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Intellectual Disability
and Social Policies
of Inclusion
Invading Consciousness
without Permeability

David P. Treanor
 Intellectual Disability and Social Policies
of Inclusion

“This book makes an important contribution to contemporary disability stud-

ies, providing one of the few comprehensive philosophical treatments of the
subject. Drawing on a wide range of sources, but with a strong emphasis on a
personalist approach, Treanor develops a clear and convincing critique of cur-
rent disability policy and practice.”
—Jeff Malpas, Distinguished Professor, University of Tasmania

“David Treanor builds a compelling case that neoliberalism, with its emphasis
on success, independence and the marketplace works against inclusion. He calls
for the praxis of nationally coordinated disability support systems to embrace
personalist principles that have at their core a relational focus that moves people
in from the margin. How to go about this challenge brings the book to conclu-
sion. It is an enlightening read.”
—Patricia O’Brien, Director, Centre for Disability Studies, and Professor of
Disability Studies, University of Sydney School of Medicine, Faculty
of Medicine and Health

“Treanor’s unwavering commitment to the full humanity of all persons flows

through every page of this important book. It is precisely this commitment
which enables him to perceive the ongoing structural, systemic, and attitudinal
barriers to dignity and belonging faced by persons with an intellectual disability.
This is a ‘must-read’ for anyone working in disability services, engaged with
government policy, or indeed, for anyone who shares or would like to share their
life with someone who has an intellectual disability.”
—Dr Lucy Tatman, University of Tasmania
 David P. Treanor

Intellectual Disability
and Social Policies of
Inclusion
Invading Consciousness without
Permeability
David P. Treanor
School of Humanities, Philosophy & Gender Studies
University of Tasmania
Hobart, NSW, Australia

ISBN 978-981-13-7055-7    ISBN 978-981-13-7056-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7056-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
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The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
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But since life is a fragile and unstable thing, we have no choice but to be ever on the search for people
whom we may love, and by whom may be loved in turn, for if charity and goodwill
are removed from life, all the joy is gone out of it.
Cicero, De Amicita 102
 Preface

The purpose of this book is to explore, after 40 to 50 years of deliberate

western government funding of programmes of social inclusion for per-
sons living with an intellectual disability, why such persons are still sepa-
rated from the social, relational and economic fabric of our neoliberal
societies. The approach reflects my experiences, studies and perceptions
of the present position for persons living with an intellectual disability
after years of what might be termed “revolutionary” changes in both
advancing the rights of persons in legislation and designing “individual-
ized or personalized” services that are provided across western nations.
The rhetoric in each of these forms of government guarantees a person’s
right to education, housing, social security benefit and health care. Indeed
in the United Kingdom, inclusion is one of the four critical policies for
persons living with a disability (Department of Health, 2001). Yet these
are not sufficient to secure independent living, employment, mainstream-
ing, personal well-being and flourishing for many persons living with an
intellectual disability. Why is this so? In summary, I believe that the
nature of the reform process has been driven unnecessarily by the eco-
nomic neoliberal paradigm, and this is not in the best interests of persons
living with an intellectual disability.
The fundamental proposition that lies at the heart of this book is that
a person living with an intellectual disability is first and foremost a person
qua person—that is, regardless of ability, age, gender, culture or ethnic
vii
viii Preface

background, each human being is a person since each person shares a

common humanity. That is, a vulnerability from our finite status and our
desire to live interdependent and flourishing lives. If the classification
“intellectual disability” is used, it will, more often than not, limit his/her
personhood by attributing negative and limiting characteristics to the
person. This is often compounded by the cultural views that are held
towards persons living with an intellectual disability. The human condi-
tion is never static. A person will continually grow, develop and deterio-
rate through the years as we experience a range of social and educational
experiences and opportunities that are normative to the culture in which
we live. Further, legislation in many western nations exists that entitles all
persons to be accepted and valued for our being and provided with oppor-
tunities to realize our full potential as a person qua person. This incorpo-
rates citizenship rights and responsibilities, with opportunities to
genuinely participate in our local communities. However, as I will dem-
onstrate, these opportunities are not available to all persons, since those
living with an intellectual disability have, and continue to be subjugated
by, negative attitudes and low expectations from peers, often family
members as well and from organizations and individuals paid to provide
support services. A good example of the message I am arguing can be
found in an initiative of one western nation, Australia. In 2019, the
Federal government established a Royal Commission to explore violence
and abuse into the lives of people with disabilities. The Commission
examined education in one state in November 2019 and yet a contradic-
tion occurred—not a single person with a disability was invited to give
evidence to the Commission (Campanella & Hermant, 2019). Lived
experiences and first-hand testimonies are vital to form valid findings,
and while this is the first of three hearings on education, the social dis-
ability principle of “nothing about us, without us” (Charlton, 1988)
appears to be ignored and I suggest this reveals Australia’s unconscious
cultural attitudes—that persons living with the experience of intellectual
disability are unable to communicate to others and their views are less
important than persons living without the experience of an intellectual
disability. There are also examples of such practices in other western
nations.
 Preface ix

This book draws upon a range of critical theories to demonstrate how

this negative paradigm sustains itself. There are a number of other theo-
retical explanations that seek to demonstrate how a person and institu-
tions act in society. One explanation that occupies this book is the
philosophy of personalism (Browne, 1908; Gibson, 1932; Knudsen,
1927; Macmurray, 1961, 1969; Maritain, 1947, 1985; Mounier, 1952),
which is compatible with the object-relations school of psychology and
psychotherapy. In addition, the work of Julia Kristeva (2006, 2010, 2011
with Jean Vanier, 2013) also serves to complement this explanation.
Thus, the dominant theory used is that of the philosophy of personalism
that emphasizes the “significance, uniqueness and inviolability of the per-
son, as well as the person’s essentially relational or social dimension”
(Williams & Olof Bengtsson, 2018). Personalist philosophy emanated
from the priority that was being attributed to a set of emerging values,
ideas and structures in western societies that a range of philosophers
believed were having an adverse effect on human persons and their soci-
ety. The value of personalism is that it questions the obscured personhood
of persons living with an intellectual disability that is inherent in the poli-
cies of social inclusion, and it raises questions that challenge these com-
fortable assumptions.
My first approach to writing this manuscript included surveying the
policies of western nations and then assessing their impact upon the lives
of persons living with an intellectual disability. A pattern emerged. The
evidence I collected from numerous scholars across western nations states,
in relation to persons living with an intellectual disability, demonstrated
on the whole that such persons are typically living outside the life rhythms
that persons living without an intellectual disability experience. It seemed
to me, it would be possible to detail, country by country, the experiences
of persons living with an intellectual disability. This would be valuable as
an anthology and would confirm the research evidence: social policies
have yet to significantly address how persons living with an intellectual
disability are incorporated in and across social, economic and political
spheres of society. However, I believe this approach would overlook the
underlying issues of social policies of inclusion.
The second approach would be to argue that social policies of inclu-
sion fail persons living with an intellectual disability, since fundamentally
x Preface

persons are valued qua persons. If persons were truly valued as persons,
social policies of inclusion would be redundant since a person’s place in
the social, economic and political spheres would be embedded in the
valued roles s/he occupies in society. In this argument the central need of
each person is to feel s/he belongs to another person since human encoun-
ter, place and space are of paramount importance in our lives as human
beings or persons in the wider community. That is, for any person it mat-
ters where we live, and with whom, who are our friends, how we spend
our time, how we express ourselves and our conception of what it means
to live a good or flourishing life. Our family of origin and the culture in
which we grew up influence and form our thoughts and beliefs on these
matters. This is the approach I have taken to understanding why social
policies of inclusion are unsuccessful. I propose we need to think differ-
ently about the nature of intellectual disability, the role culture plays in
our lives and the impact the philosophical values inherent in neoliberal-
ism have on implementing social policies of inclusion.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948,
and the subsequent human rights-based legislation that developed in
western nations all asserts that persons (the term “persons” includes all
human beings) have rights by virtue of their shared humanity, although,
as many humans know, in order to have these rights one needs to be more
than a human being (Arendt, 1998). Arendt’s legacy included success-
fully applying the phenomenological method to political philosophy, and
she demonstrated this in the treatise The Origins of Totalitarianism (1968).
Here she provided a comprehensive and critical narrative of the history of
anti-Semitism in Europe and the social and economic conditions that
enabled the development of fascism in Germany and communism in
Russia. Many other cultural groups have also experienced exclusion and
discrimination on the basis of their being, and I argue the prevailing nega-
tive cultural attitudes towards persons living with an intellectual disabil-
ity are a primary factor in compromising the ability of persons to secure
their rights in western societies. Further, the inability of political and
institutional elites to move beyond traditional paradigms prohibits per-
sons living with an intellectual disability from being fully incorporated as
persons and as members of the political community. In most western
nations the rhetoric indicates that persons living with an intellectual
 Preface xi

disability are regarded as citizens, and this offers legal protection, access
to education, health care services, voting rights and so forth. However
this “right to have rights” (Arendt, 1968, p. 296) is not secured, since
persons are not offered appropriate education, support mechanisms and
forums that secure their access to meaningful membership in any of the
western political communities.
Moreover, Arendt (1998), like Macmurray (1969), prioritizes action
over thinking and identifies three critical human activities: labour, work
and action. She argues these activities are more constitutive of person-
hood than a person’s rationality. There are other groups who are in a simi-
lar disempowered position to persons living with an intellectual disability,
for instance, refugees, undocumented immigrants or sans papiers.
However, if such persons live in a western nation, over time they can
become aware of their personal rights and can engage in public conversa-
tions. What distinguishes persons living with an intellectual disability is
society’s inability to (a) make persons aware of their rights, (b) provide
persons with access to their full range of citizen rights and, (c) most
importantly, mitigate the unintended and adverse consequences that flow
from neoliberal philosophical values that dominate the disability public
policy. Thus, holding a right only offers a framework and in itself will not
offer persons meaningful community membership or a place to belong in
their community.
How then can persons who are on the margins of, or outside, a right’s
community become members? How can individuals accompany persons
living with an intellectual disability as a friend, in more generic social and
family roles, in and through normative life cycles including active citizen-
ship roles? I propose that action is required to change current circum-
stances. This includes individual persons making some personal
commitment to developing relationships and friendships with persons
with varying abilities. It means taking risks and challenging any personal
negative attitudes of persons living without the experience of an intel-
lectual disability we may encounter. Indeed, as society has become more
inclusive of different genders, creeds, sexual orientations and ethnicities,
most citizens have demonstrated this capacity to extend their personal
and/or cultural belief systems and form relationships with persons with a
different set of characteristics. It is also about communal cooperation and
xii Preface

establishing meaningful connections with neighbours and others.

Ultimately, I propose that to move forward, we need to rethink our
notion of intellectual disability, our cultural understanding of intellectual
disability, and emphasize values of interdependency and community over
independence and autonomy. It will still remain a challenge. Change,
creative strategies and progress will only occur through errors from the
committed, tireless support of many persons. There will never be one
simple path.

