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Ideology and Organization in Indian Politics
 Ideology and Organization in Indian
Politics
Polarization and the Growing Crisis of the Congress
Party (2009–19)
ZOYA HASAN
 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, ox2 6dp,
United Kingdom
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First Edition published in 2022
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You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same
condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
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Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2022931627
ISBN 978–0–19–286341–6
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DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192863416.001.0001
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only.
Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website
referenced in this work.
For Mushir
 Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction
1. Democratic Reorganization Eludes the Congress Party
2. Collapse of the United Progressive Alliance
3. The Gujarat Model and the Turn to the Right
4. Secular Politics on the Back Foot
5. Hindu Nationalism to the Fore
6. Opposition Interrupted
Conclusion

Bibliography
Index
 Acknowledgements

A sea-change has taken place in Indian and global politics in the

decade since my book Congress After Indira: Policy, Power, Political
Change (1984–2009) was published. That book focussed on the
comeback of the Congress party after the unexpected victory in the
2004 elections. It was a story of political recovery. But it is now clear
that the political revival was transitory. The two staggering defeats in
2014 and 2019 have brought the dire state of the Congress party to
the front and Centre of public debate. This book seeks to understand
the reasons for these enormous changes by looking, first, at the
underlying conditions that led to the steep decline of the Congress
and, second, the challenges—both external and internal—
confronting the Congress and, while doing so, estimating its impact
on Indian politics.
The central question is what accounts for these changes in this
critical decade of 2009–2019: a decade defined by tremendous
political changes in India, which are reflected in the dramatic decline
of the Congress party. The book focusses on ideological and
organizational issues, which, I argue, are critical for understanding
the crisis facing the party. Exploring ideological shifts in this period
that shaped the decline of the Congress party makes a compelling
case for the significance of the Congress story in understanding the
larger political transformation underway in India. Congress’s crisis is
not just the crisis of a party; it represents the vanishing of a certain
conception of politics in the midst of the ideological consolidation of
the Right in India. The argument is focussed on the Congress party,
but comparatively speaking, it has relevance for the experience of
centrist and centre-left parties in other countries, which too suffered
a decline in the context of an upsurge of populist nationalism and
right-wing politics in the past few years.
 During the writing of this book I have benefited immensely from
the support of several individuals, friends, and institutions. I want to
thank the faculty and staff of the Council for Social Development
(CSD, New Delhi) for their support for this and other academic
endeavours during my association with the CSD for the past few
years. I am most grateful to Seema Chishti, Christophe Jaffrelot,
Gyanesh Kudaisya, and Mujibur Rehman for reading the manuscript
and giving valuable comments, and above all, I am indebted to
Amrita Basu for her meticulous reading of the manuscript and
detailed and perceptive comments and suggestions for revisions and
sharpening my analysis.
I have learnt a great deal about Indian politics and the Congress
party from numerous discussions with wonderful friends and
colleagues, as many of us watch the waning of the Congress party.
Fortunately, these discussions have been plentiful as the Congress is
always ready with a crisis or two to talk about. These splendid
interlocutors include Amir Ali, Rajeev Bhargava, Bharati Bhargav,
Anuradha Mitra Chenoy, Mannika Chopra, Suranjan Das, Peter
Ronald deSouza, Jayati Ghosh, Ajay Gudavarathy, S. Irfan Habib,
Farida Abdullah Khan, Harish Khare, Jawid Laiq, Fawzia Mujeeb,
Geetha Nambeesan, Seema Mustafa, Saeed Naqvi, Anand Sahay,
Asha Sarangi, Tanika Sarkar, Eswaran Sridharan, Pamela Philipose,
Prabhat Patnaik, Rajen Prasad, Ritu Menon, Imrana Qadeer, Achin
Vanaik, (late) Hari Vasudevan, and Vidhu Verma. I’m also obliged to
many journalists, activists, and politicians who have shared their
thoughts and understanding about the Congress with me.
For helping me with research for this book, I want to thank
Divyakshi Jain, Avishek Jha, Rupak Kumar, and Anantveer Sinha for
their commendable research assistance. I’m most grateful to my
long-standing editor Adil Tyabji for his excellent editing of the
manuscript. I would also like to thank various members of my family,
especially my nieces and nephews, for their warmth and support at
all times.
Finally, this book is dedicated to the memory of my husband
Mushirul Hasan with infinite affection and gratitude for his
companionship for several decades and for much more, for his
exceptional courage, generosity, and good humour, and for our
shared academic interest in the history of the Congress party and
Indian nationalism. Mushir’s absence is acutely felt, but his
intellectual creativity, social commitment, and luminous sparkle will
always shine and inspire me.
 Introduction

