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    PHIL106 Course Readings

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    PHIL 106 Theory of Knowledge I COURSE PACKAGE Instructor: Murat Ba¢ Department of Philosophy PHIL 106 Prof, Murat Bag Theory of Knowledge I @ Department of Philosophy Course Outline MARTHA: Me. Hathorne, lam innocent o a witeh, 1 know not what a with i, . HATHORNE: (Playing 10 the AUDIENCE) If ye know not whata witch js, how do you know you are not one? Arthur Miller, trom The Crucible Course Description: This course is intended to be the first part of a general introduction to theory of knowledge. It will cover some historical material as well as readings fiom contemporary epistemology literature. A certain portion of the course will be devoted to certain important historical figures who played the major role in the formation of what we recognize as the principal problems of epistemology. We will discuss the controversies surrounding such issues as the sources of knowledge, skepticism and analysis of knowledge. The design of the course is such that in the end of the course students will have acquired the basic skills to approach the concept or phenomenon of human knowledge from a critical point of view as well as be able to integrate their specific knowledge on epistemology with the other (more general) philosophical notions and ideas. Reading material: ‘The reader contains selections from two books (the first one being the ‘main work and the second supplementary): O'Brien, D. (2006). An Introduction to Theory of Knowledge. Cambridge: Polity Press. Pojman, L. P. (1999). The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings 2" edition, London: Wadsworth Publishing Company. (Some extra material) Grading: Students will have two examinations for this course: (1) There will be a mid-term exam in November (40% grade value); (2) The remaining part of your total grade will come from the final exam (60% grade value). Please note that if you take only one of those two exams, you will get an ‘F? grade. CONTENTS OF COURSE READER (in order of appearance in the package) Initial Readings Allen, W. “My Apology” Plato, “Euthyphro” Russell, B. “The Value of Philosophy” from: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Dan O’Brien) 1. The Theory of Knowledge 1. Epistemology 2. Structure of the Book 2.1, Part I: Introduction to Knowledge 2.2, Part I: Sources of Knowledge 2.3. Part Ill: Justification 2.4, Part IV: Skepticism 2.5. Part V: Areas of Knowledge Knowledge? 1. Philosophical Analysis, 2, The Tripartite Definition of Knowledge 6° External Material: E. Gettier’s article, from Pojman’s book) 3. Are Justification and Belief Necessary for Knowledge? 4, Gettier Cases 5. Richer Notions of Justification 5.1. Infallibility 5.2. No False Beliefs from: The Theory of Knowledge (Louis P. Pojman) Russell, B, “What Can We Know?: Appearance and Reality PART II: Skepticism IL], Descartes, R. “Global Skepticism” I13. Moore, G. E. “A Defense of Common Sense” 114, Lehrer, K. “Why Not Skepticism” from: An Intro to the Theory of Knowledge (Dan O’Brien) 3. A Priori Knowledge 1. Knowledge, Reason and Experience 2. Rationalism and Empiricism 3. The Synthetic A Priori 4, Self Evidence and Certainty 5. Innate Knowledge 10 10 142-143, 2 13 14 14 15 22 40 52 60 25 26 a7 29 31 Reading material: Side Effects (1980) by Woody Allen pp Side Efits tell the earth thar we must learn to live in peace or they vill return with special weapons and laminate every first-born male. They said they would get the results of iy blood test back in a couple of days and if didn’t hear from them I could go ahead end marry Clair.” My Apology O. all the famous men who ever lived, the one I would most like ro have been was Socrates. Not just because he was a great thinker, because I have been known to have some reasonably- profound insights myself, although mine invariably revolve oround a Swedish airline stewardess and some handcuffs. No, the great appeal for me of this wisest of all Greeks was his courage in the face of death, His decision was nor to abandon his principles, but rather to give his life to prove a point. I personally am not quite as fearless about dying and will, after any untoward noise such as a car backfiring, leap directly into the arms of the person I am conversing with. In the end, Socrates’ brave death gave his life authentic meaning; something my existence lacks totally, although it does possess 2 minimal relevaince to the Internal Revenue Department. I must confess I have tried putting my- self in this great philosopher's sandals many times 34» Side Bers and no matter how often I do, I immediately wind up dozing off and having the following dream. (Tie scene is my prison ech J am usually sitting alone, working out some deep problem of rational thoughe like: Can an object be called a work of ars if it can also be wed to clean the stove? Presently I ane visited by Agathon and Simmias,) Agatbon: Ab, my good friend and wise old sage. How go your days of confinement? Allen: What can one say of confinement, Agathon? Only the body may be circumscribed. My mind roams freely, unfettered by the four walls and therefore in truth I ask, does confinement exist? Agathon: Well, what if you want to take a walk? Allen: Good. question. I can't. (Toe shree of us sit in classical poses, not anlike a friese. Finally Agathon speaks) Agathon: T'm afraid the word is bad. You have been con- demned to death. Allen: Ab, it saddens me thet I should cause debate in the senate, Agathon: No debate: Unanimous. Allen: Really? Agatbon: First ballot. Allen: Elem. I had counted on a little more support. ‘Sinsmias: The senate is furious over your ideas for a Uto- pian state. My Avology ~ 35 Allen: guess I should never have suggested having a philosopher-king. Simmias: Especially when you kept pointing to yourself and clearing your throat. Allen; And yet 1 do not regard my executioners as evil Agatbon: Nor do 1. Allen: Ex, yeah, well... for what is evil but merely good in excess? Agatbon: Flow so? Allen: Look at it this way. If a man sings a lovely song it is bequtiful. If he keeps singing, one begins to get 4 headache. Agathe Allen: Ad if he definitely won't stop singing, eventually you want to stuff socks down his throat. : True. Agathon: Yes. Very trve. Allen: When is the sentence to be carried out? Agathon:: What time is it now? Allen: Today!? Agathon: “They need the jail cell. Allen: Then let it be! Let them take my life. Let it be recorded that I died rather than abandon the principles of truth and free inquiry. Weep not, Agathoa. Agatbon: V'm not weeping. This is on allergy. Allen: Por to the man of the mind, death is not an end but a beginning. 36 + Side Bifiets Simmias: Flow so? Allen: Well, now give me a minute Simmias: Take your time. Allen: Jes true, Simmias, that man does not exist before he is born, is it not? Simmias: Very true. Allen; Nor does he exist after his death. Simmias: Yes. 1 agree Allen: Henonm. Simmias: 80? Allen: Now, wait ¢ minute, I'm « little confused. You know they only feed me lamb and it’s never well-cooked. Sinmias: Most men regard death as the final end. Conse quently they fear it, Allen; Death is a state of non-being. That which is not, does not exist. Therefore death does not exist. Only truth exists. Truth and beauty. Each is interchangeable, but are aspects of themselves. Er, what specifically did they say they had in mind for me? Agatbon: Hemlock. Allen: (Pusaled) Hemlock? Agathon: You remember that black liquid that ate through your marble table? Allen: Really? Agethon: Yast one cupful. Though they do havea back-up chalice should you spill anything. My Apology 37 Allen: ¥ wonder if its painful? Agathon: They asked if you would try not to make 2 seene. It disturbs the other prisoners. Allen: Hom . .. Agathon: told everyone you would die bravely rather than renounce your principles. Allen: Right, right .. . er, did the concept of “exile” ever come up? Agathon: They stopped exiling last year. Too much red tape. Allen: Right... yeah... (Troubled and distracted but trying 40 remain self-possessed) Ler... $0 et... So—what else is new? Agatton: Ob, ran into Isosceles, He has a great idea for a new triangle. Allen: Right... right... (Suddenly dropping all pretense of courage) Look, I'm going to level with you—I den’t want 10 go! T'm too young! Agathon: But this is your chance to die for truth! Allen: Don't misunderstand sne. I'm all for truth, On the other hand I have a lunch date in Sparta next week and T’d hate to miss it. I's my turn to buy. You know those Spartans, they fight so easily. Simmias: Is our wisest philosopher @ coward? Allen: Ym not a coward, and I'm not ¢ hero. I'm some- where in: the middle, Simmios: A cringing vermin. 38 Side Bfcts Ailen: That’s approximately the spot. Agathon: Buc it was you who proved that death doesn’t exist, Allen: Hey, listen—I've proved « lot of things. That's how I pay my rent. Theories and little observations. A puckish remark now and then. Occasional maxims. It beats picking olives, but let's not get carried away. Agathon: But you have proved many times that the soul is immortal, Alles: And it is! On paper. See, that’s the thing about philosophy—it’s not all that functional once you get out of class, Simmias: And the eternal “forms”? You said each thing always did exist and always will exist. Allen: \ was talking mostly about heavy objects. A statue or something. With people it’s a lot different. Agathon: But all that talk about death being the same as sleep. Allen: Yes, but the difference is that when you're dead and somebody yells, “Everybody up, it's morning,” it's very hard to find your slippers. (Te executioner arrives witha cup of hemlock. He bears a close facial resemblance to sb Irish comedian Spike Milligen,) Fnecutioner: Ah—here we are. Who gets the poison? Agathon: (Pointing to me) He docs. Ailen: Gee, its a big cup. Should it be smoking like that? i My Apology * 39 Executioner: Yes. And drink it all because 2 lot the poison’s at the-bottom. Allen: (Usually bere my bebavior is totally different from Socra- ses and I am: told Isereams in my sleep.) No—I won't I don’t ‘want to die! Help! No! Please! (Fle bands me the bubbling brew amist my disgusting pleading and all seems lst. Then becouse of some Zxnate survival instinct te drearm akoays takes an upturn and a mesnger arrives.) Messenger: Hold everything! The senate has re-voted! The charges are dropped. Your value has been reassessed and it is decided you should be honored instea Allen: At last! At last! They came to their senses’ Pm a free man! Free! And to be honored yet!" Quick, Agathon and Simmias, get my bags. I must be going. Praxiteles will want to get an early start on my bust. But before J leave, I give a little parable. Sinmias: Gee, that really was a sharp reversal. I wonder if they know what they’re doing? Allen: A. group of men live in a dark cave. They are unaware that outside the sun shines. The only light they know is the flickering flame of a few small candles which they use to move around, Agarbon: Where'd