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Immigration Policy
and Right-Wing Populism
in Western Europe
Anna McKeever
Immigration Policy and Right-Wing
Populism in Western Europe
Anna McKeever
Immigration Policy
and Right-Wing
Populism in Western
Europe
Anna McKeever
School of Education and Social Sciences
University of the West of Scotland
Glasgow, UK
ISBN 978-3-030-41760-4 ISBN 978-3-030-41761-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41761-1
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to
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The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
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Cover illustration: Doomko/Alamy Stock Vector
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
For Dave
Acknowledgements
This book has benefited from the guidance and support of many people.
It has its origins as a doctoral dissertation in political science in Ulster
University, and I would like to thank my supervisors Cathy Gormley-
Heenan and Markus Ketola for their invaluable academic advice and
encouragement during the process. A special thanks to my external exam-
iner Simon Usherwood for his insights into the British chapter. I would
also like to thank Arthur Aughey for his efforts to liaise me with
Conservative politicians. At Palgrave, I express my gratitude to my editors
Ambra Finotello and Anne-Kathrin Birchley-Brun for being patient with
me throughout this lengthy process and to anonymous reviewers for their
perceptive comments.
I am deeply grateful for the expertise and support provided by Lea
Sgier. I also owe gratitude to Emily-St Denny and Emile Chabal for
their insightful comments on the French case and to Charlotte
Orgebin-Salmon from Regional Council of Ile-de-France for doing her
best to liaise me with French politicians.
The research for this book was supported by the Vice-Chancellor’s
Scholarship and by the University Association of Contemporary European
Studies (UACES) that funded my fieldwork in Switzerland, for which I am
grateful. Thanks to the librarians from Ulster University, William, Jennie
and David, whom I countlessly tortured with document delivery requests.
I owe special gratitude to my interviewees who made this research possi-
ble. To name a few: Vince Cable, David Metcalf, Luzi Stamn, Thomas
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Aeschi, Ulrich Schluer, Hanz Fehr and many others who agreed to pro-
vide the insights into the black box of immigration policymaking.
Last, but not least, I offer my gratitude to my family, to David McKeever,
who is my best friend and my toughest critic, being a political scientist too.
He has read many drafts of this book and the dissertation that came before
it. This book is dedicated to him. I am grateful to Kononenko family for
always supporting my career path and investing in my education and to
McKeever family for their encouragement.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Explaining Causes and Dynamics of Policy Change

and Policy Deadlock 15
3 From Detoxification Strategy Back to ‘Nasty Party’:

Explaining the Conservative’s Turn on Immigration
Between 2005 and 2015 35
4 Immigration Policy and the SVP: Resisting the EU

and Fighting Switzerland’s So-Called Islamisation 67
5 Immigration During Sarkozy’s Time in Office: Economic

Orientation and Cultural Backlash 97
6 Explaining the Variation in Conservative Parties’

Responses to Immigration135
7 Conclusion153
Index165
ix
Abbreviations
ACSE National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equality of Opportunities

BIS Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
CAI Contract of Reception and Integration
CCT Card of Competences and Talents
CVP Christian Democrat Party of Switzerland
EEA European Economic Area
EU European Union
FASILD Fond of Action and Support for Integration and Fight against
Discrimination
FDJP Federal Department of Justice and Police
FDP Liberal-Radical Party of Switzerland
FN Front National
IFOP French Institute of Public Opinion
INSEE National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies
MAC Migration Advisory Committee
MP Member of Parliament
MWUK Migration Watch UK
NHS National Health Service
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PBS Points-based system
SpAD Special Advisor
SVP Swiss People’s Party
UDF Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party
UMP Union for a Popular Movement
UUK Universities UK
xi
List of Figures
Fig. 3.1 Net migration to the UK (2006–2016). (Source: Office of

National Statistics (2016)) 45
Fig. 3.2 EU-15 migration to the UK (2006–2016). (Source: Office of
Fig. 3.3 EU migration to the UK (2000–2014). (Source: Office for
Fig. 4.1 EU migration to Switzerland, 2002–2017. (Source: Office
fédérale de la statistique (2018)) 80
xiii
List of Tables
Table 3.1 Conservative Party’s rhetoric on immigration and immigration

policy changes under the 2010–2015 Coalition government 43
Table 4.1 SVP’s manifesto pledges, 2007–2015 75
Table 6.1 Causes of policy change in France, Switzerland and the UK 136
Table 6.2 Contextual characteristics of the UK, Switzerland and France 140
Table 6.3 Causal mechanisms of policy change and policy deadlock in
the UK, Switzerland and France 146
xv
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
What explains the introduction of restrictive immigration policies across a

number of European states? Why do conservative parties choose to
toughen their immigration policy stances? What explains the variation in
the factors that affect conservative parties’ immigration policymaking log-
ics? What mechanisms account for the dynamics of immigration policy
change or policy deadlock? Using the cases of the UK, Switzerland and
France, this book explains why governmental conservative parties in these
countries changed their immigration policy stances and shaped immigra-
tion policy in a more restrictive direction between 2002 and 2015. It also
sheds light on the mechanisms that explain both immigration policy
change and integration policy deadlock.
Immigration has become one of the crucial issues in Western Europe
(Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019; Grande et al. 2019), dominating agenda
of political parties and voters and remaining the biggest concern of the
European voters (European Commission 2018). Britain’s exit (Brexit)
from the European Union (EU), the acceptance of the Initiative Against
Mass Migration in Switzerland, Marine Le Pen’s unprecedented success in
the 2017 presidential elections are some of the examples that highlight the
growing scepticism towards the EU and immigration in general and illus-
trate a growing demand for populist ideas. Conservative parties across
Europe have not been immune to the rise of populism and Euroscepticism,
which is largely centred around the issue of immigration. Right-wing gov-
ernments or coalitions, which included mainstream conservative parties,
© The Author(s) 2020 1

A. McKeever, Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in
Western Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41761-1_1
2 A. MCKEEVER
have adopted restrictive immigration policies, creating a fertile ground for

the growth of populism, which in the European context refers ‘to anti-
immigration and xenophobia’ (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018: 2). In
Europe, populism is generally characterised as right-wing (Betz 1994;
Zaslove 2004), ethnic identity oriented (Mudde 2007) and exclusionist
(Betz 2001). For right-wing populists, the enemy of the people is not just
elites but also ‘others’, including immigrants, Muslims and regional
minorities (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 6), which are not considered
as part of ‘the people’ (Rooduijn et al. 2014: 564). Europe and the world
are witnessing the rise of radical right populism (Inglehart and Norris
2016), which signals the need to provide explanations about the origins
and foundations of this change.
Populism and the rise of radical right in Western Europe pose chal-
lenges for mainstream parties, which ultimately influence the positions of
mainstream parties on issues like immigration, contributing to the right-
turn in European politics (Mudde 2016: 9). It has been argued that as a
result of the rise of radical right, mainstream parties and politicians have
resorted to populist rhetoric:
When explicitly prominent outsider gains prominence, parts of establish-

ment will react by a combined strategy of exclusion and inclusion; while
trying to exclude populist actor(s) from political power, they will include
populist themes and rhetoric to try and fight off the challenge. (Mudde
2004: 563)
Not being part of the governments, radical right parties nevertheless

have become significant players on political arena by politicising issues like
immigration, economy and security (Mudde 2013; Van Spanje 2010;
Abou-Chadi 2016). Growing public support for such parties has had an
impact on the strategies that mainstream parties adopted to prevent the
alienation of their electorate. Political discourse and the policies of estab-
lished parties have been shifting further to the right, which demonstrates
the ‘right turn’ in European politics (Alonso and Da Fonseca 2012).
However, while evidence points to the fact that radical right parties have
an influence on the positions of the conservative parties (Schain 2006;
Mudde 2013; Alonso and Da Fonseca 2012), it is not the only explana-
tion of why conservative parties adopt more restrictive immigration policy
stances and other factors also need to be considered. Electoral threat from
radical right parties does not solely explain the change in conservative
1 INTRODUCTION 3
arties’ immigration stances (Akkerman 2015; Alonso and Da Fonseca

p
2012) as ‘radical right populist parties should be seen as catalysts rather
than initiators, who are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the
introduction of restrictive immigration policies’ (Mudde 2013: 1). So,
what explains why conservative parties adopt restrictive immigration
stances, leading to tougher immigration policies in Western Europe?
As immigration continues to be an important issue on political agenda,
so will the need to recognise the causes and mechanisms that account for
the introduction of restrictive immigration policies. This book considers
the impact of radical right on conservative parties’ policy stances but offers
other explanations as to why conservative parties become more restrictive
on immigration. It is timely as it helps to explain the general European
shift to the right through one of the key lenses: immigration. While
country-specific nuances exist, there would appear to be pan-European
concerns around immigration. Among the challenges that immigration
poses are economic and identity concerns as well as Europeanisation, sup-
port for which is diminishing among some EU member states and their
electorates, while nation-state sovereignty in immigration matters is seen
as increasingly important. Cultural and social questions have arisen as a
response to the widening of the European community, linking immigra-
tion with anxiety about social security and welfare (Delanty 2008).
Immigration has adopted a negative connotation in European discourse
and has been linked to new social security issues. Originally it was radical
right parties like Front National (FN) in France, United Kingdom
Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK, Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark and
others that have been spearheading welfare chauvinism, arguing for limit-
ing immigrants’ access to social welfare benefits. Today, the popularisation
of ideas linking EU, immigration, welfare and security as sources of uncer-
tainty is not any more a distinctive feature of radical right parties but has
become a key issue on the agenda of conservative parties. In order to bet-
ter understand the growth of right-wing populism across Europe, this
book examines the role of conservative parties in mainstreaming it.
The new millennium has brought a new set of challenges that has
resulted in more restrictive immigration policies. The events of 9/11 in
the USA, which brought a shift in perception of certain categories of
migrants, had an impact on the perception of Muslims in the Western
world and contributed to the rise of Islamophobia and backlash against
multiculturalism (Castles and Miller 2009). Important changes have been
happening on the European arena as well. The 2004 EU enlargement
4 A. MCKEEVER
welcomed ten new countries, which substantially increased the population