Hobart, NSW, Australia David P. Treanor

References
Arendt, H. (1968). The origins of totalitarianism. San Diego: Harvest.
Arendt, H. (1998). The human condition. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Browne, B. P. (1908). Personalism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Campanella, N., & Hermant, N. (2019). Rushed disability royal commission
yet to hear from a victim or person with a disability. Retrieved from https://
www.abc.net.au/news/2019-11-09/disability-royal-commission-started-too-
early/11688270.
Charlton, J. (1998). Nothing about us, without us: Disability, oppression and
empowerment. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Department of Health. (2001). Valuing people: A new strategy for learning dis-
ability in the 21st century. London: HMSO.
Gibson, E. (1932). L’esprit de la philosophies medieval. Paris: Librairie philoso-
phise J. Grin.
Knudson, A. (1927). The philosophy of personalism. New York: The Abington Press.
Kristeva, J. (2006). At the limits of living: To Joseph Grigely. Journal of
Visual Culture, 5, 219–225. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/
1470412906066910.
Kristeva, J. (2013). A tragedy and a dream: Disability revisited. Irish Theological
Quarterly, 78(3), 219–230. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/
0021140013484427.
Kristeva, J., & Herman, J. (2010). Liberty, fraternity, and … vulnerability.
Women’s Studies Quarterly, 38, 251–268.
 Preface xiii

Kristeva, J. & Vanier, J. (2011). Leur regard percent nos ombres (Their eyes pierced
our shadows). Paris: Libraire Artgeme Fajardo.
Macmurray, J. (1969). The self as agent. London: Faber & Faber.
Macmurray, J. (1961). Persons in relation. London: Faber & Faber.
Maritain, J. (1947, 1985). The person and the common good (J. Fitzgerald, Trans.).
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Mounier, E. (1952). Personalism (P. Mairead, Trans.). Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press.
Williams, T. D., & Bengtsson, J. O. (2018). Personalism. In E. N. Azlta (Ed.),
The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition). Retrieved from
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personalism/.
 Acknowledgements

The inspiration for this manuscript emanates from my friendships with

persons living with an intellectual disability and from trying to make
sense of why my friends are not readily accepted by other persons living
without the experience of an intellectual disability and their local com-
munities. When I have questioned such persons or community organiza-
tions, the general response seems to be that “some community
organization” or “government agency” is responsible for creating friend-
ships and bringing persons into the “community”. Amado (1993), rightly
in my view, argues that community is an experience and not a location
alas, I think this notion is becoming increasingly alien to government,
support organizations, citizens and personnel employed in the disability
services in western nations. It is as if once a person living with an intel-
lectual disability secures government funding, then all other problems,
such as social inclusion, will dissipate. As I demonstrate in this book, this
does not occur.
This is not to state that all or the majority of persons living with an
intellectual disability are being exploited or abused rather. Nonetheless,
through my experience of sharing my life with many friends, I notice
how such persons are not well received in the community; examples

xv
xvi Acknowledgements

include the negative verbal and non-verbal reactions that are offered to
persons, the level of interpersonal distance in personal engagements
and the artificial content of social engagements. Some persons I know
were employed through supported workplaces, and notwithstanding
the difficulties that come with this form of employment, persons, for
the most part, received positive self-esteem and a sense of personal
value for the roles they held. Unfortunately, in Australia this form of
activity—supported employment—is becoming less of a phenomenon.
Most persons I know are not in paid employment, and this contributes
to their days being filled with leisure activities that often fail to extend
their cognitive skills or include any form of learning. My hope is a
reader will assess their own beliefs on intellectual disability and per-
sons living with the experience of intellectual disability against prevail-
ing cultural attitudes.
My thanks to all who have read earlier versions of this book, discussed
some of the ideas in it, made comments or suggestions or diligently lis-
tened to me while I was discussing the topic! I remain indebted to the
many people who offered me advice and support throughout writing this
book. However, I take full responsibility for the content. I would like to
acknowledge an academic debt to particularly two persons: first, Retired
Professor Ian Thompson. We have participated in many dialogues over
several years; many have centred on the philosophy of personalism, and I
have greatly benefited from these conversations. Ian’s confidence in me,
his own lifestyle and commitment to the “activities of caring” continue to
inspire and sustain me. In addition, through Ian’s understanding of
ancient Greek philosophy and Aristotle, he mentored and formed me
when I was undertaking my PhD dissertation, and a minor part of that
work is presented here. I would also like to acknowledge and thank Jean
Vanier, the founder of the L’Arche movement and for his belief in the
inalienable dignity of each human person and for his life commitment to
sharing his life with persons living with an intellectual disability. Members
of L’Arche communities have been an integral part of my life, and I have
discovered the meaning and importance of friendships through sharing
lives together.
 Acknowledgements xvii

I owe particular thanks to my daughter, Stella Treanor, for reading the

final version and for her suggestions and insights. Most importantly,
thanks to Cindy Treanor for all we have discovered together through our
continued conversations about friendships, intellectual disability and the
politics of social inclusion—sine qua non.

References
Amado, A. (1993). Friendships and community connections between people with
and without developmental disabilities. Baltimore: Paul H Brooks Publishing.
 Contents

1 Overview  1

2 The Integrity of Persons 19

3 Social Inclusion: Invading Consciousness 61

4 Social Policies of Inclusion and Neoliberalism 93

5 Social Inclusion: Culture and Disability129

6 Belonging in Societies151

7 Alternative Approach to Implementing Social Policies of

Inclusion173

8 Conclusion195

References201

Index229

xix
 1
Overview

1.1 Introduction
As a discipline, philosophy pursues reason and logic with the purpose of
examining reality, that is, real life and fundamental questions including
the notion of ‘persons’, ‘disability’ and if persons living with an intellec-
tual disability can be considered as human ‘persons’. Indeed, more
recently, the concept of how to treat persons who live with an intellectual
disability has been scrutinized in western nations (e.g., Kristeva, 2010;
Clapton, 2009; Carlson, 2010; Kittay & Carlson, 2009; Krall McCray,
2017). The latter offers insightful reflections on the concepts of indepen-
dence and community and how this impacts the lives of persons living
with an intellectual disability. The scholars writing on these topics are
generally persons living without an intellectual disability, which may be
seen as an advantage, as they are able to present an objective view.
Conversely, their views may be assessed as ignorant, since they may fail to
account for the actual lived experiences of persons living with an intel-
lectual disability. There is a middle ground: academic rigour can assess
historical patterns of behaviour and warn of potential pitfalls, with lived

© The Author(s) 2020 1

D. P. Treanor, Intellectual Disability and Social Policies of Inclusion,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7056-4_1
2 D. P. Treanor

experiences offering the most meaningful insights into personal lives.

This book where possible uses both sources of research.
There are many persons with a physical disability (e.g., Oliver, 1990)
or psychiatric/psych-social disability (e.g., Moeller, 2016), who can offer
insights from the perspective of cultural barriers qua culture and qua bar-
riers that impact upon personal lives. However, the insights of culture
and barriers of persons living with an intellectual disability are typically
articulated by family members, for example, De Vinck (1990), friends;
Nouwen (1997), academics; Reinders (2008), held in narrative forms.
Disability is not monolithic and indeed “even [in] the same diagnosis,
two people’s experience are unique” (Moeller, 2016, p. 230) and a per-
sonalist approach will always focus on each person’s individual experience
and cultural context. Understanding disability from this perspective also
reinforces Sherry’s (2008) contention that definitions of disability are
“unstable and open to contestations” (p. 11) and they occur “alongside
multiple other identities (such as, sexuality, ‘race’, and ethnicity, socio-
economic status, etc.” (2008, p. 75). Thus “disability” is a generic word
that incorporates a range of conditions and Complex aicethologies that
do not follow an exact trajectory for each person diagnosed, (Burke &
Fell, 2007; Rothman, 2003).
This chapter introduces an alternative philosophical lens to critique
international contemporary policies of social inclusion as they are imple-
mented in and through neoliberal paradigms and the phases that have
been used to research the goals of social inclusion. It also permits the
reader to understand the complexity of the lived experience of intellec-
tual disability. This philosophical approach posits that intellectual dis-
ability is appropriately understood when personal and cultural perceptions
of impairment and the actual lived experiences of persons are integrated.
This form of analysis is presented in later chapters. The survey reveals that
a person’s experiences and how non-peers treat them emanates from the
social and cultural reactions to intellectual disability.
 1 Overview 3

1.2 Philosophical Lens

Striker (1997) argues that to investigate the impact of social inclusion on
the lives of persons living with an intellectual disability in society requires
“a method more critical, even more militant, than to address [disability]
in terms of exclusion” (1997, p. 15). Some scholars have developed terms
such as ‘ableism’ and ‘disablism’ to understand the phenomenon of why
persons living with a disability hold a secondary status to persons who do
not live with any form of disability. ‘Ableism’ refers to “the widespread
policies and practices that perpetuate certain ways of being human as
“‘the perfect species-typical’ and therefore essential human” (Campbell,
2001). ‘Disablism’ draws our attention to the “discriminatory, oppressive
or abusive behaviours arising from the belief that disabled people are
inferior to others” (Miller, Parker, & Gillinson, 2004). These approaches
share a similarity with the technique used in this book to address social
inclusion, even though the methodology in this book emanates from phi-
losophy of personalism and in particular from the work of philosophers
who can be associated with “continental philosophy”.
The term, “continental philosophy” itself is a disputed concept—
although it is a well-defined domain of philosophy, it may not accurately
define the subject matter (Critchley, 2001; Glendinning, 2006).
Regardless of how the critical thinking is named or if ‘continental phi-
losophy’ is a separate branch of philosophy, this approach to analysing
western policies of social inclusion scrutinizes with the intention of pro-
viding wisdom and knowledge for the future practice. The means of
investigating is through an “emphasis on social, cultural and historical
conditions of thought and existence” (West, 2010, p. ix) that focuses on
persons, social interactions, ideology and structures. Critchley (2001,
pp. 54–74) suggests that a model can be deduced from “continental phi-
losophy” that the methodology differentiates it from “analytic philoso-
phy” and explains how it has been used to critique “social practices”
(p. 54) whilst aiming to initiate positive social changes.
Critchley’s (2001) model is reliant on three concepts: critique, praxis
and emancipation. Praxis has a history in philosophy that extends from
Aristotle (trans. Irwin, 1999, 1094a-13b) to contemporary theorists such
4 D. P. Treanor

as Habermas ([1996] 2007) and refers to action, activity and practice.

Critique, then, is the detailed assessment and analysis of a social practice
(or praxis) using history, culture and tradition in such a way that it demol-
ishes what is perceived as knowledge and best practices for the existing
traditions or best practices. The purpose of critique is that existing prac-
tices are unjust and thus unable to positively influence and impact fully
on social practices. This approach identifies what type of transformation
is needed to emancipate the social practice and create something differ-
ent. The transformation challenges individuals and/or collective praxis to
become emancipated or “liberated” from the unjust praxis to conceive
new possibilities. The desired outcomes include improving personal lives.
The emphasis in critique is to assess the ambitions of social inclusion
policies. Scholars have established different sets of priorities that can be
used to assess how successful social inclusion policies are for persons liv-
ing with an intellectual disability. The indicators developed by Emerson
and McVilly (2004) serve a useful purpose of understanding, how the
majority of persons living with an intellectual disability are socially
included or are part of “mainstreaming” (Department of Health, 2001,
p. 24), that is, part of the social fabric of society. The indicators include:

1. The number of friends a person has outside his/her home. A friend in

this context is defined as a person with whom the person living with
an intellectual disability meets on a regular basis and shares activities.
Friends are also persons who we can confide in and support each
other, although this will always vary to greater or lesser extents.
2. The number of neighbours a person living with an intellectual disabil-
ity knows. This means neighbours know him or her by name and who
are known by the person living with an intellectual disability.
3. The regularity with which the person living with an intellectual dis-
ability has contact with his/her family and the quality of this
rapport; and
4. The setting where friendships occur—is it through normative patterns?

