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Knowing Illusion: Bringing a Tibetan
Debate into Contemporary Discourse
Volume II
Knowing Illusion:
Bringing a Tibetan
Debate into
Contemporary
Discourse
Volume II: Translations
T H E YA K H E R D S
1
3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197603673.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Paperback printed by Marquis, Canada
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Preface
that involved many of Tibet’s greatest minds for centuries and that delve into
fundamental aspects of Buddhist thought and practice.
There are texts relevant to this debate that are not collected in this book,
although they are discussed in the study volume. The first is Tsongkhapa’s
own exposition in Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Awakening
(Lam rim chen mo). This is a tour de force of Buddhist philosophy, in which
Tsongkhapa examines in great detail and analytical subtlety the role of epis-
temology in the conventional world, along with the status of conventional
truth in Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka—the philosophical tradition that came to
be widely regarded in Tibet as the supreme articulation of Buddhist thought.
That account is already beautifully translated in the Lamrim Chenmo
Translation Committee’s Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to
Enlightenment (Lam rim chen mo) (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications,
2000–2002, vol. 3: 155–184), and we recommend that the interested reader
consult that text. Khedrupjé (mKhas grub rje dGe legs dpal bzang, 1385–
1438) offers a synopsis of this view in his Great Digest (sTong thun chen
mo), translated by José Cabezón in A Dose of Emptiness (Ithaca, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1993). That exposition also provides impor-
tant context for the debates discussed here. Finally, Jamyang Shepa’s (’Jam
dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje Ngag dbang brtson ’grus, 1648–1721/2) reply to
Taktsang is available in Jeffry Hopkins’s translation of his Great Exposition of
Philosophical Systems (Grub mtha’ chen mo) in Maps of the Profound (Ithaca,
NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2003). Because reliable translations have al-
ready been published, although we discuss them in Volume I, we do not offer
new translations here.
The reader will note that while Volume I is coauthored by the Yakherds in
toto and most chapters are not attributed to a particular member of the group,
each of the translations in Volume II is identified with several Yakherds.
This is because in each case, following a series of meetings in which we es-
tablished uniform translation policies, vocabulary, and so on, individual
Yakherds volunteered to do the initial draft translations of certain texts.
Those translations were then edited by the group to ensure accuracy, uni-
formity, and clarity. But since so much of the work takes place in that original
drafting, we give credit to those who completed those initial translations and
to others who made substantial contributions to subsequent translation and
emendation, referencing, and so on. We have endeavored, in our collective
editing, to keep the approach to translation and the vocabulary used uniform
across these texts.
Preface ix
The five treatises translated here are the most important (barring
Tsongkhapa’s initial analysis in the Great Treatise) in this centuries-long de-
bate. We present them in order of composition, beginning with Taktsang’s
Comprehensive Knowledge of Philosophy. This is followed by two works from
the first of two successive Karmapas, as it was the Karma Kagyü order that
took up Taktsang’s banner in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These
are an excerpt from One Hundred Thousand Discussions of Mahāmudrā
(Phyag rgya chen po’i sgros ’bum) and another from Chariot of the Dakpo
Kagyü Adepts (Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta) by the eight Karmapa,
Mikyö Dorjé (Mi bskyod rdo rje, 1507–1554). We next present Panchen
Losang Chökyi Gyaltsen’s (Paṇ chen bLo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1570–
1662) Lion’s Roar of Scripture and Reasoning (Lung rig seng ge nga ro), a de-
fense of Tsongkhapa’s presentation of Prāsaṅgika against Taktsang and his
Kagyü allies. We then offer two of the ninth Karmapa’s, Wangchuk Dorjé’s
(dBang phyug rdo rje, 1556–1603) texts: Conferring the Definitive Meaning
(Nges don mchog ster) and Concise Compendium of the Middle Way (dBu ma’i
don bsdu bsdus pa), in which he responds to the Geluk position by radical-
izing Taktsang’s exposition of Madhyamaka, claiming that Prāsaṅgikas say
nothing at all from their own perspective and put forward no philosophical
claims; they only report the perspectives of others. We close with Purchok
Ngawang Jampa’s (Phur lcog Ngag dbang byams pa, 1682–1762) Diamond
Slivers (rDo rje’i gzegs rna), a nuanced rejoinder to Tsongkhapa’s critics and
defense of the Geluk position.
Acknowledgments
The Yakherds have worked on this book for more than six years, and many
people and organizations have helped us along the way. We are grateful for
the research funding we received in a Discovery grant from the Australian
Research Council (DP160100947: “A Tibetan Polemical Debate and Its
Contemporary Philosophical Relevance”) and a Tier 2 Grant from the
Singapore Ministry of Education, which provided support for workshops in
India, Singapore, and Australia, as well as other costs related to our work. We
also thank Ms. Grace Kwan of Yale-NUS College for her tremendous support
in the preparation of this grant and for her work administering it.
The project has had four bases of institutional support: (1) Deakin
University, particularly the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and
Globalisation; (2) the University of Tasmania; (3) the Central Institute for
Higher Tibetan Studies (CIHTS); and (4) Yale-NUS College. We wish to
thank the administrations of all four universities for allowing research leave
for members of our group, and particularly Deakin University for support
in administering the grants and for the expert financial work of Amanda
Sutherland, Scott Cavanagh, Amy Bieser, and Amy Shay.
Sonam Thakchöe wishes to thank the University of Tasmania for providing
periods of research leave that enabled him to attend workshops and for its on-
going support for the Asian Philosophy Program. Douglas Duckworth would
like to thank Temple University for giving him a Presidential Humanities and
Arts Research Program Grant and for supporting his research on this project.
Our work has benefitted enormously from the generous support and col-
laborative input of CIHTS and its Vice-Chancellor, Ven. Professor Ngawang
Samten. CIHTS hosted four meetings at its campus in Sarnath, India, and
made available the resources of the Śāntarakṣita Library, which houses one
of the world’s premier collections of works on Buddhist philosophy. In ad-
dition, two of the Institute’s leading scholars, Khenpo Tashi Tsering and
Geshé Yeshes Thabkhas, whose breadth and depth of knowledge contrib-
uted substantially to the final products of this project, were members of the
Yakherds team.
xii Acknowledgments
1 The term “Buddhist Hybrid English” was coined by Paul Griffiths (1981) to characterize the
efforts of translators of Buddhist texts to construct neologisms to render terms from Asian languages.
