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Land Acquisition
and Compensation
in India
Mysteries of Valuation
SAT T W IC K DE Y BI S WA S
Land Acquisition and Compensation in India
“Karl Polanyi called labor a fictitious commodity. Land is even more problematic.
Land is mere imagined latency expressed along a continuum of contending dreams.
How could land possibly have a single value to a diverse community of dreamers?
Sattwick Dey Biswas sheds important light on the meaning of land in two expro-
priation cases in West Bengal, India. The empirical research is exemplary, the theo-
retical ground is well developed, and the findings are robust. The value of a parcel
of land is not discovered. Rather, that value is created as various contending mean-
ings of land are expressed, debated, and finally resolved.”
—Daniel W. Bromley, Anderson-Bascom Professor of Applied Economics
(Emeritus), University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA
“This book is an incisive analysis of the multiple uses and values of land in contem-
porary India. Rooted in a careful reading of classical theories of value and valua-
tion, Dey Biswas guides us closer to an understanding of why the vexed problem
of land dispossession and displacement refuses to go away. Readers interested in
the ongoing land grab in the global south and their associated conflicts would do
well to consult this thought-provoking book.”
—Kenneth Bo Nielsen, Associate Professor, Department of Social Anthropology,
The Centre for Development and the Environment, Oslo University, Norway and
Coordinator, Norwegian Network of Asian Studies
“This book combines deeper reflections on the theories of property valuation and
social question with two exciting cases of land acquisition in India. The book is a
marvellous exposition that valuation as frame provides the most worthwhile lens
for a public policy scholar.”
—Sony Pellissery, Executive Director, Institute of Public Policy (NLSIU),
Bangalore, India
“This book explores valuation of land from a theoretical perspective with empirical
evidence from a case study analysis in India. One of the strongest points of the
book is that it recaps the theoretical development of value and valuation in great
detail and therewith provides a comprehensive and almost exhaustive theoretical
framework on valuation–starting from Adam Smith to more recent approaches of
plural land values. An important book for everyone who is concerned with land
markets, land appraisal and land economics!”
—Thomas Hartmann, Associate Professor, Environmental Science, Wageningen
University, The Netherlands
“Sattwick Dey Biswas’s important book constructs a bridge between usually dis-
connected areas of knowledge: law of expropriation (compulsory purchase), gen-
erations of philosophy of land and economics, and the often-enigmatic practices of
the land valuators. Dr Dey Biswas merges together a set of complex concepts with
Ben Davy’s exciting “plural values of land”. Through a brilliant research method,
he then succeeds in operationalizing these concepts into a tool to gauge the opin-
ions of stakeholders in real-life expropriation cases in India. The book is intellectu-
ally challenging – as it should be – but is also very well written. The mystery of
valuation may never be solved, but this book certainly lays out the path in the right
direction.”
—Professor Rachelle Alterman, Technion–Israel Institute of Technology and
Founding President – International Academic Association on Planning,
Law and Property Rights
Sattwick Dey Biswas
Land Acquisition and

Compensation in
India
Sattwick Dey Biswas
Institute of Public Policy
National Law School of India University
Bengaluru, India
ISBN 978-3-030-29480-9 ISBN 978-3-030-29481-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29481-6
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
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Author’s Note
This book draws from the author’s dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor rerum politicarum (Dr. rer. pol.) at
School of Spatial Planning, TU Dortmund University, Germany
School of Spatial Planning

Sattwick Dey Biswas
TU Dortmund University
Dortmund, Germany
Institute of Public Policy
National Law School of India University
Bengaluru, India
v
Acknowledgement
I am indebted to several people for their support and assistance over the
course of the writing of this thesis. I am thankful to Benjamin Davy who
always provided valuable and critical feedback and challenged me in every
step of my writing. He has also kept his faith in this Social Work and Social
Policy student who has dared to write on the political economy of land at
the School of Spatial Planning, TU Dortmund University. I am also grate-
ful to Thomas Hartmann, the first reviewer of the work, for guiding me in
very “crucial” moments of writing. Without his constant support, it was
not possible to finish the project.
I am indebted to the Editor, Alina Yurova, and the Editorial Assistant,
Mary Fata, for their editorial help, keen insight, and ongoing support in
bringing ‘the mysteries of valuation’ to life. It is because of Alina’s trust in
this novice writer and Mary’s constant support that I have managed to
publish it. Rachel Moore and Ms. Sudha Soundarrajan (and her team)
were extremely patient with my errors during the production of the book.
I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their time, atten-
tion, and constructive feedback.
In the rest of the acknowledgements, whenever more than one name
will be mentioned, the appearance will follow the alphabetical order of the
first name and without academic or honorary titles. Also, in the absence of
an appropriate English word, throughout the writing, I could not indicate
the third gender in the appropriate places along with ‘he’ and ‘she’. At
various stages of writing this, Amitabh Mukherjee, Anna Rodermund, Jan
Russell, Subin Sundar Raj, and Roberto Casablanca managed to share
their valuable time in correcting my grammatical mistakes and I am grateful
vii
viii Acknowledgement
to them. The final proofreading is done by Jan Russell, for which I am in

debt. Any remaining errors are mine.
Doctoral study is a journey, and it took time to get admission and a lot
more to produce this work. It was in Bali, Indonesia, that I had my first
international exposure, which was facilitated by the late David S. Kung, a
nomad and amateur cultural anthropologist. With his encouragement, I
became curious about land and cultural plurality, and even more so after
interacting with Avi Hazuria, Ayu Ratna, Komang Ayu, Betty W., Claire
Dassonval, Gary Howlett, Gotardo Egidia, Jan Russell, Sonia Cazzanello,
and my friends in Bali. Upon my return to Santiniketan, India, where I
grew up from the age of six, some of my professors at the Social Work
Department at Visva-Bharati, such as Ashok Kr. Sarkar, Debatosh Sinha,
Kumkum Bhattacharya, Paramita Roy, and Prashanta Kr. Ghosh contin-
ued to encourage me to push my limits. During this time, Manohar Power,
Vishanthie Swapoul, and Lena Dominelli reminded me about dignity and
human rights issues in land.
The opportunity to thoroughly investigate land issues came under the
guidance of Sony Pellissery, who took on this unworthy Social Work grad-
uate as a research assistant at the Institute of Rural Management Anand
(IRMA), India. During the year that I stayed at IRMA (Institute of Rural
Management Anand), I learned a lot through my work and through infor-
mal discussions with Ajit Choudhury, Anand Venkatesh, Debashish Maitra,
Partha Sarathi Roy, Prakash Moirangthem, Ravikiran Naik, Satyendra
Nath Mishra, and Sudipa Sarkar. Till today, Debashish, Satyen, and Sudipa
discuss economic theories with me whenever I contact them.
I thank the Norwegian Quota Scholarship for fully funding my
Master of International Social Welfare and Health Policy (MIS) at Oslo
Metropolitan University. I was fortunate to learn a great many things
from Einar Overbye, Erika Gubrium, Ivar Lødemel, and Ivan Harsløf
at Oslo Metropolitan University, with appropriate support from Anne
Marie Møgster and Stuart Arthur Deakin. I wrote my master thesis with
Benjamin Davy and became an informal part of the FLOOR (Financial
Assistance (Social Cash Transfers), Land Policy, and Global Social Rights)1
team at TU Dortmund University, Germany, via Skype. Some of the team
members were Astrid Maurer, Heinz Kobs, Jackline Kabahinda, Melanie
Halfter, Michael Kolocek, Nadine Preuss, Sepideh Abaii, and Yitu Yang,
with appropriate support from Susanne Syska. Also, email communications
with Benjamin Lockwood, Gemma Burgess, Joseph Persky, Robin Burgess,
Daniel W. Bromley, and Mercedes Stickler were particularly helpful.
Acknowledgement ix
My earlier understanding of economic theory was further nurtured by

Kaushik Basu, theories of political economy by Haragopal G., and legal
theories by Chiradeep Basak, Subin Sundar Raj, Saika Sabbir, Saumya
Uma, Vanishree Radhakrishna, and Vikram Raghavan. On the other hand,
the Poverty and Shame project gave me the opportunity to interact with
and learn from Robert Walker, Elaine Chase, Lichao Yang, Leah Johnston,
Aline Gubrium, and Grace Bantebya, along with Heidi Bergsli and Biju
A. The support from Shashikala, G. Lakshmi, and Nagesh should be
acknowledged.
At the Chair of Bodenpolitik, Bodenmanagement, Kommunales
Vermessungswesen,2 I reunited with the members of the former FLOOR
team plus Julija Bakunowitsch. At the school of spatial planning, I am
thankful to Christoph Kohlmeyer, Franziska Sielker, Genet Alem, Ludger
Basten, Sabine Baumgart, Teresa Elizabeth Sprague, and Wolfgang Scholz.
Thanks, Michael, for over a hundred lunches at the ‘mensa’ and our
thoughtful discussions. I discussed my research issues with a number of
individuals at various stages of this research, some of whose names should
be indicated here: Barbara Harris-White, Bertold Bongardt, Christopher
John Webster, Erika Gubrium, Gabriel Cleopas Shamboo, Jilan Hosni,
Indranil Sarkar, Ivan Harslf, Ivar Lødemel, Kaushik Basu, Kenneth Bo
Nielsen, Nalinava Sengupta, Paramita Roy, Ric Paris, Roberto Casablanca,
Sattwati De Biswas, Satyendra Nath Mishra, Sony Pellissery, Subin Sundar
Raj, Sudipa Sarkar, Sugata Goswami, Tanima Sengupta, Rachelle Alterman,
Ram Singh, Vikram Raghavan, and Yoram Barzel. I also thank participants
of South Asia Across the Nordic Region 2018 (Oslo), PLPR 2017 (Hong
Kong), PLPR-SARC 2015 (Bangalore), and Land and Poverty 2015
(Washington DC) for their valuable feedback on my work.
Due to confidentiality agreements, I could not include all the names of
the generous individuals who ensured access to data at the grassroots level.
Without their cooperation, I would not have managed to collect the data
required for this study. I can only mention Abinandan Sen, Biswajit
Ganguli, Tapan Kumar Maiti, and Ranjan Chatterjee, who assisted me in
navigating the bureaucracy and reaching the data collection area. Also, the
members of Institutional Strengthening of Gram Panchayats (ISGP)
Program II such as Ananya Chowdhury, Arijit Roy, Chandan Maji, Sandip
Sarkar, Suvajit Sural, and Gourav Ghosh. Many representatives of human
rights groups shared their deep knowledge and experiences of land issues;
I can only indicate Ujjaini Halim, but also thank those others who wish to
keep their identities confidential.
x Acknowledgement
I should also mention a few other names from Santiniketan, India, such
as Avik Ghosh, Suprio Tagore, and Susobhan Adhikary, along with Amitab
Mukherjee, Gargi Ghosh, Kishor Bhattacharya, Mousumi Aadhikary,
Pulak Dutta, Rati Basu, Sonali Majumdar, Subhra Tagore, Subhrangsu
Sen, and Sugata Hazra. The support I received at various stages of my life
from Arabinduda, (late) Shivaditya Sen, Shantabhanu Sen, and other
members of the Pratichi Trust, Santiniketan, should also be acknowl-
edged. I would like to thank Rinson Jose, Sayannita Mallik, Susanta
Bhattacharya Zoheath Tsh. Lepcha, and Partha Sarathi Mondal for giving
me confidence and support in the difficult times. Canara Bank, Jadavpur,
provided much needed educational loan to meet the funding gap for
this project.
I will fondly remember my wonderful flatmates, Andrzej Czeremanski
and Michael Naebert, for giving me their time, space, and listening to me,
along with Chloe, Basheer, Saptarshi, Sudipa, Rinson, Tatijana, and
Dortmunder Philharmoniker. I am grateful to Doris Bongardt and
Manfred Harm for the care that they have shown to me and for sharing
their deep knowledge about Germany. I am lucky to be hosted by you!
Finally, to Anna, Avikda, Ayan, Esmeralda, Lars, Linnéa, Monimala,
Subin, and my family: thanks for the life force!
Dortmund, 2019 Sattwick Dey Biswas
Notes
1. More at http://www.floorgroup.raumplanung.tu-dortmund.de/joomla/
index.php
2. More at http://www.bbv.raumplanung.tu-dortmund.de/
Contents
1 Mysteries of Valuation 1
1.1 The Problematique 1
1.2 Introduction 2
1.3 Monorational(s) in Polyrational 12
1.4 Utilitarianism: Unavoidable Policy Rules? 15
Bibliography 20
2 Value: The Epistemology 27

