the current dynamics of their activeness in international
development and multilateral informal groupings with some focus on the
specific issue of SDGs.
The main contributions of this book to the existing literature are
threefold. First, this book intends to move beyond the traditional debate
of traditional/emerging global actors in the literature to position rising
powers as evolving actors in the international development landscape
without necessarily opposing them to the so-called “traditional” powers.
Second, this book adopts a very comprehensive and multilevel approach
to G20 rising powers’ role, actorness and limitations in transforming
international development landscape by focusing on a wide range of
topics, such as rising powers as global development actors, South-South

Development cooperation models and the connection between the inter-
national development agenda and G20 rising powers’ foreign policy
priorities. Third, this book seeks to bring added value to the existing
literature on international development by incorporating into the assess-
ment of the risks and opportunities for G20 rising powers to play an
active role in SDG implementation the issue of foreign policy priorities
and new paradigms in the changing field of global development gover-
nance. In short, this book seeks to bring novelty to the existing literature
on rising powers and international development with its multidimensional
and holistic approach covering both old and new debates and challenges.
Locating G20 Rising Powers as Emerging

Actors in International Development
In their chapter titled “Distinct Trajectories of Development Cooper-
ation among G20 Emerging Countries: Analyzing the Cases of China
and Brazil,” Alexandre Cesar Cunha Leite, Leonardo Ramos and
Samuel Spellmann map and analyze the Brazilian and Chinese strate-
gies concerning development cooperation. Given the changes in the
Brazilian political and economic scenario since the impeachment of
Dilma Rousseff (2016) and the emergence of a conservative political
and economic agenda with a notable liberal bias and, with the rupture
of the international performance guidelines reinforced by Lula da Silva
(2003–2010), the authors believe that going through this period is neces-
sary to understand Brazil’s international actions concerning development
cooperation.
During the same period, China reinforced its international role as a
promoter of multilateralism and development cooperation. Throughout
both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations, China has created and
expanded several initiatives for development cooperation, acting through
bilateral and multilateral formal channels and participating in regional
and global initiatives. Taking the current period of Brazilian inflection
to the conservative agenda that has influenced its performance as a
promoter of development cooperation the authors established wo separate
moments for analyzing Brazil: a period that encompasses both Work-
ers’ Party administrations, from Lula da Silva’s first government until the
impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016 and the period that began with
Rousseff’s former Vice President Michel Temer assuming office until the
8 E. PARLAR DAL
second year of the Jair Bolsonaro administration (2019–2020). For the

authors, this period serves as a starting point for the analysis of China’s
performance regarding development cooperation. They argue that in the
aforementioned period, there are two distinct trajectories that differen-
tiate Brazil and China. As China moves forward in proposing a more
active agenda regarding development cooperation, Brazil clearly illus-
trates a case of national retraction in its international performance as
an emerging country. Therefore, to prove this argument, in their study,
the authors intend to bring the essential elements of the performance
of each case. The case study of Brazil is complex because it is charac-
terized by several ruptures in its multilateral agenda, particularly under
the Bolsonaro administration. This is not the case for China, whose
engagement in development cooperation is characterized by a contin-
uous evolution. In the final analysis, the authors conclude that contrasting
both cases evidences the stark differences between internal political
processes and how such developments inform strategies concerning each
nations’ development cooperation. Their analysis illustrates how different
models of cooperation are informed by states’ domestic socio-political
transformations.
In “The Politics of Indonesia’s Development Cooperation: Between
Ideas, Institutions, and Structures,” Miranda P. Tahalele focuses on the
ideational process of Indonesia’s international development policy from
a historical perspective. She states that Indonesia’s international devel-
opment policy derives from a long history of cooperation shaped by
its South-South and North–South cooperation since Indonesia’s inde-
pendence in 1945; its development cooperation intensified with the
1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung and has impacted its inter-
national and national development policies and instruments. The author
argues that the political, economic and social-cultural issues embedded
in Indonesia’s development cooperation constitute the base of both its
South-South Cooperation and North–South Cooperation. The trajecto-
ries of this cooperation generated a specific structure that shaped the
idea, motivations and norms of international development cooperation,
including those projected by Indonesia’s government as both a recipient
and provider of aid.
Tahalele states that the trajectory of Indonesia’s development coop-
eration started from how the philosophy, narratives and symbolism in
Indonesia’s South-South Cooperation were expanded by its leaders, and
at the same time also how North–South Cooperation evolved within the
idea of development policy. The evolution of this cooperation expanded

on how Indonesia’s leaders identified its position and its political need
within the international development cooperation. Starting with Hatta,
the first Vice President, Indonesia’s foreign policy objectives were estab-
lished from the idea of “giving” to another country in need and accessing
finance to build and develop the country. The narratives and policies
developed by its leaders over time have built a specific pattern that cannot
be separated from Indonesia’s domestic political needs and agenda.
Furthermore, the modalities of its international development, in this case
Indonesia’s SSC, have evolved from their origins in technical coopera-
tion to now focus on economic cooperation. This reflects the current
government agenda that emphasizes an economic cooperation agenda
and developing effective cooperation by establishing the Indonesian AID
(Agency for International Development) in 2019. In the final analysis, the
author concludes that Indonesia’s international development is character-
ized by the interplay between the country’s domestic political needs and
its foreign policy interests and the way it positions itself in the G20 and
other informal groupings.
In her article titled “Assessing Mexico and Argentina’s Contribu-
tions and Limitations in International Development: Economic and
Ideational Aspects,” Nilay Tüzgen analyzes the contributions and limita-
tions of Mexico and Argentina in international development. Mexico and
Argentina, which have experienced economic crises many times during
their development processes, are seen as politically and socially turbulent
countries. However, the two countries began to be evaluated as rising
powers in the beginning of the twenty-first century, thanks to their rapid
growth and economic potential.
Tüzgen states that during their G20 presidencies in 2012 and 2018,
respectively, Mexico and Argentina focused on different dimensions of
international development by taking several initiatives within the scope of
their commitments to 17 targets of the SDGs. However, they have not
shown stable performance in adapting to development-related commit-
ments. Since they are both recipients and donors, they are considered
“mutually benefiter” actors in international development cooperation.
Moreover, the most fundamental development problems, poverty and
inequality, continue to be a significant problem for them and thus
limit their policy implementation in these areas. Given this background,
the author first provides a historical overview of Mexico and Argenti-
na’s development process. Then, she investigates their contributions to
10 E. PARLAR DAL
international development economically and ideationally. She also exam-

ines the distribution of development assistance provided by Mexico and
Argentina to other countries in cooperation with the UNDP and their
indigenous development agencies, the Mexican Agency for International
Development Cooperation (AMEXCID) and the Argentine Fund for
Horizontal Cooperation (FO.AR). Tüzgen also stresses various initiatives
taken by Buenos Aires and Mexico City in international platforms such as
the G20 and the UN. Finally, the author explains Mexico and Argentina’s
limitations in international development by examining their develop-
ment aid, global initiatives and domestic development-related challenges,
and reveals that although they experience different national development
processes, they have similarities in terms of advantages and constraints in
their contribution to international development.
The Main Contribution, Trends and Limits of G20

Rising Powers in South-South Cooperation
In her chapter titled “G20 Rising Powers and South-South Development
Cooperation: Trends and Features,” Samiratou Dipama aims to shed light
on the characteristics of selected six G20 rising powers’ policies and prac-
tices in the field of South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC),
namely Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, between
2006 and 2016. The author starts with the remark that the increasing
activeness of rising powers in the field of development cooperation has
brought important changes to the structure of global development with
the emergence of the SSDC model as an alternative to the perceived
failure of the North–South Development Cooperation (NSDC) model.
With respect to the conceptual framework of SSDC, Dipama under-
lines that SSDC distinguishes itself from NSDC through its emphasis on
principles such as win–win cooperation, solidarity and self-reliance, and
through its widening of the scope of development cooperation to include
trade and foreign investment. She notes that SSDC faces criticisms related
to its disregard of political factors in the provision of aid, and its ad-hoc,
fragmented and tying character.
Regarding the empirical aspect of the comparative assessment of the
features of the selected G20’s rising powers’ aid, the author found
out that non-negligible differences are perceived among these emerging
donors with respect to specified aid characteristics such as geographical
and sectoral distribution, bilateral or multilateral aid and contribution to

the UN Development system (UNDS). In this vein, the findings reveal
that whereas China, India, Russia and Turkey provide most of their flows
bilaterally, Brazil and South Africa channel a large part of their overall
funding through multilateral organizations and that, compared to the
other G20 rising powers, China, Russia and India’s top aid recipients
are more geographically spread out across multiple regions. The author
stresses that the wider geographical dispersion of these three emerging
donors can be linked to their great power ambitions, which leads to the
globalization of their interests. As for the financial contribution (core and
non-core multilateral contribution) of the selected emerging donors to
the UN Development System, the author reaches the conclusion that
while Turkey, India, South Africa and Brazil provide more non-core than
core multilateral aid to the UNDS, the share of Turkey and India’s bilat-
eral aid relative to multilateral aid in their total aid flows was also higher.
This mainly highlights the desire of these two states to use SSDC as an
instrument to enhance their social creativity and positive distinctiveness in
the field of development cooperation. In this line, the author remarkedly
affirms that SSDC is an important foreign policy instrument to be used
by rising powers in search for greater status in international politics.
In their article titled “Locating South Africa and Turkey in Interna-
tional Development Cooperation,” Ferit Belder, Ayda Sezgin, N. Birsen
Baran Şener focus on South Africa’s and Turkey’s increasing roles in the
field of development aid and their dual role of being recipients and donors
simultaneously. For the authors, this dual role necessitates locating these
two emerging donors in the broader context of global development assis-
tance. The comparative analysis of South Africa and Turkey’s development
assistance policies gives an insight into the potentials and limitations of
these emerging donors. The role of history, the normative construction of
the donor-recipient relationship, the objectives, institutions and priorities
of countries and certain strengths and weaknesses constitute the analytical
framework of this chapter.
In the first chapter, the authors examine the development assistance
histories of South Africa and Turkey. Since the 1990s, the develop-
ment assistance programs of both countries gained momentum and the
historical legacy played a role in determining priorities. In the second
chapter, the authors deal with the normative construction of devel-
opment assistance discourses. Belder, Sezgin and Baran Şener observe
12 E. PARLAR DAL
that policymakers from both countries stress the humanitarian aspect