of the EU. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 contributed to
the already existing tensions in certain European countries like the UK,
especially with regard to labour migration. Global financial crisis, which
unfolded in 2007–2008 and brought recession across the world, had a
negative impact on labour markets and highlighted economic insecurities,
which manifested in decreasing economic growth and rising unemploy-
ment (Hemerijck 2013).
This book examines the period between 2002 and 2015, depending on
the country case, based on the occurrence of critical junctures in each of
the countries. In Switzerland, the analysis starts from 2003, when the Swiss
People’s Party (SVP) became the largest party in National Council for the
first time in Swiss history and since then has significantly contributed to the
evolution of the Swiss immigration policy in a more restrictive direction. In
the UK, David Cameron became the leader of the Conservative Party in
2005, pledging to transform it from a ‘nasty party’ and detoxify its image
but shortly abandoned this endavour. Finally, since the appointment of
Nicholas Sarkozy as minister of the Interior in France in 2002, and until
the end of his presidency in 2012, French immigration policy experienced
substantive changes and seen the introduction of tougher integration poli-
cies, targeting primarily female Muslim population, measures designed to
restrict family, student and low-skilled migration. The period, which overall
covers a decade, differs within country cases, but is more or less consistent
across them. As different events happened at different times in three cases,
in France, the timeframe examines the period from since Sarkozy became
the minister of the Interior in 2002 until the end of his presidency in 2012;
in the UK, the period studied starts with the election of David Cameron as
the Conservative Party leader in 2005 and finishes with the end of the
Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in 2015. In Switzerland,
evolution of the SVP’s immigration stance is explored from 2003, when
the party made its major electoral breakthrough, until 2014, when the
Initiative Against Mass Migration was accepted by the population.
Focus on Conservative Parties

Whilst there has been a lot said on the radical right and their role in politi-
cising immigration, there has been less attention paid to the rightward
moves of conservative parties, despite their much greater policy impor-
tance (Bale 2008). Scholars have given considerable attention to how
1 INTRODUCTION 5
radical right parties have influenced the immigration debate (Kitschelt

and McGann 1995; Carter 2005; Akkerman 2012, 2015; Mudde 2013;
Van Spanje 2010; Van der Brug et al. 2005), but disregarded the role of
conservative parties in immigration policy change. As Bale (2008: 317)
highlights:
It is about time, however, that we turned the telescope around and, trained
it, too, on the parties that have a more direct impact on public policy at and
beyond the level of the state. In this respect, parties of the centre-right […]
have enjoyed nowhere near the scholarly attention of their more radical
counterparts, are an obvious point of departure.
Conservative parties have been far more important in shaping immi-

gration policies across Europe because of their decision-making pow-
ers, being either in government or in a coalition with other parties,
having a direct effect on immigration policymaking (Schain 2006;
Mudde 2013: 12). While existing studies have focused more on the
demand side, addressing electoral support for conservative parties,
supply-side explanations that examine the right-wing parties’ positions
and the reasons behind their changing immigration stances remain
limited.
Despite the fact that immigration has become a concern for estab-
lished parties on both sides of ideological spectrum (Bale et al. 2010;
Alonso and Da Fonseca 2012; Carvalho and Ruedin 2018), this book
focuses only on conservative parties, as immigration constitutes a vital
part of right-wing ideology and this issue has been primarily of interest
and ownership of right-wing parties in power (Alonso and Da Fonseca
2012: 3–4). Politicisation of immigration poses more electoral threat to
right-wing parties because it is one of the core issues as ‘their ideological
raison d’etre is to defend national security and national communitarian
values’ (Akkerman 2012: 516). This is not to say that left-wing parties
do not suffer from voter defection when it comes to immigration, they
also experience ‘pressure from their traditional working-class constituen-
cies to be tougher on immigration and issues of law and order’ (Zaslove
2006: 10). While immigration still remains an important issue for the
left, due to ‘a tension between representing the interests of the native
working-class and wider concerns about social justice’ (Duncan and Van
Hecke 2008: 434), for left-wing parties, immigration is not the priority
issue and they are always seen less credible on immigration compared to
6 A. MCKEEVER
the right-wing parties. Conservative parties are more likely to adopt

restrictive immigration choices, which makes them paramount in explain-
ing the introduction of restrictive immigration policies across a range of
European countries.
The book examines immigration policymaking logics of three conserva-
tive parties: the Conservative Party in the UK, the Union for a Popular
Movement (UMP—Union pour un movement Populaire) in France and
the Swiss People’s Party (SVP—Schweizerische Volkspartei) in Switzerland.
SVP stands out as it is often described as radical right wing (Skenderovic
2009) or populist radical right (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015; Heinisch
and Mazzoleni 2016) because of the nature of its rhetoric on immigration,
which is profoundly nationalistic; therefore, it cannot be excluded from
the analysis, as it has significantly redefined Swiss immigration policy in a
more restrictive direction, both on the level of discourse and on the level
of legislation.
The core questions analysed in this book are as follows. First, why have
conservative parties changed their immigration policy stances, which
resulted in the introduction of more restrictive policies in the UK,
Switzerland and France between 2002 and 2015. Second, what mecha-
nisms account for the dynamics of policy change in three country cases
and for integration policy deadlock in France.
Examining labour, student and family migration, including both EU
and non-EU migration, the book offers explanations of why conservative
parties altered their immigration stances in a restrictive way and identifies
the mechanisms that accounted for immigration policy change in three
cases and integration policy deadlock in France. Illegal immigration is not
being addressed in this book as the answer to why political parties adopt
restrictive positions towards illegal immigration is in part self-explanatory,
while the explanation of why conservative parties introduced more restric-
tive approach towards legal migration routes is more puzzling. This book
also touches upon integration in France and Switzerland, which belong to
assimilationist citizenship regime, making integration significant in under-
standing the logic of immigration policymaking overall. This book does
not cover the timeframe of Brexit, but digs into its origins, which are
linked to anti-immigration attitudes and growing Euroscepticism within
the Conservative Party, which brought Brexit onto political agenda.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
Case Selection
Undoubtedly, anti-immigration rhetoric and policies are becoming more
pronounced in other countries, including Germany, Italy, Hungary and
Poland, but this change is only relatively recent. Brexit in the UK, the
Initiative Against Mass Migration in Switzerland and support for Marine
Le Pen in 2017 French presidential election point to the increased anti-
immigration attitudes both within the political establishment and general
public. All these events are the outcomes of the growing concerns over
immigration, which conservative parties in these countries identified as a
crucial issue much earlier, and these events represent a culmination of the
concerns that parties have had on immigration for a while.
In order to answer the central question of this book—What explains the
introduction of more restrictive immigration policies?—most different
systems design (MDSD) (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Rihoux and Ragin
2009; Anckar 2008) was chosen as a case selection strategy. The goal is to
discover relevant exogenous factors (Anckar 2008: 392) that explain posi-
tion change of the conservative parties on immigration. In general, three
countries do not vary on the outcome (Landman 2003: 29–34; Sartori
1991: 250) and exemplify the introduction of more restrictive immigra-
tion policies, which have undergone considerable tightening between
2002 and 2015. The cancellation of the post-study work visa for interna-
tional students in the UK and France, the introduction of financial require-
ment for spouse visa in the UK, banning the construction of minarets in
Switzerland and introducing automatic expelling for non-Swiss offenders
are just some examples how immigration policies have changed. Three
cases have a similar outcome but differ on a number of characteristics,
which might be able to partly explain the differences in conservative par-
ties’ approaches to immigration.
The UK, Switzerland and France vary with regard to two important
characteristics: country’s relationship with the EU and country’s citizen-
ship regime. The question of country’s relationship with the EU in the
context of Brexit and the Conservative Party’s role in it is not new. The
UK’s membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) was
first questioned under the Labour government, in non-binding 1975 ref-
erendum, where the population voted to be part of the EEC. However,
Switzerland not being a part of the EU enjoys some benefits such as the
free movement of people and access to EU’s single market for most of its
industries. Finally, France has always been a Europhile country, by and
8 A. MCKEEVER
large having a positive stance towards the EU, being one of its core found-
ers, viewing Europe as a platform to exert its influence (Drake 2011).
Second, three countries belong to different citizenship regimes, which
create opportunities or constraints for political parties to exploit identity
lens in the context of immigration. While Switzerland and France can be
described as assimilationist regime type, the UK belongs to a multicultural
regime. Here, it is important to emphasise that although all three coun-
tries are multicultural in nature and have diverse immigration inflows, they
differ in terms of their integration approach, which is largely determined
by the citizenship regime. Switzerland and France both relate to assimila-
tionist model, though with some differences. While France is a part of
civic-assimilationist model, combining a ‘civic conception of citizenship
and assimilationist view of cultural obligations’ (Guigni and Passy 2004:
59), Switzerland belongs to the ethnic-assimilationist model, which
requires ‘assimilation to the norms and values of the national community
on the ethnocultural basis and tend to exclude those who are not entitled
to sharing its norms, values and symbols’ (Guigni and Passy 2004: 58).
The UK differs from two other cases as it belongs to the multicultural citi-
zenship regime, where immigrants are allowed to ‘maintain their distinc-
tive cultures and form ethnic communities, providing they conform to
national laws’ (Castles and Miller 2009: 45), which does not place integra-
tion at the centre of immigration debate, at least not until latest terrorist
attacks that happened in the UK.
MDSD helps to explain what accounts for immigration policy change
as it aims to find shared factors (Anckar 2008: 396) that lead to this
change, which helps to generalise why countries adopt restrictive immigra-
tion policies. In this book, the application of MDSD relies on both deduc-
tive and inductive logics, where some of the factors that affect party policy
change are part of previous theoretical explanations while some of the
factors emerge during the data analysis. This aids in providing generalisa-
tions for other cases that share similar contextual attributes. By comparing
these three cases, the book explains the variance of the approaches by
drawing on the similarities and differences in the evolution of immigration
policy stances of conservative parties and subsequently immigration poli-
cies in the UK, France and Switzerland and the mechanisms that explain
policy change or policy deadlock.
1 INTRODUCTION 9
Plan of the Book

