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International
Business and Security
Geostrategy in Perspective
jiye kim
a r pi t r a s wa n t
International Business and Security
“This is an impressive book about international business and security issues for
two reasons: first, it is a comprehensive book, making it relevant for all interna-
tional business scholars, and second, the intersection of international business
and security is very novel and important. As such, this book is a must-read for
scholars and practitioners likewise.”
—Professor Florian Bauer, Sir Roland Smith Chair in Strategic Management,
Lancaster University, United Kingdom
“An excellent and timely read for managers, policymakers, and researchers.”
—Dr Christopher Hoy, The World Bank, United States
“A very insightful and well-rounded take on international business and security

and how it shapes the rising powers in the Asia-Pacific. An essential read for
policymakers, researchers, scholars, and journalists.”
—Wella Andany, CNN, Indonesia
Jiye Kim • Arpit Raswant
International
Business and Security
Geostrategy in Perspective
Jiye Kim Arpit Raswant
Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University Deakin University
Beppu, Japan Melbourne, Australia
ISBN 978-3-031-05632-1 ISBN 978-3-031-05633-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05633-8
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
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illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and trans-
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
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Preface
The world is currently facing the re-configuration of the global supply

chain, intensifying nationalism and protectionism. Globalization and
open market are confronted by significant challenges in the world’s larg-
est economies. This book, International Business and Security-Geostrategy
in Perspective, addresses the international business-security nexus through
the lens of geostrategy. The book examines the implications of interna-
tional business (IB) for international security (IS) and what implications
IS has for IB.
Recently, the IB literature has shown interest in the impact of politics
and national security policies on multinational enterprises (MNEs).
Similarly, the IS literature needs research on the impact of international
business activities of MNEs and the interactions between MNEs, host,
and home countries on national security policies. The book adopts the
perspective of geostrategy that provides variables to analyze the behavior
of national and non-national players in IB and IS. The book argues that
the concept of geostrategy is useful in explaining the cross-level interac-
tion among IB and IS players. Most importantly, the book applies a com-
mon concept—geostrategy—to analyze the mutual implications of
IB and IS.
There has been a growing momentum to employ an interdisciplinary
approach in facilitating critical thinking among our students in the rap-
idly evolving international business and management environment. The
v
vi Preface
IS scholarship is a study of threats and expanded by the securitization

model, and the IB domain examines the phenomenon of globalization
and multinational corporations. Both disciplines evaluate the problems
in the individual, national, and global realms. Notably, both fields navi-
gate the ever-so-challenging geostrategic issues in the Indo-Pacific region,
which is home to a significant portion of current economic activity and
future economic growth.
We expect that this book will be demanded among scholarly commu-
nities of international business and management, international relations,
international security, and international political economy research
domains. Further, this book is likely to be a useful resource for advanced
coursework (in Honor, MSc, MPhil, and PhD degrees). Selected chapters
from this book are likely to be used in more extensive undergraduate and
postgraduate courses covering international business and security issues.
We dedicate this book to everyone working towards achieving peace in
the world.
Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Beppu, Japan Jiye Kim

Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia Arpit Raswant
Acknowledgments
This book project was made possible with the continuing support of edi-
torial and professional services staff at Palgrave Macmillan and Springer
Nature. It is imperative to acknowledge the importance of all the support
received from loved ones and well-wishers, especially during the pan-
demic period. The authors are eternally grateful to everyone who sup-
ported their writing journey of this book.
vii
Contents
1 International
Business and Security Perspective 1
1.1 Finding the Intersection 3
1.2 Structure of the Book 8
References 11
2 Emerging
Economies and Powers 15
2.1 Mapping the Stories: China and India 16
2.2 Geostrategy in Focus 23
2.3 National-Subnational Interactions 28
References 30
3 International
Business and Security Nexus in China 35
3.1 Geostrategy: The Overview 36
3.2 IB-IS Nexus with Chinese Characteristics 59
3.3 Belt and Road Initiative and Its Performers 75
References105
ix
x Contents
4 International
Business and Security Nexus in India117
4.1 Geostrategy: The Overview 118
4.2 Evolving Foreign Policies 125
4.3 IB-IS Nexus and the Global Security Order: The Quad
Story139
References154
5 International
Business and Security: Present and Future161
References171
I ndex173
About the Authors
Jiye Kim is an award-winning Assistant Professor at Ritsumeikan Asia

Pacific University in Japan and a researcher affiliated with the University
of Sydney in Australia
Arpit Raswant is an award-winning Assistant Professor at Deakin
University in Australia and a Visiting Researcher at Lancaster University
in the United Kingdom
xi
Abbreviations
AAGC Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

ADMM ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
ADMM Plus ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AOIP ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
China-CEEC China and Central and Eastern European Countries
Cooperation
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia
CPC Communist Party of China
CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
EAS East Asia Summit
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
FIPIC Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation
FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacific
IB International Business
xiii
xiv Abbreviations
IBS International Business and Security

IONS Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
IORA Indian Ocean Rim Association
IPOI Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative
IS International Security
JETRO Japan External Trade Organization
MNE Multinational Enterprise
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission
NGO Non-governmental Organization
ODA Overseas Development Assistance
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAGAR Security and Growth for All in the Region
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SCS South China Sea
SDG Sustainable Development Goals
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
WTO World Trade Organization
1
International Business and Security
Perspective
Abstract The introductory chapter provides an overview of the book and

introduces the concept of geostrategy to the reader in relation to our
research context. The discipline of international business (IB) studies the
dynamics in the global business environment and opportunities.
Meanwhile, the international security (IS) discipline examines the causes
of threats, conflicts, and wars. This monograph chooses geostrategy as a
concept to look for the interactions among the players of international
business and international security.
Keywords International business • International security • Geostrategy

• China • India • Multilevel analysis
The interests in international business (IB) discipline from scholars in

other disciplines are growing as globalization becomes a routine feature
in our everyday lives (Caves, 2007). Coinciding with IB, the interna-
tional security (IS) studies is becoming prominent in multiple research
domains as unfolding IS-linked developments such as rising geopolitical
uncertainty, changing the global balance of power, the influence of
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

J. Kim, A. Raswant, International Business and Security,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05633-8_1
2 J. Kim and A. Raswant
nationalism on foreign and security policies, urgent issues concerning

climate change, and pandemics have severely impacted business as usual
(Alvarez & Rangan, 2019; Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Doern et al., 2019).
What do the IB inquiries imply to the IS issues? What are the implica-
tions of IS issues to the IB phenomenon? This book examines the inter-
national business-security nexus through the lens of geostrategy and
discusses how an interdisciplinary study contributes to the research puz-
zle raised in each discipline and the usefulness of a geostrategic lens with
model examples of cross-level interactions among players in IB and IS.
The momentum in public debate and policy focus on urgent issues
such as climate change and exogenous shocks such as the COVID-19
pandemic has increased the scholarly attention from IB and IS disciplines
to comprehensively understand the impact of such developments on
business and our society. For instance, in the IB literature, exogenous
shocks are recognized as an underlying attribute of the global economy,
which concerns firms, in general, and particularly impacts multinational
firms (MNFs). However, exogenous shocks remain underexplored in the
IB research domain as most studies focus on business continuity and
statistically rule out extreme events (Andriani & McKelvey, 2007). In the
spirit of contributing to scholarly efforts in bringing a framework to
timely and adequately consider emergent critical issues such as conflicts
(Oh & Oetzel, 2017), disasters (Oh & Oetzel, 2011), and public health
crises (Ahen, 2019), the international business and security (IBS) nexus
requires close examination, and the lens of geostrategy helps these studies
to be integrated. Further, the organization level is considered using the
institution-based view to account for the influence of the institutional
environment (Peng et al., 2009), because the differences in institutional
characteristics between regions would significantly impact organizational
structure and behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Kostova, 1999;
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), including firms’ internationalization strategies
(Ahmadjian, 2016; Peng, 2003; Xu & Shenkar, 2002), thus contributing
to the limited literature on the IBS perspective.
1 International Business and Security Perspective 3
1.1 Finding the Intersection

In a time of rapid transformation, understanding the triggers of change
and enhancing strategic responses are essential for organizations and
institutions. It is envisaged that using the IBS perspective could provide
a much-needed comprehensive approach to appreciating and compre-
hending the challenges endured by business and society. The IS studies
focus on the sources of traditional and non-traditional security threats
and their consequences and have expanded the scope of security through
the securitization model. The IB domain examines the phenomenon of
globalization and multinational corporations. The IB scholarly commu-
nity continues to advance institutional perspectives in explaining deci-
sions taken by profit-making organizations. In doing so, IB and
management researchers have accounted mainly for advanced market
firms (AMFs) originating from home countries with robust institutions.
Both disciplines evaluate the problems in the individual, national,
regional, and global realms. Notably, both fields navigate the ever-so-
challenging geostrategic issues in the Indo-Pacific region, which is home
to a significant portion of current economic activity and future eco-
nomic growth.
The significance of security and political issues has become a popular
topic in IB literature. Global shocks such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks
have provoked the need for research on a systematic theory on the
security-business nexus (Suder, 2004). The recognition that the IB can-
not exist independently from the global power politics led by the super-
power and the security issues associated with this superpower has also
been set in the IB scholarship. Without exception, business schools and
corporations were called into studying international security, global secu-
rity threats, and geopolitics. More recently, Buckley et al. (2017, 1045)
argue that “IB can play a more constructive and vital role by tackling
expansive topics at the business–societal interface.” Chase-Dunn et al.
(2000), Jones (2007), O’Rourke and Williamson (2014), and Witt
(2019) from the IB discipline agree that politics plays a critical role for
firms and individuals to benefit from technology, transportation, and
communication. Witt (2019, 1054) argues that “the centrality of politics
stems from its role as a key driver of (de-)globalization” and suggests