2.1 Smith: Value Presented Through Price 32
2.2 Bentham: Value of a Lot of Pleasure or Pain 33
2.3 Who Decides What Is Best for Whom: Mill 36
2.4 Evaluation of Theories: Ricardo, Malthus, Marx 38
2.4.1 Ricardo: A Duel with Smith’s Paradox 38
2.4.2 Malthus’s Theory of Value 43
2.4.3 Karl Marx and Labour Theory of Value 46
Bibliography 49
3 Value: The Marginal Revolution 53

3.1 Von Thünen: A Case of Isolated State 54
3.2 Social Phenomena: The Marginal Revolution Way 59
3.3 Jevons: “Calculus of Pleasure and Pain” 63
3.4 Menger: A Distance from Explicit Measurements 66
3.5 Walras: “As If Utility Is Measurable” 70
3.6 Von Wieser’s the Natural Value 72
Bibliography 76
xi
xii Contents
4 Value: The Contemporary Ideas 81

4.1 No Chaos: Coase’s Perfect Valuation 81
4.2 Capabilities Approach and Valuation 86
4.3 Unifying Grand Theories: Plural Values 88
4.4 Location: Contemporary Schools of Valuation of Land 95
4.5 Evolution of Theories of Value: A Summary100
Bibliography106
5 The Empirical Context: Cases, Legal Context, and Theory

of Science111
5.1 The Locations(s)111
5.2 The Legal Context114
5.2.1 The Indian Constitution, Laws, and Beyond115
5.2.2 Singur Judgement: A Twist with Public Purpose and
Procedural Justice124
5.2.3 Post-Singur Judgement: A Way Forward127
5.3 The Bridge Between Theory and Data129
5.3.1 Objectives of the Research131
5.3.2 Design132
5.3.3 Methodological Challenges133
5.3.4 Data Collection135
5.3.5 Data Analysis138
5.3.6 Ethical and Other Considerations140
Bibliography144
6 Empirical Evidence: Relationship, Attributes, and Plural

Values of Land151
6.1 Relationship with Land154
6.2 Attributes of Land160
6.3 Value of Land165
6.3.1 Value of Land as Commodity or Exchange Value of
Land165
6.3.2 Value of Land as Territory or Territorial Values of
Land171
6.3.3 Value of Land as Capability or Use Value of Land172
6.3.4 Ecological or Existential Value of Land176
6.3.5 Plural Values177
6.3.6 Valuation Procedure of Land179
Bibliography187
Contents xiii
7 Empirical Evidence: Negotiations, Smith’s Value, and

Limits of Monetary Price191
7.1 Negotiations191
7.1.1 Issues of Consent194
7.1.2 Role of the Brokers196
7.1.3 Role of Others197
7.2 Value as Price202
Bibliography212
8 Empirical Evidence: Future and Ideal Values of Land213

8.1 Land: Future Use213
8.2 Life After Land Acquisition/Transaction216
8.2.1 Hypothetical Life217
8.2.2 Actual Life222
8.3 ‘How Much Is Too Much and Too Little’231
Bibliography232
9 Conclusions233
Bibliography251
Appendix255
Bibliography271
Index291
Abbreviations
AIR All India Reporter

BDO Block Development Officer
BL & LRO Block Land & Land Revenue Office
CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis
CBD Central Business District
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FGD Focus Group Discussion
GOI Government of India
ILO International Labour Organisation
INR/Rs. India Rupees (Indian currency)
IPC Indian Penal Code
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation/Civil Society
Organisation
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights
RICS Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
SC Scheduled Caste
SC (Indian court cases) Supreme Court of India
SCC Supreme Court Cases of India
SCR Supreme Court Reports of India
ST Scheduled Tribe
UN United Nations
UNCHR United Nations Council of Human Rights
UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlements Programme
USPAP Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice
WB World Bank
xv
List of Explanations
English Bengali Explanations
Zamindar জমিদার Land lord

(Jamidāra)
Bigha বিঘা (Bighā) 1600 yd2 (0.1338 hectare or 0.3306 acre); everyday
interpretation as 1/3 acre
Katha কাঠা (Kāt ̣hā) 720 square feet (67 m2), and 20 katha equals 1 bigha
Sher সের (Sēra) 0.933 kg
Mon মন (Mana) 40 Sher or 37.32 kg
Al আল (Ā la) Earthen ridge marking the physical boundary of land,
usually not more than a foot high. Dual purpose, it acts as
both boundary of land and dyke
Khas খাস (Khāsa) Possession of land by a proprietor or tenure-holder, either
by cultivating the land himself or with hired labour
Contingent The approach delay on individuals to directly indicate
valuation method their willingness to pay (WTP) to obtain a specific thing or
capture their willingness to accept (WTA) giving up a
thing
Bhadralok ভদ্রল�োক Gentlemen
(Bhadralōka)
Dam দাম (Dāma) Monetary price
Mulya মূল্য (Mūlya) Value, worth, price, cost and similar other meanings
xvii
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Map: Locations of the case study areas 10

Fig. 5.1 Map: Location of Singur 112
Fig. 5.2 Map: Location of Salboni 113
xix
List of Tables
Table 5.1 Coding rules for qualitative data analysis software 139
Table 6.1 Composition of participants: individual interviews 153
Table 9.1 Rubric: Compensation against the land by including plural
values248
xxi
CHAPTER 1
1.1 The Problematique

Many debates have taken place after a failed expropriation attempt in
Singur, West Bengal, India (Chandra et al. 2015; Ghatak et al. 2013;
Nielsen and Majumder 2017). Singur triggered a socio-political upheaval
from 2006, when the state of West Bengal decided to acquire approxi-
mately 997 acres of land to enable TATA Motors Limited to construct a
car manufacturing factory. Citizens of the area led a movement against the
land acquisition and forced TATA motors to leave the almost-finished fac-
tory. The incident has triggered a national and international awakening,
which has no intention of dying down soon. The never answered question
was, is, and (perhaps) always will be: “What is the value of land?” Answering
this question may lead us towards unearthing the meaning of adequate
compensation for land being expropriated by the state for industrialisation
or infrastructure development. The failure to answer this question lies in
broad theoretical and conceptual problems inherited within the valuation
of land doctrine. This intuition is supported by the work of many scholars
throughout history (discussed in Chaps. 2, 3 and 4). The issues concern-
ing the valuation of land are discernible at three levels, from individual to
social preferences.
First, valuation is a process of finding the value of a thing according to
a socially acceptable standard; thus (the issue is that) it is difficult to
include a broad range of individual standards (plural values; Anderson
1993/1995; Davy 2012) into a single socially acceptable and just standard.
© The Author(s) 2020 1

S. Dey Biswas, Land Acquisition and Compensation in India,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29481-6_1
2 S. DEY BISWAS
This issue is raised at the base level, where the individuals’ unique valua-
tion standards are contested against a particular social standard.
Second, the modern valuation of land doctrine has more or less accepted
that the exchange value also includes use (and plural) value of land.
Therefore, the issue is that the monetary ‘price’ presents use value and
exchange value of land. The question is in how far the existing literature
and empirical evidence are equating plural values represented in the mon-
etary price, and also whether they (literature and empirical evidence) are
in fact equating at all. At the secondary level, the issue is whether mone-
tary price represents plural values.
This takes us to the third issue at the highest level—whether all land
should have a value represented in monetary price as per the existing valu-
ation of land doctrine: should there be a price for the grave of Gandhi,
Martin Luther King, Mandela, Native American sacred sites in the United
States? What would be the real estate value of the Vatican, Mecca,
Jerusalem, Lumbini, and the Golden Temple of Amritsar? Critics might
claim that if there is a value represented in monetary price, then this might
not become an issue unless and until such property is transacted. Such an
issue will not be solved when a follow-up question is raised, that is, is the
value of the sacred places of Native Americans or Scheduled Tribes in
India more or less valuable than others? These issues operating at different
levels constitute ‘the mysteries of valuation’ which this research wants to
explore theoretically and empirically with the help of case studies
located in India.
1.2 Introduction
The terms ‘eminent domain’, ‘land acquisition’, ‘compulsory purchase’,
‘compulsory acquisition’, ‘expropriation’, and ‘resumption’ all have a
more or less similar legal meaning in the constitutions, case laws, and leg-
islations of different countries of the world (Brown 1971; FAO 2012).1 A
quick summary of these legal terms would be the power of a state and
state-approved bodies to take private property and common property for
public use in exchange for legally defined compensation packages for
affected individuals (Black 2014).2 The compensation for the land is often
based on the valuation of the land (Alterman and Balla 2010; Davy 2012;
Evans 2004; Ghatak and Ghosh 2015; Holland 1970; Mahalingam and
Vyas 2011; Singh 2012). Therefore, an educated guess would be that a
more scientific valuation technique can take us closer to a just procedure
1 MYSTERIES OF VALUATION 3
and outcome (or an improvement3 on existing social reality, as claimed by

Sen 2010a, b) during land acquisition, if not remedy the feeling of injus-
tice among all (Davy 1997). The educated guess gains credence through
the observations of various international and multilateral bodies (EU
2017; FAO 2012; ILO 1989; OHCHR 2015; UN-HABITAT 2012;
World Bank 2017) and of independent research, which indicate that inac-
curacy in valuation can lead to the violation of human rights and constitu-
tional rights (Ambaye 2015; Cernea 2008; Chakravorty 2013; Cotula
et al. 2014; Davis and Heathcote 2007; Pellissery and Dey Biswas 2012;
Sarkar 2007).
Throughout the world, a large area of land has been acquired by the
state and approved bodies and leased or bought by private enterprises. At
a global level, according to the Land Matrix,4 recently acquired land deals
in 63 low- and middle-income countries have been estimated at 44 million
hectares (2016). More future acquisition is, in fact, possible as the World
Bank identified a potential 445 million hectares for large-scale land invest-
ments (Deininger and Byerlee 2011). In the so-called developed world,
the issue is defined not only by the size of the land in question but also by
existing legal protections of the land owners and users in terms of land
acquisition and compensation packages (Azuela and Herrera 2007),
whereas in the Global South, large-scale land deals do not necessarily tar-
get ‘idle’ or ‘marginal’ land (Messerli et al. 2015). This rapid and vast land
acquisition can lead to conflicts.
India is one country of the Global South which has been witnessing
such a land acquisition drive. The intensity and number of anti-land acqui-
sition conflicts, where unwilling land owners/users and the state or other
statutory bodies fight against each other during land acquisition attempts,
is quite substantial, and a few estimates suggest that lower caste and indig-
enous populations are the worst affected (Chakravorty 2013; Fernandes
2004; Pellissery and Dey Biswas 2012; Singh 2002). Fernandes (2008)
estimated that there were more than 60 million displaced citizens between
1947 and 2000, whereas more conservative estimates put the number at
50 million people, of which 90% of the cases are resulting from the state’s
use of land (Chakravorty 2016).
Detailed sectoral data are available on dams (Singh 2002), on mining
(Fernandes 2004), and on steel plants and dams (Parasuraman 1999) that
show how land acquisitions have often ended with violent protests
(Pellissery and Dey Biswas 2012). Since the dominant valuation theories
are also followed and applied meticulously by the Indian state (see GOI
4 S. DEY BISWAS
2009; World Bank 2017), the Indian bureaucracy, and the Indian judi-
ciary, land acquisition case studies in India may help to develop a theoreti-
cal generalisation (Yin 1984, 21) for further testing and may eventually
indicate practical ways in which valuation of land should be conducted.
Before indicating the methodological choices that I have made, I should
briefly look at how the existing theories of value have shaped the present-
day valuation practices. It is the existing theories of value and their applica-
tions that have contributed to the development of mysteries of valuation
(as indicated in this chapter and later elaborated in Chaps. 2 and 3).
The dominant economic theories and practices believe that the mone-
tary price adequately reflects the value of goods and services, including
land. The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP
2016, 10; bold and italics added) explicitly states:
…fair market value is the amount in cash, or in terms reasonably equiva-

lent to cash, for which in all probability the property would have been sold
on the effective date of the appraisal, after a reasonable exposure of time on
the open competitive market, from a willing and reasonably knowledgeable
seller, to a willing and reasonably knowledgeable buyer with neither acting
under any compulsion to buy or sell, giving due consideration to all available
economic uses of the property at the time of appraisal.
The Blue Book, published by The European Group of Valuers’

