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Geo-societal Narratives
Contextualising geosciences
Edited by
Martin Bohle
Eduardo Marone
Geo-societal Narratives
Martin Bohle • Eduardo Marone
Editors

Geo-societal
Narratives
Contextualising geosciences
Editors
Martin Bohle Eduardo Marone
Ronin Institute for Independent International Association for
Scholarship Promoting Geoethics (IAPG)
Montclair, NJ, USA Rome, Italy
International Association for Centre for Marine Studies
Promoting Geoethics (IAPG) Federal University of Paraná
Rome, Italy Curitiba, Brazil
International Ocean Institute Training
Center for Latin America and the
Caribbean (IOITCLAC)
Pontal do Paraná, Brazil

ISBN 978-3-030-79027-1    ISBN 978-3-030-79028-8 (eBook)


https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79028-8

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-
tional affiliations.

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
This book is dedicated to the philosopher and physicist Mario Bunge
(1919–2020). He inspired us with his imperative ‘Enjoy life and help live’.
We learnt from him the rebellious character of philosophy and how much it
must be linked with the best of up-to-date science. He also inspired us to edit
this book, following his idea of a morally neutral science but reminding us
that social science shows that some moral codes are better than others. We are
happy with his call to give society something in exchange for the education
we were getting. Engaged by Bunge’s vision of tolerance regarding all
authentic philosophies, we wish to promote a rational debate among them.
As big questions come in bundles, we tried to tackle them systematically and
systemically because:
A philosophy without ontology is invertebrate; it is acephalous without
epistemology, confused without semantics, and limbless without
axiology, praxeology, and ethics.(i)
The Editors, 31 March 2021
(i) Bunge, M. (2016). Between Two Worlds: Memoirs of a Philosopher-­
Scientist. Springer Biographies, Springer, 496 p. (p. 406).
The dedication uses excerpts from an interview published online at
Wissenschaft & Kommunikation (https://a-­g-­i-­l.de/mario-­bunge-­the-­big-­
questions-­come-­in-­bundles-­not-­one-­at-­time/) by H.W. Droste (accessed 23
February 2021).
Foreword

Geosciences, in the sense of the science of the Earth system, have many
roots with a variety of cultures, perceptions of what role the science should
and does play, how its internal organisation is set up, how the interaction
with neighbouring fields takes place, and, in particular, how the sciences
are responding to societal expectation, and how they perceive their role in
guiding societies in making the world a better place.
The classical field of geosciences is geology, which helped understand
how Earth came into its present being and what massive changes it has
undergone. The timescales of these geological dynamics are usually very
long, and people with their relatively brief history have no role in these
dynamics. However, the added value of geological knowledge in assessing
significant geo-risks and providing access to minerals and energy is of
immediate importance to societies.
Another classical field of geoscience is geography, which deals primarily
with the inhabited world. It is the traditional field, dealing with the inter-
action of Earth and people, less so as biological species than carriers of
culture, and giving people meaning of the Earth. For a long time, it was
mostly a description of stationary conditions, as manifested in climatic
determinism concepts, but also of significant importance to history and
policymaking, for instance, when linked to colonialism.
At the other end of natural sciences, contributing to Earth science are
biology and ecosystem sciences, which have unveiled a wonderland of
complexity, non-linearity and high-dimensionality of ecosystems and their
responses to not only anthropogenic pressures. Their timescales are pri-
marily of the order of a few years, sometimes several decades of years.

vii
viii FOREWORD

These sciences have contributed to shifting at the centre of public


attention the societal concern towards the state and change of the envi-
ronment, at least in the West. Examples include the Club-of-Rome pro-
cess, with the expectation of running out of resources, with
Waldsterben (perishing of forests because of acid rain) and the expectation
of accelerating extinctions, the opposition to the use of nuclear energy.
Usually, humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), in this book referred to ‘people-­
sciences’, were hardly involved. The self-role of humanities to act as critical
commentators and sense-makers mainly was compromised by an adher-
ence to the Zeitgeist. However, science and technology studies (STS)
emerged and began to understand natural sciences, as done by actors, that
sciences are social processes [1].
The situation changed when climate science began its ascent. Driven
primarily by theoretical physicists, supported by meteorologists and ocean-
ographers, this field developed vigorously and quickly—and has increas-
ingly attracted the curiosity and attention of the public. The advent of the
IPCC1 process accelerated the career of the climate change topic to
become a central global political issue, with regular UN conference ‘of the
Parties’, large and ubiquitous demonstration of Western youth, and an
uninterrupted flow of commercial references that whatever product of
daily life is ‘climate-friendly’ or even ‘climate-neutral’.
The tasks of determining what the ongoing climate change looks like,
how it is consistently explained (namely by the continued release of green-
house gases into the atmosphere), and what the future may look like have
since been answered and documented in the series of IPCC reports. Since
then, more and other questions have arisen as to what could be the impact
of these changes on ecosystems and societies, which measures are available
to limit climate change, and which measure would allow meeting the cel-
ebrated ‘Paris goal’ of a maximum change of 1.5–2 °C by 2100.
Consistent with this development, climate science found itself in a crisis
of uncertainty about the added value that science provides to society to
decide policies. While myriad challenging scientific issues remain, such as
palaeoclimatology, theoretical issues of turbulence, the modelling of
marine and terrestrial ecosystems, or ongoing and future monitoring of
details of climate change and its impact, the community is losing its grip
on the public narrative, which drives (primarily Western) societies and
national as well as international policies.

1
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
FOREWORD ix

It is demonstrated by a series of ad hoc and certainly not representative


surveys among students and scholars during the past five years. They were
asked what they considered was the main task of the climate science com-
munity [2]. The observed differences may reflect different attitudes in the
cultures of people and disciplines, but they may also be due to differences
in timing, age groups or random variations. The main result is that the
genuinely scientific task is ticked off only rarely. Only the Chinese sample
focuses on that option, but this choice receives the least attention in all
European samples. Thus, in the various disciplinary groups, the scientific
dimension does not attain much attention any more, but instead, ‘solve’
and ‘motivate’ are considered priorities. In the two samples drawn from
geology and environmental studies, the search for solutions is the focus,
while in climate science and geology, the majority understands the politi-
cal dimension as the main task.
Obviously, the added value of climate science increasingly turning into
Earth system science is unclear for students and young scholars.
It is in this field that the issue of geoethics is getting significant. What
the term geoethics stands for, the webpage2 of the International Association
for Promoting Geoethics informs [3]:

– Geoethics consists of research and reflection on the values which underpin


appropriate behaviours and practices, wherever human activities interact
with the Earth system.
– Geoethics deals with the ethical, social and cultural implications of geoscience
knowledge, education, research, practice and communication, providing a
point of intersection for Geosciences, Sociology, Philosophy and Economy.
– Geoethics represents an opportunity for geoscientists to become more conscious
of their social role and responsibilities in conducting their activity.

Obviously, this is a big challenge, with a variety of issues, such as what


‘knowledge’ represents, what ‘geoscience knowledge’ covers, how to avoid a
Western-centred and thus postcolonial determination of ‘ethical, social
and cultural implications’, and how to overcome simplistic and naïve
views of natural scientists about societal dynamics.
This book makes a foray into this field of challenges. It will hopefully
help build a science-society interaction, which abstains from populisms,
helps maintain scientific norms (such as Merton’s CUDOS, [4]) while

2
https://www.geoethics.org/definition.
x FOREWORD

allowing the rational use of scientific insights when designing policies,


without downgrading the understanding that democracy lives from choos-
ing between options based on different societal values and interests.
On the other hand, it is not only how the achievements of geosciences
can make this world a better place, but also how to withstand the tempta-
tion to violate scientific norms to have a more substantial impact on the
political Willensbildung (decision making) by accepting scientific knowl-
edge claims prematurely, and at the same time downplaying caveats or
masking specific ideas and concepts.

Hamburg, Germany Hans von Storch


21 December 2020

References
1. Pielke, R. A. (2007). The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in
Policy and Politic. Cambridge University Press.
2. von Storch, H., Chen, X.-E., Pfau-Effinger, B., et al. (2019). Attitudes
of Young Scholars in Qingdao and Hamburg About Climate Change
and Climate Policy – The Role of Culture for the Explanation of
Differences. Advances in Climate Change Research, 10, 158–164.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accre.2019.04.001 and
von Storch, H. (2020). Surveying Opinions Among Environmental
Students on Climate Science and Baltic Sea Issues. Extended abstract,
3rd Baltic Earth Conference, 190–191.
3. Di Capua, G., Peppoloni, S., & Bobrowsky, P. (2017). The Cape Town
Statement on Geoethics. Annals of Geophysics, 60, 1–6. https://doi.
org/10.4401/ag-­7553
4. Bray, D., & von Storch, H. (2017). The Normative Orientations of
Climate Scientists. Science and Engineering Ethics, 23, 1351–1367.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-­014-­9605-­1
Preface

Contemporary societies massively apply geosciences know-how in busi-


ness, public undertakings and cultural activities. Therefore, this book tries
to initiate an exchange between scholars in ‘Earth sciences’ (geosciences)
and ‘People sciences’ [1], also, as said in the foreword, “to overcome simplis-
tic and naïve views of natural scientists about societal dynamics”. Geoscience
expertise needs comprehensive backing from understanding the social and
political facets of the human condition [2], respectively, human planet [3].
In times of anthropogenic global change, geoscience expertise shall
enable people to take care of seven-billion-plus fellow humans.
Consequently, scholars in ‘Earth sciences’ and ‘People sciences’ must coop-
erate to understand the societal contexts of the geosciences [4]. So far, and
like scientists from other disciplines, professional geoscientists have
engaged with the concept of ‘responsible science’ [5]. They studied the
social-ecological relevance of their discipline, what some [6] call ‘geoeth-
ics’. To strengthen these studies, here we propose a cross-disciplinary
exchange. ‘People scientists’ and ‘Earth scientists’, working together with-
out trespassing and in epistemic cooperation, offer narratives of various
philosophical, applied or political subjects to outline an interdisciplinary
inquiry.
Finally, some words to contextualise the book’s writing: The group of
authors was assembled in late 2019. The outlay of the book was agreed

xi
xii PREFACE

upon in early 2020. Although the essays relate only occasionally to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the turmoil of the years 2020–2021 stretched our
imagination [7].