Griffiths contends that these are often incomprehensible and present a barrier to understanding for
contemporary readers.
The Translators
Tib. dBu ma la ’jug pa’i bshad pa), sDe dge #3862, bKa’ ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. ’a: 254a.5: gnag rdzi dang
bud med la sogs pa yan cad la grags pa; Skt. gopālāṅganājana-prasiddha).
xvi The Translators
and cowherds were the equivalent of today’s “man in the street” (or in the
pasture), whose knowledge of the world is derived from empirical obser-
vation and recognition of patterns and regularities. These are used to make
pragmatic decisions (such as when to move cows into the fields and when
to bring them home) that are uninflected by the sorts of abstractions that
engage philosophers pursuing their craft. Candrakīrti, as we will see, claims
to accept all the epistemic instruments used by ordinary people (including
perception, inference, testimony, and analogy) and to do so in a manner that
is consistent with mundane epistemological practices. But this ostensibly
down-to-earth approach to epistemic warrant—to understanding what jus-
tifies assertions—sparked heated debates in India, which continued and were
expanded in Tibet. Some of the most philosophically compelling of these
debates constitute the subject matter of the present volume.
1
Freedom from Extremes Accomplished
through Comprehensive Knowledge
of Philosophy, Chapter 5
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen
1 This summary of Taktsang’s life is mainly based on his autobiography (Taktsang 2007e), with
additional material from Kodani (2017), Cabezón (1995), Dondor and Tenzin Chödrak (1993: 510–
512), and Tupten Nyima (2007: 22–30).
Knowing Illusion: Bringing a Tibetan Debate into Contemporary Discourse Volume II. The Yakherds, Oxford University
Press. © Oxford University Press 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197603673.003.0001
2 Knowing Illusion
often as part of their attempts to gain or solidify power. While the Sakyapas
remained wealthy and influential, they were now one of a number of factions
in a competitive religious marketplace.
The Gelukpas, who during Tsongkhapa’s time had avoided political
entanglements, gradually emerged as a rising power. Tsongkhapa had estab-
lished Ganden, the order’s first monastery, in 1410, and his followers expanded
the influence and spread of the brand he initiated. By Taktsang’s time, the
Gelukpas had become well-established as an intellectual and political force in
Tibet. Philosophers of other traditions viewed them as a threat and attacked
key aspects of Tsongkhapa’s system. Taktsang’s charge that Tsongkhapa’s pre-
sentation of the two truths was riddled with internal contradictions was one of
the most potent assaults on the still-nascent Gelukpa orthodoxy, one that con-
tinues to resonate in the works of Sakyapas and Karma Kagyüpas today.
In his religious autobiography, Taktsang presents himself as a precocious child
with a strong inclination toward Buddhism. He reports that he had deep faith in
the Buddha’s teachings at an early age, and he received the threefold refuge when
he was three years old.2 His parents taught him prayers to Tārā when he was five,
and when he was eight he traveled to Topgyel to begin formal study.3
In addition to Buddhist subjects, Taktsang learned calligraphy, and he also
received tantric initiation in practices related to Jetāri’s lineage of Amitāyus
(Dze ta ri’i lugs kyi tshe dpag med) from Gyatön Sönam Chöchok (rGya ston
bSod nams chos mchog, d.u.). Later, Chöjé Drakpa Sangpo (Chos rje Grags
pa bzang po, d.u.) initiated Taktsang into the practice of Red Yamāri with
Five Deities (gShin rje gshed dmar po lha lnga).
Taktsang’s biographies suggest that his parents were initially reluctant to
grant him permission to receive full monastic ordination.4 In his autobiog-
raphy, he indicates that he became fully ordained before the standard age of
twenty.5 His preceptor, Sengé Gyeltsen Pelsangpo (Seng ge rgyal mtshan dpal
bzang po, d.u.), gave him the monastic name Sherab Rinchen.
In his autobiography, Taktsang clearly intends to demonstrate his
grounding in the tradition: he lists many teachers who gave him instructions
2 Taktsang (2007e: 1). This involves formally “taking refuge” in the three jewels: the Buddha,
Dharma, and Monastic Community (Saṃgha). This is the standard way of officially becoming a
Buddhist.
3 Ibid., 5.
4 Ibid., 3.
5 This may have been the reason for his parents’ reluctance to accede to Taktsang’s wishes to be-
come a fully ordained monk. In Tibet, it is customary for monks to wait until they are at least twenty
years of age before taking full ordination.
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen 3
All of my claims here rest on the foundation of the Sage’s teachings because all
of the reasons just explained are the Victor’s intention. That said, the analysis
that clearly fleshes out such ideas as the three kinds of cyclic existence and so
forth are my own. No one else has ever taught these publically—not even the
six ornaments and the two supreme ones have done so. Therefore, the sun of
my discernment is indeed capable of illuminating all objects of knowledge,
but should its light not fall on those who stay in caves facing north, then that
is not the fault of the sun. I speak thus, feeling both proud and despondent.6
this chapter, Taktsang adduces textual sources for his reading of Candrakīrti.
In the works of Losang Chökyi Gyaltsen and Purchok we will see prom-
inent examples of the way his Geluk opponents marshal evidence from
Candrakīrti’s treatises to support their exegeses. We leave it to the reader to
decide who is offering the most compelling analysis of Candrakīrti’s corpus
and who is citing him in misleading ways.
The serious philosophical work begins in part 2 (“The Explanation of the
Actual Madhyamaka”). Taktsang begins by aligning a commitment to con-
ventional epistemic warrants with the Svātantrika school. He argues that an
important difference between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika is that the former
claims that the conventional world can be determined and ascertained ob-
jectively (despite the fact that the objects of the conventional world are ulti-
mately deceptive), while the latter denies that this is possible.