Associations (TEGoVA 2016, 17; bold and italics added), defines market
value as follows:
The estimated amount for which the asset should exchange on the date of
valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm’s length
transaction after proper marketing wherein the parties had each acted
knowledgeably, prudently and without compulsion.
The above definitions equate the value to the monetary price (as marked
in bold letters). This preliminary observation leads us to believe, even
though only 1% of the real estate market has a price and the rest has only
values, that 99% of the real estate values are measured/realised in terms of
price according to major and dominant literature5 (such as Davy 2012). In
addition to their inherent tendencies to equate value with price and more
precisely monetary price, the issues of the willing buyer and seller, the
arm’s length negotiation, open competitive market, and voluntary
t ransactions (as proposed by Coase 1960; Lincoln Institute 2016) further

make such definitions unusable during the valuation of expropriated land.
There are four methods, mostly used all over the world, to calculate the
value of land and to determine an appropriate compensation (Mahalingam
and Vyas 2011, 96). These are (a) evaluation of the market value of the
land, (b) evaluation of the net value of income derived from the land (used
in Tanzania), (c) determining original land use value determined by the
state (used in China, Chan 2006), and (d) arriving at land values through
negotiation (used in Peru, Singapore, and Japan) (Mahalingam and Vyas
2011). The epistemology of all these techniques is arguably Smith’s para-
dox of value or diamond-water paradox (1766/1896; 1776/1981).
“Smith (1776/1976) inaugurated modern economic theory with a
riddle” (Davy 2012, 90), that is, the paradox of value or the diamond-
water paradox. The diamond-water paradox uses the example of the dia-
mond as a commodity which commands a very high exchange value but is
of very little use (value) in everyday life, in contrast with the life-giving
value of water (high use value), which has nonetheless very little exchange
value. This is to indicate how demand and supply of a commodity (dia-
mond and water) produces value and value is represented in terms of mon-
etary price. Soon, a forgotten discussion on the diamond-water paradox
drew more attention, where the ‘paradox’ is further elaborated in a similar
context while considering preferences such as “colour, form, variety or
rarity, and imitation” (Smith 1776/1981, vi. x6).
Incidentally, Smith was discussing price and not value, but we see in
subsequent chapters theoretically (see Chaps. 2, 3 and 4), and later
through field study (see Chaps. 5, 6 and 7), how this second discussion
has relevance to both value and price. The existence of the second discus-
sion challenges everything that I thought I knew about the diamond-
water paradox. Smith asked what the circumstances that regulate the price
of commodities are. “The market price of goods is regulated by quite
other circumstances. When a buyer comes to the market, he never asks of
the seller what expenses he has been at in producing them” (1766/1896,
176). The ‘articles’6 of auctions are based on such principles.7 Smith’s
second discussion (1766/1896, 176–177) is as follows:
1st, the demand or need for the commodity. There is no demand for a thing
of little use; it is not a rational object of desire.
2ndly, the abundance or scarcity of the commodity in proportion to the
need of it. If the commodity is scarce, the price is raised, but if the q
uantity
6 S. DEY BISWAS
is more than is sufficient to supply the demand, the price falls. Thus it is
that diamonds and other precious stones are dear, while iron, which is
much more useful, is so many times cheaper, though this depends princi-
pally on the last cause, viz:
3rdly, the riches or poverty of those who demand. When there is not enough
produced to serve everybody, the fortune of the bidders is the only regu-
lation of the price. (added bold and italics)
The research assumes that individuals value things (such as land) differ-
ently (Anderson 1993/1995; Davy 2012), and it may or may not be in
line with approved norms of the society. A reading of the development of
the valuation doctrines contributes to understanding how such a discrep-
ancy can be interrogated. I began with the paradox of value by Smith
(1776/1981). I could trace back the roots of the everyday confusion of
equating value with price in Smith’s writings (1766/1896). This gives us
an incentive to look at the historical development of valuation theories to
identify (among many other things) how equating value with price became
the dominant economic theory and practice.
Ricardo was not convinced by Smith’s paradox; he therefore intro-
duced other criteria such as scarcity and the labour needed to obtain com-
modities or the means of production (Ricardo 1821/2001, 8, 16).
Ricardo clearly took the value of labour from the means to live a meaning-
ful life to appropriation of real wealth (for more please see Sect. 2.4.1).
Malthus restricted himself to the use and the exchange value (de Vivo
2012), whereas Marx was convinced that value is determined by labour
time (Marx 1974, 36–8; Hong 2000). Von Thünen proposed that the
value of land depends on the transporting cost of produced (mostly agri-
cultural) commodities to a central business district (1966, 235, 254–256
as quoted in Pullen 2014, 14).
Inspired by Bentham (1781/2000) and Mill (1879/2009), Jevons
(1871/1888) took the Marginal Revolution forward by adding indirect
ways to estimate pleasure and pain. This measurement was considered the
inherent measurement individuals do while determining the value of cer-
tain goods and services. The measurement should include a sufficient
number of independent data, among the rational possible alternatives.
According to Jevons, the process of creation of value depends on the cost
of the product, which determines the supply, the supply determines the
utility, and the final degree of utility determines the value. The final degree
of utility a commodity carries will depend on the price an individual is
illing to pay (1871/1888, 120). Menger (1871/2007) argued that a

w
pearl is not valuable because we need to employ a great deal of labour and
risk, but that we labour for it because it is valuable.8 He also concluded
that a thing is valuable only if there is a possibility of economising it.
Economising takes place through money and as an intermediate does not
equate to the values of the two or more objects which are being traded.
The exchange value represented through price or ‘outer value’ may actu-
ally vary while negotiating socio-political circumstances. This is an early
acknowledgement of the inflationary effect on money, opening the possi-
bility to look at other ways to compensate, keeping the marginal
value in sight.
Walras claimed that measuring utility is actually estimating utility
(1896/2014, as quoted in Moscati 2013). In the process, abstraction
considers the social transaction to be ruled by factors that are difficult for
the actors to recognise. Walras assumed that there is a value when some-
one wants to buy. During the exchange, when money takes precedence, it
(money) can be manipulated too (1896/2014, 25, as quoted in Moscati
2013). The moral appreciation of value takes a back seat and necessities
dictate the terms. This inadvertently indicates Maslow’s needs hierarchy.
Valuation of things includes use of land to satisfy elements of the needs
hierarchy. Coase argued that in a well-informed society, transaction costs
should come down to zero, even though it is practically ‘very unrealistic’
(Coase 1960, 15). He advised: “It makes little sense for economists to
discuss the process of exchange without specifying the institutional setting
within which the trading takes place, since this affects the incentives to
produce and the costs of transacting” (Coase 1992, 718).
From Smith to Coase, different criteria have been employed to value
things, including but not restricted to land. One of the preferences has
always been the public good and another is reciprocity in transaction. This
reciprocity has also been one of the pillars of the capabilities approach (Sen
2003; Nussbaum 2006). Instead of choosing between means and ends,
the capabilities approach gives equal importance to both. This principle,
when applied to the value of land and subsequent exchange or expropria-
tion, should look at both (means and ends), much like von Wieser
(1889/1893, 16, regarding the value of future wants). When applied to
expropriation of land, the value of land in the future—that is, concerns for
original owners/users’ old age—should be looked at because owning land
is instrumental in realising various human capabilities and hence improv-
ing the quality of life.
8 S. DEY BISWAS
Davy (2012, 25–26, 91) unified grand theories of value and concluded
that all previous theories could not explain the social realities because they
could not recognise that land has plural values. He summarised this plural-
ity as commodity (or exchange value), territory (or territorial value), capa-
bility (or use value) and ecological or existential9 values of land. When
applied to the expropriation of land, neither landowners nor the expro-
priator will receive justice if we ignore the plural values of land. In doing
so, we need to strike a balance between burden and benefit. Davy took a
middle path, like John Stuart Mill, “not too much and not too little”. In
Davy’s work (2012), in the case of a market-based transaction, the state or
any mediator(s) are impartial actors. At the same time, it is better to have
implicit rather than explicit values. While looking for consensus among the
plethora of valuation theories, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy sug-
gests the value of the land depends on the scarcity of land situated in a
high-demand location. Nevertheless, considerations of political economy
make valuation rather an art, estimation, or projection than a perfect sci-
ence (RICS 2008, 17). With this preliminary theoretical understanding, I
would like to return to a brief discussion on the methodological choices
that have been made for this research.
The choice of method depends on the nature of the problem under
study and its unique circumstances (Flyvbjerg 2006, 229). Karl Popper
(1959/2005) famously used a single appearance of a black swan to dis-
prove the hypothesis that “all swans are white.” There are two ways to
interpret Popper’s experiment; one is called falsification, through which
one theory can be falsified with a single case study. Another way is to
understand certain phenomena as exceptional until we identify what is
causing or contributing to the creation of exceptions to the rules. After
further investigation, the exception might appear to be part of new rules
or laws and not an exception at all (Thornton 2018). Therefore, as
researchers, we should go back to the drawing board and work further on
our theories. In the absence of a clear theory, we might come up with a
precise number calculated from a very large sample size collected for a
decade, but we cannot even ascertain a clear rule, if the particular theory
is not applied to data. If Galileo’s test bothered with wind and worthiness
of place (a fall from a church vs. peasant’s home), or Newton was inter-
ested in formulating his hypothesis,10 we would not have come even close
to understanding gravitation. As a matter of fact, for many centuries, attri-
butes such as weight were considered part of the understanding of how
things fall and the occult notion that all things must fall in their natural
places (for Aristotelian ‘natural places’, see Bodnar 2018).
Therefore, a case can be made to exclude other factors in the study as

long as it helps us to understand a phenomenon or establish a relationship
(Bailey 1992). Patton (2002, 169), suggests that a purposive sample “has
a logic and power – and provides rich information”. Therefore, a purpo-
sive selection of cases that represent the known outcome of the certain
process matches the purpose of the study (Stake 1995; Remenyi et al.
1998). However, the quality of the cases has much to do with the effec-
tiveness of the research. Yin (1984) stated that “the case study approach is
appropriate where the phenomenon (land acquisition for industrialisation)
cannot be studied separately from the context (relationship between the
land and dispossessed).”
The following two extreme or deviant cases, which are closely defined
or similar (good or problematic case; Flyvbjerg 2006), are the sources of
empirical data for this study. A violent protest took place in Singur,11 West
Bengal, India, where the Indian multinational conglomerate TATA was
building their car factory on state-acquired land. The resistance from the
landowners was severe and it had defeated a Communist Party-led demo-
cratically elected coalition government in a province of India (West
Bengal). The same government party had pioneered land reform and was
in power for the last 30 years or so. The somewhat less-studied land
acquisition case is located in Salboni,12 West Bengal, India, where a much
larger factory was proposed. The land was acquired, yet no anti-land
acquisition movement has taken place so far. The first case, ‘Singur’, is
considered a failed project and the second one, ‘Salboni’, turned out to
be successful (peaceful). These two cases, over which the researchers have
no control, will help us to enquire into ‘how’ questions in particular (Yin
1984, 20) (Fig. 1.1).
With these observations in mind, the research frames the following
objectives and research questions for study.
1. To understand how final market value is determined.

