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 Studies in the Political Economy
of Public Policy

Series Editors
Toby Carroll
Department of Asian and International Studies
City University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong

Paul Cammack
Department of Asian and International Studies
City University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong

Kelly Gerard
The University of Western Australia
School of Social Sciences
Australia

Darryl S. L. Jarvis
The Education University of Hong Kong
Faculty of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences
Hong Kong
Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy presents cutting edge,
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International Advisory Board:

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Australia.

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 Brian C. H. Fong • Tai-Lok Lui
Editors

Hong Kong 20 Years

after the Handover
Emerging Social and Institutional Fractures
After 1997
Editors
Brian C. H. Fong Tai-Lok Lui
The Academy of Hong Kong Studies The Academy of Hong Kong Studies
The Education University of The Education University of
Hong Kong Hong Kong
Tai Po, Hong Kong Tai Po, Hong Kong

Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy

ISBN 978-3-319-51372-0 ISBN 978-3-319-51373-7 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51373-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017950331

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

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Hong Kong Studies is an interdisciplinary field of area studies that takes “Hong
Kong” as a central subject of analysis, and The Academy of Hong Kong Studies
(AHKS), established in July 2015, is the first academy dedicated to fostering Hong
Kong Studies within local tertiary institutions. Adopting the strategic direction of
“Hong Kong in the World”, the AHKS drives interdisciplinary knowledge crea-
tion and transfer initiatives on Hong Kong-centric subjects and fosters the devel-
opment of a cross-regional Hong Kong Studies research community.

https://www.eduhk.hk/ahks
 CONTENTS

Part I Constitutional and Political Fractures

1 The Impasse Over Constitutional Reform: Negotiating

Democracy in Hong Kong 3
Kit Poon

2 From Executive Dominance to Fragmented Authority:

An Institutional and Political Analysis 21
Ngok Ma

3 Executive-Legislative Disconnection in the HKSAR:

Uneasy Partnership Between Chief Executives
and Pro-Government Parties, 1997–2016 45
Brian C.H. Fong

4 Changing Political Activism: Before and After the

Umbrella Movement 73
Wai-Man Lam

5 State Capacity and Political Disconnection in the HKSAR:

The Case Study of Healthcare Financing Reform 103
Alex Wo-shun Chan

vii
viii CONTENTS

Part II Economic and Social Fractures

6 Financialization and Economic Inequality in Hong Kong:

The Cost of the Finance-led Growth Regime 127
Kim Ming Lee, Benny Ho Pong To and Kar Ming Yu

7 Unequal Vulnerability to Social Risks: Analysis of Hong

Kong’s Social Strata (1993–2013) 153
Chi Kit Chan and David Wai Lun Ho

8 Housing Question and Social Discontent After 1997:

History and Continuity of Home Ownership 177
Tze Ken Yau

9 Growing Tensions in Hong Kong’s State-Nonprofit

Relations 203
Chi-kin Kwan and Ernest Wing-tak Chui

Part III Central-Local Tensions and Identity Fractures

10 A Historical Perspective on Hong Kong Autonomy:

Traditions of British Imperialism, Maritime Enclave
and Contending Views of British Interest 231
Ray Yep

11 In Beijing’s Tightening Grip 255

Peter T.Y. Cheung

12 Undoing China’s Charm Offensive: Chinese Tourists

in Hong Kong’s News Discourses (2003–2015) 287
Chi Kit Chan

13 Fading Opportunities: Hong Kong in the Context

of Regional Integration 315
Tai-lok Lui
 CONTENTS ix

Epilogue 339

Index 345
 LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 4.1 Cleavage structure 74

Fig. 6.1 Trend of stockowners and stock investors 141
Fig. 6.2 Private domestic—Annual property price indices of all classes
(territory wide), 1980–2015 144
Fig. 13.1 Hong Kong residents working in the mainland of China 321
Fig. 13.2 Occupational distribution of Hong Kong residents working
in the mainland, 1992–2010 322
Fig. 13.3 Education background of those Hong Kong residents
working in the mainland 324
Fig. 13.4 The age structure of Hong Kong residents working
in the mainland 326
Fig. 13.5 Median age of Hong Kong’s working population and Hong
Kong residents working in the mainland 327
Fig. 13.6 Hong Kong residents who had worked as employees
in the mainland during the 12 months of enumeration
by whether employed by companies in Hong Kong 329
Fig. 13.7 Hong Kong residents working in the mainland by usual place
of work while working in the mainland 330

xi
 LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 Members of the fifth legislative council (dated 2016/3/

23) 32
Table 2.2 Records of filibusters since 2009 38
Table 3.1 Patterns of executive-legislative relations in modern
democracies 49
Table 3.2 The changing composition of Legislative Council (from
1943 to 1995) 50
Table 3.3 Composition of the HKSAR legislative council 52
Table 3.4 Partisan distribution of legislative council 54
Table 3.5 Legislative success rates of the HKSAR government since
the handover (1998–2016) 56
Table 3.6 Political affiliations of political ministers under Tung
Chee-hwa, Donald Tsang and Leung Chun-ying
administrations 59
Table 3.7 Representatives of major pro-government parties
in the executive council (2002–2016) 60
Table 3.8 Illustrative examples of shelved /postponed bills 62
Table 3.9 Time spent on quorum calls and the meeting time
reduced because of adjournment of the council because
of the lack of a quorum in each of the legislative sessions
from (2012–2013 to 2015–2016) 64
Table 4.1 Cultural identity 79
Table 4.2 Trust in major institutions (percentages) 80
Table 4.3 Evaluation of law-abiding government (percentages) 80
Table 4.4a Evaluation of vertical accountability (percentages) 81
Table 4.4b Evaluation of horizontal accountability (percentages) 81
Table 4.5 Equal treatment (percentages) 81

xiii
xiv LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.6 Election effectiveness (percentages) 82

Table 4.7 Satisfaction with how democracy works 82
Table 4.8 Trust in major institutions (percentages)—Age group
comparison 83
Table 4.9 Evaluation on law-abiding government (percentages)—
Age group comparison 83
Table 4.10a Evaluation of vertical accountability (percentages)—Age
group comparison 84
Table 4.10b Evaluation of horizontal accountability (percentages)—
Age group comparison 84
Table 4.11 Equal treatment (percentages)—Age group comparison 84
Table 4.12 Election effectiveness (percentages)—Age group
comparison 84
Table 4.13 Satisfaction with how democracy works (percentages)—
Age group comparison 85
Table 4.14 Voter turnout rates in the district council elections 85
Table 4.15 Voter turnout rates in the legislative council elections 85
Table 4.16 Expressing concern or seeking help through institutional
channels (percentages) 86
Table 4.17 Discursive participation (percentages) 87
Table 4.18 Cultural identity 2014–2015 88
Table 4.19 Read, listen or watch political news (percentages) 88
Table 4.20 Discuss politics with family members and friends
(percentages) 89
Table 4.21 Express views through the Internet (percentages) 89
Table 4.22 Participation in political activities in the past three years
(percentages) 91
Table 4.23 Acceptance of confrontational tactics (percentages) 92
Table 4.24 Understandings of localism (percentages) 94
Table 4.25 Political efficacy (percentages) 98
Table 6.1 Gross domestic product (GDP) by selected economic
activity. Percentage contribution to GDP at basic prices
(2000–2014) 133
Table 7.1 Distribution of occupational categories (%) 162
Table 7.2 Distribution of managers, administrators and profes-
sionals (%) 163
Table 7.3 Distribution of elementary occupations (%) 164
Table 7.4 Indicators of Hong Kong’s economy 165
Table 7.5 Monthly median income level of employees (HKD) 165
Table 7.6 Unemployment rate (%) 168
Table 7.7 Under-employment rate (%) 169
Table 7.8 Median working hours per week 169
 LIST OF TABLES xv

Table 9.1 Social welfare subvention and total government spending 211
Table 9.2 Government subvention received by HKFYG 213
Table 9.3 Government subvention received by NLPRA 215
Table 12.1 News representation of Chinese tourists/visitors in Hong
Kong (2003–2015) 297
Table 12.2 Positive and negative views on Chinese tourists/visitors
in Hong Kong (2003–2015) 298
Table 12.3 News discourses of Chinese tourists in Hong Kong 299
Table 13.1 The distribution of occupations among Hong Kong’s
working population according to place of birth, 2011 333
 INTRODUCTION: “ONE COUNTRY, TWO
SYSTEMS” FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE:
EMERGING SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
FRACTURES IN HONG KONG SINCE 19971

In the years leading to the handover on 1 July 1997, there were both
pessimists and optimists among the observers of the process of decoloniza-
tion and the establishment of the so-called ‘One Country, Two systems’
(OCTS) in Hong Kong. For the pessimists, their main concerns were two.
First, the socialist system in China could hardly accommodate a free market
capitalist Hong Kong. Conflict was inevitable. Second, the encounter
between an authoritarian China and a highly liberalized Hong Kong
would also be a source of conflict and contention. Personal freedom in
Hong Kong would quickly be contained. For the optimists, with China
eager to carry out market reform and Hong Kong being well placed in a
position to facilitate its economic reform and modernization, capitalism
would continue to prosper in the former British colony. So, the transfer of
sovereignty and the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR) would be no more than business as usual. Changes, if any,
would be minimal. Both the pessimists as well as the optimists failed to
anticipate the kind of problems encountered by Hong Kong since 1997.
Post-handover Hong Kong was characterized by emerging fractures,
tensions and contradictions. But these fractures, tensions as well as contra-
dictions are not quite those anticipated by either the pessimists or optimists.
In the years leading up to the drafting of the Basic Law, one of the major
concerns shared by people coming from different social sectors was con-
tinuity in economic, social and political development. This partly has to do
with the fact that most people, with quite a significant proportion of them
either having first-hand experience of authoritarian rule or having parents

xvii
xviii INTRODUCTION: “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” FROM THEORY . . .

who suffered from political campaigns in the early post-revolutionary years,

were afraid of the Communists. Continuity, vividly captured by Deng Xiao-
ping’s promise of letting the Hong Kong’s way of life remain unchanged for
fifty years, was seen as the right direction for future development. It was
believed that changes were to be minimized and the status quo should
be maintained. To some extent, it was an idea of “deep freezing” Hong
Kong. What was found in the existing institutional setting of Hong Kong
then, supposedly the key ingredients for its success in achieving economic
prosperity and political stability since the end of the WWII, should be “deep
frozen.” The so-called Hong Kong system would be kept intact and was
written into the Basic Law. By the time of 1 July 1997, the “deep-frozen”
Hong Kong would undergo a process of defrosting. But it was expected
that this would involve no more than putting the past success recipe into
practice in a slightly changed environment. All those factors that were
suggested to be the keys of success had been preserved. Other than a change
of the national flag, life would continue as if nothing had happened.
Apparently, the impacts of decolonization on Hong Kong’s institutional
structure had been hugely underestimated. The questions about the poli-
tical mandate and legitimacy turned out to be major troubles that haunted
Mr. Tung Chee-hwa, Mr. Donald Tsang and then Mr. C.Y. Leung. The
so-called executive-dominant political system also encountered all kinds of
problems. Although once praised as an efficient and effective administrative
state, the HKSAR Government was found incapable of carrying out effec-
tive governance. At the same time, the Asian Financial Crisis exposed deep-
rooted problems in Hong Kong’s economy. The property bubble was one
of them, and the failure of launching major economic restructuring was
another. The belief that the maintenance of free-market capitalism after the
handover would be sufficient to ensure Hong Kong’s economic prosperity
was found problematic. In short, the problems of the HKSAR are many.