The rest of the book is organised as follows. Chapter 2 synthesises the
literature on factors contributing to party policy change and the literature
on causal mechanisms that account for policy change or policy deadlock.
This chapter starts with a discussion of scholarship on both internal and
external factors that influence parties’ positions, focusing on external tra-
dition, arguing that it provides a more complete explanation of the change.
It then moves to discuss the scholarship on causal mechanisms, which are
crucial in illuminating decision-making-processes. The chapter finishes
with the discussion of comparative case study method, data collection and
data analysis processes.
Chapter 3, the first of three case studies, explores the change in
Conservative Party’s immigration stance during David Cameron’s leader-
ship (2005–2015) and explains why the party made a U-turn on immigra-
tion policy, abandoning its ‘detoxification strategy’, which the party
adopted upon Cameron’s election as a new party’s leader in 2005. In
addition to testing existent theories of party policy change, the chapter
identifies one new crucial factor that led to the change in Conservatives’
immigration policy—the Home Office’s ideological dogmatism, which
manifested itself in the Home Office’s control over agenda setting, evi-
dence twisting and lack of communication with other governmental
departments that were involved in immigration policymaking. Framing
and departmental competition were the mechanisms that accounted for
the immigration policy change. Framing enabled the Conservatives to
argue for more restrictive immigration policies while both in opposition
and in Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. Departmental
competition accounted for the restrictive character of the UK immigration
policy under the Coalition government. The chapter also provides an
explanation of why some interest groups like Migration Watch UK
(MWUK) were more successful in lobbying the UK Conservative Party
than those of the educational sector such as the Universities UK (UUK)
on the issue of student migration, which was a crucial and divisive issue for
the Coalition government.
Chapter 4 sheds light on the change in the SVP’s immigration stance
from 2003, when the party made an electoral breakthrough, becoming
the largest party in the National Council. The chapter investigates the
evolution of the SVP’s immigration stance and its attempts to change
Swiss immigration policy using direct democracy. It demonstrates how
10 A. MCKEEVER
framing permitted the SVP to criticise the government on immigration

and acted as an instrument for popularising its stance. However, once the
SVP lost its second seat in the Federal Council (government) and the con-
trol over the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP), its ability
to shape immigration policy through governmental channels diminished.
The consensual model of Swiss politics provided extra-parliamentary ven-
ues for the SVP to use direct democracy, a second mechanism that
accounted for immigration policy change. The chapter points out that,
despite not being a member of the EU, Switzerland has been facing adap-
tational pressures from Europeanisation, demonstrating how anxieties
related to Europeanisation led to the acceptance of the Initiative Against
Mass Migration in 2014, which has endangered the cooperation between
Switzerland and the EU. It also explains integration policy change, which
relates to the prohibition of constructing minarets in Switzerland through
a lens of cultural threat.
Chapter 5 focuses on the evolution of the French immigration policy
during Sarkozy’s time in office, since he was appointed as minister of the
Interior in 2002 until the end of his presidency in 2012. The chapter
points out to a number of exogenous factors that influenced Sarkozy’s
immigration stance including perceived identity anxieties of the public,
which largely manifested themselves in the fear of Islam, perceived eco-
nomic anxieties about family immigration and pressure from the FN. The
chapter also demonstrates that the crisis impeded the success of Sarkozy’s
selective immigration approach, which aimed to attract highly skilled
immigration. Framing enabled Sarkozy and his party to justify immigra-
tion policy change. Institutional layering and departmental competition
accounted for integration policy deadlock. Institutional layering was
designed to engineer policy change but led to departmental competition
within new or combined structures, resulting in integration policy dead-
lock and triggering further institutional change.
In Chap. 6, I link the findings from the three cases and analyse the
variation in causes and mechanisms of policy change across the cases. The
chapter points out that the factors that influence parties’ immigration pol-
icy stances are broadly similar in three countries, but the way that they are
articulated by the parties is context dependent. This variation is explained
by three contextual factors: the effects of the EU integration, party com-
petition on the right and perceived identity concerns of the public towards
immigration. Parties’ immigration policy stances are shaped by the parties’
attitudes towards the EU, the type of country’s citizenship regime and the
1 INTRODUCTION 11
strength of radical right competitor. The second part of the chapter delves
into the comparison of causal mechanisms and explains the differences in
policymaking logics through examination of the type of democracy a
country belongs to.
Chapter 7, conclusion, summarises the findings of the book and points
out how they contribute to a number of broader discussions that relate to
party policy change pointing to the factors that shape their immigration
policy positions. The book also contributes to the theorisation of the
dynamics of policy change and policy deadlock, highlighting the role of
the institutions in it. The book concludes with offering some avenues for
further research.
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CHAPTER 2
Explaining Causes and Dynamics of Policy

Change and Policy Deadlock
In this chapter, I present an overview of the theories of party policy change

and the mechanisms that explain policy change or policy deadlock. I finish
with sketching out the comparative case study framework, data collection
and data analysis processes. I begin by focusing on theories that explain
party policy change from internal perspective, which means that the cause
of the change originates from within the party. I argue that these theories
cannot fully explain the change and we need to consider factors external to
the party that influence party’s policy stances to explain why parties adopt
specific policy positions. Internal factors are not sufficient to explain why the
change is happening, as parties do not take decisions in a vacuum and, in
addition to internal factors, external factors drive their policymaking logics.
As Fagerholm (2015: 501) highlights: ‘the social, political and economic
environment challenges the everyday life of political parties and forces them
to adapt to the change. This, in turn, emphasises the need for compara-
tive research on how, when and why political parties change their stand-
points’. Where the theories that focus on exogenous factors are vague, I
operationalise them into specific variables. In the second part of the chapter
I focus on the literature on causal mechanisms. Unpacking the black box
of immigration policymaking also requires examining the mechanisms that
explain policy change and policy deadlock because it is equally important to
understand not only why the change is happening, but how, or what prevents
it from happening. I conclude with the discussion of the comparative case
study method, elaborate on data collection and data analysis process.