they get the candles? Allen: Well, \et’s just say they have them. Agathon: They live in @ cave and have candles? It doesn’t ring true. Allen: Can't you just buy it for now? 40> Side Bfers Agatbon: OX, O.R., but get to the point, Allen; And then one day, one of the cave dwellers wand- ers out of the cave and sees the outside world. Simmias: In all its clarity. Allen; Precisely. In all its clarity. Agatbon: When he tries to tell the others they don’t be- Fieve him, Allen: Well, no. He doesn’t tell the others. Agathon: He doesn’ Allen; No, he opens a meat market, he marries « dancer and dies of a cerebral hemorrhage at forty-two. (icy grab me and force the hemlock down, Here I usually wake up fn a sweat and only some eggs and smoked salmon calm me dow) PLATO AND THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES. Euthyphro In Buthyphvo, Socrates (470-399 w.c.), in the law courts on his way to his trial, encounters Euthyphro, a smug fool who is about to bring ar indict- ‘ment against his father for murder and impiety, which is the subject of th dialogue. To us, to be impious means to be inteligious, whereas for the ‘Athenians the term was an amalgamation of responsibility, trustworthines piety, and loyalty. Hence, this dialogue is not enly a prelude to Socrates" trial, but it is also an excellent example of a philosophic search for the meaning of an important term, ‘TO Sruby For what is Socrates being prosecuted? For what is Euthyphro prosecuting his father? ‘What is the first definition of piely offered? What is Socrates’ jection to 4, What is the second defi objection to then? 5. What definition of piety does Socrates himself offer? 6. What problem regarding piety finally remains? jon of piety? Thitd? Fourth? What is Socrates’ Teprined with he permston of Mell College Pabishing Company Gm Eohpio Apalogy. Era by Plo, ate 3. Cech Copa © 1936 by Macatina College Pbieing Com 4 Fuhypiro Cuanactens Socrates and Euihyphro Scune The Hall of the King Eurhyphro. What in the world are you doing here in the king's hell, Socrates? Why have you left your haunis in the Lyceum? You swely cannot have a suit before him, as I have Socrates. The Adlenians, Buthyphro, call it an indictment, not a suit uth. What? Do you mean that someone is prosecuting you? 1 cannot be- lieve that you are prosecuting anyone yourself. Soc Certainly 1 am not uth, Then is someone prosecutis Socr Yes Buth, Who is he? Socr. 1 scarely know him myself, known young man. His name, however, you? ayphro; T think he most be some un- ‘Meletus, and his district Pithis. Euth. don’t know him, Socrates. But tell me, what is he prosecuting you for? Socr: What for? Not on trivial grounds, I think. It is no small thing for so young a man to have formed an opinion on such an important matter. For he, he says, knows how the young are corrupted, and who are their cornupters, He must be a wise man who, observing my ignorance, is going to accuse me to the state, as bis mother, of corrupting his fiends. I dhink that he is the only ‘one who begins atthe right point in his political reforms; for his frst care is to make the young men as good as possible, just as 2 good Farmer will take care of his young plants frst, and, after he bas done that, of the others. And so Meletus, T suppose, is first clearing us away who, as he says, corrupt the young men growing up; and then, when he has done that, of course he will tum his attention to tie older men, and so become a very great public benefactor Buh, Lhvope it may be so, Socrates, but T fear the opposite. It seems to me that in trying to injure you, he is really setting to work by striking a blow at the foundation of the state. But how, tell me, does he say that you corrupt the youth? Socr In a way which sounds absurd at first, my fiend. He says that Tam a ‘maker of gods; and so he is prosecuting me, he says, for inventing new gods and for aot believing in the old ones. Buth, T understand, Socrates. t is because you say that you always have @ divine guide. So he is prosecuting you for introducing religious seforms; and hi is going into court to arouse prejudice against you, knowing. that the mul- titude ate easily prejudiced about such matters... Well, Socrates, 1 dace say Euthyplro Ss {hat nothing will come of it. Very likely you will be successful in your uial, and I think that I shall be in mine. Socr And what is this suit of yours, Bulhyphro? Are you suing, or being sued? Ewch, Tam sui Soc Whom? Exh, A-man whom people think T must be mad to prosecute. Soc What? Has he wings to fly away with? uth, He is far enough from flying; he is a very old man. Socr Who is he? uth. He is my father. Soce Your father, my good man? Buh, He is indeed, Soct: What are you prosecuting him for? What is the accusation? Ew, Murder, Socrates. Soc Good heavens, Euthyphro! Surely the multiude are ignorant of what is right, 1 take it that itis not everyone who could rightly do witat you are doing; only a man who was alseady well advanced in wisdom. uth, ‘That is quite tre, Socrates. Socr Was the man whom your father killed a relative of yours? 