The Emerson and McVilly (2004) study demonstrated that encounters of

friendships they considered were confined to the person’s home rather
than spread across multiple geographic environments. These friendships
 1 Overview 5

were atypical of the normative friendships that persons living without an

intellectual disability experience.
This emphasis on persons living with an intellectual disability and
their unique value as a person qua person through participation in typical
social activities is consistent with the philosophy of personalism (Mounier,
1938). This is explored in detail in Chap. 2. The term personalism was
identified as a philosophical school of thought from the nineteenth cen-
tury, and although it has many different versions, the fulcrum holds that
persons are infinitely unique and the “ultimate explanatory, epistemo-
logical, ontological, and axiological principle of all reality” (Williams &
Bengtsson, 2018, p. 1). Personalism also gives priority to personal rela-
tionships and understands that they constitute our personhood and facil-
itate a more accurate insight into the opaque nature of the human being
or person and his/her life experiences that philosophy has not achieved.
The critique also describes the effects of the three different spheres of
life persons living with an intellectual disability are situated within. Their
experience of oppression is congruent with Thompson’s (2003) tri-­
dimensional PCS analysis. Griffiths (2016) notes that Thompson applied
existential thought to social work practices and how this influenced the
development of his non-discriminatory model to challenge oppression of
persons “at personal, cultural and structural levels” (p. 25). PCS refers to
the Personal, Cultural and Structural spheres of society. Thompson’s
(2003) analyses of the variables and the complexities that impact on per-
sons who have experienced discrimination and oppression can be applied
to the lives of persons living with an intellectual disability. He proposes a
multi-variable paradigm that is permeated with relevant practice exam-
ples. Thompson’s PCS measures demonstrate how each dimension acts
separately and yet interacts and is interrelated. In the individual, or per-
sonal (P), sphere, every person has thoughts, feelings and preconceived
ideas that influence how a person acts towards another person or group.
The second sphere, cultural (C), calls attention to the practices persons
use in their daily living through sharing life in social and geographical
spaces. At the structural sphere (S), Thompson argues, “The S level com-
prises the macro-level influence and constraints of the various social,
political and economic aspects of contemporary social order” (2003,
p. 17). Thompson also articulates how the Personal sphere is inserted in
6 D. P. Treanor

the Cultural sphere that in turn is also immersed in the Structural sphere
(2003, p. 18). The merit to incorporating Thompson’s analysis is that it
holds open the possibility of change. Change can and does occur, albeit
education and personal experiences are potentially a necessary condition
for change to occur.
This is the philosophical lens or methodological structure used in this
book. The critique, then, is of the existing praxis of social policies of inclu-
sion for persons living with an intellectual disability in western societies.
This critique extends over a number of chapters. Chapter 1 details the
philosophy of personalism and John Macmurray’s (1961, 1969) nexus
with personalism. Julia Kristeva’s (2006, 2010, 2013) theory of disability
is an innovative approach to understanding the lived experiences of per-
sons. The theory embraces the notion of embodiment through addressing
the issue of human vulnerability (Kristeva and Hartman, 2010) while
also accounting for the adverse role culture holds in persons with disabili-
ties attaining socially inclusive roles in societies. Kristeva’s theory of dis-
ability is grounded in her academic background and her personal
experience of disability. These theoretical perspectives are a form of eman-
cipation. That is, they are both individual and collective means of con-
ceiving alternative lifestyles, not solely for persons living with an
intellectual disability but also for all members of society.
The focus of Chap. 2 is on persons living with an intellectual disability
as they continue to remain socially excluded from their communities in
western societies. Community living programs have become the domi-
nant paradigm in these nations. On the one hand, persons living with an
intellectual disability have been “invading [the] consciousness”
(Macmurray, 1961, p. 68) of persons living without an intellectual dis-
ability, local communities and wider society. On the other hand, persons
living with an intellectual disability are hidden insomuch as the research
indicates persons living with an intellectual disability do not actively par-
ticipate in social, economic or cultural activities (Emerson & McVilly,
2004; Slee & Allen, 2001; Verdonschot, deWhitte, Reichrath, Buntinx,
& Curfis, 2009). Persons living with the experience of an intellectual dis-
ability have yet to benefit from the potential richness identified by
Emerson and McVilly’s (2004) measures of social inclusion. I propose
that persons living with an intellectual disability are now economically
 1 Overview 7

ostracized from the workforce and that they remain socially and relation-
ally isolated from the ordinary rhythms of life in their local community.
In Chap. 3, the critique assesses the neoliberal paradigm (praxis) used
in western nations to administer, fund and manage the provision of dis-
ability services. The National Disability Insurance Scheme, introduced in
Australia in 2013, is used as an example of how, despite contemporary
accepted rhetoric and recognized practices, the system does not appear to
be surmounting social exclusion barriers faced by persons living with an
intellectual disability. Chapter 3 highlights how persons living without
the experience of an intellectual disability in the majority, fail to engage
with persons living with an intellectual disability and the consequences
for the latter. The consequences are such that persons are regulated to
inferior social categories and stigmatized (North & Fiske, 2014).
Chapter 4 focuses on praxis or social practices and utilizes the research
and theory of Foucault (1979, 1989, 1994) to contextualize how the
western notion of disability qua disability mitigates against enabling and
realizing the goals of social inclusion policies. This chapter also concen-
trates on critique of tradition from a cultural practice perspective and I
argue that we perceive intellectual disability negatively, albeit uncon-
sciously. Chapter 5 is a reflection on the notion of belonging and hospi-
tality and envisages ways in which persons living with an intellectual
disability could be invited into communities. The final chapter considers
the points of divergence with the principles and business activities of a
personalist paradigm. It proposes innovative insights that might offer
individual and collective practices that would provide persons living with
an intellectual disability with opportunities to participate more fully in
normative lifestyles. It takes the neoliberal paradigm, the National
Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), as a model to critique the philo-
sophical values associated with implementing social policies of inclusion.
8 D. P. Treanor

1.3 Phases of Contemporary

Disability Research
Social welfare services are a universal term that can be used to describe the
provision, by government and benevolent organizations, of basic ameni-
ties that promotes the well-being of persons and society. These services
incorporate, in western societies, a range of components (structural,
bodily, activities, support and so forth) that function as essential constit-
uents for individual well-being and quality of life. The philosophical
principles inherent in global social welfare services have a number of pur-
poses aimed at maximizing a person’s well-being and quality of life. These
philosophical principles refer to treating the persons receiving the welfare
service as consumers/customers who know their needs and, in the con-
text of a free market, will have their needs met. In addition, the market-­
place principles of demand and supply will regulate the type, quantity
and quality of service provision. Regulation by the government is pitched
at service providers: they are to be efficient and effective and deliver quali-
tative services. The funding and provision of services to persons living
with all forms of disability are included in the term social welfare services.
Bradley (1996) suggests there have been two phases to the research
focused on deinstitutionalization of persons living with an intellectual
disability. The first phase examines the dismantling of the institution and
then analyses how the lives of persons living with the experience of an
intellectual disability have changed post-institutionalization. The pur-
pose of this research centres on answering questions such as: Are persons
leading “better” lives in the community? What has actually changed for
persons living now in smaller residences? Edgerton’s (1967) initial inter-
views with persons living with an intellectual disability in the United
States post-institutionalism, and his follow up study (1993), provide
insights into how the lives of persons living with an intellectual disability
benefitted and how personal and functional skills improved through liv-
ing in the community. Other examples of this type of research can be
found in the United Kingdom and Australia. For instance, in the United
Kingdom, Forrester-Jones (2006) conducted a longitudinal study of per-
sons living with an intellectual disability that traced their lives after they
 1 Overview 9

left an institution. Similarly, in Australia, studies by Young, Sigafiss,

Ashman, and Grevall (1998) and Clement and Bigby (2010) offer over-
views of deinstitutionalization processes for persons living with an intel-
lectual disability.
The second phase is analytically focused and investigates significant yet
obscure characteristics of deinstitutionalization that are interdependent
and which will contribute to the delivery of better personal outcomes.
Mansell and Ericsson’s (1996) study offers a comprehensive review of the
changes that have occurred in a number of western societies and unveils
wisdom from these experiences. The research also articulates the gaps that
remain post institutionalization. These studies are drawn from Britain,
Scandinavia and the United States. The methodology used assesses how
policy is translated into practice, what positive effects have resulted, what
gaps and unintended consequences occurred and how congruent policies
are with the “social model of disability” (Oliver, 1990). The focus on the
“social model of disability” results from these western nations adapting
this framework for action—to a greater or lesser extent—when they first
initiated deinstitutionalization processes. Terzi (2004) argues the social
model has limitations because it posits disability solely as a social con-
struct and this fails to incorporate the interdependence between impair-
ment, disability and society. However, she does note the merit of the
model is in reminding persons of the “simplistic views on the experience
of disability and more importantly, on the oppressive nature of some dis-
ability arrangements” (pp. 155–156).
There has been then, in the institutional, professional and personal
spheres, considerable efforts directed at social inclusion that support per-
sons living with an intellectual disability to be members of their local
community. Although the term “social inclusion” emerged in France in
the 1970s and has been adopted by other western nations as a concept to
alleviate inequality, it is difficult to define exactly (Silver, 1994, p. 536).
As a concept “social inclusion” aims to shift the emphasis of a person’s (or
group’s) socio-economic status to incorporate other dimensions such as
actual participation in society (that is, community membership), access
to education, transport, health and whether or not society on the whole
holds a positive or negative view towards the person (or groups) (Azpitarte,
2015). It might then be more appropriate to conceptualize “social
10 D. P. Treanor

inclusion” as pluralistic with a cluster of characteristics rather than as a

single materialistic indicator. Although scholars have offered adequate
definitions for their case studies and research on the success of “social
inclusion”, some findings reveal successes and practical strategies (Van
Asselt, Buchanan, & Peterson, 2015), whilst others reveal concerning
examples of isolation (Amado, Stancliff, McCarron, & McCallion, 2013)
and abuse (Sherry, 2010). Some findings note how historical negative
imagery and/or decades of marginalization have impacted on persons liv-
ing with an intellectual disability (Goggin & Newell, 2005; Wolfensberger,
2000; Yazbeck, McVilly, & Parmenter, 2004). Nonetheless, one group of
Australian researchers (Gooding, Anderson, & McVilly, 2017) noted
positive outcomes with their findings, revealing “several positive practices
and well-defined skillsets” (p. 30) that enable persons living with an intel-
lectual disability to lead good lives. However, they also note that in the
majority of cases, their research indicates that “social inclusion is not nec-
essarily well-defined across policy and service provision” (p. 22) and this
is of concern since “the prominence of ‘inclusion’ in [the] major national
policy shifts towards “personalization” and individualized funding under
the NDIS” (p. 30). The NDIS refers to the National Disability Insurance
Scheme, which is the Australian system of making available “reasonable
and necessary” (Productivity Commission, 2017, p. 3) supports that
enable persons living with an intellectual disability to live in local com-
munities and benefits from policies of social inclusion.