of the development partnership and avoid using hierarchical language.
They emphasize the significance of the mutual partnership, win–win basis
and, in the South African case, South-South Cooperation. According
to the authors, this non-hierarchical discourse is also shared with other
emerging donors like India, China and Brazil. The third chapter examines
the key objectives of South Africa and Turkey’s development aid poli-
cies by elaborating on the roles of principal institutions that coordinate
and provide aid. Like other emerging donors, South Africa and Turkey
selectively engage in development assistance projects in accordance with
their regional needs and key objectives, which are determined by polit-
ical, economic and ideological motivations, rather than having a global
perspective.
In the final part, the authors analyze the sectoral and geographical allo-
cation of development aids. The main finding here is that both countries
focus on the emergency areas in their respective regions. Whereas South
Africa has concentrated on peace and stability efforts in its immediate
neighborhood, the biggest share of Turkish development aid has been
spared for Syrian refugees in Turkey in recent years. While this sort of
sectoral and geographical concentration increases professionalization, it
constrains the countries from building a global development assistance
framework. Although Turkey positions herself as the champion of human-
itarian aid and global humanitarian power, this self-ascribed role lacks a
strategic foundation. Despite providing a lesser share, however, Turkey,
delivers aid to other geographies like the Balkans, Central Asia and
Africa. This differs Turkey from South Africa. Economic challenges can
be another source of potential limitations for both countries. Economic
stability and domestic consent are the keys to secure the sustainability of
the development assistance policies.
In the final analysis, the authors conclude that despite these limitations,
both South Africa and Turkey increase their development aid activities
and share some of the key characteristics of development assistance like
selective engagement, discursive resonance and a compelling regional
environment. However, the sectoral distribution, the constituents of the
development aid and the geographical landscape show the differences
between these two emerging donors in their development assistance
activities.
Interplay Between International Development

Agenda and Foreign Policy Priorities
In their article titled “China and the Road to an Alternative Interstate
Consensus,” Ada Celsa Cabrera García and Giuseppe Lo Brutto focus
on China’s international development process and the interconnectedness
between its development and foreign policy agendas. The authors first
posit China in the international system and explain the country’s devel-
opment process, starting from the last quarter of the twentieth century by
virtue of its incredible economic growth, which has allowed it to attract
strategic allies and partners that fuel its flourishing economy. China’s rise
has disrupted the world’s overall geopolitical and geo-economic balances
and, above all, has altered the course of the traditional system of interna-
tional cooperation defined by the global hegemony of the United States
since the end of World War II.
Against this backdrop, the authors indicate that Western institutions
such as DAC and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) have undergone restructuring in the face of China’s
megaproject, the Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to connect the
regions of the world with the Asian country through a series of land
and sea routes with funded infrastructure. For Cabrera García and Lo
Brutto, under the current international conjuncture, China seems to be
reinforcing its power in the existing Western institutions, while at the
same time challenging the existing order by creating a series of new inter-
national institutions and regimes in the interstices, mostly in favor of
the Global South. As the authors stress, China’s both accommodating
and challenging position vis-à-vis the liberal international order can be
seen in its engagement with the UN and its agencies, including the
World Trade Organization (WTO). On the other hand, China adopts
a differentiated multilateralism thanks to its active presence in informal
international institutions like BRICS and the G20. It also engages in
creating alternative IOs such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
which provides the financial foundation for the Belt and Road Initia-
tive. To the author, China is currently trying to reconfigure the liberal
international order by providing a novel, multilateral scheme based on an
SSC regime and by shifting the gears of traditional institutions in the
fora of development cooperation. All this reveals the historical incon-
sistencies and internal contradictions of the traditional assistance and
14 E. PARLAR DAL
cooperation regime, offering a glimpse of the emergence of a new world

order revolving around China and East Asia.
In the final analysis, the authors conclude that China seems to be
emulating the cooperation and assistance strategy that the United States
adopted to consolidate its hegemony in the mid-twentieth century;
however, China is deploying an alternative multilateral scheme that allows
it to reinforce its role as the center of the world economy and the leader
of the Global South. Of course, this would necessitate the establishment
of a new consensus in the interstate system of the twenty-first century
under the principles of a multipolar world order that is fairer than the
currently existing one.
In “The Interplay between Sustainable Foreign Policy and SDG Imple-
mentation: A South Korean Perspective,” Emel Parlar Dal and Samiratou
Dipama deal with the linkage between foreign policy and SDG Implemen-
tation from a South Korean perspective. The authors seek to examine in a
critical manner how effective the instruments used by Korea to integrate
the SDGs into its foreign policy goals have been in the achievement of
SDGs both domestically and globally.
The authors have built an innovative analytical framework, the Sustain-
able Foreign Policy Framework, (SFP), which takes as its premise the
idea that SDGs are likely to be well implemented by states when they
align with their foreign policy objectives (namely the promotion of its
national economic, security and cultural interests) and when coordina-
tion across ministerial departments and policy areas is enhanced. The
authors highlight that in this era of loose multilateralism, states are more
prone to reinforce their sovereignty and more reluctant to make efforts
toward achieving SDGs unless the latter contribute to enhancing states’
national interests. In this vein, the implementation of the SDGs is heavily
dependent on their complementarity with foreign policy goals and on
the effective engagement of foreign policy leaders. The SFP framework
is based on three, interrelated layers, namely prosperity, security and
stability. The SDGs related to each of these layers should be implemented
in a complementary manner to an extent that failure to implement SDGs
directly related to one or another layer would negatively impact the state’s
performance on SDGs related to the other layers and vice versa. Given the
complementarity among the three layers, the authors stress that a sustain-
able foreign policy implemented through various national and multilateral
instruments contributes to promoting states’ domestic and international
development goals.
In the empirical part, the authors investigate the various strategies used
by South Korea to integrate SDGs into its foreign policy agenda and to
enhance its achievement of SDGs both domestically and globally. This
study examines how South Korea’s pursuit of a development-centered
foreign policy contributes to its achievement of SDGs both in Korea and
globally. The authors argue that South Korea has used several instruments
to pursue its development-oriented foreign policy goals, including the
creation of an enabling environment for SDG implementation, strong
leadership and active involvement of stakeholders, integration of SDGs
into development cooperation frameworks, cooperation with the private
sector on SDG matters, an increase of knowledge-sharing on SDGs,
reduction of tariffs on trade exchanges with developing countries and
the strengthening of global partnerships. One of the key concluding
remarks of the authors is that the SFP stance is more pronounced in socio-
economic-related SDGs than in peace and security-related SDGs and that,
surprisingly enough, the development-oriented foreign policy nexus has
registered a low record in the international partnerships-related SDG,
which signals the need for South Korea to take deeper development-
oriented foreign policy measures to further increase its activeness in global
partnerships.
In Guise of Conclusion
The international development landscape is fast changing due to the
structural and conjunctural shifts in the changing international system.
The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this change by exerting financial
pressure on both traditional and emerging donor countries. We are now
witnessing states’ reduced budgets available to development assistance. In
addition to the reduction in traditional and emerging donors’ develop-
ment aid budget, the post-pandemic era has made the vulnerabilities of
the developing world more apparent than before. Added to the difficulties
emanating from the health crisis is the Russian-Ukrainian war, which will
certainly affect development aid distribution, most specifically of tradi-
tional donors. In this rapidly changing security environment, there is
a vital need for both traditional and emerging donors to redefine their
international development strategies.
In this new era, there is no doubt that emerging donors will continue
to rise in the fora of international development. Their ideational and
16 E. PARLAR DAL
behavioral advantages will make them more agile in comparison to tradi-

tional donors, through their use of non-sophisticated aid instruments.
This also means that SSC or peer-to-peer cooperation will continue to
expand its borders, while traditional donors are in quest of new aid
instruments and approaches to maintain their donor status vis-à-vis rising
powers. Another trend of this new era relevant to international develop-
ment is the changing nature of official development aid (ODA) itself, and
aid for trade mechanisms. The digitalization of diplomacy will also affect
the distribution of development aid disbursed to the developing world.
Today’s development landscape is much more complex and thus needs
to be evaluated from a multidimensional perspective. States’ international
development strategies are much more dependent upon their foreign,
security and economic policies. In this regard, the following chapters
aim to broaden the limits of the existing studies on rising powers in
international development.
Acknowledgements This edited book project is funded by the Academy of