16 A. MCKEEVER
Party Policy Change: Internal Explanations

One of the central questions of this book is to explain why parties change
their immigration policy stances, subsequently leading to the change in
immigration policies. Political parties change their policies all the time and
there are different explanations as to why this is so (Falleti and Lynch
2009: 1153).
Party policy change can be explained from two perspectives: internal
and external. Internal tradition emphasises that parties change their poli-
cies as a result of the changes that happen within the party, which include
a change of a party leader (Downs 1957; Harmel and Janda 1994), a
change in a dominant faction in the party (Harmel et al. 1995; Harmel
and Tan 2003) and electoral defeat (Harmel and Janda 1994; Budge
1994). While some postulate that a change in party leader is an important
factor for producing party policy change, especially for conservative par-
ties (Harmel et al. 1995), others (Meyer 2013) came to the conclusion
that it does not lead to the change in parties’ policy stances. The studies
that examined the change in the dominant faction within the party point
out that in isolation neither the change in a dominant faction nor the
change in a party leader causes party policy change (Harmel et al. 1995;
Harmel and Tan 2003; Fagerholm 2015). Previous electoral performance
can be important for a party, but it does not necessarily cause party policy
change (Adams et al. 2004; Janda et al. 1995; Harmel et al. 1995). Some
studies point out that parties alter their positions as a reaction to the sub-
stantial loss of their voter base, especially if it was a recent one (Somer-
Topcu 2009).
The explanation of party policy change caused simply by internal fac-
tors is not sufficient because parties do not take their decisions in a vac-
uum as parties are not immune to external pressures, which affect their
decision-making (Partos and Bale 2015: 604). Party policy change is also
driven by the events that are happening in broader political and institu-
tional environments, either local or/and regional. Therefore, there is a
need to address factors exogenous to parties to explain party policy change.
This is not to imply that the internal tradition is flawed, but to suggest that
the internal tradition cannot fully explain party policy change and that the
examination of factors external to the party needs to be addressed.
2 EXPLAINING CAUSES AND DYNAMICS OF POLICY CHANGE AND POLICY… 17
Party Policy Change: External Explanations
Party Competition
Party competition is one of the most studied factors that make parties
change their positions (Norris 2005; Meguid 2007; Schain 2006). Parties
change their policies as they tend to respond to the shift(s) of rival parties
(Budge 1994). Threatened by a rise of the competitor, some parties
choose an accommodative strategy to prevent voter defection and maxi-
mise their vote share (Downs 1957; Laver 2005). Evidence suggests that
convergence of party policy positions is higher if parties belong to the
same ideological family (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009: 835–837).
Mainstream parties tend to adopt more restrictive positions as a result of
presence of anti-immigrant parties (Sides and Citrin 2007: 477) to pre-
vent the loss of electorate. Electoral rise of radical right changed ‘the
structure of the political space’ (Rydgren 2003: 46), pressuring other par-
ties to adopt accommodative strategies (Meguid 2007). In responding to
the pressures from radical right, right-wing parties have been more recep-
tive because of their ideological proximity to competitors (Abou-Chadi
2016; Akkerman 2012); however, left-wing parties are not immune to
voter alienation either when it comes to immigration (Alonso and Da
Fonseca 2012; Goodwin and Ford 2017). When immigration gains
salience, other parties either hold onto their positions or co-opt the posi-
tions of the competitor (Bale et al. 2010). Issues like immigration have
entered mainstream politics and can no longer be disregarded by other
political parties. The rise of radical right parties’ electoral fortunes, which
creates subsequent threats for conservative parties, puts pressure on other
conservative parties, making them go hard-line on immigration.
In case study chapters, I explore if conservative parties changed their
immigration stances as a response to the rise of radical right, specifically
if the Conservative Party in the UK and Sarkozy in France have fac-
tored the concerns about the growing electoral rise of UKIP and FN
into their immigration policymaking logics. Party competition on the
right is not considered as a factor that influences SVP’s positions on
immigration because there has been no radical right competitor in
Switzerland that would threaten the electoral fortunes of the SVP since
2003, when it became the largest and the most popular conservative
party in the country.
18 A. MCKEEVER
Public Opinion
Parties also change their policies as a response to the shifts in public opin-
ion (Lahav 2004; McDonald and Budge 2005). There is evidence that
parties move away from their policy positions, when public opinion shifts
away from the party (Adams et al. 2004). While niche parties do not usu-
ally respond to change in public opinion (Adams et al. 2006), mainstream
parties do (Adams et al. 2009). Ezrow et al. (2011) demonstrate that
mainstream parties respond more to shifts in the attitudes of their sup-
porters rather than shifts in opinion of the general public. It is important
to highlight that there is a two-way relationship between public opinion
and policy, meaning that they both influence each other (Page and Shapiro
1983), and sometimes it is difficult to trace whether it is public opinion
that had an impact on policy development or vice versa. This book exam-
ines whether conservative parties incorporate concerns about public opin-
ion on immigration when altering their immigration policy stances, as
parties do not always change their policies, despite public dissatisfaction
with it (Page and Shapiro 1983).
Economic and Cultural Anxieties

The influence of public opinion on party positions is important, but it
gives a general picture whether parties consider it when deciding to change
their immigration stances. However, which particular concerns underlie
voters’ opposition to immigration? There are two main sets of threats that
explain public hostility towards immigration: economic and cultural
(Malhotra et al. 2013). Public attitudes on immigration have been known
to be linked to economic anxieties of the population, where opposition to
immigration is driven by the labour market competition, which is rein-
forced when immigrants are coming in (Citrin et al. 1997; Burns and
Gimpel 2000; Dustmann et al. 2005; Harwood 1986; Mayda 2006). As
Malhotra et al. (2013) highlight, findings in support of the economic anx-
ieties hypothesis diverge, with some studies showing empirical evidence in
support of this hypothesis (Kessler 2001; Mayda 2006; Scheve and
Slaughter 2001), while others find weak support (Burns and Gimpel 2000;
McLaren and Johnson 2007) to confirm it. Another factor that drives vot-
ers’ opposition to immigration is cultural threat, with some individuals
arguing that immigrants endanger the traditional way of life and pose
threat to national identity, as they belong to different cultures (Brader
et al. 2008; Luedtke 2005; McDaniel et al. 2011; McLaren 2001; Sides
and Citrin 2007). Without exception, existing studies demonstrate strong
evidence in support of the cultural threat hypothesis (Malhotra et al.
2013). Case study chapters explore if conservative parties changed their
policies as a response to economic anxieties (labour-market competition,
unemployment concerns) or as a response to national identity concerns
(cultural threat, anti-Islam sentiments).
Global Economic Change

While within country concerns are important, parties also react to the
change that is happening in a wider environment. There is evidence that
conservative parties alter their policy stances as a reaction to global eco-
nomic change (Adams et al. 2009; Haupt 2010; Fagerholm 2015; Ward
et al. 2011). Political parties take into consideration both domestic and
international economic situation (Hibbs 1977; Garret 1998; Pierson
2001). Economic concerns and its impact on immigration debate are
salient in a way that when a country faces economic hardship, political
parties, especially conservative ones, can adopt more restrictive immigra-
tion policies as a way to protect economic resources for the native popula-
tion by restricting access to welfare benefits, for example. In times of
economic hardship, immigration can acquire a negative connotation,
when immigrants are blamed for perceived economic problems and por-
trayed as benefit scroungers. In this book global economic change is oper-
ationalised through the lens of 2007–2008 global economic crisis, which
falls within the studied timeframe. Case study chapters examine if
2007–2008 global economic crisis has contributed to the toughening of
conservative parties’ positions on immigration.
The Effects of the EU Integration

The changing pace of immigration and erosion of certain boundaries
between states has had an impact on immigration discourse and policies
across Western Europe. As Geddes (2003: 4) pinpoints: ‘Analysis of
immigration policies should be placed in the context of general changes
that affect countries from within—welfare state and labour market
changes, and from outside—commitments to European integration’.
Even though immigration policy remains a matter largely reserved to
national governments, some of its aspects like the ‘four freedoms’, which
20 A. MCKEEVER
include free movement of people, services, goods and capital, are defined
by international agreements, established by supranational bodies. The
freedom of movement is especially relevant to the case of immigration as
it increases intra-EU mobility, which alters the levels of migration certain
countries experience. This book operationalises the changes in political
and socio-economic environment through two EU enlargements—2004
and 2007 Eastern enlargements and subsequent effects of the EU inte-
gration such as the freedom of movement. EU integration is seen to have
an impact on countries’ immigration policies through two EU enlarge-
ments, 2004 and 2007, when a big chunk of Eastern Europe joined the
EU, increasing its population by 75 million residents (Kvist 2004: 301).
These enlargements brought anxieties about the jobs and welfare con-
cerns (Kahanec et al. 2009). Widening of the EU and increased intra-EU
migration did not only bring more opportunities for EU citizens to find
work in other member states, but it also brought labour market and wel-
fare concerns.
There is an emerging crisis of solidarity with Europeanisation and this is

centrally about anxieties about peoplehood. With the emergence of a
European political community that has diminished national sovereignty at a
time when global forces are also undermining nation states, both Europe
and migration became linked as sources of instability for many people.
Anxieties about Europe and migration are linked with fears of a clash of
civilisations and anxieties about crime and social securities. (Delanty
2008: 677)
This book explores whether anxieties related to the EU integration

were driving the change in conservative parties’ immigration stances,
which eventually led to the immigration policy change in three country
cases. Even countries that are not part of the EU tend to face pressures
from it. For example, Switzerland’s participation in the free movement of
people in an exchange to the EU’s single market has been a focal point in
the SVP’s immigration discourse.
This book does not treat factors in isolation and explains how their
interaction led to the change in conservative parties’ immigration policy
stances. The change does not simply consist of a variety of conditions that
produce the change but constitutes the ‘intersection of appropriate pre-
conditions—the right ingredients for change. In the absence of any of
these essential ingredients, the phenomenon—or the change—does not
emerge’ (Ragin 1987: 25). The causes of immigration policy change are
not limited to the factors derived from the literature and described in this
chapter. Other factors that contribute to immigration policy change might
emerge through the analysis of interview data, which brings contribution
to the existing theories on party policy change.
Explaining the Dynamics of Policy Change