Taktsang then argues that a commitment to epistemic warrant only makes
sense if such warrant is obtained objectively, by the power of the objects,
and he adds that acceptance of such objectivity runs counter to being a
Prāsaṅgika. This is an important early salvo against Tsongkhapa, who
argues that the Prāsaṅgika system both requires and makes sense of con-
ventional epistemic warrant. Taktsang characterizes this notion as a “later
blend of the two distinct schools of Madhyamaka thought”—Svātantrika and
Prāsaṅgika—and thus “a baseless fabrication.”8
This is the heart of Taktsang’s critique of Tsongkhapa: Prāsaṅgika, he
argues, eschews any commitment to the reality of the conventional world, or
any sense of conventional truth. On this view, the so-called relative reality
is upon initial Madhyamaka analysis found to be entirely deceptive, and so
false. Yet even this conclusion does not stand up to sustained Madhyamaka
reasoning, and so the entire framework of the two truths—and indeed truth
and falsity—is ultimately transcended on the Madhyamaka path. Therefore,
the conventional world is, from a Madhyamaka perspective, not a proper
object of knowledge, where knowledge by definition delivers reality, or the
truth. So epistemic warrant regarding the conventional is incoherent. Verse
12 at the top of the section on Prāsaṅgika summarizes this fundamental
error that issues in the contradictions that Taktsang argues beset the Geluk
system.
Taktsang further argues that buddhas do not know conventional truth
because they are omniscient and are undeceived, and the conventional
9 Ibid., 267.
10 Ibid. 271.
11 Ibid., v.13a–b.
12 Summarized by Taktsang in verse 13c–d.
13 In verse 14a.
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen 7
impossible for them to constitute extended wholes.14 Analysis in the second con-
text, however, reveals that there are no partless particles and that everything is
infinitely divisible. Tsongkhapa’s version of Prāsṅgika, he argues, is committed
to both theses: external objects are real and are epistemically warranted, but also
that objects have parts. Taktsang argues that in trying to maintain both theses at
the same time, this system is also committed to claims that, despite their being in-
dividually true within separate contexts, cannot both be true in a single context.
Taktsang also argues15 that it makes no sense to distinguish—as Tsongkhapa
and his followers do—between true and false in a world in which everything
is deceptive. The fact that truth and falsity can be relativized to different kinds
of epistemic subjects (what the world looks like to us is very different, for in-
stance, from how it is experienced by a dog) contradicts the idea that any of us
can really be correct in a definitive sense. The remainder of the contradictions
follows this pattern, except for some that are explicitly exegetical.
Taktsang’s principal charge is that because a Prāsaṅgika must accept the decep-
tiveness of the world, there is no privileged metaphysical perspective from which
a Prāsaṅgika can talk about what is true or false, real or unreal, warranted or un-
warranted in that world. He argues that the vast majority of Buddhist terms and
principles that allegedly describe the nature of reality, the path of awakening, and
the fruition to be attained in fact belong to the unexamined, nonanalytic context,
and that Prāsaṅgikas avail themselves of those terms with this understanding in
mind. There is no special Prāsaṅgika epistemology beyond that which is encoun-
tered in the unanalyzed world, because both epistemology and ontology implode
and dissolve when one follows the Prāsaṅgika path.
Taktsang acknowledges that in the first context it is possible and indeed
necessary to say and understand what Madhyamaka classifies as relative or
conventional truth, but none of this amounts to knowledge in a Madhyamaka
sense. In the second context, we can discuss and comprehend how all of that
dissolves upon analysis. Such understanding offers insight into the ultimate
truth. But even this framework of the two truths, which is the hallmark of
the second context, does not have any metaphysical foundations. In the final
context, knowledge is transcended, and the character of this so-called third
context is hence inexpressible.
****
14 This pertains to complex debates within Buddhist scholasticism that are discussed in Duckworth
et al. (2016).
15 Verse 15b: 280.
8 Knowing Illusion
Chapter 5
Accomplishing Freedom from Extremes by
Refuting the Subtle Twofold Self
The lower schools among our own and other traditions employ inauthentic
textual sources and reasoning. They thereby entrench the innate delusions of
their continuums. But as it has been said:
Thus, [256]17 the better the textual sources and reasoning are, the more one
can refute the imaginings of the reifying mind. Here, the refutation of the
subtle self comprises: (1) a brief presentation of the classification; (2) an ex-
tensive explanation of the framework; (3) a refutation of other aspects of rei-
fication and nihilism; and (4) various elegant explanations.
The first section comprises (1) a general explanation; and (2) specific
explanations.
16 Śāntideva, Entering the Way of Bodhisattvas (Bodhi[sattva]-caryāvatāra; Tib. Byang chub sems
dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa), ix.4a–b, sDe dge #3871, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. la: 31a.
17 While we have consulted other editions of Taktsang’s text, the page numbers found in square
brackets in this translation are those of Taktsang (2007b). It should be noted that while the Tibetan
text of the autocommentary makes reference to the relevant verses of the root text, it does not
cite them in full. In our translation of the autocommentary, we have chosen to include complete
translations of the root verses at the appropriate places for ease of reading. When we get to the enu-
meration of the 18 contradictions, those will be indicated by numbers in parentheses.
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen 9
All of our own and others’ philosophical systems reflect their exponents’
perspectives. Thus, whatever the proponents of the lower systems affirm—
despite its actual nonexistence—constitutes an extreme of reification, whereas
whatever the higher systems deny—despite its actual existence—is an extreme
of nihilism. Each school claims that its own position is the middle path beyond
those two extremes. Thus, for example, in his commentary on Thirty Verses,
Sthiramati explains:
Any assertion that the cognitive object is as real as the mind is the extreme
of reification. Any assertion that cognition is as nonexistent as the cognitive
object is the extreme of nihilism. Here I will offer the middle path that is free
from those two.18
18 Sthiramati, Commentary on Thirty Verses (Triṃśikā-bhāṣya; Tib. Sum cu pa’i bshad pa), sDe dge
#4064, bsTan ’gyur, Sems tsam, vol. shi: 146b–147a. Taktsang’s rendering of this passage differs in
wording from the sDe dge version.