Indian and global politics have undergone a seismic transformation

over the past decade. This has been most apparent in the
spectacular decline of the Indian National Congress. Devastatingly
defeated twice, in 2014 and 2019, it ceased to be the fulcrum of the
Indian political system. In 2013, Rahul Gandhi had said that if India
was a computer, then the Congress was its default programme.1 The
statement was widely criticized for betraying the Congress’s feudal
mindset. He wasn’t, however, entirely off the mark because, until
2013, the party had lost national power only thrice: in 1977, 1989,
and 1996. On two of those occasions, it maintained a very healthy
vote share of 34.5 per cent in 1977 and 39.5 per cent in 1989 and
1996. A non-Congress government completed its first full term only
in 2004, a full 57 years after Independence. The party staged a
comeback when a Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
defeated the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic
Alliance (NDA) and formed the government in 2004 (although it won
just seven seats more than the BJP) and did so again in 2009. The
party increased its seat share from 145 in 2004 to 206 in 2009, with
its vote share that had dipped to 26.3 per cent (2004) increasing to
28.55 (2009). Since 2009, it has been a steep downhill curve for the
Congress.
The political history of India is intimately intertwined with the
history of the Congress, a party synonymous with modern India. It
played a crucial role in shaping and establishing a democratic system
and ‘providing the core of institutions and processes of power
through which the Indian polity had begun its career in 1947’, said
Rajni Kothari.2 However, the Congress, which led India to freedom
from colonial rule and the party of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal
Nehru, is a pale shadow of its former self. It performed dismally in
the last two general elections and in most assembly elections since
2014.
The formation of the first full-fledged right-wing government in
2014 with an absolute majority marks a critical turning point in
India’s modern political history.3 In what was an event of great
significance, the BJP replaced the Congress party at the Centre of
the political system. The political footprint of the Congress has
shrunk dramatically in a matter of years. Even as the Congress
declined, the BJP and its mentor, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS), grew in strength.4 The growth of the BJP–RSS combine
began in the late 1980s when Hindutva—a form of religious
nationalism that views Hinduness or Hindu culture as the core of
nationhood—emerged as an important influence in Indian public
life.5 The BJP promoted Hindu nationalism, as opposed to the
Nehruvian concept of secular nationalism, which had thus far found
general acceptance. It self-consciously propagated an ideology that
was at odds with composite nationalism deeply embedded in the life
of the Republic. The demolition of the Babri Masjid by karsewaks
(religious volunteers) owing their allegiance to the Sangh Parivar in
1992 was the most overt demonstration of this line of thought.6
The Congress crumbled in state after state, with the BJP replacing
it as the alternative, especially in north, central, and western India.
In the five states which account for the highest number of seats in
the 543 member Lok Sabha—Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, West
Bengal, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu—the Congress won only 12 of the 248
seats in 2014 from these five states. The party does not have a
single MLA in Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Tripura, Sikkim, and Nagaland.7
The Congress party witnessed a complete rout in several other
states until it succeeded in forming a government in Punjab and
Puducherry in 2017, in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and
Chhattisgarh in 2018, a post-election coalition government in
Karnataka (which lasted just over a year), and Maharashtra and a
pre-poll coalition government in Jharkhand in 2019. It is almost
extinct in Uttar Pradesh and virtually non-existent in Bihar; it has
ceded ground in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and
Odisha to either the BJP or to regional parties. The party’s social
alliances have completely collapsed in major states of north India,
and in consequence it has never succeeded in regaining power in
Lucknow or Patna. Its strength declined significantly in the industrial
and commercial powerhouses of Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Tamil
Nadu. It had, of course, lost out to regional parties much earlier in
Tamil Nadu, an erstwhile stronghold. The last time it was in power
on its own there was in 1967. It has found it extremely difficult to
stage a comeback in these states.
This brief outline of electoral trends underlines the Congress
party’s downslide over the past decade,8 but the crisis has a longer
history.9 It began with the setbacks suffered in 1967, when the party
lost elections in several states, and this was followed by a split in the
party in 1969. While the split saw the emergence of a decisive leader
in Indira Gandhi, it had far-reaching implications for the Congress,
which was gradually transformed from a loose coalition of
ideologically diverse groups into a highly centralized party completely
dominated by its leader. These shifts led to an institutional crisis that
the party has been facing since then. It has not been able to
reorganize itself in the intervening years.
The crisis of the Congress also stemmed from transformational
changes underway in the polity, economy, and society. The party
was both shaping and being shaped by these transformations.
Change stemmed from a shift from a state-regulated economy to a
market-based model of economic growth. It was also influenced by
wide-ranging reservation and affirmative action policies, which threw
up substantial numbers of lower-caste elites who formed the nucleus
of a highly vocal political leadership which began weighing in on the
opposition ranged against the Congress. As a consequence, political
power moved downwards from the old established elites to new
groups who sought a politics of parity and representation. These
castes drifted towards regional parties, greatly weakening the
Congress, while the upper castes began gravitating to the BJP. The
Congress hold over the Dalit and Muslim vote fell significantly in
several states, most noticeably in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.10 These
two groups had constituted the very foundation of Congress power,
and once they began shifting their loyalties elsewhere, the party’s
political dominance was truly shaken. The middle classes, the
greatest beneficiaries of economic liberalization in 1991, were
nonetheless dissatisfied and favourably considered its rival, the BJP.
These lost spaces were difficult to recover, and after 2014 it became
an even more uphill task.
The Congress began flirting with communal politics to shore up its
dwindling support but eventually became the principal victim of this
misjudged course. Its greatest failure was in the way it approached
Hindu assertiveness being spearheaded by the BJP–RSS combine.
The decisive moment came in 1989 after the implementation of the
Mandal Commission’s recommendation of 27 per cent reservations in
public employment for the Other Backward Classes (OBCs).11 This
drastically changed the balance of power between upper and
backward castes in favour of the latter prompting widespread
disturbances and violence in several parts of India. It was opposed
to reservations for OBCs, and even after the party returned to power
in 1980; it did not include OBCs in its electoral coalition, which
continued to be a combine of upper castes, minorities, Dalits, and
Adivasis, with both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi refusing to
implement the Mandal Commission’s recommendations. Rajiv Gandhi
had criticized the V. P. Singh government for thinking only ‘around
caste’ and ‘vested interests in particular castes’.12 When, however,
the UPA-1 government came to power in 2004, it introduced 27 per
cent reservations for OBCs in publicly funded educational institutions
of higher learning. This decision was a crucial element in the new
strategy of counterbalancing backward castes’ long-standing distrust
of the party, which was generally viewed as being elitist. This,
however, did not help the Congress to gain their support; indeed,
many among them gravitated towards the BJP.13
The BJP–RSS combine was incensed that reservations for OBCs
would exacerbate divisions in Hindu society. The upper castes were
hugely upset but these reservations could no longer be wished away.
Mandal politics had fired up the OBCs as the fulfilment of a long-
standing demand for greater representation in government. Mandal
emerged as the greatest hindrance to the quest for Hindu unity,
which typically based itself on an external enemy outside the
majority community against whom all Hindus could unite. Caste
divisions would upset that modus operandi, with this crucial event
upending their political plans. The dream of a unified Hindu identity
was likely to get sidelined by exposing caste divisions and
contradictions. In response, Hindutva was propagated to unify a
divided Hindu society. The Ram temple movement was positioned as
an antidote to Mandal to promote Hindu unity and dominance. The
villains of the piece would inevitably be Muslims. The idea was to
bring together Hindus under the banner of Hindutva while painting
Muslims as the ‘other’. Thus, the Ram Janmabhoomi campaign was
launched in 1989, with L. K. Advani leading it with his rathyatra
(chariot pilgrimage) through large parts of India in a demonstration
of Hindu unity, culminating in the demolition of the Babri Masjid in
Ayodhya in December 1992. Around 2,000 people died in the
violence following the demolition; even the Gujarat violence in 2002
was set off by an incident involving the death of Hindu pilgrims
returning to Gujarat from Ayodhya. Following this, vilification of
Muslims became routine and served as a foundation for the
formation of a sizeable Hindu communal majority in the northern,
central, and western parts of India.
Conditions were conducive for the emergence of the BJP as a rival
power Centre; indeed, within a few years of the Ram Janmabhoomi
movement it formed the government at the Centre in 1998, albeit in
a coalition, ending decades of political isolation. This marked the
emergence of a right-wing alternative at the Centre and regional
parties backed by the OBCs in the states, later also moved towards
the BJP. Following this development, the Congress wasn’t easily able
to position itself at the Centre. It attempted to remain broadly
centrist but the centre-ground was squeezed and pressed from both
sides by identity politics of different kinds. Historically, the Congress
was built as a centrist catch-all party, but to remain a catch-all party
became very difficult in the 1990s when two powerful cleavages
based on caste (after Mandal) and religion (related to Ayodhya)
were building up, gaining momentum and popular acceptability. This
resulted in a major confrontation between the upper and backward
castes, displacing the Congress from its position of dominance in
Uttar Pradesh. This had a cascading effect too on the party’s political
fortunes in other states. The party never recovered from this
transformation of India’s politics, which challenged the pluralist
foundation of the political system by shifting the discourse towards
identity politics. This political shift, in part a consequence of the
backward castes decisively backing non-Congress formations and
upper castes backing the BJP, reshaped politics across a large
swathe of India. The Gujarat violence was another turning point in
this chain of events that compelled the Congress to confront
communal politics, which it had until then strenuously attempted to
avoid. It did not, however, fully confront the implications of this turn
of events by not actively pursuing the pending criminal investigations
into the Gujarat violence when the UPA came to power. It thereby
helped the BJP and Narendra Modi, its prime ministerial candidate,
from taking any responsibility for the mass violence under his
watch.14
Significant shifts during this period can also be traced to the
neoliberal restructuring of the economy begun by the Congress
government in 1991. While it accelerated economic growth, it also
deepened class, regional, and rural-urban divisions. In the wake of
the economic transformation wrought by liberalization, social
inequalities compounded economic inequality with an incredible
concentration of wealth in few hands. Old sectors died and new ones
arose with incredible rapidity. The crucial question was whether
inequality could be lessened without impeding economic growth
essential to sustain social spending.
This question was addressed through redistributive public welfare
policies aimed at greater inclusiveness and what can be called an
Indian version of ‘social democracy’. This was a time when the
Congress entered into power-sharing arrangements with several
regional and state-based parties that eventually took shape as the
UPA, which ruled from 2004 to 2014.15 Backed by the Left parties,
the Congress-led alliance steered the ideological course of the UPA
in a progressive direction. Although neoliberal policies were never
abandoned, the UPA government promoted a raft of groundbreaking
rights-based welfare policies—the Mahatma Gandhi Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), the Right to Education
(RTE) Act, the Mid-day Meal Scheme, and National Food Security Act
(NFSA)—which proved to be effective in tackling economic
deprivation. The harsh effects of neoliberalism were neutralized to
some degree, although there was no decisive change in the
economic policy paradigm. The rights-based welfare programmes
were an important achievement. These were not just welfare
programmes; rather they were part of an effort to merge social and
economic rights (the material payouts) with elements of political and
civil rights guarantees of participation and accountability found
within the Acts and the Right to Information (RTI) Act. But the idea
of social democracy, such as it was, hadn’t emerged through regular
political processes but outside them. This agenda had been
outsourced to civil society organizations, most notably the National
Advisory Council (NAC), which comprised a mix of civil society
activists and ex-bureaucrats, headed by Sonia Gandhi, but hardly
included any other politician from her party which was not involved
in the initiation and mobilization for these landmark moves. In the
event, all hope for a participatory welfare society to catalyze
changes in the political landscape was probably overblown and they
didn’t take place.
Nonetheless, the Congress appeared to have regained political
support, at least temporarily, with its UPA governments, keeping the
middle class happy through growth and also, through MGNREGA,
delivering for the poor. These initiatives paid political dividends in the
2009 elections, with the Congress seat share rising from 146 to 206.
Notwithstanding these impressive returns, the political support
evaporated quite rapidly. Congress was outmanoeuvred in 2011, just
two years after its return to power. The dramatic turn of events
began with the anti-corruption movement spearheaded by India
Against Corruption (IAC), backed by the RSS and 24/7 television
coverage. This triggered an upsurge of public anger against the UPA
government and the Congress, which was unable to shake off the
corruption charges, a point the BJP exploited to the hilt to attack the
government, which eventually culminated in its devastating defeat in
2014. The party was overwhelmed by the combined opposition of
the corporate sector, middle class, and major media outlets, which
led the charge against the Congress and redistributive policies
championed by it.
The 2014 election shifted the Centre of gravity to the Right. The
year 2019 ratified the trajectory India had embarked upon that year
which saw the decimation of the Congress and of liberal progressive
forces. The 2019 elections produced a further shift, with the pivot of
politics moving more decisively to the Right. Exceeding its tally of
282 out of 543 Lok Sabha seats, the BJP now crossed the 300 mark
while its vote share jumped from 31 per cent to 38. Its victory was
so complete that it captured all or most of the seats in some states
and reduced the Congress to a mere 54, for the second time
insufficient to win the leader of the opposition post in the Lok Sabha.
The catastrophic defeat of the Congress in two successive
elections has prompted major debates about the Congress and the
UPA and whether the errors of the latter led to the Congress
downfall. The public debate was prompted by the BJP’s strong
disapproval of the UPA, which gained greater traction after its
defeat. Political pundits were quick to follow suit with the claim that
the UPA had collapsed because the Congress was elitist and was out
of touch with the aspirations of the ‘new India’ and had focused
excessively on entitlement and welfare and not empowerment and
jobs. Corporate media took the lead in projecting UPA’s social
policies as bottlenecks to economic growth and presented the
Gujarat model as the panacea. This played an important part in
shaping the public discourse, which burgeoned rapidly through social
media platforms.
The past two decades have witnessed a proliferation of studies on
the dramatic growth of the BJP and the political changes shaped by
this.16 Tracking this shift in power dynamics has been the focus of
academic research and analysis for the past few years. The
consequence has been a neglect of attention to changes taking
place on the other side of the political spectrum: notably other
political parties. This book directs attention to the other side—the
Congress party in the context of the rise of the Right in Indian
politics and its impact on the future of the once-dominant party.
The Congress party is particularly important when it comes to
exploring the challenges facing non-BJP parties caught in the
potentially destabilizing politics of polarization and communal
mobilization. While it is difficult to find something new to say about
the party, whose past history and current failings have been
thoroughly debated and scrutinized, it seemed useful to put the
Congress alongside the BJP amid the rise of the Right and ask some
questions regarding this interface and the role of polarization in
changing the structure of Indian politics and in hastening its crisis.
Political scientists tend to explain the decline and fall of parties in
terms of institutional factors that are internally specific to the party
concerned. The interface between parties and the role of internal
and external factors in their development is frequently ignored. This
analysis emphasizes both sets of factors and, above all, the role of
context and ideology and organization in the making and unmaking
of parties. The crisis of the Congress is discussed in the context of
transformations provoked by the expansion of majoritarianism in
India.
Whether in power or in opposition, the 136-year-old Congress
remains a significant political party. It is no longer the default party
of power but the one which propelled the freedom struggle,
established the structures and institutions of democracy, initiated the
economic liberalization of 1991, and established the rights-based
social security architecture of the UPA years. However, the Congress
party’s record in government and opposition should not be idealized.
In significant ways, its failings and manipulation of the politics of
religion set the stage for the rise of Hindu nationalism and for its
own crisis and decline. But even in its depleted state, it has
historical, social, and intellectual capital of which few other parties
can boast. That’s why the BJP attacks it relentlessly, well aware that
only the Congress party is capable of challenging it nationally.
 This book builds on my earlier work, Congress After Indira: Policy,
Power, Political Change (1984–2009).17 That book focused on the
comeback of the Congress, particularly the period after the
unexpected victory in the 2004 elections, which brought the party
back to power on the national stage. It chronicled changes in the
new political landscape, raising hopes of a revival. It was a story of
political recovery. The party leadership had shifted the debate from
identity politics to secular and distributive politics, which created
substantive difficulties for the return of the NDA in 2004. In
hindsight, the victories in 2004 and 2009 provided a temporary
reprieve. It worked because Sonia Gandhi was able to hold the
Congress together and forge a political alliance that held for a
decade. It is now clear that the political revival was a mere
postponement of a future long-term decline. The party had wasted
the opportunities provided by the back-to-back electoral victories of
its coalition to rebuild and restructure its own organization. These
issues are addressed through an examination of key political
developments from 2009 to 2019 in order to understand how and
why one of the world’s oldest political formations lost its place in the
public imagination within a few years of its return to power.
Discussed are the major issues that have been at the Centre of
public debates: the collapse of the UPA, the Gujarat model of politics
and development, secularism, nationalism, and majoritarianism,
which have contributed to this denouement.
Broadly speaking, the principal concern of this foray into the
contemporary history of the Congress is essentially to reflect on the
decline of the Congress and its impact on Indian politics at the
national level. In significant respects, the Congress experience
resembles the experience of centrist parties in other democracies in
the wake of an upsurge of populist nationalism and right-wing
parties.18 Several centrist parties have been affected by the
sharpened political polarization created by social and religious
divisions sweeping across the world. Analysis of the critical decade
of 2009–19 in India affords insights into these processes of
transformation on the back of political polarization that grounded the
Congress party, so to speak.