Versmold, Germany Martin Bohle


Curitiba, Brazil  Eduardo Marone

References
1. Castree, N. (2017). Speaking for the ‘People Disciplines’: Global Change
Science and Its Human Dimensions. The Anthropocene Review, 4, 160–182.
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053019617734249
2. Hamilton, C. (2017). Defiant Earth – The Fate of Humans in the Anthropocene.
Wiley, Polity Press.
3. Lewis, S. L., & Maslin, M. A. (2018). The Human Planet – How We Created
the Anthropocene. Penguin Random House.
4. Bohle, M., Preiser, R., Di Capua, G., et al. (2019). Exploring Geoethics – Ethical
Implications, Societal Contexts, and Professional Obligations of the Geosciences.
Springer International Publishing.
5. United Nations. (2013). World Social Science Report 2013. OECD Publishing.
6. Peppoloni, S., & Di Capua, G. (2015). The Meaning of Geoethics. In M. Wyss
& S. Peppoloni (Ed.), Geoethics (pp. 3–14). Elsevier.
7. Marone, E., & Bohle, M. (2020). Geoethics for Nudging Human Practices in
Times of Pandemics. Sustainability, 12, 7271. https://doi.org/10.3390/
su12187271
Acknowledgements

The editors would like to express their pleasure that this book became
possible. Happily, the co-authors were willing to cooperate, although they
never met face to face due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Most co-authors’
scientific networks were segregated from each other before the publication
project. More than half of the connections among them went through the
editors’ weak links on (scientific) social media platforms. The low fre-
quency of mutual citations in previous works, often the mere absence of
mutual citations, is a strong indicator of intellectual spread. A simple anal-
ysis of past cooperation indicates less than two bilateral links between
authors. The number drops below one when the editors are excluded from
the analysis. Therefore, the editors would like to thank all co-authors for
their willingness to engage in cooperation with unknown peers.
Correspondingly, the authors want to thank the publisher’s editors for
their trust in this untested partnership.
The editors believed this endeavour was possible. The International
Association for Promoting Geoethics (IAPG) offers an “intellectual dia-
logue space to reflect across disciplinary boundaries about the huge challenges
the Anthropocene is creating to planetary ecosystem structures and processes
and climate change while steering the course from analysis towards remedial
action and sustainability transitions” (personal communication
C.E. Nauen). Within this wider frame, Tony Milligan thanks Elise Haja
(language advisor) and the team members of the Cosmological Visionaries
project at King’s College London for improving comments and Jan
Kunnas for a helpful scepticism about a key claim. Vincent Blok would like
to thank Pieter Lemmens and Jochem Zwier for our fruitful discussions

xiii
xiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

about Morton’s criticism of the world. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath acknowl-


edges his colleagues’ helpful scrutiny at the Max Weber Centre for
Advanced Cultural and Social Studies. The editors are grateful for the help
of Elise Haja. She adventured into understanding diverse shades of
English, the content of various schools of thought, and commenting on
what she found. Finally, as for any cooperative effort, success depends also
on friends and family members in a manner difficult to measure—in the
first line, the understanding partners.
About the Book

What is the didactic idea of this book? So far, geoscientists engaged with
the implications of ‘responsible science’ on their own. However, studying
the societal relevance of geosciences requires the interaction of Earth-
sciences/geosciences and people sciences, that is, the social sciences, polit-
ical sciences and humanities. Therefore, this book gathers scholars from
the people sciences to join geoscientists in studying geosciences’ societal
contexts. In that sense, this book offers an antithesis to simplistic views of
societal geo-dynamics (see Foreword).
What is the methodology of this book? The editors created an environ-
ment to extract novel ideas. They gathered a diverse group of authors
who, so far, did not cooperate. Ideas and opinions are juxtaposed, for
example, how to approach anthropocentrism in the Anthropocene. As
sketched in the first chapter, the emphasis was on breaking new ground in
a common quest for ‘societal geosciences’.
To contextualise the book’s writing further: The authors wrote their
essays during the first year of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. It was a unique,
thought-provoking circumstance that permeated the undertaking without
overwhelming the underlying didactic and methodology.
Contents

Why Geo-societal Narratives?  1


Martin Bohle and Eduardo Marone


Current Definition and Vision of Geoethics 17
Silvia Peppoloni and Giuseppe Di Capua


Geoethics Beyond Enmeshment: Critical Reflections on the
Post-humanist Position in the Anthropocene 29
Vincent Blok


After the Permafrost: A Provisional Outline 55
Tony Milligan

 Critique of (Weak) Anthropocentric Geoethics 67


A
Giovanni Frigo and Luiz A. Ifanger


Exploring the Relevance of the Spiritual Dimension of
Noosphere in Geoethics 81
Francesc Bellaubi


How to Promote Responsible Conducts Towards the
Environment: A Semiotic Cultural Psychological Analysis 91
Alessia Rochira and Sergio Salvatore

xvii
xviii Contents

 Copernican Moment: Engaging Economic Ethics in


A
Orchestrating the Geocentric Turn in Economics105
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath


Geoethics: A Reality Check from Media Coverage of the
Anthropocene127
Leslie Sklair


Geoethics Versus Geopolitics. Shoring up the Nation in the
Anthropocene Cul-de-sac135
Daniele Conversi


Sustainable Small-Scale Fishing and Artisanal Mining Need
Policies Favourable to a Level Playing Field153
Cornelia E. Nauen


Climate Change, Uncertainty and Ethical Superstorms167
Jan Kunnas


GAIA’s Futures in the Anthropocene: A Call for Evolutionary
Leadership179
Claire Nelson


Geo-scientific Culture and Geoethics191
Gabor Mihaly Nagy and Martin Bohle


Humanistic Geosciences: A Cultural and Educational
Construction201
Eduardo Marone and Mario Bouzo


Geosciences and Geoethics in Transition: Research
Perspectives from Ethics and Philosophy of Science—A
Commentary213
Thomas Potthast

Index217
Notes on Contributors

Francesc Bellaubi is a researcher and senior advisor in natural resources


governance and environmental planning and policymaking, geoethics and
integrity. With a background in geology and mine engineering and a PhD
in Natural Sciences, he is a senior researcher at South Ural State University
and partner at Silene, a non-profit association based in Catalonia, Spain,
aimed at the study, dissemination and promotion of the spiritual and
intangible cultural heritage values inherent in nature, particularly concern-
ing the conservation of nature and natural protected areas.
Vincent Blok is an associate professor at the Philosophy Group,
Wageningen University (The Netherlands). In 2005 he received his PhD
in Philosophy at Leiden University with a specialisation in philosophy of
technology. He is involved in several (European) research projects at the
crossroads of environmental philosophy, philosophy of technology and
responsible innovation. His books include Ernst Jünger’s Philosophy of
Technology: Heidegger and the Poetics of the Anthropocene (2017) and
Heidegger’s Concept of Philosophical Method: Innovating Philosophy in the
Age of Global Warming (2020).
Martin Bohle was affiliated from 1991 to 2019 with the Directorate
General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) of the European
Commission. He worked in operational and executive functions and as an
advisor to senior management. Before these experiences in science man-
agement, he worked at the University of Hamburg (Germany) and the
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (PhD 1986, Switzerland).
He published works on the dynamics of coastal seas and lakes and

xix
xx NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

how to explore such systems for sustainable use. He got trained as a


physical oceanographer (Kiel University, Germany, 1980). As a
retired EU official (2019), he is authorised to be affiliated with the
International Association for Promoting Geoethics (IAPG, Rome,
Italy) and the Ronin Institute for Independent Scholarship
(Montclair, NJ, USA). He is a lifetime member of the European
Geosciences Union and the American Geophysical Union;
ResearchGate: D-4508-2014, ORCID: 0000-0002-8794-5810. He
publishes works, since 2015, on geoethics and societal features of
geosciences.
Mario Bouzo holds degrees in Philosophy from the Universidad Nacional
de Cuyo, Argentina, and did his postgraduate studies in Germany. Apart
from teaching philosophy, he worked as the State Secretary of Education.
He is the director of the Instituto Superior de Enseñanza Privada
(Mendoza, Argentina). He is responsible for secondary level educa-
tion, which offers a programme that combines social sciences, humanities,
economy and management.
Daniele Conversi works at the Universidad del País Vasco / Euskal
Herriko Unibertsitatea, Ikerbasque–Basque Foundation for Science.
Conversi researches on climate change and society, socio/political theory,
comparative democratisation and theory of nationalism. His projects
include ‘Cultural Homogenisation and Nation-Statism’, ‘Climate
Change, Culture Change’, ‘Democracy, Nationalism and Peace’ and the
‘Federalization of Spain’.
Giuseppe Di Capua is a research geologist at the Italian Institute of
Geophysics and Volcanology. His scientific activity covers the fields of
engineering geology, geohazards, georisks and geoethics. He develops
research on theoretical and practical aspects of geoethics, in particular, on
issues of sustainable and responsible use of georesources, and prevention
from natural risks. He is a founding member and treasurer of the
International Association for Promoting Geoethics; team/task leader
and member of the International Advisory Boards of European
Projects (such as ENVRIplus, EPOS SP, INTERMIN and SMART
Exploration); editor and author of books and articles on geoethics;
webmaster; member of the publications committee of the International
Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS); and member of the editorial board
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xxi

of the journal EPISODES. He is co-author of ‘The Cape Town Statement


on Geoethics’ and the White Paper on Responsible Mining.
Giovanni Frigo is an environmental ethicist working as a postdoctoral
researcher in the Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis
(ITAS) at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Germany. He pur-
sued his BA in Philosophy and MA in Ethics at the University of
Verona, Italy, and the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in
Paris, France. He holds a PhD in Environmental Ethics and a gradu-
ate certificate in Energy Engineering from the University of North
Texas (UNT), USA. Frigo’s interdisciplinary research aims to study the
links between ethics, ecological sciences and energy transitions.
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath has degrees in economics and Chinese stud-
ies. His primary fields of research are economics and philosophy, institu-
tional change and economic development, international economics and
Chinese economy and culture, resulting in cross-disciplinary publications
in economics, humanities and sciences. He is a transdisciplinary researcher
aiming at a synthesis of the humanities and the sciences by taking econom-
ics as the interface. He is concentrating on elaborating the normative and
political implications, resulting in a critical theory of economics.
Luis A. Ifanger is a PhD candidate at the programme of Teaching and
History of Earth Sciences in the Institute of Geosciences at the University
of Campinas, Sao Paulo, Brazil. His background is in Earth sciences and
environmental education, which he developed at the University of Sao
Paulo (USP), Brazil. In 2017, he was a visiting scholar in both the Center
for Environmental Philosophy and the Department of Philosophy and
Religion at the University of North Texas (UNT). His research investi-
gates the intersections between geoscience education and environmental
ethics with a stress on the role of ethics in environmental education.
Jan Kunnas is a writer and entrepreneur whose aim is to help companies
to find their path in the continually changing landscape of the
Anthropocene. He was a postdoctoral researcher in the project Mistra
Arctic Sustainable Development, studying the development of forest laws
in Finland and Sweden and their execution in the Arctic. He is a researcher
at the School of Resource Wisdom of the University of Jyväskylä.
Eduardo Marone did his postdoctoral work at the Istituto Nazionale di
Oceanografia e di Geofisica Sperimentale, Trieste, Italy, in 2010–2011,
xxii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

having completed his doctorate in oceanography (physical oceanography)