implications for the IB research. Recently, the IB literature has also shown
interest in the impact of politics and national security policies on multi-
national enterprises (MNEs). In conjunction with stakes in security and
political issues, IB researchers have considered the influence of state con-
trol on firms and their strategic considerations and financial performance
(Aguilera et al., 2021; Wright et al., 2021)
IB studies recently further demonstrate interest in the impact of IS and
global political issues on IB and extended their scope into studying and
applying international political theories to IB research problems. There is
a research trend of explaining the IB phenomenon using IS-related para-
digms such as realism and liberalism. It is pointed out in the IB literature
that major paradigms in international politics, political realism and liber-
alism focus on the nation-state as the primary level of analysis, while
staying away from the influence of international business players, that is,
business sectors, market, and MNEs, on world politics (Luo, 2022).
Meyer and Li use major international relations theory, realism, liberal-
ism, and constructivism, to explain the disruptions in the global econ-
omy (Meyer & Li, 2022). They focus on disruptions such as
anti-globalization populism, divergent national regulatory institutions,
and reduced people mobility and argue that the international relations
paradigms are useful in predicting the disruptions and the capability of
MNEs to influence them in the political process. The realism paradigm
of international relations, for example, views that travel barriers causing
reduced people’s mobility during the global pandemic are driven by polit-
ical power rather than by public health considerations. On the contrary,
the liberalism paradigm explains that travel barriers are instituted by
global health concerns, and multilateral cooperation would minimize the
impact on business. Constructivism, meanwhile, focuses on the role of
perceptions and ideas of risks that drive travel barriers. The disruptions
affect the strategies of multinational enterprises and the role of their for-
eign subsidiaries, and the international relations theories offer views on
the subsidiary scope. It is suggested by Meyer and Li (2022) that MNEs
and their subsidiaries are integral actors in the international relations dis-
cipline. To explain how techno-nationalism constrains IB, Luo (2022)
employs the realism theory of international politics. Techno-nationalism
brings risks to international business and MNEs by portraying the world

as a zero-sum competition and marginalizing technological interconnec-
tivity, resource complementarity, and the global technology supply chain
(Luo, 2022). Luo views the risks coming from today’s techno-nationalism
that denounces globalization and advocates imposing restrictions against
technology inflows from and outflows to other countries, which is differ-
ent from traditional techno-nationalism that espoused globalization as a
means to improve local economies.
A factor that has emerged as a challenge to the status quo in interna-
tional security order over the past decade is the rise of China. Since China
became the second-largest economy in the world in 2010 by superseding
Japan which maintained the second-largest economy status over the past
decades, China’s rise has been the subject of theoretical and empirical
debate in both IB and IS scholarships. From the realist perspective in IS,
John Mearsheimer (2001, 401–402) posits that “a wealthy China would
not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve
regional hegemony.” On the contrary, questioning what changes the rise
of China has brought to international company strategies, Grosse et al.
(2021) suggest that the rise of China did not cause the decline of global-
ization; in other words, it did not fundamentally alter the existing global
economic order. China’s rising has been affecting the global distribution
of economic and military power and appears to collide with the current
US status as a superpower. However, China claims that it has maintained
its interests in advocating the open economic order and globalization,
and it agrees to the principle of sharing global public goods as a leading
power that encourages other countries in the world to open their econo-
mies as well. This particular view implies that international company
strategies should prioritize managing risk related to policy changes due to
China’s rise rather than achieving the least-cost global supply chains
(Grosse et al., 2021).
Research on the impact of international business activities of MNEs
and the interactions between MNEs, host, and home countries on
national security policies is in demand within the IS literature. Discussions
on economy-driven power politics and geo-economics are some exam-
ples. In history, geo-economics and geopolitics constitute the dimensions
of national grand strategies of great powers (Baracuhy, 2019).
Geo-economics is the term that describes the power politics and rivalry
among countries driven by economic rather than military capability
(Luttwak, 1990). Geo-economics in international security has gained
increasing significance. State-centric analysis of geo-economics, particu-
larly, broadens our understanding of how institutionalized and organized
political powers use a tool of economic means to achieve their political
goals. Theories on economic statecraft result in policy implications of
how effectively political leaders employ economic tools. From a geo-
economics perspective, Scholvin and Wigell (2019) argue that power and
security are coupled to commanding and manipulating economic ties,
and the economic connectivity binds countries together. Thus, in addi-
tion to military means, economic statecraft with various means such as
sanctions, investment, and trade shapes the new dimension of power
politics. While the role of the economy has increasingly been more stud-
ied in IS literature, the state-centric analysis and implications focusing on
national foreign policy tend to dominate the field, particularly in tradi-
tional security studies. The phenomenon of interstate war also continues
to be the focus of security studies.
Where do IB and IS scholarships intersect? IB research’s primary topics
are firm internationalization and the interactions between MNEs, host,
and home countries. The IB discussion has implications for the diversifi-
cation of IS research’s referent object and expansion of the scope of secu-
rity. IS scholars are interested in three common questions: whose security
(the referent object), security from what (the scope of security), and how
to secure (the approach to security) (Wallis & Carr, 2016). For example,
if the referent object is a country, that is, national level, the scope of secu-
rity is a threat originating from outside the country. The approach to
security results at the national level as well, for instance, increasing
national defense expenditures, adopting foreign and security policies, and
reinforcing interstate diplomacy. The referent objects of the IS literature
further include non-state actors, such as international organizations,
interstate organizations, subnational interest groups, ethnic groups, and
individuals. The scope of security has been extended through the concept
of securitization to economic security, environmental security, and
human security by Buzan et al. (1998), that is, the Copenhagen School
(McSweeney, 1996). The Copenhagen School of security studies is
defined as “an approach broadly consistent with constructivist thought
that tries to bridge traditional and critical security studies by understand-

ing security as a ‘speech act,’” and securitization refers to the “process by
which issues become part of the security agenda” (Nyman, 2018, 101).
These scopes of security were marginalized in traditional security studies,
nevertheless, are gaining significance as non-traditional security threats
are intensifying and national governments proactively prioritize them.
The IS discussion on the balance of power (Waltz, 1979), the balance
of threat (Walt, 1987), and the balance of interest (Schweller, 1994) adds
value to the IB literature. The IS scholars analyze threats caused by the
imbalance of power, threat, or interest, and the resulting international
security issues, giving direct implications to IB scholars’ research on risks
of firm internationalization. The non-business interruptions and oppor-
tunities of MNEs’ interactions with home and host countries are related
to the common IS questions—“security from what” and “how to secure.”
The IB literature’s interest in political risks grows in the era of uncertainty,
and non-traditional referent objects and scopes of security are rapidly
expanding beyond the traditional security paradigm in the IS literature.
Building on both disciplines’ trends, the book suggests that the interna-
tional business and security nexus is an urgent interdisciplinary inquiry.
Subnational and transnational forces have been influential in shaping
emerging powers like China and India for many years (Duara & Perry,
2018). Municipal governments, international organizations, and local
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have had a critical role in
building a national government’s policy and strategy making. While the
referent objects of the IS studies have enlarged the boundary beyond
national borders, the major IB actors and the role of firms-based initia-
tives are not critical considerations of IS scholars as yet (Luo, 2022). IB
literature provides critical actors, including internationalizing firms, that
have been largely treated peripheral in the study of IS. However, multina-
tional non-state actors, including international firms and entrepreneurs,
are an inseparable part of public diplomacy in addition to traditional
state-to-state relations.
The need for multilevel analysis has come with the increasing complex-
ity of problems that often cross boundaries of related authorities that
coordinate political decisions at different levels (Benz et al., 2021).
Furthermore, diversified challenges, including new kinds of violent con-
flicts, climate change, migration, and pandemics, require multilevel
governance, while multilevel governance does coexist with the security

order in which the major powers, such as the US, China, and Russia, still
aim at shaping hierarchical order within the international system (Lake,
2013). One of the areas where the influence of non-state actors is treated
seriously in traditional, particularly military-related, international secu-
rity research is the study of the gray zone. In terms of multilevel study,
gray zone research stands out in security studies and strategic studies. The
gray zone concept has been applied predominantly in the study of mili-
tary strategy. Scholars define the gray zone concept in various ways. It
refers to the spectrum of competition to be played out primarily below
the threshold of a major war (Morris et al., 2019). According to Morris
et al., the term gray zone is associated with gray zone aggression, coer-
cion, and challenge from two particular countries—China and Russia.
They conclude with a policy implication that Chinese and Russian gray
zone coercion opens the space for the US to rally with its allies and part-
ners to address such threats.
An article published in Special Warfare, the official quarterly magazine
of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
(SWCS), defines gray zone security challenges as “competitive interac-
tions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the
traditional war and peace duality” (Kapusta, 2015, 20). Therefore, gray
zone challenges are particularly vague in terms of the nature of the con-
flict (why the conflict occurred), the parties involved (who are fighting in
the conflict), and, lastly, the legality question that frames the conflict—
whether the conflict-related actions are legal or illegal. This type of chal-
lenge differs from interstate conflicts in which national defense forces
fight one another in traditional battlefields to seize superiority.
1.2 Structure of the Book