19 The view of false representations (rnam rdzun smra ba; Skt. alīkākāravāda) is the Yogācāra po-
sition upheld by thinkers such as Ratnākaraśānti (c. 970–1045), according to which both external
objects and their mental representations (ākāra) are unreal.
20 Emend gzhan gyi dbang ni yod ma yin to gzhan gyi dbang ni yod pa ste.
21 Descent into Laṅkā Discourse (Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra; Tib. Lang kar gshegs pa’i mdo), sDe dge #107,
Next we turn to those Mādhyamikas, like Nāgārjuna and others, who are not
just called this, but actually belong to that school from among the four phil-
osophical systems. In terms of that Madhyamaka, the Prāsaṅgikas are those
22 Great Discourse on Emptiness (Śūnyatā-nāma-mahāsūtra; Tib. mDo chen po stong pa nyid), sDe
rnam par ’byed pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa), i.2–3, sDe dge #4021, bsTan ’gyur, Sems tsam, vol. phi: 640b.
24 This refers to Prajñākāragupta (c. eighth century), author of Ornament for Commentary on the
Just as in Tibet, these two systems were also known in India under the names
Nonfoundationalism and Illusionism.27 Thus, in his Instructions for Cultivating
the Ultimate Spirit of Awakening, the supreme scholar Śūra28 explains: [258]
25 The triple criteria are the following: the truth of the minor premise; the fact that the possession of
the property in the subject of the major premise guarantees the possession of the property in its pred-
icate (anvaya-vyāpti); and the fact that anything that lacks the property mentioned in the predicate of
the major premise also lacks the property mentioned in its subject (vyatireka-vyāpti).
26 This is the Pramāṇavāda school of Dignāga (c. 480–540) and Dharmakīrti (c. seventh century),
(rNgog bLo ldan shes rab, 1059-1109) on this issue, denies that this is a valid way of distinguishing
Mādhyamikas. On this and related issues, see Ruegg (2000: 32–35).
28 On the complexities of identifying Śūra or Āryaśura and his authorship of this text, see Ruegg
(1981: 59n, 119–120). For a summary of the argument regarding the two kinds of Mādhyamikas in
Śūra’s work, see Almogi (2010).
29 The fourth line of this verse appears as the second in the sDe dge edition. The translation is based
Thus, he argues that one fails to see the Mañjuśrī qua freedom from
fabrications even if one may otherwise have proven illusion, or the like. Thus,
having explained how establishing illusions is unreasonable, he proceeds:
This may be shown, and yet it is not something that can be shown.
Here there is nothing at all to clear away.
Emptiness is also empty.
Here there are neither buddhas nor sentient beings.
the Tibetan canon, but none appear to contain this exact wording.
35 Advayavajra (Maitreyanātha /Maitrīpāda), Jewel Garland of Reality (Tattva-ratnāvalī; Tib. De
kho na nyid rin po che’i phreng ba), sDe dge #2240, bsTan ’gyur, rGyud, vol. pi: 115b–120b.
36 Jetāri, Differentiating the Sugata’s Thought (Sugatamata-vibhaṅga-kārikā; Tib. bDe bar gshegs pa
gzhung rnam par ’byed pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa). sDe dge #3899, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. a: 7a–8b.
14 Knowing Illusion
The two approaches are also correctly known as “the school of reasoning that
exposes contradictions in others” versus “the school of reasoning that furnishes
autonomous proofs.” They are also referred to as those who deny—versus those
who assert—that relative truth can be divided in terms of correct and incor-
rect, that buddhas have impure karmic perceptions, and that the view involves
assertions.
Nonetheless, some earlier Tibetans claimed that the schools may be distin-
guished in terms of whether or not they accept the relative truth, whether or
not they hold that buddhas possess gnosis, whether or not they declare the ul-
timate to be absence of fabrications or a nonimplicative negation, and so on.
Nevertheless, none of those distinctions work because even Prāsaṅgikas accept
the relative truth as it appears in the perspective of others, and both Candrakīrti
and Śāntideva (c. 685–763) refute in their treatises the idea that buddhas have
no gnosis. Finally:
37 Jñānagarbha, Differentiation of the Two Truths (Satyadvaya-vibhaṅga; Tib. bDen pa gnyis rnam
par ’byed pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa), verse 9a–b, sDe dge #3881, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. sa: 2a.
38 See Ngok Lotsawa Loden Sherab (2006), Drop of Nectar (bDud rtsi’i thig le), bKa’ gdams gsung
’bum phyogs bsgrigs thengs dang po, vol. 1: 709. See also Ruegg (2000: 32–34).
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen 15
The first and the last because they assert true existence;
The second because they leave out all the factors of method;
And the third because they contradictorily find, upon analysis,
A common locus of the false and the nondeceptive. [6]
39 Rational cognition (rigs shes) is a technical term for any cognition that engages ultimate truth. It
does not refer to cognitions that relate to conventional reality in a rational way.
16 Knowing Illusion
Thus they teach that the pure dependent nature of the system of false
representation itself is the ultimate truth, the sphere of reality, emptiness
endowed with all supreme features—and as such is immune to analysis.
They proclaim that the teacher of that system, Vasubandhu (c. fourth cen-
tury), is a proponent of the Great Madhyamaka, and they deny that glorious
Candrakīrti, Haribhadra (c. 459–529), and other such teachers of intrinsic
emptiness [261] are Dharma teachers of the age of perfection. Instead
they see them as propagating nihilism. Similarly, they say that when noble
Nāgārjuna (c. second century) composed his analytical corpus,40 his intellect
had not yet matured in the way that it had when he authored his Praise of the
Sphere of Reality.41 Those who in this way persistently seek to prove true ex-
istence nevertheless vainly consider themselves representatives of the Great
Madhyamaka.