at the University of São Paulo in 1991, and undergraduate and graduate
studies in physics at the Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Argentina. He
is a full professor at the Federal University of Paraná, which he joined in
1991. He was Vice-Director and Director of the Center for Marine Studies
and Head of the Civil Engineering Course, being Director of the
International Ocean Institute Training Centre for Latin America at the
Caribbean and the Brazilian section of the International Association for
the Promoting of Geoethics, and actual deputy-chief of the undergraduate
course on oceanography. He participated in international working groups
of SCOR, IOC/UNESCO and others. He was vice-chair of the Coastal
GOOS Programme Panel of IOC (C-GOOS), associate researcher of the
International Center for Theoretical Physics and member of the
Millennium Assessment as a leading author.
Tony Milligan is an ethicist with a specialisation in space and our human
future. He is the author of various books, including Nobody Owns the
Moon (2015), the co-editor of the White Paper on Astrobiology and
Society in Europe Today (2018) and co-editor of The Ethics of Space
Exploration (2016). In September 2020 he took up the position of senior
researcher on the Cosmological Visionaries: Shamans, Scientists, and
Climate Change at the Ethnic Borderlands of China and Russia proj-
ect. The project will carry out research in Siberia and Southwest China
and be based out of King’s College London and the University of
Manchester.
Gabor Mihaly Nagy is the principal adviser on ‘Knowledge Management’
in the Publications Office of the EU. Previously, he was an adviser on
‘Scientific Culture’ in DG R&I of the European Commission. He was also
head of unit coordinating the management of calls of the ERC (European
Research Council). For almost two years, he also served as head of the
Scientific Department of ERCEA (European Research Council Executive
Agency). Before joining the European Commission in 2007, Nagy was
head of department in the KFKI Atomic Energy Research Institute
(Budapest, Hungary) and authored numerous publications in physical
chemistry and material sciences.
Cornelia E. Nauen holds a PhD in Fisheries Science/Marine Ecology
from Kiel University, Germany. She worked in FAO’s Fisheries Department
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xxiii

and, since 1986, in the development cooperation department and


later in international science cooperation of the European
Commission. Since 2010 she heads the international non-profit asso-
ciation Mundus maris—Sciences and Arts for Sustainability, regis-
tered in Belgium. Mundus maris seeks to combine scientific concepts
with participatory research, arts and practice embedded in local,
mixed and global cultural spaces in Africa, Europe and elsewhere. She is
also chair of the board of trustees of the scientific non-profit Quantitative
Aquatics, Inc (Q-quatics), based in the Philippines, that maintains and
develops such global biodiversity databases as FishBase and SeaLifeBase.
Her research interests focus on sustainable small-­ scale fisheries (SSF),
including the essential gender dimension. She supports the implementa-
tion of the SSF Guidelines as part of the Sustainable Development Goals
of the UN. She sees critically engaged science and arts as among the most
promising approaches to support transitions for sustainable living, thus
supporting active participation of citizens and private and civil society
organisations as well as governments at various levels.
Claire Nelson is ideation leader of the Futures Forum, a research and
education practice that is specialising in bringing the power of strategic
foresight, the discipline of sustainability engineering and the art of story-
telling to complex challenges facing organisations and communities.
Before establishing the Futures Forum, Nelson was a senior develop-
ment equity specialist at the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB). She served as a thought leader in promoting strategic fore-
sight in development and pioneered the topic of development with equity
for people of African descent in Latin America. A sought-after speaker,
award-winning writer and founder of the Institute of Caribbean Studies,
the leading Caribbean American advocacy organisation, she also serves on
the editorial advisory board of the World Future Review and Journal of
Futures Studies and is a member of the World Futures Studies Federation
and Association of Professional Futurists. Her many awards for leadership
include the Ortiz Mena Award for Leadership (IADB), an Outstanding
Alumni Award (Purdue), and being named a White House Champion of
Change. She holds a bachelor’s degree and a master’s in Industrial
Engineering and a PhD in Engineering Management. She is distinguished
as the first Jamaican woman to earn a doctorate in an engineering disci-
pline and is a fellow of multiple Salzburg Global Seminar programmes.
xxiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Silvia Peppoloni is a PhD geologist and a researcher at the Italian


Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology. Her scientific activity covers the
fields of geomorphology, engineering geology, georisks, geoeducation and
geoscience communication. She is fully involved in the base research
on geoethics, focusing on ethical, social and cultural implications of
geoscience knowledge, research and practice. She is adjunct professor
at the University of Rome “Sapienza” (2008–2011), founding member
and current Secretary-General of the International Association for
Promoting Geoethics (IAPG), a councillor of the International Union of
Geological Sciences (IUGS; 2018–2022), member of boards of several
geoscience organisations (among them, the International Council for
Philosophy, or ICPHS, and International Association of Engineering
Geology Italia, or IAEG), work package/task leader and member of the
International Advisory Boards of H2020 European projects (such as
ENVRIplus, EPOS SP and ENGIE projects), and author and editor of
books and articles on geoethics. She was awarded in Italy for Science
Communication and Naturalistic Literature. She is co-author of the
‘Geoethical Promise’ and ‘The Cape Town Statement on Geoethics’.
Thomas Potthast is Full Professor of Ethics, Philosophy and History of
the Life Sciences, in the Faculty of Mathematics and Science, and
Co-director of the International Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and
Humanities (IZEW) of the University of Tübingen, Germany. He studied
biology (Diploma 1993) and philosophy at Freiburg, Germany, followed
by a PhD at Tübingen (1998) with a study on links between evolutionary
biology, ecology and environmental ethics. His postdoctoral studies were
undertaken at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin
(1998–2001), followed by a Humboldt Foundation fellowship at the
University of Madison-­Wisconsin, Department of History of Science, and
Centre for Environmental Studies. His research and teaching are based on
moral philosophy, philosophy of science and environmental philosophy;
he deals in ethical and epistemological dimensions of the sciences and
humanities, also addressing conceptual and practical questions of interdis-
ciplinary and transdisciplinary practice at the science-society interface,
with a particular focus on the life sciences, biodiversity and sustainable
development.
Alessia Rochira is an assistant researcher in social psychology at the
University of Salento, Department of History Society and Human Studies.
She holds a PhD in Community Psychology from the University of Salento
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xxv

and a European PhD in Social Representations and Communication from


the La Sapienza University of Rome. Her research is based on a social and
community psychology background, yet with a robust interdisciplinary
attitude. She researched the topic of justice and legal compliance and,
more recently, her research interests cover the analysis of the psychosocial
processes related to migration and acculturation, community resilience,
sense of community and respect for diversity within territorial
communities.
Sergio Salvatore was Professor of Dynamic Psychology at the University
of Salento (2008–2012) and is working as a professor at La Sapienza
Università di Roma. His scientific interests regard the psychodynamic and
semiotic theorisation of mental phenomena and the methodology of ana-
lysing psychological processes as field dependent dynamics. He also
takes an interest in the theory and analysis of psychological intervention in
clinical, scholastic, organisational and social fields. He has designed and
managed various scientific projects on these issues and published more
than 200 works. He is associate editor of Integrative Psychological and
Behavioral Science; Research in Psychotherapy: Psychopathology, Process and
Outcome; and RPC Rivista Psicologia Clinical-­ Review of Clinical
Psychology.
Leslie Sklair is Emeritus Professor of Sociology, London School of
Economics. He has published widely in sociological theory and the sociol-
ogy of development and has been a consultant to the United Nations
Centre on Transnational Corporations. In the 1980s, he carried out field
research on the developmental impacts of foreign investment in
Ireland, Egypt and (more intensively) China and Mexico. His works
provided the material basis for Sociology of the Global System (published
1991, second updated edition in 1995, translated into Portuguese,
Spanish, Japanese, Persian and Korean). He held various visiting profes-
sorships and lectured at universities and conferences in the UK, Europe,
North, Central and South America, Egypt, China, Hong Kong, Korea,
Australia and Jamaica.
Why Geo-societal Narratives?

Martin Bohle and Eduardo Marone

1   Introduction
This book, Geo-societal Narratives: Contextualising Geosciences, gathers
studies of scholars of the people-sciences [1] and geosciences. Hence,
scholars from the social sciences, political sciences and humanities join
geoscientists in studying societal contexts of the geosciences [2].
This introduction is a scaffold to situate the essays that form this book.
Each essay brings a fresh perspective challenging the reader to discover
another societal context of the geosciences. The subjects range from phil-
osophical questions that address the foundations of geoethics to issues
related to human sense-making and political relevance inherent to

M. Bohle (*)
Ronin Institute for Independent Scholarship, Montclair, NJ, USA
International Association for Promoting Geoethics (IAPG), Rome, Italy
e-mail: martin.bohle@ronininstitute.org
E. Marone
International Association for Promoting Geoethics (IAPG), Rome, Italy
Centre for Marine Studies, Federal University of Paraná, Curitiba, Brazil
International Ocean Institute Training Center for Latin America and the
Caribbean (IOITCLAC), Pontal do Paraná, Brazil

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1


Switzerland AG 2021
M. Bohle, E. Marone (eds.), Geo-societal Narratives,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79028-8_1
2 M. BOHLE AND E. MARONE

geoscience practices. The essays also address outlooks for possible futures
and broader perspectives, such as scientific culture, education and philoso-
phy of science. Together these essays point to a research subject that may
be called tentatively ‘societal geosciences’.
To situate geosciences vis-à-vis the people-sciences: geoscientists are
professionals in how, for example, a habitable Earth has developed [3].
Less metaphorically, geosciences are “a range of applied and fundamental
research fields, as well as related engineering disciplines and commercial
undertakings. Together, they address the functioning of the Earth, the inter-
sections of Earth and human systems, as well as the extraction and use of
(abiotic) natural resources” ([4], p. 171). That is, geosciences (or Earth
sciences) are distinct, although related to geography. The relationship of
both disciplines tightens with the degree of studying societal practices as
part of the Earth system, and the border zones of geosciences and geogra-
phy are somewhat arbitrary [4]. With that caveat, the notions ‘geosciences’
and ‘geoethics’ are applied in the book, acknowledging studies of ‘ethics in
geography’ as a distinct subject [5].