IB and IS scholarships have been actively interacting with each other’s
agendas, and the multilevel analysis in each scholarship has widened the
intersection between them. There has been a growing momentum to
employ an interdisciplinary approach in facilitating critical thinking
among scholars in the rapidly evolving international business and
security environment. Building upon this development, the following

chapters examine in detail the issues in studying the nexus between IB
and IS in this book.
Chapter 2 discusses the significance of studying emerging powers,
China and India, and the conceptual scope, geostrategy, of this book. As
the most populous countries in the past, at present, and expected to be in
the future, and owing to the economic and military rise of China and
India, there are various predictions about the changes in their roles in IS
and IB and their impact on international order. As China and India have
large territories and populations, there are many cultural, linguistic, and
economic differences within each country. When the two countries are
compared as a whole, there are also many differences in geographical,
political, and diplomatic aspects. However, the foreign and security poli-
cies adopted by China and India have a similar purpose, that is, expand-
ing their geopolitical influence, for which the IB-IS nexus framework has
implications. The concepts of geography, geostrategy, and application of
these concepts in the relevant theory will be examined in this chapter in
the context of emerging powers and the IB-IS nexus.
Chapter 3 reviews existing literature, including academic sources avail-
able in English and published in Chinese journals listed in the Chinese
Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI). We selectively choose journals
using the CSSCI list depending on their scopes and higher impact fac-
tors. China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) provides full
texts of academic sources and information on the impact factors of each
academic journal. Using CSSCI and CNKI is helpful for the following
reasons; however, there are also caveats. First, the data provided by CSSCI
and CNKI is helpful to access dominant narratives in Chinese scholar-
ship. The mainstream Chinese academic platform provides international
scholars access to the prevailing consensus in China on the book’s topics.
Second, international researchers would learn about the ongoing debates
among Chinese scholars using the local academic database. Debates are
not organized in an evident and distinguishable manner in academic
publications; however, we try to read how each scholar approaches the
same phenomenon with a different focus. For instance, a journal with a
higher impact factor would be regarded by the domestic audience in
China, including academics, practitioners, and relevant stakeholders, as
an impactful source. The discussion taking place in these journals pro-

vides information on the issues being considered for policymaking in
China. To understand dominant narratives and ongoing discussions in
China, researchers need to maintain a critical approach, particularly on
studies related to government policy, to overcome caveats rising from the
mainstream academia in China. Chapter 3 focuses on reviewing existing
studies that show the narratives within China, which are not accessible to
international and non-Chinese researchers, and collecting data that dem-
onstrates the usefulness of the integrated perspective of international
business and international security. Taking the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) as an example, there have been research outcomes showing that the
Chinese government’s expectations of Chinese business entities and the
business entity’s expectations of the government increased at the same
time as both of them were involved in the BRI as critical players. By inte-
grating the international security approach and international business
approach to analyze the BRI, the book attempts to illustrate the phenom-
enon that the existing international security approach does not compre-
hend and discover the problems that the international business approach
does not locate from the operation of the BRI. This chapter critically
approaches sources and data used to support the Chinese government
policies or business activities.
Chapter 4 looks into the question of how the IB-IS nexus works in
another emerging power, India. This chapter elaborates on the geographic
environment of India and the interactions between IB and IS players
under the national foreign and security policy directions since its eco-
nomic liberalization in the 1990s, including Neighborhood Diplomacy,
Look East policy, Act East policy, and Connect Central Asia. The interac-
tion between the regional and international organizations and subna-
tional actors is explained through the lens of geostrategy. This chapter
provides an in-depth study of the unfolding story of the quadrilateral
security cooperation, that is, the Quad, among the US, Japan, Australia,
and India, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy led by the US in close relations
to the Quad cooperation. The chapter explains the background of India’s
endorsement of the security order led by the US in 2007 by joining the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) and India’s official acceptance of
the US-led Indo-Pacific concept in 2017 from a geostrategic lens. The
chapter focuses on how India’s security and business agendas are inter-
twined with India’s strategic engagement in the Quad and the US-led
Indo-Pacific Strategy and how India harmonized its national projects
with the dynamics in the regional and global balance of power. This chap-
ter studies how India implements India’s Indo-Pacific vision, and it argues
that India’s Indo-Pacific vision is an example of a cross-level nexus of IB
and IS that is in line with India’s Look East policy (later developed into
Act East policy).
Lastly, Chap. 5 concludes that there is an institutional difference
between China and India in the IB-IS interactions. This chapter sum-
marizes evidence found in the empirical analysis of the national policies
and the roles of multilevel actors, including subnational and transna-
tional players, and suggests geostrategic implications. This chapter sug-
gests that players in IB and IS could produce the best performance as
responsible actors when the national foreign and security policies address
dynamics in the IS environment and promote creative IB activities.
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2
Emerging Economies and Powers
Abstract As the most populous countries in the past, at present, and

expected to be in the future, and owing to the economic and military rise,
there are various predictions about the changes in the roles of China and
India in international business and global security order. This chapter
examines the significance of studying emerging powers, China and India,
using the lens of geostrategy. As China and India have large territories
and populations, each country has many cultural, linguistic, and eco-
nomic differences within the country. However, the foreign and security
policies adopted by China and India have similar geostrategic goals as
indicated in their pursuit of national projects and policy, that is, the Belt
and Road Initiative and the Act East policy. This chapter discusses the
concept of geostrategy and its attributes of multilevel and cross-level
interactions in the context of emerging powers and the international
business and security nexus.
Keywords Emerging economies • Emerging powers • Geostrategy •

China • India • Indo-Pacific
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 15

J. Kim, A. Raswant, International Business and Security,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05633-8_2
2.1 Mapping the Stories: China and India

China and India are the two most populous countries in the world.
China’s population has reached 1.41 billion and India’s population is
1.38 billion in 2020. The two countries’ populations combined amount
to 35% of the world population in the same year. The US, Indonesia, and
Pakistan follow after China and India as the top five populous countries
(World Bank, 2022). According to World Population Prospects 2019 pub-
lished by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations, India is expected to surpass China as the most populous country
around 2027 (United Nations, 2019). The UN report predicts that India
could remain the most populous country through the end of the century,
followed by China, Nigeria, the US, and Pakistan. A similar prediction
made by a report prepared for the US Office of the Secretary of Defense
forecasted that India’s population will surpass China’s from 2025 onward.
China’s population would reach its maximum in 2032, while India’s
would continue increasing through 2050 (Wolf et al., 2011).
Predictions that China and India would continue to be ranked num-
ber one and second places in terms of population imply the continued
influence the two countries would have on the global economy and secu-
rity order. A decade ago, a research publication prepared for the US
Office of the Secretary of Defense delved into the question of which
country, China or India, will be ahead in 2025 in demography, macro-
economics, science and technology, and defense (Wolf et al., 2011). The
report estimated that India has advantages in democracy and the rule of
law, IT and service skills, institutional stability, and property rights, while
China would be more advantageous in productivity growth, foreign
investments, and infrastructure. They conclude that demographic changes
would be relatively more favorable to India than to China, while their
assessment of macroeconomics in terms of respective GDPs, science and
technology, and defense procurement is more favorable to China.
China and India are the second- and sixth-largest economies in the
world in terms of GDP (current US$), respectively, in 2020 (World
Bank, 2022). Since China’s Reform and Opening-Up policy began in
1978 and India liberalized its economy in 1991, their economies have
2 Emerging Economies and Powers 17
been deeply interwoven into the persistent forces of economic globaliza-

tion (Sharma, 2009). Wang (2011) from Peking University shares this
view about China and posits that the economic achievement of China’s
reform and opening up created a “competitive market economy with
Chinese characteristics.” China encompasses contrasting orientations,
that is, repressive and top-down Communist governance apparatus and a
market-oriented economy (Cohen, 2015). The liberalization of the
Indian economy unleashed competitive markets and generated benefits
of promoting pro-business policy that continue today (Press Information
Bureau, 2020).
Their economic status is linked to their military capabilities. China
and India were the second- and third-largest powers in terms of military
spending as of 2020. India was the second-largest arms importer in
2016–2020, while China was the fifth (SIPRI, 2021a, 2021b). The two
military powers process nuclear weapons and were involved in a war
against each other over their disputed borders in 1962, where the dis-
putes have continued since then. The increasing significance of China’s
and India’s roles and capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond,
as well as how or whether the two powers continue to grow, has been
discussed by scholars in international relations and security studies from
various viewpoints ranging from political stability and economic growth
to foreign and security policies (Gaskarth, 2015; Ninan, 2017;
Shambaugh, 2016; Yan, 2019). It should also be taken into account that
India’s military modernization is still in progress and in some areas
remains slow, for example, equipment projects delays and cost overruns,
especially in the indigenous systems (International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 2021).
Studies on China and India discuss the growth potential and sustain-
ability of their rising trend from various perspectives. China and India are
examined in parallel to meet growing interests and concerns about the
countries in various realms such as regional leadership and science and
technology development (Acharya, 2017; Kennedy, 2015, 2017, 2018).
A study analyzing China and India in terms of technological innovation
divides the existing literature into three groups: first, a group of research
impressed with the accomplishments of China and India; second, less
impressed with these countries’ track records; and third, studies equivocal
about the two countries’ technological innovation trajectories (Kennedy,