The second of these four schools teaches that because nothing whatsoever
can be established from the rational perspective, one may, even in conven-
tional terms, dispose with the factors of method. There are many who thus,
while in actual fact following the way of the Chinese Hashang (Ch. Heshang
Moheyan 和尚摩诃衍, fl. eighth century), proclaim an all-sufficient Great
Perfection (rDzogs chen) that brings liberation upon perception.42 They say
that while people who lack merit will not meet with this Dharma, those who
do encounter it will be liberated without even having to pursue the three
trainings.43 Those three approaches all constitute actual grasping at extremes.
The third school holds that the relative truth is false. But it also asserts
that relative things, while being false, may nevertheless be conventionally
40 Nāgārjuna’s Analytical Corpus is a group of texts on logic and reasoning attributed to him: (1)
Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā; Tib. dBu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur
byas pa shes rab ces bya ba); (2) Reply to Objections (Vigraha-vyāvartanī; Tib. rTsod pa bzlog pa’i
tshig le’ur byas pa); (3) Jeweled Garland (Ratnāvalī; Tib. Rin po che’i ’phreng ba); (4) Seventy Verses
on Emptiness (Śūnyatā-saptati; Tib. sTong pa nyid bdun cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa); (5) Sixty Verses of
Argument (Yukti-ṣaṣṭikā-kārikā; Tib. Rigs pa drug cu pa’i ’grel pa); (6) Detailed Analysis (Vaidalya-
prakaraṇa; Tib. Zhib mo rnam par ’thag pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa); and a no longer extant work
entitled Establishment of the Mundane (Vyavahāra-siddhi; Tib. Tha snyad grub pa), a few verses of
which are cited in Jeweled Garland.
41 Dharmadhātu-stotra; Tib. Chos dbyings bstod pa, sDe dge #1118, bsTan ’gyur, bsTod tshogs, vol.
ka: 63b5–67b3.
42 Heshang Moheyan (Tib. Hashang Mahayana) is commonly portrayed in Tibet as a paradig-
matic example of someone who holds heterodox views. He is regarded as propounding an antino-
mian vision of Buddhist practice in which simply eliminating all thought leads to awakening. This
simplistic version of his teachings is at odds with extant sources from his time, but it has become
widely accepted in Tibet. See van Schaik (2008 and 2015) and Gómez (1983). A summary of the
Great Perfection system of practice can be found in Powers (2007: 383–393).
43 These are training in ethics, meditation, and wisdom.
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen 17
This involves explaining (1) the Svātantrikas and (2) the Prāsaṅgikas.
2.2.1. The Svātantrikas
This topic is explained by way of: (1) showing that Svātantrika is the ap-
propriate approach for those who are fond of epistemically warranted
conventions; (2) showing that Svātantrikas are not representatives of
the Great Madhyamaka; (3) proving that they generally do qualify as
Mādhyamikas; and (4) presenting their subdivisions.
2.2.1.1. Svātantrika Is the Way for Those Who Are Fond of Epistemically
Warranted Conventions
Thus, it would certainly be contradictory to assert that the same thing can be
both false and nondeceptive in the context of a realist system. Nevertheless,
as explained by many scholars of India and Tibet, Svātantrika makes sense
if you want epistemically warranted conventions. Śūra, the supreme scholar
and great son of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva (c. 163–261), teaches that through
18 Knowing Illusion
such an approach, which refutes the system of false representation, one will
fail to see either the Mañjughoṣa that transcends verbal expression or that is
imperceptible and nonappearing. However, one may still perceive the forms
of Mañjughoṣa up to that which is beyond consciousness and phenomena.44
Moreover, the tradition that asserts that the same thing can be both false
and nondeceptive was established by Bhāviveka, an early son of Nāgārjuna,
and so this system is among the original explanations of Madhyamaka.
Therefore, the later blend of the two distinct schools of Madhyamaka thought
is a baseless fabrication. For this reason, the Indian and Tibetan scholars
who adhered to the Svātantrika system are extremely numerous, and as
Candrakīrti says:
Thus, Candrakīrti appears to declare that there has been no one but himself
who did otherwise. As for Candrakīrti’s followers, there were only a few—
for example, Vidyākaukila (d.u.), the great Lord Atiśa, the latter’s spiritual
son Siṃha (d.u.), and so on. In Tibet, glorious Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka
treatises were not translated until the coming of Patsap Nyima Drakpa
(Pa tshab Nyi ma grags pa, b. 1055), and hence even Entering the Way of
Bodhisattvas was given a Svātantrika interpretation. Among the four sons of
Patsap,46 it seems that apart from the one lacking expertise about both word
and meaning, Shang Thangsakpa (Zhang thang sag pa Ye shes ’byung gnas,
eleventh century), they did not produce very many lineage holders.
The noble Sakya forefathers, as well as Butön (Bu ston Rin chen grub, 1290–
1364) and others, referred to their own approach as Great Madhyamaka,
but they did not teach it very often. Nonetheless, Tibetan scholars in, for
44 For the complete list of views characterised as approaching Mañjughoṣa to a greater or lesser ex-
sDe dge #3861, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. ’a: 218b.
46 According to Gö Lotsawa’s (’Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal, 1392–1481) Blue Annals (Deb gter
sngon po; Gö Lotsawa 1984: 417), Patsap’s main disciples are (1) Tsangpa Sarbö (gTsang pa Sar sbos,
d.u.); (2) Mabja Jangchup Tsöndrü (rMa bya Byang chub brtson ’grus, d. 1185); (3) Dar Yönden Drak
(Dar Yon tan grags, d.u.); and (4) Shang Tangsakpa Yeshé Jungné (Zhang thang sag pa ye shes, a.k.a
Ye shes ’byung gnas). Gö credits them with “spreading the Madhyamaka teachings in Ü and Tsang.”
There is a tradition that the first student understood the words of the teachings, while the third un-
derstood their meaning. Mabja understood both words and meaning, and Shang Tangsakpa Yeshé
Jungné understood neither.