1.4 Terminology
I use four key concepts throughout this book and I would like to briefly
describe them here. A more in-depth discussion occurs in subsequent
chapters. They are invading consciousness (Macmurray, 1961, p. 68), social
policy of inclusion, personalism (Mounier, 1938, p. 138) and social role
valorization (Wolfensberger, 1983).
Invading consciousness refers to what I perceive has occurred for persons
living with, and persons living without, an intellectual disability. Persons
living with an intellectual disability, in the majority in western nations,
are living in local communities. Regardless of the circumstances of the
 1 Overview 11

living arrangements, the assimilation process for persons living with an

intellectual disability is different when compared to other persons living
as peers. When new persons become part of a local community, we tend
to notice these persons as neighbours and we speak to each other. If there
are local shops, we develop relationships with the proprietor(s) and gen-
erally we participate together in the local community. If you like, the new
neighbours become aware of their new surroundings and persons become
aware of each other. We mostly develop more meaningful relationships as
we establish whether we share similar interests, activities, feelings and
beliefs. If there is symmetry we can develop friendships that extend over
many years. This, I argue, has not occurred for persons living with an
intellectual disability in local communities, despite being in geographical
proximity to other persons. One immediate reason why this may have
failed to occur has been the lack of effective education programs targeted
at social relations between all persons. The limited inclusive educational,
social and recreational opportunities afforded to these persons have had
enormous consequences. These include envisaging persons living with an
intellectual disability as having needs that exclude a focus on competency,
human development, personal flourishing and diverse personal relation-
ships. The results, however, see persons living with an intellectual disabil-
ity being ostracized from normative rhythms of life enjoyed by persons
living without an intellectual disability. The former are thus socially
ostracized from their local community and society in general and fail to
benefit from systemic changes in the cultural and cultural and societal
spheres.
The second concept social policy is a term that is widely used in research
areas in the humanities. I am using it here for a specific purpose; first, to
refer to the impact western government decisions have on the lives of
persons living with the experience of an intellectual disability. Thus the
term is used to refer to the set of activities that central, regional and local
governments, service providers, statutory agencies use to implement their
mandated government strategies, “from signals of intent to final out-
comes” (Cairney, 2012, p. 5). Social policy is more often than not an
incremental process, that is, it responds to both internal and external
influences, to stakeholders and formal and informal networks. This
implies that social policies are also a set of practices that uses a body of
12 D. P. Treanor

knowledge to inform its operations/practices (Gill, Singleton, &

Waterton, 2017). The knowledge used to inform these practices is derived
from medicine and the social sciences.
The third term is personalism. Personalism is this branch of philosophy
that holds that all human life is unique and respected for its own sake;
persons are ends in themselves. The prominence it gives to a human person
also extends to social and political intercourse, as persons are both subject
and agent and a person’s identity is discerned and delineated through their
relationships. A second critical aspect of personalism that is relevant to our
study of social policies of inclusion for persons living with an intellectual
disability is the inseparability of feelings and emotions (Maritain, 1947
[1985]). Personalism argues that “we exile…[feelings and emotions] from
our talk and thought about persons at our peril” (Beauregard & Smith,
2016, p. 17), since our actions and beliefs tend to act in tandem. This also
implies that “action”, that is, our agency and how we act as persons, is
essential to our personhood; we are typically judged by what we do, by
persons who are important to us, by others and by ourselves.
The fourth term frequently used is social role valorization (Wolfensberger,
1983). This term emerged first from the normalization principle, that it
is appropriate for persons living with an intellectual disability to experi-
ence typical or normative patterns of life that all persons in the society
experience (Nirje, 1969). Wolfensberger (1983) advanced this concept of
normalization substantially, to highlight the devalued roles that are
ascribed to persons living with an intellectual disability. Social role valori-
zation Wolfensberger, 1998) transferred the problem of intellectual dis-
ability from the mind and bodies of persons to the ideologies of the
persons who influenced policy-making and care practices. Wolfensberger
(1972) defines ideologies as the “culmination of beliefs, attitudes and
interpretations of reality that are derived from one’s experiences, one’s
knowledge of what are presumed to be facts and above all, one’s values”
(p. 7). Thus, as a theory, social role valorization offers an explanation for
negative cultural attitudes and institutional behaviour that contribute to
the social and economic devaluation of persons living with an intellectual
disability. It also posits strategies that can be utilized to mitigate these
adverse living circumstances. Similar to other discourses, social role valo-
rization has its critics (e.g., Barns, Mercer, & Shakespeare, 1999; Oliver,
 1 Overview 13

1996); however, what is often overlooked in these appraisals is the first

principle of the theory as a reflective practice. In this sphere, the theory
aims at influencing individual and societal perceptions of the social role
granted to persons; however, often when modern managerialist interpre-
tations are applied to the theory, they can distort the principle through
developing formulaic approaches and measurable outcomes and fail to
either acknowledge social roles Or personal friendships (Carling-­
Jenkins, 2014).

1.5 Conclusion
The theme of this book is that, since social policies of inclusion and com-
munity living programs have become the dominant paradigm in western
societies, persons living with an intellectual disability have been “invad-
ing [the] consciousness” (Macmurray, 1961, p. 68) of persons living
without an intellectual disability, local communities and wider society.
That is, the greater the number of persons living in smaller congregate
care dwellings with families or in independent situations offers persons
with intellectual disabilities a physical presence in local communities.
However, persons living with an intellectual disability are hidden inso-
much as the research indicates that persons do not actively participate in
social, economic or cultural activities (Emerson & McVilly, 2004;
Verdonschot et al., 2009). This book explores, despite the introduction of
deliberate legal and policy frameworks, how “invading consciousness”
has failed to address Thompson’s (2003) PCS measures and enable per-
sons living with an intellectual disability to have a relational, social, eco-
nomic and political place in society.

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 2
The Integrity of Persons

2.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the philosophy of “personalism” and concentrates
on John Macmurray’s exposition of “personalism”. This theorist was cho-
sen because his conception and thesis of persons-in-relation as the leitmo-
tif of a human being is instructive for our consideration of the social
policies of inclusion regarding intellectual disability and how they have
positively influenced the lives of persons. Social personhood is a constant
theme in Macmurray’s philosophy and he presented philosophical form
and method “capable of analyzing personality, its modes of experience
and its relatedness to both the material and human world” (Conford,
1996, p. 20). Macmurray’s notion of persons-in-relation argues that what
counts as being a person is how persons engage through personal rela-
tionships with other persons. That is, a person is unintelligible unless his/
her interactions and intercourse with other persons is considered. This is
similar to what Pfeiffer in 2005 argues: that “people with disabilities (like
all people) are humans, Foible, make mistakes and are capable of taking
risks” (p. 139), however are persons living with an intellectual disability
allowed to live this way? The general myths that are often held of persons

© The Author(s) 2020 19

D. P. Treanor, Intellectual Disability and Social Policies of Inclusion,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7056-4_2
20 D. P. Treanor

living with the experience of an intellectual disability appear to indicate

that these persons are not permitted to take risks like other persons. In
human services practitioners often describe the person they work with in
negative terms, for example Saint-Jacques, Turcotte, and Pouliot (2009)
discovered that on 72% of occasions, practitioners used weakness words
rather than strength-based words about persons they worked with. This
contrasts with contemporary theorists such as Kristeva (2006, 2013);
Kristeva and Herman (2010); Vanier (1998) and Reinders (2000, 2008).
These scholars offer a positive ontology of disability, that is, they present
persons as competent, engaged with other persons and capable of living
flourishing lives. This sets the framework for the following chapter that
analyses neoliberalism, culture and belonging. The first section briefly
explores the central constituents of personalism as a philosophy. The sec-
ond presents a reading of Macmurray, which locates his philosophy
within the tradition of personalism. The penultimate section presents
Kristeva’s (2006, 2013); Kristeva and Herman (2010) theory. Finally, in
Sect. 2.4, Macmurray’s thesis, the form of the personal, its nexus with
Kristeva (2006, 2013); Kristeva and Herman (2010) and its relevance
with social policies of inclusion are discussed.

2.2 The Central Constituents of Personalism

In the first half of the twentieth century, the term personalist was applied
to a range of philosophers who shared a symmetry of critical thinking. In
the United States, persons such as Border Parker Browne, Edgar Sheffield
Brightman, Albert Knutson, Walt Whitman, Martin Luther King and
William James have been identified as personalists. In Europe, personal-
ism can be found in the thoughts of Nicolai Berdyaev in Russia, Karl
Wojtyla in Poland, Martin Buber and Max Scheler in Germany, in
Emmanuel Mounier, Jacques Maritain and Gabel Marcel in France.
British personalists include Austin Farrer, John Macmurray and Michael
Polanyi. Contemporary personalists include Beauregard (2019),
Beauregard and Smith (2016), Olof Bengtsson (2006), Burgos (2012),
Smith (2017), Williams and Bengtsson (2018). Olof Bengtsson (2006)
and Buford (2014) trace the roots of personalist philosophy across cul-
tures and time to locate it in the overall history of philosophy. As a school
 2 The Integrity of Persons 21

of thought, personalists hold divergent views on what they mean by “per-

son” and this different emphasis in personalism has led some thinkers
(e.g., Mounier, 1938, 1952, pp. 483–488) to propose there are many
forms of personalisms rather than a categorical personalism.
A primary and distinctive characteristic of personalism relates to the
prominence it gives to a human person in social and political intercourse.
Persons are a subject and agent in action and a person’s identity is dis-
cerned and delineated through a person’s relationships. Macmurray
explains:

The self must be conceived, not theoretically as subject, but practically as

agent. Secondly, human behaviour is comprehensive only in terms of a
dynamic social reference; the isolated, purely individual self is a fiction. In
philosophy this means, as we shall see, that the unity of the personal cannot
be thought as the form of an individual self, but only through the mutual-
ity of personal relationship. In face of both difficulties a radical modifica-
tion of our philosophical system is demanded. The first requires us to
substitute for the Self as subject, which is the starting-point of modern
philosophy, the Self as agent; and to make this substitution is to reject the
traditional distinction between subjective and objective. The second com-
pels us to abandon the traditional individualism or egocentricity of our
philosophy. We must introduce the second person as the necessary correla-
tive of the first, and to do our thinking not from the standpoint of the ‘I’
alone, but the ‘you and I’. (Macmurray, 1969, p. 38)

A second critical aspect of personalism that is relevant for our study of

social policies of inclusion for persons living with an intellectual disabil-
ity is the inseparability of feelings and emotions. Often emotions and
feelings are used interchangeably to explain the same phenomenon, yet
they are different sides of a coin; emotions are event-driven, while feel-
ings are latent learned behaviours that emanate from an external event.
Beauregard and Smith would argue that “we exile…[feelings and emo-
tions] from our talk and thought about persons at our peril” (2016, p. 17)
since to rely on either rationality, feelings or emotions alone is fiction.
Macmurray (1969) would agree that feelings and emotions should be
part of our philosophical psychology since our actions and beliefs tend to
interact with each other. This also implies that action, that is, how we can
22 D. P. Treanor

act as persons, is essential to our personhood; we are typically judged by

these three categories—by persons who are important to us, by others
and by ourselves.
In addition to this central commonality, Brightman (1950), Knudson
(1927) and Williams and Bengtsson (2018) identify further characteris-
tics that are common to personalism. For the purpose of expediency, I
will only consider the five common themes identified by Beauregard
(2019) and Williams and Bengtsson (2018). These are:

1. There is a radical difference between persons and non-persons though

there is an interrelationship between persons, animals and nature
2. The dignity of the person
3. Interiority and subjectivity
4. Self-determination
5. Relationality and communion (Williams & Bengtsson, 2018)

Accordingly, I will extrapolate the rationale underpinning these dimen-

sions since it appears to me that a synthesis might provide a more reliable
methodology to understand the connection between persons living with
an intellectual disability and social policies of inclusion. The link between
Kristeva’s argument and Macmurray’s thesis is: we are essentially “persons-­
in-­relation” who do not live in a vacuum. Kristeva’s case studies (2006);
Kristeva and Herman (2010) present the environmental influences that
impact on persons living with an intellectual disability. Macmurray
(1969) demonstrates the role other persons and nature have on a person’s
formation. Both scholars offer explanations of the interrelationship of
persons with nature, which is plant and animal life, and their social and
political environments.
Gabriel Marcel (1936) uses the term “neighbour” to argue for a new
type of relationship; he terms this a “fraternity”, which is an ordinary
friendship shared by persons founded on mutual goodwill that is simi-
larly found in positive kinship relationships (p. 130). It is these types of
relationships, Marcel argues, that omit the inherent human dignity in
each person. He states fraternal relations are, “essentially hetero-centric:
you are my brother, I recognize you as such … and because you are my
brother, I rejoice not only in anything good which may happen to you
but also in acknowledging the ways in which you are superior to me.
 2 The Integrity of Persons 23