2015). Kennedy reviews the interdisciplinary debate that discusses
whether China and India are emerging technological powerhouses and
examines the studies belonging to each group in detail. He concludes that
“the lack of critical thinking about the relationship between innovation
and power in the twenty-first century” is commonly found in existing
studies. Scholars interested in technological innovation in China and
India deal with the players in each country that lead technological inno-
vation, and the power relationship formed in international relations is a
secondary matter to them. Conversely, scholars interested in national
power and policymaking think that progressive technological innovation
is an important contributor to a stronger country, but their interest in
technological innovation itself is not substantial. As a result, it is difficult
to locate a comprehensive study on how the innovative capacities of
China and India change the global balance of power.
The principal differences between China and India suggest that a com-
parative study of China and India could be very interesting. There are
three major differences. First, China and India have different characteris-
tics in terms of the geopolitical environment that significantly affect
resources in national economic and security policymaking in each coun-
try. The emergence of China as a rising geopolitical center is attributed to
both the weakening of the US and Russian influence and geography
within China itself. Cohen (2015) defines the “continental-maritime
split personality” of China as referring to the open system in the maritime
realm and inward-facing continental realm. This is reflected in the differ-
ences between the highly industrialized and high-income eastern coastal
regions and the western regions with relatively low industrial and income
levels. As per the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2021), in the
fourth quarter of 2021, four out of the top five prosperous regions in
terms of Gross Regional Product were Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong,
and Zhejiang Provinces. These provinces are all located on the east coast.
Meanwhile, among the five least prosperous regions, four provinces are
located in west-central China. These provinces are the Tibet Autonomous
Region, Qinghai Province, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, and Gansu
Province. In the case of China, through national projects such as the Belt
and Road Initiative, it has been trying to enhance connectivity and
mutual growth between less-developed western provinces and neighbor-

ing Central Asian countries. There are similarities between China and
India in this point of view, because in the case of India as well, under the
Act East policy promoted by the Modi government, India has pursued
developing the low-growth northeast states of India and improving con-
nectivity between these Indian states and neighboring Southeast Asian
countries. Nevertheless, the geopolitical conditions created in the history
of India are very different from those of China. Robert Kaplan (2012)
views that “the Greater Indian Subcontinent features among the least
stable geopolitics in the world,” and in South Asia, the bipolar conflict
between India and Pakistan influences the precariousness of the region
along with Afghanistan and the disputed Kashmir as battlegrounds.
“India desperately wants to escape from this geography” (Kaplan, 2012),
and as new conditions such as threats from China rising have arisen,
India is at present actively advancing into the Indian Ocean and pursuing
cooperation in the security and business domains with major maritime
powers including the US, Japan, and Australia.
The second point worth noting as a major difference between China
and India is the political systems and policymaking processes of China
and India are distinctly different. China’s national legitimacy and mili-
tary leadership are concentrated in the Communist Party of China
(CPC). The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China writes that
“the victory in China’s New-Democratic Revolution and the successes in
its socialist cause have been achieved […] under the leadership of the
Communist Party of China” and “under the leadership of the Communist
Party of China […] the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue
to adhere to the people’s democratic dictatorship” (National People’s
Congress, 2004). The Constitution of the Communist Party of China
elaborates on the relationship between the Party and national defense
forces as follows: “The Communist Party of China shall uphold its abso-
lute leadership over the People’s Liberation Army and other people’s
armed forces; implement Xi Jinping’s thinking on strengthening the mili-
tary [...] build people’s forces that obey the Party’s command” (Communist
Party of China, 2017). The difference between the political systems of
India and China is often explained as the world’s largest parliamentary
democracy and a one-party dictatorship (Bertolucci, 2018), and a
parliamentary democracy and a communist party-state (Duara &

Perry, 2018).
The disciplines of international business and international security
define the global status of two countries in common as an emerging
power (Acharya, 2014; Chacko, 2012; Pandey et al., 2021). However,
the last point as the difference between the two countries is how these
two countries respond to the existing regional and global orders as their
emerging paths are different. For example, China and India demonstrate
different approaches to the development of international law such as the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is a legal regime
that defines rules about the oceans and their resources. Particularly, in
terms of a third-party arbitration initiated for disputes in which China
and India are involved as state actors, India has showcased a more positive
attitude than China toward the role of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea. China denied participating in the arbitration and rejected
the tribunal’s jurisdiction, while India agreed that the Tribunal had juris-
diction over the relevant disputes and participated in the arbitration
(Kim & Druckman, 2020; Kim & Raswant, 2022). India’s favorable
stance is reflected in its Constitution, which states, “The State shall
endeavor to ... encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitra-
tion” and “foster respect for international law and treaty obligations”
(The Constitution of India, 1950). On the contrary, China’s constitution
does not have a particular clause about dispute settlement, which “makes
it easier for China to decide which methodology to use in the application
of a particular treaty” (Cai, 2016, 288). The comparative approach raises
questions about how China and India are adapting to the currently dom-
inant rules and norms in other domains in the international community.
2.1.1 When the Two Giants Meet
From the international security point of view, China and India are
involved in potential regional flashpoints as direct contestants that poten-
tially cause ripple effects in the region. Territorial disputes between coun-
tries are a traditional realm of security. China has experienced disputes
with its neighbors on land and sea, and India has done so with its
neighbors. There are unresolved territorial disputes between China and

India over the past few decades. The border disputes between China and
India caused a war between the two countries in 1962, and the skirmishes
and diplomatic negotiations at the China-India border have been repeated
over the past year (Kim, 2018). In 2017, two countries clashed at the
India-Bhutan-China tri-junction, referred to as the Doklam crisis, and in
2020, two countries engaged in a series of military standoffs at the
Pangong Lake and Galwan Valley near their border.
Territorial disputes that exist in the form of geographical flashpoints
are interactively influenced by each country’s nationalist tendencies and
the formation of public opinion and domestic politics. Although territo-
rial disputes are a traditional domain of security and a consequence of
geopolitical competition, and national governments are the principal
actors, the process and outcome of the aggravation and settlement of the
conflict affect varied domestic actors within the country concerned.
Territorial disputes, at present, are dynamic in nature, affecting public
diplomacy, international business, and interactions between ordinary
citizens’ day-to-day business in the countries concerned. At the time of
the Galwan Valley skirmish in 2020, when Indian media reported photos
of hand-to-hand combat between Indian and Chinese forces, public
anger raged and Chinese businesses in India were directly affected by the
anti-China protests and sentiment. The Indian government banned
Chinese-made mobile applications, including TikTok (Pathak, 2021).
Anti-India sentiment in China was well expected too. Since the standoff
began at Pangong Lake in May 2020, Global Times, an English newspa-
per of China’s largest newspaper People’s Daily, targeted the Indian audi-
ences and further criticized the Modi government’s economic policies
(Ranade, 2022).
In the case of South China Sea (SCS) disputes, which are maritime
disputes among China and Southeast Asian countries, China has been
one of the claimants for decades. Historical, economic, political, and
legal research on the origin and development of this conflict has widely
attracted scholars’ and policymakers’ attention (Hayton, 2014; Kim,
2017; Lim & Kim, 2020). The ripple effect of the SCS disputes on the
regional and global security order is strong, and those who are not direct
claimants of the disputes also proactively demonstrate their positions and
engage in the disputes by cooperating with claimant Southeast Asian

countries. As the disputed waters of the SCS are geographically China’s
backyard, the existing status-quo powers, which seek to prevent China
from advancing into the sea, and China, the country approaching the
SCS as a matter of legitimacy of its history, are bound to clash. As for
India, it strives for a dominant military and economic presence in the
Indian Ocean and an active leadership role. India is expanding its diplo-
matic and economic footprints in the Indian Ocean. In particular, the
Defence Ministry Annual Report, published annually by the Ministry of
Defence, repeatedly claims over the past years that the Indian Navy has
been playing a “maritime leadership role” in the Indian Ocean Region.
Among neighboring countries of China and India, Myanmar and
Pakistan are major variables in the geostrategy of both China and India
in competing for the leading position in the region where Southeast Asia
and South Asia meet. Myanmar is bordered by the Yunnan province of
China to the east, the northeastern states of India to the west, and Tibet
on the northernmost border. For China, Myanmar is a country in a geo-
strategically important position to advance into South Asia, and for
India, it is located in a critical position to access Southeast Asia. Myanmar’s
geostrategic importance as a neighbor to China and India is evidenced by
the connectivity projects and expanded business opportunities that these
two major powers have been creating with Myanmar as a partner country.
China is Myanmar’s biggest foreign investor, and Myanmar was one of
the first countries that joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
initiated by China. Following the establishment of the Belt and Road
guiding committee in Myanmar in 2018, the China-Myanmar Economic
Corridor construction has also entered, which connects China’s Yunnan
province to the north and Myanmar’s Mandalay and Yangon to the south
(Jiang, 2020). India is also improving connectivity with Myanmar
through the India-Myanmar Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport
Project and India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (Indian Mission
to ASEAN, 2022; Karmakar, 2021). India and Myanmar are also mem-
bers of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), an interregional group between
Southeast Asia and South Asia. In China’s mental map of BRI at present,
Myanmar and Pakistan are the anchors located at the east and west of the
Maritime Silk Road (Men, 2019). During the Cold War, China reacted
to threats posed by the Sino-Soviet split and the Soviet-Indian ties by
aligning with Pakistan which required settling the border issue with
Pakistan. Pakistan ceded to China the northern Azad Kashmir territory,
which was also claimed by India, and China became the major arms sup-
plier to Pakistan over the next two decades. The Karakoram Highway,
“the sole paved section of the historic Silk Route from the Mediterranean
to China” (Cohen, 2015, 354), was completed in 1978 after almost
20 years of construction. The Highway connects Kashgar (a city in the
Xinjiang Province of China) and Islamabad (the capital city of Pakistan).
2.2 Geostrategy in Focus