and Policy Deadlock
Causes of party position and policy change have been extensively covered
in party politics literature, yet there has been less attention paid to identi-
fication of the mechanisms that explain policy change and policy deadlock
(Bennett 2010; Falleti and Lynch 2008; Falleti and Lynch 2009). While
the causes driving policy change have been documented, the processes
that explain this change remain unclear (Afonso 2014: 568). Mechanisms
are crucial in explaining how certain conditions produce a specific out-
come (Mayntz 2004) and this book aims to identify the mechanisms that
explain policy change or the absence thereof.
There is no single agreed definition of a causal mechanism, but this
book takes an approach in viewing a mechanism as a process: a causal path-
way, which links causes with the outcomes (Gerring 2008: 178; Bengtsson
and Hertting 2014: 4–5). It is important to note that while identifying
and describing mechanisms, only specific parts of the causal process are
described and the goal is to elucidate crucial details of the process by
rejecting irrelevant details (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 53). Identifying
causal mechanisms responsible for policy change is possible with the use of
process tracing (Collier 2011; George and Bennett 2004; Beach and
Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2015; Goertz and Mahoney 2012).
It helps to open the black box of causality (Trampusch and Palier 2016)
and figure out ‘who knew what, when, and what they did in response’
(Bennett 2010: 209), examining the change over time (Collier 1993).
While some (Mahoney 2001: 580–581) postulate that mechanisms work
the same in different contexts, following a deterministic approach to
understanding mechanisms, others (Falleti and Lynch 2009: 1144) argue
that context is crucial in explaining the change, following the probabilistic
understanding of a mechanism, which means that mechanism does not
always operate the same, but can work differently, depending on the con-
text. The book views causal mechanisms as probabilistic, meaning that
22 A. MCKEEVER
their operation cannot be predetermined and is ultimately context

dependent (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Falleti and Lynch 2009). A proba-
bilistic understanding of mechanisms helps to make stronger causal infer-
ences than a deterministic one, by stressing the importance of appropriate
contextualisation of mechanisms to avoid flawed causal inferences
(Bengtsson and Hertting 2014; Falleti and Lynch 2009) and generalises
causal mechanisms based on the context in which they operate. Below I
discuss some of the mechanisms that are pertinent to explaining party
policy change.
Framing
Originally developed in the area of social movements, the concept of
‘frame’ originated from the work of Goffman (1974) and was later extrap-
olated to other areas, including party politics and policymaking. Muller
(1997) describes a frame as ‘a set of cognitive and moral maps that orient
an actor within a policy sphere’. Frames are used to socially construct spe-
cific assumptions about certain groups or issues. As Bleich (2011: 60)
points out:
frames help actors identify problems and specify and prioritise their interests
and goals; they point actors towards causal and normative judgements about
effective and appropriate policies in ways that tend to propel policy down a
particular path. […] frames give direction to policy making and help account
for policy outcomes.
Framing represents the way political actors present their policy posi-
tions and how they articulate their views on certain issues. Framing is an
argumentative mechanism that enables politicians to justify their views on
specific policies as frames:
function as modes of attribution and articulation. They attribute blame for

perceived social problems by identifying individuals, social groups or struc-
tures that are believed to have caused the problem in question (diagnostic
framing); they also suggest a general line of action (prognostic framing).
(Rydgren 2005: 426)
However, political parties do not adopt frames randomly, they are care-
ful in selecting which to choose because they are seeking to adopt the
frame that resonates with a large number of voters in order to increase

their vote share and prevent the alienation of their electorate. In Chaps. 3,
4 and 5, I explain how conservative parties framed immigration to create
ground for the implementation of more restrictive immigration policies.
Departmental Competition
Departmental competition has been used to explain policymaking
process. In a nutshell departmental competition occurs when, depart-
ments protect their own interests rather than contribute to the over-
all development of a policy, creating a path-dependency and holding
their ground on specific policies (Cole and Fenwick 2003; Kavanaugh
and Richards 2001; Hampshire and Bale 2015). Departments develop
specific cultures of policymaking and, when working together, would
oppose the change or the practices that would differ from their exist-
ing set of experiences (Kavanaugh and Richards 2001). Departments
are often characterised by the ‘long held practices of protecting bud-
gets and maintaining departmental “turf”—where a department seeks
to maintain or extend the range of responsibilities—have only exac-
erbated the isolation of departments and in turn dissagregated gov-
erning’ (Consterdine 2018: 163). Departmentalism helps to explain
not only why and how policy advances in a specific direction, but also
how, at times, a policy comes to a dead end because policymakers and
bureaucrats ‘see things differently from colleagues in other departments
because their organizations have different objectives, ways of doing
things, and because they have been socialized into thinking and acting
in a different way’ (Page 2005: 143). Departmental tensions can be
a result of the political relationships between actors (Suleiman 1978)
where different departments want to reassure their centrality in policy-
making process (Bezes 2009). The competition can also be structured
by power relations within institution, where different departments have
unequal policy influence because of the lack of financial resources or the
lack of information to assert influence (Suleiman 1974). The competi-
tion can be aggravated by the autonomy that civil servants working in
these departments acquire (Genieys 2005).
Chapters 3 and 5 explain how departmental competition led to the
domination of restrictive immigration policy choices in the UK and to
integration policy deadlock in case of Sarkozy’s integration policy.
Explaining UK immigration policy change under the Conservative-Liberal
24 A. MCKEEVER
Democrat Coalition government, this book sheds light on why certain

departments like the Home Office and the Department for Work and
Pensions were able to have their policy choices to dominate. In the French
case, departmental competition acted as a constraint to the development
and implementation of policy, encouraging opposition between senior
civil servants, ministers and their staff, who refused to cooperate, leading
to policy deadlock.
Institutional Layering
While previously institutional layering has been used to explain policy
change (Thelen 2003; Streeck and Thelen 2005), in this book institu-
tional layering is a mechanism that explains policy deadlock any progress
on a given policy development. As institutions ‘both constrain and condi-
tion the behaviour of political actors’ (Consterdine 2015: 131), institu-
tional change has a direct impact on a policy change or on the absence
thereof. Therefore, the book examines how institutional layering, which
aimed to change integration policy in France, led to departmental compe-
tition within layered institutions, creating integration policy deadlock.
The essence of institutional layering is ‘the introduction of new rules on
top of existing ones’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2009: 15), which affects the
behaviour of the actors in that institution (Thelen 2003). While Mahoney
and Thelen (2009: 17) posit that institutional layering can lead to sub-
stantial policy change, where old core is usually replaced by new core
(Streeck and Thelen 2005: 31), this book argues that it is not necessarily
the case and that new layers can be pushed out by the old core, leading to
policy deadlock and further institutional change. In this book, institu-
tional layering explains integration policy deadlock during Sarkozy’s time
in the office, both as a minister of the Interior and as a president of the
Republic.
Methods
This book takes qualitative approach to opening the black box of immigra-
tion policymaking as it enables to explain not only why specific factors
mattered but how they did so. Using case study method, the book sheds
light on immigration decision-making by illuminating ‘why they were
taken, how they were implemented, and with what result’ (Schramm 1971
cited in Yin 2003: 12). As the focus is on explaining the logic of conservative
parties’ immigration position and policy changes from a structuralist per-

spective, emphasising the role of external factors in producing the change,
the case study method is particularly suitable as it investigates the question
in the context, explaining why certain decisions are made (Blatter and
Haverland 2012; Hall 2003, 2008; Gerring 2007; Yin 2003). Context is
operationalised through factors exogenous to a party and is crucial in
explaining the variation in policymaking logics of conservative parties and
the variation in the mechanisms that account for policy change. It is
important to stress that the purpose of the book is to identify the factors
that influenced conservative parties’ positions on immigration and not the
degree to which one factor was more important than the other. Case study
method also allows to unveil causal mechanisms that account for the
dynamics of policy change or policy deadlock (George and Bennett 2004).
Unlike statistical methods, case studies cannot determine the strength of a
specific factor, but they are able to trace causal mechanisms (Gerring 2007:
44–45), which are directly relevant to answering the research questions
this book raises.
The aim of this book is not to produce three different explanations
regarding conservative parties’ immigration stance and policy change,
but to provide certain grounds for generalisation that can be tested in
other cases of policy change. As process tracing is unable to yield cross-
case inferences, which are important for generalisation of the findings, a
comparative method is used to remedy this shortcoming and to over-
come limitations associated with the generalisation of the findings pro-
duced by process tracing. As ‘single case constitutes neither the basis for
valid generalisation nor the ground for disproving an established gener-
alization’ (Lijphart 1971: 691), comparative method allows to point to
the variation across the cases. Comparative method enables a systematic
comparison of the factors across the cases (Collier 1993: 106). Explaining
a variation is, in a nutshell, a point of comparison (Ragin 1987: 2)
because by pointing out the explanation of why the variation occurs, we
are able to provide causal inferences to other cases that share similar
traits. While within-case inferences on why the immigration policy
change occurred in the UK, Switzerland and France are important for
scholars who study these countries, the aim of the book is to suggest
grounds for generalisations that are important for scholars who study
party policy change and immigration in general.
26 A. MCKEEVER
Data
In order to document immigration policy change, the book examines elec-
toral manifestos of the three conservative parties and these countries’
respective immigration policies. The change in SVP’s position on immi-
gration is evidenced by examining 2007, 2011 and 2015 federal elections
manifestos, immigration initiatives launched by the SVP or by its party
members, immigration laws and referendums. The evolution of the UK
Conservative Party immigration stance is demonstrated with the reference
to 2005, 2010 and 2015 general election manifestos and by examining
immigration policies adopted under 2010–2015 Coalition government.
Finally, French immigration policy change is explored through Sarkozy’s
immigration laws, adopted during his time as the minister for the Interior,
his 2007 and 2012 presidential programmes and integration laws that
were adopted under his presidency between 2007 and 2012.
The explanation of immigration policy change comes from semi-
structured elite interviews that I conducted in the UK, Switzerland and
France between 2015 and 2017. Semi-structured elite interviews allow to
shed light on the logic of immigration policy change and are crucial in
allowing to get first-hand accounts of certain processes and decisions
(Tansey 2007: 767). They help to generate ‘unique data to investigate the
complexities of policy and politics’ (Beamer 2002: 86). I conducted forty-
five semi-structured elite interviews in the UK, Switzerland and France.
The interviewees were chosen by targeted sampling. I identified the elites
who belonged to the conservative parties and those who were part of the
immigration policymaking process or those who exerted certain influence
on political elites or on immigration decision-making. Across three cases,
interviews were conducted with conservative politicians, civil servants,
ministers, members of the Coalition government, special advisors and,
where possible, pressure group representatives. Interviewees were con-
tacted mostly by email, sometimes via the phone and in person during
party events. While understanding that targeted sampling can cause a
selection bias (King et al. 1994), it is the best strategy to explain the logic
of the right-wing parties’ positions on immigration, as ‘certain categories
of individuals may have a unique, different or important perspective on
the phenomenon in question and their presence in the sample should be
ensured’ (Robinson 2014: 32). Snowballing technique was employed at a
later stage to increase the number of interviews. In Switzerland, the
response rate was higher compared to the UK and, especially, compared to
France, which was an obstacle for generalisation and had a potential to