Notes
1. ‘Rahul Gandhi Says if India Is a Computer, Then Congress is Its Default
Program’, The Times of India, 24 Aug.2013.
2. Rajni Kothari, ‘The Idea of Congress’s, The Indian Express, 18 Apr. 2009.
3. Pratul Sharma, ‘The Indian Right Arrives in Official Policy Prime’, Sunday
Standard, 7 Dec. 2014.
4. Hindu Right, refers to organizations and parties that subscribe to the
ideology of Hindutva or Hindu primacy, are socially conservative and in
favour of a strong quasi-authoritarian state. It would include organizations
such as the RSS, Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), and Bajrang Dal, among
others. It has dozens of affiliates representing women, youth, and students,
all loosely linked under an RSS umbrella of Hindu nationalist organizations.
It also runs thousands of schools across India under the Sangh Parivar’s
affiliate Vidya Bharati. Its affiliates hold shakhas, the morning marching-
and-meditation sessions, in dozens of other countries, including the United
States.
5. For the BJP’s self-description of its ideology, see
http://www.bjp.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=369:hindutva-the-great-
nationalistideology&Itemid=501. Accessed 17 Nov. 2020.
6. Sangh Parivar is an umbrella term that refers to a whole host of political,
cultural, and social organizations affiliated to the RSS.
7. Kaushik Deka, ‘What’s Wrong with the Congress’s, India Today, 3 Aug.
2020.
8. For more recent writings on the Congress party, see Adnan Farooqui and E.
Sridharan, ‘Can Umbrella Parties Survive? The Decline of the Indian National
Congress’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 54, no. 3, ;
Suhas Palshikar, ‘Congress in the Times of the Post-Congress Era’, Economic
and Political Weekly, 50, no. 19, 9 May 2015; Praveen Rai and Sanjay
Kumar, ‘Decline of Congress in India Politics’, Economic and Political Weekly,
52, no. 12, 25 Mar. 2017; Express Web Desk, ‘Mapped: Congress’s Decline
Through the Years’, The Indian Express, 21 May 2016.
9. Roshan Kishore, ‘Is the Decline of the Congress Seasonal, as Veerappa
Moily Claims?’, Live Mint, 22 Mar. 2017,
https://www.livemint.com/Politics/yJ5cGKzuQq8268lu2zc1vK/Is-the-decline-
of-the-Congress-seasonal-as-Veerappa-Moily-c.html. Accessed 17 Nov. 2021.
10. On the changing social base of the Congress, see Anthony Heath and
Yogendra Yadav, ‘The United Colours of the Congress: Social Profile of
Congress Voters, 1996 and 1998’, Economic and Political Weekly, 34, no.
34/35, 8 Aug.1999.
11. Reservations of 27 per cent for the OBCs in government employment were
put into practice at the national level in the 1990s after Prime Minister V. P.
Singh decided to accept the recommendations of the Mandal Commission
and after the recommendations were modified by the Supreme Court.
Fifteen years later, in April 2006, the UPA government introduced
reservations for the OBCs in elite institutions of higher and professional
education. See Zoya Hasan, ‘The Die Is Cast(e): The Debate on Backward
Caste/Class Quota’, inAnthony Heat and Roger Jeffery (eds.), Diversity and
Change in Modern India: Economic, Social and Political Approaches, Oxford
Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 2010.
12. Rajiv Gandhi’s speech on the Mandal Commission in the Lok Sabha,
published in The Indian Express, 9 Jun. 2006.
13. Kancha Iliah Sheperd, ‘Shudras and Democratic India’, in Kancha Ilaiah
Shepherd and Karthik Raja Karuppusamy (eds.), The Shudras: Vision for a
New Path, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2021.
14. R.B. Sreekumar was with the Gujarat Intelligence Bureau in April–
September 2002. Terming the conduct of the Congress leadership in the
aftermath of the riots as ‘quite vacillatingly obnoxious’, Sreekumar writes,
‘Soulless secularism and over-sensitivity to Hindu sentiments presumably
prompted Congress leaders to block the plans of Congress president Sonia
Gandhi to visit Zakia Jafri … during her Gujarat visit after the riots, for
expressing condolence.’ Report on Sreekumar’s book titled Gujarat Behind
the Curtain, Manas Publication, (2015) published in Leena Misra, ‘Congress
Didn’t Let Sonia Meet Zakia Jafri After Riots: 2002 “Whistleblower” ’, The
Indian Express, 28 Dec. 2015.
15. The Tenth Indira Gandhi conference organized by the Indira Gandhi
Memorial Trust in 2010, presided by Sonia Gandhi, addressed the challenges
and the prospects of creating an alternative Indian social democracy. See
the two volumes which were an outcome of this discussion. Sunil Khilnani
and Manmohan Malhoutra (eds.), An Indian Social Democracy: Integrating
Markets, Democracy and Social Justice, Two Volumes, New Delhi: Academic
Foundation, 2013.
16. Achin Vanaik, Hindutva Rising: Secular Claims, Communal Realities, New
Delhi: Tulika Books, 2017; Angana P. Chatterji, Thomas Blom Hansen, and
Christophe Jaffrelot (eds.), Majoritarian State: How Hindu Nationalism Is
Changing India, London: Hurst & Co, 2019; Meghnad Desai, Making Sense
of Modi’s India, New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2015; Ashutosh Varshney, ‘The
Emergence of Right-Wing Populism in India’, in Niraja Gopal Jayal (ed.), Re-
Forming India: The Nation Today, New Delhi: Penguin India, 2019; Saba
 Naqvi, Shades of Saffron: From Vajpayee To Modi, New Delhi: Westland
Publications, 2018.
17. Zoya Hasan, Congress After Indira: Policy, Power, Political Change (1984–
2009), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012.
18. John Feffer, ‘Nationalism Is Global: The Left Is on the Defensive’, The
Nation, 6 Nov. 2019. Accessed 15 Nov. 2019.
 1
Democratic Reorganization Eludes the
Congress Party

Political parties, providing the linkage between institutions and

constituencies within the polity and bringing to the fore issues
affecting the interests of social groups and the public at large, are
indispensable in a democracy. Well-functioning parties perform these
functions by representing the public, aggregating their views,
demands, and interests, providing political choices to voters,
mobilizing them to participate in the democratic process, and holding
governments accountable. None of this would be possible without an
effective party organization. That is why it is important to begin this
account of the Congress during this critical decade (2009–19) with a
discussion of the party organization.1 Following an initial discussion
of the nature of party organization, I highlight the Congress party’s
institutional problems, principally the challenges facing it
organizationally, especially in relation to setting up a democratic
structure.
The Congress is a mass party, but one without cadres that recruits
anyone willing to join it.2 As a ruling party, it occupied the middle
ground as a centrist organization, although occasionally tilting to the
Left. The party’s ideology was essentially based on the principles of
constitutionalism and social revolution, embodied in the Constitution.
Socialism inclusive of democracy, secularism, equality, and social
justice were the party’s articles of faith.3
Post-Independence, the Congress party, under the leadership of
Jawaharlal Nehru, was the anchor of the political system. Until 1989,
it formed all governments, with the exception of a brief interlude in
1977 to 1980 when it lost power to the Janata party following the
imposition of the unpopular Emergency (authoritarian rule) from
1975 to 1977. The party won a sizeable majority of seats, although
not always the popular vote at the national level, and the same was
true in most states.
The key to the Congress’s success lay partly in its ability to
represent and aggregate the regional, ethnic, caste, and class
interests, which made up India’s extraordinarily diverse electorate.
The electoral strength of the Congress in the early years of the new
republic was thus ascribed to the party’s institutional strength. This
enabled district leaders to distribute patronage and incorporate
social groups at both the local and state levels. The organization
provided space for groups and factions within the party to compete
for influence and therefore ‘an intricate structure of conflict,
mediation, bargaining, and consensus was developed within the
framework of the Congress’.4 The party performed the critical
function of conflict mediation both within and beyond its
organization.
The Congress party has been dominated by the Nehru–Gandhi
family, which dominated India’s public life over the past century.
They have held the reins of the party ever since the freedom
struggle under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru cast a
spell over the twentieth century. The top echelon of leadership has
remained within the family, first with Nehru himself, and later with
Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Sonia Gandhi, and Rahul Gandhi in turn
heading the Congress. Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira, and Rajiv Gandhi,
who occupied the office of prime minister for two-thirds of the post-
Independence era, loomed large over Indian politics and the
Congress. Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984, and that of her son
Rajiv a few years later, diminished the overwhelming influence the
family exerted in electoral politics and this brought to end the era of
Congress dominance. The declining power of the Congress party has
not, however, reduced their hold over the party. Their leadership has
not been challenged despite their decreasing ability to deliver votes
for the party because, in the words of Digvijaya Singh, ‘the Nehru–
Gandhi family which has an unparalleled history of sacrifice for the
nation before and after the Independence is a binding factor for
Congress workers throughout India. No one in the Congress would
like to even think of Congress without them’.5 However, Congress
leaders who have left the party or are disgruntled with it squarely
blame the Gandhis for the terrible condition of the organization.

Organizational structure
Formally, the organization developed by Mahatma Gandhi’s
reorganization of the Congress through the years 1918 to 1920 has
been retained at least in name.6
Prior to Independence, the Congress organization extended down
to the village level. Each district had a committee reporting to a
provincial committee. The latter reported to the All India Congress
Committee (AICC), a body of about 350 people. The Congress
Working Committee (CWC) was responsible for political policy and
other policy decisions. The party membership was open to all who
paid nominal dues and were not members of any other political
party. The limited criteria for membership opened the party to the
masses as primary and active members. While it provided the party
a mass base, this rule lent itself to misuse by the enrolment of
bogus members, which has been a bane of the party.
Post-independence, the Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC)
became the Centre of power in each state. The district units of the
Congress corresponded to the administrative boundaries of districts.
Each PCC had a Working Committee of 10–15 key members, with
the state president as leader of the state unit. The PCC was
responsible for directing political campaigns at local and state levels
and assisting the campaigns for parliamentary constituencies. The
AICC was formed of delegates sent from PCCs around India. The
delegates elected various Congress committees, including the CWC,
which comprised senior party leaders and office-bearers, and took all
important executive and political decisions. The CWC and the
president remained at the top of the national party structure, which
ran the party at the national level on a day-to-day basis and took all
key decisions.7 Control of the presidency was critical for the control
of the CWC, Congress Parliamentary Board (CPB), and Central
Election Committee (CEC). During the early years, the CWC was not
only a convenience but also significant as the principal arena where
there was constructive dialogue between the national and state
party leaders concerning all manner of issues.8 The fact that there
was a strong presence of state leaders in these bodies enhanced the
influence of the Congress in the states. Party competition could
sometimes be significant, but the most important struggles and
debates occurred within the Congress, among leaders with a social
base in particular states or constituencies. It was a grand coalition of
major social and political groupings.
It is clear from this brief account that Congress was a party with a
formidable organization that ran an effective political machine,
mobilizing wide political support through its strong state units and
dedicated workers. In most parts of India, given its robust
organization, the party’s influence quite effectively penetrated
downward, at least to the sub-district level and sometimes further
down to the taluka. It was held together by the popularity of its
leaders and a host of powerful state leaders who enjoyed
considerable support, and there was space for intra-party democracy
which allowed for accommodation of different groups and interests.9

Institutional erosion
All of this changed with the arrival of Indira Gandhi at the Centre
stage of national politics and the split of the Congress party in 1969.
The split was the consequence of a bitter battle between Indira
Gandhi and the Syndicate or the old guard, led by party president, S.
Nijalingappa, who was expelled by her. Indira Gandhi accused the
old guard of being reactionaries and opposed to progressive policies
such as the nationalization of banks and abolition of the princes’
privy purses.10 The break was complete when Indira Gandhi, after
proposing N. Sanjeeva Reddy’s name for the post of president, asked
Congressmen to ‘vote according to their conscience’. V. V. Giri, the
rebel Congress candidate supported by her, won. She later led her
faction of the party known as the New Congress Party or Congress-R
(R stood for Requisition) to an overwhelming victory in the 1971
parliamentary elections. The Congress-R won 352 seats, roughly a
two-third majority in the Lok Sabha. The split had transformed the
Congress, clearly establishing the supremacy of the parliamentary
wing over the organizational and the political executive over the
party. Prior to the split, the party organization had enjoyed some
independence from the executive.
Once Indira Gandhi had established political supremacy, she did
not countenance any leader with an independent power base in any
state as he/she might pose a potential challenge to the central
leadership, appointing office-bearers personally selected by her. She
established total control over the CWC, CPB, and the CEC. Chief
ministers were nominated by her as the party in the states usually
requested her to nominate the chief minister. The centralization of
power in party and government remained the defining feature of
Congress dominance, dispensing with all processes of intra-party
democracy connecting the Centre to lower levels in the system.11
It soon became clear that the move towards centralization had
cost the party heavily in terms of popular credibility and broke its
political monopoly by the late 1970s. The party lost power in the
1977 general elections held after the Emergency had been lifted and
began the process of the party’s long decline. Its political influence
began to be seriously challenged once the party machinery began
breaking down in the states. The centralizing drives coupled with a
penchant for tight control and political manipulation were largely
responsible for organizational erosion.