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen 19
example, the lineage coming from Ngok Lotsawa for the most part taught
Svātantrika. [263] Moreover, the preceptor Śāntarakṣita (8th century), whose
kindness toward Tibet is immense, taught a combination of Madhyamaka
and Pramāṇavāda—and thus Svātantrika—in his Ornament of the Middle
Way,47 his epistemological Compendium of Metaphysics,48 Establishing the
Ultimate,49 and elsewhere. Therefore, the fact that Tibetans adhere to his ap-
proach is also in accord with the ways of the world.
Although they set forth the relative truth as compelling only when not
examined,
Due to their immense habituation to logic they do not understand
How without a shared dependent arising free from imputations
Things can function in a world that is only imputed by mind.
Regarding their claim that emptiness and dependent arising amount to the
same thing,
They are also slightly confused. For these reasons this is not the Great
Madhyamaka. [7c–8d]
47 Madhyamakālaṃkāra-kārikā; Tib. dBu ma rgyan gyi tshig le’ur byas pa, sDe dge #3884, bsTan
tshig le’ur byas pa), verse 64a–b, sDe dge #3884, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. sa: 55a.
20 Knowing Illusion
rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan zhe bya ba’i pa’i ’grel pa),
sDe dge #3793, bsTan ’gyur, Shes phyin, vol. ja: 118b.
53 Ngok Loden Sherab (2006), Drop of Nectar: 708.
54 As explained on p. 11, note 25, the “triple criterion” (trairūpya) sets conditions for the validity of
an argument. To put this in the terms of Buddhist logic, reason (liṅga; Tib. hetu) must (1) be present
in the subject (pakṣadharmatva; Tib. phyogs chos); (2) also be present in similar cases (anvayavyāpti;
Tib. rjes khyab); and (3) not be present in any dissimilar case (vyatirekavyāpti; Tib. ldog khyab). These
criteria are often associated with Dignāga, but they originated with Vasubandhu; see Frauwallner
(1957).
55 Jñānagarbha, Differentiation of the Two Truths, verse 8a–c: 2a.
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen 21
It also states:
The same point is made extensively in Ornament of the Middle Way and its
commentary,57 Light of the Middle Way,58 and Heart of the Middle Way59 and
its commentary.60
Nevertheless, this approach refutes the fact that things resist ultimate
analysis
And teaches the ultimate, final pacification of fabrications
As well as the figurative nonarising.
Thus, it is superior to the realists and is nothing but the Middle Way. [9]
snying po’i tshig le’ur byas pa), sDe dge #3855, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. dza: 1a–40b.
60 Bhāviveka, Blaze of Reasoning: A Commentary on the Verses on Heart of the Middle Way
(Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-vṛtti-tarka-jvālā; Tib. dBu ma snying po’i ’grel pa rtog ge ’bar ba), sDe dge
#3856, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. dza: 40b–329b.
22 Knowing Illusion
absence of birth and the emptiness of anything real as the so-called figurative
ultimate. Thus, Differentiation of the Two Truths explains:
2.2.2. The Prāsaṅgikas
This topic comprises (1) refuting the misleading; and (2) establishing the
genuine.
2.2.2.1.1. Presentation
Certain recent Tibetan holders of the teachings who were great scholars
propounded Candrakīrti’s system accurately and faithfully early in their
careers. [266] Nonetheless, they later deviated, but not due to any improve-
ment in their logical acumen. Generally, Tibet abounds with terminology de-
rived from logic texts, and in particular from Chapa’s (Phya pa Chos kyi seng
ge, 1109–1169) compendia. Moreover, Mādhyamikas embrace the “blessing
of relative truth that is nondeceptive dependent arising” of the Svātantrika
teaching and are hounded by the statement that “causality cannot reliably be
posited simply on the basis of an erroneous perspective.”
They believe that if this were so, then in terms of conventional reasoning
that is not ultimate analysis, it would follow that a dream elephant and an
elephant perceived when awake would be equally efficacious; and a halluci-
nation of falling hairs and a perception of blue would likewise be epistemi-
cally indistinguishable. Their principal concern is that it would follow that
the process of karmic causality would not be reliable.
Those who have such concerns and believe themselves to be followers of
the system of Candrakīrti and Śāntideva face further contradictions, as we
shall see. Consider this:
And similarly:
64 Nāgārjuna, Reply to Objections (Vigraha-vyāvartanī; Tib. rTsod pa bzlog pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa),
verse 71, sDe dge #3828, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. tsa: 29a.
65 Nāgārjuna, Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā; Tib. dBu ma rtsa
ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba), xiv.18, sDe dge #3824, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. tsa: 15a.
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen 25
set forth based on the afflictive ignorance that belongs to the twelve links of
existence.”67
The second variant of the relative is supplied as follows: Disciples and sol-
itary buddhas68 who have completed their training, [268] as well as noble
bodhisattvas of the Mahāyāna who are still training, have relinquished the
afflictive ignorance that is responsible for relative truth, as mentioned ear-
lier. Therefore, it is explained that nonpathological ignorance, or mere igno-
rance, supplies the relative as experienced by those who partake in gnosis
that involves appearances. Thus, for them “the relative is fabricated and not
truth, because they do not presume that it is real.”69
Candrakīrti then explains: “Such beings experience mere ignorance in the
form of cognitive obscuration and so this appears to noble beings who par-
ticipate in the domain of appearances. . . .”70 Therefore, forget about relative
truth in the case of buddhas; Candrakīrti states that they are free from even
that which serves to set up the mere relative. As he says:
That is not the case for those who participate in the domain without ap-
pearance. Since buddhas have attained true and complete awakening with
respect to all phenomena, all movements of mind and mental states have
completely ceased.71
And:
Tib. dBu ma la ’jug pa’i bshad pa), sDe dge #3862, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. ’a: 255a. For a discussion
of the twelve links of existence, see Keown (2003: 221).
68 These are categories of Buddhist practitioners. “Disciples” (śrāvaka; lit. “hearer”) are followers
of the Buddha who belong to what is often called the “Lesser Vehicle” (Hīnayāna) and whose main
religious goal is the liberation of an arhat. Solitary buddhas (pratyeka-buddha) are more advanced
than disciples and have superior attainments, but still fall short of the aspirations of bodhisattvas. See
Keown (2003: 102 and 177) for more details.
