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In The Shadows of Naga Insurgency Tribes State and Violence in Northeast India 2018 1St Edition Jelle J P Wouters Full Chapter PDF
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In the Shadows of Naga Insurgency
CHINA
PRADESH
HAL
NAC
TIBET U
AR
SIKKIM
Itanagar
Gangtok BHUTAN
NEPAL ASSAM
Dispur NAGALAND
Kohima
BIHAR MEGHALAYA
Shillong Imphal
ND
KHA
BANGLADESH
AR
MANIPUR
JH
Agartala
TRIPURA Aizawl
MIZORAM MYANMAR
WEST BENGAL
Bay
of
Bengal
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trademark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries.
Published in India by
Oxford University Press
2/11 Ground Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110 002, India
NEPAL ASSAM
Dispur NAGALAND
Kohima
BIHAR MEGHALAYA
Shillong Imphal
ND
KHA
BANGLADESH
AR
MANIPUR
JH
Agartala
TRIPURA Aizawl
MIZORAM MYANMAR
WEST BENGAL
Bay
of
Bengal
T
his book invites its readers to the upland tribal state of
Nagaland in India’s Northeast to reflect upon what hap-
pens to a society long saturated in violent political conflict.
It points to the ways in which Naga insurgency and the Indian state’s
response to it aggravated the imbrications of violence and disorder,
tribalism, failing development, volatile politics, and corruption into
the socio-political fabric of post-statehood Nagaland. However, for all
the precarity and strain that political conflict produces, Naga society is
not incarcerated in a terrifying epic of violence and political disorder
in any simple sense. Theorizing from the vantage of rural Nagaland,
I shall show ethnographically how the acts, articulations, and aspira-
tions of Naga villagers are infused with an agency and imagination
of their own making, albeit often in ways that complicate, if not con-
tradict, normative practices and principles of state, development, and
democracy. Their everyday enactments are undoubtedly a product of
the condition of protracted political conflict but not necessarily wholly
xii preface and acknowledgements
glosses over the diversities and politics internal to the Naga struggle,
in particular the generational, tribal, and factional conflicts that came
to divide and drain the Naga Movement and the very diverse attitudes
and aspirations taken on by different Naga communities and individu-
als. Today, listed amongst the most protracted postcolonial struggles
anywhere, the impact of the conflict on Naga society is complicated,
dispersed, and polyphonous and felt in the everyday contexts of social
relations and moral judgments, governance and politics, societal tensions
and violent memories, imagination, affect, and affliction.
For these reasons, I wish to see Naga insurgency not as a historical and
straightforward narrative of resistance nor yet as extracted from wider
social processes, or, for that matter, in terms of clear victims and victors.
Instead, this book explores how protracted political conflict affects
and afflicts ‘the everyday’. I, therefore, approach Naga insurgency—and
herein lies this book’s main contention—as a complex, an ‘insurgency
complex’, and explore the consequences of and corollaries to protracted
conflict, illustrating and arguing how Naga insurgency and the state’s
reaction to it has long flooded the banks of political conflict and surges
through all areas of social life.
Amidst the Indo-Naga conflict, which, at the time of my research and
writing remains unresolved in spite of two decades of political dialogue,
it is impossible to write anything about Nagas without it being some
kind of politics and protest. In a way, participant observation and eth-
nography, on which this book heavily relies, is, writes Shah (2017: 56),
always a ‘political act’, even a ‘potentially revolutionary praxis’ because
it ‘enables us to challenge received wisdom and produce knowledge that
previously had no space in the world, was confined to its margins, was
silenced’. Projecting ethnography as politics connotes not just the search
for new ontologies and cosmologies, or the genuine appreciation of fun-
damental moral differences between societies, but also to foreground
and privilege in the art of theorizing, the views, experiences, and con-
cerns of ‘ordinary’ men and women as they go about their lives and make
sense of the world around them.