2   Geosciences, Societal Contexts and Geoethics


As experience shows, geoscientific knowledge easily seeps into human
practice because it is application-oriented and context-dependent. Artisans,
technicians, architects or engineers all use geoscientific expertise. They
apply it, for example, to create artefacts or to alter natural environments.
Examples may be mineral extraction, laying the foundation for buildings
or managing floodplains. In like manner, Earth has always been used as a
reference by artists, poets or philosophers striving to reflect on human
identity. Several essays in this book (chapters “Geoethics Beyond Enmeshment:
Critical Reflections on the Post-humanist Position in the Anthropocene”,
“After the Permafrost: A Provisional Outline”, “A Critique of (Weak)
Anthropocentric Geoethics”, “Exploring the Relevance of the Spiritual
Dimension of Noosphere in Geoethics”, “Dealing with the Subjectivity Stance
of the Human-­Earth Interdependence. How to Promote Responsible Conducts
Towards the Environment: A Semiotic Cultural Psychological Analysis” and
“Humanistic Geosciences: A Cultural and Educational Construction”) wit-
ness human identity issues. Other essays point to social and political rela-
tionships, such as chapters “A Copernican Moment: Engaging Economic
Ethics in Orchestrating the Geocentric Turn in Economics”, “Geoethics: A
Reality Check from Media Coverage of the Anthropocene”, “Geoethics Versus
WHY GEO-SOCIETAL NARRATIVES? 3

Geopolitics. Shoring up the Nation in the Anthropocene Cul-­ de-­


sac”,
“Climate Change, Uncertainty and Ethical Superstorms”, “GAIA’s Futures
in the Anthropocene: A Call for Evolutionary Leadership” and “Geo-­
scientific Culture and Geoethics”. Chapters “Why Geo-­societal Narratives?”
and “Current Definition and Vision of Geoethics” attempt to aggregate
different perspectives of identity and philosophical relationships.
The recent studies of the societal contexts of geosciences form a distinct
nascent field of research [6]. Its scholars often label it as ‘geoethics’ (quite
a few write ‘Geoethics’); albeit, ethical and philosophical concepts in geo-
sciences also may be named differently [7, 8]. Geoethics within applied
ethics intersect environmental ethics, sustainability ethics, engineering
ethics, and professional ethics. However, it is not synonymous with them,
neither a super- nor sub-category [9]. Initially, geoethics was designed by
geoscientists to study responsible geoscience research and practice (deon-
tology). Like scientists from other disciplines, professional geoscientists
have engaged with the concept of ‘responsible science’ [10], that is, the
social-ecological relevance of their discipline. More recently, scholars
expanded geoethics into a sense-making tool for the human condition,
often phrased as the obligation of appropriate practices where and when
human activities interact with the Earth system. What that view implies
was already described by Peppoloni and Di Capua [11] some years ago. It
is summarised in the chapter “Current Definition and Vision of Geoethics”,
which also sketches latent horizons of thought about responsible geosci-
ences (i.e. geoethics).
By way of introduction to societal geosciences, including geoethics, five
observations are made to assist the reader:

• First, geosciences, including geoethics, are a product of Western cul-


ture. Over the last 500 years, the post-medieval European cultural
models mobilised gigantic physical, mental and economic resources
[12–14], also engaging (early) with the sciences of Earth [15, 16].
Nowadays, ample evidence has accumulated, showing that the given
societal practices of interventions into the Earth system are not sus-
tainable. Anthropogenic climate change is the main example.
However, the change of the global nitrogen cycle [17] is as illustra-
tive. It started before World War I (WWI) with the development of
industrial processes for the fixation of gaseous nitrogen [18].
4 M. BOHLE AND E. MARONE

Regarding geoethics, the wording of its definition, namely “human


activities interact with the Earth system” (pp. 4–5 in [11]), conveys a
basic concept of European origin—the ‘dichotomic stance’ of Nature
versus World [19, 20].
• Second, the word geoethics was first used thirty years ago, initially at
scientific conferences [21, 22] and later by international organisa-
tions of geoscientists [23], often describing geosciences as a service
to society [24, 25]. Also, the term geoethics was used to describe
Earth, Nature and World from various other perspectives, for exam-
ple, political sciences [26] or geography [27, 28]. Likewise, notions
like ‘geo-logic’ [8, 29] or ‘geographical ethics’ are used [30] instead.
Ethical thinking in other sciences (e.g. in forestry [31]) is analogous
to geoethics. Likewise, geoethics may amalgamate concepts like
environmental justice [32] or Gaian–ethics [33]. Finally, early pre-
cursors of geoethical thinking in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth
centuries can be identified [34, 35]. Furthermore, the term geoeth-
ics can carry a spontaneous (public) meaning [36]. At the onset of
the twenty-first century, these early and heterogeneous thoughts
lead to concepts [2] that gather a robust corpus of knowledge,
although more from science and geosciences and less from the
people-sciences.
• Third, meaningful human practices require affective sense-making
[37, 38]. Geoethics also conveys such [39]. Furthermore, the central
tenet of geoethics is the virtuous and responsible person (human
agent) who pursues a practice that is geosciences knowledge-based,
just, equitable, inclusive, participatory and ecologically oriented
[40]. Hence, other than cognitive insights, geoethics also offers aspi-
rational meaning, idealistic philosophical framing and affect-laden
description of what ought to be done. That, in turn, may cause
some,1 who, given the absence of socio-economic analyses, so far,
qualify that “the whole thing [geoethics] consists of an idealist-based
approach … the world is idealised as a sum of individual atoms deprived
of any social character and of any capability of social and collective
actions…”. Indeed, beyond cognitive and affective features of
­sense-­making, understanding how human sense-making functions

1
Anonymous review published in Quaternary (2019); https://www.mdpi.com/2571-
550X/2/2/19/review_report.
WHY GEO-SOCIETAL NARRATIVES? 5

also requires scrutiny of socio-economic and philosophical embed-


ding of human agency.
• Fourth, the Earth science community’s message [41, 42] that
humans may alter Earth’s physical dynamics has led to a very com-
mitted debate. In turn, geosciences were at the centre of a discussion
about humans, society and nature [43–45]. Alternative concepts,
other than Anthropocene [46] or Capitalocene [47], are proposed;
for example, Mother Earth/Gaia [48] or Ecomodernism [49].
When situated relative to those concepts, geoethics is a school of
thought that inclines towards anthropocentrism [50] since humans
are subject to obligations. Henceforth, the Anthropos should be at
the centre of any ethics of responsibility towards the fellow
human being.
• Fifth, within Western societies’ development over several centuries,
science evolved from a tiny elite’s activity to a massive societal
endeavour [51, 52]. Subsequently, the ethics of science gained rele-
vance—as deontology and a societal feature [53–55]. Related to that
area of research, explicit consideration of ethics in geosciences is a
relatively recent field [9, 56].

Drawing on these observations, it becomes clear that studying the soci-


etal relevance of geosciences requires the interaction of geosciences and
people-sciences. Such interactions happen in some academic geoscience
research sectors, like climate research, Earth-system sciences or
Anthropocene studies [57, 58]. However, and besides exceptions [59,
60], cross-disciplinary research [61] often is missing within the bulk of
academic, applied or commercial geosciences and their diverse applica-
tions, such as mining, engineering geology or hydrology to name only a
few [9].
Geoscience expertise enables people to take care of seven-billion-plus
fellow humans [62]. That is the tacit assumption that determined geoeth-
ics [40] and underlay the visions that geoethics may inspire [63].
Subsequently, geoscience expertise, including geoethics, needs under-
standing the social and political facets of the ‘human condition’ [64],
respectively, a ‘human planet’ [65], including the cautious reminder “to
overcome simplistic and naïve views of natural scientists about societal
dynamics” (Hans von Storch, Foreword, this book). In that sense, to com-
plement specific geoscience expertise, this book offers a humble initial
antidote to what otherwise would be a pretentious assumption.
6 M. BOHLE AND E. MARONE

3   How to Read the Book?


The description in the previous section sketches a very vast field of study.
Therefore, the readers should view the following essays as some pieces of
a much bigger puzzle. The essays offer mutually complementary narra-
tives. They add to other narratives about geo-societal contexts; see for
example [66–68] (and literature quoted therein). As a discipline like ‘geo-­
societal sciences’ (or ‘societal geosciences’) is missing, one could turn to
socio-environmental research [69] to borrow methodologies to analyse
geo-societal narratives. However, such an approach seems premature,
considering that this book attempts to gather such narratives. Therefore,
alternatively, a metaphor is presented here. It describes how to address the
following essays, each in its merit and mutual relationship. The metaphor
is taken from field-geology. Outcrops of rocks in the landscape indicate at
the surface the underground structure, the subsoil. Mutatis mutandis,
these essays are manifestations of a subsoil where geosciences and society
amalgamate. Hence, these essays are ‘geo-societal outcrops’ of a ‘geo-societal
subsoil’. Therefore, they should be examined like geologists analyse the
subsoil through outcrops of rocks. The concluding chapter of the book
(“Geosciences and Geoethics in Transition: Research Perspectives from Ethics
and Philosophy of Science—A Commentary”) sketches, in the form of a
commentary, how such an examination may be undertaken. The reader is
invited to trace back each and any contribution in this book from that
commentary.
Putting this metaphor into practice, the editors have attempted to cre-
ate a welcoming environment to extract ideas instead of encouraging only
a given set of views. Therefore, the book may surprise some readers with
ideas and opinions, sometimes convergent, often incomplete or at other
times divergent—for example, how to approach anthropocentrism. The
goal was to gather a diverse group of authors to deliberate about geoethi-
cal concepts. The ideas, opinions and content of each chapter belong to
the respective authors. The editors encouraged the authors to express
their ideas and opinions about and around the societal context of geosci-
ences for the benefit of the reader; the ‘geoethics approach’ was offered as a
possible mutual reference [70]. To position each of the essays a short
outline/summary of each of the chapters is given below:

• The second chapter, “Current Definition and Vision of Geoethics”,


describes the established conceptual stance of geoethics [40] and,
WHY GEO-SOCIETAL NARRATIVES? 7

subsequently, sketches potential new horizons [63]. It is written by


the geologists Silvia Peppoloni and Giuseppe Di Capua, who,
together with other geoscientists, drove the recent development of
geoethics. This chapter has a double role. On the one hand, the first
sections provide background about what currently is labelled as geo-
ethics (or ‘Geoethics’ with capital ‘G’). On the other hand, its later
sections sketch how geoethical thinking might evolve. In its essence,
this chapter indicates that shaping the concept of geoethics is a work
in progress. The chapter also profiles geoethical thinking as having
prominent aspirational and affective features to which chapters
“After the Permafrost: A Provisional Outline”, “A Critique of (Weak)
Anthropocentric Geoethics” and “Exploring the Relevance of the
Spiritual Dimension of Noosphere in Geoethics” refer. How affective
features relate to social sense-making and policy-making is illus-
trated, for example, in chapter “Dealing with the Subjectivity Stance
of the Human-­Earth Interdependence. How to Promote Responsible
Conducts Towards the Environment: A Semiotic Cultural Psychological
Analysis”.
• Geoethics operates with concepts like ‘agency’, ‘Earth system’ and
‘intervention’. Working with these concepts, the philosopher Vincent
Blok’s chapter “Geoethics Beyond Enmeshment: Critical Reflections on
the Post-humanist Position in the Anthropocene” tackles a basic tenet
of geoethics and, implicitly, scrutinises ideas of broad application
scopes in geoethics. He explores the conceptual separation or aggre-
gation of human activities and the (natural) Earth system. Vincent
Blok uses a critical review of a post-humanist position to illustrate the
intrinsic difficulties of aggregating human activities and the (natural)
Earth system in times of anthropogenic global change, the
Anthropocene. He gives one example that the philosophical founda-
tions of geoethics require scrutiny and should not be taken for
granted. He describes the asymmetry of the human condition as
‘being-in-the-world’ and ‘being-on-Earth’. In his view that double
condition makes humans in the Anthropocene act as ‘ born transgres-
sors’. Such features of the human condition shape the “human ethos
in general and geo-ethos in particular”.
• In the chapter “After the Permafrost: A Provisional Outline”, the phi-
losopher Tony Milligan studies how altering the physical integrity of
geo-heritages (in the Anthropocene) may shape human perceptions
of anthropogenically driven change, be it in building large infrastruc-
8 M. BOHLE AND E. MARONE