I ask (research question 1): how do plural values interact with
Smith’s paradox of value to produce a final market value?
2. To measure the potential full compensation by including the plural
values of land.
I ask (research question 2): how do individuals perceive the ideal
‘monetary’ sufficiency or ‘non-monetary’ sufficiency equal to plural
values of land?
10 S. DEY BISWAS
Fig. 1.1 Map: Locations of the case study areas

(I drew the above location map based on Bing Ariel with labels accessible via QGIS
software, shape files downloaded from the freely available sites. Accessed on
January 2018 retrieved from http://data.biogeo.ucdavis.edu/data/diva/adm/
IND_adm.zip)
I explored the actual valuation principles employed in practice by the

participants of the study via the first research question and propose a
framework for full compensation with the help of the second research
question. The earlier research question deals with the ‘interaction’ between
plural values and Smith’s paradox of value. By ‘interaction’ I mean the
mechanism through which the existential or ecological values of land may
or may not be more than the real estate value of land, or land value as a
commodity, or the exchange value of land according to the plural value
theory. Central Park in New York City indicates a situation where the exis-
tential value of the park is more than the exchange value represented in
terms of monetary price. Millions of hectares of forest cleared everywhere
around the world (FAO 2015) gives us an example where the existential
or ecological value of land is less than the exchange value represented in
terms of monetary price.
With the help of empirical evidence, the research will develop a social
policy rubric (Gubrium et al. 2014) by including plural values of land
(Davy 2012). This rubric represents a policy framework and a scale to

grade compensation packages by identifying the components of compen-
sation in various fields within the rubric (such as below expectations, needs
improvement, satisfactory, and progressive improvement over time) as
against a one-size-fits-all policy recommendation which does not take into
account the social, economic, and political context of the case of land
acquisition in question. The second research question gives us indications
of the scope and limits of the ideal ‘monetary’ sufficiency or ‘non-
monetary’ sufficiency commensurate with plural values of land. If I can
understand the scope and limitations, then the rubric will be able to reflect
the social realities and the scope and limits of monetary sufficiency or non-
monetary sufficiency commensurate to plural values of land and produce a
plural value-based policy rubric.
Semi-structured in-depth interviews have been conducted to produce
‘thick descriptions’ of participants’ general experiences (Geertz 1973)
with land, and descriptions of related land, value, plural values, scarcity,
demand, location, relationship with land, limits of value represented
through price, monetary, and non-monetary means. These issues are dif-
ficult to capture in a survey-type questionnaire, where often yes or no
questions are asked and there is no possibility to explore the reasons
behind each brief (yes/no) answer. In other words, in a survey-type ques-
tionnaire, the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions are not sufficiently asked,
answered, and followed up. Gill et al. (2008, 292) suggest that the
strength of qualitative research interviews over the quantitative is as follows:
The purpose of the research interview is to explore the views, experiences,

beliefs and/or motivations of individuals on specific matters…Qualitative
methods, such as interviews, are believed to provide a ‘deeper’ understand-
ing of social phenomena than would be obtained from purely quantitative
methods, such as questionnaires.
The semi-structured interview guides were used particularly for partici-

pants’ everyday experiences in relation to land (Rapley 2004). Such flexi-
guides have disciplined the researcher(s) to focus on pertinent topics for
discussion and at the same time give room to ask appropriate follow-up
questions with the emerging issues raised by the participants.
I have engaged with participants via (a) in-depth (one- to two-hour)
one-on-one interviews with 15 individuals subject to expropriation of land
as well as (b) in-depth (one- to two-hour) one-on-one interviews with
12 S. DEY BISWAS
stakeholders (15 from each of the selected cases, Salboni and Singur). The
stakeholders include government officials, local political representatives,
industry representatives, and other individuals involved in the expropria-
tion process or who have first-hand experience with expropriation of land.
The data collected in this segment has, therefore, reflected a total of 60
one-on-one interviews. (c) The research has also organised six focus group
discussions (FGDs) at these case sites. Participants have mostly been drawn
through rapport-building with community resource persons and snowball
sampling from the Upper Caste, Scheduled Caste, and Scheduled Tribe,
while maintaining parity in terms of gender and age group.
1.3 Monorational(s) in Polyrational

The world is seen through different lenses and these lenses encourage us
to describe the world with different words. Some of us even use the same
word to indicate a different phenomenon or meaning.13 Similarly, the
meaning of land is no exception. A civil lawyer’s worldview on land is a
product of his experience with civil disputes that she or he represents at
court (which can often be summarised as a ‘bundle of sticks’).14 A home-
less person understands the meaning of land while being kicked out from
one place to another, and a farmer sees it as a place to grow grains. The
nature of our proximity with the land shapes our worldviews and how we
value the subject. One such group of people can be described as
observers(s); another, however, has a direct relationship with the land.
What do I mean by an observer? When I took a walk by the Oslo Fjord,
in the courtyard of the European Parliament in Brussels, or on the banks
of the Kopai River in Santiniketan, India, I did not influence those condi-
tions. This is what I call a proximal observer. On the other hand, when
there is a direct relationship as an agency, it shapes our understanding of
land and shapes our meaning to land. This direct relationship can be as a
lawyer, as police personnel, or as an interested buyer. Our lifelong experi-
ences influence us and give meaning to the existence of those conditions.
This feeling is not absolute, a second person will not necessarily feel in a
similar way, nor is it certain that a second person will not find this experi-
ence equally significant. Numerous such experiences influence how we
value or do not value certain things in life. Anderson (1993/1995) and
Davy (2012) have shown (among many other things) how polyrational
our world is.
Anderson (1993/1995) believes values are pluralistic enough not to be

categorised at all. The central problem is how to deal with what one values
personally and how the same thing is evaluated against a socially accept-
able set of standards. On the other hand, Davy (2012) accepts that plural
values are already considered within the existing valuation methods and
we have just been blind enough not to identify it. These two conclusions
are puzzling in many ways and we remain far from a consensus in under-
standing the mysteries of valuation (earlier discussed in this chapter).
Anderson (1993/1995) proposed, “The theory of rational action…
(which) can be called an expressive theory.” The theoretical foundation
she states:
According to the rational attitude theory of value, something is valuable if

and only if it is rational for someone to value it, to assume a favourable atti-
tude toward it. And to adequately care about something requires that one
express one’s valuations in the world, to embody them in some social reality.
That it is a demand of self-understanding. (Taylor 1979, 73 as quoted in
Anderson 1993/1995)
How can we be sure that individuals have adequate understanding/

information to realise the value of the relationship between oneself and
the object concerned? If we believe Anderson’s arguments then, one may
argue, all the progressive legislations such as universal franchise, equal
right to inheritance, and gender-neutral parenting, are not valuable at all,
since many individuals can’t find such changes value worthy.
In order to differentiate personal considerations, she proposed the
idea of intrinsic and extrinsic goods (Anderson 1993/1995, 4, 117). The
second will come into play if one object is valued because of its associa-
tion with another object. One may like a compact disk (CD) not only
because of the contents of the CD, but because of the person that gave it
to him/her and the gesture of giving. The first one is independent of
other considerations, like communities, animals…persons who are sub-
ject to respect and love…beautiful paintings. Things that we rationally
find have ‘value in themselves’. A human being by nature loves the value
intrinsic to things, but the challenge is to differentiate the intrinsic goods
from the extrinsic ends. Motivational states like whims, habits, compul-
sions, and addictions are not intrinsically valuated “because what is intrin-
sically valuable is the object of a rational favourable attitude, not just the
object of any favourable attitude, the fact that we have favourable attitudes
14 S. DEY BISWAS
such as appetite and whims toward states of affairs does not show that
these states of affairs are intrinsically valuable” (Anderson 1993/1995,
21). This hypothesis has long been contested philosophically and in social
science literatures, but Anderson’s (1993/1995) has enlightened us with
the depth of polyrationality. Davy (2012), on the other hand, avoids the
ranking of values or ranking against some moral principle (i.e. some asso-
ciations that make one thing more valuable than others) when applying
Mary Douglas’s Cultural Theory in land policy. To Davy (2012), every-
thing is extrinsic because values are a social construction too.
Davy (2012) suggests that land has a plural meaning and it has plural
values too. Such plurality can be summarised as commodity (or exchange
value), territory (or territorial value), capability (or use value), and eco-
logical or existential value of land. Eventually, it is the market that sum-
marises all the values into one figure (Davy 2012, 91), that is, in a monetary
price. The dominant contemporary economic theories and practices
believe that market price adequately reflects value; both use value and
exchange. The product of such belief is the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), The Blue Book by the European
Group of Valuers’ Association, where the German market value definition
under Section 194 BauGB talks about selling price (Davy 2012, 94). This
preliminary observation leads us to believe, even though only 1% of the
real estate has a market price and the rest has only values, that 99% of the
real estate values are measured/realised in terms of price. Against this
backdrop, while reviewing literature on value, valuation, and price, I keep
the following two questions in mind.
• How can we formalise plural individual standards (plural values;

Davy 2012; Anderson 1993/1995) into a single standard within the
valuation of land?
• If the modern theories of valuation of land have more or less accepted
that the exchange value of land characterised by monetary price rep-
resents plural values of land too, then, what are the principles based
on which certain use values are considered more valuable and should
be reflected in ‘monetary price’ while others are not?
Two important works (Davy 2012; Anderson 1993/1995) compel us

to appreciate plural values and at the same time encourage us to look into
the existing literature for consensus. It takes us to the dominant way
of consensus building by using aggregating preference, and often via
uantification. This dominant way is nothing else but utilitarian.15

q
Policymakers, whether lawyers, economists, spatial planners, or elected
representatives, cannot avoid assessment of the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of
outcomes (Smart and Williams 1973) and their inherent tendency to max-
imise utility or welfare (Sen and Williams 1982). In the following section,
I will investigate what utilitarian theories have to say about the process of
turning plural values into a single and standard format.
1.4 Utilitarianism: Unavoidable Policy Rules?