Korean Studies’ grant N. AKS-2020-R42 for my project entitled “Development-
Foreign Policy Nexus of the Republic of Korea compared to Asian Rising Powers
in the G20.”
Distinct Trajectories of Development
Cooperation Among G20 Emerging
Countries: Analyzing the Cases of China
and Brazil
Alexandre Cesar Cunha Leite, Leonardo Ramos,

and Samuel Spellmann
Introduction
Over the last four decades, the International Relations (IR) debate
regarding international cooperation has largely been driven by two
distinct yet converging arguments regarding cooperation and develop-
ment. The development of interdependence is largely connected to the
1980s, a decade in which the spread of economic integration throughout
A. C. C. Leite (B)
Graduate Program of International Relations, PPGRI/UEPB, Paraíba State
University, João Pessoa, Brazil
e-mail: alexccleite@gmail.com
Graduate Program of Public Management and International Cooperation,
PGPCI/UFPB, Paraíba Federal University, João Pessoa, Brazil
A. C. C. Leite · L. Ramos · S. Spellmann
Graduate Program of International Relations, PPGRI/PUC-MINAS, Pontifical
Catholic University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 17

Switzerland AG 2022
E. Parlar Dal (ed.), G20 Rising Powers in the Changing International
Development Landscape,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07857-6_2
18 A. C. C. LEITE ET AL.
the world happened in parallel to the productive restructuration of manu-

facturing and the rise of the neoliberal ideology in hegemonic thinking
(see Antunes 2009; Mészáros 2005).
As argued by Vadell et al. (2020) and Hoeveler (2017), cooperation
in international studies is widely influenced by Keohane and Nye’s Power
and Interdependence argument on the possibility of using cooperation
strategies for avoiding conflict among States (Keohane and Nye 1989). In
contrast, even though realist perspectives of IR largely drew their conclu-
sions on cooperation over the place, these actions occupied in States’
strategies linked to national self-interest—thus being reflected in a States’
Foreign Policy—(Morgenthau 1962; Kennan 1971; Glaser 1994), the
common ground between liberal institutionalist and neorealist scholars
alike meant a new interpretation of cooperation as a part of the national
strategy toward other states. Cooperation thus needed to be classified in
accordance to particular interests, thus being distinct in its two classical
forms: cooperation as a partnership and cooperation as an aid.
Cooperation as foreign aid is widely attributed to North–South Coop-
eration (NSC), linked to Organization for Economic Cooperation &
Development (OECD) operations dating back to W. W. Rostow’s influ-
ence in the development framework established by the UN in the 1940s
and 1950s (Ish-Shalom 2006). The NSC connection to the OECD
defines the States that promote foreign aid, while also limiting the desti-
nation of aid to developing countries. Aid, thus, could be subordinated
to certain objectives for advanced capitalist economies, while a notion
of economic subalternity was created between North and South. Even
though foreign aid has existed throughout the second half of the twen-
tieth century, the existing ideological connotation of these limitations
largely evokes the 1980s and 1990s the attempts of control of periph-
eral capitalist economies’ development agendas, a process that continues
to this day.
In contrast, cooperation as a form of partnership among developing
countries shaped itself as South-South Cooperation (SSC). SSC embodied
the characteristics of world solidarity, horizontality, complementarity and
mutual respect. Horizontality has been questioned largely due to the
distinct initiatives for development from emerging economies and its
consequences over the general reproduction of capitalism on the world
scale (see Chaponnière et al. 2011; Gray and Gills 2016; Garcia and
Bond 2018). These initiatives encompass several different States among
the political concepts of the Global South, ranging from Brazil and Saudi
DISTINCT TRAJECTORIES OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AMONG … 19
Arabia to China and Angola. As argued by Alden and Vieira (2005), these
initiatives can also be described as a reaction to neoliberalism’s ideological
diffusion through the existing International Development Cooperation
institutions during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Taken together, these
distinct SSC initiatives had already reached a particular level of develop-
ment by the mid-2000s, culminating in distinct alternatives to the World
Bank/IMF institutional engagement to the developing world (Manning
2006; Woods 2008). This movement can be described as an outreach
toward the expansion of the existing structures of multipolar world gover-
nance through developing cooperation initiatives, and in accordance with
different structural values of NSC to date.
The 2000’s decade also witnessed the changing economic process of
stabilization within developing countries’ economies. Generally, this led
to a reorganization of diplomatic initiatives by these States, reflecting
on their respective agendas, which were also influenced by particular
national historical conjunctures in the capitalist periphery. Several exam-
ples can be traced back to this period. The strengthening of Brazil and
Portuguese-speaking mutual bilateral and multilateral engagement initia-
tives happened on the wake of post-civil war periods in Angola and
Mozambique and Lula da Silva’s Administration diplomatic offensive to
the developing world (2003–2010) (Visentini and Pereira 2009). The
early 2000s economic recovery of Russia after the deep economic crisis
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union also became a factor of
consideration for international politics, now that the restructuring of the
Russian economy enabled several State-led developmental initiatives (Gray
and Gills 2016). During the early years of the 2000’s decade, China’s
reform and opening-up policy started to prove its advantages in rein-
forcing China’s international engagement (Zhou 2017). Jiang Zemin’s
third term as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPCh)
(1998–2002) oversaw both the final stages of the early period of market
reforms while sustaining China—and arguably to a larger extent Eastern
Asia’s—financial system after the 1997–1998 market crisis. Jiang also
presided over the institution of China’s going out policy, which enabled
the creation of several multilateral regional development cooperation
initiatives linking China and other developing countries, particularly at
this point South-east Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Woods 2008; Zhou
2017). China and Russia also led the creation of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization (SCO). These initiatives continued to prove themselves
fruitful during Hu Jintao’s mandate as head of the CPCh (2002–2012)
(Zhou 2017). The diplomatic articulation between Brazil, India and

South Africa, dubbed IBSA, proved to be a useful platform for multi-
lateral dialogue, particularly focusing on the shared legacies of both a
colonial past and present Western democratic institutions. Finally, the
political articulation between Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South
Africa eventually led to the creation of the G-20 (Ramos 2014).
Between the mid-2000s and the early years of the following decade,
the BRICs articulation expanded, eventually reaching the point of the
creation of several multilateral institutions, addressing both security and
political-economic concerns (Gray and Gills 2016). From this era, several
multilateral institutions emerged, such as the New Development Bank
(NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). However,
the footprint of the multilateral—and arguably bilateral—development
cooperation initiatives start to fade when several economic restrictions
appear. Brazil is particularly affected by the ensuing economic and polit-
ical crises, developments that can be both traced back to the country’s
surge in commodities exportation following China’s seemingly ever-
expanding demand of the previous decade and the ensuing fall of
international commodity prices between 2013 and 2014 (Zhebit 2019).
Politically, the internal political crisis enabled the forestalling of several
development indicators by the then reelected Dilma Rousseff govern-
ment, which presided over the fourth continous administration of the
federal government by the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—
PT).
The stark political and economic crisis affecting Brazil starting from the
mid-2010s is arguably significatively distinct from the internal processes
happening in China. The continuation of several separate yet articulated
initiatives for international development cooperation appears to be ever-
expanding, with the creation of new multilateral institutions. During Xi
Jinping’s tenure as President of China and Chairman of the Communist
Party, these separate initiatives appear to be integrating themselves into
the large-scope of the Belt and Road Initiative, the geoeconomic strategy
articulated by China to re-engage in world development through state-led
investments.
The purpose of this chapter is to map and analyze the Brazilian
and Chinese strategies concerning development cooperation. Given the
changes in the Brazilian political and economic scenario since the
impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016 and the emergence of a conser-

vative political and economic agenda with a notable neoliberal bias
and, with the rupture of the international performance guidelines rein-
forced by Lula da Silva (2003–2010), we believe that investigating this
period is necessary to understand Brazil’s international actions concerning
development cooperation.
Over the same decade, China reinforced its international role as a
promoter of multilateralism and development cooperation. Throughout
both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations, China has created and
expanded several initiatives for development cooperation, acting through
bilateral and multilateral formal channels, and participating in regional
and global initiatives.
Taking the current period of Brazilian inflection to the conservative
agenda that has influenced its performance as promoter of development
cooperation, we established two separate moments for analyzing Brazil: a
period that encompasses both Workers’ Party administrations, from Lula
da Silva’s first government until the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in
2016; and the period that began with Rousseff’s former Vice President
Michel Temer assuming office until the second year of the Jair Bolsonaro
administration (2019–2020).
This period will serve as a starting point for the analysis of China’s
performance regarding development cooperation. We understand that in
the aforementioned period, there are two distinct trajectories that differ-
entiate Brazil and China. As China moves forward in proposing a more
active agenda regarding development cooperation, Brazil clearly illus-
trates a case of national retraction in its international performance as an
emerging country.
The case study of Brazil is complex because it is characterized by several
ruptures in its multilateral agenda, particularly under the Bolsonaro
administration. This is not the case of China, which presents itself with
a continuous evolution of its engagement in development cooperation.
Contrasting both cases indicating stark differences between internal polit-
ical processes and how such developments inform strategies concerning
each nations’ development cooperation. This analysis will illustrate how
different models of cooperation are informed by domestic socio-political
transformations, while also complexifying emerging countries’ engage-
ment perspectives to development cooperation.
Brazil
Dealing with Brazilian cooperation at the start of the twenty-first century
constitutes a complex task. The period has been marked by both offen-
sives and retreats, by attempts at the continuity of policies started at the
early 1990s, as well as by ruptures bringing back bad practices and myopic
alignments.
The Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) Administration (1995–2002)
followed, in what concerns its foreign policy, the logic that was denoted
by Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) as “Autonomy through Participation”.
It was understood that being present at the main discussion topics of
the international agenda would bring good results for Brazilian inter-
national relations. The foreign policy formulations of the FHC govern-
ment considered that participating in multilateral and regional forums,
discussing the main themes of the global agenda, would consist of an
important, pragmatic and advantageous decision for Brazil.
Between the themes dealt at the time, several required Brazilian
efforts for fomenting international cooperation. However, what could be
observed in the case of the FHC Administration was that the great themes
that involved cooperation were subordinated to internal political vari-
ables, and the concern in presenting an explicit support to US-sponsored
agendas as an attempt at widening the Brazilian’ insertion in global topics
conversely led to Brazil’s insertion in themes of little promise, such as
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) integration agenda and the
discussions over the Brazilian participation as a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Regional integration also occupied a relevant role to the FHC Admin-
istration. The economic relations indicators (commerce and investments)
with Brazil’s South American surrounding countries were promising by
the end of the 1990s decade. In parallel, in what concerns international
cooperation, FHC’s main focus was on the diplomatic relations to the US
and the European Union, sustaining his personal thesis that the path for
Brazilian development was the nation’s insertion as a subsidiary capitalist
economy to the capitalist core.
Generally, the South-South Cooperation agenda was little explored
during this period. Few experiences with Global South countries were
observed when considering meaningful agreements. The continuity of
technical accords was observed, as they were usually restricted to the
independent actions of government agencies and public autarkies, such as
the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), the Oswaldo

Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), which were supported by the Brazilian
Agency for Cooperation (ABC).
It is worth of mention that, at the end of the FHC Administration,
during the retroviral HIV/AIDS’ patents litigation led by the then Health
Minister José Serra, Brazil aligned itself to India and South Africa in
order to attempt to reduce international prices of retroviral drugs, being
publicly supported by civil society sects of several other countries. This
can be comprehended as the closest cooperation experience between
emerging countries to fall within the CSS framework under the entire
FHC Administration.
Change came with the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula)
(2003–2010). According to Lula himself, his government would repre-
sent change:
Change: this is the keyword; this was the great message that the Brazilian
society gave at the [General Brazilian] October [2002] elections. Hope
defeated fear and the Brazilian society decided that it was time to trail new
paths. […] For this reason the Brazilian people elected me as President of
the Republic: to change. (Lula da Silva 2003, pp. 27–28)
Lula’s foreign policy forecast the construction of more solid and direct
relations to emerging countries, especially India, South Africa, Russia
and China. In order to do such, Lula and his foreign policy formulators
trusted in the capacity for integration, insertion and overcoming of South-
South Cooperation development obstacles. SSN represented an escape
route to Brazil’s constraints imposed by the existing division between
developed nations and those that seek to reach superior levels of devel-
opment. Domestic order constraints linked to the nation’s socio-historical
formation were also considered at the formulation of the Brazilian foreign
policy.
The CCS offensive represented an attempt at a wider integration to
countries in a similar situation to Brazil. Cepaluni and Vigevani (2007)
employ the concept of “Autonomy through Diversification” as a north for
the foreign policy of the Lula Administration. According to the authors,
the concept consisted on the adhesion of the country to international
principles and norms, having as its main instrument the construction
of alliances of South-South character, including regional partnerships,
and agreements with countries that could be understood as being “non-

traditional”. Examples in this sense would be: the other BRICS countries;
Asia–Pacific region States, African nations (with a particular focus to
Portuguese-Speaking African Countries); Eastern European countries;
and Middle-East nations. In the background, it was believed to be
possible to reduce foreign relations asymmetries to Global North States,
particularly the US, expanding Brazil’s negotiation power.
Together with these directives, the Lula Administration achieves a
reasonable highlight at the international scene, promoting agendas that
would inevitably link themselves to SSC. In that sense, ALCA, which
was being forced upon Brazilian-US relations, lost its strength during
the Lula Administration, to the point that it no longer appeared at the
Brazilian foreign policy agenda, not being considered as a meaningful
topic afterward. The same could be affirmed about the previously special
relationship Brazil had to other developed economies.
The Brazilian acting in international agendas and multilateral organiza-
tions which interacted with international cooperation indicated a rupture
to what was previously being enacted by other administrations. As time
moved forward during the 2010s decade, the approximation to other
Global South countries gained a larger importance at the Lula Adminis-
tration. The Brazilian government seeks to construct a lasting relationship
with other developing economies. It was understood that the coincidence
of similar obstacles and objectives strengthened the ideological speech
and the diplomatic acting of Brazil in its sponsored unity build-up to the
rest of the Global South. A partnership between India, Brazil and South
Africa was institutionalized under the IBSA initiative, which encompassed
several areas, such as security, commerce and technological interchange.
Afterward IBSA lost its thrust as the BRICS institutionalized their asso-
ciations as Brazil’s preferential partners. This period also accounted for
an elevated number of agreements of international cooperation. Financial
G20 also gained traction as a main arena for Brazilian CSS initiative. The
personal acting of Lula da Silva at this forum indicated the success of the
presidential diplomacy of the Brazilian Executive power (Ramos 2013).
In comparison to the accomplishments of the FHC Administration,
Brazil’s government under Lula brought meaningful advances to technical
cooperation regarding the development of African countries (Mendonça
and Farias 2015). The number of agreements established to African
countries during the Lula Administrations reached 229. In comparison,
the FHC Administration agreements to African countries totaled 33.
According to Mendonça and Farias (2015), the core areas responsible for
the growth of cooperation relations were, in order of relevance, health,
agriculture and education. The authors state that the spike in agreements
obtained by Lula with African countries can be represented not only by its
sheer numbers, but also by the diversity of new partners and in thematic
areas.
At least in its first term, Dilma Rousseff Administration (2011–2016)
indicated a continuity of the same elements present in the foreign policy
of the Lula Administration, especially in what concerned the advances in
South-South Cooperation. There is a debate in literature which indicates
the disagreements over the use of the term continuity. Scholars involved
in this debate such as Goulart, Menezes and Fingermann 2020 sustain
that the Rousseff Administration suffered considerably due to the strong
instability at the international arena. This scenario enabled changes at the
domestic political forces, breaching the pact established between different
sectors of the business class during the Lula Administration, causing direct
consequences to the Brazilian aspirations concerning the inclusion of an
international commerce and investments matrix within SSC, especially
concerning technical cooperation. Conversely, the absence of a direct
presidential engagement to diplomacy, the dispersion of interest groups
that previously supported the Lula Administration, provoked a series of
disruptions on SSC Brazilian initiatives.
The bases for cooperation relations to emerging countries (the Global
South) derived from the Lula administration were kept at first. It should
be noted that Dilma Rousseff initiated her government facing the effects
of the international financial crisis of 2008. Consequently, recalibrating
the Administration’s attention to the domestic scenario could be under-
stood as a necessary decision. Domestic fragilities caused direct conse-
quences to the upkeep of Brazilian international cooperation, especially
within the framework of the SSC and Technical Cooperation for Devel-
opment agreements. Among the most striking factors of the impact of
the international financial crisis, we can highlight that it: obligated the
Brazilian government to further limit its resources destined to the contin-
uation of pre-existing agreements; inhibited the creation of new fronts
for international engagement; reduced the negotiation and execution
power of agreements to developing countries at diplomatic spaces; and it
affected the domestic economic activities that could foment international
cooperation.
Facing the scenario of uncertainty at the international level, the

Rousseff Administration extended its relationship to other BRICS coun-
tries as a necessary measure to mitigate the crisis’ effects on Brazil. The
objective was to keep the existing privileged cooperation relationships
with BRICS countries. Such a decision indicates that the BRICS were
seen as a meaningful instance of foreign insertion and privileged focus
of SSC. At the same time, other Brazilian institutional and multilateral
arrangements lost traction. IBSA lost its core reason to exist, as BRICS
consolidated its preferential status. South America-Africa and South
American-Arab Countries Summits also lost importance in the diplomatic
agenda. Within the immediate motives for this decision, the periodicity of
the meetings and the meaningful increase of the Chinese engagement to
the BRICS initiative acted as catalyzers to the disengagement process.
Dilma Rousseff’s second term was interrupted by the Impeachment
trials of 2015–2016. Rousseff’s Impeachment is mainly connected to
the discontentment among part of the Brazilian entrepreneurial elite, of
the core interest groups and the fragility of the Administrations’ polit-
ical support at the Brazilian Congress. As the main motives for the
Impeachment trials were not judicially sustained, the political mobiliza-
tion constituted a Coup, and resulted in Michel Temer assuming the
presidential office on May 12, 2016. As the Impeachment Trials were
confirmed by the Brazilian Senate on August 31, 2016, Dilma Rousseff
was definitely excluded from her elected post. Temer continued his term
as the Brazilian President up until December 31, 2018.
Facing the domestic political institutional crisis and still under the
effects of the international financial crisis, Michel Temer, resembling what
was decided by the Rousseff Administration in previous years, directed his
attention to the internal scenario. At first, Temer decided to nominate to
the Ministerial Office of Foreign Relations then Senator José Serra, later
being replaced by Senator Aloysio Nunes. This indicated the first rupture
from the ideas established at the Brazilian foreign policy centerpieces
during both Rousseff and Lula da Silva Administrations. This decision
was followed by the explicit proposition of repositioning the Brazilian
foreign policy toward a commercial offensive, reducing the existing inter-
national cooperation efforts. The relationship to African, Asian and to
other Latin American countries was meaningfully weakened as regional
cooperation initiatives stalled. In addition, the replacement of the univer-
salist speech of the Lula Administration for a discourse more aligned to
the one of developed nations, notedly the US, debilitated the relations
between Brazil and other developing countries, consequently, touching