John F. Kennedy (1961) once stated, “Geography has made us neighbors.
... Economics has made us partners. And necessity has made us allies.”
From classical to contemporary geopolitics, theorists discussed the geo-
graphic reality and the centroid of the economy and power. Classical
geopolitics refers to the study of the “impacts of certain geographic fea-
tures, such as states’ and regions’ positions and locations, resources,
topography, distance, and the like, on states’ foreign policies and actions”
(Kelly, 2016, 70). Kelly suggests a list of assumptions that fit the tradi-
tional geopolitical definition. These assumptions describe the direct link-
ages between the geographic environment and society. For example, the
“immediate environment of a country conditions its decision-makers,”
the “relative location of a state within a region impacts upon its behavior
and policy,” and “most geopolitically based themes will persist over some
time regardless of contemporary issues” (Kelly, 2016, 72–76).
Geography refers to the physical reality and a constant with a few
exceptions that dramatically change the geographic setting of a country,
thus not always a useful variable to explain changes in the foreign policy
(Grygiel, 2006). Building on the definition of geography, Grygiel (2006)
further defines geopolitics as the geographic distribution of resources and
communication and assigning strategic value to specific geographic loca-
tions. Geopolitical thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
argue that the economic potential of the Eurasian heartland (Mackinder,
1951), maritime trade and naval power (Mahan, 1949), or the capacity
to control the Asia-Pacific rimland (Spykman, 1944) change the global
balance of power. Traditional geopolitical theories have their own strate-
gic interests and implications for the national strategy of their countries,
for example, Halford Mackinder for British geopolitics, Nicholas
Spykman for containment strategy, and Alfred Thayer Mahan for naval
power. Geopolitics has traditionally been a concept of analyzing the for-
eign and security policymaking of a country actor. For example, to
Mackinder, the rise of transcontinental railroads such as the Trans-
Siberian Railway completed in 1904 was the key to Russian control of
Eurasia and the greatest threat to the global hegemony of Britain (Cohen,
2015). Mackinder’s idea of Eastern Europe as the key to world domina-
tion was reflected in his dictum, “Who rules Eastern Europe commands
the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands World-Island: Who
rules World-Island commands the world” (Mackinder, 1919). Spykman,
the American international relations scholar, on the contrary, viewed that
the Eurasian coastal lands were the keys to world control, not Mackinder’s
pivot area in the Eurasian continent, based on his strategic focus on bal-
ancing the rise of Germany (Cohen, 2015).
The term, strategy, is commonly used in various scholarships and con-
texts such as business strategy, investment strategy, and national and mili-
tary strategy. Strategic studies are also one of the subfields that constitute
the domain of security studies. Strategic studies and security studies share
an academic curiosity in terms of understanding threat and risk, and both
are highly engaging in real-world policymaking. However, one of the sig-
nificant differences between the two is that strategic studies focus on the
means and ends of political and military actions, while security studies
question whose security matters and how to secure them. Liddell Hart, a
British military historian and strategist in the twentieth century and one
of the most frequently cited figures in strategic studies for the classic defi-
nition of strategy, defined strategy as “the art of distributing and applying
military means to fulfill the ends of policy” (Hart, 1967, 351). Strategic
studies and security studies are essential subfields of the broader interna-
tional relations (IR) discipline that researches war and peace.
Then, what is geostrategy? Geostrategy incorporates the locational
dimension employed in the IB literature and is a concept used in the
study of foreign and security policymaking in the IS discipline. It has

been primarily applied to research on national security, interstate rela-
tions, and great power rivalry. Grygiel, a contemporary strategist, eluci-
dates that geostrategy is “the geographic direction of a state’s foreign
policy” and “where a state concentrates its efforts by projecting military
power and directing diplomatic activity” (Grygiel, 2006, 22). He under-
scores that ideological drives, intrastate interest groups, or individual fig-
ures might lead a country’s geostrategy toward a specific location and
project power to that particular location. More recently, the geostrategic
analysis focuses on actors at various levels (Rhodes, 2019). These levels
include individual policymakers’ perception of space (individual level), a
government’s policymaking as an outcome of group thinking and group
culture (national level), and the dynamics of the relationship between
countries (international level). The perspective of geostrategy provides a
widely applicable lens to analyze the behavior and interactions of national
and non-national players in IB and IS. This book applies a common con-
ceptual focus—geostrategy—to analyze the international business and
security nexus at various levels. In this book, geostrategy is used as a con-
cept to integrate various players in the IB and IS and study the interac-
tion between them and the primary mechanism of multilevel analysis.
The following chapters examine the implications that IB and IS provide
to each other by studying the interaction of players of IB and IS through
the common lens of geostrategy.
Stephen Walt, one of the renowned international security theorists at
Harvard University, proposed the balance of threat theory that gave sig-
nificance to geographic proximity as one of the factors in the threat
assessment (Walt, 1985). In his recent commentary countering an argu-
ment that major technology firms exercise influence on geopolitics and
the global order, he contends that states have a durable role, and geogra-
phy still counts (Walt, 2021). He asserts that big technology firms will
not remake the global order because “states remain the dominant politi-
cal form in the world today” and “if corporations enjoy certain privileges
[...], it is because governments have given these to them.” His position is
based on the recognition that the state, the people’s lives, and the geo-
graphical conditions are closely intertwined. He also notes that “our ines-
capable dependence on the physical environment is why humans fight
over territory, control of sea routes, and other physical resources, and it is
why states created borders and devised institutions such as sovereignty to
regulate political authority over the inhabitable land areas in which we
dwell” (Walt, 2021). A state is created based on geographical conditions,
and the role of the state and the government is perpetuated to the extent
that geographical conditions are inseparable from basic human life.
The phenomena of globalization and new technologies have brought
obvious changes in the life of mankind, but they have not entirely made
alterations to the geopolitical nature of global politics and economy
(Grygiel, 2006). Globalization seems to have significantly reduced the
role of geography, but on the other hand, it has also created more com-
plex and diversified variables of policymaking processes based on geopoli-
tics. In other words, globalization did not completely lift traditional
geostrategic considerations from national governments, such as the dis-
tribution of resources and the configuration of physical trade routes on
land, sea, and air. For example, the issue of Sea Lines of Communication
(SLOC) security is a common concern of both international business and
security studies. The significance of SLOC has been strengthened owing
to globalization; however, the direct cause of rising global interests in
SLOC security comes from the fact that a great power like the US needs
to protect and control key trade routes and possesses the power to do so.
Grygiel (2006, 166–167) contends that “it will continue to be necessary
to incorporate geographic factors in the foreign policy of states,” and
“some regions will be more strategic than others and as a result will
demand greater attention.”
In traditional international security studies, it is an important research
question under what conditions countries wage war, conflict, cooperate,
and form alliances. Among other theories in the study of international
security, the balance of threat theory takes a geographic factor as one of
the elements that makes a country considered a threat by others. The bal-
ance of threat theory explains four specific factors: strength, offensive
capabilities, intentions, and proximity (Walt, 1985). Out of these factors,
offensive capabilities and intentions tend to be a relatively subjective fac-
tor that depends on the perspective or the politically driven judgment.
But, strength and proximity factors are more measurable and
predictable.
Some countries use a strategy of balancing against an existing threat,

while others use a strategy of bandwagoning the threat. Stephen Walt,
who proposed the balance of threat theory, argues that balancing and
bandwagoning behaviors are not completely framed in terms of the dis-
tribution of power as theorized by structural realism and the balance of
power theory. However, Walt argues that “states will ally with or against
the most ‘threatening’ power” (emphasis original), and there are four fac-
tors that enable a state to pose a threat to other countries (Walt, 1985,
8–9). These four factors are strength, offensive capabilities, intentions,
and proximity.
The balance of threat theory explains the process by which a country
exerts influence over other geographically close countries using the con-
cept of threat. The combination of a threat from proximate power and
bandwagoning responses of states creates a “sphere of influence.” Walt
denotes, “When a threat from proximate power leads to bandwagoning,
by contrast, the familiar phenomenon of a ‘sphere of influence’ is cre-
ated” (emphasis original) (Walt, 1985, 11). This process of creating a
sphere of influence affects not only the government responsible for for-
mulating foreign and security policy but also the government acting as
the home country of international business. The theory, therefore, is rel-
evant to the discussion beyond international security studies and suggests
implications for the discipline of international business.
The Indo-Pacific region today is where the geostrategies of multiple
major powers are competing with each other (Medcalf, 2020b). The con-
cept of “Indo-Pacific” has timely implications for the IB and IS research
domains, particularly for emerging markets in the region. The birth and
development of the regional concept of the Indo-Pacific are related to the
ever-increasing business-security interaction. The Indo-Pacific concept
has been incepted and used by the US and the US allies and partners
since 2017 to reinstate and strengthen the existing security order in the
Asia-Pacific region (Medcalf, 2020a). The Indo-Pacific is also defined as a
network that connects countries seeking a common security order. The
so-called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue partners—the US, Australia,
Japan, and India—are the key countries that support the US-led Indo-
Pacific security order. More US allies and security partners agree to align
with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy with their foreign and security policies,
expanding the Indo-Pacific as the US-led security network. The Indo-

Pacific is a relatively new regional and geostrategic concept dominantly
used by the Western powers; meanwhile, the specific substance and pur-
pose are different from country to country (Wilkins & Kim, 2020). For
example, as Chap. 4 will discuss in detail, India has endorsed the US-led
Indo-Pacific Strategy and joined the Quad members’ meetings along with
the US, Australia, and Japan, while developing its own version of the
Indo-Pacific vision that underscores inclusiveness in cooperation among
the countries in the Indo-Pacific region and integrates other Quad coun-
tries’ Indo-Pacific Strategy with its foreign and development policy such
as the Act East policy and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative. Also, as
Chap. 3 will further examine, China conceives that the primary target of
the US Indo-Pacific Strategy since Trump’s administration has been
China (Zeng & Zhang, 2021).
2.3 National-Subnational Interactions