3ut, of course, he was. You would never have prosecuted your father for the murder of a stranger? Futh You amuse me, Socrates. What difference does it make whether the ‘murdered man were a relative or a steanger? The only question that yeu have to ask is, did the murderer kil justly or not? ... In the present case the mur ered man was poor laborer of mine, who worked for us on our farm i Naxos. While drunk he got angry with one of our slaves and killed him. My father therefore bound the man hiand and foot and threw him into a dtc, while he sent to Athens 10 ask the priest what he should do. While the messenger ‘was gone, le entitely neglected the man, thinking that he was a murderer, and that it would be no great matter, even if he were to die. And that was exacily ‘what happened; hunger and cold and his bonds killed him before the nessen- gee returned. And now my father and the rest of my family ave indignant with ‘me because I am prosecuting my father for the murder of this murderer. They assert that he did not kill the man at all; and they say that, even if he hal killed him over and over again, the man himself was a murderer, and that [ ought ‘not to concern myself about such a person because it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder. So Title, Socrates, do they know the divine law of piety and impiety. 6 Euhyphio Soct: And do you mean 10 say, Euthyphro, that you think that you under- stand divine things and piety and impiety so accurately that, in suc a ease as you lave stated, you can bring your father to justice without fear that you ‘yoorseif may be doing something impious? Euth. TET did not understand all these matters accurately, Socrates, I should not be worth much. Soct Then, my dear Euthyphro, I cannot do better than become your pupil ‘and challenge Meletus on this very point before the til begins. I should say that L had always thought it very important to have knowledge about divine things; and that now, when he says that I offend by speaking carelessly about them, and by introdueing reforms, | have become your pupil. And I shoule say, “Meletus, if you acknowledge Euthyphro 10 be wise in these matters and to hhold the correst belief, then think the same of me and do not put me on trials but if you do not, then bring a suit, not against me, but agaiast my master, for comupting his elders~-namely, myself whom he corzupls by his teaching, and bis own father whom ie corrupts by adimonishing snd punishing him.” And if 1 did not succeed in persuading him to release me from the suit or to indict you in my place, then T could repeat my challenge in court Euth. Yes, by Zeus! Socrates, 1 think T should find out his weak points if be were to try to indict me. I should have 2 good deal to say about hita in court long before I spoke about myself Soc Yes, my dear friend, and knowing this I am anxious to become your pupil. I see that Meletus here, and others t90, seem uot to notice you at all, but he sees through me without difficulty and at once prosccutes me for impi= ety. Now, therefore, please explain to me what you were so confident just now thet you knew. Tell me what are righteousness and sactilege with respect 0 ‘murder and everything else. I suppose that piety is the same in all actions, and that impiety is always the opposite of piety, and retains its identity, and that, as impiety, it always bas the same character, which will be found in whatever is impious, uth, Certainly, Socrates, I suppose so. Socr Tell me, then, what is piety and what is impiety? Euch, Well, then, 1 say that pioty means prosecuting the unjust individwat who has committed murder or sacrilege, or any other such etime, as I am doing now, whether he is your father or your mother or whoever he is; and I say that impiety means not prosecuting him. And observe, Socrates, I will give you a clear proof, which I have already given co others, that itis so, and that. Going right means not letting off unpunished the sacrilegious man, whosoever hhe may be. Men hold Zeus to be the best and the most just of the gods; and they admit that Zeus bound his own father, Cronos, for wrongfully devouring his children; and that Cronos, in his tur, castrated his father for similar rea euthypao 7 sons. And yet, these same men ate incensed with me because I proceed against ny father Tor doing weong, So, you see, they say one thing in the case of the gods and quite another in mine, Socr Is not that why Tam being prosecuted, Euthypinco? T mean, because | find it hard fo accept such stories people tell about the gods? f expect that 1 shall be found at fault because I doubl those stories. New if you who under stand all these matters so well agtee in holding all those tales tue, then I sup- ose that I must yield to your authority. What could T say when I admi, myself that T know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of friendship, do you really believe that these things have actually happened? Eu. Yes, andl move amazing things too, Socrates, which the multiude do rot know of, Soct Then you really believe (hat there is war among the gods, ard biuer hatteds, and battles, suel as the posts tell of Eu. Yes, Socrates, and mote besides. As I was saying, L will pet to you ‘many other stories about divine maters, if you like, whieh Tam sure will as- tonish you when you hear them, Socr I dare say. You shall report them to me at your leiswe ‘At present please ty (© give a more definite answer to the quest asked you just now. What I asked you, my friend, ws, What is piety? and you have not explained ito me to my satisfaction. You only tell me that what you are doing now, namely, prosecuting your father for muster, is a pious act. uth, Well, that is ue, Socrates Soc Very likely. But many other actions are pious, are they not, Eutayphro? Euth. Certainly. Socr Remember, then, T did not ask’ you to tell me one or two of all the any pious actions that there are; T want to know what is characieistic of Piety which makes all pious actions pious. You said, I think, that