Every ethnographer, I would like to think, has an academic (and
moral) obligation to not be allied with power—whatever form that
power might take—but to breathe ethnographic life into the everyday
acts and articulations of the people he or she resides and works with, in
xiv preface and acknowledgements
our case Naga villagers whose selves, individual biographies, and social
lifeworlds have long been wrought by political violence and volatility. If
doing so, in the Naga context, amounts to a ‘potentially revolutionary
praxis’ it is because the competing analyses and discourses that emerged
from the Indo-Naga conflict belong either to the Indian state or to Naga
militant leaders, in the process often glossing over the experiences and
views of Naga men and women living in villages (and towns).
Besides being scant on people’s experiences, the now considerable
literature on the Indo-Naga conflict, both contemporary and historic,
remains, with few exceptions, also largely derivative of formal declara-
tions and manifestos, colonial documents, and other secondary sources.
Starting with depictions of who the Nagas are, most such accounts
narrate the history of Nagas’ resistance to British colonization, the arrival
of missionaries and the spread of evangelical Christianity, the creation of
the Naga Club and the memorandum its members sent to the Simon
Commission in 1929 (which goes as the first official record of Nagas’
desire for Independence), the advent of the Naga National Council
(NNC), and the role of A.Z. Phizo in conducting the 1951 plebiscite
and in organizing the Naga rebellion. They then discuss the state vio-
lence and repression, the enactment of the state of Nagaland in 1963 as
an envisaged (but failed) political compromise, the abortive treaties and
peace processes of the 1960s and 70s, the demise of the NNC, the rise of
the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) and its subsequent
splits into rivalling factions, and finally the 1997 ceasefire and the elusive
status of the peace talks. This literature, while certainly valuable, pays
virtually no attention to the dialectical interactions between the Naga
Movement and Naga society, to the particularistic state-society rela-
tions that protracted conflict and capricious violence produces, and to
the wider consequences and carryovers of conflict on the fabric of Naga
social and political life.
This lack is understandable as all these years of insurgency and
counter-insurgency was hardly conducive to the practice of ethnography
in the area. Moreover, a stringent Inner-Line regime and the additional
requirement for foreign nationals to obtain a (sparingly granted)
Protected Area Permit long restricted access to the Naga highlands.
This long-lasted impossibility of doing fieldwork in the Naga highlands
feeds into a larger absence, as Shah and Pettigrew (2009: 230) note, of
preface and acknowledgements xv
to live inside the main city of Shillong. In this search, I was joined by
Wungreithing Sali, a Naga classmate whose application for a hostel
seat had been similarly unsuccessful, although for different reasons. We
decided to rent a room together. For the next year we shared the same
living-space, during which Mark (the Catholic name by which he was
better known) often spoke about life ‘back home’, the Naga struggle, and
the many conundrums Naga society was facing. While Mark and I were
formally the only tenants of the room, there was a continuous arrival of
his relatives and fellow-villagers, who came to Shillong for admissions in
schools and colleges, medical treatment, or in search of employment, and
who rolled out blankets on the floor and often stayed for weeks. Besides
the pleasure of making new friends (and the taste of the dried meat they
invariably brought with them), the many stories and personal experi-
ences they shared as we sat together during evenings gradually convinced
me that I wanted to pursue ethnographic research among the Nagas.
Of course, back then, I was formally still an undergraduate student and
lacked the training required to conduct fieldwork. In any case, Nagaland
was then still near hermetically sealed for foreign nationals.
In more concrete terms, this book has its origins in a PhD programme
at NEHU, which culminated into a thesis unimaginatively titled: State,
Development, and Democracy in Nagaland. Initially, my research project
was registered as ‘Land relations and development in Nagaland: A case
of the jhum and terrace villages’, but even as I collected a good amount
of ethnographic data on this while in the field, I soon discovered that my
informants were greatly interested in talking about the Naga struggle,
governance, development, and, most of all, politics. This eventually led
me to request the University to allow me to change the topic of my
research. My request was granted, although I was advised to leave out
the politics of Naga insurgency, at least so from my thesis title.