tures or causing climate change. Tony Milligan’s analysis scrutinises


some essentials and practices of geoethical thinking. More generally,
the chapter underscores how vital relational values, like integrity, are
for human attitudes towards geo-conservation [39].
• In the chapter “A Critique of (Weak) Anthropocentric Geoethics”,
Giovanni Frigo and Luis A. Ifanger, who are environmental ethicists,
analyse the language used in geoethical works. They point to hidden
concepts borrowed from the mainstream of Western cultures. The
authors notice a persistent (weak) anthropocentric approach and
propose instead an eco-centric perspective.
• Francesc Bellaubi is a mining engineer who studies spiritual and cul-
tural heritage. The chapter “Exploring the Relevance of the Spiritual
Dimension of the Noosphere in Geoethics” outlines how metaphysical
concepts may shape the virtuous behaviour of the individual human
agent; to recall, the virtuous individual human agent is the central
feature of geoethics.
• The cultural foundations of human behaviour do shape social sense-­
making and policy-making. Therefore, the chapter “Dealing with the
Subjectivity Stance of the Human-Earth Interdependence. How to
Promote Responsible Conducts Towards the Environment: A Semiotic
Cultural Psychological Analysis”, written by the psychologists Alessia
Rochira and Sergio Salvatore, describes how social practices enact
cultural meanings. They illustrate how such practices ground sense-­
making and policy-making, for example, promoting a geoethical
value setting. Conceptually, social practices should enact cognitive
insights, aspirational goals and affective features of geoethics.
• The economist Carsten Herrmann-Pillath develops, in the chapter
“A Copernican Moment: Engaging Economic Ethics in Orchestrating
the Geocentric Turn in Economics”, how to relate geoethical practices
to economics. Geoethical value setting could be applied to institu-
tions and rights to tune economic performance. The expected out-
come is an alternative, namely a geocentric economy. In turn, this
approach leads to a systemic operational framework to evaluate soci-
etal practices from an Earth system perspective.
• Geoethical thinking has little chance to achieve societal impact with-
out the public’s attention. Consequently, in the chapter “Geoethics: A
Reality Check from Media Coverage of the Anthropocene”, the sociolo-
gist Leslie Sklair analyses mass media for the occurrences of concepts
relating to the notions of ‘Anthropocene’ and ‘geoethics’. Although
WHY GEO-SOCIETAL NARRATIVES? 9

the intersection of both concepts is vital for the bearing of geoethics,


it is found to be feeble due to the lack of engagement, so far, of
scholars in both fields. Considering that geoethics is a nascent field
of study with a limited community, the finding is unsurprising but
indicates the scope of outreach actions that still need to be
undertaken.
• Daniele Conversi puts geosciences, including geoethics, into the
political sphere. The chapter “Geoethics Versus Geopolitics. Shoring up
the Nation in the Anthropocene Cul-de-sac” develops the relationship
between global change, geoethics, consumerism and nationalism.
Geoethical practice beyond professional geosciences will have to
handle political features effectively. Hence, such practices must con-
sider nationalism as a given issue of the political panorama while
focusing on alternative (geoethical) forms of community-building.
• Cornelia E. Nauen, an expert in fisheries science and marine ecology,
develops how artisanal fisheries’ experiences can inspire more effec-
tive artisanal mining practices. The chapter “Sustainable Small-Scale
Fishing and Artisanal Mining Need Policies Favourable to a Level
Playing Field” emphasises the interface between science and policies,
critical engagement with civil society groups, making research results
relevant in multi-agent decision-making processes, and, finally,
mutual learning from diverse knowledge.
• The chapter “Climate Change, Uncertainty and Ethical Superstorms”
by writer and entrepreneur Jan Kunnas investigates the ethics of
uncertainty and the responsibility of dealing with climate change in
an equitable way. His essay addresses an ‘open flank’ (one of several
[9] (pp. 8–11)) in the scholarship of geoethical thinking that aims to
go beyond geoscience professions’ deontology. Furthermore, Jan
Kunnas shows how ‘what is (geo-)ethical sound’ depends on the used
ethical framework.
• Claire Nelson, an expert in research and education strategy and
development policy, begs questions about leadership and sustainable
development. The chapter “GAIA’s Futures in the Anthropocene: A
Call for Leadership” visions the horizon of intellectual thought and
professional practice that geoethics may aim at, being conscious of
the implications of global anthropogenic change.
• The two chapters “Geo-scientific Culture and Geoethics” by Gabor
Nagy and Martin Bohle and “Humanistic Geosciences: A Cultural
and Educational Construction” by Eduardo Marone and Mario
10 M. BOHLE AND E. MARONE

Bouzo both take application perspectives of geoethics. These two


chapters are co-authored by the editors who refrain from summaris-
ing the book. Instead, the two co-authorships offer contributions to
the debate between scholars from geosciences and people-sciences.
Doing otherwise would be premature. An exception from this ‘cau-
tious retreat’ is Eduardo Marone and Mario Bouzo’s reflection about
the need for new and robust institutional and governance frame-
works for educating the next generation [71] as well as a new type of
ethical leadership, as Claire Nelson (chapter “GAIA’s Futures in the
Anthropocene: A Call for Evolutionary Leadership”) claims would
guide humanity to a ‘better world’ that the Earth and its future gen-
erations deserve.
• The last chapter, “Geosciences and Geoethics in Transition: Research
Perspectives from Ethics and Philosophy of Science—A Commentary”,
offers an outlook on research to be done. The philosopher Thomas
Potthast delineates a programme on how to challenge the binary
notion of natural science versus social science. He proposes to study
the epistemic-moral hybrids found in geosciences and people-­
sciences’ approaches to geosciences’ ethically sound practice.
Subsequently, research should explore how relational ethics might
get around the debates of anthropocentrism and its various counter-
parts, using a dialectical approach to avoid the unproductive binary
idea of a moral conflict narrated as ‘humans versus nature’.

4   To Contextualise the Book’s Writing


The group of authors was assembled in late 2019. The outlay of the book
was agreed upon in early 2020. The authors wrote their essays during the
first year of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Although the essays relate only
occasionally to the pandemic, it was a unique circumstance. The turmoil
of the years 2020/2021 stretches imagination and shapes new geo-­societal
narratives [72, 73]. Two years ago, the editors considered the notion
‘geosophy’ [74] to set a wider perimeter than the notion geoethics can pre-
scribe, a consideration which now seems even more valid [75] (p. 155,
quoting J. K. Wright ([74] p. 10), geography replaced by geoscience):
“My term is Geosophy, compounded from geo meaning ‘earth’ and sophia
meaning [wisdom]… Geosophy, to repeat, is the study of [geoscience] knowl-
edge from any or all points of view … Thus, it extends far beyond the core area
of scientific [geoscience] knowledge or of [geoscience] knowledge as otherwise
WHY GEO-SOCIETAL NARRATIVES? 11

systematised by [geoscientists]. Taking into account the whole peripheral


realm, it covers the [geoscience] ideas, both true and false, of all manner of
people—not only [geoscientists], but farmers and fishermen, business execu-
tives and poets, novelists and painters, Bedouins and [Khoikkois]2—and for
this reason, it necessarily has to do in large degree with subjective conceptions.
Indeed, even those parts of it that deal with [geoscience] must reckon with
human desires, motives, and prejudices, for unless I am mistaken, nowhere
are [geoscientists] more likely to be influenced by the subjective than in their
discussions of what [geoscience] is and ought to be.” Inspired by Wright’s
words it may be appropriate to investigate the notion geo-ethos3 as pro-
posed by Vincent Blok (see chapter “Geoethics Beyond Enmeshment:
Critical Reflections on the Post-­humanist Position in the Anthropocene”) fol-
lowing the research programme sketched by Thomas Potthast (see chapter
“Geosciences and Geoethics in Transition: Research Perspectives from Ethics
and Philosophy of Science—A Commentary”). This notion could label a
scientific culture conscious of the societal contexts of the geosciences, fos-
tering a geocentric economy (see chapter “A Copernican Moment:
Engaging Economic Ethics in Orchestrating the Geocentric Turn in
Economics”) and help geosciences practitioners to be aware of their socio-
ecological responsibilities.

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Current Definition and Vision of Geoethics

Silvia Peppoloni and Giuseppe Di Capua

1   Introduction
The primary purpose of this chapter is to highlight the evolution of geo-
ethical thinking. It starts from definitions and a description of principles
and values which connote its conceptual structure, finally supporting a
vision of an ‘ecological humanism’. That sketch from definition to vision
may give context to other perspectives that Geoethics has inspired, for
example, as those outlined in the following chapters.
By its definition, Geoethics considers human beings’ operational behav-
iour, both as individuals and social groups, in relation to the Earth system,
which is intended as a complex structure constituted by abiotic, biotic,
technological, and socio-cultural elements. Geoethics aims to identify
principles, values, and categories of reference to propose a synthesis
between different ideas and visions of the world.
The development of Geoethics was based on some essential
considerations:

S. Peppoloni (*) • G. Di Capua


Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia, Rome, Italy
IAPG—International Association for Promoting Geoethics, Rome, Italy
e-mail: silvia.peppoloni@ingv.it

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 17


Switzerland AG 2021
M. Bohle, E. Marone (eds.), Geo-societal Narratives,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79028-8_2
18 S. PEPPOLONI AND G. DI CAPUA

• Referring to socio-historical contexts, Homo sapiens by its intrinsic


nature creates and modifies its ecological niche [1]: this observation
led to introduce the concept of Anthropocene less than two decades
ago [2]. It is nowadays scientifically ascertained that human actions
have a profound impact [3–5] on social-ecological systems [6–8],
which is a monumental niche construction process [9] that leads to
negative planetary consequences, including pandemics [10].
• Considering geosciences, geoscientists’ expertise is essential for the
functioning of modern societies. It provides knowledge to identify
effective strategies and solutions to address global problems affecting
social-ecological systems and economic sustainability, exceeding eco-
logical tipping points [11], determining a self-sustained deteriora-
tion of the human operative space [12], and provoking a systemic
collapse of the planet habitability for human and other living species.
An effective Earth system management must consider planetary
boundaries [13] and those critical, interacting processes on the
planet that contribute to the stability and resilience of the Earth
system [14].
• Geoethics was an approach initially developed as professional ethics
(deontology) inside geosciences [15–17] to frame inquiries on the
responsible behaviour of geoscientists and the societal relevance of
geosciences [18, 19]. Over the years, the theoretical framework of
Geoethics has progressively enriched to include extra-professional
responsibilities towards society and the environment [20–23].

Currently, Geoethics is designed as an ethics of the human agent


towards the Earth system and a framework in decision-making processes.
Geoethics proposes a philosophical reflection and practices (individual and
collective human agents) that are potentially extendable to other parts of
society while respecting and implementing other people’s contribution
with diverse knowledge, experiences, and perspectives to face global prob-
lems [24, 25]. However, this wide diversity needs to be dealt with on a
common ethical basis, by defining a reasonable alignment of values (eco-
nomic, social, and moral) to minimise inevitable conflicting needs and
expectations among stakeholders, to overcome differences among various
social-ecological-cultural contexts, and to come to global ethics for an
increasingly globalised world [25].
The philosophy of geosciences (e.g. Geology [26]) provides distin-
guishing perspectives through the lens of geologic time and complex
CURRENT DEFINITION AND VISION OF GEOETHICS 19

systems to analyse Human-Earth system interactions. It highlights the


original contributions that Geoethics, grounded on the wealth of geosci-
ence knowledge [25], could give with respect to environmental ethics [27,
28] and engineering ethics [22–24].