thers is one characteristic which makes all pious actions pious, and another characeristic Which makes all impious actions impious. Do you not romembee? Buh, 1 do. Socr Well, then, explain to me what is this characteristic, that L may have it to tum {o, and {0 use as a standard whereby to judge your actions aud those of other men, and be able to say that whatever action resembles itis pious, and whatever docs not, is not pious. Euth, Yes, L will tel you that if you wish, Socrates, ... What is pleasing to the gods is pious, and what is not pleasing to then is impious, Soc Fine, Buthyphro. Now you have given me de answer that 1 wanted, Whether what you say is true, I do not know yet. But, of course, you will go fn to prove that itis tue, 8 Euthyphro uth, Certainly. Soct Come, then, let us examine our statement. The things and the men that are pleasing to the gods ere pious, and the things and the men that are dis- pleasing to the gods are impious. But piety and impiety are not the same; they are as opposite as possible—was not that what he said”? uth, Certainly. Socr Have we not also said, Euthyphro, that there are quarrels and di fpreements and hatreds among the gods? Buh, We have. Socr But what Kind of disagreement, my friend, causes hatred and anger? Let us look at the mailer thus. IF you and I were to disagree as to whether one number were more than another, would that make us angry and enemies? Should we not settle such a dispute at once by counting? Buh, OF course. Soc And if we were to disagree as to the relative size of two things, we should measure them and put an end (0 the disagreement at once, should we not?.... And should we not settle a question about the relative weight of two things by weighing them? wth, OF course. Soct Then what is the question that would make us angry and enemies if we disagreed abont it, and could not come to a settlement? Perhaps you have not a answer ready; but Esten (0 mine, Is it not the question of the just and unjust, of the honorable and the dishonorable, of the good and the bad? Ts it not questions about these matters that mak you and me and everyone else quarrel, when we {do quarrel, if we differ about them and can reach no satisfactory agreement, uth, Yes. Socrates, itis disagreements about these matters, Soce Well, Buthyphro, the gods will quarrel over these things if they quar- relat all, will they not? wh, Necesswrily. Soct ‘Then, my good Euthyphro, you say that some of the gods think one thing just, the others, another; and that what some of them hold (0 be honorable ‘or good, others hold to be dishonorable or evil. For there would not have been quarrels among them if they had not disagreed on these points, would there? uth, You are right. Socr. And each of them loves what he thinks honorable, and good, and just; ‘and hates the opposite, does he not? uth, Certainly. Socr. But you say that the same action is held by some of them to be just, and by otheis to be unjust; and that then they dispute about it, and so quarrel and Fgh ‘among themselves. Is it not so? Bulhypivo 9 Buk, Yes. Soc Then the same thing is hated by the gods and loved by then and the same thing wil be displeasing and pleasing to them. Buh, Apparatly. Socr Then, aecording to your account, the same thing will be p.ous and impious. Buh, So it seems. Soc Then, my good frend, you have not answered my question. [did aot sek you to tell me what ection is both pious and impious; but it seems that ‘whatever is pleasing to the gods i also displeasing to thein. And so, Buthy- pro, I should not be surprised if what you are doing now in punishing your father is an action well pleasing 10 Zeus, but hateful to Cronos and Ur and ecceptable to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera; and if any of the ober gods disagree about it, pleasing 0 some of them and displeasing to others Euth, But on this point, Socrates, I think that there is no difference of opia- ion among the gods: they all hold that if one man Kills snother unvsty, he rast be punished. * Soci What, Eulhyphro? Among mankind, have you never heard disputes whether a man ought t0 be punished for killing another man unjust, oF for doing some other unjust deed? Euth, Indeed, they never cease from these disputes, especially in cours of justice. Tey do all manner of unjust things, and then there is nothing which they will not do and say to avoid punishment. Soci Do they admit that they have done something unjust, and atthe same time deny that they ought be punished, Euthyphro? Euh, No, indeed, that they do not. Sock ‘Then it is not the cate that there is nothing which they will not do and say. 1 take it, they do not dave to say or argue that they must not be punished iT hey have done something unjust. What they say is that they have not dane anything unjust, is it not so? Euth, That is wue. Socr: Then they do not disagree over the question thatthe unjust individual ‘st be punished. They disagree over the question, who is unjust, aad what was done and when, do they not? But, ‘That is tue, Soct: Well, is not exactly the same thing true of the gods if they quarrel bout justice and injustice, as you say they do? Do not some of them say that the others are doing something unjust, while the others deny it? No one, 1 sup- pose, my dear friend, whether god or man, dares (o say that a porsor, who has done something unjust must not be punished 10 Bulhyphro Buh, No, Socrates, that is wue, by and large Socr Lake it, Buthyphro, that he disputants, whether men or gods, if the gods do disagree, disagree over each separate