SSC efforts.
The electoral process finalized at the ending months indicated the elec-
tion of Jair Bolsonaro to the 2019–2022 Presidential term. Bolsonaro’s
candidacy for office indicated a conservative push rightward, with the
then candidate positioning himself as an extreme pole, antagonizing the
Workers’ Party administrations. With over three years into Bolsonaro’s
government, it is noteworthy that an important part of the discourse
professed during the electoral campaign of 2018 only enabled the State
capture of elite conservative entrepreneurial groups directly protected by
a large web of fake news. The foreign policy of the Administration largely
acted under the umbrella of “anti-globalism”. In practice, Bolsonaro
dodged every global agenda related to environmental, social and health
themes. During this process, SSC was set aside, with the Brazilian Coop-
eration Agency (ABC) losing its relevance. South-South Cooperation
lost its comparative relevance to North-South engagement, particularly
with the US under the Trump Administration. Following Temer’s initia-
tive, one of the Bolsonaro presidency’s chief goals was to take part in
OECD. The Brazilian Administration also created obstacles for State-led
initiatives for acquiring vaccines while simultaneously stimulating anti-vax
groups domestically, passing on opportunities to engage in multilateral
agreements over global health and vaccine diplomacy through SSC.
China
China’s assessment of IDC can be traced back to the need for geopolitical
repositioning during the early stages of the Cold War in the 1950s, and it
is largely influenced by China’s own conceptions of development and its
consequences to world order. Chen (2014) argues that the then PRC
Premier Zhou Enlai’s engagement expressed in the Bandung Confer-
ence largely influenced the definition of the five principles for friendship
and cooperation among nations. The following decades however saw the
expansion of the US and the core capitalist countries’ organized reaction
against the spike of independence struggles. The spread of military inter-
ventions and neocolonial war throughout Africa, Latin-America and the
Asia–Pacific up until the end of the twentieth century led to several articu-
lated consequences for IDC. First, the 1970s erosion of the US hegemony
over capitalism created the necessary environment for the eventual reartic-
ulation of US control over the developing world through different means.
The reorganization of the international financial system over a mix of

high interest rates, flexible US Dollar and high indebtedness of devel-
oping countries created the necessary political-economic environment for
the introduction of neoliberal policies in the following decades. Within
the IDC, the outcome of this process can be summarized in the reduc-
tionist approach adopted in the Buenos Aires Action Plan of 1978, which
consolidated the restricted interpretation of SSC within the boundaries
of technical cooperation forms among developing countries (Domínguez
Martín 2016).
As Ezra Vogel (2011) comments on his Deng Xiaoping and the Trans-
formation of China, the Communist Party’s internal debates over what
became the process-policy of reform and open up ranged over several
decades starting in the late 1950s, arguably the same period as Zhou’s
expanding engagement in the international sphere. By the mid-1970s,
Deng started rising back to power after the Cultural Revolution, assuming
the Executive vice-premiership of China after Zhou’s physical decay in his
final years. With this intermediary post also came Deng’s new position
as vice-minister of Foreign Affairs and the continuation of Zhou’s poli-
cies regarding China’s International Relations, a reorganization that was
steamed by both Zhou and Mao (Vogel 2011). Deng’s political position
coincided with China’s new international diplomatic stance in the mid-
1970s, which focused on their expressive opposition to the Soviet Union
interventionist policy ranging over socialist countries, the normalization
of Foreign Relations between China and the US and the resumption of
China’s engagement to peripheral countries under an IDC banner (Deng
1974; Vogel 2011). This position is reflected in Deng Xiaoping’s famous
speech at the UN in 1984, which stated:
We hold that all countries, big or small, rich or poor, should be equal,
and that international economic affairs should be jointly managed by all
the countries of the world instead of being monopolized by the one or
two superpowers. We support the full right of the developing countries,
which comprise the great majority of the world’s population, to take part
in all decision-making on international trade, monetary, shipping and other
matters. (Deng 1974)
China’s emphasis on the equalitarian condition of States in the interna-

tional sphere was apparently in stark difference to the explicitly accusatory
critical position to the Soviet Union’s International Affairs (Zubok 2008).
The Soviet position enabled China to an explicit rejection of intervention

in the internal affairs of other countries. In this regard, several outcomes
can be traced to Deng’s 1974 UN Speech denunciation of “hegemonism”
and of “social-imperialism”. First, in the short term, Deng oversaw the
continuation of Mao’s policy of diplomatic confrontation with the USSR
during the 1970s. Secondly, China’s new position as a leading political
force among emerging economies should now be paired by the task of
explicitly avoiding “changing its colors”, namely, replicating superpowers
behavior on the world stage. Finally, it indicates that precautions were
considered so that the economic changes China enacted in the following
decades could take place without the replication of the socioeconomic
conditions that led to imperialism and hegemonism, avoiding making the
political mistakes of both the US and the USSR. These aligned political
positions would later ensure the communication between China’s former
position as a leading force among emerging powers during Mao Zedong’s
leadership to Xi Jinping’s “striving for achievement” moment in the early
2010s and the political-economic transformations at the onset of “the
new era”.
However, during Deng’s core leadership of the CPCh, the transforma-
tion of the Maoist political-economic organization into a market socialist
system happened in parallel to the general change of the development
pattern reached during the 1970s by peripheric countries. The down-
ward turn in economic growth in the period largely affected international
public policies formulation and SSC initiatives, culminating in the so-
called domestication of the SSC between the 1980s and the early 2000s.
This happened in parallel to China’s own domestic rearticulation at the
end of the Mao Era as leader of the CPCh and the onset of the “Reform
and Open Up” Era.
The sharing of the economy between the Chinese State and the
several sectors of both international capital and the rising domestic and
foreign Chinese bourgeoisie enabled China to undergo several rounds
of transformations within the larger framework of the “reform and open
up” process. The regained focus on the development of the means of
production, the reinstitution of the household’s responsibility system, the
establishment of the Special Economic Zones, the creation, expansion
and overall destruction and incorporation of the TVEs, the territorial
reintegration of Hong Kong and its continued usage as a center for inter-
national trade, the opening up to capital markets and the institution of
the SASAC, the integration of China to GVCs—fundamentally scarred
by China’s aid in East-Asian recovery after the 1997–1998 financial crisis

and China’s entrance in the WTO—were defining signs of the period.
By the early 1990s, the rise to power of Jiang Zemin to the CPCh
leadership enabled the final push for the “four modernizations” program,
which was achieved by the end of the twentieth century (Hu et al. 2021).
The expansion of the Chinese economy also led to further engagement
with the SSC. While promoting joint ventures and government subsi-
dized loans domestically, China reformed its foreign aid regime to carry
out similar projects in cooperative operations or in projects fully carried
out by Chinese enterprises. The engagement with multilateral financial
institutions grew, as China’s Ministry of Finance established better rela-
tions with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African
Development Bank.
As international commerce and investments grew, China also estab-
lished several discussion forums for South-South dialogue and coopera-
tion, like the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, the
China-Central and Eastern European Countries-China Forum (China-
CEEC) in 2012, the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States Forum (China-CELAC) in 2015, among others. Multilateral struc-
tures for dialogue were also a response to the lack of a wider democrati-
zation in international forums. However, as argued by Xiong (2017), as
China’s contributions to financial organizations grew, voting rights were
not frequently expanded. This repressed demand for democratization and
sharing of power at the international level was shared by other developing
economies, China started to engage in explicit calls for redistribution of
voting powers, and started acting as a catalyst for the creation of other
multilateral SSC institutions.
Hu Jintao’s tenure (2002–2012) was marked by China’s explicit rise
to its current position as the world’s second economy. The range of inter-
national investments and commercial relations continued to grow in spite
of the 2008–2009 financial market crisis. From that point until 2013,
China demonstrated an explicit transition from the international relations
engagement model designed by Deng Xiaoping, the famous “hide your
strength, bide your time” to the one exposed by Xi Jinping, dubbed
“striving for achievement” (see Yan 2014).
Xi Jinping’s current tenure as the general secretary of the CPCh has
seen an expansion of Chinese engagement to the SSC. Building on several
ideas linked to Xi Jinping Thought, the PRC’s involvement in bilateral
and multilateralism reached new levels. The change in China’s position
coincided with the creation of the Belt and Road Initiative. The geopolit-
ical and geoeconomic push for the greater integration of Eurasia rapidly
expanded to the whole world, as China firmed memorandums of under-
standing ranging from Ecuador and Argentina in South America to Italy
and Portugal in Western Europe. Parallel to this, the creation of the AIIB
as a multilateral institution for development financing. Originally focusing
on infrastructure and commercial finance, the bank rapidly became a
supplier for economic aid during the COVID-19 pandemic, partnering
with domestic institutions, national governments and multilateral finan-
cial institutions, particularly the World Bank (Spellmann and Lima 2021).
At the bilateral level, China also provided outstanding aid to the entire
world as a supplier for personal protective equipment and other medical
supplies, respirators and vaccines.
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Another random document with
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the approval of the governor of the islands, authorize the
cities and towns to form among themselves associations or
communities for determined ends, such as the construction of
public works, the creation and foundation of beneficent,
charitable, or educational institutions, for the better
encouragement of public interests or the use of communal
property.
{389}
"ARTICLE 54.
It shall be the duty of commanding officers of military
districts, immediately after the publication of this order, to
recommend to the office of the military governor in which towns
within their commands municipal governments shall be
established, and upon approval of recommendations, either
personally or through subordinate commanders designated by
them, to issue and cause to be posted proclamations calling
elections therein. Such proclamations shall fix the time and
place of election and shall designate three residents of the
town who shall be charged with the duty of administering
electors' oaths; of preparing, publishing, and correcting,
within specified dates, a list of electors having the
qualifications hereinbefore set forth, and of presiding at and
making a due return of the election thus appointed. The
proclamation shall specify the offices to be filled, and in
order to determine the number of councilors the commanders
charged with calling the election shall determine, from the
best available evidence, the class to which the town belongs,
as hereinbefore defined; the classification thus made shall
govern until the taking of an official census. The first
alcaldes appointed under the provisions of this order shall
take and subscribe the oath of office before the commanding
officer of the military district or some person in the several
towns designated by said commanding officer for the said
purpose; whereupon the alcalde so sworn shall administer the
said oath of office to all the other officers of the municipio
there elected and afterwards appointed. The election returns
shall be canvassed by the authority issuing the election
proclamation, and the officers elected shall assume their
duties on a date to be specified by him in orders.
"ARTICLE. 55.
Until the appointment of governors of provinces their duties
under this order will be performed by the commanding officers
of the military districts. They may, by designation, confer on
subordinate commanding officers of subdistricts or of other
prescribed territorial limits of their commands the
supervisory duties herein enumerated, and a subordinate
commander so designated shall perform all and every of the
duties herein prescribed for the superior commanding officer.
"ARTICLE. 56.
For the time being the provisions of this order requiring that
alcaldes be elected, in all cases shall be so far modified as
to permit the commanding officers of military districts, in
their discretion, either to appoint such officers or to have
them elected as hereinbefore prescribed. The term of office of
alcaldes appointed under this authority shall be the same as
if they had been elected; at the expiration of such term the
office shall be filled by election or appointment.
"ARTICLE 57.
The governments of towns organized under General Orders No.
43, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army
Corps, series 1899, will continue in the exercise of their
functions as therein defined and set forth until such time as
municipal governments therefor have been organized and are in
operation under this order."
United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session,