MIND THE GAP: INSTITUTIONS UNDER PRESSURE AFTER 1997

Signs of institutional failure in post-1997 Hong Kong were quickly iden-
tified by the political observers not long after the political transition. The
idea of the need for forming a strategic governing alliance, put forward by
Lau (e.g., 1999, 2000 and 2002), is actually an indication of an awareness
of problematic features in the institutional arrangements that may under-
mine effective governance after the handover. He argues that, to make
effective governance possible, the Chief Executive needs to secure meta-
 INTRODUCTION: “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” FROM THEORY . . . xix

constitutional political power and authority. The viability of the so-called

executive-dominant polity depends on obtaining reliable and steady sup-
port from a powerful and influential strategic governing alliance. With the
participation of these leading and influential political, economic and social
leaders, the strategic alliance is internally a platform wherein its members
are willing to negotiate with each other and able to reach compromises,
and externally they will be able to reach out and secure grassroots support.
What we find most interesting about Lau’s diagnosis of the governance
question in post-1997 Hong Kong is not his proposal of a strategic
alliance per se, but rather his recommendation of alliance building outside
of the institutional structure of the polity. This is to suggest that the
existing institutional arrangement is not conducive to the building of a
power center around the Chief Executive (say, the control of majority
support in the legislature). What is critical to effective governance of the
SAR rests upon the building of an informal power alliance. But, as we
would like to point out here, Lau is not clear about how this idea of the
formation of a strategic alliance can be realized under the existing political
conditions and environment in Hong Kong. Upon what social basis
would, for example, the local political, economic and social elites become
cooperative among themselves and with the Chief Executive? Lau’s ana-
lysis largely begs the questions about the viability of a class compromise
and the formation a strategic governing alliance. He fails to fully recognize
the diverse economic and political interests among the local elites and their
implications (see Lui and Chiu, 2007; Fong, 2014).
Lee (1999) looks at the governance crisis of the HKSAR from a
different perspective. Her idea is that “the governance crisis in Hong
Kong is the result of institutional incongruity” (ibid: 941). The crux of
her analysis is that the political and administrative institutions that func-
tioned effectively under the colonial setting, which paradoxically served as
the blueprint for the institutional arrangements of post-colonial Hong
Kong and are deliberately preserved in the Basic Law, are no longer
capable of meeting the challenges arising from the post-colonial setting
because of changes in the broader socioeconomic and political environ-
ment. The bureaucratic colonial state fared reasonably well in an environ-
ment of continuous economic growth, a political environment with a weak
civil society and a population enjoying steady improvements in the stan-
dard of living. The same institutional arrangements are becoming proble-
matic in the post-colonial setting wherein economic growth has slowed
down, the civil society has become more vocal, and economic
xx INTRODUCTION: “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” FROM THEORY . . .

restructuring has brought about reduced opportunities for steady

improvements in people’s livelihood. These changes in the socioeconomic
and political environment call for a different form of political governance,
but such problems have not been addressed. The political superstructure is
found incongruent with the emerging environmental conditions. Like
Lee, Scott (2000) and Cheung (2005) similarly observed the fractures
between the political institutions and its operating environment. Scott
summed up the failure of governance as “the disarticulation of political
system” under which the executive, the legislature and the bureaucracy are
basically “uncoordinated, poorly developed, fractious and sometimes dys-
functional,” and therefore occasional skirmishes and conflicts within the
political system will usually happen from time to time. Cheung described
the institutional fractures of post-1997 Hong Kong as “institutional
incompatibility.” He pointed out that the post-1997 political system,
which originated from colonial times, is incompatible with post-colonial
needs and demands by which the political logic of executive-dominant
government as inherited from the pre-1997 period was not compatible
with the post-1997 public sentiment in favor of democratic accountability.
This resulted in “a widening cognitive gap between government and
people” after 1997.
Lee, Scott and Cheung’s analysis points out that there are fractures
in the institutional arrangements of post-1997 Hong Kong. Their notions
of institutional incongruity/disarticulated political system/institutional
incompatibility are most pertinent and yet the focus on the incongruity
between the political system and the changing environment is far from
a comprehensive picture of the failure of governance after 1997.
Particularly, their description of the governance crisis as brought about
by growing demands from below, and thus the consequence of political
overload seems rather simplistic. The SAR Government has always been
under political pressure from various sectors and not just from the grass-
roots and the pro-democracy campaigns. It is weak in facing the increas-
ingly vibrant civil society. However, it is equally fragile when dealing with
the major interests in the establishment. All three administrations have
failed to build a new class alliance with the major stakeholders and to
address the emerging socioeconomic and political issues. The Tung admin-
istration raised question about the need for Hong Kong to step out of its
old framework (e.g., an emphasis on technological innovation under the
new government) but quickly found itself in the political crossfire and was
unable to move forward. The Tsang administration tried to restore a
 INTRODUCTION: “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” FROM THEORY . . . xxi

relatively peaceful political environment by avoiding confrontation with

different interests. But it had little to offer to help Hong Kong make
major breakthroughs in economic and social development. Hong Kong
soon found itself, around 2008–2010, overwhelmed by the rise of China.
Regional and national integration became a source of social tension and
conflict. For the Leung administration, political trust evaporated, and
tensions between the executive and the legislature grew to such an extent
that the HKSAR Government was partially paralyzed. Between 1997 and
2016, the HKSAR Government simply failed to build its political leader-
ship and not to mention a hegemonic leadership.
All in all, the overall argument of this book volume is that the “crisis”
pertaining to the OCTS model since the handover of sovereignty is not
simply about the incompatibilities between the political system and its
operating environment, but “multiple institutional and social fractures”
exist and grow on various fronts including the constitutional and political
front (such as executive-legislative relations, government-society rela-
tions), socioeconomic front (such as economic inequality and welfare
provision) and central-local front (such as local autonomy and cross-
border integration).

A MID-TERM REVIEW FOR ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS

July 1, 2017, will mark the 20th anniversary of the transfer of Hong
Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China, and this edited book volume,
with the title of “Hong Kong: 20 Years after the Handover,” will provide a
timely account and review of the emerging social and institutional frac-
tures in Hong Kong under the OCTS. Four chapters (Chapters 2, 6, 12
and 13) together with this introductory chapter came from a Special
Feature of China Perspectives first published in 2014, and they have been
substantially updated and revised for the purpose of inclusion in this book.
The remaining chapters were originally papers specifically written for this
edited book volume.
The whole book volume is organized into three parts so as to offer a
comprehensive account of the social and institutional fractures facing
Hong Kong under the OCTS. Part I of this book focuses on constitu-
tional and political fractures. The actual operation of the OCTS showed
that problems and limitations of the constitutional design of the HKSAR
sowed the seeds of political fractures and socio-political conflicts in Hong
Kong after 1997. The problems at stake are not only confined to the issue
xxii INTRODUCTION: “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” FROM THEORY . . .

of democratization; this is only one among many fractures in the political

system. Equally significant are institutional fractures in the executive-
dominant system resulting in the disconnection between the executive
and the legislature. Largely as a result of the above problems, we witness
changing social mobilization and political activism. The pattern of inter-
action between the government and the civil society has also changed
drastically. Poon’s chapter rightly points out the dualistic accountable
nature of the office of HKSAR Chief Executive and its resultant conflicts
between the central authority and local autonomy. Ma provides an over-
view of the fragmented nature of the HKSAR executive authority, while
Fong focuses on examining the disconnection between the executive and
the legislature, both chapters best illustrating the institutional incongrui-
ties within the HKSAR constitutional system. Lam’s chapter provides an
account of the evolving features of political activism in post-handover
Hong Kong by highlighting the implications of youth activism, radicalism
and localism for socio-political aspects. Chan’s analysis of the repeated
failures of health care reforms provides a good case study on how the
disconnection between the HKSAR government and major policy stake-
holders gave rise to a lack in the governing capacity of the Hong Kong
state after 1997. In short, constitutional and political fractures, tensions
and conflicts will constitute the leading themes in our discussion in Part I
of this book volume.
Part II of this book pays attention to economic and social fractures.
Prior to the transfer of sovereign in 1997, unlike other members of the
Four Little Dragons (namely, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South
Korea), Hong Kong was a case of high income inequality in the course of
rapid economic development. Issues concerning socioeconomic inequal-
ities as well as the distribution and redistribution of social resources have
been swept under the carpet, in the hope that the market economy and
continuous economic growth would allow people from all walks of life to
remain happy. However, post-1997 Hong Kong has witnessed growing
social tensions and conflicts over questions that have long been unduly
neglected—are ordinary people benefitting from the current state of socio-
economic development? Lee’s chapter looks at the growing economic
inequality after 1997 in the context of Hong Kong’s move towards
financialization and alerts us of how the gap in asset ownership has
impacted the poor and deprived. Chan and Ho’s analysis demonstrates
the social inequality in post-handover Hong Kong by illustrating the
unequal vulnerability to social risks across different occupational groups.
 INTRODUCTION: “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” FROM THEORY . . . xxiii

Yau explores the history and continuity of home ownership in the HKSAR
era and discusses the housing problem has become a source of social
fractures after 1997. Kwan’s chapter traces the changing dynamics of
state-nonprofit relations in Hong Kong and argues that the co-financing
welfare model has yielded uneasiness and tensions between the welfare
sector and the HKSAR Government. In a nutshell, Part II includes three
chapters that analyze how economic and social fractures have been widen-
ing since 1997.
Part III of this book looks at central-local tensions and identity
fractures in Hong Kong after 1997. The OCTS was originally conceived
as an institutional design that would keep socialist China and capitalist
Hong Kong apart from each other. Questions concerning central-local
relations and regional as well as national integration have been down-
played (if not totally ignored). At one point in time, it was simply assumed
that Hong Kong could take advantage of the liberalization of China’s
economy by relocating its manufacturing industries to the Pearl River
Delta and Hong Kong people could seize opportunities created by mar-
ketization and subsequently globalization in the Mainland. The actual
practice of the OCTS after 1997 points to the fact that the dynamics of
central-local relations are much more complex and challenging than ori-
ginally perceived. Yep’s chapter looks at the dynamics of central-local
relations by adopting a historical perspective. He traces the evolution of
Hong Kong autonomy during the British colonial time and then draws
lessons about the prospects of the autonomous status of Hong Kong
under Chinese sovereignty. Cheung analyzes the growing conflictual rela-
tions between the Mainland and Hong Kong in the midst of Beijing’s
“tightening” of its policy toward Hong Kong after the 1 July 2003 Protest
Rally. Chan makes use of secondary survey data on local identity analyzing
local Hong Kong people’s ambivalence toward China as their nation and
their resistance to a top-down approach to build national identity. Lui
examines the changing opportunity for Hong Kong residents working in
the Mainland, arguing that the notion of “China opportunity” in the
process of cross-border socioeconomic integration is actually unrewarding
and may well be a source of tension and grievance after 1997. Without
doubt, the four chapters in this part of the book demonstrate the various
challenges and problems surrounding the central-local relations in post-
handover Hong Kong.
This book volume is not only an attempt to capture the current social
and political development in Hong Kong, but it goes beyond that and
xxiv INTRODUCTION: “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” FROM THEORY . . .

strives to identify the underlying constitutional, political, socioeconomic

and identity fractures underpinning the existing design and operation of
the OCTS. Discussion and analysis offered by the contributors of this
book volume present an argument for deeper and probably more somber
reflection on Hong Kong’s future in the context of the 2047 Question—
the year when Beijing’s promise of keeping the OCTS unchanged for
50 years, as enshrined by the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the
HKSAR Basic Law, will come to an end.
Tai-lok Lui
and Brian C.H. Fong

NOTE
1. Originally published in a slightly different form, reprinted from China
Perspectives, 2014/1 (online version at: http://www.cefc.com.hk/issue/
china-perspectives-2014-1), by permission of the French Centre for
Research on Contemporary China.

REFERENCES
Cheung, Anthony B.L. 2005. “Hong Kong’s Post-1997 Institutional
Crisis: Problems of Governance and Institutional Incompatibility.”
Journal of East Asian Studies, 5(1): 135–167.
Fong, Brian C.H. 2014. Hong Kong’s Governance Under Chinese
Sovereignty: The Failure of the State-Business Alliance After 1997.
United Kingdom: Routledge.
Lau, S.K. 1999. “The Rise and Decline of Political Support for the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Government.” Government and
Opposition, 34(3): 352–371.
Lau, S.K. 2000. “The Executive-Dominant System of Governance:
Theory and Practice,” in S.K. Lau (ed.), Blueprint for the 21st
century Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press (in
Chinese), pp. 1–36.
Lau, S.K. 2002. “Tung Chee-hwa’s Governing Strategy: The Shortfall in
Politics,” in S.K. Lau (ed.), The first Tung Chee-hwa administration,
Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, pp. 1–39.
 INTRODUCTION: “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” FROM THEORY . . . xxv

Lee, Eliza W.Y. 1999. “Governing Post-Colonial Hong Kong:

Institutional Incongruity, Governance Crisis and Authoritarianism.”
Asian Survey, 39(6): 940–959.
Lui, T.L., and Stephen W.K. Chui 2007. “Governance Crisis in Post-1997
Hong Kong: A Political Economy Perspective.” The China Review,
7(2): 1–34.
Scott, Ian. 2000. “The Disarticulation of Hong Kong’s Post-1997
Political System.” The China Journal, 43: 29–53.
 PART I

Constitutional and Political Fractures

 CHAPTER 1

The Impasse Over Constitutional Reform:

Negotiating Democracy in Hong Kong

Kit Poon

INTRODUCTION: DUAL ACCOUNTABILITY, CONSTITUTIONAL

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
More than anything else, the dualistic legal-political construct of the Chief
Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region embodies the
tension between state authority and local autonomy. As stipulated in the
Basic Law, the Chief Executive is vested with the power to govern through
a dual selection process. He or she is selected locally and appointed by the
Central People’s Government. As such, he/she is constitutionally accoun-
table to the people of Hong Kong on the one hand and the Central
People’s Government on the other.1 The task of the Chief Executive to
serve two masters, as entailed by the dual accountability, is daunting when
perceptions and interests of the two diverge (Poon 2008). However, the
stress of the office arising from the dual accountability has been somewhat
alleviated by a carefully designed Election Committee. Functioning as a
local electorate that selects the Chief Executive, the Election Committee
has been comprised of limited numbers of political and business elites as
well as professionals. The Election Committee as a whole represents the