There is more than one utilitarian property theory (Alexander and
Peñalver 2012), but all have consequentialist16 tendencies. Sen and
Williams (1982) go even further to call them welfarist consequentialism
while noting the exception of Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971).
Traditionally, Utilitarianism has been seen on the one hand as a theory of
personal morality and on the other hand as a theory of public choice.
Utilitarians believe the existence of plural values and rationalities are very
complex within individuals so it is hardly possible to arrive at generalis-
ability (Taylor 1977, as quoted by Sen and Williams 1982). Valuation of
land is such a process of generalisability which affects individuals’ unique
sovereignty by imposing a social standard. This social standard is a prod-
uct of the political process to produce public rationality.17 Utilitarians are
divided on what to do with plurality among individuals (not within indi-
viduals) within public rationality. One group of people believes contem-
porary decentralised state functionaries ensure the accommodation of
public plurality as against centrality or monoliths or monorationality.
Another group believes that utility criteria are accommodative enough to
incorporate plurality (Sen and Williams 1982).
Utilitarianism as welfarist consequentialism has a property known as
sum ranking. When sum ranking is used, polyrationality concedes and
monorationality secures the upper hand in decision making. Rawls was
worried about these rankings and as a result introduced the ‘Difference
Principle’. According to this principle, actions should be judged not
only in terms of the consequences but in terms of the procedure too
(1971, 147–8). Later, we find this debate was (re)introduced by Sen,
who convincingly put forward reasons why the consequences (or ends,
in Sen’s case) are not only the parameters of justice, we have to look at
the procedure or means of justice too. The moral lens imposes a strict
condition where certain types of information are excluded to encourage
16 S. DEY BISWAS
onorationality. The moral lens can be produced via democratic con-

m
sensus building. Consensus building is not an easy task. Plurality com-
plicates the process in the absence of any standardisation. Utilitarian
theories encourage us to generate empirical information which can be
standardised and compared openly. To do this, different mathematical
tools are employed.
The treatment of the empirical data can vary greatly, and consequently,
the emerging intuition is that, depending on the choice of technique, the
same data set can lead us to different conclusions. Alexander and Peñalver
(2012, 14–17) have discussed the inherent issues with aggregating empiri-
cal information. Based on Bentham’s principle of aggregation, Alexander
and Peñalver (2012) claimed two things have to be in place to be a utilitar-
ian measure or in other words to find a monorational standard from the
polyrational standards. First, the utility must be quantifiable as cardinal
value,18 and second, the utility must have an interpersonal comparison.
The cardinal value principle states whether Esmeralda prefers a chocolate
ice-cream over a vanilla or otherwise. Bentham’s principle demands that
the information should indicate which flavour he or she likes the most
and, at the same time, how much more he or she prefers it to the alterna-
tives. The interpersonal comparison requires that ‘a unit of pleasure expe-
rienced by one must be the same as an equivalent unit of pleasure
experienced by another.’ If Esmeralda likes all the flavours of ice-cream
equally and with the same intensity, then Bentham’s utility must be able to
indicate how Erika’s desire for ice-cream differs from Esmeralda’s. At a
higher level, the method should be able to compare the pleasure Esmeralda
derives from an ice-cream in Oslo with the pleasure Erika derives from
travelling to Uganda during Christmas.
Puzzled with these complexities involved in the aggregation of data,
cost-benefit analysis (CBA)19 (and the importance of public good in Smith
and von Thünen) has been widely used. CBA assumes that Esmeralda will
pay more to spend a Christmas in Uganda if she thinks it provides more
pleasure than having an ice-cream in Oslo. Similar complexities arise when
this is applied to land: Esmeralda will pay more to get land for residential
purposes in the Grønland area of Oslo if she thinks it provides more plea-
sure than owning a larger area of land in the outer reaches of the city. To
complicate this matter further, we can consider a recreational area in the
wonderfully green Ruhr region versus a housing plot in Oslo for a cost-
benefit analysis and examine which is more valuable to Esmeralda.
According to utilitarian theories, this decision is based on net utility gain
or loss generated by a monorational social choice. In order to complicate

this matter further, Alexander and Peñalver (2012, 15) discussed Broges’s
selection of ice-cream at the marketplace while comparing prices of differ-
ent flavours. Not only is it difficult to quantify why Esmeralda will choose
vanilla rather than chocolate when the price she pays is the same, it is even
more difficult for her to assess whether she would have paid more for
vanilla ice-cream if she was asked to pay more (Alexander and Peñalver
2012, 16). Applied to land, it is not only difficult to quantify why
Esmeralda will choose the green Ruhr area against Oslo when the price
she pays is the same, it is even more difficult for her to assess whether she
would have paid more for land in Oslo if she was asked to pay more and if
she had more money. These questions have been central to designing vari-
ous ways to quantify qualitative data, especially in the field of valuation.
Adams called this “the great unresolved mystery” (1974, 619). I will dem-
onstrate in the next chapters while conducting a limited but comprehen-
sive study of the evolution of valuation theories that it still remains ‘the
great unresolved mystery’.
In the next Chaps. 2, 3, and 4, I will present our understanding of the
historical evolution of valuation. In Chap. 5, I will explain the empirical
context, the legal scenarios, and the theory of science. Chapters 6, 7, and 8
detail findings and specifically answer the research questions. Finally,
Chap. 9 details the conclusion and indicates an abstract valuation frame-
work with a social policy rubric which can be used during land acquisition.
Notes
1. Along with these legal terms, there is another socio-political term often
used by the civil society organisations. It is called ‘land grabbing’. It is
defined as “…being the control (whether through ownership, lease, con-
cession, contracts, quotas, or general power) of larger than locally-typical
amounts of land by any person or entity (public or private, foreign or
domestic) via any means (‘legal’ or ‘illegal’) for purposes of speculation,
extraction, resource control or commodification at the expense of peasant
farmers, agroecology, land stewardship, food sovereignty and human
rights” (Baker-Smith and Miklos-Attila 2016, 2). Due to the very broad
nature of this definition, the research has used legal terms such as ‘land
acquisition’ and ‘land expropriation.’ These terms can be precisely defined
and are associated with the cases selected for this research.
2. See also Black’s Law Dictionary, freely available at https://thelawdictionary.
org/ accessed on 12 April 2018.
18 S. DEY BISWAS
3. The primary concerns of the Smithian theory of justice (if we can infer
from Smith’s writings) and that of Sen’s idea of justice is “how could jus-
tice be advanced?” This contrasts with other existing transcendental theo-
ries of justice, such as the Rawlsian theory, which is more concerned with
the question ‘how could we identify perfectly just institutions?’ Smith’s
and Sen’s approach have a dual ‘effect’: first, it is a comparative rather than
transcendental route; and second, it focuses “on actual realisations in the
societies involved, rather than only on institutions and rules” (Sen 2010a,
p. 59) or an improvement.
4. The Land Matrix is a global and independent land monitoring initiative
which is a transnational collaboration of civil society organisations. I sus-
pect, the working definition used by the Land Matrix is land grabbing and
not specifically restricted to land acquisition. For more on land acquisition,
please see Sect. 5.2.
5. For professional valuation Shapiro et al. (2012, 12–15) suggested five prin-
ciple methods of valuation. They are (a) the market approach or the com-
parative method, (b) the income approach or investment method, (c) the
residual approach or development method, (d) the profit approach, and
(e) the cost approach or contractor’s method. Professional valuation
organisation such as the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS
2008) talks about three categories instead, and they are (a) cost approach,
(b) income approach, and (c) market approach. For more on contempo-
rary and applied theories of value, please see Chap. 4.
6. I found that there are differences between different versions of Lectures on
Jurisprudence. The Liberty Fund version does not include the line where
‘articles’ was mentioned and rather left us with the word ‘circumstance’.
Whereas the Oxford version of 1896 indicates ‘articles’. This version is
used by this research. Instead of going into the linguistic difference
between these two words and why the two versions differ, I accept that
Smith meant to indicate certain rules or principles.
7. For more on auction, please see Sect. 7.2. During our empirical investigation
at Salboni and Singur, I have investigated the roles of buyers, sellers, brokers,
and other actors, and how ultimately the negotiation takes place. The poten-
tial seller(s) interacts with as many people as possible to receive the highest
possible return in exchange of land.
8. On a lighter note, this assumption that something is valuable only when an
individual considers it to be valuable, was the theoretical basic for ‘Last
Week Tonight with John Oliver’ episode on 11 March 2018. The episode
was focused on Bitcoin and crypto currencies. Accessed on 15.03.2018,
retrieved from http://time.com/5195126/john-oliver-cryptocurrencies-
last-week-tonight/
9. In the context of Davy’s plural values theory, throughout the research

exchange value or land value as commodity, use value or land value as
capabilities, territorial value or land value as territory, and existential value
of land or ecological values of land, are interchangeably used. Please see
Sect. 4.3 of this research or Davy’s original work (2012, 91–136).
10. Newton famously said, “Hypotheses non fingo”/I frame no hypotheses
since hypothesis has no place in experimental philosophy.
11. Singur (22. 84°. N 88. 21°. E, location of a now abandoned factory).
12. Salboni (22. 57°. N 87. 30°. E, the location of a factory building complex
now under construction).
13. On a lighter note, if a chicken can fly why should Olympian Carl Lewis’s
8.91 m (29 ft. 2. 7 inches) leap be called a jump (International Association
of Athletics Federations 2018)? Accessed on 15.03.2018, retrieved from
https://www.iaaf.org/athletes/united-states/carl-lewis-1622
14. On ownership and property, see Alexander (1982).
15. Some argue for existence of many utilitarian theories such as Alexander and
Peñalver (2012, 11).
16. Consequentialism is “about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that
whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that
act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act
or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind” (Sinnott-Armstrong
2015).
17. Public rationality is “the forms of public justification appropriate to a cer-
tain kind of social order” (Sen and Williams 1982, 3).
18. It is a value in a single (monorational) scale indicating both “absolute rank-
ing in a particular state of affairs relative to alternatives and about the dis-
tance between them” (Alexander and Peñalver 2012, 15).
19. In recent times, there are several ways in which CBA has been applied to
understand the project’s impact in a given society (for more, please see
Evans 2004). The social cost-benefit analysis is one such interesting mech-
anism and mandatory for major infrastructure projects in the Netherlands
(Kumar 2002; Harberger 1978). The objective of the analysis to deter-
mine the monetary price to as many indicators as possible in order to uni-
formly weigh the heterogeneous effects of the intervention. These
monetary prices indicate the value society attributes to the planned change.
As innovative or ‘social’ as it may sound, the process still suffers from dif-
ficulties, similar to other cost-benefit analysis, in obtaining a wide range of
data and issues discussed by Alexander and Peñalver (2012).
20 S. DEY BISWAS
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CHAPTER 2
Value: The Epistemology
What are the rules which men naturally observe in exchanging them
either for money or for one another, I shall now proceed to examine.
These rules determine what may be called the relative or exchangeable
value of goods.
The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and
sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the
power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object con-
veys. The one may be called ‘value in use;’ the other, ‘value in exchange’.
The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no
value in exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest value
in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful
than water: but it will scarcely purchase anything; barely anything can be
had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce value in use;
but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange
for it. (Smith 1776/1981; Book 1, Chapter 4, pp. 44–45; original format)
Modern economics was inaugurated with this riddle (Davy 2012, 90). It
is popularly known as the paradox of value or the diamond-water paradox.
Adam Smith (1723–1790) discussed this on two occasions. At first, the
paradox is used to explain on the grounds of preference between pleasure
and pain. Smith explained that human species require the basic necessities
of life, but also that our delicacy of taste gives us reasons to work for ‘many
insignificant demands’. Attributes such as colour or variety constitute
grounds of preference. In the second case, the ‘paradox’ is further elabo-
© The Author(s) 2020 27