House Document Number 659.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (April).

Appointment of the Second Commission to the Philippines and
the President's instructions to it.
Steps to be taken towards the establishment of civil
government, and the principles to be observed.
On the 7th of April, 1900, the President of the United States

addressed the following communication to the Secretary of War,
appointing a Second Commission to the Philippines, "to
continue and perfect the work of organizing and establishing
civil government" in the Islands, and defining the principles
on which that work should proceed: "In the message transmitted
to the Congress on the 5th of December, 1899, I said, speaking of
the Philippine Islands: 'As long as the insurrection continues
the military arm must necessarily be supreme. But there is no
reason why steps should not be taken from time to time to
inaugurate governments essentially popular in their form as
fast as territory is held and controlled by our troops. To
this end I am considering the advisability of the return of
the commission, or such of the members thereof as can be
secured, to aid the existing authorities and facilitate this
work throughout the islands.'
"To give effect to the intention thus expressed I have

appointed the Honorable William H. Taft of Ohio, Professor
Dean C. Worcester of Michigan, the Honorable Luke I. Wright of
Tennessee, the Honorable Henry C. Ide of Vermont, and
Professor Bernard Moses of California, Commissioners to the
Philippine Islands to continue and perfect the work of
organizing and establishing civil government already commenced
by the military authorities, subject in all respects to any
laws which Congress may hereafter enact. The Commissioners
named will meet and act as a board, and the Honorable William
H. Taft is designated as President of the board. It is
probable that the transfer of authority from military
commanders to civil officers will be gradual and will occupy a
considerable period. Its successful accomplishment and the
maintenance of peace and order in the meantime will require
the most perfect co-operation between the civil and military
authorities in the island, and both should be directed during
the transition period by the same executive department. The
commission will therefore report to the Secretary of War, and
all their action will be subject to your approval and control.
"You will instruct the commission to proceed to the City of

Manila, where they will make their principal office, and to
communicate with the Military Governor of the Philippine
Islands, whom you will at the same time direct to render to
them every assistance within his power in the performance of
their duties. Without hampering them by too specific
instructions, they should in general be enjoined, after making
themselves familiar with the conditions and needs of the
country, to devote their attention in the first instance to
the establishment of municipal governments, in which the
natives of the islands, both in the cities and in the rural
communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their
own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they are
capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and
control which a careful study of their capacities and
observation of the workings of native control show to be
consistent with the maintenance of law, order, and loyalty.
The next subject in order of importance should be the
organization of government in the larger administrative
divisions corresponding to counties, departments, or
provinces, in which the common interests of many or several
municipalities falling within the same tribal lines, or the
same natural geographical limits, may best be subserved by a
common administration. Whenever the commission is of the
opinion that the condition of affairs in the islands is such
that the central administration may safely be transferred from
military to civil control, they will report that conclusion to
you, with their recommendations as to the form of central
government to be established for the purpose of taking over
the control.
{390}
"Beginning with the 1st day of September, 1900, the authority

to exercise, subject to my approval, through the Secretary of
War, that part of the power of government in the Philippine
Islands which is of a legislative nature is to be transferred
from the Military Governor of the Islands to this commission,
to be thereafter exercised by them in the place and stead of
the Military Governor, under such rules and regulations as you
shall prescribe, until the establishment of the civil central
government for the islands contemplated in the last foregoing
paragraph, or until Congress shall otherwise provide. Exercise
of this legislative authority will include the making of rules
and orders, having the effect of law, for the raising of
revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the
appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the islands;
the establishment of an educational system throughout the
islands; the establishment of a system to secure an efficient
civil service; the organization and establishment of courts;
the organization and establishment of municipal and
departmental governments, and all other matters of a civil
nature for which the Military Governor is now competent to
provide by rules or orders of a legislative character. The
commission will also have power during the same period to
appoint to office such officers under the judicial,
educational, and civil service systems and in the municipal
and departmental governments as shall be provided for. Until
the complete transfer of control the Military Governor will
remain the chief executive head of the Government of the
islands, and will exercise the executive authority now
possessed by him and not herein expressly assigned to the
commission, subject, however, to the rules and orders enacted
by the commission in the exercise of the legislative powers
conferred upon them. In the meantime the municipal and
departmental governments will continue to report to the
Military Governor, and be subject to his administrative
supervision and control, under your direction, but that
supervision and control will be confined within the narrowest
limits consistent with the requirement that the powers of
government in the municipalities and departments shall be
honestly and effectively exercised and that law and order and
individual freedom shall be maintained. All legislative rules
and orders, establishments of Government, and appointments to
office by the commission will take effect immediately, or at
such times as it shall designate, subject to your approval and
action upon the coming in of the commission's reports, which
are to be made from time to time as its action is taken.
Wherever civil Governments are constituted under the direction
of the commission, such military posts, garrisons, and forces
will be continued for the suppression of insurrection and
brigandage, and the maintenance of law and order, as the
military commander shall deem requisite, and the military
forces shall be at all times subject, under his orders to the
call of the civil authorities for the maintenance of law and
order and the enforcement of their authority.
"In the establishment of Municipal Governments the commission

will take as the basis of its work the Governments established
by the Military Governor under his order of Aug. 8, 1899, and
under the report of the board constituted by the Military
Governor by his order of January 29, 1900, to formulate and
report a plan of Municipal Government, of which his Honor
Cayetano Arellano, President of the Audencia, was Chairman,
and it will give to the conclusions of that board the weight
and consideration which the high character and distinguished
abilities of its members justify. In the constitution of
Departmental or Provincial Governments it will give especial
attention to the existing Government of the Island of Negros,
constituted, with the approval of the people of that island,
under the order of the Military Governor of July 22, 1899, and
after verifying, so far as may be practicable, the reports of
the successful working of that Government, they will be guided
by the experience thus acquired, so far as it may be
applicable to the conditions existing in other portions of the
Philippines. It will avail itself, to the fullest degree
practicable, of the conclusions reached by the previous
commissions to the Philippines. In the distribution of powers
among the Governments organized by the commission, the
presumption is always to be in favor of the smaller
sub-division, so that all the powers which can properly be
exercised by the Municipal Government shall be vested in that
Government, and all the powers of a more general character
which can be exercised by the Departmental Government shall be
vested in that Government, and so that in the governmental
system, which is the result of the process, the Central
Government of the islands, following the example of the
distribution of the powers between the States and the National
Government of the United States, shall have no direct
administration except of matters of purely general concern,
and shall have only such supervision and control over local
Governments as may be necessary to secure and enforce faithful
and efficient administration by local officers.
"The many different degrees of civilization and varieties of