2   Defining Geoethics


• Geoethics consists of research and reflection on the values which under-
pin appropriate behaviours and practices, wherever human activities
interact with the Earth system.
• Geoethics deals with the ethical, social, and cultural implications of geo-
science knowledge, research, practice, education, and communication,
and with the social role and responsibility of geoscientists in conducting
their activities.
• Geoethics encourages geoscientists and wider society to become fully
aware of humankind’s role as an active geological force on the planet
and the ethical responsibility that this implies.
• Geoethics is considered a point of intersection for Geosciences, Sociology,
Philosophy, and Economics [20, 21, 29–31].

These statements outline the perimeter of geoethical analyses, aims,


and actions, underlining the need to first identify those values on which to
shape a responsible and sustainable interaction with Nature. The main
issues and topics of Geoethics are sustainable use of natural resources;
reduction and management of natural and anthropogenic risks; manage-
ment of land, coastal areas, seas, and open oceans; pollution and its impacts
on human health; global environmental changes, including the climate
change; protection of natural environments; research integrity and the
development of codes of scientific and professional conduct; literacy and
education in geosciences; geodiversity, geoheritage, geoparks, and geo-
tourism; forensic geology and medical geology. Hence, the ‘geoethical
thinking’, its implications and applications, can be located within broader
societal concerns about the responsible conduct of science and the science-­
society interface [19, 31].
Ideas that underpin the conceptual foundations of Geoethics are traced
back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when anthropogenic
impacts on Nature began to be broadly recognised and documented
[32–35]. In the early 1990s, the word ‘geoethics’ began to be used to
20 S. PEPPOLONI AND G. DI CAPUA

define the ethical and social implications of geosciences [36, 37], bearing
in mind that several other scientists dealt with similar issues and perspec-
tives without using that specific word [38, 39]. The need to increase
awareness of the ethical obligations of geoscientists’ activity [40] was for-
malised in 2014 with the publication of the ‘Geoethical Promise’ [41],
proposed to be extended to include applied Earth system sciences [42].
The Geoethical Promise is part of the ‘Cape Town Statement on Geoethics’
[29], a document translated into 35 languages [43] that provides the first
comprehensive description of values that frame Geoethics.

3   Geoethics for the Earth System: Principles


and Values

Geoethics is an emerging subject to inform human agents’ actions and


societal decisions [21, 31], with well-established conceptual foundations
and structure [25] and a developing framework for its practical application
across the geoscience disciplines to ensure sustainability, safe and healthy
conditions to human communities, and protection of biotic and abiotic
entities [30, 31].
The four fundamental characteristics of Geoethics can be summed up as
follows: (a) human agent-centric, (b) shaped as virtue-ethics, (c) geosci-
ence knowledge-based, (d) with space-time context-dependent approaches.
The human agent is the quantum of societal behaviour, consciously
adheres to a framework of individual and interpersonal reference values
(honesty, integrity, accuracy, reliability, transparency, listening, sharing,
and trust), and behaves according to the virtues of care, coherence, pru-
dence, wisdom, dialogue, and good sense. These features make possible,
along with other individuals’ virtuous behaviours, to establish a human-­
Earth system relationship that is founded on the recognition of dignity of
all the elements that make up the social-ecological systems. Hence the
duty to guarantee to any entity the same value and existential space based
on a recognised diversity.
Geoethics is a modern virtue-ethics that places at the forefront indi-
vidual and responsible action based on adopting societal and professional
reference values within a pragmatic, open, and continuous revision pro-
cess. According to personal abilities and possibilities, it calls upon each
human being to operate within an ethical dimension, in which the duty to
safeguard the rights of others takes precedence over the right to demand
CURRENT DEFINITION AND VISION OF GEOETHICS 21

others’ duties. The human agent’s virtuous behaviours lean on universal


rights and imply universal duties, as we recently proposed in the Charter
for a Human Responsible Development [25]. This proposal starts from
the consideration that the duty to guarantee to oneself and any other than
oneself the same value and the same opportunities arises from the aware-
ness of having to act in accordance with one’s own complex biological-­
emotional-­rational nature, shaped by the knowledge of themselves and the
world, and from the awareness of recognising oneself as a moral being.
This approach opens the possibility that the rights of the human being are
accompanied by the imperative duties of everyone, not as a jurisprudential
dictation, but as evidence of their humanity [25], just like in the vision of
Edgar Morin [44], who invokes personal reform as a necessary step to
achieve an ethical revitalisation of the individual.
The human agent shall act within an inclusive process to solve issues on
a scientific basis, informed by human experience, supported by the multi-
disciplinary approaches of (geo)scientific knowledge and expertise on ter-
restrial dynamics, and respectful of traditional and indigenous
knowledge [45].
Geoethics is context-dependent in space and time: this means that simi-
lar ethical issues and dilemmas that arise in different contexts and circum-
stances may require different choices. Geoethics is shaped and informed
by the awareness of the technical, environmental, economic, cultural, and
political limits existing in different socio-ecological contexts and any deci-
sion inspired by Geoethics cannot ignore the physical-chemical-biological
peculiarities of the territories affected by anthropic interventions [31].
Concepts such as prevention, diversity, sustainability, adaptation, protec-
tion of the territory (as an interlacement of natural, socio-cultural, eco-
nomic elements), stewardship, conservation of the environmental and
aesthetic quality of Nature, and geo-environmental education become ref-
erence values for geoethical action [21, 25, 46]. Any approach in problem-­
solving must be based on equity to guarantee equal opportunities for
social, economic, and cultural development to the various human groups
and to future generations aiming to build a more just society, in a natural
environment that is not degraded, even aesthetically. Hence, the necessity
to protect geodiversity and geological heritage is considered a reference
concept for Geoethics [21, 24, 29, 31].
Geoethics considers Kohlberg’s hierarchy of moral adequacy that iden-
tifies six developmental stages for moral reasoning [47, 48], as a reference
22 S. PEPPOLONI AND G. DI CAPUA

scale for assessing the maturity of Human–Earth system interactions


[49, 50].
The concept of responsibility (the commitment to answer for our
actions and their consequences) is the central pivot in Geoethics: the
human agent sits at the centre of an ethical reference system in which (a)
individual, (b) interpersonal/professional, (c) social, and (d) environmen-
tal values coexist, underpinning responsibilities within these four levels
(named ‘Geoethical domains’) [20, 21, 30, 31]. Responsibility is the geo-
ethical criterion for human action [20, 31, 51] to ensure recognition and
protection of the intrinsic value of any living and non-living element with
which the human being interacts on the planet. Making responsible
choices requires applying ethical principles while considering the impact of
one’s choices on future generations [52].
In the final instance, Geoethics is ethics of responsibility towards the
Earth system, leading the human agent to inform his/her action on the
awareness of being a moral subject, on justice (intra- and intergenera-
tional) when considering consequences of actions, and on respect for geo-­
biodiversity and social-ecological systems. This awareness makes the
human agent capable of giving meaning to existence, primacy to dignity,
and responsibility to action in all circumstances.
In the geoethical vision, the human agent moves within those four exis-
tential and interactive domains of Geoethics and acts consciously, accord-
ing to an analytical and prudent approach based on the principle of
responsibility. A genuine geoethical decision can only come from a respon-
sible choice, whose fundamental prerequisite is the freedom to choose
among different options, acting by one’s own conscious and reasoned
choice, rather than under compulsion. Only widely shared ethical values
can guide human beings towards common decisions that are as acceptable
as possible, both socially and ecologically, that allow approaching the com-
plexity of natural and human reality and handling it with caution, while
respecting geodiversity and biodiversity. Transferring this attitude to soci-
ety means contributing to the promotion of responsible economic, tech-
nological, and social development, and pushing towards political decisions
and legal systems that consider the consequences of human actions affect-
ing the natural system and related issues on different time scales. Any
intervention on the environment imposed without considering the condi-
tions and characteristics of the local contexts risks provoking opposing
reactions, even violent ones, by the communities involved [31]. Geoethics
fosters inclusive and participatory processes with the population and an
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intellectual fire kindled from the waters of the sea.” Is not the
definition, consequently, obscurer than the term, requiring another
demonstration to prove if it be true? It is therefore better to say, in
the common and distinct form of speech, “that the brightest of the
heavenly bodies is named the sun.” For this expression is more
credible and clearer, and is likewise admitted by all.
CHAPTER III.
DEMONSTRATION DEFINED.

Similarly, also, all men will admit that demonstration is discourse,


[1319]agreeable to reason, producing belief in points disputed, from
points admitted.
Now, not only demonstration and belief and knowledge, but
foreknowledge also, are used in a twofold manner. There is that
which is scientific and certain, and that which is merely based on
hope.
In strict propriety, then, that is called demonstration which
produces in the souls of learners scientific belief. The other kind is
that which merely leads to opinion. As also, both he that is really a
man, possessing common judgment, and he that is savage and
brutal,—each is a man. Thus also the Comic poet said that “man is
graceful, so long as he is man.” The same holds with ox, horse, and
dog, according to the goodness or badness of the animal. For by
looking to the perfection of the genus, we come to those meanings
that are strictly proper. For instance, we conceive of a physician who
is deficient in no element of the power of healing, and a Gnostic who
is defective in no element of scientific knowledge.
Now demonstration differs from syllogism; inasmuch as the point
demonstrated is indicative of one thing, being one and identical; as
we say that to be with child is the proof of being no longer a virgin.
But what is apprehended by syllogism, though one thing, follows
from several; as, for example, not one but several proofs are
adduced of Pytho having betrayed the Byzantines, if such was the
fact. And to draw a conclusion from what is admitted is to syllogize;
while to draw a conclusion from what is true is to demonstrate.
So that there is a compound advantage of demonstration: from its
assuming, for the proof of points in question, true premisses, and
from its drawing the conclusion that follows from them. If the first
have no existence, but the second follow from the first, one has not
demonstrated, but syllogized. For, to draw the proper conclusion
from the premisses, is merely to syllogize. But to have also each of
the premisses true, is not merely to have syllogized, but also to have
demonstrated.
And to conclude, as is evident from the word, is to bring to the
conclusion. And in every train of reasoning, the point sought to be
determined is the end, which is also called the conclusion. But no
simple and primary statement is termed a syllogism, although true;
but it is compounded of three such, at the least,—of two as
premises, and one as conclusion.
Now, either all things require demonstration, or some of them are
self-evident. But if the first, by demanding the demonstration of each
demonstration we shall go on ad infinitum; and so demonstration is
subverted. But if the second, those things which are self-evident will
become the starting points [and fundamental grounds] of
demonstration.
In point of fact, the philosophers admit that the first principles of all
things are indemonstrable. So that if there is demonstration at all,
there is an absolute necessity that there be something that is self-
evident, which is called primary and indemonstrable.
Consequently all demonstration is traced up to indemonstrable
faith.
It will also turn out that there are other starting points for
demonstrations, after the source which takes its rise in faith,—the
things which appear clearly to sensation and understanding. For the
phenomena of sensation are simple, and incapable of being
decompounded; but those of understanding are simple, rational, and
primary. But those produced from them are compound, but no less
clear and reliable, and having more to do with the reasoning faculty
than the first. For therefore the peculiar native power of reason,
which we all have by nature, deals with agreement and
disagreement. If, then, any argument be found to be of such a kind,
as from points already believed to be capable of producing belief in
what is not yet believed, we shall aver that this is the very essence of
demonstration.
Now it is affirmed that the nature of demonstration, as that of
belief, is twofold: that which produces in the souls of the hearers
persuasion merely, and that which produces knowledge.
If, then, one begins with the things which are evident to sensation
and understanding, and then draw the proper conclusion, he truly
demonstrates. But if [he begin] with things which are only probable
and not primary, that is evident neither to sense nor understanding,
and if he draw the right conclusion, he will syllogize indeed, but not
produce a scientific demonstration; but if [he draw] not the right
conclusion, he will not syllogize at all.
Now demonstration differs from analysis. For each one of the
points demonstrated, is demonstrated by means of points that are
demonstrated; those having been previously demonstrated by
others; till we get back to those which are self-evident, or to those
evident to sense and to understanding; which is called Analysis. But
demonstration is, when the point in question reaches us through all
the intermediate steps. The man, then, who practises demonstration,
ought to give great attention to the truth, while he disregards the
terms of the premisses, whether you call them axioms, or premisses,
or assumptions. Similarly, also, special attention must be paid to
what suppositions a conclusion is based on; while he may be quite
careless as to whether one choose to term it a conclusive or
syllogistic proposition.
For I assert that these two things must be attended to by the man
who would demonstrate—to assume true premisses, and to draw
from them the legitimate conclusion, which some also call “the
inference,” as being what is inferred from the premisses.
Now in each proposition respecting a question, there must be
different premisses, related, however, to the proposition laid down;
and what is advanced must be reduced to definition. And this
definition must be admitted by all. But when premisses irrelevant to
the proposition to be established are assumed, it is impossible to
arrive at any right result; the entire proposition—which is also called
the question of its nature—being ignored.
In all questions, then, there is something which is previously
known,—that which being self-evident is believed without
demonstration; which must be made the starting point in their
investigation, and the criterion of apparent results.
CHAPTER IV.
TO PREVENT AMBIGUITY, WE MUST BEGIN WITH CLEAR DEFINITION.