K. Poon (*)
Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Ave,
Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR, China
e-mail: kitpoon@cityu.edu.hk

© The Author(s) 2018 3

Brian C.H. Fong, T.-L. Lui (eds.), Hong Kong 20 Years after the
Handover, Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51373-7_1
4 K. POON

socioeconomic establishment that the central government also sought to

preserve in the 1980s (Lau 2014: 110).
However, the Election Committee as an institution preserving a
delicate balance was meant to exist for a limited time. As a result of
negotiation between the central government and various social forces in
Hong Kong, the Basic Law also provides that the Chief Executive will
eventually be elected by universal suffrage via democratic procedures in
Hong Kong.2 This provision imparts an evolving nature to the Office
within a 50-year time frame.3 Nevertheless, terms of ‘universal suffrage’
and ‘democratic procedure’ were left unspecified. Such vagueness might
be constructive for facilitating an agreement among Basic Law drafters
from different political cultures, beliefs and interests at that historical
time, but certainly opened rooms for competing interpretations there-
after (Poon 2008).
Consequently, constitutional reforms concerning the Office of Chief
Executive unfolded periodically in the post-handover years, which in
essence provided opportunities to reconstruct the office of the Chief
Executive. Not surprisingly, these reforms became locus of competition
among stakeholders. On the one hand, the oppositions in Hong Kong
sought to expand the local electorate so that the Chief Executive could be
more responsive to popular demands. On the other hand, the central
government guarded against hasty reforms so as to preserve its power
over the selection of its agent, ultimately the local establishment and its
authority over the territory. As such, democratization in Hong Kong
underscores the contestation and renegotiation of the boundary between
the state and the Hong Kong SAR. It has been marked by interplays of
competing perceptions and interests.
In the period between 1997 and 2015, three rounds of constitutional
reform took place and each resulted in different outcomes. The first round
of reform, dealing with the selection method for the Chief Executive in
2007, took place in 2005. Short of an agreement, this round of reform
resulted in a political stalemate as the reform package was vetoed in the
Legislative Council. The second round of reform, held in 2010, dealt with
the selection method for the Chief Executive in 2012. This round of
reform resulted in noticeable progress after intense negotiation and com-
promise by the parties involved. Consequently, the number of Election
Committee members was increased from 800 to 1200, while more elected
District Councilors were absorbed into the Election Committee. The
third round of reform, which officially began in December 2013, sought
 THE IMPASSE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: NEGOTIATING . . . 5

to materialize universal suffrage for the Chief Executive in 2017 as per-

mitted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
(NPCSC). In its decision issued in December 2007, the NPCSC set out
two tasks that served as the framework for the third round of reform. First,
a ‘broadly representative’ nominating committee with reference to the
formulation of existing Election Committee was to be established.
Second, ‘democratic procedures’ that allowed the nominating committee
to nominate a certain number of candidates for the office of the Chief
Executive for popular vote were to be formulated.4 In other words, this
round of reform primarily focused on the composition of the nominating
committee and the ways in which it would nominate candidates for
the Chief Executive. This framework underlined the intention of the
central government that the universal suffrage would proceed in a con-
trolled fashion. However, this round of reform concluded with a political
impasse. Universal suffrage for the Chief Executive was put off to an
undetermined future.
At each round of constitutional reform, three clusters of actors came to
the fore because of their constitutional powers over reform proposals as
specified in the Basic Law, including the NPCSC, the opposition parties in
the Legislative Council, and the Chief Executive and his administration.5
The NPCSC has been directly involved in interpreting the Basic Law and
issuing decisions concerning electoral reforms in Hong Kong. The
NPCSC together with relevant state departments, such as the Hong
Kong and Macau Affairs Office under the State Council and the Liaison
Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong, collectively
articulate and defend the interest of the central government. The opposi-
tion parties within the Legislative Council constitute the second important
cluster of actors as they can veto reform proposals in the Legislative
Council if they form a voting block. This cluster of actors promotes a
quickened pace of electoral reform, ultimately, strengthening themselves
through extended political channels and elected seats. Due to their differ-
ences in interest and tactics, the composition of the opposition alliance has
been fluid. Constituent parties join hands or go their separate ways as
political circumstances shift. More, these parties often sought to maximize
their bargaining power by allying with activist groups outside of the
Legislative Chamber. Last but not the least, the Chief Executive and his
administration at any given time form the third actor. Since 2004, the
Chief Executive has given the responsibility to initiate reforms, draft
reform packages and give consent to reform packages passed in the
6 K. POON

Legislative Council before these packages could be submitted to the

NPCSC for approval.6 Although the outcome of reform will only affect
the selection of his or her successors, the incumbent Chief Executive is not
without a stake in it, especially when he or she is looking for second term
in the office. The way that the incumbent Chief Executive handles
the reform tests his or her allegiance. The political skills exhibited in the
management of reform could also affect his or her popularity and the
credibility of his administration as a whole.

CHARACTERISTICS: CONFRONTATION IN THE ABSENCE

OF INTERMEDIARIES

Like the previous two rounds of constitutional reforms, the introduction

of universal suffrage for the Chief Executive in 2017 was marked by a
complex interplay among actors. But the dynamics this time unfolded with
a number of discernible characteristics. First, the opposition alliance and
the central government rushed into the battlefield at an early stage of the
reform process, which resulted in direct confrontation and quick escala-
tion of tensions between the two. Second, a willing and capable inter-
mediary for effective communication between the two was lacking. Third,
an internal split and the radicalization of the opposition alliance further
prohibited dialogues between the two. Possible trade-offs between issues
to which the two sides attached different values were far out of reach. As
the result, the third round of reform lacked the necessary conditions that a
successful political negotiation would require.
In fact, the oppositions began their social mobilization campaign
almost a year before the Hong Kong SAR Government formally launched
its public consultation on constitutional reform. In January 2013, a mobi-
lization campaign coined as Occupy Central with Love and Peace was put
in motion by activists. The founders of this campaign argued that the
universal suffrage for the Chief Executive must satisfy international stan-
dards, and any restrictions imposed on the right to stand for election as a
candidate for the Chief Executive would not be acceptable. The founders
sought to conduct a ‘civil referendum,’ soliciting public views on reform
proposals. They further called for civil disobedience actions, by blocking
roads and paralyzing the central business district, if the concerned autho-
rities failed to endorse the outcome of the referendum.7 Echoing this
campaign, 27 legislators from a dozen opposition parties gathered behind
 THE IMPASSE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: NEGOTIATING . . . 7

the banner of the Alliance for True Democracy in March 2013. The
Alliance also called for the adoption of a universal standard as the principle
for formulating the electoral system for the future Chief Executive.8
Although started separately, these two groups united in testing the deci-
sion issued by the NPCSC in 2007. By stressing universal standards, they
fought against any nominating procedure that might put the oppositions
in a defensive position.
The rise of Occupying Central with Peace and Love and the Alliance for
True Democracy in effect jump-started public discussion on constitutional
reform. Moreover, the concept of civil referendum and civil disobedience
agitated the central government as these suggested confrontation and
possibilities of social disorder. The central government soon rebuffed
them by pressing forward its bottom line for constitutional reform. It
declared that only those whose loyalty lies with the country and Hong
Kong could become the future Chief Executive if universal suffrage for the
Chief Executive was to be introduced in 2017. It categorically excluded
those who might be seen as “antagonistic” to the central government
from entering the race for the office of the Chief Executive. It warned that
universal suffrage for the Chief Executive must be kept within the bound-
aries set by the Basic Law and the decisions made by the NPCSC in 2007.9
If the high-profiled mobilization campaign had been a tactic for poli-
tical bargaining, then it did not produce the effect that the opposition
alliance had desired, nor did the stern warning on the part of the central
government reign in the oppositions as it had hoped. On the contrary, the
tension between the central government and the opposition alliance
quickly escalated. The Alliance shifted to a radical position by dropping
reconciliatory proposals that it had been considering.10 The final proposal
it put forward attempted to nullify the function of the future nominating
committee. It was proposed that anyone who could secure the endorse-
ment of political parties should be eligible to stand for the election of the
Chief Executive. Coined ‘civil nomination,’ the Alliance also proposed
that anyone who could secure the nomination of two percent of eligible
voters should be considered eligible. One the other hand, the future
nominating committee would unconditionally endorse candidates nomi-
nated by political parties and registered voters. The Occupy Central with
Peace and Love declared in June 2014 that the Alliance’s proposal had
won the hearts of participants who cast their votes via its electronic plat-
form. Together, these two groups sought to evade the decision of the
NPCSC in 2007 as the framework of reform.
8 K. POON

In response, the central government quickly translated its “bottom

line” for reform into specific provisions. In its decision issued in August
2014, the NPCSC further ruled that the future nominating committee
would exactly mirror the existing Election Committee. Second, only
persons who could obtain the endorsement of more than half of all
nominating committee members could become nominees. Third, only
two to three nominees with the highest number of endorsements would
go to the public ballot.11 These provisions in effect eliminated representa-
tives of the opposition groups from standing as candidates for popular
vote. Following the composition of the existing Election Committee, the
future nominating committee would be comprised of 1200 members
returned by a mixture of individual votes, corporate votes and votes
from ex officio from four designated clusters of the society. If history
could be any guide, then the oppositions may only be able to secure a
fraction of total seats in the nominating committee. Consequently, their
representatives would be unlikely to pass the threshold of nomination.
By August 2014, the central government and the opposition alliance
came to a standoff. On the one hand, the opposition alliance sought to
evade the decision of the NPCSC in 2007 as the framework of reform. On
the other hand, the central government sought to exclude representatives
of opposition groups from standing as eligible candidates for the popular
vote. Given the polarization, it would require effective communication
and serious mediation between the two, if negotiation and compromise
were to be possible at all.
However, a willing and capable intermediary was nowhere in sight in
the process of constitutional reform this time. After his inauguration
in 2012, the Chief Executive immersed himself in welfare policies. As
seen in his policy address in 2013, the incumbent Chief Executive focused
on the supply of housing and land, the increase of resources for elderly
care as well as his mission to combat poverty.12 Public consultation on
constitutional reform was time and again delayed until December 2013,
almost a year and half after he took the office. He delegated the reform to
the Task Force led by the Chief Secretary for Administration. Unlike the
previous Chief Executive who was visible in the process of reform, for
example, facilitating the negotiation between the central government and
the Democratic Party and appealing for support in public, the incumbent
Chief Executive chose to take a back seat.
The absence of the incumbent Chief Executive in mediating disputes
between the central government and the opposition groups might be
 THE IMPASSE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: NEGOTIATING . . . 9

explained, partly, by the hands-on approach adopted by the central gov-

ernment. The role of the incumbent Chief Executive and his administra-
tion was thus pre-empted. But the incumbent Chief Executive also
appeared fairly content with a minimal role in the reform process. In
fact, the incumbent Chief Executive rose to power after a heated competi-
tion with his rival candidate from the same pro-establishment camp. He
came to the office with a deeply divided pro-establishment camp and a
combative opposition alliance in the Legislative Council. Given such con-
straints, the Chief Executive chose to build his credibility by focusing on
welfare and education policies, while leaving the contentious reform to his
seasoned and popular subordinator.
The strategic positioning adopted by the central government and the
Chief Executive was unfavorable to effective communication between the
two camps. Without an intermediary, the two sides could only read each
other from speeches and statements in the public arena. Possible room for
negotiation was clouded by political gesturing. Further, the possibility of
effective dialogue was eliminated by the internal split that erupted within
the opposition alliance. As the opposition alliance drifted to a radical
position, the Democratic Party left the alliance shortly after the outcome
of the referendum was made public.13 As a party that played a key role in
striking a deal with the central government at the second round of reform
in 2010, the Democratic Party arguably was the only member of the
Alliance that had established a rapport with the central government.
Without the Democratic Party, the two sides appeared to move ever
more quickly to disengagement, let alone agreement.
The final proposal that the Hong Kong SAR Government submitted to
the Legislative Council for approval in 2015 arrived too late with too little
substance. The supplementary provisions that sought to “increase the
number of contenders” and provide a “level playing field” did little to
resolve the standoff. As proposed by the Hong Kong SAR Government, a
person recommended jointly by 120 nominating committee members is
entitled to seek nomination, and each person may only obtain a maximum
of 240 recommendations. As a result, the system could allow at least five
and at most ten places for persons seeking nomination. In addition,
members of nominating committee were allowed to “support at least 2
and at most all persons seeking nomination.”14 These rules implied that
the opposition groups may send a few nominees to contend for the
nomination. But, the end result pretty much ascertained that their
nominees would unlikely pass the threshold for nomination. As many
10 K. POON

predicted, the Hong Kong SAR Government was short of the two thirds
of the total votes required for the passage of the reform package in the
Legislative Council. Legislators from the opposition alliance united
against the passage of the package.15