custom and capacity among the people of the different islands
preclude very definite instruction as to the part which the
people shall take in the selection of their own officers; but
these general rules are to be observed: That in all cases the
municipal officers, who administer the local affairs of the
people, are to be selected by the people, and that wherever
officers of more extended jurisdiction are to be selected in
any way, natives of the islands are to be preferred, and if
they can be found competent and willing to perform the duties,
they are to receive the offices in preference to any others.
It will be necessary to fill some offices for the present with
Americans which after a time may well be filled by natives of
the islands. As soon as practicable a system for ascertaining
the merit and fitness of candidates for civil office should be
put in force. An indispensable qualification for all offices and
positions of trust and authority in the islands must be
absolute and unconditional loyalty to the United States, and
absolute and unhampered authority and power to remove and
punish any officer deviating from that standard must at all
times be retained in the hands of the central authority of the
islands.
{391}
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions
which they are authorized to prescribe, the commission should
bear in mind that the government which they are establishing
is designed not for our satisfaction, or for the expression of
our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the
measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs,
their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent
consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable
requisites of just and effective government.
"At the same time the commission should bear in mind, and the
people of the islands should be made plainly to understand,
that there are certain great principles of government which
have been made the basis of our governmental system which we
deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of
individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately,
been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are
also certain practical rules of government which we have found
to be essential to the preservation of these great principles
of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules
of government must be established and maintained in their
islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however
much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure
with which they are familiar. It is evident that the most
enlightened thought of the Philippine Islands fully
appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and
they will inevitably within a short time command universal
assent. Upon every division and branch of the government of
the Philippines, therefore, must be imposed these inviolable
rules: That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation;
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall
exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of
attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press, or the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed.
"It will be the duty of the commission to make a thorough

investigation into the titles to the large tracts of land held
or claimed by individuals or by religious orders; into the
justice of the claims and complaints made against such
landholders by the people of the island or any part of the
people, and to seek by wise and peaceable measures a just
settlement of the controversies and redress of wrongs which
have caused strife and bloodshed in the past. In the
performance of this duty the commission is enjoined to see
that no injustice is done; to have regard for substantial
rights and equity, disregarding technicalities so far as
substantial right permits, and to observe the following rules:
That the provision of the treaty of Paris pledging the United
States to the protection of all rights of property in the
islands, and, as well, the principle of our own Government,
which prohibits the taking of private property without due
process of law, shall not be violated; that the welfare of the
people of the islands, which should be a paramount
consideration, shall be attained consistently with this rule
of property right; that if it becomes necessary for the public
interest of the people of the islands to dispose of claims to
property which the commission finds to be not lawfully
acquired and held, disposition shall be made thereof by due
legal procedure, in which there shall be full opportunity for
fair and impartial hearing and judgment; that if the same
public interests require the extinguishment of property rights
lawfully acquired and held, due compensation shall be made out
of the public Treasury therefor; that no form of religion and
no minister of religion shall be forced upon any community or
upon any citizen of the islands; that, upon the other hand, no
minister of religion shall be interfered with or molested in
following his calling, and that the separation between State
and Church shall be real, entire, and absolute.
"It will be the duty of the commission to promote and extend,

and, as it finds occasion, to improve, the system of education
already inaugurated by the military authorities. In doing this
it should regard as of first importance the extension of a system
of primary education which shall be free to all, and which
shall tend to fit the people for the duties of citizenship and
for the ordinary avocations of a civilized community. This
instruction should be given in the first instance in every
part of the islands in the language of the people. In view of
the great number of languages spoken by the different tribes,
it is especially important to the prosperity of the islands
that a common medium of communication may be established, and
it is obviously desirable that this medium should be the
English language. Especial attention should be at once given
to affording full opportunity to all the people of the islands
to acquire the use of the English language. It may be well
that the main changes which should be made in the system of
taxation and in the body of the laws under which the people
are governed, except such changes as have already been made by
the military Government, should be relegated to the civil
Government which is to be established under the auspices of
the commission. It will, however, be the duty of the
commission to inquire diligently as to whether there are any
further changes which ought not to be delayed, and, if so, it
is authorized to make such changes, subject to your approval.
In doing so it is to bear in mind that taxes which tend to
penalize or to repress industry and enterprise are to be
avoided; that provisions for taxation should be simple, so
that they may be understood by the people; that they should
affect the fewest practicable subjects of taxation which will
serve for the general distribution of the burden.
{392}
"The main body of the laws which regulate the rights and
obligations of the people should be maintained with as little
interference as possible. Changes made should be mainly in
procedure, and in the criminal laws to secure speedy and
impartial trials, and at the same time effective
administration and respect for individual rights. In dealing
with the uncivilized tribes of the islands the commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in
permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to
maintain their tribal organization and government, and under
which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by a civilization to which they are
unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments
should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation;
and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active
effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs. Upon all officers and employés of
the United States, both civil and military, should be
impressed a sense of the duty to observe not merely the
material but the personal and social rights of the people of
the islands, and to treat them with the same courtesy and
respect for their personal dignity which the people of the
United States are accustomed to require from each other. The
articles of capitulation of the City of Manila on the 13th of
August, 1898, concluded with these words: 'This city, its
inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its
educational establishments, and its private property of all
descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the
faith and honor of the American Army.' I believe that this
pledge has been faithfully kept. As high and sacred an
obligation rests upon the Government of the United States to
give protection for property and life, civil and religious
freedom, and wise, firm, and unselfish guidance in the paths
of peace and prosperity to all the people of the Philippine
Islands. I charge this commission to labor for the full
performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and
conscience of their country, in the firm hope that through
their labors all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands may
come to look back with gratitude to the day when God gave
victory to American arms at Manila and set their land under
the sovereignty and the protection of the people of the United
States.
WILLIAM McKINLEY."
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (April).

Speech of Senator Hoar against the subjugation and
retention of the Islands by the United States.
See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (APRIL).
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (May).

Filipinos killed, captured and surrendered from the breaking
out of hostilities with them to May, 1900.
Losses of American army.
In response to a resolution of the United States Senate, May

17, 1900, the following report, by cable, from Manila, was
made by General MacArthur:
"Filipinos killed, 10,780;

wounded, 2,104;
captured and surrendered, 10,425;
number prisoners in our possession, about 2,000.
No systematic record Filipino casualties these headquarters.

Foregoing, compiled from large number reports made immediately
after engagements, is as close an approximation as now
possible, owing to wide distribution of troops. More accurate
report would take weeks to prepare. Number reported killed
probably in excess of accurate figures; number reported
wounded probably much less, as Filipinos managed to remove
most wounded from field, and comparatively few fell into our
hands. Officers high rank and dangerous suspicious men have
been retained as prisoners; most other men discharged on field
as soon as disarmed. Propose to release all but very few
prisoners at early date."
56th Congress, 1st Session,

Senate Doc. 435.
For returns of casualties in the American army during the same

period,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (JUNE).
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (May-November).

The question in American politics.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 {July).

Appeal of citizens of Manila to the
Congress of the United States.
An appeal "to the Congress of the United States," dated at

Manila, July 15, 1900, and signed by 2,006 of the inhabitants
of the city, who were said by Senator Hoar and Senator Teller
to be "the leading people of that section of country—lawyers
and bankers and professional men generally" was presented to
the Senate on the 10th of January, 1901. It opens as follows:
"The undersigned, Filipinos and peaceful inhabitants of this

city, in their own name and in the name of the misnamed
'irreconcilables,' respectfully present themselves and submit
to the worthy consideration of the Congress of the United
States of America the following appeal: "The people of the
Philippine Islands, in view of their calamitous condition,
demand in the name of her sons, in the name of all races, in
the name of humanity, that an end be put to the misfortunes
which afflict them which, while they distress and agonize her,
compel her to struggle for the rights that are hers, and for
the maintenance whereof she must, if necessary, continue to
pour out her blood as she has so constantly and generously
done on battlefields, in the woods, on the mountains, in the
city, everywhere! The blood which has been shed and that is
still being shed, and which will continue to be shed until she
has secured her rights, is not shed because of the intrigues
of a few who, according to misinformed persons, desire to
exploit the people and enrich themselves at the cost of their
brother's blood. It has, gentlemen, sprung from the hearts of
the people, who alone are the real strength of nations, the
sovereign king of races, the producers of the arts, of
science, of commerce, of wealth, of agriculture, of
civilization, of progress, and of all the productions of human
labor and intelligence, in all of which the people of the
Philippine Islands had made great progress. The Filipinos were
not sunk in lethargy, as some untruthfully assert. They
suffered, but the hour to break their chains came to them in
August, 1896, and they proclaimed to the world their
emancipation."
{393}
The paper proceeds to review the circumstances of the revolt

against Spanish rule which broke out in 1896, and the later
circumstances of the conflict between Filipinos and Americans
at such length that it cannot be given in full. Its aim and
its spirit may be sufficiently shown by quotation of the
following passages from the closing parts of the appeal:
"Even supposing that America should force us to submit, and

after many years of war the country should submit, as the
lesser evil, to the proclamation of an ample autonomy, that
autonomy would not produce a sincere bond of friendship
between the two people, because, having sacrificed herself for
her independence, the country could not look with affection upon
those who would be the only obstacle to her happiness. She
would always retain her aspirations, so that autonomy would be
a short 'interregnum' which the country would necessarily take
advantage of to regain new strength to be used in the
attainment of her high political ideals, happen what may, and
perhaps in some hour of peril strike a fatal blow at a hated
oppressor. … In giving this warning we do not forget the good
Americans whom we sincerely respect; we are mindful of the
rupture of our good relations with the United States; we are
mindful of the blood which will again run on the soil of our
country. We see in that autonomy a new and sorrowful page in
the history of the Philippines, and therefore we can not but
look upon it with horror. Our people have had enough of
suffering. … They steadfastly believe that their independence
is their only salvation. Should they obtain it, they would be
forever grateful to whomsoever shall have helped them in their
undertaking; they would consider him as their redeemer, and
his name will be engraved with bright letters in the national
history, that all the generations to come may read it with
sublime veneration. America, consistent with her tradition, is
the only one which could play that great rôle in the present
and future of the Philippines. If she recognizes their
independence, they could offer her a part of the revenues of
the Philippine state, according to the treaty which shall be
stipulated; the protection in the country of the merchandise
of the United States, and a moral and material guarantee for
American capital all over the archipelago; finally, whatever
may bring greater prosperity to America and progress to the
country will, we doubt not, be taken into account in the
treaty which shall be celebrated.
"That the independence of the country will be attended with