Centralization
The workings of the party organization underwent a major change in
this period. Until the split in 1969, the Congress held regular
elections, but no elections were held after the party split. The party
has never recovered from the atrophy that set in then and has
continued to operate with a top–down structure ever since. Decision-
making became the preserve of the high command headed by the
party president.12 In consequence, loyalty was privileged over the
political support base of the leader. The sole criterion of loyalty for
any Congress worker was to the people who had nominated them.
‘There’s no loyalty to party or ideology’.13 The high command
syndrome that decided party matters earlier at the national level and
in relation to state matters was extended to local levels with no
connection with party functionaries there.
At various points since the mid-1980s, Congress leaders have
signalled their awareness of organizational erosion. Rajiv Gandhi’s
address at the party’s centenary celebrations in Bombay (now
Mumbai) in 1985 famously declared it to be a party of power-
brokers, but he did very little to change that. Elections that had been
promised early in his tenure were never conducted during his term
as party president.14 During his time, the Congress leadership
became even more personalized, managerial, and Delhi centric. The
massive mandate given to the Congress in memory of his mother
was squandered and misunderstood as a personal mandate for him.
Although he was acutely aware that the party organization required
a thorough overhaul he made no serious effort to change or
revitalize it, and therefore the centralization of the party continued.
Like his mother, he depended on the institutions of the state and not
the party to mobilize people.
During his tenure, the party functioned as a centralized unit,
although every now and again the high command recognized that
only a strong organization anchored in public support could enable
the party to grow. The party, however, did not move away from its
dependence on a single leader, the Congress remaining a leader-
driven party, completely dependent on Rajiv Gandhi. He did not trust
Congress leaders, even those who had been known to have been
close to his mother. He went on to change the decision-making
structure in the party by bringing in professionals and friends as
advisors. He replaced her coterie with his own set of friends who
had little exposure to political realities. They had no mass base, yet
they were given important positions in the party. Some of them, like
Arun Nehru, gave disastrous advice, for example, on unlocking the
gates of Babri Masjid in Ayodhya or overturning the Supreme Court
judgment in the Shah Bano case.15

State leaders sidelined

This period witnessed an accelerated decline in the importance of
state leaders in the party. As the process of decision-making was
centralized with the core committee in Delhi deciding everything, the
party was unable to draw strength from the lower levels of the
organization or politics. State leaders, keen to establish a distinctive
political identity, were often sidelined with little regard for the long-
term consequences of this.16 Most of the crucial states, such as Uttar
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Haryana,
Rajasthan, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh had chief ministers for
short spells because they fell out of favour with the central
leadership. Indeed, very few Congress chief ministers were able to
complete a full five-year term. Even the electoral debacles of 1989
and 1990 did not alter this pattern of control.
This trend was completely at variance with the emergence of
states as the principal theatre of political activity. With the
decentralization of politics and the shift in the Centre of political
gravity from the Centre to the states, people began to look upon
their chief ministers as the major power Centre and the principal
reason to vote for one party or another.17 The implications for
Congress’s politics of a refusal to factor in these developments were
obvious. No individual leader in any region was able to construct a
durable alliance of social support for the party as the basis for
electoral mobilization.
The most dramatic consequence of this began to be felt in the
rapid erosion of the Congress as the centrepiece of the political
system. However, even as the party was losing ground, looking up to
the high command for the smallest decisions and neglect of leaders
with popular support remained the norm.18 This absence of
democracy at the bottom, together with the nomination of chief
ministers and members of the CWC, PCCs, and DCCs, resulted, for
the most part, in a weak, ineffectual, and strife-torn organization. In
order to change this, the leaders who were not active in mass
politics needed to be replaced by leaders with a mass base. This
required a wholesale change in the organizational culture of the
party symbolized by the high command, which took all decisions.19

Party elections put off

The attrition of the Congress system in the 1990s indicates that the
fundamental malaise was the organizational corrosion of the party
and that therefore emphasis should’ve been given to revamping it.
However, the party never seriously undertook reform. Election to the
CWC was held in 1992 during Narasimha Rao’s tenure as prime
minister after a gap of 20 years. The process of elections proved
messy, with an embarrassing number of irregularities, squabbles,
and indeed violent clashes between factions across states.20
Elections were held but the process came to an abrupt halt when
Rao decided to nominate members who had actually been elected to
reinforce his primacy in the party.21 He pulled out Sharad Pawar and
Arjun Singh from the elected group and nominated them. His
defence was that ‘the party leaders in the states have got used to
old habits and that they have forgotten the process of election,
compelling him to nominate PCC and CWC leaders’.22 Elections were
held in 1997 but again were deeply compromised to prevent Rajesh
Pilot from being elected to the CWC.23 Many senior leaders were not
in favour of internal elections, believing that this would create more
divisions and factionalism than already existed and lead to a lopsided
result.
Sonia Gandhi, when she assumed charge as the party president in
1998, held out the hope of reorganizing the party on democratic
lines, declaring that her goal was to revive the party organization
and that her priority would be reinforcing the role of the ordinary
worker in the party organization. According to her, ‘such a
development can alone provide an organizational structure
representative of the party, responsible to the party, and therefore,
responsive to the party’. She said that the Congress needed nothing
less than complete revitalization and a return to a time when the
party was instinctively the first choice of the electorate. She
repeatedly called for efforts to strengthen the organization,
particularly in those states which had been annexed by political
rivals.24 However, apart from a brainstorming session in Panchmarhi,
very little was done to restructure the organization, although she
had promised to broad-base the party and revive intra-party
democracy in her acceptance speech in April 1998 when she was
unanimously elected as the Congress president. The leadership fell
back on the old top–down method of recasting the CWC and AICC
through nominations. Barely a month after Sonia Gandhi was
appointed president she was given full freedom to nominate the
elected quota of the CWC and was continually authorized by the PCC
chiefs to select CWC members and other party functionaries.
Elections were postponed on one pretext or another, earning the
Congress a show-cause notice from the Election Commission seeking
to know why the party should not be derecognized for its failure to
hold organizational elections. Elections for the post of president were
finally held in October 2000 when Sonia Gandhi resoundingly
defeated Jitendra Prasada.

No reorganization
Sonia Gandhi was re-elected president of the Congress in May 2004
when the party returned to power as the head of the United
Progressive Alliance (UPA). The Congress that assumed power was
different both organizationally and ideologically. Politically, it wrested
a position of dominance by dislodging the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP)-led NDA. The mandate for the party, to quote Rajni Kothari,
was more ‘exciting than the assumption of power by the Indian
National Congress after Independence’.25 For him, the distinctive
thing about the renewed mandate was that ‘the Congress was a
party rather than a governing structure that has been assigned the
role of providing a new institutional structure’.26 He expected the
focus on the party would contribute to its renewal as an
organization.27 Disappointment was, however, in store for those who
expected change. This was particularly so because, for the first time
after 30 years, there was a division of power and authority between
the prime minister and the Congress president, and between the
government and the party, a new socio-political configuration. Sonia
Gandhi had an opportunity to reorganize the party, especially
because the party president was not the prime minister. The party
was, however, unable to take advantage of it because the focal point
of Sonia Gandhi’s leadership was not, and has not been, on party
building or reform but on managing a fractious coalition.28 There
was therefore no change in the party’s functioning. But she had
certainly restored the party to Centre stage without holding any
governmental position. She took the lead in providing the ideological
foundations for a welfare-oriented government policy which directly
benefited the people.29 She remained party president for 20 years
until December 2017.
As noted above, Sonia Gandhi was unable to shake up the party
even though she enjoyed unparalleled dominance in the party. This
raised serious doubts about the regeneration and efficacy of the
party, leading, as in the past, to greater reliance on government and
welfare programmes to win support than on reforming the party to
mobilize the electorate. The response of the Congress to most
fundamental issues has been generally ‘governmental rather than
political. This failure to distinguish between modes of governmental
action and possible responses of a party apparatus is obvious.’30 The
lack of organizational heft was a severe limitation, hampering the
party’s ability to reap the political dividends which could have
accrued to it from the unprecedented welfare spending by the
central government. Organizational degeneration hampered the
party’s capacity to engage with mass politics.
As the Congress began losing ground in several states, it became
clear that the organization was dysfunctional. As a corrective, Sonia
Gandhi set up several committees to recommend ways of
reorganizing and strengthening the organization.31 The first was a
task force headed by P. A. Sangma, and the second, headed by A. K.
Antony, was entrusted with looking into the reasons for the
Congress’s poor performance in the 1998 elections. The report was
submitted but none of the recommendations were ever
implemented. ‘We deliberated on it for nine hours. Yet, when the
time for reorganization came in 2000, all the PCC chiefs were
retained and the AICC posts were filled up by senior leaders.’32
Sonia Gandhi set up a third committee, known as ‘The Group to
Look into Future Challenges’, headed by Veerappa Moily, to examine
the same issues: party reorganization and intra-party reforms.33
‘This group too proposed internal reforms but went a step further
and recommended that Congress build cadres on the lines of
organizations like the BJP and the Left parties. The party had to find
out some way of touching every household right from the day of
election notification till the end of the campaign’, Moily said.34
Cadres must reach out to people rather than the party banking on its
candidates’ abilities and resources to mobilize support to achieve
victory, the committee suggested. According to a news report, this
proposal was prompted by the Election Commission’s greater
stringency in relation to limits to election expenditure and the ban of
posters and graffiti that led the committee to propose this drastic
and clearly unrealistic change of the Congress into a cadre-based
party.35 However, the suggestion that campaigns needed to be more
party oriented than just candidate oriented was an important one.
‘Now our campaigns are mainly candidate-oriented. We want to
make them party-oriented. That’s why the need for committed
workers or cadres who can do door-to-door campaigning instead of
organizing meetings for the candidate or big party leaders’, said a
member of the Future Challenges Group.36 According to Mani
Shankar Aiyar, ‘these changes were also recommended in the Uma
Shankar Dikshit recommendations to revamp and democratize the
party which was endorsed by Rajiv Gandhi and steered by him
through the CWC and AICC in July 1990’.37 There was, however, no
discussion or follow-up on these committee reports. All the reports
were shelved for fear of stirring up the pot and upsetting the status
quo and the established hierarchies in the party. No progress could
be achieved because the top leadership just did not have the
political will to restructure the organization.

No-changers
There was no change in the party structure with no-changers having
their way. The party was not serious about decentralization of
decision-making, although Sonia Gandhi was disinclined to exercise
absolutist control.38 Her approach was consultative and she allowed
discussion to proceed on most subjects so that members could have
their say. ‘She listens to criticism’ and gives ‘space to various
disagreements, questions and concerns’, commented Aruna Roy on
the basis of her experience of working with her as a member of the
NAC.39 However, unlike Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, who had created
new leadership structures, Sonia Gandhi relied on the existing
leadership to work the party hierarchy even after 2004 when she
had fully established her pre-eminence. She was clear from the
outset that she would work with senior leaders who had backed her
during the 20 years she held the reins of the party. Many of these
leaders lacked a political base. The absence of linkage between
those who were given political responsibilities and the rough and
tumble of state politics was glaring. This gulf was aggravated by the
tendency to marginalize leaders who had at least some links with
ground-level politics for fear of disturbing local power structures. It
was difficult to change this structure because ‘Sonia Gandhi herself
relied heavily on the old order in the party’.