For every question is solved from pre-existing knowledge. And the


knowledge pre-existing of each object of investigation is sometimes
merely of the essence, while its functions are unknown (as of stones,
and plants, and animals, of whose operations we are ignorant), or
[the knowledge] of the properties, or powers, or (so to speak) of the
qualities inherent in the objects. And sometimes we may know some
one or more of those powers or properties,—as, for example, the
desires and affections of the soul,—and be ignorant of the essence,
and make it the object of investigation. But in many instances, our
understanding having assumed all these, the question is, in which of
the essences do they thus inhere; for it is after forming conceptions
of both—that is, both of essence and operation—in our mind, that we
proceed to the question. And there are also some objects, whose
operations, along with their essences, we know, but are ignorant of
their modifications.
Such, then, is the method of the discovery [of truth]. For we must
begin with the knowledge of the questions to be discussed. For often
the form of the expression deceives and confuses and disturbs the
mind, so that it is not easy to discover to what class the thing is to be
referred; as, for example, whether the fœtus be an animal. For,
having a conception of an animal and a fœtus, we inquire if it be the
case that the fœtus is an animal; that is, if the substance which is in
the fœtal state possesses the power of motion, and of sensation
besides. So that the inquiry is regarding functions and sensations in
a substance previously known. Consequently the man who proposes
the question is to be first asked, what he calls an animal. Especially
is this to be done whenever we find the same term applied to various
purposes; and we must examine whether what is signified by the
term is disputed, or admitted by all. For were one to say that he calls
whatever grows and is fed an animal, we shall have again to ask
further, whether he considered plants to be animals; and then, after
declaring himself to this effect, he must show what it is which is in
the fœtal state, and is nourished.
For Plato calls plants animals, as partaking the third species of life
alone, that of appetency.[1320] But Aristotle, while he thinks that
plants are possessed of a life of vegetation and nutrition, does not
consider it proper to call them animals; for that alone, which
possesses the other life—that of sensation—he considers
warrantable to be called an animal. The Stoics do not call the power
of vegetation, life.
Now, on the man who proposes the question denying that plants
are animals, we shall show that he affirms what contradicts himself.
For, having defined the animal by the fact of its nourishment and
growth, but having asserted that a plant is not an animal, it appears
that he says nothing else than that what is nourished and grows is
both an animal and not an animal.
Let him, then, say what he wants to learn. Is it whether what is in
the womb grows and is nourished, or is it whether it possesses any
sensation or movement by impulse? For, according to Plato, the
plant is animate, and an animal; but according to Aristotle, not an
animal, for it wants sensation, but is animate. Therefore, according
to him, an animal is an animate sentient being. But according to the
Stoics, a plant is neither animate nor an animal; for an animal is an
animate being. If, then, an animal is animate, and life is sentient
nature, it is plain that what is animate is sentient. If, then, he who has
put the question, being again interrogated if he still calls the animal
in the fœtal state an animal on account of its being nourished and
growing, he has got his answer.
But were he to say that the question he asks is, whether the fœtus
is already sentient, or capable of moving itself in consequence of any
impulse, the investigation of the matter becomes clear, the fallacy in
the name no longer remaining. But if he do not reply to the
interrogation, and will not say what he means, or in respect of what
consideration it is that he applies the term “animal” in propounding
the question, but bids us define it ourselves, let him be noted as
disputatious.
But as there are two methods, one by question and answer, and
the other the method of exposition, if he decline the former, let him
listen to us, while we expound all that bears on the problem. Then
when we are done, he may treat of each point in turn. But if he
attempt to interrupt the investigation by putting questions, he plainly
does not want to hear.
But if he choose to reply, let him first be asked, To what thing he
applies the name, animal. And when he has answered this, let him
be again asked, what, in his view, the fœtus means, whether that
which is in the womb, or things already formed and living; and again,
if the fœtus means the seed deposited, or if it is only when members
and a shape are formed that the name of embryos is to be applied.
And on his replying to this, it is proper that the point in hand be
reasoned out to a conclusion, in due order, and taught.
But if he wishes us to speak without him answering, let him hear.
Since you will not say in what sense you allege what you have
propounded (for I would not have thus engaged in a discussion
about meanings, but I would now have looked at the things
themselves), know that you have done just as if you had propounded
the question, Whether a dog were an animal? For I might have
rightly said, Of what dog do you speak? For I shall speak of the land
dog and the sea dog, and the constellation in heaven, and of
Diogenes too, and all the other dogs in order. For I could not divine
whether you inquire about all or about some one. What you shall do
subsequently is to learn now, and say distinctly what it is that your
question is about. Now if you are shuffling about names, it is plain to
everybody that the name “fœtus” is neither an animal nor a plant, but
a name, and a sound, and a body, and a being, and anything and
everything rather than an animal. And if it is this that you have
propounded, you are answered.
But neither is that which is denoted by the name fœtus an animal.
But that is incorporeal, and may be called a thing and a notion, and
everything rather than an animal. The nature of an animal is
different. For it was clearly shown respecting the very point in
question, I mean the nature of the embryo, of what sort it is. The
question respecting the meanings expressed by the name animal is
different.
I say, then, if you affirm that an animal is what has the power of
sensation and of moving itself from appetency, that an animal is not
simply what moves through appetency and is possessed of
sensation. For it is also capable of sleeping, or, when the objects of
sensation are not present, of not exercising the power of sensation.
But the natural power of appetency or of sensation is the mark of an
animal. For something of this nature is indicated by these things.
First, if the fœtus is not capable of sensation or motion from
appetency; which is the point proposed for consideration. Another
point is; if the fœtus is capable of ever exercising the power of
sensation or moving through appetency. In which sense no one
makes it a question, since it is evident.
But the question was, whether the embryo is already an animal, or
still a plant. And then the name animal was reduced to definition, for
the sake of perspicuity. But having discovered that it is distinguished
from what is not an animal by sensation and motion from appetency;
we again separated this from its adjuncts; asserting that it was one
thing for that to be such potentially, which is not yet possessed of the
power of sensation and motion, but will some time be so, and
another thing to be already so actually; and in the case of such, it is
one thing to exert its powers, another to be able to exert them, but to
be at rest or asleep. And this is the question.
For the embryo is not to be called an animal from the fact that it is
nourished; which is the allegation of those who turn aside from the
essence of the question, and apply their minds to what happens
otherwise. But in the case of all conclusions alleged to be found out,
demonstration is applied in common, which is discourse (λόγος),
establishing one thing from others. But the grounds from which the
point in question is to be established, must be admitted and known
by the learner. And the foundation of all these is what is evident to
sense and to intellect.
Accordingly the primary demonstration is composed of all these.
But the demonstration which, from points already demonstrated
thereby, concludes some other point, is no less reliable than the
former. It cannot be termed primary, because the conclusion is not
drawn from primary principles as premisses.
The first species, then, of the different kinds of questions, which
are three, has been exhibited,—I mean that, in which the essence
being known, some one of its powers or properties is unknown. The
second variety of propositions was that in which we all know the
powers and properties, but do not know the essence; as, for
example, in what part of the body is the principal faculty of the soul.
CHAPTER V.
APPLICATION OF DEMONSTRATION TO SCEPTICAL SUSPENSE OF
JUDGMENT.

Now the same treatment which applies to demonstration applies


also to the following question.
Some, for instance, say that there cannot be several originating
causes for one animal. It is impossible that there can be several
homogeneous originating causes of an animal; but that there should
be several heterogeneous, is not absurd.
Suppose the Pyrrhonian suspense of judgment, as they say, [the
idea] that nothing is certain: it is plain that, beginning with itself, it
first invalidates itself. It either grants that something is true, that you
are not to suspend your judgment on all things; or it persists in
saying that there is nothing true. And it is evident, that first it will not
be true. For it either affirms what is true or it does not affirm what is
true. But if it affirms what is true, it concedes, though unwillingly, that
something is true. And if it does not affirm what is true, it leaves true
what it wished to do away with. For, in so far as the scepticism which
demolishes is proved false, in so far the positions which are being
demolished are proved true; like the dream which says that all
dreams are false. For in confuting itself, it is confirmatory of the
others.
And, in fine, if it is true, it will make a beginning with itself, and not
be scepticism of anything else but of itself first. Then if [such a man]
apprehends that he is a man, or that he is sceptical, it is evident that
he is not sceptical. And how shall he reply to the interrogation? For
he is evidently no sceptic in respect to this. Nay, he affirms even that
he does doubt.
And if we must be persuaded to suspend our judgment in regard
to everything, we shall first suspend our judgment in regard to our
suspense of judgment itself, whether we are to credit it or not.
And if this position is true, that we do not know what is true, then
absolutely nothing is allowed to be true by it. But if he will say that
even this is questionable, whether we know what is true; by this very
statement he grants that truth is knowable, in the very act of
appearing to establish the doubt respecting it.
But if a philosophical sect is a leaning toward dogmas, or,
according to some, a leaning to a number of dogmas which have
consistency with one another and with phenomena, tending to a right
life; and dogma is a logical conception; and conception is a state and
assent of the mind: not merely sceptics, but every one who
dogmatizes is accustomed in certain things to suspend his judgment,
either through want of strength of mind, or want of clearness in the
things, or equal force in the reasons.
CHAPTER VI.
DEFINITIONS, GENERA, AND SPECIES.