S. Dey Biswas, Land Acquisition and Compensation in India,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29481-6_2
28 S. DEY BISWAS
rated in similar context while considering preferences such as ‘colour,

form, variety or rarity, and imitation’ (Lectures on Jurisprudence (A)
VI. X6). The second example also discusses the following determi-
nants of price:
1st, the demand or need for the commodity. There is no demand for a thing
of little use; it is not a rational object of desire.
2ndly, the abundance or scarcity of the commodity in proportion to the
need of it. If the commodity is scarce, the price is raised, but if the quan-
tity is more than is sufficient to supply the demand, the price falls. Thus it
is that diamonds and other precious stones are dear, while iron, which is
much more useful, is so many times cheaper, though this depends princi-
pally on the last cause, viz:
3rdly, the riches or poverty of those who demand. When there is not enough
produced to serve everybody, the fortune of the bidders is the only regu-
lation of the price. (Smith 1766/1896, 176–177; added bold and
italics)
The first two principles are much discussed throughout the literature
when the diamond-water paradox is talked about. Relatively less impor-
tance is given to the third principle. One of the first reactions I have
received from a sympathetic reviewer is that “it is written in Lectures and
not in The Wealth of Nations.” Also, the latter was perhaps a more devel-
oped and better thought-out version since it was written later. I must be a
little cautious when using this second explanation. Not because it is less
cited by scholars, but because here Smith is talking about how the price is
determined, not the value. Later, I will explore how this second discussion
of the paradox of price explains the paradox of values too.
It is often said that Smith has been greatly misunderstood (Persky
1989; Sen 2010). “The riches and poverty of those who demand” takes us
to different considerations. Smith establishes his scarcity principle with a
story of a merchant lost in a desert. The price of water can be more than
that of a diamond under certain conditions. The fortunes of those who
demand, here the merchant in the desert, regulate the price. Intuitively,
the seller should be able to apprehend the riches and poverty of those who
demand when asking a price. This is true in all circumstances, including
for scarce commodities. Smith (1766/1896, 227–8) pointed out how rare
or scarce things always go to richer people. He uses the example of an auc-
tion to describe how those who have more have the ability to pay higher
prices and thus constitute the third principle of price. Smith (1766/1896,
2 VALUE: THE EPISTEMOLOGY 29
227–8) stops at looking at how the price mechanism works. Unlike this
research, he did not indulge in issues of subjective valuation at this stage.
Smith is not consistent throughout his idea of value, which I discuss in the
later paragraphs. Nevertheless, one missed opportunity for Smith
(1766/1896, 227–8) was that while discussing how fortune can increase
the value, he could have also discussed how fortune decreases the value.
The rich merchant can dictate the price in both directions.
It is the third principle that determines what the price of a beautiful
painting done by an unknown artist should be. The principal factor is the
owners’ ability to purchase a thing. What is missing in the analysis is the
relative position and bargaining process taking place between the buyer
and the sellers. If the owner of the painting is relatively poorer than the
potential buyer, it is highly probable and possible that the owner will be
paid less. Paintings of artists whose works are part of a historic art exhibi-
tion, and artists who are considered superstars in today’s world fetch a
higher monetary price in today’s market than, for example, van Gogh did
during his lifetime (Hellmanzik 2016, 429). A similar principle has been
in practice for millennia, and many novels and poems have been written on
this issue. One of Rabindranath Tagore’s famous poems “My little Plot of
Land” reflects similar sentiments (Tagore 2009).
The riches of the buyer possess the power to determine the price,
through social and political forces. In the case of Smith’s rich merchant in
the Arabian Desert, though the price of water is higher than that of dia-
monds, he or she might decide to pay less if the (then) owner of the water
does not understand the value of the water to the thirsty merchant or
perceives the possibility that the rich merchant is armed with a gun. One
important aspect of this gun analogy is that a gun represents the purchas-
ing power or riches while keeping other relative power differences out of
the equation. The existence of information asymmetry, where the poor
person does not know the importance of water for the rich merchant in
the desert, could be heard from the real-world individuals interviewed at
the field of study in India. There can be situations where the uninformed
buyer(s) and the uninformed seller(s) are conducting irrational transactions.
This principle, when applied in the context of land, indicates that the
relative positions of the potential buyers and sellers determine the value
and the price of the land. In the case of the poem by Tagore, we found the
small piece of land was invaluable (a means to survive) for the farmer,
whereas for the landlord, the forceful acquisition of the small farmer’s land
could have only marginally increased the aesthetic beauty of the landlord’s
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The use of metals in America falls into three stages. The
peripheral and backward areas, such as Patagonia and California,
and those parts of the Tropical Forest in which nature had denied a
supply and remoteness had shut off trade, did wholly without metals.
In the areas of medium advancement, like the Northwest,
Southwest, and the ancient Mound Builder region of the Ohio Valley,
native copper was beaten out into sheets, trimmed, bent, gouged,
and engraved. It was not smelted from ore nor cast. Its treatment
was thus essentially by stone age processes. Gold, silver, and other
metals were not used; iron only sporadically when it could be
obtained in the native metallic state from a fallen meteorite. The
supply even of copper was rarely large. It flowed in trade, much like
precious stones among ourselves, to the wealthier groups of nations
able to part with their own products in exchange for this substance
prized by them for jewelry and insignia but rarely made into tools.
The third stage is that of true metallurgical processes, and is
confined to the three Middle American areas. Here, copper, gold,
silver, and so far as they were available tin and platinum, were
sought after and worked. Copper at any rate was extracted from its
ores by smelting; all the known metals were fused and cast, both in
permanent molds and by the method of melting wax out of a single-
time mold. Wire was beaten or drawn out; gold leaf and acid plating
practised; and welding, hardening by hammering, and self-soldering
were known. Alloys were made: copper-tin bronze in Bolivia and the
south Peruvian highland, whence its use later spread north, perhaps
being carried as far as Mexico (§ 108); copper-arsenic bronze and
copper-silver alloy on the Peruvian coast; copper-gold in Colombia
and Mexico; copper-lead bronze in Mexico.
Nowhere, however, was metal the standard material for tools,
which continued to be mostly of stone or wood. Metallic tools and
utensils, especially knives and axes, were not altogether rare in the
bronze region of South America. The superior hardness of bronze as
compared with copper no doubt proved a stimulus in this direction.
But Maya temple-cities were built with stone tools, and the Aztecs
cut and fought with obsidian. In general, metal remained treasure or
ornament. There were not even the beginnings of an iron culture
anywhere in the hemisphere.
In the larger outlines, the history of American metallurgy is thus
simple enough, as something developed late and never diffused
beyond the central region of intensive culture. As to the sequence of
use of the several metals and processes, on the other hand, rather
little has been ascertained. It seems that in these matters South
America might have been somewhat in advance of Mexico, both in
time and in degree of attainments. The age of the metallurgical arts
in Middle America must not be underestimated. In spite of their
relative recency, they can hardly have been less than several
thousand years old.
197. Calendars and Astronomy

The earliest stage of anything like time reckoning in America was
what might be called the descriptive moon series. The return of the
seasons marked the year. Within the year, rude track was kept of the
passage of time by following a series of “natural” months or lunations
named after events, such as “heavy cold,” “flying geese,” “deer
rutting,” or “falling leaves.” No one cared and perhaps no one knew
how many days there were in a moon, let alone in a year. No one
knew his age, nor, as a rule, how many years ago any event had
taken place. It is a mark of pretty high civilization when people know
how old they are.
From the point of view of accuracy, the moon series calendar left
much to be desired, since there are something over twelve and
considerably under thirteen visible lunations in a solar or seasonal
year. Some tribes allowed twelve moons, others thirteen, in some
different individuals disagreed. Whenever the geese actually flew,
debates were settled: it was flying geese month, and every one went
on with the series from there. If he had happened to get a moon
ahead or behind, he accepted the event as a correction.
The moon series calendar was used by the majority of tribes in the
United States and Canada.
Somewhat more advanced is the solstitial moon series. This takes
one of the solstices, usually the one just before our Christmas, as
the fixed beginning and end of the year. The days are noticeably
shortest then. Some tribes went farther and employed landmarks to
observe the place on the horizon of the sun’s rising. Until the solstice
this place shifts daily southward, after it northward. Also, the
noonday shadows fall longest at the winter solstice. Here then was a
point in the year which was always the same, whereas the geese
might fly or the leaves fall early one year and late the next. The
definiteness thus obtained was followed up by numbering the moons
instead of describing them, or by recognizing both solstices as a
frame within which there fell two parallel groups of six moons, or of
five moons and a slightly longer solstitial period.
This method also did not solve the really difficult problem of
making twelve lunations and an irregular fraction fit automatically
and permanently into the solar year; and provision for counting days
and years was still wholly lacking. Yet the first beginnings of exact
astronomical observations had been made and were utilized to give
the year and its subdivisions a certain fixity.
The occurrence of the simple solstitial calendar in North America is
significant. It occurs in the Southwest and Northwest: that is, in the
area most directly influenced by the higher Mexican center, and the
area which made most progress independently of Mexico.[29]
These two stages of the descriptive and the solstitial moon series
were long ago passed through in southern Mexico and a need felt for
a more precise time reckoning. No calendar can either serve
accuracy or cover long periods which fails to concern itself with the
exact arithmetical relation of its smaller units to its larger ones: the
number of days in the month and year, for instance. This concern,
would not be difficult if the relations were simple; but nature has put
something over 29½ days into a lunation, something under 365¼
days and a little over 12⅓ lunations into the year. The first step
ahead was undoubtedly a day count, as previously the numbering of
the moons had marked an advance over their descriptive naming.
The day count must have revealed the discrepancy between the
actual numbers and those assumed for the larger units, such as 30
and 360. A great advance was therefore made when the natural
lunation was wholly abandoned and artificial units substituted. The
Mayas, or possibly some previous and forgotten people, invented a
“month” of twenty days, probably because they counted by twenties
instead of tens. Eighteen of these months, with five added leap days,
made a 365-day year. Thirteen 20-day months made another and
wholly arbitrary period of 260 days, which the Aztecs, who borrowed
the system, called tonalamatl.[30] The tonalamatl had no basis in
nature or astronomy and was a pure invention: a reckoning device. It
ran its course concurrently with the year as two wheels of 260 and
365 cogs might engage. The same cogs would meet again at the
end of 73 and 52 revolutions respectively, that is, 365 and 260
divided by 5, their highest common factor. At the end of each 52
years, therefore, the beginning of the year and of the tonalamatl
again coincided, giving a “calendar round” of that duration. This 52-
year period is the one by which the Aztecs dated.
The Mayas, however, did not content themselves with the 52-year
period, but reckoned time by katuns of 20 and cycles of 400 years.
[31] The dates on Maya inscriptions are mostly from their ninth cycle,
with some from the end of the eighth and beginning of the tenth. This
period corresponds approximately to the first six centuries of the
Christian era. The beginning of the first cycle would fall more than
3,000 years before Christ. There is no reason to believe that this
time reckoning began then. It is more likely that a little before the
time of Christ the Mayas perfected this system of chronology and
gave it dignity by imagining some seven or eight cycles to have
passed between the beginning of the world, or some other
mythological event, and the actual commencement of their record.
From the close of their eighth cycle, however, the dates are
apparently contemporary with the events to which they refer.
This system is so elaborate that it could scarcely have been
devised and adopted all at once. There must have been a time
lasting some centuries, perhaps over a thousand years, previous to
the Christian era, during which the first day count was being
elaborated and perfected into the classical calendar of the early
post-Christian Maya monuments.
This calendar did not exhaust the astronomical and mathematical
accomplishments of the Mayas. They ascertained that eight solar
years correspond almost exactly with five “years” or apparent
revolutions (584 days) of the planet Venus, and that 65 Venus years
of a total of 37,960 days coincide with two calendar rounds of 52
solar years. They knew that their 365-day year was a fraction of a
day short of the true year, determined the error rather exactly, and,
while they did not interpolate any leap days, they computed the
necessary correction at 25 days in 104 years or two calendar
rounds. This is greater accuracy than has been attained by any
calendar other than our modern Gregorian one. As regards the
moon, they brought its revolutions into accord with their day count
with an error of only one day in 300 years. These are high
attainments, and for a people without astronomical instruments
involved accurate and protracted observations as well as calculatory
ability.
Much less is known of South American calendars; but, like the
dwindling away from Maya to Aztec to Pueblo and finally to the
rudiments of the descriptive moon series of the backward tribes in
the northern continent, so there is discernible a retardation of
progress as the Maya focus is left behind toward the south. The
most developed calendar in South America was that of the Chibchan
peoples of Colombia. Beyond them, the Inca, in their greater empire,
got along with a system intermediate in its degree of development
between the Aztec and the Pueblo ones. In the Tropical Forest and
Patagonian areas there do not seem to have been more than moon
name series comparable to those of peripheral North America.
198. Writing
Related to calendar and mathematics in its origin was writing,
which passed out of the stage of pictographs and simple ideograms
only in the Mexican area. The Aztecs used the rebus method (§
130), but chiefly for proper names, as in tribute lists and the like. The
Mayas had gone farther. Their glyphs are highly worn down or
conventionalized pictures, true symbols; often indeed combinations
of symbols. They mostly remain illegible to us, and while they appear
to contain phonetic elements, these do not seem to be the dominant
constituents. The Maya writing thus also did not go beyond the
mixed or transitional stage. The Chibcha may have had a less
advanced system of similar type, though the fact that no remains of it
have survived argues against its having been of any considerable
development. The Peruvians did not write at all. They scarcely even
used simple pictography. Their records were wholly oral, fortified by
mnemonic devices known as quipus, series of knotted strings. These
were useful in keeping account of numbers, but could of course not
be read by any one but the knotter of the strings: a given knot might
stand equally for ten llamas, ten men, ten war clubs, or ten jars of
maize. The remainder of South America used no quipus, and while
occasional pictographs have been found on rocks, they seem to
have been less developed, as something customary, than among the
North American tribes. All such primitive carvings or paintings were
rather expressions of emotion over some event, concrete or spiritual,
intelligible to the maker of the carving and perhaps to his friends,
than records intended to be understood by strangers or future
generations.
Connected with the fact that the highest development of American
writing took place in southern Mexico, is another: it was only there
that books were produced. These were mostly ritualistic or
astrological, and were painted on long folded strips of maguey fiber
paper or deerskin. They were probably never numerous, and
intelligible chiefly to certain priests or officials.
199. The Several Provincial Developments:

Mexico
Since the calendrical and graphic achievements enumerated,
together with temple sculpture, lie in the fields of science,
knowledge, and art, and since they show a definite localization in
southern Mexico, in fact point to an origin in the Maya area, they
almost compel the recognition of this culture center as having
constituted the peak of civilization in the New World.
This localization establishes at least some presumption that it was
there rather than in South America that the beginnings of cultural
progress, the emergence out of primitive uniformity, occurred. To be
sure, it is conceivable that agriculture and other inventions grew up
in Andean South America, were transported to Mexico, for some
reason gained a more rapid development there, until, under the
stimulus of this forward movement, further discoveries were made
which the more steadily and slowly progressing Peruvian motherland
of culture failed to equal. Conjectures of this sort cannot yet be
confirmed or disproved. Civilization was sufficiently advanced in both
Mexico and Peru to render it certain that these first beginnings now
referred to, lay some thousands of years back. In the main, Mexican
and Peruvian cultures were nearly on an equality, and in their
fundamentals they were sufficiently alike, and sufficiently different
from all Old World cultures, to necessitate the belief that they are,
broadly, a common product.
Still, the superiority of the Mexicans in the sciences and arts
carries a certain weight. If to this superiority are added the
indications that maize and cotton were first cultivated in the south
Mexican area, in other words, that the fundamentals of American
agriculture and loom-weaving seem more likely to have been
developed there than elsewhere; and if further the close association
of pottery with agriculture throughout the western hemisphere is
borne in mind, it seems likely that the seat of the first forward
impetus out of the wholly primitive status of American culture is to be
sought in the vicinity of southern Mexico.
200. The Andean Area

The triumphs of Mexican civilization were in the spiritual or
intellectual field; those of Peru lay rather in practical and material
matters. The empire of the Incas was larger and much more
rigorously organized and controlled, their roads longer and more
ambitious as engineering undertakings, their masonry more massive;
their mining operations and metal working more extensive. The
domestication of the llama and the cultivation of certain food plants
such as the potato gave their culture an added stability on the
economic side.
The extent of the Inca empire, and of the smaller states that no
doubt preceded it, was of influence in shaping Andean culture.
Organized and directed efforts of large numbers of men were made
available to a greater degree than ever before in the New World. The
empire also operated in the direction of more steady industry, but its
close organization and routine probably helped dwarf the higher
flights of the mind. In the quality of their fabrics, jewelry, stone fitting,
and road building, as well as in exactness of governmental
administration, the Peruvians excelled. It is remarkable how little,
with all their progress in these directions, they seem to have felt the
need of advance in knowledge or art for its own sake. They thought
with their hands rather than their heads. They practised skill and
inhibited imagination.
The Incas, like the Aztecs in Mexico, represent merely the
controlling nation during the last stage of development. Their specific
culture was the local one of the highlands about Cuzco. Prehistoric
remains from the coast both north and south, and in the Andean
highland southward of Cuzco in the vicinity of Lake Titicaca and the
adjacent parts of Bolivia, demonstrate that this Inca or Cuzco culture
was only the latest of several forms of Andean culture. At the time of
Inca dominion, the great temple of Tiahuanaco near Lake Titicaca
was already a ruin. Pottery of a type characteristic of the Tiahuanaco
district, and similar in style to its stone carvings, has been found in
remote parts of the Andean area, thus indicating the district as an
early center of diffusion. Other centers, more or less
contemporaneous, some of them perhaps still earlier, can be
distinguished along the coast. In short, the inner history of the
Andean region is by no means summed up in that picture of it which
the Inca domination at the time of discovery presented. New
scientifically conducted excavations throughout the area will no
doubt unravel further the succession of local cultural developments.
201. Colombia
The Chibchas of Colombia, the intermediate member of the three-
linked Middle American chain, fell somewhat, but not very far, below
the Mexicans and Peruvians in their cultural accomplishments. Their
deficiency lay in their lack of specific developments. They do not
show a single cultural element of importance peculiar to themselves.
They chewed coca, slept in hammocks, sat on low chairs or stools;
but these are traits common to a large part of South America.
Consequently the absence or weak development of these traits in
Mexico is no indication of any superiority of the Chibchas as such.
The great bulk of Colombian culture was a substratum which
underlay the higher local developments of Mexico and Peru; and this
substratum—varied agriculture, temples, priesthood, political
organization—the Chibchas possessed without notable gaps.
Whatever elements flowed from Mexico to Peru or from Peru to
Mexico at either an early or a late period, therefore probably passed
through them. In isolated matters they may have added their
contribution. On the whole, though, their rôle must have been that of
sharers, recipients, and transmitters in the general Middle American
civilization.
202. The Tropical Forest

The line of demarcation between the narrow Pacific slope of South
America and the broad Atlantic drainage is sharp, especially in the
region of Peru. The Cordilleran stretch is arid along the coast, sub-
arid in the mountains, unforested in all its most characteristic
portions. East of the crest of the Andes, on the other hand, the
rainfall is heavy, often excessive, the jungle thick, communication
difficult and largely dependent on the waterways. Even the
Caucasian has made but the slightest impression on the virgin
Amazonian forest at its densest. The Inca stretched his empire a
thousand miles north and a thousand to the south with comparative
ease, establishing uniformity and maintaining order. He did not
penetrate the Tropical Forest a hundred miles. At his borders, where
the forest began, lived tribes as wild and shy as any on earth. The
Andean civilization would have had to be profoundly modified to
flourish in the jungle, and the jungle had too little that was attractive
to incite to the endeavor. Some thousands of years more, perhaps,
might have witnessed an attempt to open up the forest and make it
accessible. Yet when one recalls how little has been done in this
direction by Caucasian civilization in four centuries, and how
superficial its exploitation for rubber and like products has been, it is
clear that such a task would have been accomplished by the
Peruvians only with the utmost slowness.
Yet various culture elements filtered over the Andes into the
hidden lowlands. The Pan’s pipe, for instance, an element common
to the Andes and the Forest, is likely to have originated in the higher
center. Elements like the blowgun, the hammock, the chair or stool,
are typical of the northern Forest and Antilles, and may have
infiltrated these areas from Colombia or even been locally
developed. The same is true of the cultivation of the cassava or
manioc plant, from which we draw our tapioca. This, the great staple
of the Forest region, is better adapted to its humid climate than is
maize, which flourishes best in a sub-arid environment. Cassava
may therefore be looked upon as perhaps a local substitute for
maize, evolved as a domesticated plant under the stimulus of an
already established maize agriculture. Its cultivation has evidently
spread through the Forest region from a single source, since the
specialized processes of preparing it for food—the untreated root is
poisonous—are relatively uniform wherever it is grown. Maize is not
unknown in the area, but less used than cassava wherever the forest
is dense.
A characteristic quality of those Forest culture-traits which are not
common ancient American inheritance, is that, whether of Middle
American or local origin, they are detached fragments, particular
devices having little or no relation to one another, like the hammock
and the blowgun, or cassava and the Pan’s pipe. Original
fundamental processes, higher accomplishments necessitating order
or organization of effort, are lacking. This is precisely the condition
which might be anticipated when a culture too low to take over a
higher one in its entirety had borrowed from it here and there, as the
Forest peoples undoubtedly have borrowed from Middle America.
Three districts within the Forest area have previously been
mentioned (§ 174) as regions in which the forest becomes open or
disappears, and whose type of culture is locally modified: Guiana,
eastern Brazil, and the Chaco. Of these the Brazilian highlands
constitute an area of unusually deficient culture. In parts of them
agriculture and pottery seem to be lacking. These highlands are
perhaps to be construed as an interior marginal region representing
an isolation within the greater Forest area. Had these highlands
been in juxtaposition to the Andean area, or even situated near it,
they would presumably have been able to take over Andean culture
elements more successfully than the low-lying Forest, and would
then have stood out from this through superiorities instead of
absences. Their remoteness, however, enabled the intervening
Forest region to shut them off from Andean influences of
consequence, while giving to them only part of its own low cultural
content.
The peculiarities of the Chaco are due to the opposite reason. The
Chaco is a partly open country at the southerly extremity of the
Forest. It lies close to the foot of the Andes where these broaden out
into the southern Bolivian plateau. It also shades off into the treeless
Patagonian region. It is thus open to influences from three sides, and
its culture appears to represent a mixture of the three adjacent ones.
The basis would seem to be the culture of the Tropical Forest, but
definite Patagonian as well as Andean elements are traceable.
203. Patagonia
Patagonia is par excellence the peripheral region of South
America, culturally as well as geographically. As regards civilization,
this is true in the highest degree at the extreme tip of the continent
about Tierra del Fuego. Many of the most widely spread South
American culture traits being lacking here, there is a curious
resemblance to the northerly tribes of North America.
Yet even this culturally disinherited area is not without a few local
developments of relatively high order. The most striking is the plank-
built canoe of the south Chilean archipelago. The skill to carpenter
such boats was exercised in only one other region in the
hemisphere; the Santa Barbara Islands of California. Curiously
enough the latter is also a district of comparatively backward culture.
In any event this built-up canoe of the rude people of the extreme
south contrasts strikingly with the lack of any real boats among the
advanced nations in the Andean area. The moral would seem to be
that it is speculative to base much theory or explanation on any
single culture trait.
Of other elements specific to the Patagonian region, there might
be mentioned coiled basketry (§ 104) and the bolas. This is a
hunting weapon of three stones attached to ropes swung so as to
wind around the neck or legs of game. Except at the extreme south,
Patagonian culture was profoundly modified by the introduction of
the horse, which soon after the arrival of the Spaniards multiplied on
the open plains. The horse enlarged the ability of the Patagonian
tribes to take game, especially in the Pampas in the north, increased
their wealth, and strengthened their warlike interests. The same
change occurred in the Chaco.
204. North America: the Southwest

In North America the Southwest area lies at the point where the
continent spreads out fanwise. It is therefore the gate or transforming
station through which Mexican influences flowed on their way to the
various areas beyond. Whatever of Mexican culture the Pueblos
received and accepted, they worked over before they passed it on.
This reconstitution gave the culture a new color. Nearly every one on
first coming in contact with Southwestern culture has been struck
with its distinctive cast. Analysis, however, shows few intrinsic
elements peculiar to it. The novelty as compared with Mexico lies in
a different emphasis or a new arrangement of the elements.
Masonry, for instance, is used for dwellings instead of temples. Town
life is well developed, but the political organization which
accompanies it in Mexico is much weaker in the Southwest.
205. The Southeast