KEY ISSUES: RISK-MANAGEMENT, FRAGMENTATION

AND POLITICAL NEGOTIATION

The political impasse over universal suffrage for the Chief Executive in
2017 illustrates two key challenges for democratization in Hong Kong
within the framework of One Country and Two Systems. The first chal-
lenge is the central government’s propensity for risk management. Rooted
in the political culture of the Chinese mainland, the central government
viewed high-profile social mobilization such as referendums and civil
disobedience with deep suspicion. To eliminate the risk of losing control
over the territory, it prefers to err on the safe side by tightening the strings
to reform. The second challenge lies in the fragmentation of the opposi-
tion alliance. Embedded in the local electoral system characterized by
Proportional Representation, the number of opposition parties grew
while the number of the seats represented by leading parties shrank in
the Legislative Council. Opposition parties can only enhance their nego-
tiation power by forging alliance among themselves and with activist
groups. The dilemma is such that the larger the alliance is, the wider the
political spectrum that the alliance represents and, consequently,
the harder it would be to formulate agreed negotiation positions. In the
event of massive social mobilization, the alliance tended to succumb to
radicalism to preserve unity within and its leadership position in social
movements. Both issues undermined the abilities of the two sides to forge
consensus over constitutional reforms.
The political impasse that resulted from the third round of reform
vividly exemplifies both challenges. With its authority in interpreting the
Basic Law and rendering decisions on constitutional development in
Hong Kong, the NPCSC assumes the role of dominant player.
Perceptions of the central government about its gains and losses at each
round of reform determine its willingness and degree of concession.
Behind the central government’s tight leash on constitutional reform
this time lay a sense of heightened risks of losing its control over the
territory. In fact, a year before the third round of constitutional reform
 THE IMPASSE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: NEGOTIATING . . . 11

unfolded, the central government came to a “new recognition” about

Hong Kong’s political landscape. It reckoned that the Legislative
Council election held in 2012 had been interfered with by political forces
from overseas. These external forces had been fostering oppositions in
Hong Kong while coordinating the oppositions to the election.16
Although Chinese leaders have warned against interference of external
forces in Hong Kong’s affairs since the early 1980s, this threat appeared
to be ever more tangible this time. For the first time, the report of the 18th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China adopted the word
“contain” instead of “prevent” when referring to interference of external
forces in Hong Kong’s affairs. Moreover, Chinese leaders saw these
interferences as a part of a conspiracy to contain China, congruent with
the Back to Asia strategy adopted by the United States since 2011
(Lau 2015: 264–267). Hence, not only the central government’s interest
in Hong Kong, but also the nation’s interest in a peaceful rise was at stake.
The need to protect the nation’s sovereignty, security and interest in
development was thus stressed as the most important objectives of Hong
Kong policy.17
The central government saw the constitutional reform as a battle over
Hong Kong’s governing power. Losing the office of the Chief Executive
to the oppositions would mean losing Hong Kong’s governing power to
the external forces behind them (Li 2013: 47). As such, the electoral
system for electing the future Chief Executive “must provide an institu-
tional guarantee.” Only those whose loyalty lies with the country and
Hong Kong could assume the office. This institutional guarantee was
seen as “conditioned by the legal position of the Chief Executive” and
his/her “important duty” to ensure both the interests of Hong Kong and
that of the nation being protected.18
To achieve this objective, the central government was not content with
merely exercising its power to appoint or veto the future Chief Executive-
elected. It sought to ensure that the nomination mechanism would only
produce candidates whom it trusted. As some officials explained in private,
votes could be swung in the blink of eye on the day of the election. The
central government ought to avoid the possibility that it had to either
accept a distrustful Chief Executive-elected or veto the result of a general
election. In the latter scenario, the central government would make itself
an enemy of millions of Hong Kong voters. Hence, the nomination
mechanism must be structured in such a way that the central government
would be free from risks (Zhu 2015:24).
12 K. POON

The risk-free approach was in sharp contrast with the comparative leni-
ence that the central government had shown toward the oppositions in
previous races for the Chief Executives. Although selected by a fairly limited
Election Committee, candidates from the opposition parties succeeded in
becoming candidates in all three selections for the Chief Executive in the
post-handover years, including the by-election for the Chief Executive in
2005 and selections for the Chief Executive in 2007 and 2012. Although
none of these candidates eventually succeeded, one candidate from the
oppositions in fact secured the endorsement of nearly 32 percent of votes
in the Election Committee in 2007 (Li 2013: 48). Such tolerance toward
the oppositions suggests that the perception of the central government had
a great impact on its willingness to compromise. Constitutional reforms in
the future are likely to be continually shaped by the judgment of the central
government on the political landscape in Hong Kong.
The fragmentation of the oppositions forms the second challenge for
democratization in Hong Kong. In fact, the radicalization of the opposition
alliance illustrates the ways in which fragmentation undermines its ability to
negotiate with the central government in a cohesive manner. For parties
that sought reconciliation, ‘civil nomination’ was adopted as a compromise
for the sake of unity within the Alliance. Some opposition leaders hoped
that it could be a starting position for negotiation, while preparing to accept
a reform package within the framework of the Basic Law.19 But unity came
with a price. The Alliance soon saw itself being gradually dragged toward
the radical side of the political spectrum. ‘Civil nomination’ was adopted
first as one among a few options. Next, the Alliance found itself endorsing
nothing but nominating procedures that deviated from the decision of the
NPCSC issued in 2007 (Li 2013: 48).
The radicalization of the opposition alliance, in part, can be explained
by the weakness of leading parties in steering the direction of the Alliance.
The Proportional Representation system allows the survival of small
parties in elections. As the result, the number of opposition parties in
the Legislative Council had grown rapidly in the post-handover years.
Opposition parties hence often compete with each other for votes from
the same pool of supporters. A non-compromising stance as a campaign
strategy works for small parties as it appeals to certain segments of
the society. However limited the votes, small parties may be able to secure
one or two seats in the Legislative Council under the Proportional
Representation system. For parties that seek expansion via expended poli-
tical space and channels, reconciliation is the way forward. Nonetheless,
 THE IMPASSE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: NEGOTIATING . . . 13

reconciliation could be turned into a weapon against leading parties dur-

ing elections. Therefore, the leading parties were neither capable of com-
manding cooperation from its peers, nor could they unequivocally resist
radical appeals (Li 2013: 48).
The emerging radical movement led by students also contributed the
radicalization of the Alliance. In the course of 2013 to 2014, two student
groups rose to take the flag of the social movement. The Scholarism, a student
group that emerged in the anti-national education movement in 2012, moved
to center stage in the summer of 2013. The proposals that the Scholarism put
forward were far more radical compared to those of the Alliance for True
Democracy. This group proposed that the nominating committee should be
comprised of 3,500,000 eligible voters. Those who could secure the endorse-
ment of 100,000 eligible voters should become candidates for the office of the
Chief Executive.20 This student group later was joined by the Hong Kong
Federation of Students. In the summer of 2014, these two students groups
revealed their joint proposal. They advocated that the nominating committee
should be comprised of all legislators chosen by direct election. Those who
could secure the endorsement of 35,000, about 1 percent, of total eligible
voters should become candidates for the Chief Executive election. The nomi-
nating committee should be comprised of members of the Legislative Council
returned by direct election. Those who could secure an endorsement of 8
percent of members of the nominating committee should also be qualified as a
candidate for the popular vote.21 In the nutshell, this proposal completely
evaded the decision of the NPCSC in 2007. As students, they had anything
but invested interest in the establishment, which made them free to advocate
any kind of proposals at no cost.
By September 2014, not only leading opposition parties lost their grip
on the direction of the Alliance for True Democracy, but also the Alliance
as a whole began to lose its grip on the direction of the social movement.
The Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of students succeeded in
moving into the limelight by launching vicious protests. The Occupy
Central with Peace and Love campaign was surpassed by what later was
called the Umbrella Movement. Led by the students groups, major com-
mercial districts were shut down for 79 days. During this period, tear-gas
was fired. Bricks were thrown. Policemen and protesters were bruised.
Roads and traffic were blocked. Several districts were paralyzed, hindering
business operations and the lives of ordinary residents.
The opposition alliance was completely marginalized as the social move-
ment took a drastic turn. They could neither lead nor divorce themselves
14 K. POON

from the social movement they had initiated at the beginning. Vetoing the
reform package tabled in the Legislative Council by the government was the
only politically sensible option. As a voting block, opposition parties showed
their solidarity with the student activists who then appeared to occupy the
moral high ground. Such a collective action also spared everyone in the
alliance from losing votes to its sister parties in the next Legislative Council
election. Caught between a radical social movement and a hawkish central
government, the opposition parties behaved the way they had been condi-
tioned by the Proportional Representation system. In the end, neither the
opposition alliance nor the students groups were able to advance Hong
Kong’s democratization.

THE PROSPECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE FUTURE

The impasse over constitutional reform marks a failed negotiation between
the central government and the oppositions. But it is by no means the end
of contestation over the boundary between the state and the territory. If
the Basic Law is to govern the relationship between the state and Hong
Kong, then electoral reform concerning the office of the Chief Executive,
as provided by Article 45, will emerge again. However, the prospect for
success for the next round of reform will continue to be daunting if the
underlying issues remain unchanged.
As a major stakeholder, the central government will continue to guard
state authority over the territory with a certain safety margin. But it has an
equally important incentive to compromise in the quest for greater auton-
omy so as to maintain a rapport with the territory. The critical questions
are when and to what degree that concession will be granted. From an
optimistic view, the central government’s propensity for risk management
may be alleviated when the perceived threat of losing control over the
territory eases. In fact, China’s peaceful rise in the world appears to be just
a matter of time in light of its active participation in the international arena
in recent years. Once the central government acquires sufficient confi-
dence in national strength and in the stability of the communist rule in
China, its urge for risk management may dissipate. Alternatively, if the
oppositions focus on political platforms within the framework of the Basic
Law, they may be perceived as “loyal oppositions” (Li 2013: 41). Trust
between the central government and the oppositions can then be rebuilt.
Constitutional reform could proceed to allow greater participation for all.
Of course, such changes require time and patience.
 THE IMPASSE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: NEGOTIATING . . . 15

Comparatively, the fragmentation of the oppositions presents a bigger

challenge as far as negotiation for electoral reform is concerned. Unless
changes in the local electoral system occur, the oppositions will continue
to be weighted down by internal competition and constant realignment. If
there is an alliance when the next round of reform emerges, it is likely to
exhibit swings in political positioning and have difficulty in forging a
consensus among the constituent parties. Currently, opposition parties
are trying to adapt to an ever more competitive political market. In the
aftermath of the failed reform, student groups that emerged in the
Umbrella Movement began to transform themselves into political parties,
vying for seats in the next Legislative Council. Following their radical
appeals during the Umbrella Movement, these new parties advocated
localism and self-determination through a popular referendum.
Although short of calling for Hong Kong’s independence, the new parties
nonetheless suggested that the people of Hong Kong should consider the
validity of the One Country Two System framework after 2047. The long-
standing opposition parties have found themselves on the defensive side.
The Civic Party has been forced to adjust its platform. Citing its disap-
pointment with the central government, the Party embraced localism,
self-determination and plurality as its core values in its manifesto com-
memorating the 10th anniversary of the party.22 The Democratic Party
appears to be caught in a dilemma. It seems to resist radical platforms. But
it could not ignore the attack from new competitors saying that reconci-
liation has failed to advance democracy in Hong Kong. Without a funda-
mental change in the local electoral system, the oppositions are unlikely to
form a unified force to effectively advance democracy in Hong Kong.
Besides the above-mentioned constraints, there are reasons to believe
that the political actors involved will learn from this round of reform. They
will adjust their strategies and positions accordingly for the next round of
reform. At the time of writing, the central government has already resumed
its contact with the oppositions. In early 2016, private meetings between
representatives of the central government and opposition leaders took place
in both Hong Kong and Beijing. During his visit to Hong Kong in May
2016, the Chairman of the NPCSC also met opposition leaders from a
number of major political parties. These meetings suggest that both sides
are willing to step out of political stalemate. Positive interaction between the
two at the next round of reform is not entirely out of reach. By the time the
fourth constitutional reform emerges on the horizon, there will be a whole
new political setting within which the stakeholders interact.
16 K. POON