Why would I feel the need of being your equal? We are brothers through
all our dissimilarities” (p. 132). We will also consider this concept of
human dignity in Chap. 4 and the role of social relations between persons.
Personalism is a school of social thought that aims to describe and
make sense of the political, economic and social behaviour based on the
ethical or metaphysical value of a person since s/he has preeminent value
and is essential to measuring reality. This claim follows from personalism
as an anthropology that includes a person’s search to lead a meaningful
and flourishing life, which includes maintaining friendships and relation-
ships with other persons. In centring persons as primary, the personalist
anthropology allocates a secondary role to ideology, economics and poli-
tics. This approach allocates presence, the act of existing as valuable,
which sends economic and other forms of productivity to the peripheral.
Macmurray (1961, 1969) and other personalists incorporate the idea that
all domains of social life need to be arranged to guarantee relational prox-
imity between persons since personal well-being or flourishing of the
individual and community is determined by the quality of personal
relationships.
The following practices serve as key characteristics for personalism,
given the priority some personalists ascribe to persons as persons-in-­
relations. These are:

• The quality of relationships and social well-being is of utmost impor-

tance to a person’s life.
• Having concern for persons who might be experiencing disadvantages
either in their social relations or in their access to material resources.
• Providing the family with the necessary resources to act as the primary
foundation space where persons can experience love and support from
other persons.
• If persons have lived positive emotionally robust family relationships,
then there is the potential for persons to build positive relationships
amongst persons in their neighbourhoods and cities.
• Institutions that are created will share power with persons. At a sys-
tematic level consultations and slow decision-making process will be
implemented as the most effective forms of organizational
accountability.
24 D. P. Treanor

• In the political sphere there will be a commitment to acting with jus-

tice (in a broad sense) and working towards reconciliation in personal,
institutional and political spheres when injustice has occurred.
• Financial and other resources will be used to strengthen and enrich
robust personal, social, commercial and political relationships.

Some personalists acknowledge there is an interrelationship between

human beings, animals and nature. However, modern European person-
alists who have been influenced by Catholicism (e.g., Burgos, 2012)
believe that “person” is a single category and it is a serious error to use
analogies drawn from the animal world. Aristotle’s view that “every realm
of nature is marvelous” (trans. W. D. Ross, 2001, 645a16) and his meth-
odology for defining a species in terms of its proximate genus and specific
difference would be contested by some personalists. Thus, personalism
might differ with Aristotle’s view and emphasis on a human being as a
“political animal” (trans. W. D. Ross, 2001, 1253a7) because this could
lead the “unacceptable reduction of the human person to the objective
world” (Williams & Bengtsson, 2018). It would also fail to account for
the personalist belief in the immaterial and primal uniqueness of the per-
son, which understands that a person’s ultimate value is determined by
the ontological significance of their being. Appropriately with this empha-
sis on personal ontology, personalism takes seriously the numerous facets
of a human person which differ from our physical nature: time, horizon,
transcendence, communication, intimacy, inner-life, sympathy, sense of
emptiness, value, liberation and appropriation, to laugh, love and so forth.
In their elucidation of the continuity of personalist thought, Beauregard
and Smith (2016) describe some personalist theorists’ “anti-reductive”
(p. 22) approach to understanding persons. Their aim is to be “more
constructive” (p. 22) though rejecting the notion of the person as “pure
reason” (p. 22). Personalists will, however, argue that persons are neither
captured nor immobilized by and within these categories. Macmurray
(1935) explains:

the full existence of a person includes a material and an organic existence.

Indeed, it would be more illuminating to point out that the idea of the
organic and the material are, in fact, limitations in personal consciousness.
 2 The Integrity of Persons 25

We do not build up our conception of the personal from our knowledge of

the material world. On the contrary, we reach the conception of matter by
leaving out certain aspects of our personal experience which we consider to
be peculiar to our personal and organic existence. The importance of this
consideration is that it indicates that a personal conception of the world
includes the organic or the material conception of it. Here again the persis-
tent dualism between mind and matter dogs our footsteps. To assert that
the world is spiritual is not to deny that it is material. In a properly per-
sonal conception of the world there is no denial of materialism. On the
other hand, to assert materialism as the last word about reality is to deny its
personal character and its organic character. (p. 223)

A common theme among personalists is the notion of persons as those

who deliberately engage with each other in emotional and personal
spheres since s/he is not an isolated individual. Rather:

the human principle is, in principle, shared experience; human life, even in
its most individual elements, is a common life and human behaviour car-
ries always, in its inherent structure, a reference to the personal Other. All
this may be summed up by saying that the unit of personal existence is not
the individual, but two persons in personal relation; and that we are per-
sons not by individual right, but in virtue of one another. The personal is
constituted by personal relatedness. The unit of the persona is not the ‘I’,
but the ‘You and I’. (Macmurray, 1961, p. 61)

The dialogical philosophy of Martin Buber (1966) is often presented

as a form of personalism and his thesis concentrates on human interper-
sonal dialogue to accentuate the relational aspect of personalism. Buber
locates a human being in the act of dialogue, in and as the primary word
I-Thou. Buber argues:

Man1 wishes to be confirmed in his being by man, and wishes to have a

presence in the being of the other…. Secretly and bashfully he watches for
a YES which allows him to be and which can come to him only from one
human person to another. (1966, p. 71)

1
Read ‘person’. In all future reference to ‘man’, read person.
26 D. P. Treanor

One possible example of how this dialogical personalist philosophy is

implemented is how persons who are in non-family relationships live and
share life together. One such example occurs in the L’Arche Communities.
Members of L’Arche communities, persons living with and without the
experience of an intellectual disability have formed mutually adult appro-
priate meaningful friendships and relationships over the past fifty-five
years. The communities are part of an International Federation across 38
countries and 4 continents. These relationships have brought to society’s
attention the possibility of I-Thou relationships between persons of all
abilities, gender and ethnicity. In establishing L’Arche, Jean Vanier has
thus offered many persons living with the experience of an intellectual
disability a biographical rather than a mere biological reality of personal
experience. Vanier shifted the dominant paradigm from the 1960s of per-
sons as useless, redundant, a burden to persons who have a personal his-
tory, needs, desires and who can live flourishing lives. Members who
share lives together in L’Arche note how this implies a constant commit-
ment to relationships, conversation, participation and encounters. The
different other is revealed as a person: L’Arche is a school in personal
relationships, which enables persons who are different to understand each
other as unique persons by mutually exposing aspects of their character
to each other and being accepted for their unique personhood (Mosteller,
1978; Vanier, 1998; Dansereau, 2018).
Costello (2002) notes that Buber valued Macmurray’s philosophical
acumen that “conceptualize[s] the form of the personal” (2002, p. 14,
p. 322) since it offers a framework to explore the fundamental metaphysi-
cal truths of human existence: what it means to be human. Costello fur-
ther argues: “Martin Buber, whom Macmurray knew more personally,
considered himself to be the poet of this project” (2002, p. 15). The
project Buber refers to is giving prominence to the “form of the per-
sonal”, that is, emphasizing the importance of persons and their interac-
tions and interdependence in contemporary philosophy.
The personalist distinction between persons and non-persons in the
first instance, contributes to a reasoning process that has implications for
how the former are to interact with other persons and their environment
and other realities. It demands that each person honours and affirms the
inherent uniqueness and value of each individual person. This notion of
 2 The Integrity of Persons 27

the uniqueness of human persons is contested (e.g., McMahan, 2002;

Singer, 1994); however, personalists like Crosby (1996) and Wojtyla
(1975) endorsed the notion of uniqueness. Crosby argues that Boethius’s
argument implies that persons are not only an individual substance of a
human nature, but also an irreplaceable being: a Buber or Macmurray or
any other name, that is, there will only ever be one physical being known
as Martin Buber with his experiences and relationships. Wojtyla argues
the misinterpretation of Boethius’ definition focuses on the absence of a
person’s “lived experience”, which offers a person an “eyewitness” view of
their own self and personal experiences (1975, pp. 213–214). Zagzebski’s
(2001) analysis of whether persons are unique assesses five definitions of
a person that include notions developed by Boethius, Locke, Kant and
Wojtyla. Her findings argue that human persons are infinitely valuable in
virtue of their shared nature but that persons are “irreplaceably valuable
because of nonqualitative features of their personhood” (2001, p. 410). If
we accept this view of persons as unique, then persons are related to each
other as equals. However, “this does not mean that they have, as a matter
of fact, equal abilities, equal rights, equal functions or any other kind of
de facto equality. The equality is intentional: it is an aspect of the mutual-
ity of the relation” (Macmurray, 1961, p. 158). This is the form of per-
sonal interactions expected, since it is not contingent upon intelligence,
personal skills or behavioural transgressions. Nonetheless, important for
Macmurrian personalism is the reality that persons live in a world of
value. Values are more than our biological actuality, and biology is a
description of living things; culture and similar things are ways of being
for a living organism, specifically a human person. They do not cancel
each other out, they are not mutually exclusive and they are integral to
our culture, conception of living a good life, ability to communicate and
create and sustain meaningful or intrinsic relationships.
One line of thought some personalists argue follows from the idea that
persons are unique is that personal dignity is inherent in their ontological
status (Beauregard, 2019). A person’s ontological status establishes a set
of ethical demands on them and one such demand is affirming each per-
son’s human dignity and his/her inherent personal value. Dignity in the
most generic sense implies a particular and positive value to an entity
(Sulmasy, 2018, p. 937). The word dignity emanates from the Latin word
28 D. P. Treanor

dignus and is used to refer to worth, honour and esteem. Indeed it implies
what is being referred to has merit and is worthy of respect and impor-
tance. The term dignity is typically used in discourse about human per-
sons, vis-à-vis human persons possessing a higher value or importance
above other entities.
Marcel (1963) advanced a notion of human dignity that is relevant to
our discussion in which he argues that priority needs to be provided to
the full range of human experiences. Marcel states:

It is my own profound belief that we cannot succeed in preserving the

mysterious principle at the heart of human dignity unless we succeed in
making explicit the proper sacral quality peculiar to it … when we consider
the human being in his nudity and weakness—the human being as help-
less, as a child, the old man, or the pauper. (1963, p. 128)