Methodological nationalism privileges national territoriality, the type of
regime of the nation-state as the principal driver of changes occurring in
a country, and it treats the sovereign nation-state as the sole actor in his-
tories (Duara & Perry, 2018). Duara and Perry propose the alternative
view that appreciates the role of subnational forces that condition devel-
opments within countries, for example, particular cities in which subna-
tional and global processes interact.
The international security and economic policies pushed forward by
China and India basically have a strong national government-led nature.
Since 2013, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the
Chinese Communist Party, China has promoted the Belt and Road
Initiative as a national development project. India has been promoting
the Act East policy since 2014, which was expanded and developed by
Narendra Modi’s government from the former Look East policy that the
Indian government adopted as its Asian policy after economic liberaliza-
tion in the 1990s. Two emerging powers seek to expand their geopolitical
influence in the immediate region and beyond. However, the national
policies or projects being pursued under the leadership of Xi and Modi
have common attributes other than the dominant and leading role of
national governments. They require the contribution of domestic subna-
tional actors and various multilevel actors at home and abroad. China
and India seek to advance their geopolitical influence in neighboring
countries that are in contact with relatively underdeveloped regions of
each country and intend to improve connectivity with these neighboring
countries. Compared to other provinces in China, the income levels are
low in the western inland regions that China needs to pass through to
enter Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Therefore, for China, the devel-
opment of these inland regions and the joint development of neighbor-
ing countries is a critical prerequisite for maximizing the achievements of
the Belt and Road Initiative. Likewise, in order for India’s Act East policy
to successfully connect India with neighboring Asian countries in the
Southeast and Northeast Asian regions, the joint growth of India’s north-
east regions, which are on the way to the neighboring countries, is a
necessary task. Considering the importance of developing such geostrate-
gically important regions within the country for national projects, the
national-subnational interactions are gaining significance. The Belt and
Road Initiative and the Act East policy further suggest the need for
research on the national-subnational interactions.
The traditional approach to international security studies views a
country and national government as a unitary actor like a “billiard ball,”
and the country actor is the primary level of analysis. At the same time,
the conceptualization and empirical examination of the roles of subna-
tional actors, transnational actors, and non-government actors and their
impact provide a useful framework for explaining new trends in interna-
tional security, international relations, and international business.
According to a study of a Chinese subnational government, subnational
actors reinforce or influence their national governments’ foreign policy
agenda. For example, the efforts of the subnational government, Guangxi
Province’s Shanglin County, complicated China’s foreign relations with
Ghana, the particular case they study, and further resulted in influencing
Beijing’s policy by threatening its efforts to gain access to the African
country (Hess & Aidoo, 2016).
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[“God’s blessing on his heart that made this:” sayd one, “specially
for reuiuing our auncient liberties. And I pray God it may take such
place with the magistrates, that they may ratifie our olde freedome.”
“Amen,” sayd another: “for that shall bee a meane both to stay and
vpholde themselues from falling, and also to preserue many kinde,
true, zealous, and well meaning mindes from slaughter and infamy. If
king Richarde and his counsailours had allowed, or at the least but
winked at some such wits, what great commodities might they haue
taken thereby? First, they should haue knowen what the people
misliked and grudged at, (which no one of their flatterers either
woulde or durst haue tolde them) and so mought haue found meane,
eyther by amendment (which is best) or by some other pollicy to
haue stayed the people’s grudge: the forerunner commonly of ruler’s
destruction.[1750] Vox populi, vox Dei, in this case is not so famous a
prouerbe, as true: the experience of all times doe[1751] approue it.
They should also haue bene warned of their owne sinnes, which call
continually for God’s vengeaunce, which neuer faileth to fall on their
neckes sodainly and horribly, vnles it bee stayed with hearty
repentaunce. These weighty commodities mought they haue taken
by Collingbourn’s vaine rime. But, as all thinges worke to the best in
them that bee good, so best thinges heape vp mischiefe in the
wicked, and all to hasten their vtter destruction. For after this poore
wretche’s lamentable persecution (the common rewarde of best
endeuours) strait followed the fatall[1752] destruction both of this
tyrant, and of his tormentours. Which I wishe might bee so set forth,
that they might bee a warning for euer, to all in authority, to beware
howe they vsurpe or abuse theyr offices.” “I haue here,” quoth[1753] I,
“king Richard’s tragedy.” “Reade it, wee pray you:” quoth[1754] they.
“With a good will,” quoth[1755] I. “For the better vnderstanding
whereof, imagine that you see him tormented with Diues in the
deepe pit of hell, and thence howling this which followeth.”]
[How Richarde Plantagenet Duke of
Glocester murdered his brother’s
children, vsurping the crowne, and in
the third yeare of his raigne was most
worthely depriued of life and
kingdome, in Bosworth plaine, by
Henry Earle of Richmond after called
King Henry the vij. the 22 of August
1485.[1756]
1.
What heart so hard, but doth abhorre to heare

The rufull raigne of me the third Richard?
King vnkindly calde, though I the crown did weare,
Who entred by rigour, but right did not regard,
By tyranny proceding in killing king Edward,
Fift of that name, right heyr vnto the crowne,
With Richard his brother, princes of renowne.
2.
Of trust they were committed vnto my gouernaunce,

But trust turned to treason, too truly it was tryed,
Both agaynst nature, duty, and alleigaunce,
For through my procurement most shamefully they dyed:
Desire of a kingdom forgetteth all kinred,
As after by discourse it shalbe shewed here,
How cruely these innocents in prison murdered[1757]
were.
3.
The lords and commons all with one assent,

Protectour made me both of land and king,
But I therewith, alas, was not content:
For minding mischife I ment another thing,
Which to confusion in short time did mee bring:
For I, desirous to rule and raigne alone,
Sought crowne and kingdom, yet title had I none.
4.
To all peeres and princes a president I may bee,

The like to beware how they do enterprise,
And learne theyr wretched falles by my fact to foresee,
Which rufull stand bewayling my chaunce before theyr
eyes,
As one cleane bereft of all felicityes:
For right through might I cruelly defaced,
But might helped right and mee agayne displaced.
5.
Alas, that euer prince should thus his honour stayne

With the bloud of innocents, most shamefull to be tolde:
For these two noble impes I caused to be slaine,
Of yeares not full ripe as yet to rule and raigne:
For which I was abhorred both of yong and olde,
But as the deede was odious in sight of God and man,
So shame and destruction in the end I wan.
6.
Both God, nature, duty, alleigaunce all forgot,

This vile and haynous act vnnaturally conspyred:[1758]
Which horrible deede done, alas, alas, God wot,
Such terrours mee tormented, and my sprites[1759] fired
As vnto such a murder and shamefull deede required,
Such broyle dayly felt I breeding in my brest,
Whereby, more and more, increased mine vnrest.
7.
My brother’s children were right heyres vnto the crowne,

Whom nature rather bound to defend then destroy,
But I not regarding theyr right nor my renowne,
My whole care and study to this end did employe,
The crowne to obtayne, and them both to put downe:
Wherein I God offended, prouoking iust his ire,
For this my attempt and most wicked desire.
8.
To cursed[1760] Cayn compare my carefull case,

Which did vniustly slay his brother iust Abel:
And did not I in rage make run that rufull race
My brother duke of Clarence? whose deth I shame to tel,
For that it was so straunge as it was horrible:
For sure he drenched was, and yet no water neare,
Which straunge is to bee tolde, to all that shall it heare.
9.
The but hee was not whereat I did shoote,

But yet he stoode betweene the marke and mee,
For had he liu’d,[1761] for mee it was no boote
To tempt[1762] the thing that by no meanes could bee,
For I third was then of my brethren three:
But yet I thought the elder being gone,
Then needes must I beare the stroke alone.
10.
Desire of rule made mee, alas, to rewe,

My fatall fall I could it not foresee,
Puft vp in pride, so hawty then I grewe,
That none my peere I thought now could bee,
Disdayning such as were of high degree:
Thus dayly rising, and pulling other downe,
At last I shot how to win the crowne.
11.
And dayly deuising which was the best way

And meane, how I might my nephues both deuour:
I secretly then sent, without furder delay,
To Brackinbury, then lieutenaunt of the tower,
Requesting him by letters to helpe vnto his power,
For to accomplish this my desire and will,
And that hee would secretly my brother’s children kill.
12.
He aunswered playnly with a flat nay,

Saying that to dye hee would not doe that deede:
But finding then a profer to my[1763] pray,
“Well worth a friend (quoth[1764] I) yet in time of neede:”
Iames Tyrrill hight his name, whom with all speede,
I sent agayne to Brackinbury, as you heard before,
Commaunding him deliuer the keyes of euery dore.
13.
The keyes hee rendred,[1765] but partaker would not be

Of that flagitious fact. O, happy man, I say:
As you haue heard before, he rather chose to dye,
Then on those sely lambes his violent hands to lay:
His conscience him pricked his prince to betraye,
O constant minde, that wouldst not condiscend,
Thee may I prayse, and my selfe discommend.
14.
What though hee refused, yet bee sure you may,

That other were as ready to take in hand that[1766] thing,
Which watched and wayted as duely for their pray,
As euer did the cat for the mouse taking,
And how they might their purpose best to passe bring:
Where Tyrrill hee thought good to haue no bloud shed,
Becast them to kill by smothering in their bed.
15.
The wolues at hand were redy to deuoure

The seely lambes in bed, wheras they laye,
Abiding death, and looking for the howre,
For well they wist, they could not scape away:
Ah, woe is mee, that did them thus betray,
In assigning this vile deede to bee done,
By Miles Forrest and wicked Ihon Dighton.
16.
Who priuely into their chamber stale,

In secret wise somwhat before midnight,
And gan the bed together tug and hale,
Bewrapping them, alas, in wofull[1767] plight,
Keping them downe, by force, by power, and might,
With haling, tugging, turmoyling, turnde[1768] and tost,
Tyll they of force were forced yeeld the ghost.
17.
Which when I heard, my hart I felt was eased