anarchy is asserted only by those who, offending the truth and
forgetting their dignity, represent the Filipinos under
horrible colors, comparing them to beasts. Their assertions
are backed by isolated acts of pillage and robbery. What
revolution of the world was free from such deeds? At this
epoch passions are unrestrained; vengeance finds opportunity
to satisfy itself; private ambitions are often favored by the
occasion. Could such criminal deeds be avoided? Pythagoras
said: 'If you like to see monsters, travel through a country
during a revolution.' …
"In order to end our appeal we will say, with the learned
lawyer, Senor Mabini: 'To govern is to study the wants and
interpret the aspirations of the people, in order to remedy
the former and satisfy the latter.' If the natives who know
the wants, customs, and aspirations of the people are not fit
to govern them, would the Americans, who have had but little
to do with the Filipinos, be more capable to govern the
latter? We have, therefore, already proven—
1. That the revolution was the exclusive work of the public;
2. That in preparing it they were moved by a great ideal, the

ideal of independence;
3. That they are ready to sacrifice their whole existence in
order to realize their just aspirations;
4. That in spite of the serious difficulties through which

they are passing, they still expect from America that she will
consider them with impartiality and justice, and will
recognize what by right belongs to them, and thus give them an
opportunity to show their boundless gratitude;
5. That the annexation of the Philippines to America is not

feasible;
6. That the American sovereignty is not favored by the

Philippine people;
7. That an ample autonomy can not be imposed without violating

the Filipino will;
8. That the Filipinos are firm for self-government.
"From this it results that the only admissible solution for

the present difficulties is the recognition by America of the
independence of the Filipinos. In saying this we do not
consider either the nullity or the legality of the Paris
treaty on our country, but the well-known doctrine of the
immortal Washington, and of the sons of the United States of
America, worthy champions of oppressed people. Therefore we,
in the name of justice and with all the energies of our souls,
demand—
1. That the independence of the Filipinos be recognized;
2. That all the necessary information regarding the events

which are taking place, concerning the peaceful towns and
places which are supporting the arms of the revolution, be
obtained from Filipinos who, by their antecedents and by their
actual conduct, deserve the respect and confidence of the
Filipino people."
Congressional Record,
January 10, 1901, page 850.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (September).

Adoption of civil service rules.

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: A. D. 1900.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (September-November).

Civil government of the Islands by the President's Commission.
Legislative measures.
Report of the Commission.
"In April of this year the second Philippine commission, of

which Honorable William H. Taft, of Ohio, Professor Dean C.
Worcester, of Michigan, Honorable Luke I. Wright, of
Tennessee, Honorable Henry C. Ide, of Vermont, and Professor
Bernard Moses, of California, were members, sailed for Manila
with the powers of civil government prescribed in the
instructions of April 7, 1900 [see above]. After devoting
several months to familiarizing themselves with the conditions
in the islands, this commission on the 1st of September, 1900,
entered upon the discharge of the extensive legislative powers
and the specific powers of appointment conferred upon them in
the instructions, and they have since that time continued to
exercise all that part of the military power of the President
in the Philippines which is legislative in its character,
leaving the military governor still the chief executive of the
islands, the action of both being duly reported to this
Department for the President's consideration and approval. …
On consultation with the commission, and with the President's
approval, a note of amnesty was issued by the military
governor, dated June 21, 1900, and supplemented by a public
statement by the military governor, under date of July 2,
1900, based, in the main, upon the instructions to the
commission.
{394}
… In pursuance of them something over 5,000 persons, of all
grades of the civil and military service of the insurrection,
presented themselves and took the following oath: 'I hereby
renounce all allegiance to any and all so-called revolutionary
governments in the Philippine Islands and recognize and accept
the supreme authority of the United States of America therein;
and I do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to that government; that I will at all times
conduct myself as a faithful and law-abiding citizen of said
islands, and will not, either directly or indirectly, hold
correspondence with or give intelligence to an enemy of the
United States, neither will I aid, abet, harbor, or protect
such enemy. That I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion, so help me God.' This number included many of the
most prominent officials of the former Tagalog government. …
"The commission in its legislative action is following the

ordinary course of legislative procedure. Its sessions are
open, and its discussion and the proposed measures upon which
it is deliberating are public, while it takes testimony and
receives suggestions from citizens as if it were a legislative
committee. Its first legislative act was the appropriation, on
the 12th of September, of $2,000,000 (Mexican), to be used in
construction and repair of highways and bridges in the
Philippine Islands. The second act, on the same day, was an
appropriation of $5,000 (Mexican) for a survey of a railroad
to the mountains of Benguet, in the island of Luzon. The
proposed railroad, about 45 miles in length, extending from
the Manila and Dagupan road, near the Gulf of Lingayen, to the
interior, will open, at a distance of about 170 miles from
Manila, a high tableland exceedingly healthy, well wooded with
pine and oak, comparatively dry and cool, and where the
mercury is said to range at night in the hottest season of the
year between 50° and 60° F. The value of such a place for the
recuperation of troops and foreign residents will be very
great. The third act of the commission was an appropriation
for the payment of a superintendent of public instruction.
They have secured for that position the services of Frederick
W. Atkinson, recently principal of the high school of
Springfield, Massachusetts, who was selected by the commission
for that purpose before their arrival in Manila.
"Before the 1st of September a board of officers had been

engaged upon the revision of the tariff for the islands in the
light of such criticisms and suggestions as had been made
regarding the old tariff. The commission has considered the
report of this board, and after full public hearings of
business interests in the island has formulated a tariff law
which has been transmitted to the Department. … A
civil-service board has been constituted by the commission
[see, in this volume, CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: A. D. 1900). They
have secured from the United States Civil Service Commission
the experienced and capable services of Mr. Frank M. Kiggins,
and a civil-service law has been enacted by the commission
providing for the application of the merit system to
appointments in the island."
United States, Secretary of War, Annual Report,

November 30, 1900, pages 25-27.
A report by the Commission, dated November 30, was received at

Washington late in January, 1901. Of the legislative work on
which it entered September 1st, and which, at the time of
reporting, it had prosecuted during three months, the
Commission speaks as follows:
"It adopted the policy of passing no laws, except in cases of

emergency, without publishing them in the daily press after
they had passed a second reading, and giving to the public an

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G20 Rising Powers in the Changing

International Development Landscape:

The struggle for recognition in international relations

Power Transition in the Anarchical Society: Rising

Subas Dhakal Alan Nankervis John Burgess Ageing Asia

International Law and Development in the Global South

International Management: Strategic Opportunities and

New Development Assistance: Emerging Economies and the

Contested World Orders: Rising Powers, Non-Governmental

The Changing Role of SMEs in Global Business: Volume I:

G20 Rising Powers

ISBN 978-3-031-07856-9 ISBN 978-3-031-07857-6 (eBook)

Cover credit: Alex Linch/shutterstock.com

G20 Rising Powers in the Changing International

China and the Road to an Alternative Interstate Consensus 139

Baran Şener N. Birsen has a master’s degree from the Department

on economic analysis, BUAP-CA 130. She has recently applied to be part

y Universitá degli Studi diPalermo, Laurea in Relazioni Internazionali).

International Relations. She is studying on the security-development

Assessing Mexico and Argentina’s Contributions and

Locating South Africa and Turkey in International

Assessing Mexico and Argentina’s Contributions and

G20 Rising Powers and South–South Development

Table 3 G20 rising powers’ 2014–2016 average contribution

China and the Road to an Alternative Interstate Consensus

Emel Parlar Dal

E. Parlar Dal (B)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

economics efficiently. The last decade also witnessed the emergence of

to analyze, in-depth, the G20 rising powers’ perspective on international

Contribution to the Literature

the rising powers’ model of development cooperation with that of tradi-

SDGs beyond their borders. In illustration, a working paper, “Under-

topics, such as rising powers as global development actors, South-South

Locating G20 Rising Powers as Emerging

second year of the Jair Bolsonaro administration (2019–2020). For the

idea of development policy. The evolution of this cooperation expanded

international development economically and ideationally. She also exam-

The Main Contribution, Trends and Limits of G20

and sectoral distribution, bilateral or multilateral aid and contribution to

that policymakers from both countries stress the humanitarian aspect

Interplay Between International Development

cooperation regime, offering a glimpse of the emergence of a new world

behavioral advantages will make them more agile in comparison to tradi-

Acknowledgements This edited book project is funded by the Academy of

Alexandre Cesar Cunha Leite, Leonardo Ramos,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 17

the world happened in parallel to the productive restructuration of manu-

(Zhou 2017). The diplomatic articulation between Brazil, India and

impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016 and the emergence of a conser-

the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), the Oswaldo

and agreements with countries that could be understood as being “non-

Facing the scenario of uncertainty at the international level, the

between Brazil and other developing countries, consequently, touching

The reorganization of the international financial system over a mix of

China’s emphasis on the equalitarian condition of States in the interna-

The Soviet position enabled China to an explicit rejection of intervention

by China’s aid in East-Asian recovery after the 1997–1998 financial crisis

United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session,