It is a pervasive fear of those around the Congress president that elections

might lead to undesirable consequences such as instability that stands in the
way of party rejuvenation. All those in the coteries might find themselves
booted out because they are all nominated and few of them have any mass
support. Moreover, they are keen to retain their influence irrespective of
whether they face the electorate or win elections or not.
Arjun Singh had remarked in an interview.40
After gaining prominence, Rahul Gandhi was keen to democratize
the party but he too made little headway. He questioned the lack of
inner-party democracy and deplored the culture of entitlement. His
appointment as the vice president of the party at the AICC meeting
in Jaipur in January 2013 held out the hope that it would bring about
the much-needed change in organizational matters, as this was one
of the major reasons he had advanced for not accepting a cabinet
berth in the two UPA governments. He emphasized that the
Congress needed to reinvent itself with a new methodology of public
outreach. He encouraged lateral entry into the party as early as
2004 but did not pursue it in the long run. He made no bones about
the need to remove deadwood and democratize the party structure
by opening up the organization to young leaders from the ranks of
the Youth Congress and the National Students Union of India
(NSUI). The hope was that the democratization experiment of the
NSUI would be followed up by the parent party. That has not,
however, happened even though he recognized that the only way of
resolving the organizational crisis was decentralization of decision-
making and devolution of power and policy-making from the hands
of a few to the many.41 There was however no course correction
because he ran into a wall of opposition each time he attempted to
tinker with the old order of the party. His experiments were unable
to effect the changes that he had so often spoken about42 and
indeed may have proved counterproductive. At the end of the day,
nothing tangible was effected at the ground level to strengthen the
party organization.
In 2015, the Congress leadership outlined a blueprint to revamp
the party by progressively devolving power and increasing the
accountability of leaders at all levels.43 A note prepared by Rahul
Gandhi with suggestions culled from a series of discussions with
around 450 leaders on ways and means of reviving the party was
circulated.44 It was released before the CWC meeting in January
2015 and highlighted strategies such as distribution of power, party-
government interface, institutionalization of Congress committees as
deliberative platforms, accountability, and mass contact as the way
to the party’s revival in the states. This radical blueprint for party
restructuring went nowhere because Sonia Gandhi and the veterans
believed that changing the structure of party organization at a time
when it was out of power would only hasten its demise. Most leaders
were wary of Rahul Gandhi’s radical plans and this put the blueprint
in cold storage.45 After the defeat in the Uttar Pradesh assembly
elections in 2017, Rahul Gandhi reiterated the need for change: ‘We
need to make structural and organizational changes—that’s a fact.’46
But his hand was greatly weakened by the defeat and the party let
matters drift and the status quo continued.
Rahul Gandhi was appointed party president in December 2017.
Soon after his appointment, he once again made it clear that he was
keen on reorganizing the party, starting with the democratization of
the CWC. CWC is one of the oldest decision-making bodies in any
party. According to the Congress constitution, 12 of the 25 members
of the CWC are supposed to be elected, but in reality there have
been no elections to the CWC. Over the past 45 years, elections to
the CWC have been held only twice. All CWC members are
nominated rather than elected. Of the 25 members in 2019, 19 are
permanent invitees and there are 10 special invitees. Rahul Gandhi
was keen to change this, with at least half its members being
elected to this key decision-making body. However, as with all earlier
proposals this too was put on ice. His desire to hold elections for 12
of the 25 CWC members faced resistance and the system of
nomination to the CWC continued. Of the 18 CWC members who
contested the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, only four won their seats,
including Rahul Gandhi, who won from Wayanad but lost in the
traditional Gandhi-family stronghold of Amethi.47 The other CWC
members who won are Sonia Gandhi (Rae Bareli), Gaurav Gogoi
(Kaliabor), and A. Chellakumar (Krishnagiri).48
 Organizational stagnation
Rahul Gandhi has made several attempts to usher in change but has
met with grief because of the inter-generational clash within the
party and old-timers refusing to make way for younger leaders, and
also because, under him, the party has faced major electoral losses.
But even when the party has performed well as in the Rajasthan,
Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh state assembly elections in 2018
he has not had his way in promoting younger leaders to leadership
positions. The process of lobbying during the selection of chief
ministers in these three states became so intense that eventually the
party decided to appoint senior leaders as chief ministers in all the
three states, in the face of much heartburn among the young
leaders close to Rahul Gandhi. While Kamal Nath was appointed
chief minister of Madhya Pradesh and Ashok Gehlot chief minister of
Rajasthan, these appointments left the two young leaders,
Jyotiraditya Scindia in Madhya Pradesh and Sachin Pilot in Rajasthan,
extremely unhappy and discontented. Both began plotting their own
strategies to strengthen their influence at the expense of the party,
which eventually led to Scindia’s exit from the party and the eventual
downfall of the Kamal Nath government in Madhya Pradesh in March
2020. As regards Pilot, he raised a banner of revolt against the
Gehlot administration along with a band of his supporters over
complaints of their neglect and deliberate sidelining in the Rajasthan
government but was persuaded to remain in the party.
The top–down model run by backroom specialists with a
disinclination to engage with the risks of mass politics holds sway at
the cost of party building. The party functions as a bureaucratic
organization and its approach to politics is essentially managerial
and technocratic.49 This process has killed innovation, and discussion
and debate have ceased to exist. There is, besides, perfunctory
discussion on most issues. When the Congress was in power,
discussions took place only in the Cabinet and by Groups of Ministers
(GoMs).
 Decisions were taken by the Core Group formed by Sonia Gandhi
in 2004 to help the UPA government, which became the effective
decision-making body. All crucial decisions were taken by this group
which replaced important party institutions which in any case never
met.50 The CPB, for instance, didn’t meet at all after the formation
of the Core Group. ‘Meetings of the Congress Parliamentary Party
(CPP) have been reduced to [the] customary address by the
Congress president and obituary references. The past practise of
discussion has been discontinued. That is required now that the
party is in Opposition.’51 CWC meetings are episodic and reactive
rather than those of a deliberative body setting a national agenda
and taking policy initiatives. Consensus was evolved even before an
issue was decided in the CWC, although members were permitted to
speak and air their views. Decisions were taken ‘by managing
consensus and consensus was managed through backroom
discussions’.52 In short, as a former Congress leader said, ‘the party
structure exists on paper. Nominated small coteries play musical
chairs, they become ministers or chief ministers when Congress is in
power, and when the party is in opposition, they are office-bearers
of the party’.53 In these circumstances, ‘the Congress knows what it
has to do. It also knows why, for more than three decades this has
not been done’.54 ‘And the inner circle of the Congress knows that it
is none other than the inner circle that is blocking organizational
reforms’, observed a Congress leader.
The contrast between the Congress and the BJP organizations is
stark, not in terms of internal democracy and decision-making
structure, which is centralized in both cases, but especially in terms
of electoral management. The Congress party’s ramshackle
organization is no match for the RSS, which provides ground support
in election engineering, propaganda, mobilization, and booth
management. The Congress is not a cadre-based party which puts it
at a great disadvantage in comparison with the organizational
strength of the BJP–RSS combination. The BJP has, at its disposal, a
well-oiled political machine led by the RSS and its affiliated
organizations. During the 2019 election, the BJP had workers in the
position of panna pramukh (page in-charge) who were responsible
for mobilizing voters listed on a single page of the published voter
list (which contains approximately 30 voters, although in practice
they may have handled up to 60). This is the greatest strength of
the BJP and the Congress has nothing remotely similar dedicated to
election management. In six states—Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West
Bengal, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu, which account for
over 250 Lok Sabha seats—the party has no credible organizational
structure. At one time, it had a strong organization, although it was
a loosely organized party with no cadres. Most leaders agree that
the organization is not what it should be and needs to be revamped,
and yet nothing has been done to change this. The party is bereft of
a dedicated cadre of grassroots workers in the states or districts
even as the BJP–RSS continued its steady expansion. It has no
ground game because it lacks cadres and workers at the booth level,
which is essential for winning elections.
‘The AICC does not meet regularly, CWC meets sporadically and
PCCs and the Block level units exist virtually on paper’, lamented a
former Congress leader. One political advisor said that ‘hardly any
CWC members has ever been to a village or spent a night there’.55
Most CWC members are Delhi based with little or no relevance in
their own regions, and yet they continue to exercise power to decide
the future course of action within the party even though they have
no mass base and are entirely dependent on the patronage of the
party president. A majority of them have either never contested a
Lok Sabha or Assembly election or did so decades ago when the
politics, discourse, and tools of fighting elections were very different.
Their influence has, however, grown in direct proportion to the
weakening of party units across India.56 Therefore, ‘the only thing
the CWC has ensured is status quo so that they remain relevant to
the power-mongers within the set-up’, remarked Pradyot Manikya
Bikram Debbarma, former president of the Tripura PCC.57
It is thus amply clear that the idea of internal democracy has not
travelled very far.58 Organizationally, centralized command and
control and loyalty have replaced ideology. Nothing much has been
done to rebuild the organization from the time Rahul Gandhi was
appointed vice president in 2013 until May 2019, when he resigned
as president. Although he had been president since December 2017,
his writ did not run as forcefully in the party as his mother’s did, and
leaders loyal to the two Gandhis frequently do not see eye to eye
with one another, leading to speculation that there are two power
centres in the Congress. Centralized functioning has impeded the
party’s ability to regain support leading to a gradual shrivelling and
withering away of the party structure, with a high command which is
disconnected not only from its workers but also from its own
leaders. Barring a few states, notably Kerala, Karnataka, Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, and Assam, the Congress has no
strong organization in any of the other states.
It is true that it is not easy for a loosely organized mass-based
party to build a strong organization, but at least the Congress can
begin with a genuine pan-Indian membership drive. Most PCC
members are ‘resourceful middlemen with close links to
businessmen’ who can easily mobilize bogus members.59 The PCCs
could be asked to submit reports on organizational and political
issues in the states ‘but even this minimum work hasn’t been
done’.60 The party organization is weak, factional, and chaotic in
most states. District units remain headless because the party was
unable to even fill important posts in the states.

Political consequences
The Congress party is never short on declarations of intent, and such
declarations come far more frequently than actual change. Indeed,
the changes that are required have been spelt out in a series of
reports commissioned by the high command mentioned above. But
these recommendations have not been acted upon. The party would
not have come to such a pass had it implemented these
recommendations and the repeated promises of party leaders to
revitalize the party.
 The overall organizational decay and leadership crisis has had
major political consequences for the party over the past decade.
‘Organizational atrophy and ideological obfuscation can be fixed by a
leadership with a clear vision. That is the elephant in the room’,
observed one leader.61 Several prominent leaders have left the party
and joined the BJP. Defections, splits, and the ensuing electoral
decline is not a new phenomenon in the party’s long history, but the
defections after the last two defeats in 2014 and 2019 have
weakened the party more than ever before. Some of these
defections were a consequence of the leadership’s slow and
sometimes confusing movement on key organizational matters. The
party has not only suffered from defections in key states but also
lost governments due to the inaction of its leaders and office-
bearers. The party has not encouraged state leaders who could have
been entrusted with the task of rebuilding the party. Its crisis has
coincided with the rise of regional parties, most of whom are
breakaways from the Congress: the Trinamool Congress in West
Bengal, the Nationalist Congress Party in Maharashtra, and
Jaganmohan Reddy’s YSR Congress in Andhra Pradesh, to name a
few. The Congress has paid a heavy price for its failure to give space
and leeway to mass leaders at the state level leading many, such as
Mamata Banerjee, Himanta Biswa Sarma, and Jaganmohan Reddy,
to leave.
Andhra Pradesh and Assam are prime examples of this
phenomenon. In 2009, Andhra Pradesh gave the Congress 33 Lok
Sabha seats, the party’s largest contingent from any state in India,
thereby strengthening the UPA position at the Centre. There was,
however, a serious crisis in the Congress soon after the sudden
death of Chief Minister Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy in a helicopter crash
on 2 September 2009 when he was just settling down to serve a
second consecutive stint as chief minister. He had almost single-
handedly achieved the challenging feat of defeating the Telugu
Desam Party (TDP) in two consecutive elections and outwitted the
Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) chief K. Chandrashekar Rao by
speaking in favour of Telangana before the elections and
subsequently reversing his position.
The Congress crisis deepened at the same time as it had spurned
Jaganmohan Reddy, who was keen to replace his father as chief
minister after his death.62 Not only was he denied the post but he
was arrested by the Central Bureau of Investigation on charges of
embezzlement and jailed for 16 months. K. Rosaiah, with no mass
base, was appointed as the new chief minister and was later
replaced by Kiran Kumar Reddy in a bid to retain him in the party.
The refusal to appoint Jaganmohan as chief minister resulted in a
division of the party because Jaganmohan was backed by most in
the Andhra Congress. Thereupon, he left the party and formed the
YSR Congress Party (YSRCP). The crisis was aggravated further on
the issue of Telangana and spiralled out of control after the
bifurcation of the state.63 Far from reaching out to disgruntled
leaders, important decisions such as the bifurcation of the state were
taken by the central leadership without fully considering its
implications for the future of the party in the state. Ironically the
mishandling of the state’s bifurcation spelt the end of the Congress
in both Andhra Pradesh and Telangana as neither state was satisfied
with the hastily created new state of Telangana. This was the end of
the Congress in Andhra Pradesh, where it had been a formidable
force since Independence, and after 2014 it was unable to regain
lost ground in both states. The Telangana fiasco underscored the
pitfalls of the command and control approach, which proved to be
disastrous for the party.
The same was the case in Assam, which the Congress lost again
due to the inability of the central leadership to accommodate the
ambitions of state leaders. As in Andhra Pradesh, the sidelining of a
powerful leader like Himanta Biswa Sarma resulted in his defection
to the BJP.64 This provided the BJP with an opportunity to make
inroads not just into Assam but the entire north-east. In 2015,
Sarma left the Congress, where he had played the role of deputy to
former chief minister Tarun Gogoi for nearly 14 years since 2001.
Cracks between the two leaders had, however, begun appearing
soon after the Congress’s victory in the 2011 Assembly elections,
which was largely organized and coordinated by Sarma. He had
expected to be rewarded with the chief-ministerial post for steering
the Congress to victory, but Gogoi was chosen again by the party
high command. According to Sarma, his decision to leave the party
was further sparked by Rahul Gandhi’s cavalier approach to his
demands. Shortly after walking out of the party in 2015, Sarma
entrenched himself as the key strategist of the BJP in the north-east,
successfully pushing the Congress out of power in the region. His
electoral expertise led to the BJP forming governments in Assam,
Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Nagaland, and Tripura.65 Before
Sarma’s entry into the BJP, the party had very small electoral
presence in the region.66 In 2018, the BJP formed part of the
government in six of the seven north-eastern states. The Congress
performed poorly in the subsequent general elections, winning just 3
out of the 14 seats in the state in the 2019 general elections. The
Congress, which traditionally had strong state leaders, cannot afford
to lose them to other parties. Indeed, even in the post-2014 period,
it remained relevant as a political force on the strength of its state
leaders. The centralization of political authority by an exaggerated
deference to party bosses has robbed the party of leaders in the
states who were denied their due.
The Congress failed to initiate organizational changes, which
would have helped it in elections. The organizational neglect has
been blamed on the leadership’s indecisiveness and inability to do
what it takes to reorganize the party. However, as noted above,
party reform was attempted by Rahul Gandhi, but notwithstanding
his primacy in the party, he has been unsuccessful in democratizing
the party. He has faced stiff resistance every time he has made an
attempt to break the grip of the old guard and patronage networks
in the states. This has prevented the party from evolving as an
effective organization in the states. Its inability to motivate the
cadres for the long haul has greatly hampered it as a party that fully
awakens only when elections are upon it. Restructuring and
democratizing the organization is imperative because the party
requires leaders backed by the masses and not office-bearers in
Delhi with little connection with ground realities.