From Shillong, the town of Dimapur, the main gateway into
Nagaland, was just an overnight bus journey away, making ‘my field’
readily accessible (at least so in theory as military checkpoints, Assam
floods, and abruptly announced bandhs now and then blocked the
highway and prolonged journeys). Being a doctoral student at a uni-
versity inside the region, moreover, helped me navigate the exhaustive
paperwork and permits needed to carry out prolonged fieldwork in
Nagaland (again, in theory, as despite possessing the necessary permits,
intelligence agencies continually doubted my presence and intentions
preface and acknowledgements xix
To start with, I must thank Ellen Bal, who, about a decade ago,
when I was an undergraduate student in Amsterdam, dissuaded me
from taking up admission as an exchange student at Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi, which I had applied for and been granted.
Instead, she suggested that I must take admission at North-Eastern
Hill University in Shillong, some of whose faculty she knew person-
ally. Everything else followed from this early intervention. When, as an
MPhil student at Oxford University, I first started thinking and writing
seriously about Naga society and political conflict, David N. Gellner
generously commented on my ideas and drafts and was an incredible
source of intellectual inspiration. I also thank Willem van Schendel,
whose student I was, much to my regret, only briefly, but whose insights
on the region, encouragement of my research, and in his role as an
external examiner of my PhD thesis was a beacon of light. I received
similar encouragement from Philippe Ramirez, whose deconstruction
of ethnicity and kinship in the Assam-Meghalaya borderland influenced
my own understanding of social bonds among Nagas.
I carried out fieldwork in Nagaland for roughly two years between
2011 and 2014. I am grateful to Lucy Zehol, Besasayo Kezo, and
Kühüpoyo Puro for guiding me to the Chakhesang Naga village, which
I shall call Phugwumi, and for facilitating my fieldwork there. Kühüpoyo
Puro especially was a constant source of support and his house in
Kohima a place of intellectual and bodily nourishment. My second
fieldwork took place in the Chang Naga village of Noksen, for whose
arrangements I thank Achu Chang in Pune and his extended family in
Noksen. My fieldwork in Nagaland was funded by the Wenner-Gren
Foundation, for whose generosity I remain deeply grateful (the disser-
tation fieldwork grant that they awarded enabled me to release myself
from a very edifying but marginally paid position at the Don Bosco
Museum for Indigenous Cultures in Shillong and to fully concentrate
on my PhD research).
My greatest debt, as ever, is to the Phugwumi and Noksen villagers
who warmly welcomed me into their lives and whose never faltering
cooperation, hospitality, and kindness I am at loss to ever be able to
reciprocate. For reasons of confidentiality, and in view of the sensibilities
that run through this book, I have to restrain myself from mention-
ing those who helped me so immensely, but they certainly include my
hosts, interlocutors, and friends in both villages. While I have used
preface and acknowledgements xxi
I
t is autumn 2013 and a mass protest is scheduled in Dimapur.
Schools and educational institutes are closed, and shops and busi-
ness establishments have rolled down their shutters. Only a few
minutes have passed and already thousands of Nagas are spilling onto
the streets to air their anguish against the internal divisions and per-
ceived degeneration of the Naga National Movement. The number of
protestors first swells below the clock-tower, a landmark in the heart of
Dimapur, from where they fan out across the town’s lanes and streets,
shouting, sloganeering, and flaunting banners as they march.
For over 60 years, since the mid-1950s, the Naga Movement—
in its various forms, factions, and guises—has fought for Naga
Independence, and in doing so presents itself as a people’s movement
supported by tribal and Christian uplanders.1 The Naga armed struggle
provoked a massive escalation of violence from the Indian state, a dense
In the Shadows of Naga Insurgency: Tribes, State, and Violence in Northeast India.
Jelle J.P. Wouters, Oxford University Press (2018). © Oxford University Press.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199485703.003.0001
2 in the shadows of naga insurgency
rejected and resented, however, was the current form and factions of the
Naga Movement, and which to their eyes had reduced Naga nationalism
to a pretext for national workers to accrue purely private material gains
and to fight over interpersonal and intertribal differences.