This view of a person conceives of them as finite entities and this aspect
of human experiences needs scrutiny, alongside vulnerability and mortal-
ity, for a proper comprehension of human dignity to occur. It is easy to
attribute value and worth to economic or social roles, status and posses-
sions. However, how can any person believe that finitude, weakness or
vulnerability is worthy of respect in other persons? Marcel argues that the
solution is dialectical since fragility alone is unable to provide the power
necessary to omit respect. A reader of Marcel’s Le Dard, which Marcel
argues is an exposition of human dignity, can respect Werner in his weak-
ness at the end of the play and though it is not dignity per se, we can
respect his honesty, courage and his ability to overcome the desire to
have, that is to accumulate wealth, power and prestige (he could be rec-
ognized in France or Germany) and stay in the realm of being. A person
can admire his decision to accept whatever outcome results from his act
of being rather than holding on to his financial security, seeking posses-
sions, esteem, or status. This act of being also confers him with power,
respect and dignity for the nonqualitative features of his personhood.
There is also an intersubjective dimension to human dignity for Marcel.
The meeting of two persons can engage persons in finitude, weakness and
vulnerability without necessarily focusing on their role or what the
 2 The Integrity of Persons 29

person has. Marcel refers positively to Levinas’ expression “face-to-face”

of the uniqueness of the other person (Marcel, 1963, pp. 130–131).
This contradicts relationships based on equality since in this matrix
relations are ego-centric; they are claims to something (e.g., rights) and
focus on having. In fraternal relationships we are equal because of our
inequality, finitude, weakness, vulnerability, our uniqueness and in being
nonpareil to each other. Other persons are not a threat and as we engage
with the other in our lives, persons “will have become an integral part of
our experience” and we can continue to enjoy the mystery of each other
and what comes through our encounter (Marcel, 1963, p. 141).
In congruence with other personalists, (Marcel, 1963; Macmurray,
1961) human dignity is relational. It moves beyond ascribing value to a
person on the basis of personal intelligence, physical agility, social com-
petence and so forth; rather, the idea of negating any single aspect of
human character distracts from affirming our dignity as human persons.
This paradigm challenges neoliberalism emphasis on individuality, effi-
ciency and productivity and affirmation or value on the basis of achieving
these outcomes. Marcel also argues that linking human dignity externally
to “the objective world whose physiognomy is increasingly strange and
threatening, entails in fact a pulverization of the subject” (1936, p. 165).
He therefore argues this approach comprises human dignity and respect
for the truth, and positions a person as a subject who is more than his/her
actions. The analysis of this form of personal subjectivity (in the personal-
ist tradition this subjectivity includes “interiority, freedom and personal
authority” (Williams & Bengtsson, 2018)) reveals an immanent nature
and unity that applies to actions and the inner happenings derived from
our human and personal lived experiences. Macmurray (1969) explains
that “action is choice,” it is “to do this and not that,” it is therefore “the
actualization of a possibility, and as such it is a choice” (p. 139). As per-
sons who exist in relation to each other, what can emerge through inter-
actions are our character and our personality, which are influenced by the
inner happenings and our lived experiences. Knudson (1927) informs us
that, “personalism finds the ontologically real only in personality” (p. 66)
and “it lays more stress on the will than the intellect and inclines to the
view that life is deeper than logic” (p. 66). That is, personalism does not
30 D. P. Treanor

rely on reason only to substantiate its argument because it believes there

is a ravine between thought and reality.
It is not surprising that personalist emphasis on action and happenings
supports the belief that persons are by nature free individuals. Brightman
(1950) notes that personalism has investigated the psychology of person-
ality to minimize analytic views of the mind and behaviourism. Many
theorists explore the somewhat nebulous nature of freedom with such
uniformity which reveals that it is never a question of acting simply with-
out regard to anyone but oneself. Moreover, unlike Kant’s proposition,
freedom is not an expression of pure reason nor is it Sartre’s power of
choice: “the nothingness that inserts itself between motives and action”
(Sartre, 1966, p. 71). One of Sartre’s motives in exploring freedom is to
refuse determinism, and he argues that freedom is threatened by neither
nature nor nurture. Rather, as Warnock (1971) states, he argues that per-
sons create his/her own actions and identities. In personalism, freedom is
the expression of personal existence of a being, thus, it “can be lived, but
not seen” (Sartre, 1966, p. 71). Freedom is also participating in being,
that is personal actions, forming our characters and living shared lives
and establishing the parameters that are set by our capacity to engage in
mutually reciprocal goodwill relationships as well as or in addition to
more intimate and loving relationships. For Macmurray, freedom for per-
sons means, “the absence of restraint upon action” (1935, p. 175) and it
is expressed most fully by “the ability to live spontaneously (that is, for
themselves) and in terms of the other (that is, for and in and by what is
not of themselves” (1935, p. 84). A person acting according to this nar-
rative expresses his/her authentic nature and freedom.
An overall principle underlying personalism is how the nature of inter-
personal interactions constitutes the social character of persons. Williams
and Bengtsson highlight the distinction that some advocates of personal-
ism articulate about the difference between “social nature” and “interper-
sonal communion” with the latter representing a permanent union
established through personal ontology (2018, p. 19). A person’s ability to
form friendships and enter into wider community personal networks is
one social characteristic; however, persons engaging in intimate person-
able ways and belonging to other persons offer a more significant union
than mere sociability. This notion of communion is more than a
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themselves the revenging justice of God, from verse 10. to the end
of the Chapter. In the description of the false teachers he makes,
1. A comparison of the like betwixt the false teachers and those that
were false prophets among the people of Israel, partly that he might
joyne together this discourse with the former, where he spake of true
Prophets; and partly that he might meet with the scandall which
might arise by such seducers; and partly that he might stirre up the
faithfull so much the more, to beware of their seducing. In the first
respect, the last words of the former Chapter, and the first of this
Chapter, make such a discreet axiom as this; although there were
many Prophets among the People of Israel, that were holy men of
God, and were moved by the Spirit of God in those things that they
spake; yet among the same people also there were many false
Prophets. This discretion is shewed in these words: But there were.
In the second respect these words make a copulate axiom thus: Like
as there were false Prophets among the People of Israel, so also
shall there be false teachers among you. In the third respect there is
intimated and implicitely contained such a connex axiom as this: If
there shall be false teachers among you, like as there were false
Prophets among the people of Israel, then must you be alike careful
to beware of these, as the Israelites were warned heretofore to
beware of them. After that description which is made by way of
comparison, followes an absolute description; wherein the false
teachers are described by their effects. Which effects have either an
immediate reference unto the false teachers themselves, or unto
others by them. Those that have reference unto the false teachers
themselves, are 1. The bringing in of heresies, which are set forth by
their adjunct, that they are damnable, whereof he gives a reason
also, taken from the nature of heresies, which is said to be such, that
it brings in a denying of the Lord. 2. The second effect is, that they
bring upon themselves swift destruction. In respect of others the first
effect is, that they shall have many followers, who are pointed out by
another effect accompanying this seducing, namely, a speaking evill
of the truth, or of the Gospell, which shall come to passe by their
meanes. The other effect is the abuse of those whom they do
seduce for gain; which abuse is set forth by the helping cause,
namely by fained words.
 The Doctrines arising herehence.

Doctrine 1. There are alwayes false prophets and false

teachers in the Church.

This is gathered from these words: there were, there shall bee.

Reason. This comes to passe in a threefold respect, 1. in respect

of God. 2. In respect of the Devill. 3. In respect of men. First, in
respect of God, and that 1. that they which are approved in the
Church may be made manifest, 1 Corinthians 11.19. Deuteronomy
13.3. 2. That the obstinate wicked may perish in their ungodlinesse
and cruelty, 2 Thessalonians 2.10,11,12. 1 Kings 22.20,21,22.
Secondly, in respect of the Devill, because he is alwayes the father
of lyes, and a murtherer, and that envious one, which soweth tares
among the good seed. Thirdly, In respect of men, because the
wisdome of the flesh is enmity against God and his truth.

The use hereof according to the Apostles intention is twofold:

Vse 1. To admonish us, not to be offended, nor to be too much

troubled in minde, when we see heresies to arise in the Church, but
to say as the Apostle did, There were, there shall be.

2. To instruct us, not to believe every spirit, but to try whether

they are of God, 1 Iohn 4.1.

Doctrine 2. Every heresie hath damnation joyned with it.

This is gathered from these words: damnable heresies. Some are

more damnable then others, yet all do in their nature tend to
damnation. For all are contrary unto the way of truth, whereof
mention is made, verse 2. which way alone leads unto life. But there
are some heresies which can by no meanes consist with salvation or
eternall life. Hereupon such opinions are by a kind of appropriation
called heresies in the Church, that is, opinions altogether damnable.
For there is a difference to be observed betwixt things rashly spoken,
bare errors in faith, and heresies properly so called. In the heresies
themselves also we must distinguish betwixt the materiality, and the
formality of it. For to make a formall heresie, for which a man is
properly called an heretick, there is required besides an errour in
those things that pertaine unto the fundamentals of religion, a
reluctation against the cleare light, and obstinacy in that reluctation.

Vse. This may serve to condemne those that under the name of
peace and charity, make so little reckoning of the bringing in of
heresies into the Church. They would have all things received in and
tollerated, which is all one, as if they would for peace and charity
admit of damnation it selfe. For heresies have damnation joyned with
it.

2. To admonish us, 1. to take diligent heed that we do not by any

means further such heresies. 2. Not rashly or for a light cause to
pronounce any man an heretick. 3. As carefully to beware of
heresies, as we should of damnation.

Question. In the reason which is here given of this property of

heresies, that they are damnable, a question is moved, What is
meant by denying the Lord? denying the Lord that bought them. For
many gather from this place, that all and every particular man were
redeemed by Christ, because it is here said that he bought even
those wicked hereticks: but it may be answered divers wayes.

Answer 1. That these false teachers were members of the visible

Church, and therefore, 1. they accounted themselves such as were
redeemed by Christ, and made shew of that profession. 2. Men were
to account them such, as long as they continued in the Church; and
in this respect they may be said to be such as were redeemed by
Christ; like as the Apostles are wont to call whole Churches justified,
sanctified, and elect. There is not the same reason therefore of all
and every particular man, as there was of these.

Answer 2. He doth not here speak of Christ properly, as he is

Redeemer, nor of the redemption of his blood, but of that right,
whereby masters chalenge their servants, as having bought them;
which may be thus shewed: 1. Here is no mention of Christ as being
Lord properly, but Master. For in the Greek it is δεσπώτης, which is
properly, a Master in respect of a servant, not κώριος, Lord. And
these two names are clearly distinguished, Iude verse 4. where the
same thing is spoken of the same false teachers: there they are said
to deny their Dominum & herum, Lord and master; although he may
be called their Herus, Master, he is not properly called their
Dominus, Lord. Then againe, the Lord is not said to have redeemed
all men, but only to have bought them: now although the word
ἀγορώζω, to buy, be sometimes used in the same sense that the
other is, yet it is not alwayes so.

Answer 3. The comparison here is plainly made betwixt the false

teachers and the false Prophets, ♦betwixt the visible Church and the
people of Israel; for the Lord is said to have bought those men in the
same sense, that he is said to have redeemed and delivered all the
people of Israel; that is, as he delivered them out of Egypt, and
challenged them to himselfe in a peculiar manner, that by a solemne
covenant they should be his servants; so also all those that give their
names unto the Church, he may in this respect be said to have
bought, as a Master, that they should serve him for ever. To deny the
Lord is, not to acknowledge God or Christ for the Lord, Matthew
10.32,33. to confesse and to deny are made contrary one to another,
Luke 12.8,9. The reason is, because it hath once professed the
name of the Lord, and afterwards departs from that profession, it is
all one as if he did plainly say, that he would no longer be a servant
of that Lord. For this denying is twofold, either verball or reall. A
verball denying was in Peter, a reall denying is in all those that after
they have made profession of the faith, return unto a profane life,
1 Timothy 5.8. 2 Timothy 3.5. The denying in this place is properly
meant of a reall denying. For the description of these men doth
rather expresse their profane courses, then their open renouncing of
Christ.

♦ “bewixt” replaced with “betwixt”

 Doctrine 3. It is a damnable impiety to deny Christ either in
word or deed.

Reason 1. ♦Because by this means Christ is greatly dishonoured;

for men, our lusts, and Sathan himselfe are preferred before him,
Mark 8.38. where the indignity of this sinne is shewed, that an
adulterous and sinfull generation is preferred before Christ. Christ
also by this means is accused of iniquity: for no servant usually
goeth away from his master, if he confesseth him to be a just master;
therefore this going away is as it were a professing that he doth
accuse that master from whom he goes of some iniquity. Hereupon
was that contesting of the Lord against his rebellious people, that he
was a just and right master, neither did he give them any cause to
depart from him, Ieremiah 2.5. Micah 6.3. Deuteronomy 32.4.