Notes
1. My book Congress after Indira: Policy, Power, Political Change (1984–2009),
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012 provides a detailed account of the
party organization and the pitfalls of dynastic leadership in Chapter 4, some
of which is recounted here.
2. On the Congress party, see the official website of the Congress, which
includes a brief history of the party. https://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKE
wjErZbJiKf0AhUWxDgGHZtVCtkQFnoECAsQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww
.inc.in% =AOvVaw2PMqpViLT3zTMV22EyhH5q. Accessed 20 Nov. 2021.
3. A note circulated in 2015 on party revamp suggested the redraft of socio-
economic policies. It said the party must take up all progressive issues
including ‘but not limited to secularism or welfare for the poor’. ‘We have to
redraft our socio-economic policies keeping their aspirations in view.’
‘Congress Outlines Blueprint for Party Revamp Post-electoral Debacle’, The
Economic Times, 10 Jan. 2015.
4. Rajni Kothari, ‘The Congress System in India’, Asian Survey, 4, no. 12, Dec.
1964, pp. 1161–73.
5. Ibid.
6. For a description and discussion of this, see Gopal Krishna, ‘The
Development of the Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization,
1918–1923’, Journal of Asian Studies, 25, no. 3, May 1966, pp. 413–30.
7. Stanley Kochanek, The Congress Party of India, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1968, 189.
8. Ibid.
9. Zoya Hasan (ed.), Parties and Party Politics in India, New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2002; Rajni Kothari, Politics in India, New Delhi: Orient
Longman, 1970; Kochanek, The Congress Party of India; Myron Weiner,
Party Building in a New Nation: Indian National Congress, Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1967; Richard Sisson and Ramashray Roy (eds.), Diversity
and Dominance in Indian Politics: Changing Bases of Congress Support,
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990.
10. For details on this period of Congress history and the 1969 split, see Ch. 10
in Francine R. Frankel, India’s Political Economy: 1947–2004, New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2005, 2nd ed.; Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., ‘The
Congress in India—Crisis and Split’, Asian Survey, 10, no. 3, Mar. 1970, pp.
256–62.
11. James Manor, ‘Organizational Renewal’, Seminar, no. 526, 13 Mar. 2009.
12. The Electoral College for the election of the party president comprises 7946
PCC delegates.
13. Interview with Kishore Deo, 8 Jul. 2020. V. Kishore Chandra Deo was a
member of the Congress Party and part of its highest decision-making body,
the Congress Working Committee. He has been a five-time Lok Sabha MP
and a one-term Rajya Sabha MP, and Union Minister of Tribal Affairs and
Panchayati Raj in the Manmohan Singh-led UPA - 2 government from 2011
to 2014. He joined the Telugu Desam Party in 2019.
14. Sukumar Murlidharan, ‘A Difficult Legacy’, Frontline, 15, no. 2, 24 Jan.–6
Feb. 1998.
15. On this, see Ch. 1, ‘Ayodhya and the Politics of Religion’, in Hasan, Congress
after Indira, pp. 10–45.
16. Murlidharan, ‘A Difficult Legacy’.
17. Shekhar Gupta, ‘Yes, Chief Minister’, The Indian Express, 3 Sep. 2005.
18. Jyotirmaya Sharma, ‘Spluttering on All Cylinders’, DNA (Mumbai), 18 May
2006.
19. Harish Khare, ‘Sonia Gandhi’s Decade as Congress Mascot’, The Hindu, 12
Mar. 2008.
20. James Manor, ‘Organisational Renewal’, Seminar, no. 526, 13 Mar. 2009.
21. Interview with Mani Shankar Aiyar, New Delhi, 26 Sep. 2010. Mani Shankar
Aiyar was a career diplomat until he joined the Indian National Congress in
1989. He has been a three-time Lok Sabha MP (1991, 1999, and 2004) and
a nominated member of the Rajya Sabha. He served in multiple positions in
the first UPA government as Union Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas
(2004–6), Panchayati Raj (2004–9), Youth Affairs and Sports (2006–8), and
Development of North Eastern Region (2008–9).
22. Manor, ‘Organisational Renewal’.
23. Ibid.
24. See Chapter 4 for details of Congress organization in Hasan, Congress after
Indira.
25. Rajni Kothari, ‘The Idea of Congress’, The Indian Express, 18 Apr. 2009.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. For a discussion on the state of party organization during UPA-1, see Ch. 4
in Zoya Hasan, Congress after Indira.
29. Khare, ‘Sonia Gandhi’s Decade as Congress Mascot’.
30. Tridip Suhrud, ‘Is Congress a Political Party’, The Indian Express, 11 Mar.
2008.
31. This account draws on my book, Hasan, Congress after Indira, Chapter 4.
32. Lakshmi Iyer, ‘Tiring of Sonia Gandhi’, India Today, 6 Mar. 2000.
33. The panel chaired by Veerappa Moily included Rahul Gandhi, Jairam
Ramesh, Sachin Pilot, Digvijay Singh, Jagdish Tytler, Salman Khurshid, and
Another random document with
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 ‘Be of good courage, Diomedes,’ she said. ‘Thy prayer is granted.
But if thou shouldst meet any of the gods in battle, smite none of
them save golden Aphrodite.’
Then did Diomedes turn back to the battle, and threefold courage
came upon him, so that he fought as fights an angry lion.
Ten warriors, brave and gallant, fell before him, and the horses of
these he took and gave to his men to drive to the ships.
Then said Aeneas, captain of the Trojan host, son of a mortal
warrior and of the goddess Aphrodite:
‘Where are thy bows and arrows, Pandarus? Canst thou not slay
this man who makes havoc of the host?’
‘Methinks this man is Diomedes,’ answered Pandarus. ‘Already
have I smitten him, but without avail. Surely he is no man, but a
wrathful god. Behind me in my own dear land left I eleven fair
chariots, each with its yoke of horses, for I feared that my good
horses might not find fodder in the camp. So now have I no chariot
but only my bow, and now is my bow of no help to me, for Menelaus
and Diomedes have I smitten, yet they have not died.’
Then said Aeneas:
‘Talk not thus, but mount in my chariot and take the reins and
whip, and I myself will stand upon the car and fight with Diomedes.’
‘Nay,’ said Pandarus, ‘take thou thyself the reins. Should thy
horses be driven by one they know not, and hear a strange voice
from him who drives them, mad might they go with fear. So drive
thine own horses, Aeneas, and with my spear will I go against
Diomedes.’
In the chariot then mounted Aeneas and Pandarus, and swiftly
galloped the horses against Diomedes. His charioteer saw them
coming and to Diomedes he said:
‘Pandarus and Aeneas come against us, Diomedes—mighty
warriors both. Let us haste back to our chariot.’
 ‘Speak not of flight!’ answered Diomedes. ‘It is not in my blood to
skulk or cower down. As for these, both shall not escape me. But if
Athene grant that I slay them both, then stay my chariot where it is,
binding the reins to the chariot rim, and leap upon the horses of
Aeneas and drive them forth into the host of the Greeks. For truly
there are no better horses under the sun than these horses of
Aeneas.’
When Pandarus and Aeneas drew near, fiercely Pandarus hurled
his bronze-shod spear. Through the shield of Diomedes it passed,
and reached his breastplate.
‘Thou art hit in the loin!’ cried Pandarus; ‘now, methinks, thou
soon shalt die.’
But Diomedes, unafraid, replied:
‘Nay! thou hast missed and not hit.’
With that he hurled his spear. Through the nose and teeth and
tongue of Pandarus it passed, and from the chariot he fell, his
gleaming armour clanging on the ground. And it was from a dead
man that the horses swerved aside.
Then Aeneas leapt from his chariot and stood astride the lifeless
body, like a lion at bay, fearful lest the Greeks should take from him
the body of his friend.
In his hand Diomedes seized a mighty stone, and with it smote
Aeneas on the thigh, crushing the bone, and tearing the skin. On his
knees fell the great Aeneas, and soon must he have perished, but
Aphrodite saw the peril of her son and wound her white arms about
him, and would have borne him safely away. But Diomedes, leaping
in his chariot, pursued her, and with his spear he wounded her sorely
on the wrist. With a great cry Aphrodite let fall her son, but another of
the gods was near and bore him away in the covering of a cloud.
‘Away with thee, Aphrodite!’ called Diomedes. ‘It is surely enough
for thee to beguile feeble women and to keep away from battle!’
 Then upon Aeneas he leapt, not knowing that it was a god whose
arms held him. Three times did he seek fiercely to slay Aeneas, and
three times did the god beat him back.
‘Thou warrest with the gods! Have a care, Diomedes!’ shouted
the god in a terrible voice, and Diomedes for a little shrank back.
Then truly did the gods come to war against Greeks and Trojans,
for Mars and Athene and Hera in fury fought amongst the hosts.
‘Shame on ye! men of Greece,’ cried Athene. ‘While noble
Achilles went forth to war, the Trojans dared scarcely pass without
their gates, but now they bring their fighting close to the ships on the
beach!’ So she roused the Greeks to further fury.
To Diomedes then she went. Him she found beside his chariot,
wiping away the blood from the wound dealt him by Pandarus.
‘An unworthy son of thy brave father art thou, Diomedes,’ she
said. ‘Alone would thy father fight; but though I stand by thy side to
guard thee, either weariness or fear hath taken hold on thee.’
‘I have no fear, neither am I weary,’ answered Diomedes, ‘but
thou hast told me to smite none of the gods save Aphrodite, and now
see I the god Mars leading the men of Troy. So have I stayed my
hand and called back my men from the battle.’
Then answered bright-eyed Athene:
‘Diomedes, joy of mine heart, fear not Mars nor any other of the
gods, for I am thy helper. Go now, guide thy chariot against Mars and
smite him hand to hand. This day did he promise me to fight for the
Greeks, and now he fights against them.’
So saying, she made the charioteer of Diomedes give her his
place, and herself, with whip and reins, did she guide the fiery
horses.
And Mars, seeing the chariot of Diomedes draw near, leaving
many dead behind him, eagerly came to meet it. With furious thrust
did he drive his spear at Diomedes, but Athene seized it in her hand
and turned it aside. Then did Diomedes thrust at Mars with his spear
of bronze, and it Athene guided so that it pierced the thigh of the god
of war. Loud as nine thousand or ten thousand warriors cry in battle,
did Mars bellow with rage and pain, and like a thunder-cloud he
swept upwards through the sky to Olympus.
And still the fight went on, and sorrow came to many from the
slaying of that day.