introduce ‘significant systemic error’ (Goldstein 2002: 669). This prob-
lem was, to a certain extent, offset by concentrating on the ‘degree to
which non-respondents are likely to differ from those sampling units who
are successfully contacted and interviewed’ (Goldstein 2002: 670). Thus,
many non-respondents and refusals belonged to the same cohort of suc-
cessfully targeted interviewees. All interviews were recorded and supple-
mented by the notes taken during the interview.
Overall, the fieldwork in Switzerland and the UK has been successful in
terms of getting the interviews, while in France the success was hindered
by the low response rate. I briefly present some observations from con-
ducting fieldwork in three countries, which might be useful for researchers
working on similar topics in these three countries. Sketching out the pecu-
liarities of political cultures in three cases can provide an insight into over-
coming obstacles in getting access to elites and conducting interviews in
different languages. In the UK, the low response rate was offset by the
direct recruitment of the interviewees in person, during the Conservative
Party conferences, and by networking. The UK Conservative Party con-
ferences were a useful tool in getting access to politicians, with some of the
interviews established during the conferences. Connections and knowing
the right people also yielded positive results in the UK. In Switzerland, the
problem with a low response rate was non-existent, as Swiss politicians
were very forthcoming and a majority of them agreed for an interview
straight away, which probably can be partly explained by direct democracy
and openness of the Swiss political representatives to the public. Some
interviews were also established through snowballing technique, which
also proved successful. The language could be a definitive barrier to speak-
ing to Swiss politicians from the French region, as most of them would
not speak English or German, therefore fluency in French is advised. Swiss
politicians from the German-speaking region would be more multilingual
and would often be able to speak English or French. The success of get-
ting interviews in France was hindered as, at the time of fieldwork, the
Republicans (former UMP) were in the middle of primaries for the 2017
presidential election and were not particularly interested in giving inter-
views to academic researchers, or, at least, to the unknown foreign
researchers. Targeted sampling successfully worked with French senior
civil servants, while it failed with French politicians. Overall, getting inter-
views in France presented a bigger challenge than in the UK or Switzerland,
even with researcher’s fluency in French.
28 A. MCKEEVER
Interviews were analysed using thematic approach, which ‘allows cate-

gories to emerge from the data’ (Saldaña 2013: 1770) was used to analyse
semi-structured elite interviews. Thematic approach searches for the
themes in data, and these themes emerged both deductively—from the
theories of party policy change and theories of causal mechanisms and
inductively—from the raw data. During the initial level of coding, which
was descriptive, I searched data for thematic explanation like party compe-
tition, or the role of economic factors in party policy change, which has
been described by existing theoretical frameworks. Initially, bits of inter-
view data, usually passages, were attributed a specific theme (Saldaña
2013; DeCuir-Gunby et al. 2011), which constituted first cycle codes that
were ‘identifications of the topic’ (Tesch 1990). The codes were generated
differently: some of the codes were developed from the theory (Boyatzis
1998: 33), while other codes were data-driven, meaning that they were
not specified by the theory, but emerged from the raw data. These data-
driven codes are crucial for enriching theories that explain particular phe-
nomena (DeCuir-Gunby et al. 2011: 138). Descriptive coding was an
essential step for the second cycle analytical coding, which focused on the
interpretation and analysis (Saldaña 2013; Wolcott 1994). Among differ-
ent second-level coding techniques, I used pattern coding for the second
cycle to search for causes and explanations (Saldaña 2013).
This chapter highlights the importance of exogenous factors in explain-
ing policy change. Structural explanations provide a better insight into
immigration policy change, although agency-related explanations are not
completely disregarded. In order to unpack the black box of immigration
policymaking, it is equally important to explain the dynamics of the
change, which can be achieved by tracing the mechanisms that account for
the change or the mechanisms that lead to policy deadlock. The next
chapter proceeds with the explanation of the UK Conservative Party’s
immigration stance and why it has abandoned its detoxification strategy
and introduced a number of restrictive immigration policies in the UK.
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CHAPTER 3
From Detoxification Strategy Back to ‘Nasty

Party’: Explaining the Conservative’s Turn
on Immigration Between 2005 and 2015
In June 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU. As the analysis of the vote
demonstrates, immigration was the key driver of Brexit vote (Goodwin
and Milazzo 2017; Goodwin and Heath 2016) and Leave campaign’s slo-
gan ‘Take back control’ was primarily about taking control over immigra-
tion (Gietel-Basten 2016: 673–674). Britain’s exit from the EU has been
brought on the political agenda in 2013, when Cameron promised to
hold a referendum, delivering the so-called Bloomberg speech (Clarke
et al. 2017: 2). This demonstrated a stark contrast with the position of the
Conservative Party that argued for softening its stance on certain issues
including immigration as previously its positions have alienated voters
(Clarke et al. 2017: 2). What has triggered this change? In order to under-
stand this change, we need to examine the Conservative’s Party changing
stance on immigration that preceded Brexit debate, where immigration
has been a defining theme. The question that needs answered is what
changed the Conservative Party’s mind on immigration?
When David Cameron became leader of the Conservative Party in
2005, he came in on a platform of ‘detoxification’, pledging to change the
image of the Conservatives as the ‘nasty’ party (Partos and Bale 2015: 2).
Its political slogan for 2005 general election, ‘Are you thinking what we
are thinking? It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration’ (The
Conservative Party 2005: 1, 17–18) was not well received within the
British public and the party lost 2005 general election. After being out of
government for thirteen years, the Conservative Party was desperate to

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VALUABLE WORK.
There can scarcely be anyone who will question the educational
value of such visits as these. Not only are they of great value
educationally to those privileged to take part in them, but the results
of the investigations carried out, when made available as these were,
in book or pamphlet form, convey much valuable information and
become the means of imparting many new ideas to people to whom
the larger books in which such information is to be found are not
available. If they should have served, in however small a measure, in
penetrating the veneer of complacency with which the average
untravelled and uninformed Co-operator regards his own movement
as in all things the last word in perfection of organisation and
treatment of those employed, they would be worth far more to the
movement than the few pounds which each trip cost.
THE YEARS OF WAR.
At first the war did not make much difference to the work of the
educational committee or of its agencies, but as more and more of
the younger male employees were called up or joined voluntarily,
there was a perceptible falling off in the membership of the various
agencies. The rowing club had to suspend operations altogether, and
the band was hard put to it to maintain the balance of instruments,
new players having to be brought in to take the places of those who
had joined up. Meantime a senior choir had been formed, and did
much good work, not only by providing concerts in St Mungo Hall,
but by singing at concerts organised in aid of war charities and to
provide entertainment for convalescent soldiers. In work of a semi-
military character, the band also took a full share.
The educational committee also took charge of the funds organised
by the various departments to provide parcels for employees serving
with the Forces, and in this way a constant stream of parcels went
from the Bakery to distant comrades. The provision of lectures by
prominent men and women in the Co-operative and kindred
movements continued to be a feature of the work carried on by the
committee each winter, while it was usually arranged that some
prominent Co-operator should give an address at the quarterly
meeting held under the auspices of the committee, such addresses
being generally on matters of current interest.
The work of an educational committee is usually arduous and
somewhat discouraging. In commercial work the results of a policy
are generally forthcoming immediately, but educational work is
somewhat like scattering bread upon the waters. Doubtless good
results accrue, but time must elapse before they show themselves,
and the intervening period is one of faith and hope. Then, also,
educational work is work in which a departure from stereotyped
methods is necessary occasionally. There is a monotony in doing the
same work year after year, which tends to “grooviness,” and this is a
danger which must be avoided at all hazards, for from “grooviness”
comes staleness and with staleness comes satiety. When an
educational committee breaks new ground, as the Baking Society’s
committee did in 1913 with their deputation to works of prominent
firms in England, interest is stimulated, and even the stereotyped
work takes on a new freshness. In the future we may hope to see the
good work already done by the Baking Society’s educational
committee broadening out in new directions, and acquiring fresh
vigour with new successes. The educational committee has been in
the past a welfare committee in the best meaning of that word, and
without any of the prying, sometimes nicknamed “spying” by the
employees, it has done much to promote the physical and mental
wellbeing of those for whom it works. As the years pass, fresh outlets
in this direction for its energies will also manifest themselves, and
these it will take advantage of as readily as it has done in the past.
CHAPTER XXI.
MEN WHO WROUGHT.
GABRIEL THOMSON—JAMES BORROWMAN—DAVID SMITH