NOTES
1. Article 43 and Article 45, the Basic Law.
2. Article 45, the Basic Law.
3. Article 5, the Basic Law.
4. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Decision of the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for
Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and
for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage (Adopted at
the Thirty First Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s
Congress on 29 December 2009), http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/tc/basiclaw
text/index.html (accessed 18 May 2016).
5. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, The Interpretation
by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of
Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted at
the Eight Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s
Congress on 6 April 2004), http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/
index.html (accessed on 18 May 2016).
6. Ibid.
7. Occupy Central with Peace and Love, “manifesto”, http://oclp.hk/index.
php?route=occupy/book_detail&book_id=11 (accessed 18 May 2016).
8. Alliance for True Democracy, “Proposals for universal suffrage”, http://
www.atd.hk/?page_id=38 (accessed 18 May 2016).
9. Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong,
“Speeches of Qiao Xiaoyang at the Forum with Selected member of
Legislative Council” (in Chinese), http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/
trad/china/2016/05/160519_china_zhangdejiang_hk_politics (accessed
April 17, 2017).
10. Alliance for True Democracy, “Proposals for universal suffrage”, http://
www.atd.hk/?page_id=177 (accessed 18 May 2016).
11. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Decision of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to
the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Region by
Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 (In
Chinese), http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/decision/index.html (accessed
on 18 May 2016).
12. Chun-ying Leung, “Seek Change Maintain Stability Serve the People with
Pragmatism”, http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2013/eng/ (accessed 18
May 2016).
 THE IMPASSE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: NEGOTIATING . . . 17

13. Ta Kung Pao, 6 May, 2014. http://news.takungpao.com/hkol/politics/

2014-05/2479327.html (accessed 18 May 2016).
14. The Hong Kong SAR Government, “Method for Selecting the Chief
Executive by Universal Suffrage Consultation Report and Proposals”,
http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/second/report.html (accessed 18 May
2016).
15. Nanzao.com, June 18, 2015, http://www.nanzao.com/tc/hk-macau-tw/
14e050f45b7586e/28-zan-cheng-8-fan-dui-0-qi-quan-li-fa-hui-fou-jue-
2017-te-shou-pu-xuan-zheng-gai-fang-an (accessed 18 May 2016).
16. Wen Wei Po, 22 November, 2012. http://paper.wenweipo.com/2012/
11/22/PL1211220007.htm (accessed 18 May 2016).
17. China Review News, 9 December 2012. http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1023/
3/1/5/102331521.html (accessed 18 May 2016).
18. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Decision of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to
the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Region by
Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 (In
Chinese), http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/decision/index.html (accessed
on 18 May 2016).
19. Path of Democracy, http://pathofdemocracy.org/%e6%b9%af%e5%ae%b6%
e9%a9%8a-%e6%94%bf%e6%94%b9%e5%a4%b1%e6%95%97-%e6%89%80%
e7%82%ba%e4%bd%95%e5%9b%a0/ (accessed 18 May 2016).
20. Inmediahk.net, June 24, 2013. http://www.inmediahk.net/node/
1017063 (accessed 18 May 2016).
21. Hong Kong Students Union Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/hku
supage/posts/682252188499949 (accessed 18 May 2016).
22. Civic Party, “Manifesto Commemorating the 10th Anniversary”, http://
www.civicparty.hk/?q=node/7025 (accessed 18 May 2016).

REFERENCES

Books and Journal Articles

Lau, Siu Kai. 2014. Hong Kong’s Unique Path to Democracy. Hong Kong:
Commercial Press (Hong Kong) (in Chinese).
Lau, Siu Kai.. 2015. The Implementation of the One Country Two Systems in Hong
Kong. Hong Kong: Commercial Press (Hong Kong) (in Chinese).
Li, Xiaohui. 2013. “Discussion on the Struggle over the Governing Power and the
Path to Consensual Politics Concerning the Development of Political System in
Hong Kong.” Hong Kong and Macau Studies. June. (in Chinese).
18 K. POON

Poon, Kit.. 2008. The Political Future of Hong Kong: Democracy within
Communist China. London: Routledge.
Zhu, Shihai. 2015. “Candidates for the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and the Will of the Central Government.” Hong Kong
and Macau Studies. January. (in Chinese).

Documents
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China.
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues
Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues
Relating to Universal Suffrage (Adopted at the Thirty First Session of the
Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress on 29
December 2009).
The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China
(Adopted at the Eight Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth
National People’s Congress on 6 April 2004).
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues
Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Region
by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 (in Chinese).

Websites
Occupy Central with Peace and Love, http://oclp.hk.
Alliance for True Democracy, http://www.atd.hk.
Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong, http://www.
locpg.hk.
The Constitution and Mainland Affairs Bureau, http://www.2017.gov.hk
Path of Democracy, http://pathofdemocracy.org.
Hong Kong Students Union Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/hkusupage.
Civic Party, http://www.civicparty.hk.

Kit Poon is a Visiting Fellow at the Department of Public Policy, City University
of Hong Kong. Her publications include The Political Future of Hong Kong:
Democracy within Communist China (Routledge, 2008). She completed her
 THE IMPASSE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: NEGOTIATING . . . 19

PhD in Government and Public Administration at the Chinese University of Hong

Kong, Master’s degree in International Affairs at the Columbia University and
Bachelor of Arts from Rutgers University in the United States. Kit taught at Hong
Kong Polytechnic University as an Assistant Professor and served as the Under
Secretary for the Environment of the Hong Kong SAR Government prior to
joining the City University of Hong Kong.
 CHAPTER 2

From Executive Dominance to Fragmented

Authority: An Institutional and Political
Analysis

Ngok Ma

INTRODUCTION
Since the sovereignty changeover in 1997, the much-maligned execu-
tive-legislative relations in Hong Kong have been seen as a major cause
of governance problems in Hong Kong. In the last 20 years, Hong Kong
has seen three different Chief Executives (CEs). Each of them agreed
that there were major problems between the executive and legislature.
The problem remains unresolved if not aggravated by 2017, despite this
acknowledgement from both the executive and legislature.
For decades, the Hong Kong constitutional setup has been described
as “executive-dominance” or “executive-led” (行政主導). The term
conveyed a connotation of an autocratic, powerful, centralized executive
branch, with much power vested in the CE, resembling the colonial
governor, capable of dominating policy-making. In practice, the Hong
Kong executive after 1997 was plagued by a lack of elite cohesion, a
confused institutional logic, flawed political strategies, and other problems

N. Ma (*)
Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University
of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
e-mail: mangok@cuhk.edu.hk

© The Author(s) 2018 21

Brian C.H. Fong, T.-L. Lui (eds.), Hong Kong 20 Years after the
Handover, Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51373-7_2
22 N. MA

that severely weakened its authority and capacity. The problem has grown
more serious in recent years, with executive-legislative conflict reaching a
climax by 2016, as testified by the frequency of filibusters and the inability
of the executive to control the legislative schedule.
This chapter will analyze the plight of executive authority in Hong Kong.
It will start from an institutional analysis of the political structure as laid
down in the Basic Law. It shows that the constitutional setup has a few gaps
and inconsistencies, which hamper executive authority, creating problems
and conflicts after 1997. It will analyze the political changes since 1997 that
brought about the fragmentation of authority of the executive branch and
exacerbated executive-legislative conflicts. Over the years, the incongruities
of the system, the absence of reform, and its inability to cope with rapid
changes in society mean that the maintenance of an ill-conceived system
with anachronistic features is bound to bring governance problems.

“EXECUTIVE-DOMINANCE” AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE

“Executive dominance” has been hailed as a pillar principle for the con-
stitutional design of Hong Kong. However, “executive dominance” is not
a well-defined term in political science. Lijphart (1999: 116) has used
“executive dominance” loosely to describe systems that vest much power
in the executive branch, the most representative being the Westminster
system. Yet it is obvious that the Hong Kong system bears little resem-
blance to the Westminster system, before or after 1997. The Basic Law
text also does not contain the term “executive dominance,” although
mainland and Hong Kong officials had repeatedly emphasized that the
principle was “embedded” in the mini-constitution. Lau (2000) and Li
(2001) gave the best elaboration of the key features of the “executive
dominant” system of Hong Kong:

1. The Chief Executive (CE) and the bureau secretaries control most
of the policy-making power. Most government policies do not need
the approval of the legislature unless they entail changing of laws or
new appropriations.
2. The CE has a superior constitutional status to other branches of the
government. The CE is elected independent of the Legislative
Council (Legco).
3. The executive holds the initiative to propose legislations. Government
bills have a priority to get onto the Legco agenda (Article 72 (2)).
 FROM EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE TO FRAGMENTED AUTHORITY: AN . . . 23

All bills passed by the Legco need the signature of the CE to become
effective laws.
4. The CE has a wide range of appointment powers, ranging from
government officials, judges, to chairs and members of various
public corporations, committees and boards. This appointment
power is not constrained by the Legco or the courts.
5. If the CE considers a bill passed by the Legco “not compatible with
the overall interests” of Hong Kong, he can return it to the Legco
for reconsideration. The CE can dissolve the Legco if s-he does not
want to sign a bill passed the second time by the Legco, or if the
Legco refuses to pass the annual budget or any important govern-
ment bills (Article 50).

This setup originated from the colonial system, which gave the
Governor dictatorial powers. Before 1985, the Governor appointed all
members of the Executive Council (Exco) and the Legco. The latter was
relatively powerless, with the exception of the power of financial control,
where it was entrusted to control the government to preserve a low-
expenditure, low-tax colony (Ma 2002). In the 1980s, when the Basic
Law was under draft, this “executive dominant” system was seen by
Beijing as an efficient one with power in the hands of bureaucrats, with
few political struggles and no party politics that might adversely affect
stability and governing efficiency. The basic logic was then borrowed
and instituted into the post-1997 Basic Law, hoping to deliver effective
governance by putting most power in the hands of the CE and the
bureaucratic polity.
It would be too simplistic to assume that a post-colonial monarch was
instituted in the Basic Law, no matter how the CE is eventually going to
be selected. If we make a careful analysis of the Basic Law, there are a few
noteworthy institutional “gaps” that are not clearly defined and ambig-
uous. These gaps have impacted the formation of the executive branch,
the division of labor within the executive, the political capacity of the
executive branch and executive-legislative relations after 1997.

SYSTEMIC VOIDS IN THE BASIC LAW

If a political scientist reads the Basic Law carefully, s-he would be
curious as to how the system works. As it is, in the constitutional
setup there are quite a few places that are institutionally under-defined,
24 N. MA

leading to ambiguities and potential conflicts when the system was put
into practice after 1997.

The Role of the Executive Council

The Executive Council (Exco) (行政會議) is one of the most under-
defined institutions in the Basic Law, in terms of its functions and com-
position. Article 54 of the Basic Law states that the Exco “shall be an
organ for assisting the Chief Executive in policy-making.” This is vague
and ambiguous to say the least. It can be a high-level cabinet-like body
composed of ministers, which makes and carries out policies. It can be a
committee of top-level aides who do not actually hold executive or admin-
istrative power. It can also be a casual collection of advisers that plays only
a consultative role and “assists” the CE in policy-making. Precisely what
role it plays in policy-making is not specified in the Basic Law. Article 56
does specify that the CE needs to “consult” the Exco before making
important policy decisions. The same article, however, allows the CE to
choose not to accept majority Exco opinion; s-he only needs to put the
reason on record. The choice of the words “assist” and “consult” implies
that the power lies with the CE to decide how much weight is to be given
to the Exco in decision-making.
In early colonial days, the Exco was exclusively composed of colonial
officials. It started to introduce appointed unofficial members in 1896,
drawing from the elite class. In the postwar years, it was an important
mechanism of “administrative absorption” (King 1975) when British
trading firm representatives and Chinese businessmen and industrialists
were coopted to ensure their support to colonial rule. When decoloniza-
tion was imminent, the British prepared for localization by appointing
elites like Allen Lee, Selina Chow and Rita Fan and made them simulta-
neously Exco and Legco members. Since the mid-1980s, these members
were responsible for explaining and promoting government policies,
facing the challenge from the public, the media and a nascent democratic
opposition. By disallowing members to serve in both Exco and Legco,
Chris Patten severed this executive-legislative tie and made Exco a group
of his own personal advisers, promoting liberals such as Anna Wu and
Christine Loh.
All these showed that in colonial times, the Exco had served different
functions at different times. It could be a “Council of Ministers”-type
cabinet (early times). It could be a body for “synarchy” of colonial
 FROM EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE TO FRAGMENTED AUTHORITY: AN . . . 25

bureaucrats and Chinese economic elites (postwar years) (King 1975).