Mars, like a thunder-cloud, swept upwards through the sky to Olympus

(page 52)
 CHAPTER V
HECTOR AND ANDROMACHE

From where the battle still raged went Hector, son of Priam. At the
oak tree by the gates of Troy there came running to meet him wives
and daughters of those who fought. For eagerly did they long for
tidings of many a warrior who now lay dead on the field.
When he reached the beautiful, many-pillared palace of his
father, his mother came to meet him.
His hand she took in hers, and gently spoke she to him.
‘Art thou wearied that thou hast left the battle, Hector, my son?’
she said. ‘Let me bring thee wine that thou may’st be refreshed and
yet gain strength.’
‘Bring me no wine, dear mother,’ said Hector, ‘lest it take from me
the strength and courage that I have. Rather go thou to the temple of
Athene and offer her sacrifices, beseeching that she will have mercy
on Troy and on the wives of the Trojans and their little children. So
may she hold back Diomedes the destroyer. I go to Paris—would
that he were dead!’
And the mother of Hector straightway, with other old women, the
mothers of heroes, offered sacrifices and prayers to Athene. But
Athene paid no heed.
To the palace of Paris, his mighty bronze spear in his hand, then
strode Hector.
Paris, the golden-haired, sat in a room with Helen, idly handling
his shining shield and breastplate and curved bow.
In bitter scorn spoke Hector to his brother.
 ‘Our people die in battle for thy sake!’ he cried, ‘while here thou
sittest idle. Up then, ere the enemies that thou hast made for us burn
our city to the ground!’
And Paris answered:
‘Justly dost thou chide me, Hector. Even now hath Helen urged
me to play the man and go back to battle. Only let me put on my
armour, and soon will I overtake thee.’
Never a word did Hector answer him.
But to Hector did Helen then speak.
‘Brother Hector,’ she said, ‘unworthy am I to be sister of thine.
Would that I had died on the day I was born, or would that the gods
who have brought me this evil had given me for a husband one who
was shamed by reproach and who feared dishonour. Rest thee here,
my brother, who hast suffered so much for the sake of wretched me
and for the sin of Paris. Well I know that for us cometh punishment of
which men will sing in the far-off years that are yet to come.’
‘Of thy love, ask me not to stay, Helen,’ answered Hector. ‘For to
help the men of Troy is my whole heart set, and they are now in want
of me. But rouse this fellow, and make him hasten after me. I go now
to see my dear wife and my babe, for I know not whether I shall
return to them again.’
In his own house Hector found not his fair wife Andromache, nor
their little babe.
‘Whither went thy mistress?’ he asked in eagerness of the
serving-women.
‘Truly, my lord,’ answered one, ‘tidings came to us that the
Trojans were sorely pressed and that with the Greeks was the
victory. So then did Andromache, like one frenzied, hasten with her
child and his nurse to the walls that she might see somewhat of what
befell. There, on the tower, she stands now, weeping and wailing.’
 Back through the streets by which he had come then hastened
Hector. And as he drew near the gates, Andromache, who had spied
him from afar, ran to meet him.
As, hand clasped in hand, Andromache and Hector stood, Hector
looked silently at the beautiful babe in his nurse’s arms, and smiled.
Astyanax, ‘The City King,’ those of Troy called the child, because
it was Hector his father who saved the city.
Then said Andromache:
‘Dear lord, thy courage will bring thee death. Hast thou no pity for
this babe nor for thy wife, who so soon shall be thy widow? Better
would it be for me to die if to thee death should come. For if I lose
thee, then sorrow must for evermore be mine. No father nor mother
have I, and on one day were my seven brothers slain. Father and
mother and brother art thou to me, Hector, and my dear loved
husband as well. Have pity now, and stay with thy wife and thy little
child.’
‘All these things know I well, my wife,’ answered Hector, ‘but
black shame would be mine were I to shrink like a coward from
battle. Ever it hath been mine to be where the fight was fiercest, and
to win glory for my father’s name, and for my own. But soon will that
glory be gone, for my heart doth tell me that Troy must fall. Yet for
the sorrows of the Trojans, and of my own father and mother and
brethren, and of the many heroes that must perish, grieve I less
bitterly than for the anguish that must come upon thee on that day
when thou no longer hast a husband to fight for thee and a Greek
leads thee away a prisoner. May the earth be heaped up high above
me ere I hear thy crying, Andromache!’
So spake Hector, and stretched out his arms to take his boy.
But from his father’s bronze helmet with its fiercely nodding
plume of horse-hair the babe shrank back in terror and hid his face in
his nurse’s breast. Then did the little City King’s father and his sweet
mother laugh aloud, and on the ground Hector laid his helmet, and
taking his little son in his arms he kissed him and gently dandled
him. And as he did so, thus Hector prayed to Zeus and all the gods:
‘O Zeus and all ye gods, grant that my son may be a brave
warrior and a great king in Troyland. Let men say of him when he
returns from battle, “Far greater is he than his father,” and may he
gladden his mother’s heart.’
Then did Hector lay his babe in Andromache’s arms, and she
held him to her bosom, smiling through her tears.
Full of love and pity and tenderness was the heart of Hector, and
gently he caressed her and said:
‘Dear one, I pray thee be not of over-sorrowful heart. No man
shall slay me ere the time appointed for my death hath come. Go
home and busy thyself with loom and distaff and see to the work of
thy maidens. But war is for us men, and of all those who dwell in
Troyland, most of all for me.’
So spake Hector, and on his head again he placed his crested
helmet. And his wife went home, many times looking back to watch
him she loved going forth to battle, with her eyes half blinded by her
tears.
Not far behind Hector followed Paris, his armour glittering like the
sun, and with a laugh on the face that was more full of beauty than
that of any other man on earth. Like a noble charger that has broken
its bonds and gallops exultingly across the plain, so did Paris stride
onward.
‘I fear I have delayed thee,’ he said to his brother when he
overtook him.
‘No man can speak lightly of thy courage,’ answered Hector, ‘only
thou hast brought shame on thyself by holding back from battle. But
now let us go forward, and may the gods give the Greeks into our
hands.’
So went Hector and Paris together into battle, and many a Greek
fell before them on that day.
 CHAPTER VI
THE FIGHT BETWEEN HECTOR AND AJAX

From Olympus did Athene mark with angry heart how Greek after
Greek fell dead before the spears of Hector and of Paris.
Then did she plot with Apollo, her brother, how best she might
discomfit these men of Troy.
And into the heart of Hector did they put the wish to make the
Trojans and the Greeks cease from battle, while he challenged the
bravest Greek of the host to meet him, man to man, in deadly
combat.
Then did Hector and Agamemnon make the fighting cease, and
with gladness did Hector call upon the Greeks to send forth their
bravest champion that he might fight with him, hand to hand.
‘If I be slain,’ said Hector, ‘then let the victor despoil me of my
armour, but give back my body to my home. And if I slay him who
fights with me, then shall his armour be mine. But his body the
Greeks shall have, that they may build for him a tomb in their own
land, near the sea, so that in the days to come men may look at it as
they sail past in their ships and say, “This is the tomb of a man that
died in days of old, a champion whom Hector slew.”’
Silent stood the Greeks before him. For they feared to meet him
hand to hand, and were ashamed to show their fear.
Then up sprang Menelaus, and with scorn of the others he
donned his armour.
‘Shame on ye all!’ he cried. ‘I myself will fight with Hector, and the
gods will slay that man whom they will to die.’
But Agamemnon would not have it that his brother should fight.
 ‘This is madness, Menelaus,’ he said. ‘Draw back, though it pains
thee, for even Achilles did dread to meet this man in battle, and how
much more mighty is Achilles than thou.’
Then rose up nine chiefs of the Greeks, all ready to fight with
Hector, and lots were cast to see which of these, the most valiant of
the host, should meet with the champion of the men of Troy.
To Ajax the giant-like did the lot fall, and glad was the heart of the
hero that so it should be.
In his shining bronze armour did Ajax array him, and as he strode
forward with a smile on his stern face and his long spear brandished
in his hand, he looked as looks Mars the terrible when he goes forth
to battle.
The Trojans trembled at the sight, and the heart of Hector beat
faster, as the giant, with his great bronze shield, came towards him
with mighty strides.
‘Achilles, the lion-hearted, sitteth by his ships, yet shalt thou be
shown, Hector, that the Greeks have other warriors in their ranks,’
cried Ajax. ‘But thou shalt begin the battle.’
‘Am I a woman or a feeble boy who knows naught of fighting,
Ajax?’ answered Hector. ‘Well do I know the rules of the great game
of war. But I have no mind to smite thee by cunning. Openly shall I
smite thee, if I smite at all.’
Thereat he hurled at Ajax his bronze-shod spear. But on his
mighty shield of sevenfold hide, bronze-covered, Ajax caught the
blow, and only six folds of the shield were pierced.
Then did Ajax the giant hurt his spear, and it passed through
Hector’s bright shield and his corslet, and rent the doublet on his
thigh. But Hector swerved aside and so escaped death. Then did
each grip a fresh spear, and, like angry lions, did they rush each at
the other. Again did Hector smite the shield of Ajax with his spear,
but the spear point was bent back and unpierced was the shield. And
Ajax, with a mighty drive, sent his spear through the shield of Hector,
and the point pierced his neck, so that the dark blood gushed forth.
But even then Hector ceased not to fight. From the ground he seized
up a great jagged stone and hurled it against the shield of Ajax, until
the bronze rang again. A stone, greater by far, did Ajax then hurl,
and the shield of Hector was crushed inwards, and Hector was borne
backwards, and fell, and had been slain, had not Apollo, with
invisible hands, raised him up. Their swords they drew then, and
would have fought on, had not heralds rushed between them and
with their staves held them apart.
‘Fight no more, dear sons,’ said the herald of Troy. ‘Well do we
see that ye both are brave warriors, and well-beloved of Zeus. But
night falleth, and bids you cease the combat.’
Said Ajax:
‘For Hector it is to speak, for he challenged the bravest of the
Greeks to battle. As he wills, so shall I do.’
‘The gods have given thee stature and might and wisdom, Ajax,’
said Hector, ‘and surely there is no greater fighter among the Greeks
than thou. Night falleth, so let us cease from battle, and hereafter will
we fight again, and the gods shall grant one of us the victory. But
now let us exchange gifts, that Greeks and Trojans may say, “In
fierce strife did Ajax and Hector meet, but in friendship they parted.”’
So spoke Hector, and gave to Ajax his silver-studded sword, with
scabbard and sword-belt; and to him did Ajax give his belt bright with
purple.
So parted the two heroes, and greatly did the men of Troy and of
Greece rejoice at the safe return of their champions.
 CHAPTER VII
THE BURNING OF THE DEAD; AND THE
BATTLE OF THE PLAIN