—ROBERT CRAIG—WILLIAM BARCLAY—THOMAS SLATER
—ANDREW BROWN—ALEXANDER FRASER—JOHN
FERGUSON—DUNCAN M‘CULLOCH—JAMES H. FORSYTH
—JAMES YOUNG—PETER GLASSE—DANIEL H. GERRARD
—JAMBS BAIN—THE BOARD AT THE END OF FIFTY
YEARS.
The Co-operative movement has ever been rich in men and women
who have given to it devoted, whole-hearted, and able service. There
have always been men with sufficient faith in the principles on which
the movement is based to spend themselves, their energies and their
money, in furthering it, from the days when Robert Owen, working
to better the conditions of the miserable creatures who were helping
to pile up wealth for himself and his partners, discovered that it was
through striving to help others that man could best help himself, and
devoted his wealth and the remainder of his life to the promulgation
of this doctrine. In men whose faith in this principle was great and
whose work for its enthronement in the councils of the world was
arduous the United Co-operative Baking Society has been rich. They
have all of them been men who believed that Co-operation was the
true principle of progress, and in their own way and time each one
did his best to further the cause he had at heart.
GABRIEL THOMSON.
It is peculiar that of the man who played perhaps the most
prominent part in the work of establishing the United Baking Society
little has been placed on record. Mr Gabriel Thomson was a man in
late middle life when the proposal to establish the S.C.W.S. was
being discussed. He was a representative of St Rollox Society at the
meeting at which it was finally decided that a Scottish Wholesale
Society should be established, and moved the resolution to that
effect. When the committee was being formed he was appointed
treasurer, and when the proposal for a federated bread baking
society was being discussed he read a paper on the subject which
went far to decide the delegates in favour of the proposal to establish
the United Baking Society, there also moving the resolution in favour
of its formation. He was appointed first chairman of the Society, thus
acting as chairman of the U.C.B.S. and treasurer of the S.C.W.S. at
the one time; but he only remained at the head of affairs for the first
year, and his official connection with the Society then severed. He
died in the Townhead district about the end of the century.
JAMES BORROWMAN.
Those who knew James Borrowman have described him as one of
the most effective Co-operative propagandists and platform men that
the movement in Scotland has produced. He was a man of boundless
energy and enthusiasm, and was filled with a lofty idealism which
caused him to look ever ahead beyond the petty difficulties of the
moment. Unfortunately, his abounding faith in the possibilities of
Co-operation caused him to overlook sometimes the immediate and
practical difficulties in the way and, reversing the position of the men
who are unable to see the wood for the trees, his gaze was fixed so
firmly on the beautiful vista ahead that he failed to observe the rocks
in the pathway on which he trod until he had stumbled over them.
Mr Borrowman was one of the pioneers of Crosshouse Society, but at
the time when the Baking Society was being discussed he had just
been appointed manager of the newly formed Wholesale Society and
had joined the Anderston Society. He worked faithfully as secretary
of the Baking Society until pressure of work for the S.C.W.S. caused
him to resign, and but a few years later his unquenchable optimism
caused him to make the mistake of allowing the Ironworks Society to
overdraw largely on the Wholesale Society. This finished his
outstanding work for the cause of Co-operation.
DAVID SMITH.
When Mr Borrowman resigned the secretaryship of the Baking
Society he was succeeded by Mr David Smith, who had been acting as
assistant secretary for some months before the resignation took
place. Mr Smith was a representative of St Rollox Society on the
board of the U.C.B.S., making his first appearance as a representative
from that society at the committee meeting which was held on 15th
March 1872. On the resignation, in the summer of 1875, of Mr Robert
Craig from the management of the Society, Mr Smith was appointed
manager, and continued to act in that capacity until the end of 1889,
when he resigned in order to start in business as a baker in Maryhill.
Unfortunately, he did not succeed, and shortly afterwards went to
South Africa. Evidently he did not find things to his liking there, for
in a year or two he was back in Scotland again, and was acting as
master of works in connection with the reconstruction work of the
Drapery and Furnishing Society. He died almost exactly seven years
after severing his connection with the Baking Society.
ROBERT CRAIG.
Mr Robert Craig was only a short time—two and a half years—in
the service of the Society, but during that short period he did such
good work as to cause a general regret on the part of those who knew
him when ill-health caused him to sever his connection with it. In a
vain effort to restore his health he went to Spain, but, finding that he
was not benefiting by the change, he returned to Glasgow again,
where he died in 1877. Mr Craig was a native of Barrhead, and before
taking up his duties as cashier to the Baking Society he acted as
bookkeeper with the Wholesale Society. He seems to have been of a
most lovable disposition, beloved by all who came into contact with
him.
WILLIAM BARCLAY.
The name of William Barclay will always be associated with the
Scottish Co-operative Convalescent Homes Association, which he
helped to found, and for which he worked earnestly and
enthusiastically. In the early days of the U.C.B.S. he was associated
with St Rollox Society, and it was as a member of that society that he
was appointed to the chair of the Baking Society in 1870. He
continued to act as chairman for fifteen months only, and then
severed his connection with the committee. In his later years he was
associated with Kinning Park Society, and it was as a member of that
society that he did his work in connection with the Homes
Association.
THOMAS SLATER.
When Mr David Smith resigned the secretaryship of the Society to
take up its management he was succeeded by Mr Thomas Slater, who
represented London Road Society on the board, and Mr Slater
continued to act as secretary until the end of 1887. During his term
of office Mr Slater had proven himself a most efficient and
painstaking secretary, and it was due to his initiative that the ground
annual of the St James Street property was purchased by the Society.
After ceasing his official connection with the Society he continued to
take a keen interest in its affairs and at times even to criticise the
policy of the directors through the columns of the press.
ANDREW BROWN.
It is probable that it was to the wise guidance of Mr Andrew Brown
more than to the work of any other man that the Baking Society was
able to overcome the difficulties of its early days. He was appointed
to the chair in 1872, and continued to act as president during all the
strenuous days when the proposals for building a branch bakery
farther west were being discussed with vigour. When he became
president the Society had many difficulties to contend with, not the
least of which were inefficient workmen, while shortage of money
retarded its operations to a very great extent. Mr Brown continued to
act as chairman until his society—Paisley Provident—withdrew from
membership at the end of 1880. All those who had the pleasure of
knowing him speak of him as a cautious leader, shrewd and clear-
sighted, who always took a business view of the proposals which
came before the committee. Thus he was able to steer clear of the
many pitfalls which lined the pathway of his Society.
ALEXANDER FRASER.
Mr Alexander Fraser succeeded Mr Brown in the chair. At the time
of his appointment to the chair he had been continuously a member
of the board of the Society from March 1873, as the representative of
Busby Society, and he continued to perform the duties of president of
the Society until the quarterly meeting which was held in December
1887. Mr Fraser had thus an unbroken connection with the
committee of the Society for the long period of fourteen years, until
then the longest period during which any member had filled a seat
on the board. During his term of office he had seen the Society grow
wondrously. He had seen it become too big for its home at St James
Street, and had steered it safely to its new home, erected specially for
its occupation, at M‘Neil Street, and he felt that, that task
accomplished, he did well to lay aside his task. He was a worthy
successor to Mr Brown and a worthy predecessor of the men who
followed him.
JOHN FERGUSON.
Mr Fraser was succeeded by Mr John Ferguson, of Glasgow
Eastern Society. Before Mr Ferguson came to the Baking Society’s
board he had filled many positions of responsibility in the Eastern
Society. He was member of the committee for a number of years, a
member of the first educational committee of the society when it was
formed in 1876, and was also president of the society for a number of
years. In his own society and in the Baking Society he did good work
for Co-operation, and was much respected by all who came into
contact with him. He, too, joined the great majority a number of
years ago.
DUNCAN M‘CULLOCH.
Mr Duncan M‘Culloch was born in the little village of Carfin in
Lanarkshire. After serving his apprenticeship as a joiner in Wishaw,
he came to Glasgow, and on marrying became connected with
Kinning Park Society. In 1887 he was made president of the society,
and afterwards a member of the then newly formed educational
committee. He took a prominent part in the formation of the first
branch of the Scottish Co-operative Women’s Guild—Kinning Park
Central branch—and came to be known amongst the ladies of the
guild as “The Father of the Guild,” a title of which he was justly
proud. After having been for a short time a member of the committee
of the Baking Society, he was elected chairman in 1889, and
continued to occupy that honourable position for the long period of
fifteen years. During these years the Baking Society entered on a
period of expansion which raised it from the position of a moderately
sized bakery, doing a trade of 700 sacks a week, to that of the largest
institution of its kind, with a trade of almost 4,000 sacks weekly. He
saw the biscuit factory started, and during his term of office the
Clydebank branch was opened and the Belfast branch was
commenced. Mr M‘Culloch also took a warm interest in the affairs of
the Convalescent Homes Association, and he served for many years,
until his death in the summer of 1915, as a director of this, “the
brightest jewel in the Co-operative crown,” as the chairman of the
Homes Association sometimes describes it. Mr M‘Culloch became
again a president of Kinning Park Society, and there, as in the work
of the Baking Society, he displayed enterprise, acumen, and
firmness. He was a man of strong will and dominant personality, and
his work on the various boards of the Co-operative movement with
which he was associated was always marked by strong common
sense. On the Co-operative Defence Committee and on the Scottish
Sectional Board he was also a tower of strength; never favouring
schemes or policies which were far in advance of the times, but never
holding back when he thought action was for the benefit of the
movement to which he had devoted the leisure moments of his life.
For some time in 1915 he had been laid aside with illness, and as the
Congress of that year met for its first session the news of his death
arrived and cast a gloom over the minds of the Scotsmen present,
who felt that one who had been all a man had gone from them.
JAMES H. FORSYTH.
The genial cashier of the Baking Society is one of the best known
and most highly respected business men in the Co-operative
movement. His balance-sheets are models of lucidity, and this
feature is often commented on in the columns of the financial press.
Mr Forsyth has had a lifelong acquaintance with Co-operative
accounting. As a lad he entered the office of the Wholesale Society,
and waited there until, as he himself has put it, he began to
understand what double entry bookkeeping really was. Then a desire
to see other lands possessed him for a time, and he voyaged to the
great Republic of the West. He had been there for only two years,
however, when the homing instinct possessed him, and returning to
Glasgow, after a short interval, entered the office of the Baking
Society as bookkeeper. Here he had been for some four years when
Mr David Smith retired from the management of the Society, and the
board, deciding that they were going to try and work the Society for a
time at least without a manager, appointed Mr Forsyth cashier and
bookkeeper, and cashier and bookkeeper he has been ever since. Mr
Forsyth is one of those officials who treat the business for which they
work as if it was their own. He is indefatigable in his efforts to
maintain and even to improve the wellbeing and to accelerate the
progress of the Baking Society, and during the strenuous years of the
war, when the demands of the War Office were depleting his staff,
nevertheless he “carried on” in a manner which won the approval of
management and delegates alike. He is one of those careful,
painstaking officials who are assets of great value to the societies
fortunate enough to possess them.
JAMES YOUNG.
Mr James Young, the widely respected manager of the Baking
Society, is an idealist turned business man. He has the vision of the
poet, and is ever looking forward from the sordid to-day to the
brighter and better to-morrow; but he is none the less a business
man. He served on the board of the Baking Society as a
representative of Uddingston Society for some three years before he
was appointed, in 1899, manager of the Society. Since then he has
conducted the business of the Society wisely and well, and his advice
is eagerly sought after in matters connected with the trade. He is very
popular with all with whom business brings him into contact, for he
is recognised by all to be a man of high principle, who is incapable of
stooping to anything mean. To this aspect of his character is
probably due the remarkably good terms which have always existed
between the Society and the employees, for he is kind and
considerate to those whom fortune has placed under his charge.
Unfortunately, in these latter years his health has not been quite as
robust as his friends would like, but one and all hope that many years
of service yet remain to him.
PETER GLASSE.
Mr Peter Glasse succeeded Mr Slater as secretary. He was the
representative of St George on the board of the Baking Society at the
time of Mr Slater’s resignation, and was for many years one of the
most active Co-operators in the West of Scotland. He took a very
active part in all the strenuous work which fell to the lot of good
platform men during and after the boycott of 1896–97. On several
occasions he served with distinction in the chair of his own society,
and was for many years a member of the board of the Wholesale
Society. He demitted office as secretary of the Baking Society in the
spring of 1895. From 1896 until the merging of the West of Scotland
Co-operative Defence Committee in the National Co-operative
Defence Association, Mr Glasse acted as chairman of the committee,
and then as chairman of the National Association until its work was
merged in that of the Scottish Sectional Board. He died early in 1917
after a life which had been full of service to Co-operation.
D. H. GERRARD, J.P.
Mr Daniel H. Gerrard, J.P., is one of the best known figures in the
Co-operative movement, and it is a matter for sincere regret to his
many friends that he is not able to go out and in amongst them as of
yore, and doubly regrettable that illness should have stricken him
down two months before the Society for which he had worked so
hard completed its fiftieth year of existence. Mr Gerrard is a
Southerner, but he has lived so long in Scotland that he has become
acclimatised. His first connection with Co-operation was with the
second Maryhill Society, in the formation of which he took an active
part, and of which he was president for many years. When that
society amalgamated with St George he threw himself with equal
vigour and success into the work of his new society, and ere long was
appointed to the presidency. Then fifteen years ago he was elected to
the chair of the Baking Society, and continued to act in that capacity
until he was compelled by the orders of his medical man to give it up.
He was an able and earnest advocate of Co-operation, and took an
active part in the strenuous work of the boycott days as well as in Co-
operative missionary work in Ireland and elsewhere. It is the earnest
wish of all friends that in his retirement he will be long spared to
look back with complacency over his many fights for the cause he
loved.
JAMES BAIN.
Mr James Bain, the genial secretary of the Baking Society, has had
a long and active connection with the cause of Co-operation in
Glasgow. He succeeded Mr John Ferguson as chairman of Glasgow
Eastern Society, and was chairman of that society when the
Dalmarnock Road premises were opened in 1893. He was also
treasurer of the society for a number of years. In the spring of 1895
he was elected secretary of the Baking Society in succession to Mr
Glasse, and that position he continues to fill with honour to himself
and profit to the Society. Nor, although the secretaryship of the
Baking Society would seem to be enough spare-time work for any
man, does he rest content with that. Ever since its formation he has
acted as president of that beneficent Co-operative institution, the Co-
operative Veterans Association. In his work for the Bakery he has
always been conscientious and clear, and has also done much work
which lies outside his special work as secretary. For example, he read
a paper a number of years ago at a conference of representatives of
the Glasgow societies, in which he advocated strongly the desirability
of establishing a system of bread baking which would enable the
bakers to begin their work at a reasonable hour. He is getting on in
years now, but his minutes are as clearly written as ever, and his
many friends hope that it will be long ere he has to lay down his
secretarial pen.