act. When they quacrel about any act, some of them say that it was just, and others that it was unjust. Is it not 60? Fuh, Yes. Sock Come, then, my dear Eulhyphro, please enlighten me on this point. ‘What proof liave you that all the gods think that a laborer who has been im- prisoned for murder by the master of the man who ie has murdered, and who dies from his imprisonment before the master has had time to leatn from the religious authorities what he should do, dies unjustly? How do you know that itis just for 2 son to indict his Father and to prosecute him for the murder of such a man? Come, see if you can make it clear to me that the gods neces- sotly agree in thinking that this action of yours is just; and if you satisfy me, will nover cease singing your praises for wisdom. uth, I could make that clear enough to you, Socrates; but I am afraid that it would be a long business Soce T see you think that I am duller than the judges. To them, of course, you will make it cleat that your father has committed an unjust aetion, and that all the gods agece in hating such actions uth, Lill indeed, Socrates, if they will only listen to me, Soce ‘They will listen if they think that you are a good speaker. But while you were talking, it occuered to me to ask myself this question: suppose that Euthyphro were to prove to me as clearly as possible that all the gods think such & death unjust, how has he brought me any nearer to understanding what piety and impiety are? This particular act, perhaps, may be displeasing to the gods, but then we have just seen that piety and impiety cannot be defined i Uhat way; for we have seen iat what is displeasing to the gods is also pleas- ing to them, So I will let you off on this point, Buthypbro; end all the gods shall egree in thinking your father’s action wrong and in hating it, if you like. But shall we correct our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is impious, and whatever they all love is pious; while whatever some of thes love, and others hate, is either both or neither? Do you wish us now to define piety and impiety in this manner? Euth, Why not, Socrates? Socr There is no reason why I should not, Euthyphro. 1t is for you to con- sider whether that definition will help you to teach me what you promised. Fut, Well, I should say that piety is what all the gods tove, and that impi- cty is what they all hate. ‘lyn 14 Soc Are we to examine this definition, Euthyphro, and see if itis @ good ‘Buch, For my part T think that the definition is tight this time. Soc We shall know that better in litle while, my good friend. Now con- sider this question. Do the gods love piety because itis pious, or is iC sious because they love it? Buh. 1.do not understand you, Socrates, Soct I will uy to explain myself: we speak of a thing being eartied and carrying, and being led and leading, and being seen and sesing; and you un= derstand that all such expressions mean different things, and what the éffer- Buh, Yes, I think T understand. Soct And we alk of a thing being loved, of a thing loving, and the wo are diferent? Buh. OF cours. Soce Now tell me, i a thing which is boing carried in a state of being car- ried because itis carried, ot for some other reason? Euth, No, because itis carried. Soc And a thing is in a state of being led because it is led, and of being seen because it is seen? Buh. Certainly. Socr: ‘Then a thing is not seon because it is in a state of being seen: itis a state of being seen because itis seen; and a thing is not led because Ie is a state of being led: itis in a state of being led because itis led; and a thing is not carted because itis in a state of being cattied: itis in a stale of being carried because it is carted. Is my meaning clear now, Euthyphico? I mean this: if anything becomes or is affected, it does not become because it isin a state of becoming: it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; and itis not af- fected because itis in a slate of being affected: iis in a stae of being affected because itis affected. Do you not agree? Buh. To. Socr Is not that which is being loved in a state either of becoming or of alfected in some way by something? Buh. Certainly. Socr Then the same is true here as in the former cases. A thing is not oved by those wiuo love it because itis in a stave of being loved; itis ia 0 state of being loved because they love it uth, Necessatily. 2 Buthyphro Soct Well, then, Buthyphro, what do we say about piety? Is it not loved by all the gods, according to your definition? Eu, Yes. Soce Because i is pious, or for some other reason? uth. No, because itis pions, Socr Then its loved by the gods because itis pious; itis not pious because itis loved by them? Buth, Tt seems so. Socr But, then, what is pleasing to the gods is pleasing to them, and isin a slate of being loved by them, because they love i(? Buh, OF course Socr Then piety is not what is pleasing to the gods, and what is pleasing to the gods is not pious, as you say, Euthyphro. They ate different things Euth, And why, Socrates? Soct Because we are agreed that the gods love piety because itis pious, and that i¢ is noe pious because they love it Is not this so? Euh. Yes, Socr. And that what is pleasing to the gods because they love it, is pleasing to them by reason of this same love, and that they do not love it because it is pleasing 10 them. mh True, Socr Then, my dear Buthyphro, piety and what is pleasing to the gods are ifforent things. If the gods had loved piety because it is pious, they would also have loved what