69 Candrakīrti, Autocommentary on Introduction to the Middle Way: 255a.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Candrakīrti, Introduction to the Middle Way, xi.17d: 216b. The Autocommentary explains that
Candrakīrti then anticipates an objection: You say that gnosis that is free
from dualistic appearance has no object (“if at the time of pacification the
intellect does not engage . . .”74). But it does not make sense for cognition to
know an object in the absence of the appearance of an object. He replies to
this objection with the verses that begin: “When non-arising is reality . . .”75
Thus he argues that, as is commonly held, an object is known when a mental
state arises with its representation; when the object does not arise, the mental
state does not arise either, just like water being poured into water. Similarly,
the phrase: “the mind knows an object” may be used when the character of
the object and its appearance to the mind correspond. So Candrakīrti does
not deny the absence of any appearance of an object. [269] Also, Entering the
Way of Bodhisattvas teaches that no object appears:
turns his wheel so powerfully that it continues to spin without further effort. Similarly, buddhas train
in such qualities as wisdom and compassion over the course of eons, and the force of this enables
them to respond spontaneously to the needs of sentient beings.
28 Knowing Illusion
Thus, he argues that the objection does not hit the mark, and he does not
deny that buddhas do not have minds. Confused by such statements, Kharak
Jangchub Shönnu (Kha rag pa Byang chub gzhon nu, d.u.) and others have
taught that these two masters deny that buddhas possess gnosis. If we ex-
amine these debates, however, it is clear that Candrakīrti and Śāntideva af-
firm the existence of the gnosis of equipoise without appearances—a gnosis
that fully comprehends the manifold reality of all cognitive objects as having
a single taste.
Suppose someone objects: “Such gnosis requires mind and mental states.
Hence, Clear Meaning also says: ‘Nondual minds and mental states must be
accepted; how should they be classified?’ ”81
But that is a Svātantrika assertion. Thus, the same commentary also
asserts: “These must not be refuted based on another philosophical system.”82
[270] Similarly, “One single moment of your understanding embraces the
full sphere of what is knowable” is a statement from the commentary to
Differentiation of the Two Truths.83
Again, it might be objected: “Well, consider these passages from
Introduction to the Middle Way:
78 Śāntideva, Entering the Way of Bodhisattvas, ix.36: 32a. The magical jewels and trees spoken of in
bDen pa gnyis rnam par ’byed pa’i ’grel pa), sDe dge #3882, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma, vol. sa: 14b.
84 Candrakīrti, Autocommentary on Introduction to the Middle Way: 312b.
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen 29
And:
The same treatise also provides an extensive exposition of the ten powers,
such as the knowledge of what is right and what is wrong.86 Why is that?”
To this we reply that the first two passages concern the gnosis of equi-
poise without appearances. The second passage—and a number of others,
including Entering the Way of Bodhisattvas’ statement that “buddhas and
bodhisattvas have unimpeded vision of everything”87—is made from the
perspective of trainees. These claims—that the Buddha knows, that he was
born, and so on—are about bodies that are responses to the disciples. These
emanational embodiments of the Buddha that are responses to sentient
beings are simply magical displays or merely semblances of the Buddha. If
one were to say that because they seemingly display cognition they actually
cognize, one would, by the same token, also have to say that they in fact attain
awakening anew in the world when they appear to do so.88
Moreover, it would follow that when the world and its inhabitants appear
to a person who performs actions and suffers from pathologies, the apparent
environment and inhabitants are not produced by their specific causes, viz.,
actions and pathologies. It would follow that these appearances are not due
to the causes for error, viz., actions and pathologies. Similarly, it would follow
that darkness would make physical things imperceptible for perfectly awak-
ened buddhas, that their bodies would be burnable by the flaming red-hot
iron of hell and destructible in a rain of weapons, and that this appears to
heaven of Akaniṣṭha before he appeared to attain awakening under the Bodhi Tree. Thus, the attain-
ment of awakening at Bodhgaya was only an appearance—a pretense, as it were—and not reality. See
Cabezón (1999).
30 Knowing Illusion
buddhas themselves. This is because except for the appearance of true ex-
istence, which does not appear to buddhas, all of the other properties of
the world—solidity, and so on—that appear to ordinary individuals are
warranted exactly as they appear by means of epistemic instruments—and
[271] indeed chiefly by buddhas’ epistemic instruments.
Moreover, there would be no point in cultivating aspects of the path such
as the illusory body, which are for the sake of attaining the embodiment of a
buddha through gnosis that is free from the elemental, material factors of or-
dinary physical embodiment.89 This is because the apprehension of all phys-
ical factors is here held to be a special quality of buddhas’ gnosis.
One would also lose the concordance between the path and the result. This
is because during the gnosis of equipoise on the stages of training, and before
every mandala of the path of Mantra, one must forcefully dispel appearances.
Nevertheless, here our opponents hold that all appearances are manifest at
the time of the result. Because all phenomena are seen during the gnosis of
equipoise at the time of the result, it would follow that the perception of the
gnosis of equipoise would have to improve continuously beyond the path of
seeing, gradually enabling one to see phenomena more clearly.90
Therefore, this idea that the gnosis of buddhas is the primary epistemic war-
rant for discerning the relative truth is a primary flaw of this system. Describing
the relative truth as “worldly”—as in the phrase “the truth of worldly conven-
tion and the ultimate truth”91—would make no sense. Statements that could
be cited in this context are abundant, but consider, for example, these:
89 Yogas relating to the illusory body (māyā-deha) are aspects of tantric practice; see Powers
(2007: 286–287).
90 The path of seeing (darśana-mārga) is the third of the five paths to awakening; see Powers
(2007: 91–98).