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Immigration Policy and Right-Wing

Populism in Western Europe Anna

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ISBN 978-3-030-41760-4 ISBN 978-3-030-41761-1 (eBook)

Cover illustration: Doomko/Alamy Stock Vector

2 Explaining Causes and Dynamics of Policy Change

3 From Detoxification Strategy Back to ‘Nasty Party’:

4 Immigration Policy and the SVP: Resisting the EU

5 Immigration During Sarkozy’s Time in Office: Economic

6 Explaining the Variation in Conservative Parties’

ACSE National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equality of Opportunities

Fig. 3.1 Net migration to the UK (2006–2016). (Source: Office of

Table 3.1 Conservative Party’s rhetoric on immigration and immigration

What explains the introduction of restrictive immigration policies across a

© The Author(s) 2020 1

have adopted restrictive immigration policies, creating a fertile ground for

When explicitly prominent outsider gains prominence, parts of establish-

Not being part of the governments, radical right parties nevertheless

­ arties’ immigration stances (Akkerman 2015; Alonso and Da Fonseca

welcomed ten new countries, which substantially increased the population

Focus on Conservative Parties

radical right parties have influenced the immigration debate (Kitschelt

Conservative parties have been far more important in shaping immi-

the right-wing ­parties. Conservative parties are more likely to adopt

Plan of the Book

framing permitted the SVP to criticise the government on immigration

Betz, H.-G. (1994). Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Basingstoke:

Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition,

Explaining Causes and Dynamics of Policy

In this chapter, I present an overview of the theories of party policy change

© The Author(s) 2020 15

Party Policy Change: Internal Explanations

Party Policy Change: External Explanations

Economic and Cultural Anxieties

Global Economic Change

The Effects of the EU Integration

There is an emerging crisis of solidarity with Europeanisation and this is

This book explores whether anxieties related to the EU integration

Explaining the Dynamics of Policy Change

their operation cannot be predetermined and is ultimately context

function as modes of attribution and articulation. They attribute blame for

frame that resonates with a large number of voters in order to increase

Democrat Coalition government, this book sheds light on why certain

parties’ immigration position and policy changes from a structuralist per-

France, which was an obstacle for generalisation and had a potential to

Interviews were analysed using thematic approach, which ‘allows cate-

Competition in Twenty-Five Post-War Democracies. British Journal of Political

Boyatzis, R. (1998). Thematic Analysis: Coding as a Process for Transforming

Falleti, T. G., & Lynch, J. F. (2008). From Process to Mechanism: Varieties of

Haupt, A. (2010). Parties’ Responses to Economic Globalization. Party Politics,

Mayntz, R. (2004). Mechanisms in the Analysis of Social Macro-Phenomena.

From Detoxification Strategy Back to ‘Nasty

© The Author(s) 2020 35

GABRIEL THOMSON—JAMES BORROWMAN—DAVID SMITH

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