I was not in Dimapur at the time of the rally, but seven hours
of winding roads away in a Chakhesang Naga hilltop village I shall
call Phugwumi, and where I learned about the protest march, as did
the villagers, through the radio, newspapers, and phone calls.7 Most
villagers talked about the protest as ‘bold’ and ‘daring’. One villager,
whom I grew to know well, told me: ‘There is a problem with our
national movement. Before we used to respect national workers,
almost worshipped them as supra-humans, but now they fight amongst
themselves and things are topsy-turvy’. Another commented: ‘Earlier
national workers served the Naga cause, but today it seems we are serv-
ing them’. Some in the village, however, expressed apprehension about
the possible consequences of the rally: ‘Could the Central Government
use the protest march to weaken the NSCN-IM’s negotiation posi-
tion and so impede an honourable political solution?’,8 ‘Would Naga
underground groups react and retaliate by going after the organizers
of the protest?’, ‘Might this lead to a new wave of violence?’ These were
genuine worries villagers expressed.
Dimapur’s public rally drew widespread attention, both within and
outside Naga society. Never before, in long decades of political conflict,
had ordinary Nagas come out in large numbers against the form and
functioning of the Naga Movement. But even as multiple analysts,
commentators, and media channels interpreted the protest march
as foreboding the implosion of the Naga Movement, this was not the
message either the ACAUT or the protestors, several of whom I spoke
with later, wanted to express. For instance, while they rejected the exces-
sive and multiple taxes levied by national workers, they did not object
to contributing financially to the Naga Movement per se. A Dimapur
resident (and a former classmate) working in a government office told
me: ‘I am ready to contribute part of my salary to the Naga cause.
Almost all Nagas remain willing to do so. But we cannot be expected to
finance the existence of rivalling underground groups and governments
whose existence serves no purpose except causing hardship, violence,
and tribalism’. In fact, by rejecting the disintegration and degeneration
Introduction 5
were Nagas Indians, nor had their hills ever been Indian terrain, be it
in terms of precolonial political realities, mythological and cosmological
configurations, or the cultural stretch of Bharat. Naga spokespersons
had articulated this viewpoint as early as 1929, when a memorandum
signed by members of the Naga Club, the first Naga apex body of sorts,
was submitted to the Simon Commission, which had come to British
India to study constitutional reform. The memorandum read:
Were the British to depart, as rumour already had it, they pleaded, ‘we
should not be thrust to the mercy of other people … but to leave [sic] us
alone as in ancient times’ (cited in Vashum 2005: 175). It was a reading of
history and a future political vision India’s newly Independent government
rejected. In the 1940s and early 1950s, these conflicting interpretations
of what was, and what was not, Indian territory, and who was, and who
was not, an Indian, were battled with rhetoric, historical narratives,
political treatises, and symbolic acts. However, when subsequent talks,
negotiations, and attempted treaties failed, Jawaharlal Nehru ordered in
his military and paramilitary forces. In those early days, few perhaps had
foreseen that this political disagreement would become accompanied by
anything like the protracted conflict, violence, and bloodshed that even-
tuated. ‘Troops moved into Tuensang by Oct. 1955’, B.N. Mullik, then
Director of India’s Central Intelligence Bureau recounted, ‘and the war
with the Nagas started from then’ (cited in Vashum 2005: 12).
The subsequent history of the Indo-Naga conflict is a history of a
daring resistance, one defying the odds of a small, initially ill-equipped
Naga force holding out despite being outnumbered many times over.
Over the past decades, several ceasefires and treaties were signed, but in
8 in the shadows of naga insurgency
the end each failed to hold or backfired, turning Naga insurgency into
a multi-generational struggle. But there is more to the Naga Movement
than resistance against Nagas’ enclosure into the Indian nation-state.