is plessing to them because itis pleasing 10 them; but if ‘what is pleasing to them hed been pleasing to them because they loved it, then piety, t00, would have been piety because they loved it. But now you see that they are opposite things, and wholly different from each other. For the one is fof a sort (0 be loved because itis Toved, while the other is loved because it is (fa soit to be loved. My question, Euthyphiro, was, What is piety? But it urns ‘out that you Nave not explained to me the essential character of piety; you have been content to mention an effect which belongs to it—namely, that all gods love it, You have not yer told me what its essential characteris. Do not, if you please, keep from me what piety is; begin again and tell me that. Never mind whether the gods love it, or whether it fas other effects: we shall not di fer on that point, Do your best to make clear to me what is piety and what is ‘impiey. Ew. But, Socrates, T really don't know how to explain to you what is on ‘my mind, Whatever statement we put forward always somehow moves round ele, and will not stay where we put it Euthyphro 13 Soc Then we must begin again and inguice what picty is. I do not mean to give in until {have found out, Do not regard me as unworthy: give your whole ‘mind to the question, and this time tell me the truth. For if anyone knows it, itis you; and you are a Proteus whom I must not let go until you have told ime, it eannot be that you would ever have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for the murder of 2 laboring man unless you had known exactly what picty and impiety are. You would have feared to risk the anger of the gods in case you should be doing wrong, and you would have been afraid of what would say. But now I'am sure that you think that you know exactly wha: is pious and what is not, so tell me, my good Buthypho, and do not conceal from me what you think: Buth, Another time, then, Socrates, I om in a hurry now, and it i time for ime to be off, TO THINK ABOUT 1, How does one determine the definition of aterm such as pieny or muraer’? 2. Do the ways a word is used in society always represent its correct mean- ing? Can you think of an exception? 3, “There is only one thing a philosopher can be relied upon fo do, and that is to contradict ather philosophers.” ‘Wanttant Jatt 4, “We are discussing, no small mattes, but how we ought to live.” Socnats, in Plato's Repustic 5. “Why worry about death, when you don’t concern yourself about your nothingness before your biclh?” Goun 6 “Since ignorance is no guarantee of security, and in fact only makes ur insecurity still worse, itis probably better despite our fear to krow where the danger lies, To ask the right question is already half the so- lution of a problem... Discerning persons have realized for some time that external ... conditions, of whatever kind, are only ...jump- ing-off grounds, for the real dangers that threaten our lives.” C. G. Jono 7. “We do not are because truth is difficult to see, It ig visible at a glance. We err because this is more comfortable.” ALEXANDER SOLZHENISYN 8, "Tho life-blood of philosophy is argument and counter-argument. Plato and Aristole thought of this occurring in what they called dialectic dis- cussion, Today, it might be argued that itis just the same, except that it operates on a much wider seale, both historically and gcographically. Ar- gument and couater-argument in books and journals is the modem ver- sion of dialectic.” D. W, Hannxn Wuat Is THE VALUE oF PHILOSOPHY? 3 The Value of Philosophy ‘Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), the grandson of Lord John Russell, a priene ‘minister under Queen Victoria, was bom in Wales. He stadied msthemct- {cs and philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge, from 1890 to 1894, He was a fellow at Trinity from 1895 t0 1901, and a lecturer in philosophy there Srom 1910 :0 1916, In 1916, Russell was dismissed from his position Doeause af his pacifist activities. Then, in 1938, he was seatenced to dx ‘months in prison because of an allegedly lbelovs aticle in which he ex _recsed his opposition to World War I and his desire for peace. Russell was a fellow of the Royal Society, an honorary fellow of the British Acadezy, and a recipient of the Order of Merit. He was awarded the Nobel Prize fr literature in 1950. In the area of logic, Russell wrote Principles of Matha- matics (1903), Principia Mathematica (with A. N. Whitehead; three vol- umes, 1910-13), and Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919). Fis ‘works in epistemology and metaphysics include Our Knowledge of the Ex- ternal World (1914), The Analysis of Matter (1927), and Human Knowl- edge, is Scope and Limits (1948). Among his books on social issues are ‘Marriage and Morais (1929) and Education and the Sociel Order (1952). “Practical” people often dismiss philosophy because they see it as vague and ‘neers, Russell agrees that philosophy deals wih isues with uncertain en- swers, Yet in this uncertainty, he sees phiosophy’s chief value—thet in cco templating the great questions one is freed from marrow pecsonal inteeis Fe Benoa Hh bln of Ply tC ey 22). ‘Repeinted by permission of Oxford University Press. sia a 46 The Voiue of Phitosophy ‘lose, Rosell Blloves that unless the Individual can escape from his “ine ‘sdoctive Sel" the sei concamed only wi immediate personal needs, thea be ‘wil be assauited and damaged by the events outside tet private world. Toe ‘praccal” person who scoms philosophy does have 2 plilosopty—usvally “sagged individuaism"—a philosophy Russoll argues is inadequate, in part be ‘cause it falls to mest one's meal needs. i To sTUDY 7 J. Describe the “practical” person, “ 2. Why must we free ourselves fom the prejudices of the “practical indi= ‘vidual? 