Of grudge, of griefe, and inward deadly payne,
But with this deede the nobles were displeased,
And sayde: “O God, shall such a tyrant raygne,
That hath so cruelly his brother’s children slayne?”
Which bruit once blowen in the people’s ears,
Their doloure was such, that they brast out in tears.
18.
But what thing may suffise vnto the gredy[1769] man,

The more hee baths in bloud, the bloudier hee is alway:
By proofe I do this speake, which best declare it can,
Which onely was the cause of this prince’s decay:
The wolfe was neuer gredier then I was of my pray:
But who so vseth murder, full well affirme I dare,
With murder shall bee quit, ere hee thereof beware.
19.
And marke the sequel of this begone mischiefe:

Which shortly after was cause of my decay,
For high and low conceiued such a griefe
And hate agaynst mee, which sought, day by day,
All wayes and meanes that possible they may,
On mee to bee reuenged for this sinne,
For cruelly murdering vnnaturally my kyn.
20.
Not only kyn, but king, the truth to say,

Whom vnkindely of kingdome I bereft,
His lyfe from him, I also raught[1770] away,
With his brother’s, which to my charge was[1771] left:
Of ambition beholde the worke and weft,
Prouoking mee to do this haynous treason,
And murder them, agaynst all right and reason.
21.
After whose death thus wrought by violence,

The lords not lyking this vnnaturall deede,
Began on mee to haue greate diffidence,
Such brinning hate gan in their harts to breede,
Which made mee doubt, and sore my daunger dreede:
Which doubt and dreede proued not in vayne,
By that ensude, alas, vnto my payne.
22.
For I supposing all things were as I wished,

When I had brought these sely[1772] babes to bane,
But yet in that my purpose far I missed:
For as the moone doth chaunge after the wane,
So chaunged the hearts of such as I had tane
To bee most true, to troubles did mee tourne:
Such rage and rancoure in boyling brests doth[1773]
burne.
23.
And sodainly a bruit abroade was blowne,

That Buckingham the duke, both sterne and stout,
In field was ready, with diuers to mee knowne,
To giue mee battayle if I durst come out:
Which daunted mee and put mee in greate doubt,
For that I had no army then prepared:
But after that, I litle for it cared.
24.
But yet remembring, that oft a litle sparke

Suffred doth growe vnto a greate flame,
I thought it wisdome wisly for to warke,
Mustred then men in euery place I came:
And marched forward dayly with the same,
Directly towards the towne of Salisbury,
Where I gat knowledge of the duke’s army.
25.
And as I passed ouer Salisburie downe,

The rumour ran the duke was fled and gone,
His hoast dispersed besides Shrewesbury towne,
And hee dismaied was left there post alone,
Bewailing his chaunce and making great mone:
Towards whome I hasted with all expedition,
Making due search and diligent inquisition.
26.
But at the fyrst I could not of him heare,

For hee was scaped by secrete bywayes,
Unto the house of Humfrey Banastaire,
Whome hee had much preferred in his dayes,
And was good lorde to him, in all assaies:
Which hee full ill[1774] requited in the end,
When hee was driuen to seeke a trusty frend.
27.
For so it happened to his mishap, alas,

When I no knowledge of the duke could heare:
A proclamation, by my commaundement, was
Published and cryed throughout euery shyre,
That whoso could tell where the duke were,
A thousand marke shoulde haue for his payne:
What thing so hard but mony can obtayne?
28.
But were it for mony, meede, or dreede,

That Banastaire thus betrayed his ghest,
Diuers haue diuersly deuined of this deede,
Some deeme the worst, and some iudge the best,
The doubt not dissolued, nor playnly exprest:
But of the duke’s death hee doubtless was cause,
Which dyed without iudgement, or order of lawes.
29.
Loe, this noble duke I brought thus vnto bane,

Whose doings I doubted and had in greate dread,
At Banastaire’s house I made him to bee tane,
And without iudgement be shortned by the head,
By the shriue of Shropshyre to Salisburie led,
In the market place vpon the scaffolde newe,
Where all the beholders did much his death rewe.
30.
And after this done I brake vp my hoaste,

Greatly applauded with this heauy hap,[1775]
And forthwith I sent to euery sea cost,
To foresee all mischieues and stop euery gap,
Before they shoud chaunce or[1776] light in my lap,
Geuing them in charge to haue good regarde
The sea cost to keepe, with good watch and warde.
31.
Dyrecting my letters vnto euery shriue,

With strait commaundement vnder our name,
To suffer no man in their partes to aryue,
Nor to passe forth out of the same,
As they tendred our fauour, and voyde would our blame,
Doing therein theyr payne and industry,
With diligent care and vigilant eye.
32.
And thus setting things in order as you heare,

To preuent mischieues that might then betyde,
I thought my selfe sure, and out of all feare,
And for other things began to prouide:
To Nottingham castle straight did I ryde,
Where I was not very long space,
Straunge tydings came, which did mee sore amaze.
33.
Reported it was, and that for certainty,

The earle[1777] of Richmond landed was in Wales
At Milford hauen, with an huge army,
Dismissing his nauy which were many sayles:
Which, at the fyrst, I thought flying tales,
But in the end did otherwise proue,
Which not a little did mee vexe and moue.
34.
Thus fauning fortune gan on mee to frowne,

And cast on mee her scornfull lowring looke:
Then gan I feare the fall of my renowne,
My heart it faynted, my sinowes sore they shooke,
This heauy hap a scourge for sinne I tooke:
Yet did I not then vtterly dispayre,
Hoping storms past the weather shoulde bee fayre.
35.
And then with all speede possible I might,

I caused them muster throughout euery shyre,
Determining with the earle spedely to fyght,
Before that his power much encreased were,
By such as to him great fauour did beare:
Which were no small number, by true report made,
Dayly repayring him for to ayde.
36.
Dyrecting my letters to diuers noble men,

With earnest request their power to prepare
To Notingham castle, where, as I lay then,
To ayde and assist mee in this waighty affayre:
Where straite to my presence did then repayre,
Ihon duke of Northfolke, his eldest sonne also,
With th’earle of Northumberland and many other mo.
37.
And thus being furnisht with men and munition,

Forwarde wee marched in order of battayle ray,
Making by scouts euery way inquisition,
In what place the earle with his campe lay:
Towards whom dyrectly wee tooke then our way,
Euermore mynding to seeke our most auayle,
In place conuenient to gieue to him battayle.
38.
So long wee laboured, at last our armies met

On Bosworth playne, besides Lecester towne,
Where sure I thought the garland for to get,
And purchase peace, or els to lose my crowne:
But fickle fortune, alas, on mee did frowne,
For when I was enchamped in the fielde,
Where most I trusted I soonest was begylde.
39.
The brand of malice thus kindling in my brest

Of deadly hate which I to him did beare,
Pricked mee forward, and bad mee not desist,
But boldly fight, and take at all no feare,
To wyn the field, and the earle to conquere:
Thus hoping glory greate to gayne and get,
Myne army then in order did I set.
40.
Betyde mee lyfe or death I desperatly ran,
And ioyned mee in battayle with this earle so stoute,
But fortune so him fauoured that hee the battayle wan,
With force and great power I was beset about:
Which when I did beholde, in midst of the whole route,
With dint of sword I cast mee on him to be reuenged,
Where in the midst of them my wretched life I ended.
41.
My body was hurried and tugged like a dog,

On horsebacke all naked and bare as I was borne:
My heade, hands, and feete, downe hanging lyke a hog,
With dirte and bloud besprent, my corpes all to torne,
Cursing the day that euer I was borne:
With greuous woundes bemangled, moste horrible to
see,
So sore they did abhorre this my vile cruelty.
42.
Loe, heare you may behold the due and iust rewarde
Of tyranny and treason, which God doth most detest:
For if vnto my duety I had taken regarde,
I might haue liued still in honour with the best,
And had I not attempt the thing that I ought leste:
But desyre to rule, alas, did mee so blinde,
Which caused mee to doe agaynst nature and kynde.
43.
Ah, cursed caytife, why did I climbe so hye,

Which was the cause of this my balefull thrall:
For still I thirsted for the regall dignitye,
But hasty rising threatneth sodayne fall:
Content your selues with your estates all,
And seeke not right by wrong to suppresse,
For God hath promist ech wrong to redresse.
44.
See here the fine and fatall fall of mee,

And guerdon due for this my wretched deede,
Which to all princes a miroir now may bee,
That shall this tragicall story after reede,
Wishing them all by mee to take heede,
And suffer right to rule as it is reason:
For tyme tryeth out both truth and also treason.
F. Seg.[1778]]
[When I had read this, we had much talke about it. For it was
thought not vehement enough for so violent a man as king Richard
had bene. The matter was well enough liked of some, but the meetre
was misliked almost of all. And when diuers therefore would not
allowe it, “What,” quoth[1779] one, “you know not wherevpon you
sticke: els you would not so much mislike this because of the
vncertaine meeter. The cumlines called by the rhetoricians decorum,
is specially to bee obserued in all thinges. Seing than that king
Richard neuer kept measure in any of his doings, seeing also hee
speaketh in hell, whereas is no order: it were against that[1780]
decorum of his personage, to vse either good meetre or order. And
therefore if his oration were farre worse, in my opinion it were more
fit for him. Mars and the muses did neuer agree. Neither is to be
suffered, that their milde sacred arte should seeme to proceede from
so cruell and prophane a mouth as his: seeing they themselues doe
vtterly abhorre it. And although wee read of Nero, that hee was
excellent both in musicke and in versifying, yet doe not I remember
that euer I sawe any song or verse of his making: Minerua iustly
prouiding, that no monument should remayne of any such vniust
vsurpation. And therefore let this passe euen as it is, which the writer
I know both could and would amend in many places, saue for
keeping the decorum, which he purposely hath obserued herein.” “In
deede,” quoth[1781] I, “as you say: it is not meete that so disorderly
and vnnaturall a man as king Richard was, should obserue any
metricall order in his talke: which notwithstanding in many places of
his oration is very well kepte: it shall passe therefore euen as it is,
though too good for so euill[1782] a person.”[1783] Then they willed
mee to reade the blacke Smith. “With a good will,” quoth I: “but first
you must imagin that you see him standing on a ladder ouer shrined
with the Tyburne, a meete stage for all such rebelles and traytours:
and there stoutly saying as followeth.”]
The wilfvll fall of the blacke Smith,
and the foolishe ende of the Lorde
Awdeley, in Iune, Anno 1496.[1784]
1.
Who is more bolde then is the blinde beard?[1785]