‘When history is written as a history of struggle’, Pandey (2004: 4) writes,
‘it tends to exclude the dimensions of force, uncertainty, domination and
disdain, loss and confusion, by normalizing the struggle, evacuating it
of its messiness and making it part of a narrative of assured advance
towards specified (or specifiable) resolutions’. Pandey diagnoses this in
relation to the history of Partition, but, in adapted form, his observation
bears on the Naga struggle, which besides a history of resistance (and an
advance towards a political solution favourable to Nagas) also contains
a history of multiple dissensions, coups, rivalries, acts of tribalism, and
factional feuds within, splitting and complicating the Naga Movement
into myriad rivalling underground groups.
What sets the Indo-Naga conflict apart from most armed conflicts
is its longevity, its listing amongst the longest postcolonial struggles
worldwide. Scholarship on armed conflict is voluminous, and I do not
intend to traverse its theoretical triumphs and pitfalls here. What never-
theless needs pointing out is that most treatises on conflict concentrate
on tales of violence, resistance, and survival, often emphasizing the
destructive nature of violent conflict on social life. Violent conflict,
Carolyn Nordstrom (2004: 68) posits, ‘undermines core foundations of
society … [it causes] the wounding of culture, social dislocation, and the
destruction of the very epistemological and ontological tools by which
we construct our world and ourselves in it’. The realization that the rami-
fications of armed conflict go beyond bodily damage and destruction is
pertinent, and perhaps still too often overlooked. However, most such
approaches end up essentializing armed conflicts in terms of violence,
and in so doing quarantine them from wider social processes, struggles,
and realities that continue alongside it, rather mistakenly presenting the
conflict as a ‘thing in itself ’ (Richards 2005: 3).
Tobias Kelly (2008: 351) critiques such ethnographic studies of
armed conflict for ‘over-determining violence’ and ‘ignoring the mundane
nature of most political conflicts’. This is not to underestimate the real
devastation and destruction armed conflicts cause, but to acknowledge
that social life, even in situations of conflict, usually remains a great deal
more complex and ‘thicker’ than tactics of coping alone (Thiranagama
Introduction 9
locally, and, amidst all this, what agency and imagination Naga villagers
possess to appropriate and rework apparatuses and policies of state,
development, and democracy to their own uses, understandings, and
distinctive lifeworlds.
Where Is Nagalim?
When the Central Government, in 2016, began fencing and trenching the
international boundary between India and Myanmar the ‘trans-border’
Khiamniungan Naga tribe protested. Its apex body condemned it as a
‘felonious act’ and explained that the ‘Khiamniungan have always lived
as one community’ but that ‘after British colonialism an imaginary line
was drawn between India and Myanmar, dividing the tribe between two
countries’. This ‘imaginary line’, it is popularly imagined, ‘was drawn over
the Patkai ranges when Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minster of
India, and U Nu, the then Prime Minister of Burma, flew over the area to
determine the international boundary, thus unwittingly dividing villages
perched on the mountaintops between the two nations’ ( Joshi 2013: 166).
The National Socialist Council of Nagalim–Isak/Muivah also
objected to the physical demarcation of the international boundary in,
what it called, ‘the heart of the Naga homeland’. It stated, in a public
communiqué, ‘We shall no longer accept any policy to further divide the
Naga family in the form of an artificial boundary fencing between India
and Myanmar’. The Naga Hoho—a pan-Naga apex body—similarly
issued a newspaper statement rejecting the border fencing as ‘an attempt
by India and Myanmar to rewrite the history of Nagas’. Nagaland’s
Chief Minister, in turn, stated: ‘Even if we may not be able to do much
to change the international boundary, we will do everything to see that
the traditional right of the Naga people to move about freely within their
own ancestral land is not taken away’. These public outpourings were
followed up by Nagaland’s lone representative to the Lok Sabha, who
wrote, in a letter addressed to the Prime Minister, that ‘the people living
in both sides of the border in the Naga areas belong to similar tribes and
have been living as one community since time immemorial’.15
If borders are amongst the ‘most paradoxical of human creations’
(Gellner 2013: 2), this is, in parts, because they often either join
what is different or divide what is similar (Van Schendel 2005a: 9).