♦ “Becawse” replaced with “Because”

2. Because Christ threatned a most heavie judgement against

this sin, when he saith that he will deny those men; that he wil be
ashamed of them before God and his Angels, Mark 8.38.

Vse 1. This may serve to condemne, not only the manifest

Apostates, but also all those, that with the profession of godlinesse
joyne a profane life, or turn aside from that profession. The sinne of
these men is more grievous, then of Turks and Infidels, that never
gave their names unto Christ; for the neerer any man commeth unto
God, the more doth he dishonour his name, if he doth fall back
againe. He that hath in some sort forsaken Sathan, and given
himselfe up unto God, and afterward forsakes God again, and gives
himselfe up unto Sathan, seems to have known both masters, and
advisedly to pronounce that he is the better, whose servant he would
rather be, that is, Sathan.

2. To admonish us, 1. Carefully to beware, not only of the

damnable sin it selfe, but also of all appearance, and every degree
of it, and every occasion that might leade us thereunto. 2. If in any
respect we have turned towards such like abomination, to recall our
selves betimes, and seriously to bewaile our offence, like as Peter
did after his denying of Christ, Matthew 26.75.

Doctrine 4. It is the nature of such sinnes to bring destruction

upon men.

This is gathered from these words; bring upon themselves

destruction.

Reason. Because sinne in respect of the guilt that is joyned with

it, hath a kind of power whereby it drawes all evill; like as faith and
prayers obtain every good gift from God. Hence is it, that our sins
are said to cry for vengeance; and also to draw punishment unto it
as it were with strong cords, Isaiah 5.18. For while men draw sin with
such-like cords, they do also draw the punishment of sinne, which is
joyned unto it.

Vse 1. This may serve to admonish us, in this respect to beware

of sin.

2. To exhort us, by faith, repentance, and prayers, to turn away

that destruction from us, which our sins would bring upon us.

Doctrine 5. The destruction which hangs over the heads of

grievous offenders will come swiftly.

This is gathered from these words; swift destruction.

Doctrine 6. Men are wonderfully prone to imbrace errors.

This is gathered from these words; And many shall follow.

Reason 1. By reason of that darknesse, which hath taken hold of

mens mindes; thereupon they may be easily drawne under any shew
or glimps of light.

2. By reason of that disposition which they have, alien from the

truth; thereupon they easily imbrace those things that are contrary to
this truth.

3. By reason of that disposition which they have, agreeing with

the nature of errors. For sinners have in themselves the seeds, of all
sins, errors and heresies; so that the nature of corrupt man doth as
easily receive errors, as the tinder fire.

4. By reason of the just judgement of God, whereby for the

punishment of other sins they are given over to the power of errors,
2 Thessalonians 2.10.

Vse 1. This may serve to instruct us, to shew the corruption and
wretchednesse of our nature, how hardly are we brought to imbrace
the heavenly and saving truth, when we are carried headlong unto
damnable errors.

2. To admonish us, that it should not be an offence unto us, if we

see many given unto errors; because this was foretold us by the
Apostle, and it hath a manifest reason; so that it is not to be wondred
at, that many are given unto errors, but that rather, that any one doth
believe the truth.

3. To exhort us, 1. Unto humiliation, in respect of this pronenesse

unto error, 2. To care and circumspection that we be not overswayed
by it. And an Argument whereby we may and should be stirred up
unto this care, we have in the text, whiles they which follow heresies
and hereticks, are said to follow their destruction. For not only the
authors of heresies run unto destruction, but also their followers, as
in the place of the Thessalonians before cited. In those which perish,
so that it is a signe of destruction, to be seduced by hereticks.

Doctrine 7. The fruit of errors and heresies is speaking evill of

the way of truth.

This is gathered from these words, By reason of whom the way of

truth shall be evill spoken of. By the way of truth is meant the
Gospell, or the will of God revealed in the Scripture, which shewes
the true way of salvation. It is said to be evill spoken of, when the
dignity thereof is violated, most properly by reproachfull words. It is
said to be evill spoken of by them, namely, by the authors of the
heresies and their followers, in a two-fold respect, 1. When they
themselves speak reproachfully of it, as the Scribes and Pharisees
did of Christ. 2. While they give others occasion to speak
reproachfully of it, as the Jewes did unto the Gentiles, Romans 2.24.
both respects seeme to be meant here by these, for the Greek word
διὰ signifies per & propter, by, and by reason of.

Vse 1. This may serve to instruct us, to judge aright of the nature
of sinne, that never staies till it hath brought men to blasphemy
against God, and to speak evill of the way of God.

2. To admonish us, 1. For this cause to withstand the beginnings

of sin, lest at length we be brought also to blasphemy against the
holy Ghost, which Christ saith is a sin that shall never be forgiven.
2. To beware also of those men, that durst openly speak evill of the
truth; amongst the number of whom they are to be put, that dare
mock and scoffe at the name of predestination and the predestinate.

Doctrine 8. They which propagate errors under faire pretence,

do often times seek their own gaine.

This is gathered from these words; through covetousnesse with

fained words: Covetousnesse is commonly the companion of
heresies, oftentimes the mother, very often the Nurse of them, as we
may see in the Papists.

Vse. This may serve to admonish us, 1. Not to believe mens

fained words. 2. To beware of covetousnesse, which is the root, as of
all evils, so also of heresies.

Doctrine 9. Miserable is the condition of those men that are

seduced by hereticks; for they are sold like beasts and cattell.

This is gathered from these words, they shall make merchandize

of you.
Verse 3, at the end. Whose judgement now of a long time lingreth
not, and their damnation slumbreth not.

The Analysis.

H itherto we have seen the description of false teachers, and their

sins; now followes their reproofe, or the punishment for their
sins, that shall certainly befall them. This punishment is set forth,
1. Metonymically, by the cause, in that it is called judgement. 2. By
the effect, in that it is called damnation. 3. By the adjunct of
swiftnesse and speed, which is shewed by the negation of those
things that are opposed unto swiftnesse. Now in generall, lingring or
slownesse is opposed thereunto; in speciall, slumbring, which is put
as a species of idlensse or slacknesse. This swiftnesse of the
punishment that shall befall them, is set forth by the adjunct of time,
that it did not now first of all begin to make hast, but now of a long
time.

The Doctrines arising herehence.

Doctrine 1. The punishment of sinne followes after sinne.

This is gathered from the connexion of these words with the

words foregoing: there was the description of sin; and here presently
followes the threatning of punishment.

Vse. This may serve to admonish us, never to think of sin, but to
adjoyne also the consideration of the punishment, which is joyned
unto sin.

Doctrine 2. This punishment proceeds from the just

judgement of God; for that it is here called judgement.

For God as judge of all the earth, pronounceth sentence upon

men for their sins, and the execution of that sentence is called
punishment. Now he pronounceth sentence according to right and a
most holy law, and therefore the punishment which God inflicteth is
in a proper sense called judgement.
 Vse 1. This may serve to refute, 1. prophane men, which think
that those evils that men suffer, both publick and private, come by
chance. 2. Those that are wont to complaine of the evils which they
suffer, as if God did deale unjustly with them, Genesis 18.25.
Deuteronomy 32.4.

2. To admonish us, continually to walke in the feare of the Lord,

because we live in his sight, that exerciseth judgement.

Doctrine 3. This judgement of God brings damnation upon

sinners, that is, a privation of all good, which pertaines unto the
happinesse or well-being of man, and the sense of all misery; which
makes that very being bitter and unpleasant.

Vse. This may serve to admonish us, with feare to flye away from
sin, and to seek the face of God.

Doctrine 4. This damnation comes swiftly upon sinners.

Reason 1. Because it comes long before their expectation of it.

2. Because it is not deferred beyond the time which is most fit,

and appointed by God, and in that respect it is said not to linger.

3. Because no impediment can hinder it, but it is deferred through

Gods mercy and long-suffering; in that respect it is said not to
slumber, because slumbring and sleepe bindes the mind, and
hinders the actions.

4. Because now of a long time before, way is made and prepared

for this damnation.

5. Because the damnation it selfe, although the wicked

oftentimes are not sensible of it, yet it takes hold of them, and
spiritually worketh in their minds and consciences.

Vse 1. This may serve to condemne those, that give themselves

wholly unto sin, either because they think that punishment commeth
slowly, or else because they hope to escape unpunished,
Ecclesiastes 8.10,11,12.

2. To admonish us, to make haste to repent of our sinnes, not to

linger nor slumber.

Doctrine 5. In all those things which pertaine unto judgement

against sinners, like as in all other things, God doth nothing rashly,
but foreseeth, premeditateth, and prepareth all things.

This is gathered from the adjunct of time, Now of a long time. So

Iude verse 4.

Verse 4. For if God spared not the Angels that sinned, but cast them
downe to hell, and delivered them into chaines of darknesse to
be reserved unto judgement.

The Analysis.

N ow the Apostle proves that which he had before laid downe

concerning the punishment that should befall false teachers.
The conclusion of this arguing is, 1. In generall propounded of all the
wicked, verse 9. For there is the consequent part of that connex
axiom, the antecedent whereof begins verse 4. and is shewed by the
connexion If, as, If God spared not the Angels, &c. Then afterwards
in speciall, of these false teachers themselves and their followers,
verse 10. In the generall conclusion, verse 9. he doth not barely set
downe the condemnation of the wicked, but also by a copulate axiom
joynes together with it, the deliverance of the godly from that
temptation, which ariseth unto them by means of the wicked. And the
reason is, because the Apostles purpose was, so to reprove the
wicked, that he might in the mean time comfort the godly, and
strengthen them against all the temptations, whereunto they were
obnoxious by means of the wicked. In the antecedent part of this
arguing he sets downe three arguments, which are as so many
examples & judgements of God against the wicked; & they may
make three syllogismes to prove one and the same conclusion. The
first example is of the Angels that fell, verse 4. The second is of the
old world, verse 5. The third is of Sodome and Gomorrha. The
syllogismes are knit together, after this manner: If God spared not
the Angels, nor the old world, nor Sodome and Gomorrha; then he
will not spare these false teachers, nor the like wicked men; But the
former is true, by the testimony of Scripture, Therefore, &c. These
examples in respect of the generall conclusion, which is set downe,
verse 9. are as species unto their genus. But in respect of the
speciall conclusion wᶜʰ is set down, verse 10. they are as comparata,
partly alike, partly greater. That wherein they are alike, consists
therein, as God condemned those sinners, so also will he condemn
these. Their inequality therein; if God spared not his most excellent
creatures, the Angels, nor the old world, nor those cities; then much
lesse will he spare these false teachers.

The Doctrines arising herehence.

Doctrine 1. The judgements of God which he hath executed

from the beginning of the world were ordained to be examples for us.

This is evidently gathered from all this arguing of the Apostle, and
it is plainly taught us, verse 6. So 1 Corinthians 10.6. they are called
types, that is, ensamples; which appears also by verse 11. which
sense of the words Beza and others have missed.

Reason. The reason of this truth is Gods unchangeable nature

and constant justice, whereby he is alwayes like himself, not only
inwardly and in himselfe, but also outwardly towards us in the
dispensation of his punishments and rewards, if we look to the
substance of God. Hence is it, that by this argument the godly are
both confirmed in their hope, Isaiah 59.1. & 9.9,10. and assured of
the destruction of all their enemies, and of all those that give
themselves over unto impiety.