Where is more craft than in the clouted shone?
Who catch more harme than such as nothing feard?[1786]
Where is more guile then where mistrust in[1787] none?
No plaisters helpe before the griefe be knowen,
So seemes by mee who could no wisdome lere,
Untill such time I bought my wit too deare.
2.
Who, being boystrous, stout, and braynlesse bolde,

Puft vp with pride, with fire and furyes fret,
Incenst with tales so rude and playnly tolde,
Wherein deceit with double knot was knit,
I trapped was as seely fishe in net,
Who swift in swimming, not doubtfull of[1788] deceit,
Is caught in gin wherein is layde no bayt.
3.
Such force and vertue hath this dolefull playnt,

Set forth with sighes and teares of crocodile,
Who seemes in sight as simple as a saynt,
Hath layde a bayte the wareles to begyle,
And as they wepe they worke deceit the while,
Whose rufull cheare the rulers so relent,
To worke in haste that they at last repent.
4.
Take heede therefore ye rulers of the land,

Be blinde in sight, and stop your other eare:
In sentence slow, till skill the truth hath scand,
In all your doomes both loue and hate forbeare,
So shall your iudgement iust and right appeare:
It was a southfast sentence long agoe,
That hasty men shall neuer lacke much woe.
5.
Is it not truth? Baldwine, what sayest thou?

Say on thy minde: I pray thee muse no more:
Me thinke thou star’st and look’st[1789] I wot not howe,
As though thou neuer saw’st[1790] a man before:
Belike thou musest why I teach this lore,
Els what I am, that here so bouldly[1791] dare,
Among the prease of princes to compare.
6.
Though I bee bolde I pray the blame not mee,

Like as men sowe, such corne nedes must they reape,
And nature hath so planted in[1792] eche degree,
That crabs like crabs will kindly crall and crepe:
The suttle foxe vnlike the sely shepe:
It is according to my education,
Forward to prease in rout and congregation.
7.
Behold my coate burnt with the sparkes of fire,

My lether apron fylde with the[1793] horse shoe nayles,
Beholde my hammer and my pinsers here,
Beholde my lookes, a marke that seldom fayles,
My cheekes declare I was not fed with quayles,
My face, my cloathes, my tooles, with all my fashion,
Declare full well a prince of rude creation.
8.
A prince I sayde, a prince, I say agayne,

Though not by byrth, by crafty vsurpation:
Who doubts but some men princehood do obtayne,
By open force, and wrongfull domination?
Yet while they rule are had in reputation:
Euen so by mee, the while I wrought my feate
I was a prince, at least in my conceyte.
9.
I dare the bolder take on mee the name,

Because of him whom here I leade in hand,
Tychet lord Awdley, a lorde of byrth[1794] and fame,
Which with his strength and powre serude in my band,
I was a prince while that I was so mande:
His butterfly still vnderneath my shielde
Displayed was, from Welles to Blackeheath fielde.
10.
But now beholde hee doth bewayle the same:

Thus after wits theyr rashnes do depraue:
Beholde dismayde hee dare not speake for shame,
He lookes like one that late came from the graue,
Or one that came forth of Trophonius caue,
For that in wit hee had so litle pith,
As he a lord to serue a traytour smith.
11.
Such is the courage of the noble hart,
Which doth despise the vile and baser sort,
Hee may not touch that sauers of the cart,
Him listeth not with ech jacke lout to sport,
Hee lets him passe for payring of his porte:
The iolly egles catch not litle flees,
The courtly silkes match seelde with homely frees.
12.
But surely, Baldwine, if I were allowde

To say the troth, I could somewhat declare:
But clarkes will say: “This smith doth waxe to prowde,
Thus in precepts of wisedome to compare:”
But smiths must speake that clarkes for feare ne dare:
It is a thing that all men may lament,
When clarkes keepe close the truth lest they be shent.
13.
The hostler, barber, miller, and the smith,

Heare of the sawes of such as wisdom ken,
And learne some wit, although they want the pith
That clarkes pretend: and yet, both now and then,
The greatest clarkes proue not the wisest men:
It is not right that men forbid should bee
To speake the truth, all were hee bond or free.
14.
And for because I [haue] vsed to fret and fome,

Not passing greatly whom I should displease,
I dare be bolde a while to play the mome,
Out of my sacke some other’s faults to lease,
And let mine[1795] owne behinde my backe to peyse:
For hee that hath his owne before his eye,
Shall not so quicke another’s fault espye.
15.
I say was neuer no such wofull case,

As is when honour doth it selfe abuse:
The noble man that vertue doth embrace,
Represseth pride, and humblenes doth vse,
By wisdome workes, and rashnes doth refuse:
His wanton will and lust that bridle can
In deede, is gentill, both to God and man.
16.
But where the nobles want both wit and grace,

Regarde no rede, care not but for theyr lust,
Oppresse the poore, set will in reason’s place,
And in theyr wordes and doomes bee found vniust,
Wealth goeth to wracke till all lye in the dust:
There fortune frownes, and spite begins[1796] to growe,
Till high, and lowe, and all be ouerthrowe.
17.
Then sith that vertue hath so good rewarde,

And after vice so duly wayteth shame,
How hapth that princes haue no more regarde,
Theyr tender youth with vertue to enflame?
For lacke whereof theyr wit and will is lame,
Infect with folly, prone to lust and pryde,
Not knowing how themselues or theyrs to guyde.
18.
Whereby it hapneth to the wanton wight,

As to a ship vpon the stormy seas,
Which lacking sterne to guide it selfe aright,
From shore to shore the winde and tyde to[1797] teese,
Fynding no place to rest or take his ease,
Till at the last it sinke vpon the sande:

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International Business and Security:

Geostrategy in Perspective Jiye Kim

Disruptive Technology in Banking and Finance: An

Family Firms and Business Families in Cross-Cultural

International Business and Emerging Economy Firms:

International Business 3rd Edition Geringer

Global Business Analysis: Understanding the Role of

Why Rivals Intervene: International Security and Civil

Sustainable Luxury: An International Perspective

International Business: Competing in the Global

“A very insightful and well-rounded take on international business and security

ISBN 978-3-031-05632-1 ISBN 978-3-031-05633-8 (eBook)

The world is currently facing the re-configuration of the global supply

IS scholarship is a study of threats and expanded by the securitization

Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Beppu, Japan Jiye Kim

Jiye Kim is an award-winning Assistant Professor at Ritsumeikan Asia

AAGC Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

IBS International Business and Security

Abstract The introductory chapter provides an overview of the book and

Keywords International business • International security • Geostrategy

The interests in international business (IB) discipline from scholars in

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

nationalism on foreign and security policies, urgent issues concerning

1.1 Finding the Intersection

stems from its role as a key driver of (de-)globalization” and suggests

brings risks to international business and MNEs by portraying the world

that tries to bridge traditional and critical security studies by understand-

governance, while multilevel governance does coexist with the security

1.2 Structure of the Book

security environment. Building upon this development, the following

an impactful source. The discussion taking place in these journals pro-

Luo, Y. (2022). Illusions of techno-nationalism. Journal of International Business

Suder, G. G. S. (2004). Terrorism and the international business environment: The

Abstract As the most populous countries in the past, at present, and

Keywords Emerging economies • Emerging powers • Geostrategy •

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 15

2.1 Mapping the Stories: China and India

been deeply interwoven into the persistent forces of economic globaliza-

about the two countries’ technological innovation trajectories (Kennedy,

mutual growth between less-developed western provinces and neighbor-

parliamentary democracy and a communist party-state (Duara &

2.1.1 When the Two Giants Meet

neighbors. There are unresolved territorial disputes between China and

engage in the disputes by cooperating with claimant Southeast Asian

2.2 Geostrategy in Focus

study of foreign and security policymaking in the IS discipline. It has

Some countries use a strategy of balancing against an existing threat,

expanding the Indo-Pacific as the US-led security network. The Indo-

2.3 National-Subnational Interactions

Karmakar, R. (2021, February 15). India-Myanmar Kaladan project in final

Men, H. (2019). The belt and road initiative in China-World Interactions

What heart so hard, but doth abhorre to heare

Of trust they were committed vnto my gouernaunce,

The lords and commons all with one assent,

To all peeres and princes a president I may bee,

Alas, that euer prince should thus his honour stayne

Both God, nature, duty, alleigaunce all forgot,

My brother’s children were right heyres vnto the crowne,

To cursed[1760] Cayn compare my carefull case,

The but hee was not whereat I did shoote,

Desire of rule made mee, alas, to rewe,

And dayly deuising which was the best way

He aunswered playnly with a flat nay,

The keyes hee rendred,[1765] but partaker would not be

Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Beppu, Japan Jiye Kim

1.1 Finding the Intersection

1.2 Structure of the Book

2.1 Mapping the Stories: China and India

2.1.1 When the Two Giants Meet

2.2 Geostrategy in Focus

2.3 National-Subnational Interactions