In the David Wilson era (1987–1992), the British tried to use some Exco
members as quasi-ministers to groom Hong Kong politicians as possible
leaders after 1997. Chris Patten dropped this idea and made Exco more or
less a purely advisory body.
The unclear role definition is reflected from the composition outlined
in the Basic Law. Article 55 states that the Exco members “shall be
appointed by the Chief Executive from among the principal officials of
the executive authorities, members of the Legislative Council and public
figures.” It does not specify the ratio of each of the three sources of
members, but the writing implies that all three types (officials, Legco
members and public figures) need to be included. It more or less is left
to the CE to decide.
After 1997, the role, function and composition of the Exco went
through several changes. Tung Chee-hwa at first tried to make it a partial
cabinet by making unofficial Exco members such as Antony Leung, CY
Leung and Tam Yiu-chung in charge of education, housing and elderly
policy, respectively. This led to a role conflict with the policy secretaries,
who were not Exco members, but in theory should be responsible for
making and answering for policies in their respective areas. Tung made
a major change in 2002 when he introduced the Principal Official
Accountability System (POAS). The goal of the POAS, inter alia, was to
allow the CE to pick his/her political appointees from outside the govern-
ment to serve as bureau secretaries. Tung recomposed Exco after introdu-
cing POAS, making all the bureau secretaries Exco members, with a small
number of unofficial members. The Exco thus functioned like a cabinet-
like council of ministers since 2002.
This model apparently did not work very well either. Regina Ip criticized
that the Exco under POAS did not work like a team, as she was left alone to
face the political battle of Article 23 in 2002–2003 and shouldered all the
political responsibility. This “council of ministers” form was short-lived, as
Tung stepped down in March 2005. When Donald Tsang took office, he
reverted the Exco function to one resembling Patten’s era—a collection of
unofficial advisers drawn from the elite class. The bureau secretaries were
officially Exco members, but they did not need to attend every meeting
unless there was an agenda item related to their area.
Due to Exco’s “collective responsibility” rule, Legco members who
serve on the Exco are obliged to support the government. Incorporating
pro-government party leaders in the Exco has become a coalition-building
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
diese Völker müssen auf irgend eine Art verschwinden, sei es, dass
sie unter den Ackerbauern aufgehen, sei es, dass der stärker
werdende Kampf ums Dasein sie gänzlich verdrängt.
Die sesshaften Stämme ernähren sich sämmtlich von Ackerbau,
der mit der Hacke betrieben und von Viehzucht gänzlich unabhängig
ist, die nebenbei auch gepflegt wird. Im abflusslosen Gebiet und in
Unyamwesi spielt Sorghum die erste Rolle, bei den Waschaschi
Eleusine und Penicillaria, in Usinja Maniok, in Ussui Sorghum, in
Urundi vorherrschend Bananen und Hülsenfrüchte.
Selbstverständlich wird nur soviel angebaut, als zum Leben
nothwendig ist, da irgend welcher Export an Nahrungsmitteln nicht
stattfindet. Fast bei allen Stämmen wird der Ackerbau mit grosser
Sorgfalt betrieben, die Felder sind meist gut gehalten. Die besten
Ackerbauer sind die Wanyamwesi, die mit grosser Vorliebe und
ungemein rasch fremde Kulturpflanzen, wie Reis und Baumwolle,
annehmen und bauen.
Dennoch schliesst diese Art der Kultur häufige Hungersnoth nicht
aus. Bei einer Missernte sind die Vorräthe, so bedeutend sie auch oft
sind, nicht genügend, um bis zur nächsten Ernte vorzuhalten und die
Isolirung der einzelnen Landschaften, der Mangel jeglicher
Verkehrsmittel lassen selbst eine rein lokale Missernte zur
Katastrophe werden, der Hunderte erliegen. Diese periodisch
auftretende Hungersnoth, verbunden mit Stammesfehden, welche
jene Gebiete fast unaufhörlich zerfleischen und Pockenepidemien,
die oft furchtbare Verheerungen anrichten, decimiren die
Bevölkerung oder lassen doch eine Vermehrung derselben nicht zu.
Es liegt auf der Hand, dass die Verbesserung der Verkehrsmittel, die
Erhöhung der Sicherheit des Lebens und Eigenthums, die Kultur mit
einem Worte, geeignet ist den materiellen Zustand dieser Stämme
und damit auch die Bevölkerungszahl zu heben.
Wenn wir die K u lt u r p fla n ze n der Eingeborenen auf ihre
Entwickelungsfähigkeit für den Export betrachten, so sind die
Hirsearten (Sorghum, Eleusine, Penicillaria) wohl nicht oder doch
erst in zweiter Linie zum Export aus so fernen Gebieten geeignet.
Dasselbe gilt von den Knollengewächsen, Maniok, süssen Kartoffeln
und von Bananen, die sämmtlich an erster Stelle als
Nahrungspflanzen stehen. Aussichtsvoll sind jedoch manche jener
Produkte, die heute nur nebenher gebaut werden.
We i ze n wird in Unyanyembe und Irangi durch Araber und
Wanyamwesi gebaut. Obwohl diese Gegenden keineswegs
besonders fruchtbar sind, liefert er doch bei fleissiger Berieselung
gutes Erträgniss. Noch besser würde er in Hochgebieten gedeihen.
Da durch die Erfahrung bewiesen ist, dass Weizen selbst in
trockenen Gebieten Ostafrika's gedeiht, so scheint mir eine
Förderung seiner Kultur vor Allem wünschenswerth.
Re is wird in Usukuma, Unyanyembe und Urambo von
Eingeborenen gebaut und wurde ursprünglich von Arabern importirt.
Da die betreffende Varietät auch im Trockenen gedeiht, so steht
einem Anwachsen dieser Kultur kein Hinderniss entgegen.
Ba u mw o l l e pflanzt man in Usukuma zur Herstellung des
ungemein festen, einheimischen Baumwollzeuges. In Gegenden, wo
das europäische Zeug eingeführt wird, schwindet diese Kultur, die
hauptsächlich für die Tieflandsgebiete bestimmt erscheint.
O e lf r ü ch t e, Sesam und Arachis pflanzt man in vielen
Gegenden, letztere besonders massenhaft in Schaschi und es liesse
sich bei geeigneten Transportmitteln schon jetzt ein namhafter
Export erzielen. P a lm- O e l produziren die Tanganyika-Ufer in
grossen Mengen und versorgen selbst Tabora mit solchem.
Ka ff e e wird, soweit mir bekannt, in Deutsch Ost-Afrika nirgends,
wohl aber in Uganda gebaut und liefert dort eine grossbohnige, dem
Liberia-Kaffee ähnliche Sorte von mittelmässiger Qualität. Dieselbe
könnte eben so gut in deutschem Gebiete gepflanzt werden.
 Ta b a k wird fast überall in reichlichen Mengen, allerdings
minderer Qualität gebaut und könnte heute schon einen Exportartikel
liefern.
Pr o d u kt e d e r Vie h z u ch t spielen im Karawanenverkehr eine
gewisse Rolle. Zeburinder, Ziegen und Schafe werden als
Schlachtvieh an die Küste getrieben und dort meist mit sehr grossem
Gewinn verkauft. Esel der guten Massai- und der schlechteren
Wanyamwesi-Varietät gelangen auch oft an die Küste, wo sie sehr
schwankende Preise von 5-40 Rps. erzielen. Die Seuche, welche in
den letzten Jahren in Ost-Afrika wüthete, hat einen grossen Theil der
Rinder hinweggerafft und nur langsam erholen sich die Viehzüchter
von derselben. Rationelle Zucht, eventuell Veredelung durch fremde
Rassen, kann viel zur Hebung der Viehzucht beitragen, auch muss
auf die Ausbildung der Rinder zu Zugthieren Bedacht genommen
werden, da die höhere Entwickelung des Ackerbaues solche
unbedingt erfordern wird.
Die Esel sind heute schon ein nicht zu unterschätzendes
Transportmittel und sowohl als Lastthiere, wie zum Karrenzug
verwendbar. Veredelungen mit den im Innern vorzüglich
gedeihenden Maskat-Eseln würden jedenfalls gute Resultate
erzielen. —
Fast sämmtliche oben genannte Kulturpflanzen sind n i ch t
afrikanischer Abkunft, sondern erst seit relativ kurzer Zeit eingeführt.
Grade dieser Umstand beweist, dass man von den Afrikanern
erwarten und hoffen kann sie zur weiteren Ausdehnung dieser
Kulturen wie zur Annahme neuer Nutzpflanzen bereit zu finden.
Manche Stämme, vor Allem die Wanyamwesi, haben sich
Bedürfnisse, hauptsächlich an Baumwollzeug, angeeignet, zu deren
Befriedigung sie sich grosser Mühe unterziehen. Als Träger wandern
sie nach der Küste, leisten dort oft Dienste als Arbeiter und kehren
dann mit den europäischen Industrieerzeugnissen ins Innere zurück.
 Mit dem Schwinden des Elfenbeins, mit der Eröffnung der Kongo-
und Nyassaroute wird der grosse Karawanenverkehr und damit auch
diese Einnahmequelle aufhören. Zwar werden die Leute an der
Küste stets Arbeit finden, aber es scheint doch sicher, dass sie auch
bereit sein werden, durch Anbau werthvoller Kulturpflanzen ihre
Bedürfnisse zu decken, falls durch Verkehrsmittel die Märkte zu
solchen geschaffen werden. Auch jene Stämme, welche
gegenwärtig abseits der Handelsstrassen ein primitives Dasein
führen, unter welchen sich jedoch hochbegabte und kräftige Völker,
wie die Wambugwe und vor Allem die Warundi, befinden, werden
sich Bedürfnisse aneignen und mit der Aussenwelt in Beziehung
treten, sobald moderne Verkehrsmittel bis ins Innere führen.
Der Imp o r t nach diesen Gegenden besteht vor Allem in
bedeutenden Mengen Baumwollzeug. Dieses wird wohl stets die
erste Rolle spielen und gewinnt täglich an Verbreitung. Im südlichen
Unyamwesi und Ost-Ussui hat es Fell- und Rindenkleidung fast
vollkommen ersetzt, in Usukuma nimmt es ungeheuer zu. Nur im
abflusslosen Gebiet ist fast ausschliesslich Lederkleidung üblich,
während Urundi nur Rindenzeug kennt. Wie rasch jedoch
Baumwollzeug solche nationalen Bekleidungsmittel verdrängen
kann, zeigt das Beispiel in Umbugwe. Im März 1892, bis zu welchem
Zeitpunkt das Land gänzlich unzugänglich war, sah ich dort
ausschliesslich Lederkleidung. Als durch die Kämpfe der Expedition
das Land erschlossen wurde, verbreitete sich Baumwollzeug mit
unglaublicher Schnelligkeit und im Januar 1893 fand ich die meisten
Eingeborenen damit bekleidet, während im März 1892 kaum ein
Fetzen im ganzen Lande aufzutreiben war. Was die Qualität dieser
Stoffe anbelangt, so verlieren die sch le ch te n immer mehr an
Beliebtheit. Die Erfolge des Irländers Stokes gegenüber seinen
indischen und arabischen Konkurrenten liegen hauptsächlich darin,
dass er g u t e und b i llig e Stoffe verkauft, welche die Eingeborenen
den schlechten vorziehen, auch wenn diese noch billiger sind.
 Neben Baumwollstoffen könnte noch die Waffen- und
Munitionseinfuhr genannt werden, die stets in bedeutenden Mengen
stattfand. Dieselbe steht jedoch in so innigem Zusammenhange mit
dem Sklavenhandel und könnte eine so bedrohliche Macht im
Rücken des Küstengebietes schaffen, dass ihre strenge
Unterdrückung bekanntlich zu den wichtigsten, durch internationale
Verträge verbürgten Aufgaben der deutschen Kolonialverwaltung
gehört. Es kommen also nur mehr Nebenartikel, wie Glasperlen,
Metalldraht, Produkte der Eisenindustrie u. s. w. in Betracht.
Dass diese Länder eine kolossale Konsumtionsfähigkeit besitzen
ist zweifellos. Um jedoch die Völker zu Konsumenten zu machen,
bedarf es vor allem der Hebung der eingeborenen Produktion durch
Herstellung geordneter Zustände und durch Schaffen von
Verkehrsmitteln, welche den kostspieligen, für minderwerthige
Produkte ungeeigneten Trägertransport vortheilhaft ersetzen.
Was die unbewohnten Gebiete anbelangt, so scheint mir deren
allmähliche Besiedelung in hohem Grade wünschenswerth. Dieselbe
muss durch eingeborene Einwanderung begonnen werden, welcher
dann vielleicht eine fremde Einwanderung folgen kann.
Bei der e i n g e b o r e n e n Ein w a n d e r u n g denke ich vor Allem
an die Wanyamwesi, die heute schon mit Vorliebe Kolonien in