12 in the shadows of naga insurgency
The Nagas were divided by the British administration into three major
units. About one fifth of the Naga population with that much in
proportion of our land were administrated from British India [Naga
Hills district]. About the same proportion was administrated by British
Burma. And approximately sixty percent of the population occupying a
territory of about seventy percent of Nagaland [Naga-lands] were left
untouched and undisturbed, who were absolutely independent.
(cited in Nuh 1986: 101)
Introduction 13
Naga civil societies, too, demand this and, in 2010, the Naga Hoho
proclaimed: ‘henceforth, we derecognize any artificial boundary lines
drawn across our ancestral lands in the so-called Manipur state’ (cited
in Longvah 2014: 44).17
each are likely to differ. Nor, perhaps, could this be otherwise. Besides
political colouring, our understanding of Naga history is also ‘thin’.
Much of what we assume we know about Nagas’ ancient and precolonial
pasts is either derived from oral histories, legends, songs, and folktales,
or is an interpretation of fragments and shards of historical accounts
written, not by Nagas, but by litterateurs of neighbouring kingdoms and
dynasties in the Assam and Imphal valleys. This section, in the briefest of
summaries, sketches Nagas’ political history up till the demand for Naga
Independence on 14 August 1947, one day before India gained hers.
The Naga inhabited hills are usually said to be made up of dispa-
rate tribes. These, prior to their (partial) incorporation into the British
Empire and later complete enclosure into the Indian and Burmese states,
were political communities with a fierce history of self-governance.
In actual practice, however, both the locus and ethos of Naga political
organization was vested not in the tribe, but in the prototypical Naga
‘village republic’ (Chapter 2 in this volume). It was only seldom that
separate villages asserted themselves as a tribal entity that in its func-
tioning was considerably constant, corporative, and cohesive. From
the earliest documentary accounts we have, we know that these Naga
villages maintained complex sets of relations with kingdoms and dynas-
ties in the adjacent Brahmaputra, Barak, and Imphal Valleys, and which
across time and space included raids and retaliations, trade and tribute,
cooperation, co-optation, and conflict, suzerainty, and submission
(Devi 1968; Mackenzie 1884; Wouters 2011).
As a general principle, however, Naga villages, while occasionally
subdued, were never administrated by an external force, but left to fend
for themselves. This relative seclusion was—though never completely
isolated, bounded, and sealed—first, because the rugged uplands seemed
to offer little of value to dynasties in the plains. Secondly, because plain
dwellers both scorned and feared the upland Nagas as headhunters,
found their behaviour as fickle as the upland winds, and generally looked
upon the hills as a fortress of savagery, nakedness, and barbarity best
kept away from.18 And thirdly, because Naga villages and communities
themselves fiercely resisted intrusions into their hills, putting up fero-
cious fights to push back invaders. This was also the evaluation of the
few European travellers who ventured into Assam before its formal
annexation by the British Raj, and who described the Naga highlands as
Introduction 15
the place where civilization ended and unruly, violent savages took over
(Mackenzie 1884).
With measures of historical verifiability, the relations between Nagas
and Ahoms (whose princes and nobles reigned over large swathes of
the Brahmaputra Valley from roughly the thirteenth till nineteenth
century) were documented in the Ahom Buranjis, or court chronicles.
Some selected passages detail: ‘the Itania Nagas revolted’, ‘the Chiefs
of the Lakma Nagas came down and hurdled spears into the air’, ‘the
Nagas of Tirualia revolted…. They entered into our villages, murdered
our men, and pillaged the people. For many days, they devastated the
villages and our men had no peace’, and ‘Malauthupia Nagas killed a
number of our villagers and pillaged their properties’ (Baruah 1980).