91 Nāgārjuna, Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way, xxiv.8c–d: 15a.
92 Candrakīrti, Introduction to the Middle Way, vi.164d: 212a.
93 Ibid., vi.81c–d: 208a.
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen 31
94 Emend ’bral to ’bras. Śāntideva, Entering the Way of Bodhisattvas, ix.76b–77b: 33b.
95 The Sanskrit term timira (Tib. rab rib) is frequently used in Buddhist literature as an ex-
ample of mistaken perception. It can refer to a wide range of visual defects, including floaters, oc-
cluded or hazy vision, or seeing spots, lines, dots, flowers, or clouds. Many of these (e.g., floaters or
perceptions of sky-flowers) result from defects in the eye’s vitreous humor, but they are perceived as
external. Floaters cast shadows on the retina or refract light that passes through them, which causes
perceptions of external phenomena. In his Commentary on the Discourse Explaining the Thought
(Ārya-gambhīra-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra-ṭīkā; Tib. ’Phags pa dgongs pa zab mo nges par ’grel pa’i mdo
rgya cher ’grel pa; sDe dge #4016, bsTan ’gyur, mDo ’grel, vol. ti [118]: 517.4), Wonch’ŭk 원측/圓測
(613–696) explains: “Through the power of clouded vision existing in the eye, an eye-consciousness
and a mental consciousness that [arises] at the same time are generated through the power of those
two consciousnesses; a conceptual mental consciousness cognizes circular hairs and so forth in the
second moment.” On p. 518.5, citing the Compendium of Abhidharma (Abhidharma-samuccaya), he
adds that timira can also refer to conditions that cause people to misperceive colors: “Due to the de-
generation of an eye sense power that is affected by jaundice of the eye, blue is perceived as yellow.”
See also MacDonald’s (2015, vol. 2: 111–112, n. 228) discussion of translations of timira. The term is
discussed in a number of Indian Buddhist sources, including Madhyamaka-kārikā-vṛtti, ed. Louis
de la Vallée Poussin (1903–1913, ch. 18: 373); Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (la Vallée Poussin
1970: 102 and 109).
When the term is used to indicate floaters perceived externally, ophthalmologist Dr. Mindy
Kim-Miller (personal communication) stated that from a contemporary medical perspective,
“myodesopsia” is a close match for “the effect of floaters on vision, whereas floaters can refer to the
physiologic etiology. Given modern medical advances, the analogy to seeing things that aren’t there
seems to be a misinterpretation. The floaters that cause the ‘hair-like’ debris are actually present in
the vitreous of the eyeball, but they get misinterpreted as hairs or flowers or insects.” She added that
she has floaters in her own eyes, and so she perceives external hairs, but as an ophthalmologist she
recognizes them as false at the same time as she experiences this phenomenon. Kobayashi (2013)
provides a useful overview of relevant Indian medical literature on the subject.
96 Emend mi zad pa’i to mi bzad ba’i.
32 Knowing Illusion
If this were not the case, then it would also be unreasonable to assert—based
on the statement: “That is indeed true, but only in mundane terms; every-
thing else is, according to mundane people, falsely conceived”101—that the
distinction between correct and incorrect relative reality is drawn only in
mundane terms and that it is not the way of our own Prāsaṅgika system.
“Well,” one might then think, “I see that these passages make exactly the
same point. So I will henceforth accept that our system distinguishes between
97 Lo chen sKyabs mchog dPal bzang (c. 1340–1415), teacher of Rendawa Shönnu Lodrö (Red
mda’ ba gZhon nu blo gros, 1349–1412). Kyabchok was also the teacher of another great Sakya
scholar, Ngorchen Kunga Sangpo (Ngor chen Kun dga’ bzang po, 1382–1456) and the author of a
commentary on Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way: Clarification of the Meaning of the Words
of the Commentary on Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi ’grel pa
tshig don rab gsal), as well as a commentary on Introduction to the Middle Way entitled Extensive
Explanation of Introduction to the Middle Way Thoroughly Clarifying the Essence of the Ocean of
Scripture (dBu ma la ’jug pa rgya cher bshad pa gsung rab rgya mtsho’i de kho na nyid rab tu gsal ba).
98 Candrakīrti, Clear Words (Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti-prasanna-padā; Tib. dBu ma rtsa ba’i ’grel
pa tshig gsal ba), sDe dge #3860, bsTan ’gyur, dBu ma vol. ’a: 25b.
99 Dharmakīrti, Commentary on Compendium of Epistemology (Pramāṇa-vārttika; Tib. Tshad ma
rnam ’grel), sDe dge #4210, bsTan ’gyur, Tshad ma, vol. ce: 94b1–151a7.
100 Candrakīrti, Clear Words: 25b. Rendered according to the canonical translation.
101 Candrakīrti, Introduction to the Middle Way, vi.25c–d: 205a.
Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen 33
correct and incorrect relative truth.” But that is not reasonable if you take
statements like this one into account:
Thus, Candrakīrti repeatedly explains that for as long as the causes of delu-
sion endure, the horses and elephants in a dream are just as existent as the
ones we may encounter when awake. Once the causes of delusion cease,
both are equally nonexistent. Therefore, it is accurate to say that in our own
Madhyamaka system there is no distinction between correct and incorrect
relative truth. Without losing sight of this point, one must conclude that our
own Madhyamaka system does not divide the relative into four—as would
be the case if it is distinguished between what is and what is not an epistemic
warrant.
Our opponents claim that disciples and solitary buddhas must realize the
absence of self in phenomena; but Svātantrikas do not accept this. They are
also at odds with Prāsaṅgika because they march under the banner of “the
crossed lions’ necks of Madhyamaka and Pramāṇavāda.”103 This system tries
to get everything right and thereby becomes full of contradictions.
All objects being false104 contradicts their subjects being non-deceptive. [13a]
Our opponents explain that unless one realizes that the object is false, one
will fail to understand the meaning of relative truth. This is exactly right.
In the Prāsaṅgikas’ own system, one indeed realizes that the relative truth
is false. Therefore, it is contradictory to hold on the one hand that all rela-
tive objects are false and on the other hand that the cognitions that are their
subjects can be nondeceptive and epistemically warranting. This is because
contradiction here involves the inconsistency of the object not existing in the way it appears and the
subject apprehending the object as it appears.
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determining the conditions of its use.
THE SCANDAL.
THE CLAIMS.