anderen Gegenden gründen. Ihre Arbeitskraft, Zähigkeit und
Intelligenz macht sie zu Kulturträgern ersten Ranges, wie man in
Unyanganyi und Ussandaui sehen kann, wo Wanyamwesi-Ansiedler
die wilden Eingeborenen vollkommen gebändigt und das Land dem
Handel erschlossen haben. Die Förderung und systematische
Anlegung solcher Kolonien gerade im abflusslosen Gebiet scheint
mir von hervorragender Wichtigkeit. Jede solche Niederlassung
vertritt, wenn sie unter gehöriger Aufsicht steht, eine Station mit
einem Europäer; ohne Schutztruppe, ohne Weissen kann man hier
dasselbe Ziel, die Sicherung der Strassen, die allmähliche
Heranbildung der Eingeborenen, erreichen. Menschenmaterial findet
man in Unyamwesi genug, denn der Unternehmungsgeist dieses
merkwürdigen Volkes treibt Angehörige desselben immer wieder in
die Ferne. Solche Kolonien unter primitiven Völkern, wie Wafiomi,
Wanyairamba, Wanyaturu u. s. w. wären ein äusserst nützliches
Ferment. Wo sie heute bestehen, sieht man deutlich, wie die
Eingeborenen mehr und mehr ihre ursprünglichen Sitten verlassen
und sich dem Wanyamwesi-Typus nähern, eine Umwandlung,
welche der Ethnograph vielleicht beweint, der Kolonialpolitiker aber
nur mit Freuden begrüssen kann.
Dass ähnliche Niederlassungen unter europäischer Aegide
möglich sind, zeigt meine Begründung einer Wanyamwesi-Kolonie in
Umbugwe unter Mwanangwa Swetu. Dieselbe erblühte unglaublich
rasch und war für meine Nachfolger Kompagnieführer Langheld und
Herrn Wolf ein Stützpunkt von hohem Werth, erfüllt also genau
denselben Zweck als eine Station mit einem Europäer, nur dass die
Kosten monatlich nicht mehr als 5 Rps. betragen! Solche Ansiedler,
die ihre Existenz an ein Land knüpfen haben eben ein direktes
Interesse mit den Eingeborenen einen modus vivendi zu finden und
verstehen es rasch zu Einfluss zu gelangen. Anderseits ist ihnen das
Wohlwollen und die Unterstützung der Europäer von so hohem
Werth, dass sie sich sorgfältig hüten es mit diesen zu verderben.
Natürlich muss ihre Autorität den Eingeborenen gegenüber eine
gewisse Stütze erhalten; diese liesse sich jedoch von einer
europäischen Station aus leicht gewähren, die gleichzeitig die
Ueberwachung dieser Wanyamwesi-Kolonien zu leiten hätte.
Wenn schon im besiedelten Theil des abflusslosen Gebietes
solche Wanyamwesi-Niederlassungen den höchsten Werth hätten,
so wäre dies noch mehr im Massai-Land, hauptsächlich in Mutyek
und bis Serengeti hin der Fall. Dass es möglich wäre Leute zu
finden, die sich in den genannten Gegenden sowie in den Massai-
Steppen, am Donyo Kissale u. s. w. niederlassen und dadurch diese
Gebiete zugänglich machen, scheint mir völlig zweifellos. Von den
Massai ist, wie ich ausdrücklich betone, weder bezüglich solcher
Ansiedelungen noch überhaupt das Geringste zu fürchten. Ihre
Hauptmacht ist gebrochen, auch sind sie, wie sich in der englischen
Interessensphäre täglich zeigt keineswegs so schroff ablehnend wie
stets angenommen wurde.
Eine wenn auch noch so sporadische Besiedelung durch
eingeborene Ackerbauer muss vorangehen, bevor an die Einleitung
einer fremden e u r o p ä i sch e n Ein wa n d e r u n g gedacht werden
kann. Wenn es überhaupt Gebiete im tropischen Afrika giebt, die für
solche Ansiedelung geeignet sind, so sind es die deutschen Massai-
Gebiete von Iraku bis Mau, wo Höhenklima sich mit
Wasserreichthum paart. Allerdings wäre es verfehlt, direkt einen
diesbezüglichen Versuch einzuleiten. Zu einem solchen eignen sich
die küstennahen Hochweide-Gebiete Usambára's und Pare's,
vielleicht auch des Kilimanjaro am meisten. Da die für Europäer
geeigneten Striche dieser Landschaften immerhin nur kleine sind, so
muss jedoch schon von vornherein an die Möglichkeit einer
Besiedelung der Massai-Gebiete gedacht werden, die vor Allem
durch Anlage von Wanyamwesi-Kolonien eingeleitet werden könnte.
Denn nur in den Hochgebieten, die eben in geschlossenen
Massen im Massailand vorhanden sind, kann an die Möglichkeit
europäischer Ansiedelungen gedacht werden. Die Tie flä n d e r unter
1200 m Seehöhe sind nirgends malariafrei und gestatten daher
Europäern eine dauernde Niederlassung nicht. Ob für diese weiten,
spärlich bewohnten Striche vielleicht eine andere fremde, etwa
chinesische oder indische Einwanderung in Betracht käme, mag
dahingestellt bleiben: Raum genug für eine solche wäre jedenfalls
vorhanden.
Wie immer man jedoch die wirthschaftliche Zukunft des Innern
Ostafrika's betrachtet, stets stösst man auf die Schwierigkeit der
Tr a n s p o r t mi t t e l, deren heutige Form jede Entwickelung hemmt.
Durch Trägerkarawanen lässt sich eben nur Elfenbein, vielleicht
auch Vieh und Esel mit grosser Schwierigkeit nach der Küste
schaffen. Alle anderen Produkte, vor allem jene des Ackerbaus, die
doch die eigentliche Zukunft des Landes bilden, sind auf diesem
Wege nicht zu befördern, da sie die Kosten solchen Transportes
nicht lohnen.
Wenn es sich nun darum handelt Linien zu finden, welche durch
Anlage einer S tr a sse oder Eise n b a h n die Kolonie erschliessen
sollen, so müssen dabei in erster Linie wirthschaftliche, in zweiter
Terrain-Gründe maassgebend sein. Es muss ferner bedacht werden
die »zweite Küste« Ostafrika's, die der grossen Seen möglichst
auszunutzen.
Eine Linie, welche, sei es nun von Tanga oder von Bagamoyo
oder Dar-es-Salaam aus nach Tabora führt, müsste nach dem
obengenannten Gesichtspunkte als gänzlich verfehlt betrachtet
werden. Denn bei diesem Projekt herrscht offenbar die irrige
Voraussetzung, dass Tabora, das lange Zeit das Emporium des
Elfenbein- und Sklavenhandels w a r aber schon heute nicht mehr ist
auch in Zukunft eine Rolle spielen werde. Dies ist jedoch, wie oben
ausgeführt, vollkommen ausgeschlossen. Ebenso wie Msenne,
welches 1858 der Centralpunkt des Inlandhandels war, völlig
verschwunden ist, so wird in einem Jahrzehnt auch von Tabora nicht
viel übrig bleiben.
Eine Bahn von Tanga nach Tabora hätte allerdings keine
wesentlichen Terrainschwierigkeiten zu überwinden. Sie würde bei
Korogwe den Ruvu überschreiten und bei Mgera fruchtbares Gebiet
verlassen. Durch den ödesten Theil der Massai-Steppe würde sie
nach Irangi führen und die fruchtbaren Hochgebiete weitab im
Norden liegen lassen. Etwa bei Unyanganyi müsste sie das Plateau
ersteigen, welches in Turu besonders unfruchtbar ist, hierauf die
Wembere-Steppe durchqueren und käme erst in unmittelbarer Nähe
Taboras in halbwegs fruchtbares Gebiet.
 Nicht viel besser ist die Linie Bagamoyo—Tabora, die überdies
Anfangs ziemlich grosse Terrainschwierigkeiten bietet. Sie verlässt in
Usagara fruchtbares Gebiet und führt durch wasserarme, dürre
Strecken von Ugogo nach Tabora. — Die ganze Linie, vom
Küstengebiet, also von Mgera einerseits und Usagara andererseits
wäre wirthschaftlich völlig unproduktiv und müsste erst durch
Seitenlinien ergänzt werden. Dasselbe wäre auch in Tabora der Fall,
man müsste einerseits zum Victoria-See, andererseits zum
Tanganyika Linien errichten, wenn das ganze Unternehmen
überhaupt einen Zweck haben soll. Wenn es sich also, wie auch von
den Vertretern der Tabora-Linie allgemein anerkannt wird, vor Allem
um die Erreichung der Seen handelt, so ist kein Grund einzusehen,
warum dieser Zweck nicht in gerader Richtung angestrebt werden
soll.
Eine Bahn, die von Tanga zum Speke-Golf führt, würde sich der
Luftlinie am meisten nähern. Im Anschluss an die Korogwe-Bahn
würde sie, dem Thal des Ruvu oder Mkomasi folgend, an den Fuss
des Kilimanjaro gelangen. Der weitere Weg wäre nach Ober-
Aruscha, um das Südende des Simangori-Berges zum Nordende
des Manyara-See, dann auf die Höhe des Plateaus, durch Mutyek
und am Nordende des Eyassi vorbei nach Serengeti und Ntussu
zum Nyansa, der etwa bei Nassa erreicht würde.
Die Terrainschwierigkeiten dieser Linie wären nicht bedeutende,
jedenfalls ohne Vergleich geringer, als die der englischen Mombas—
Victoria-See-Bahn.
Bis zum Kilimanjaro durchschneidet die Bahn Ebenen und hat
keinerlei nennenswerthe Hindernisse zu überwinden. Aus rein
wirthschaftlichen Gründen wäre die etwas schwierigere Mkomasi-
Route jener durch das Ruvu-Thal vorzuziehen. — Zwischen dem
Kilimanjaro und Ober-Aruscha dehnen sich ebenfalls Ebenen aus, in
welchen die Ueberbrückung einiger Gewässer nothwendig wären. —
Zwischen Ober-Aruscha und dem Manyara-See führt die Linie fast
völlig eben. Die Bäche, welche in den See münden, würden wieder
einige unbedeutende Brücken erfordern, hierauf wäre die grösste
Schwierigkeit, die Ersteigung des Plateaus zu überwinden. Der
Abfall ist aber am Nordende des Manyara nur ca. 100 m hoch, also
weit niedriger und sanfter als an irgend einer anderen Stelle. Am
Plateau von Mutyek, etwa bis zur Höhe des Eyassi, dürften noch
einige nicht namhafte Schwierigkeiten zu bewältigen sein. Dann tritt
die Linie wieder in Ebenen und durchschneidet diese
ununterbrochen bis zum Victoria-See. Bei einer Länge von ca. 800
km hätte die deutsche Victoria-See-Bahn also ungleich geringere
Terrainhindernisse zu überwinden als die 1060 km lange englische.
Wirthschaftlich könnten durch eine solche Bahn die folgenden
Ziele erreicht werden: die fruchtbaren Gebiete des nördlichen
Usambáras und Pares würden direkt an die Küste angeschlossen.
Der Kilimanjaro, der nach Aussage aller Beobachter zu den besten
Gebieten Ostafrika's gehört und auch militärisch von hoher
Wichtigkeit ist, wäre zugänglich gemacht. Im weiteren Verlauf
berührt die Linie den Meru, der kaum weniger günstig beschaffen ist
als der Kilimanjaro, durchschneidet die Massai-Steppe in ihrem
weniger unfruchtbaren, schmalen Nordabschnitt und erreicht den
Manyara, in dessen nächster Nähe sich die bewohnten
Ackerbaudistrikte Umbugwe und Iraku befinden. Sie durchzieht
hierauf das Mutyek-Plateau, welches, heute unbewohnt, doch zu
den fruchtbarsten Gebieten gehört und besonders in Bezug auf
europäische Einwanderung in Betracht kommt. Am Nordende des
Eyassi-See berührt die Linie die reichen Kochsalzlager dieser
Distrikte, führt hierauf durch Serengeti, das hauptsächlich als
Weideland in Betracht käme und betritt Usukuma, eines der dichtest
bewohnten und bebauten Gebiete des Innern, das bezüglich
Ackerbau sehr entwicklungsfähig ist.
Im Anschluss an die Bahn müsste natürlich ein Dampfer auf dem
Victoria-See laufen. Selbst für Dampfer bis zu 6 m Tiefgang ist der
See bequem fahrbar, doch müsste Feuerungsmaterial, sei es von
Kohlen oder Petroleum, mit der Bahn heraufgeschafft werden.
Dieser Dampfer, sowie einige Segelschiffe müssten den Verkehr auf
dem See herstellen und vor Allem dessen Küsten mit S a lz
versorgen.
Von Seiten feindlicher Völkerschaften wäre auf dieser Linie so
gut wie nichts zu befürchten. Einzig die Bewohner von Ober-Aruscha
sind entschiedene Gegner, doch steht deren endgiltige
Niederwerfung in hoffentlich naher Aussicht.
Im weiteren Verlauf der Route, besonders im Massai-Land, sind
Hindernisse von Seiten der Eingeborenen ganz und gar nicht zu
fürchten. Die Engländer, deren projektirte Bahn doch ebenfalls das
Massai-Land durchquert, veranschlagen für dieselbe eine
Schutztruppe von 400 Swahíli-Askari, hauptsächlich zur Bewachung
der Telegraphendrähte. Nach meiner Ansicht wäre diese Zahl für die
deutsche Linie noch zu hoch gegriffen. — Jedenfalls müsste jedoch
einem Bahnunternehmen die wenigstens theilweise Besiedelung der
Massai-Länder durch Wanyamwesi-Kolonien vorangehen, da die
Verpflegung der Arbeiter während des Baues sonst schwierig würde.
Die Anlage solcher könnte in 1-2 Jahren in genügender Zahl erfolgt
sein und mit den Trassirungsarbeiten für die Bahn Hand in Hand
gehen.