While such accounts evidence the early presence of upland Nagas,
specifications as Itania, Lakma, Tirulia, and Malauthupia Nagas but also
‘Barduria, Paniduria, Mithonia, Banfera, Joboka, Jaktungias [Nagas]’
(Prakash 2007: 384) have long fallen into oblivion, and it is hard, though
not always impossible, to reconstruct to which Naga villages or village-
clusters they referred.
By the first decades of the nineteenth century, and as a result of
Burmese incursions followed by the authoritative arrival of the British
in Assam, Ahom rule first crumpled, then was obliterated. The colonial
administration that followed, certainly in the beginning, strongly
revolved around the causes of tea, taxes, and timber. It was the cause of
tea that led the British into the Naga foothills, which, even if not always
inhabited, were used by Nagas as ancestral hunting grounds. As early as
1844, Owen, a British officer, invoked a report from ‘scientific gentlemen’
to claim that ‘these Naga Hills must undoubtedly bear better sorts of tea
than is found in the plains of Assam’ (1844: 8). Soon, the acquisition
of Naga lands began. In fact, a major contention between the British
and upland tribes, including Nagas, was the ‘pushing of hill tribes up
into the hills, alienating them from land previously under their control
and granting such land, formally declared “wasteland”, to tea planters and
immigrant peasants from Bengal’ (Karlsson 2011: 270).19
Naga villages responded in ways they knew best, and carried out raids
on tea plantations and the Assam plains beyond. They would swoop
down, usually after dark, and destroy produce, loot harvests, and, in
some instances, capture labourers which they put to work in the hills
16 in the shadows of naga insurgency
arable—in short, “the tribal areas” from “Assam proper”’ (Kar 2009: 52).
What lay beyond the Inner Line, the Naga Hills included, was legally
notified as ‘backward tracts’, which entailed that laws passed by legisla-
tures did not apply to them but that they were administrated directly by
the offices of the Governor. Later the term ‘backward’ was replaced with
‘excluded’ and ‘partially excluded’ areas, although the same principle of
governance largely remained in place (Robb 1997).23 Areas beyond the
Inner Line were also subjected to a permit regime, ostensibly to ‘protect’
Nagas against the perceived cunning and deceit of the more ‘advanced’
plainsmen. But even as total seclusion was not enforceable since hill and
valley people needed to meet for purposes of trade, more stringent forms
of regulations did curb the frequency with which such interactions took
place, in the process isolating the Naga uplands in unprecedented ways.
In the wake of British rule came missionaries, most of them
belonging to American and Welsh Baptist missions. Within the course
of a century, they succeeded in converting most Nagas to Christianity
( Joshi 2012; Thomas 2016). Besides ‘sin and salvation’, missionaries
also brought with them modern education and medicine, which they
promoted across the hills, and in doing so shaped not only novel reli-
gious and moral outlooks but also new perspectives, ways of thinking,
and expectations. Some colonial officers supported, and facilitated, the
arrival of missionaries and missions—‘Who shall say that the Bible will
not be the means of changing the habits and ideas of these wild savages?
The experiment is worthy of trial,’ wrote John Butler (1855: 66). Most
British officers, however, felt ambivalent, if not rancorous, towards these
missionaries, whom they accused of destroying Naga traditions and
culture. J.P. Mills (1935: 148) wrote thus: ‘Government has been at pains
to preserve them [Naga customs] to the utmost limit possible…. In
strong contrast has been the attitude of the American Baptist Mission.
As religion is a part in every Naga ceremony and as that religion is not
Christianity, every ceremony must go’. In spite of cultural loss, what
Christianity did offer was a common denominator among Naga commu-
nities in a way disparate languages, cultural practices, customs, beliefs,
and bloodshed histories of inter-village strife could not. Ultimately, it
was Christian faith, and the universal truths it espoused, that ‘mediated
the formation of a modern political identity among Nagas’ (Thomas
2016: 1). Over time, Christian discourses, symbols, and slogans became
18 in the shadows of naga insurgency
One wonders what impressions remain with them from their sudden
contact with higher civilizations at war. Possibly, they are reflecting
that, after what they have seen, the White Man’s condemnation of the
relatively innocuous headhunting of the Nagas savours on hypocrisy.