3. Atwhat does philosophy sia? caer 4. With what type of qvesions does philosopay deal? Give an example, 5. Accotiag to Russel, where ees the cio vate chptosophy Let? 6 Describe the instinctive person. = 7. How does the “Self enlarge itvelf? ¥ 8. What is te relation of the philosophic mind to te world of action and Jstice? Can you suggest as example of aa indiviial so concemed”? Having now come to the end of our bref and very incomplete review of ‘the problems of philosophy, it willbe, wel to consider, i coacusion, what is the value of philosophy and wihy it ooght to be studied, fig the more necessary to consider tis question, in view of tho fact that many men! uncer the inSuence of science or of practical affrs, ar inclined to doubt whether philosophy is soything beter than innocent but useless tifing,beirspliing distinctions, ard controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible. ‘This view of philosophy appears 1 reso, perly from a wrong coucep- ion of the ends of lif, partly from a wrong conception of the kind of goods ‘hich philosophy strives to achieve, Physical scieuce, through the medium of inventions, is usefl to iamumerable people who aze wholly ignocaat of thus ‘the study of physical science is co be recommended, not only, or primarily, be ‘cause ofthe effect on mankind in genera. This wity does aot belong to pai- losophy. If te stady of philosophy has any valve at all for others then stidents of philosophy, it must be only nazecty, cough its effets upon the lives of those who study it Tt is in these efloois, therefore i anywhere, thatthe value ‘of philosophy must be primary sought. ‘But father, if we are not to fallin our endeavour to deteniine the value of philosophy, we must first free our minds from the prejudloes of what xe ‘The Value of Philosooty <7 ‘wrongly called “practical” mee. The “practice!” maa, ab this word is ofea used, is one who recognizes coly material needs, who realizes that ren must || ave food for te body, but is oblivious of the aseessity of providing food for the mind, Ifall men were well off, if poverty and disease had been rednced to theic lowest possible point, thee would sill xeasin much to be dove 00 pio {dace 2 valuable society; and even inthe existing worl! the goods of the mind are atleast as important 2s the goods ofthe body tis exclusively amoag the ‘goods ofthe mind thatthe value of philosophy is to be found; and only these ‘who are not indiferent to these goods can be persuaded tht the study of p= Tosophy is nor a-waste of time. Philosophy, lke all oter studies, aims primadly at knowledge, The Jnowledge i aims at is the Kind of mowledge which gives unity and systen to the body of the sciences, and the kind which rsuls from 2 excl exami antion of che grounds of out convicsions, prejudices, and beliefs. Butt eanrot ‘be maintained that philosoghy bas had tay very great measure of saccess in its tempts to provide definite answers to its quections. Hf you ask a mms matician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of lotming, what de nite body of tuts has been ascertained by his science, his answer Will lst 5 Jong 28 you aze willing to stra. Bor if you pu the same question t a philsa- het, he Will if be is candid, have to confess that bie study bas ot achieved positive xeaits sch as have been achieved by other exioace. Ito te that {his is petly accounted for by th face tha, as s9on a defizite Knowledge cca ceming any subject Becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philos- ‘ply, and becomes a separate science. The whole study ofthe heavens, which snow belongs to astronomy, was once iaehided in philosophy; Newaon’s erst work was called “the mathematical principles of manuel philesoohy” Sini- Jarly, the sady of the hnman mind, which was, unl very lately, apart of phic losopiy, has now been separated from philosophy and has become the seen of psychology. Thus, to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is mrs apparent than real: ‘those questions Which are slready capable of defite answers are placed in the sciences, while those oaly to which, at present, n0 definite answer can be given, remain o form the residue which is cal Philosophy. ‘This is, however, only a pat of the truth conceming the uncertainty of philecepay. Thee aro many questions—end among them those that are af be profeundestiterest to ou spszuallife—which, so far as we can se, mst = rain inscluble fo the humen intellect unless its powers become of quite a af erent order from what they aro now. Hes the usivece any unity of plan ot ‘Purpose, or is it a formitous concourse of atoms? Ts consciousness a pectse ent pert of the universe, giving hope of indeGikte growth in wisdom, ore it & wanstory accident on @ small planet cn whieh life mast ultimately beoone ‘impossible? Are good and evil of importance to the universe or oaly to man? 48 The Value of Phtiosopny Soch questions are asked by philosophy, and variously answered by vous plilosophers. But it would soem that, vbetber answers be otherwise discover: fle or no, te answers suggested by philosophy are nooo of them deman- strably tue. Yet, owever slight may te tbe hope of discovering an answer, i is part of the business of philesopiy to continue the consideration of suck

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