The introductions and sources of questions are about these points


and in them.
But before definitions, and demonstrations, and divisions, it must
be propounded in what ways the question is stated; and equivocal
terms are to be treated; and synonyms stated accurately according
to their significations.
Then it is to be inquired whether the proposition belongs to those
points, which are considered in relation to others, or is taken by
itself. Further, If it is, what it is, what happens to it; or thus, also, if it
is, what it is, why it is. And to the consideration of these points, the
knowledge of Particulars and Universals, and the Antecedents and
the Differences, and their divisions, contribute.
Now, Induction aims at generalization and definition; and the
divisions are the species, and what a thing is, and the individual. The
contemplation of the How adduces the assumption of what is
peculiar; and doubts bring the particular differences and the
demonstrations, and otherwise augment the speculation and its
consequences; and the result of the whole is scientific knowledge
and truth.
Again, the summation resulting from Division becomes Definition.
For Definition is adopted before division and after: before, when it is
admitted or stated; after, when it is demonstrated. And by Sensation
the Universal is summed up from the Particular. For the starting point
of Induction is Sensation; and the end is the Universal.
Induction, accordingly, shows not what a thing is, but that it is, or
is not. Division shows what it is; and Definition similarly with Division
teaches the essence and what a thing is, but not if it is; while
Demonstration explains the three points, if it is, what it is, and why it
is.
There are also Definitions which contain the Cause. And since it
may be known when we see, when we see the Cause; and Causes
are four—the matter, the moving power, the species, the end;
Definition will be fourfold.
Accordingly we must first take the genus, in which are the points
that are nearest those above; and after this the next difference. And
the succession of differences, when cut and divided, completes the
“What it is.” There is no necessity for expressing all the differences
of each thing, but those which form the species.
Geometrical analysis and synthesis are similar to logical division
and definition; and by division we get back to what is simple and
more elementary. We divide, therefore, the genus of what is
proposed for consideration into the species contained in it; as, in the
case of man, we divide animal, which is the genus, into the species
that appear in it, the mortal, and the immortal. And thus, by
continually dividing those genera that seem to be compound into the
simpler species, we arrive at the point which is the subject of
investigation, and which is incapable of further division.
For, after dividing “the animal” into mortal and immortal, then into
terrestrial and aquatic; and the terrestrial again into those who fly
and those who walk; and so dividing the species which is nearest to
what is sought, which also contains what is sought, we arrive by
division at the simplest species, which contains nothing else, but
what is sought alone.
For again we divide that which walks into rational and irrational;
and then selecting from the species, apprehended by division, those
next to man, and combining them into one formula, we state the
definition of a man, who is an animal, mortal, terrestrial, walking,
rational.
Whence Division furnishes the class of matter, seeking for the
definition the simplicity of the name; and the definition of the artisan
and maker, by composition and construction, presents the
knowledge of the thing as it is; not of those things of which we have
general notions. To these notions we say that explanatory
expressions belong. For to these notions, also, divisions are
applicable.
Now one Division divides that which is divided into species, as a
genus; and another into parts, as a whole; and another into
accidents.
The division, then, of a whole into the parts, is, for the most part,
conceived with reference to magnitude; that into the accidents can
never be entirely explicated, if, necessarily, essence is inherent in
each of the existences.
Whence both these divisions are to be rejected, and only the
division of the genus into species is approved, by which both the
identity that is in the genus is characterized, and the diversity which
subsists in the specific differences.
The species is always contemplated in a part. On the other hand,
however, if a thing is part of another, it will not be also a species. For
the hand is a part of a man, but it is not a species. And the genus
exists in the species. For [the genus] is both in man and the ox. But
the whole is not in the parts. For the man is not in his feet.
Wherefore also the species is more important than the part; and
whatever things are predicated of the genus will be all predicated of
the species.
It is best, then, to divide the genus into two, if not into three
species. The species then being divided more generically, are
characterized by sameness and difference. And then being divided,
they are characterized by the points generically indicated.
For each of the species is either an essence; as when we say,
Some substances are corporeal and some incorporeal; or how
much, or what relation, or where, or when, or doing, or suffering.
One, therefore, will give the definition of whatever he possesses
the knowledge of; as one can by no means be acquainted with that
which he cannot embrace and define in speech. And in consequence
of ignorance of the definition, the result is, that many disputes and
deceptions arise. For if he that knows the thing has the knowledge of
it in his mind, and can explain by words what he conceives; and if
the explanation of the thought is definition; then he that knows the
thing must of necessity be able also to give the definition.
Now in definitions, difference is assumed, which, in the definition,
occupies the place of sign. The faculty of laughing, accordingly,
being added to the definition of man, makes the whole—a rational,
mortal, terrestrial, walking, laughing animal. For the things added by
way of difference to the definition are the signs of the properties of
things; but do not show the nature of the things themselves. Now
they say that the difference is the assigning of what is peculiar; and
as that which has the difference differs from all the rest, that which
belongs to it alone, and is predicated conversely of the thing, must in
definitions be assumed by the first genus as principal and
fundamental.
Accordingly, in the larger definitions the number of the species
that are discovered are in the ten Categories; and in the least, the
principal points of the nearest species being taken, mark the
essence and nature of the thing. But the least consists of three, the
genus and two essentially necessary species. And this is done for
the sake of brevity.
We say, then, Man is the laughing animal. And we must assume
that which pre-eminently happens to what is defined, or its peculiar
virtue, or its peculiar function, and the like.
Accordingly, while the definition is explanatory of the essence of
the thing, it is incapable of accurately comprehending its nature. By
means of the principal species, the definition makes an exposition of
the essence, and almost has the essence in the quality.
CHAPTER VII.
ON THE CAUSES OF DOUBT OR ASSENT.

The causes productive of scepticism are two things principally.


One is the changefulness and instability of the human mind, whose
nature it is to generate dissent, either that of one with another, or that
of people with themselves. And the second is the discrepancy which
is in things; which, as to be expected, is calculated to be productive
of scepticism.
For, being unable either to believe in all views, on account of their
conflicting nature; or to disbelieve all, because that which says that
all are unreliable is included in the number of those that are so; or to
believe some and disbelieve others on account of the equipoise, we
are led to scepticism.
But among the principal causes of scepticism is the instability of
the mind, which is productive of dissent. And dissent is the proximate
cause of doubt. Whence life is full of tribunals and councils; and, in
fine, of selection in what is said to be good and bad; which are the
signs of a mind in doubt, and halting through feebleness, on account
of conflicting matters. And there are libraries full of books, and
compilations and treatises of those who differ in dogmas, and are
confident that they themselves know the truth that there is in things.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE METHOD OF CLASSIFYING THINGS AND NAMES.

In language there are three things:—Names, which are primarily


the symbols of conceptions, and by consequence also of subjects.
Second, there are Conceptions, which are the likenesses and
impressions of the subjects. Whence in all, the conceptions are the
same; in consequence of the same impression being produced by
the subjects in all. But the names are not so, on account of the
difference of languages. And thirdly, the Subject-matters by which
the Conceptions are impressed in us.
The Names are reduced by grammar into the twenty-four general
elements; for the elements must be determined. For of Particulars
there is no scientific knowledge, seeing they are infinite. But it is the
property of science to rest on general and defined principles.
Whence also Particulars are resolved into Universals. And
philosophic research is occupied with Conceptions and Real
subjects. But since of these the Particulars are infinite, some
elements have been found, under which every subject of
investigation is brought; and if it be shown to enter into any one or
more of the elements, we prove it to exist; but if it escape them all,
that it does not exist.
Of things stated, some are stated without connection; as, for
example, “man” and “runs,” and whatever does not complete a
sentence, which is either true or false. And of things stated in
connection, some point out “essence,” some “quality,” some
“quantity,” some “relation,” some “where,” some “when,” some
“position,” some “possession,” some “action,” some “suffering,”
which we call the elements of material things after the first principles.
For these are capable of being contemplated by reason.
But immaterial things are capable of being apprehended by the
mind alone, by primary application.
And of those things that are classed under the ten Categories,
some are predicated by themselves (as the nine Categories), and
others in relation to something.
And, again, of the things contained under these ten Categories,
some are Univocal, as ox and man, as far as each is an animal. For
those are Univocal terms, to both of which belongs the common
name, animal; and the same principle, that is definition, that is
animate essence. And Heteronyms are those which relate to the
same subject under different names, as ascent or descent; for the
way is the same whether upwards or downwards. And the other
species of Heteronyms, as horse and black, are those which have a
different name and definition from each other, and do not possess
the same subject. But they are to be called different, not
Heteronyms. And Polyonyms are those which have the same
definition, but a different name, as, hanger, sword, scimitar. And
Paronyms are those which are named from something different, as
“manly” from “manliness.”
Equivocal terms have the same name, but not the same definition,
as man,—both the animal and the picture. Of Equivocal terms, some
receive their Equivocal name fortuitously, as Ajax, the Locrian, and
the Salaminian; and some from intention; and of these, some from
resemblance, as man both the living and the painted; and some from
analogy, as the feet of Ida, and our feet, because they are beneath;
some from action, as the foot of a vessel, by which the vessel sails,
and our foot, by which we move. Equivocal terms are designated
from the same and to the same; as the book and scalpel are called
surgical, both from the surgeon who uses them, and with reference
to the surgical matter itself.
CHAPTER IX.
ON THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF CAUSES.

Of Causes, some are Procatarctic and some Synectic, some Co-


operating, some Causes sine quâ non.
Those that afford the occasion of the origin of anything first, are
Procatarctic; as beauty is the cause of love to the licentious; for
when seen by them, it alone produces the amorous inclination, but
not necessarily.
Causes are Synectic (which are also univocally perfect of
themselves) whenever a cause is capable of producing the effect of
itself, independently.
Now all the causes may be shown in order in the case of the
learner. The father is the Procatarctic cause of learning, the teacher
the Synectic, and the nature of the learner the Co-operating cause,
and time holds the relation of the Cause sine quâ non.
Now that is properly called a cause which is capable of effecting
anything actively; since we say that steel is capable of cutting, not
merely while cutting, but also while not cutting. Thus, then, the
capability of causing (τὸ παρεκτικὸν) signifies both; both that which is
now acting, and that which is not yet acting, but which possesses the
power of acting.
Some, then, say that causes are properties of bodies; and others
of incorporeal substances; others say that the body is properly
speaking cause, and that what is incorporeal is so only
catachrestically, and a quasi-cause. Others, again, reverse matters,
saying that corporeal substances are properly causes, and bodies
are so improperly; as, for example, that cutting, which is an action, is
incorporeal, and is the cause of cutting which is an action and
incorporeal, and, in the case of bodies, of being cut,—as in the case
of the sword and what is cut [by it].
The cause of things is predicated in a threefold manner. One,
What the cause is, as the statuary; a second, Of what it is the cause

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