Now that they are back in their own hills, will they settle down to the
indigenous simple life and revert to the primitive conditions which were
temporarily disturbed?
(Balfour 1921: xvi)
Settling back into ‘indigenous simple life’ they did not, and France return-
ees were amongst those who initiated the Naga Club in 1918, the first
pan-Naga apex body. Initially a social club, which ran, among others, a
football team and a cooperative store, the Naga Club gradually assumed
a more political character as its members started, the Naga historian,
Mashangthei Horam, writes,
tribes across the border into Myanmar). Much important work is yet to
be done, but for which a large number of Naga anthropology and sociol-
ogy students are now being trained in universities inside and outside
India. Important to highlight, however, is that today’s ethnographic
scarcity contrasts starkly with the colonial era during which Naga tribes
turned into an ethnological hotbed, arguably even a cradle of British
Social Anthropology.
While administrated ‘lightly’, Naga culture and customs became
subjected to intense ethnological scrutiny and speculation, mostly by
‘administrator-anthropologists’. British military and civil officers like
Davis, Butler, Woodthorpe, Godden, Mills, and Hutton repeatedly
addressed gatherings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great
Britain and Ireland and the Asiatic Society in Calcutta (now Kolkata),
and amongst whose eminent audiences their ethnographic material
incited lively, if at times fantastical, discussions. After retiring from
the colonial Indian Civil Service, J.H. Hutton and J.P. Mills, moreover,
and based on their ethnological studies of Nagas, were appointed as
Anthropology Professors at Cambridge University and the London
School for Oriental and African Studies respectively. Till date, most
reputed university libraries in places across the globe flaunt a shelf of
Naga colonial monographs, most of them bound in characteristic dark
blue colour covers, and carrying titles such as The Angami Nagas (Hutton
1921a), The Sema Nagas (Hutton 1921b), The Lhota Nagas (Mills 1922),
The Rengma Nagas (Mills 1937), The Ao Nagas (Smith 1925), another
The Ao Nagas (Mills 1926), The Naked Nagas (Fürer-Haimendorf
1939), The Naga Tribes of Manipur (Hodson 1911), and Naga Path
(Bower 1950).26 Ethnographic museums—be they in Oxford, Basel,
or Berlin—too continue to showcase Naga skulls, spears, headgear, and
other artefacts. Such was the interest in Naga material culture that there
are reportedly ‘over 12,000 Naga artefacts in Britain alone’ (Macfarlane
and Turin 2008: 370), all of which were variously confiscated, gifted, and
procured by colonial administrators, missionaries, curators, and travellers,
today spurring, besides a continuing popular interest in Naga material
culture, complicated debates on authenticity and ownership, including
calls to have these artefacts returned to their villages of origin.
Back then, writings on Naga communities were diverse and colourful,
including detailed narrations of religious beliefs and rituals, origin and
22 in the shadows of naga insurgency
Higher ends were in the view of these orators upon these occasions.
They were subjects connected with the public policy of the times and
with measures which they themselves had directed. Upon the
success of these depended their popularity, and on that hung their
fortunes, their homes, nay, their lives. They afforded happy
occasions for defending their policy, for pushing their claims upon
public favor, and for weaving by a thousand plies the cord which
bound them to popular sympathy, in those moments of deep feeling
when the people were too much absorbed in their own emotions, to
examine into the personal motives of their orators. No such
consequences depend upon the popularity of our orators. Their
popularity can scarcely be really affected, by any orations which they
could deliver on the battle of Lexington, the Bunker Hill monument,
or the death of La Fayette. The public measures of the present day
have but a remote connection with them. What worthy motive then
could have influenced them, we were going to say, in the
perpetration of such folly? In such men of the closet as the younger
Adams and Everett, it is not surprising; but in Webster, who is
capable of real and effective oratory, it can only be viewed as a weak
compliance with the morbid taste of the clique around him.