Baumann, Massai, pag. 255.

 Schematisches Profil der Victoria See-Bahn.
1:4,000,000.

Die Engländer nehmen für ihre Bahn die Benutzung indischer

Kulis als Arbeiter in Aussicht, da die englische Interessensphäre
keinerlei Völker beherbergt, die gegenwärtig schon zu intensiver
Thätigkeit geneigt wären. — Darin ist man deutscherseits in
glücklicherer Lage; die Wanyamwesi stehen hier zur Verfügung.
Tausende von Arbeitern sind jederzeit in Usukuma und in den
südlichen Strichen Unyamwesi's zu haben. Nur für Arbeiten, welche
besonderes Geschick erfordern, wären Leute von der Küste oder
von auswärts nöthig.
Die Verpflegung von Trassirungs-Kolonnen, sowie die der
Arbeiter während des Baues hätte keinerlei unüberwindliche
Schwierigkeiten. Bis Ober-Aruscha liefern die umliegenden
Landschaften genügende Nahrung. Ein Proviantdepot am Nordende
des Manyara, wo auch eine Wanyamwesi-Niederlassung zu gründen
wäre, liesse sich leicht von Umbugwe aus versorgen. Zwischen
Manyara-See und Ntussu ist allerdings gegenwärtig kein Proviant zu
erhalten und es müsste die Verbindung durch Begründung von
Wanyamwesi-Niederlassungen vermittelt werden. Uebrigens ist die
genannte Strecke kaum so lang wie die von Kikuyu nach Kavirondo
der englischen Bahntrasse, die ebenfalls absolut keine
Nahrungsquellen bietet. Transporte auf dieser Route könnten von
Anfang an vorzugsweise mit Eseln ausgeführt werden, die sich, wie
ich aus Erfahrung weiss, sehr gut dazu eignen.
Ausser der genannten Linie könnte für eine Victoriasee-Bahn
noch die Route Tanga—Korogwe—Mgera—Irangi—Umbugwe—
Meatu—Speke-Golf in Betracht kommen. Dieselbe ist zweifellos
kürzer und bequemer als die alte Ugogo-Route und daher einer
v o r l ä u f i g e n Entwickelung als Karawanenstrasse wohl werth. Doch
bietet sie ungleich mehr Terrainschwierigkeiten und durchschneidet
vielfach wirthschaftlich aussichtslose Gebiete, sodass eine Bahn hier
keine Vortheile hätte. Da Umbugwe und die Nachbarländer viele
Esel besitzen und in Mgera einerseits, in Usukuma andererseits,
leicht Träger zu bekommen sind, so hat diese Route für
gegenwärtige Verhältnisse, sowie als Zufuhrlinie bei Bahnarbeiten
grossen Werth und könnte durch rohe Klärung event. auch für
Eselkarren befahrbar gemacht werden. — Durch Wanyamwesi-
Kolonien nahe den Routen Mgera-Irangi und Mbulu-Meatu liessen
sich die grossen nahrungslosen Strecken dieser Linie verkürzen.
Hier sowohl wie im Massai-Lande mag es schwierig erscheinen,
Niederlassungen in unbewohnten Gebieten zu errichten. Wie ich
jedoch die Verhältnisse kennen gelernt, ist mir nicht zweifelhaft, dass
man das nöthige Menschenmaterial dazu findet und dass in wenigen
Jahren n a h e zu o h n e K o ste n, die weiten unbewohnten Gebiete
wenigstens sporadisch besiedelt sein könnten.
Was das Bahnunternehmen anbelangt, so erscheint es auf den
ersten Blick gewagt, dasselbe auf eine Linie zu lenken, die heute
fast völlig unproduktiv ist. Aber es kann nicht genug betont werden,
dass jedes Projekt, welches auf den h e u ti g e n Handelsverkehr
basirt ist, von gänzlich verfehlter Anschauung ausgeht. Denn
Elfenbein wird niemals eine Bahn bezahlt machen, das können nur
Produkte des Ackerbaues.
Dass eine Bahn ein Kulturfaktor ersten Ranges und geeignet ist,
einen ungeahnten Aufschwung zu veranlassen, ist durch zahllose
Beispiele in europäischen und überseeischen Ländern bewiesen.
Nicht nur der gesammte Handel wird sich sofort an der Bahnlinie und
ihren Ausgangspunkten koncentriren, sondern auch jeder unerlaubte
Verkehr, vor Allem der Sklavenhandel wird aufhören oder bei der
kolossalen Abnahme jedes Karawanen-Verkehrs leichter zu
verhindern sein.
Die Engländer, die doch in kolonialen Dingen gewiss keine
Phantasten, keine »Schwärmer« sind, gehen mit Ernst an den Bau
der Victoriasee-Bahn. Der einzige wenn auch nur scheinbar
stichhaltige Einwand gegen eine deutsche Bahn wäre der, dass
z we i Bahnen zum Victoria-See des Guten etwas viel seien. Die
Vortheile der Route Kilimanjaro—Speke-Golf gegenüber jener
Kikuyu—Kavirondo sind jedoch in die Augen springend. Vor Allem ist
es die n ä ch st e Linie — käme doch eine Bahn Mombas—
Kilimanjaro—Speke-Golf der Luftlinie nahezu gleich —, ferner sind
die Terrainschwierigkeiten ungleich geringer und Arbeitskräfte weit
leichter zu beschaffen. Die Kosten einer solchen Bahn wären also
weit geringer und der erreichte Hauptzweck, die Verbindung des
Victoria-Sees und Uganda's mit der Küste wäre derselbe. Es scheint
also nicht abzusehen, warum eine Ve r e i n i g u n g d e r b e id e n
B a h n p r o je kt e, des deutschen und englischen, nicht denkbar wäre.
Wenn man die Victoriasee-Bahn auf die Möglichkeit einer
weiteren Verlängerung betrachtet, so findet man, dass die
Mlagarassi-Zuflüsse in nächster Nähe des Victoria-Sees
entspringen, also zweifellos eine Bahnlinie zum Tanganyika, etwa
von Bukome nach Ujiji, ohne besondere Schwierigkeiten
ermöglichen würden. Doch gehört eine solche zweifellos der
späteren Zukunft an, vorläufig ist der Tanganyika unbedingt
abhängig von der Nya ssa - Ro u te. Kein wie immer geartetes
Bahnprojekt kann mit dieser konkurriren. Sich zur Nyassa-Route
einen Zugang zu sichern, die weiten, vielversprechenden Gebiete im
Süden des Schutzgebietes, die heute noch eine terra incognita sind,
zu erforschen und der Kultur aufzuschliessen, scheint mir eine der
dringlichsten Aufgaben deutscher Kolonialpolitik. Hier ist noch
Pionierarbeit zu thun, während dieselbe im Norden des
Schutzgebietes vollendet und die Spezialforschung, die allmähliche
wirthschaftliche Erschliessung einsetzen kann.
Auf die Wichtigkeit geographischer Forschung kann nie genug
hingewiesen werden, obwohl dieselbe selbst in kolonialen Kreisen
gar oft als »gelehrter Kram« im Gegensatz zu den »praktischen«
Arbeiten aufgefasst wird. Wie kurzsichtig diese Ansicht ist, zeigt am
besten das Beispiel von Usambára. Es ist neuerdings öfter die Frage
aufgeworfen worden, warum sämmtliche wirthschaftliche
Unternehmungen sich auf Usambára koncentriren, wo doch andere
Gebiete ebenso grosse, ja grössere Vortheile bieten sollen. Die
Antwort darauf ist einfach die: weil man Usambára kennt und weil es
Niemanden einfällt sein Kapital in Ländern auf's Spiel zu setzen, von
welchen man nichts weiss. Aber nicht nur die geographisch-
naturwissenschaftliche, sondern auch die ethnographische
Forschung hat eine eminent praktische Bedeutung, auf die auch
Stuhlmann in seinem ausgezeichneten Werk hinweist. Denn sie
allein ist im Stande uns mit dem Denken und Fühlen der
dunkelfarbigen Völker vertraut zu machen, welche die deutschen
Schutzgebiete bewohnen. So lange Offiziere und Beamte vom
hohen Ross ihres Europäerthums verächtlich und interesselos auf
den Neger herabblicken, solange sie »Afrika ohne die Afrikaner«
regieren wollen, so lange wird die Zeit der verhängnissvollen
Irrthümer kein Ende nehmen.
Was die Frage anbelangt, ob die ferneren Arbeiten sich auf die
Küste beschränken, oder auch das ferne Innere mit umfassen sollen,
so ist es allerdings richtig, dass die fruchtbaren Küstengebiete das
naheliegendste und aussichtsreichste Feld für koloniale Thätigkeit in
Ostafrika sind. Doch vor der Thatkraft und seltenen Kühnheit, mit
welcher Engländer und besonders Belgier heute daran gehen, das
Herz Afrika's der Kultur zu eröffnen, kann deutscher
Unternehmungsgeist nicht zurückstehen. Auf meinen langjährigen
Reisen im tropischen Afrika bin ich zu der Ueberzeugung gelangt,
dass die Erschliessung des dunklen Welttheils zwar noch schwere
Opfer erfordern, dass aber der L o h n dieser Mühen sicher nicht
ausbleiben wird.
Kapt. Lugard, ein genauer Kenner indischer und afrikanischer
Verhältnisse, spricht die Ueberzeugung aus, dass Ostafrika nicht
besser und nicht schlechter sei als Britisch-Indien. Hier wie dort giebt
es fruchtbare und wüste Strecken, gesunde Hochländer und
fieberreiche Niederungen. Was jedoch Indien unbedingt voraus hat,
ist die kolossale Bevölkerung; was uns in Ostafrika fehlt, sind
Me n s ch e n. Ungeheure Striche, und zwar nicht nur Steppen,
sondern auch wasserreiche, üppige Hochländer sind so gut wie
unbewohnt; überall ist die Bevölkerung äusserst dünn gesäet.
He b u n g d e r E in wo h n e r za h l bleibt daher die wichtigste Aufgabe
in Deutsch-Ostafrika, möge sie immer durch Versuche angebahnt
werden, die zu einer fremden Einwanderung führen, oder möge sie
die Faktoren zu beheben suchen, welche eine Vermehrung der
Eingeborenen verhindern. Nicht nur aus Humanität, nicht nur aus
sentimentaler Sorge um unsere »schwarzen Brüder« sind wir
verpflichtet, deren Lage zu verbessern, sondern aus dem rein
praktischen Interesse, das eine Kolonialmacht an der Entwickelung
ihrer Schutzgebiete haben muss. Die Vermehrung der
Inlandstationen, die strenge Aufrechterhaltung des Verbotes der
Waffeneinfuhr werden dem Fluch der Sklavenjagden und
Stammesfehden ein Ende machen und die vorschreitende Kultur
wird das Elend der Hungersnoth und der Seuchen mildern, das
schwer auf den Afrikanern lastet.
Den ungeheueren Anstrengungen der europäischen Nationen,
die in der Geschichte nicht ihres Gleichen haben, ist es gelungen,
das tropische Afrika zu erschliessen. Zwar ist die Periode der
Erforschung keineswegs abgeschlossen, viele Gebiete hat noch
keines Europäers Fuss betreten, und dass auch die Zeit der
Entdeckungen noch nicht vollendet, hat die Massai-Expedition
bewiesen. — Aber die Arbeit des Pioniers kommt heute nicht nur der
Wissenschaft zu Gute, sondern der Missionar, der Kaufmann, der
Pflanzer, sie folgen unaufhaltsam seinen Spuren.
Auch mir war es vergönnt, bei der Erschliessung eines Theiles
von Ostafrika mitzuarbeiten. U sa mb á r a, welches ich in den Jahren
1888 und 1890 als förmliche terra incognita durchstreift, es steht
heute im Brennpunkt der deutschen kolonialen Interessen. Durch die
Urwälder von Handeï schallt die Axt des Pflanzers, auf den Höhen
der Bergdörfer hat der Missionar sein Kreuz aufgerichtet und am
Fuss der Berge ertönt der Pfiff der Lokomotive, der bestimmt ist, das
Land aus tausendjährigem Schlummer zu erwecken.
Mögen auch jene fernen Gebiete, in welchen die Massai-
Expedition zuerst die deutsche Flagge entfaltet, mögen auch die
Hochplateaus des Massailandes und die Quellländer des heiligen
Nil, mögen auch sie dereinst der Kultur erschlossen sein!
ANHANG.
 Die Kartenaufnahmen von Dr. O. Baumann werden unter dem Titel »Die
kartographischen Ergebnisse der Massai-Expedition des Deutschen Antisklaverei-
Komite« als Ergänzungsheft No. 110 zu Petermanns Mittheilungen veröffentlicht.