Vse 1. This may serve to instruct us, so to read the sacred

History, not as we read profane histories and fables, either for
delight, or to be informed only in the knowledge of the times, or in
things that have bin done; but alwayes to observe Gods warnings
and apply them unto our own use.

2. To admonish us, not to deceive our selves, as if we had a

priviledge to sin above other men, or as if God ♦would not deale so
severely with us, if we should continue in our sins, as he did
heretofore with those whom he destroyed: *Other mens harmes
should teach us to beware of the like sins. In the first example we
have, first, The object of Gods judgement, The Angels that sinned.
Secondly, the manner how he dealt with them, If he spared them not.
Thirdly, the degree of this judgement, present, and to come: present,
that they were adjudged unto damnation; and to come, that they
were to be reserved unto judgement. The sin of the Angels is not
particularly set downe in the Scriptures, because it doth not so much
pertaine to our edification and salvation, to know their sin, as it doth
to know our own sins. But in generall we are taught, that they kept
not their first estate. Iude verse 6. that is, they left that estate
wherein God had placed them, and afterwards exercised envie,
lying, murther towards men. We are taught also that the number of
those that fell was great; thence it is that the Apostle here speaks in
the plurall number. They are said to have been cast down to hell,
1. By reason of the change of their estate, because from that
wonderfull high condition, which they had received by creation, they
were cast downe to the lowest of all. 2. By reason of the change of
their place, because from the place of blisse, where they were round
about the throne of God with the other Angels, they were thrust
downe into a lower place fit for sin and misery: But that this place is
in the lowest parts of the earth, as the Papists would have it, it
cannot be shewed out of the Scriptures, but rather the contrary: for
they are said to be in the aire, and to rule there, and to go about the
earth seeking to devoure men. This at least is plaine out of the
Scripture, and it should suffice such as are not over-curious: 1. That
they suffer a great change of estate. 2. That they are excluded from
their first habitation. 3. That they are in that place, where they
receive pœnam damni & sensus, the punishment of losse, and the
punishment also of sense. They are said to be delivered into
darknesse, partly in respect of sin, partly in respect of misery: for
both are signified by darknesse in the Scriptures. They are said to be
delivered into chains, by a metaphor taken from malefactors that are
condemned, who are kept in prison bound with chains. Now these
chains are, 1. A hardning in their sins. 2. A despaire of all
deliverance. 3. A fearfull looking for that misery whereof mention is
made, Hebrews 10.27. 4. The providence of God which alwayes
watcheth over them, to keep and punish them. They are said to be
reserved unto judgement, because they are bound so fast with these
evils, that they can never escape; and yet these are but the
beginnings of the evils, which they must farther undergo.

♦ “wold” replaced with “would”

Doctrine 2. There is no dignity that can exempt a sinner from

the judgement of God.

This is gathered from the nature of the Angels.

Reason. Because dignity doth not lessen the sin, but aggravate
it. For he that hath received much, owes much, and of him much is
required.

Use. This may serve for admonition, that men should not trust to
such staffes of reed.

Doctrine 3. That severity is due unto sin, that sinners should

not be spared.

This is gathered from these words, He spared not.

Reason 1. Because sinners alwayes abuse the goodnesse of

God.

2. They spare not the glory of God, but themselves.

Vse 1. This may serve to instruct us, to ascribe it unto the grace
and mercy of God, that he hath hitherto spared us.
 2. To exhort us, not to contemne this long-suffering of God, but
thereby to be led unto repentance, Romans 2.4.

Doctrine 4. By sinne a sinner is cast downe from the place

and condition which he had before.

This is gathered from these words; cast down to hell.

Reason. Because sin is an aversion from God. Now as the

communion which we have with God, makes us to ascend into a
high condition, even into Heaven it selfe, so that our conversation is
in heaven, as it is Philippians 3.20. So also aversion from him makes
us to descend, even untill we come unto hell it selfe.

Vse. This may serve to admonish us, not to trust the devill, nor
our own imaginations, as if we could ever attain any good by sinning.
For so our first parents were deceived, when they thought to make
themselves like unto God by sin, they were made like unto the devill.

Doctrine 5. The darknesse of misery followes the darknesse

of sinne.

This gathered from these words; delivered them into chaines of

darknesse.

Reason. Because the light is the same, whereby we are directed,

and whereby we are perfected; therefore the privation of perfection
and happinesse followes the privation of direction.

Use. This may serve to admonish us, alwayes to walk in the light,
as children of the light, if we desire to avoid utter darknesse.

Doctrine 6. Sinners are held in sinne and in their misery, as it

were with bonds.

This is gathered from that: Chaines.

Reason. Because the sins themselves are the snares of the

devill, 2 Timothy 2.last. Lamentations 1.14. There are other reasons
given of this thing in the Analysis.

Vse. This may serve to admonish us, betimes to pray for

deliverance from our sins, which then we shall obtaine, when we do
flye unto Christ, who gives deliverance unto the Captives; Luke 4.18.

Doctrine 7. The extreamest punishment of sinners is deferred

unto the last judgement of God.

Use. This may serve for instruction, that no man should please
himselfe therein, that he suffers afflictions in this world, as if
therefore he should escape free in the world to come, which is the
miserable comfort of some men.

Verse 5. And spared not the old world, but saved Noah, the eighth
person, a Preacher of righteousnesse, bringing in the flood upon
the world of the ungodly.

The Analysis.

T he second and third example of Gods justice towards sinners are

not barely propounded, as the first was, but are illustrated by
different examples, or by examples of Gods mercy, which he shewed
towards the godly, while he destroyed the wicked. The reason is, that
both parts of the conclusion, which is set down, verse 9. might be
fitly inferred; where the deliverance of the godly is joyned together
with the destruction of the wicked. In the former of these examples is
set downe, 1. The object of Gods justice, materially, the old world,
which is more formally explained by the adjunct of impiety, whence it
is called the world of the ungodly. 2. This justice is also illustrated by
the instrument thereof, namely, the bringing in of the flood upon the
world of the ungodly. The object of Gods mercy is made to be Noah
with his family: who are described, 1. By their small number, wherein
his family was contained, which is said to be eight. This Peter
shewes, 1 Epistle chapter 3. verse 20. 2. By the effect, that he was a
Preacher of righteousnesse. For the office or duty is not here
commended, but the act or exercise of this duty. For the duty was
common to him with many more, but the exercise of it was proper
unto himselfe.

The Doctrines arising here-hence.

Doctrine 1. The multitude of those that sinne doth not hinder

Gods justice from executing his judgements upon them for their
sinnes.

This is gathered from this; He spared not the whole world. For as
it was with dignity in the Angels, so it is also with the multitude now
in the world.

Reason 1. Because the multitude doth not lessen, but rather

increase the guilt of sinne, and more fill up the measure thereof, as it
is in the Proverbe, Qui peccat exemplo, bis peccat, he that sins with
example, sins twice: So he that sins with many examples, sins often
times, if the thing be rightly considered. As if a man should see
another fall in a slippery way, and not take the more heed unto
himselfe therein, but fall into the same place and after the same
manner, he is much more taxed by men, then if he had fallen alone,
or first of all: so is it also in these.

2. Because the multitude which seemeth unto us a great thing, as

if it could withstand Gods anger, is before God like unto water, that
fals from a bucket.

Vse. This may serve to admonish us, not to follow a multitude to

do evill. And so much the more necessary is this admonition,
because we are all too prone to go in the way of the multitude; which
fault also we seeme to commit with some reason.

1. Because that we presume that many eyes see more then one,
whence it is that the voice of the people is often taken for the voice
of God.

2. Because the labour of examination seemes too difficult, and

almost impossible.
 3. Because that which all men do, usually goes unpunished
among men, and we conceive the like thing of God.

4. Because he that doth not follow the multitude, shall gaine a

multitude of enemies, and such as hate him.

But the contrary reason, which is of greater value then all those,
is that of Christ, Matthew 7.13. Broad is the way that leadeth to
destruction, and many there be which go in thereat. To the first
reason or objection we answer; that one eye of a man that seeth,
perceives more, then a thousand blind eyes. The world or the
multitude of the world is blinded; therefore one Christian which hath
the eye of his mind inlightned by the Spirit, and followes the light of
Gods word, can see more then a great multitude of others. To the
second we answer, that the duty of examination lies upon all and
every one. And they had need to do it, not only as they are
Christians, and as Christ commands them, to prove all things, and
hold fast that which is good, but also as they are men: for it is not a
humane, but a brutish thing to follow the multitude of those that go
before, without judgement. To the third we answer, that the wayes of
God are not as the wayes of men: Men winck at many, either out of
ignorance, or impotency, or for feare, and the like imperfections
which are not incident to God. To the fourth we answer, If God be
with us, who can be against us?

Doctrine 2. The creatures which are most necessary and

profitable unto us, by sin are made our enemies and hurtfull unto us.

This is gathered from the flood of waters, that destroyed the old
world. Now nothing is more necessary and profitable unto us then
water.

Reason. Because the creatures are the servants and hoast of

God, and therefore they depend upon his will, and pleasure, and
command both for war and peace, Hosea 2.18.

Vse 1. This may serve to admonish us, so much the more to

beware of sin.
 2. To instruct us, if we would have any true comfort from the
creatures, to lay the foundation thereof in our reconciliation with God.

Doctrine 3. God in the midst of judgement towards the

ungodly, is mercifull towards the godly.

This is gathered therehence, that when he destroyed the world,

he saved Noah.

Reason. Because God doth not execute judgement according to

the fiercenesse of his anger or fury, as men oftentimes use to do, but
according to the counsell of his most perfect wisdome.

Use 1. This may serve to instruct us, not to ascribe those things
unto fortune or chance, which happen unto us or others in this kind.

2. To comfort us, because in a world of all dangers and

judgements, we may flye unto the mercy of God.

Doctrine 4. There are wont to be but a few godly men in the

world.

This is gathered therehence, that Noah is called the eighth of the

godly, or rather he may be called the seventh, because Cham was
cursed.

Reason 1. In respect of God, because he gives this grace but

unto a few, that his goodnesse and mercy towards them may
appeare the more abundant.

2. In respect of the second causes, and of the nature of the thing

it selfe, because that which is most difficult, and of the greatest care
and perfection, is not wont to be found but in few. The gifts of nature
are common unto all; of art and industry to fewer, but the gifts of
grace to fewest of all. There are more good Taylors, then good
Physitians, and more good Physitians then good Kings. So that that
hath the greatest perfection, which is given but to a few.
 Vse 1. This may serve to admonish us, to be so much the more
diligent to make our election and calling sure.

2. To exhort us, to give God thanks, that he hath made us

partakers of that happinesse, which he grants but to a few.

Doctrine 5. All the godly, that will be made partakers of Gods

mercy, must be preachers of righteousnesse, as Noah was.

Now righteousnesse is preached not only in words, but also in

deeds. For so it is wont to be said, The thing it selfe speaketh, not
the tongue only, Philippians 2.15,16.

Reason. Because no man can escape the revenging justice of

God, unlesse he labour to follow and advance the righteousnesse
that is prescribed by him.

Vse 1. This may serve to condemne and reprove those, that are
rather Preachers of unrighteousnesse, then of righteousnesse.

2. To exhort us, more and more to stir up our selves to have a

care of this duty.

Verse 6. And turning the Cities of Sodome and Gomorrha into ashes,
condemned them with an overthrow, making them an ensample
unto those that after should live ungodly.

Verse 7. And delivered just Lot, vexed with the filthy conversation of
the wicked:

Verse 8. (For that righteous man dwelling among them, in seeing

and hearing, vexed his righteous soule from day to day, with
their unlawfull deeds.)

The Analysis.