With feasting did the Greeks do honour to Ajax, and when the feast
was ended, Nestor, the oldest and the most wise of the warriors,
gave counsel that at daybreak on the morrow they should gather the
bodies of their dead and burn them on a great pyre.
But while the Greek chiefs in peace took council together, they of
Troy with fierce and angry words disputed at a gate of their city.
Said one:
‘How can we hope to prosper in the fight when our oath is
broken? Let us then give back to the Greeks fair Helen and all her
wealth.’
But Paris, in wrath, made reply:
‘Mad indeed thou art if thou dost think I will do as thou sayest!
The wealth of Helen will I return with a willing heart, and to it add
more wealth of mine own. But Helen my wife will I give back never!’
At dawn on the morrow did the Trojan heralds come to the camp
of Agamemnon and gave to him the message.
‘Thus saith Priam of Troy and all his nobles, The wealth that
Helen brought with her to Troy will Paris return, and more besides of
his own, but the beautiful wife of Menelaus he saith he will not give.
But grant to us a truce until we have buried our dead, and then again
will we fight until the gods grant us victory.’
Then said Diomedes:
 ‘Let us take none of the treasures of Helen nor of Paris, neither
Helen herself for well we know that the days of Troy are already
numbered.’
In applause of the words of Diomedes the Greek host shouted,
and Agamemnon said to the heralds:
‘Thou hearest the answer of the Greeks. Yet we grant ye the
truce, that ye may bury your dead.’
The sun was rising from the sea and chasing grey darkness from
the fields of Troyland when on the morrow Greeks and Trojans met
in peace, and tenderly, and with hot tears falling, carried away the
bodies of the fallen and buried them in mighty pyres.
A deep ditch and a high wall did the Greeks also make for
themselves. And at nightfall they feasted, and when some ships from
Lemnos came to the harbour, well laden with wine, they bought a
goodly supply. Some of them paid the men of Lemnos with bronze,
and some with iron, some with hides and kine, and some with
prisoners.
All night long they feasted, and in Troy also did the Trojans feast.
But in Olympus did Zeus angrily plan the overthrow of the men who
seemed to fear him not, and the noise of his thunderings filled the
feasters with dread of what was to come.
On the next day, when golden dawn was spreading over the
earth, Zeus held a council of the gods, and with a fearful doom did
he threaten the god or goddess who should dare to aid either Greek
or Trojan.
‘We bow to thy will, great father Zeus,’ Athene made answer. ‘Yet
let us, I pray thee, give counsel to the Greeks that they may not all
perish before the mightiness of thine anger.’
‘So be it,’ answered Zeus, smiling upon her, for dear to the king
of the gods was Athene, his beautiful daughter.
Then did Zeus, in his armour of gold, mount upon his car. His
fleet-footed horses, bronze-shod, had flowing tails of gold, and them
he lashed with his golden whip so that like lightning they flashed
across space, between earth and the starry heavens. High up on
Mount Ida did he rein them in, and in thick mist upon the mountain-
top he sat him down and watched the Greeks and Trojans, as
though they were his playthings, fighting far below on the plain.
Early that day did the two hosts meet, and soon was the morning
air filled with the cries of pain and of rage, of defeat, and of victory,
and the fair earth was streaming with the blood of men, dead and
dying.
When midday came, Zeus stretched out from his throne on the
mountain his golden scales, and in them laid two weights of death,
one for the Greeks and the other for the men of Troy. And the scale
of the Greeks sank down low, and as it sank, Zeus sent down a
blazing lightning flash so that the two armies saw the great god and
his scales, and fear seized upon the Greeks.
The mightiest Greek no longer kept his courage. Only Nestor,
oldest of the warriors, still had a dauntless heart. With an arrow from
his bow had Paris slain one of the horses in Nestor’s chariot, but
from his chariot did the old man leap down and with his sword
fiercely hewed at the traces. But as he still hewed, through the
throng Hector furiously drove his chariot. Then had Nestor indeed
perished, but that Diomedes marked what would befall.
With a great shout did he call to Odysseus:
‘Whither fleest thou, like a coward, Odysseus? Stand thy ground
till we have saved the old man from his mighty foe!’
So spake he, but Odysseus heard him not, and hastened
onward.
Alone then did Diomedes take his stand by the side of Nestor.
‘Younger warriors than myself beset thee hard!’ said Diomedes.
‘Thou art feeble, thy charioteer is a weakling, and thy horses slow.
Quickly mount my car, and see what are the paces of my horses that
I took from Aeneas. Straight against Hector shall we guide them, that
he may know the power of the spear of Diomedes.’
On the chariot of Diomedes did old Nestor then mount; in his
hands he took the reins, and he lashed the horses. In furious gallop
they came to meet Hector, and Diomedes hurled his spear. But the
spear passed Hector, and in the breast of his brave charioteer was it
buried, so that he fell to the ground and there he died.
Upon the men of Troy might defeat then have come, but in his
hands Zeus took a thunderbolt, and right in front of the horses of
Diomedes it burst in awful flames, making the horses in desperate
panic rear backwards.
‘Zeus himself fighteth against thee, Diomedes!’ cried Nestor. ‘Let
us flee, for no man is so great in might that he can fight against the
will of Zeus.’
‘Thou speakest truth, old man,’ said Diomedes, ‘yet sore grief it is
to my heart to think that some day the boast of Hector may be, “To
his ships fled Diomedes, driven before me.” May the earth swallow
me up on that day!’
‘Hector may call thee coward,’ said Nestor, ‘yet no son of Troy will
believe him, nor any of the widows of these men whom thou hast
slain.’
Then did Nestor wheel the horses and flee, while thick the spears
and darts from the Trojan host followed him.
And above the din of battle rose the voice of Hector:
‘Behold the hero of the Greeks! Hero no longer art thou! Begone,
feeble girl! poor puppet!’
Furiously did Diomedes listen to his taunts, and fain would he
have turned back and tried to slay him. But three times did Zeus
send peals of his thunder rolling down from the mountain-top, and to
the Trojans was it a sign of victory, and fear did it send into the
hearts of the Greeks.
 Then did Hector call on his men to be of good courage, for with
them fought Zeus, the Thunderer. And to his horses he called:
‘On, now, Bayard, and Whitefoot, and Flame of Fire, and Brilliant!
Forget not how Andromache hath cared for and tended you! Make
haste that we may seize from old Nestor his shield of gold, and strip
Diomedes of his gorgeous breastplate!’
Onward, then, dashed his chariot, while the Trojans followed him,
driving the Greeks in headlong flight before them. Soon had the
Greek ships been burned and the long war ended, had not Hera put
it into the heart of Agamemnon to arouse the Greeks and force them
on to battle.
‘Shame on you, ye Greeks!’ he cried. ‘What hath come of all your
boasting?’ Then did he pray to Zeus that even now he would grant
the victory to the Greeks.
And his prayer was heard by Zeus, who sent a portent in answer.
For there came, winging through the sky, an eagle with a young fawn
in its talons. By the altar of Zeus did the eagle drop the fawn, and the
Greeks took the sign to mean the favour of Zeus, and afresh they
went to battle.
Then did gallant warrior slay warrior as brave as himself, and
hero fall before hero.
Teucer, a mighty archer, sheltering under the great shield of Ajax,
sent one arrow speeding after another, and each arrow brought
death. But against Hector in vain did he drive his shafts, slaying,
each time he drew his bow, one standing near the man whose life he
longed to take.
One arrow smote the charioteer of Hector in the breast, and from
the chariot did he fall dead. Full of rage and grief was Hector, and
from the car he leapt, with terrible shout, and, with a jagged stone in
his hand, rushed at Teucer. Even at that moment had Teucer pulled
his bowstring to let an arrow fly, but on the collar bone Hector smote
him. His bowstring snapped, his arm grew numb, the bow fell from
his hand, and on his knees he sank. But swiftly did Ajax stand
astride him, and with his shield he sheltered him until two of his
comrades bore him, groaning in grievous pain, to the ships.
Once again did Zeus put courage in the men of Troy so that they
drove the Greeks in rout before them.
Then did Hera and Athene mark their plight, and pity them, and
would have come down from Olympus to their aid, had not Zeus sent
stern warning to them of the doom that should be theirs were they to
go against his bidding.
‘On the morrow,’ said he, ‘more evil things shall thine eyes
behold, for Hector will not cease to slay until that day when fleet-
footed Achilles be roused to come and fight for the Greeks where
Patroclus the brave lies dead. Such is the doom of heaven.’
Then did black night fall, and while the Trojans chafed at the
darkness, the Greeks rejoiced that rest had come to them at length.
Leaning on his bronze-pointed spear, Hector spoke to the
Trojans.
‘Hearken to me!’ he said. ‘This day I thought to destroy the
Greeks and all their hosts and return to our own windy Troy, but
Night hath come too soon. To Night, then, must we yield, so let us
take food, and give fodder to our horses. All night long let us burn
fires lest in the darkness the Greeks strive to make for the sea. And
let the heralds proclaim that boys and old men must guard the
battlements of Troy, and each woman burn a great fire in her house
lest the Greeks send an ambush to enter the city while we men are
here. At dawn will we fight by the ships, and we shall see whether
Diomedes will drive me back from the shore to the walls of Troy, or if
with my spear I shall lay him low.’
So spake Hector, and the Trojans shouted aloud.
They unyoked their horses, and gave them fodder, and from the
city they brought food for the fires.
All night they sat by the battlefield, high hopes in their hearts, and
their watch-fires burning. As when the moon shines clear on a
windless night, and all the crags and glens and mountain-tops stand
sharply out, and wide and boundless is the sky, and all the stars are
seen; even so many were the lights of the watch-fires that gleamed
in the plain before Troy. A thousand fires did burn there, and in the
red glow of each blazing fire sat fifty men. Beside the chariots stood
the horses champing barley and spelt, waiting for the coming of
dawn.
 CHAPTER VIII
THE MESSAGE TO ACHILLES

While the Trojans sat by their watch-fires, sorely troubled were the
hearts of the Greeks and of Agamemnon their overlord.
Hurriedly did Agamemnon send his heralds to call an assembly,
bidding each man separately and with no loud shouting.
Sorrowfully did they sit them down; and when Agamemnon rose
up to speak, the bitter tears ran down his face as flows the wan
water of a mountain stream down the dark gulleys where the
sunbeams never play.
‘My friends,’ he said, ‘leaders and captains of the Greeks, hard of
heart is Zeus, and ill hath he dealt with me. Victory did he promise,
but shame hath he brought. Nothing now is left for us but to flee with
our ships to our own land, for never shall Troy be ours.’
So spake he, and long did the Greek warriors sit in silent grief.
Then spoke Diomedes:
‘A coward hast thou called me, Agamemnon; whether I am a
coward the Greeks, young and old, know well. To thee hath Zeus
given power above all other men, but courage, which is the highest
power of all, hath he kept from thee. Thinkest thou that we Greeks
are cowards and weaklings such as thou? If it is thy will to flee, flee
then! Thy ships wait for thee by the sea. But as for us, here will we
stay till Troy lies in ruins before us. And if it even be the will of every
Greek here to flee with thee, here still will I and my friend Sthenelus
abide and fight until Troy is ours. The gods sent us hither! To us will
the gods give the victory!’
Then spoke old Nestor:
 ‘Mighty in battle art thou, Diomedes, and well hast thou spoken.
But thou art yet young—full well mightest thou be my youngest son.
So let all who hear, yea, even Agamemnon, hearken to my words
and not gainsay me, who am so old a man. For without clan, without
laws, without a home must be he who loveth strife. Hasten then, and
let us all take food, and see that the sentinels be watchful along the
deep trench without the wall. For to us this night cometh victory or
death.’
Then did Agamemnon speedily have a feast prepared, and when
the feast was ended, Nestor again uprose and spoke.
‘King over all nations hath Zeus made thee, great Agamemnon,’
he said. ‘Therefore is it thy part to listen to all the counsel that is
given to thee that may aid thee to govern thy folk. Right heartily did I
try to prevent thee from taking fair Briseis from the tent of Achilles on
that day when thou didst anger the bravest of all warriors. Let us now
try if we may not persuade him by gifts of friendship and with kindly
words to come back and fight for Greece once again.’
Then answered Agamemnon:
‘Yea, truly, a fool was I in that I gave way to my wrath. But gladly
will I now make amends to Achilles, the beloved of Zeus. Rich and
goodly gifts will I send to him; priceless gifts of gold, horses of
wondrous speed, and seven fair slaves skilled in needle-work. Fair
Briseis, also, shall again be his, and if he will come to our aid and
Troy is ours, the richest of all the spoils shall be the spoils of
Achilles. One of my daughters shall he have for his wife, and lands
and cities and a people to rule as king shall be my gift to him.’
Speedily then did they choose messengers to go with the gifts to
Achilles.
And the messengers were Phœnix, a warrior dear to Zeus, and
giant Ajax, and Odysseus of the many Devices. Two heralds went
with them that they might tell Achilles of the noble Greeks who came
to seek for his aid.