Superficially, Southeastern culture appears different from
Southwestern. Much of the seeming difference is due to the wooded
and rather humid environment; another portion is accounted for by
the failure of the Southeastern tribes to build in stone. But there are
differences that go deeper, such as the poverty of Southeastern
ritual and the comparative strength of political organization. The
religious dwarfing may be attributed to greater distance from Mexico.
The precise routes of diffusion into the Southeast are not wholly
clear. The culture center of the area lay on or near the lower
Mississippi—sufficiently close to the Southwest. Yet the district which
is now Texas intervened, and this was one of distinctly lower culture,
largely occupied by tribes with Plains affiliation. Theoretically it would
have been possible for cultural elements to travel from Mexico along
the Texas coast to the Southeast. Yet what little is known about the
tribes of this coast indicates that they were backward. A third
possibility for the transmission of culture was from the Antilles,
especially by the short voyage from Cuba or the Bahamas to the
point of Florida. Some connections by this route almost certainly took
place. But they seem to have affected chiefly the peninsula of
Florida, and to have brought less into the Southeast as a whole than
reached it overland.
206. The Northern Woodland

The Northeast was historically dependent on the Southeast as this
was on the Southwest and the Southwest on Mexico. It was thus the
third stage removed from the origins in Middle America. It was
inferior to the Southeast in several points. Pottery was cruder, clans
mostly patrilinear instead of matrilinear, town and tribal life less
organized. Some exceptions within the Northeast can be traced to
direct influences or migrations from the Southeast. The matrilinear
and confederated Iroquoian tribes of the Northeast, for instance,
were linguistic relatives of the Cherokee in the Southeast.
A similar movement of culture or peoples, or both, occurred at an
earlier time and has left as its remains the mounds of the Ohio valley
—local equivalents of the Mexican temple pyramid. Some of these
are of surprising bulk, and others have the form of animals.
Associated with them are earthwork fortifications which indicate
coherent populational groups of some size. The industries of the
Mound Builders were also on a somewhat higher level, especially as
regards artistic quality, than those of the historic tribes of the region.
In detail the Mound Builder culture represents many interesting
points that remain to be cleared up. In the large, however, it was a
temporary local extension of the Southeastern culture, from which
flowed its occasional resemblances to Middle America.
207. Plains Area

The Plains area is adjacent to the Southwest, but a review of its
culture elements shows that a surprisingly small fragment of
Southwestern civilization penetrated it. The most advanced Plains
tribes seem rather to have been in dependence on the Southeast.
This is probably to be explained as the result of a flow of culture up
the more immediate Mississippi valley. The western Plains, close to
the Rocky mountains, were sparsely populated in aboriginal times,
and life there must have been both unsettled and narrow in its
scope. Contacts between these western Plains and the Southwest
no doubt existed, but presumably the Plains tribes were too
backward, and too engrossed in their own special adaptation to their
environment, to profit much by what they might have borrowed from
the Pueblos.
Certain specific culture traits were developed on the Plains. The
nearly exclusive dependence on buffalo stunted the culture in some
directions, but led to the originating of other features. Thus the Plains
tribes came to live in tipis—tents made of the skin of the buffalo—
pitched these in regular order in the camp circle, and traveled with
the bundled tents lashed to a “travois” frame dragged by dogs. While
they never accomplished anything notable in the way of
confederating themselves into larger stable groups, nor even in
effective warfare, they did develop a system of “coup counting” or
military honors which loomed large in their life.
During the seventeenth century the horse was introduced or
became abundant on the Plains. It reached the Indians from Spanish
sources, as is shown by their adopting modifications of Spanish
riding gear and methods of mounting. The horse gave them an
extension of range and a greater sureness of food supply; more
leisure also resulted. The consequence was a general upward swing
of the culture, which put it, as regards outward appearances, on a
par with the cultures of other areas that in purely aboriginal times
had outranked the Plains. This development due to the horse is in
many ways comparable to that which occurred in the Patagonian
area, but with one difference. The Patagonians possessed a meager
culture. The introduction of the horse resulted in their hybridizing two
elements so dissimilar as their own low civilization and the
Caucasian one. The Plains culture had a somewhat fuller content.
The Plains tribes were also protected from intimate Caucasian
contacts for nearly two centuries, during which they were able to use
the new and valuable acquisition of the horse to enrich and deepen
their culture without essentially remodeling it. Horse transport was
substituted for dog transport, tipis became more commodious and
comfortable, the camp circle spread out larger, more property could
be accumulated. Warfare continued to be carried on as a species of
game with military honors as prizes, but now provided the added
incentive of substantial booty of herds easily driven off.
208. The Northwest Coast

The North Pacific coast is the most anomalous of the North
American areas, and its history is in many ways unique. It is nearer
in miles to the Southwest and Mexico than is the Northeast, yet
agriculture and pottery never reached it. At the same time the
Northwest culture is obviously more than a marginal one. People
with so elaborate a social organization as these Coast tribes, and
with so outstanding an art, were certainly not peripheral dependents.
The explanation is that much of the development of culture in the
Middle American region never became established in the Northwest,
but that this area manifested a vitality and initiative of its own which
led to the independent development of a number of important culture
constituents. The art is in the main of such local origin, since it does
not affiliate closely with the art of other areas. Very important too was
the stress increasingly laid on wealth in the Northwest. Society was
stratified in terms of it. The potlatch, a combination of feast, religious
ceremony, and distribution of property, is another peculiar outcome
of the same tendency. The use of dentalium shells as a sort of
standard currency is a further manifestation. The working of wood
was carried farther than anywhere else. Several traits, such as the
solstitial calendar and matrilinear clans, which the Northwest Coast
shares with other areas, have already been cited as probable
instances of independent evolution on the spot.
All in all, then, it is necessary to look upon the Northwest Coast
culture as one that fell far short of the high civilizations of Middle
America, in fact barely equaled that of the Southwest, yet as the only
one in the New World that grew to any notability with but slight
dependence on Middle America. It is an isolated secondary peak
standing aloof from the greater one that culminated in Mexico and
Peru and to which all the remainder of the hemisphere was
subordinate. Figure 35 visualizes this historic relation.
209. Northern Marginal Areas

The Arctic, Mackenzie, Plateau, and California areas were also but
little influenced by Middle American civilization. In fact, most of the
elements which they share with it may be considered direct survivals
of the general proto-American culture out of which the early Middle
American civilization emerged. Yet why these areas on the Pacific
side of North America should have profited so much less by the
diffusion of Mexican advancement than the areas on the Atlantic, is
not clear. In the mostly frozen Arctic and Mackenzie tracts, the
hostile environment may have forbidden. But this explanation
certainly does not apply to the California area which lies at the very
doors of the Southwest and yet refrained from taking over such
fundamentals as agriculture and pottery. Sparseness of population
cannot be invoked as a cause, since at least along the coast the
density of population was greater than in almost all the eastern half
of the continent.
Of the people of these four areas, the Eskimo are the only ones
that evinced notable originality. It is easy to attribute this quality of
theirs to the stern rigor of environment. In fact, it has been customary
to appeal to the Eskimo as an example of the popular maxim that
necessity is the mother of invention. Yet it is clear that no great
weight can be attached to this simple philosophy. It is true that
without his delicately adjusted harpoon, his skin boat, his snow hut,
his dog sled, and his seal oil lamp, the Eskimo could not have
maintained an existence on the terrifically inhospitable shores of the
Arctic. But there is nothing to show that he was forced to live in this
environment. Stretches of mountains, desert, and tundra in other
parts of the world were often left uninhabited by uncivilized peoples.
Why did not the Eskimo abandon his Arctic shore or refuse to settle
it in the first place, crowding his way instead into some more
favorable habitat? His was a sturdy stock that should have had at
least an equal chance in a competition with other peoples.
Furthermore it is evident that rigorous environment does not
always force development or special cultural adaptations. The tribes
of the Mackenzie-Yukon and the most northerly part of the Northeast
area lived under a climate about as harsh as that of the Eskimo. In
fact they were immediate neighbors; yet their culture is definitely
more meager. A series of the most skilled devices of the Eskimo
were wanting among them. If necessity were truly as productive a
cause of cultural progress as is commonly thought, these
Athabascan and Algonkin Indians should have been stimulated into
a mechanical ingenuity comparable to that of the Eskimo, instead of
continuing to rank below them.
These considerations compel the conclusion that the Eskimo did
not develop the achievements of his culture because he lived in his
difficult environment, but that he lived in the environment because he
possessed a culture capable of coping with it. This does not mean
that he had his culture worked out to the last detail before he settled
on the American shores of the Arctic ocean. It does mean that he
possessed the fundamentals of the culture, and the habits of
ingenuity, the mechanical and practical turn of mind, which enabled
him to carry it farther and meet new requirements as they came up.
Where and how he acquired the fundamentals is obscure. It is well to
remember in this connection that the physical type of the Eskimo is
the most distinctive in the New World, and that his speech has as yet
shown no inclination to connect with any other American language. It
is conceivable that the origin of the Eskimo is to be set at a time later
than that of the American race and somewhere in Asia. The fact that
at present there are Eskimo villages on the Siberian side of Behring
Strait is too recent and local a phenomenon to afford strong
confirmation of such a view, but certainly does not operate against it.
Somewhere in the Siberian region, then, within occasional reach of
influences emanating from higher centers of civilization in Asia or
Europe, the Eskimo may have laid the foundations of their culture,
specialized it further as they encountered new conditions in new
Asiatic habitats, and evolved only the finishing touches of their
remarkable adaptation after they spread along the northernmost
shores of America. Some of the Old World culture influences which
had reached them before they entered America may go back to the
Magdalenian culture of the Palæolithic. There are at any rate certain
resemblances between Magdalenian and Eskimo cultures that have
repeatedly impressed observers: the harpoon, spear thrower, lamp,
carving, and graphic art (§ 67).
210. Later Asiatic Influences

One set of influences the Eskimo, and to a lesser degree the
peoples of adjacent areas, were unquestionably subject to and
profited by: sporadic culture radiations of fairly late date from Asia.
Such influences were probably not specially important, but they are
discernible. They came probably as disjected bits independent of
one another. There may have been as many that reached America
and failed of acceptance as were actually taken up. In another
connection (§ 92) it has been pointed out how the tale known as the
“Magic Flight” has spread from its Old World center of origin well into
northwestern America. A similar case has been made out for a
material element: the sinew-backed or composite bow (§ 101), first
found some three to four thousand years ago in western Asia. This is
constructed, in Asia, of a layer each of wood, sinew, and horn; in its
simpler American form, which barely extends as far south as the
Mexican frontier, of either wood or horn reinforced with sinew. Body
armor of slats, sewn or wound into a garment, seems to have spread
from Asia to the Northwest Coast. The skin boat, represented in its
most perfect type by the Eskimo kayak; the tipi or conical tent of
skins; birchbark vessels; sleds or toboggans with dog traction; bark
canoes with underhung ends; and garments of skin tailored—cut and
sewn—to follow the contours of the body, may all prove to represent
culture importations from Asia. At any rate they are all restricted in
America to the part north and west of a line connecting the St.
Lawrence and Colorado rivers, the part of the continent that is
nearest to Asia. South and east of this line, apparently, Middle
American influences were strong enough to provide the local groups
with an adequate culture of American source; and, the Asiatic
influences being feeble on account of remoteness, Asiatic culture
traits failed of acceptance. It is also noteworthy that all of the traits
last mentioned are absent on the Northwest Coast, in spite of its
proximity to Asia. The presumable reason is that the Northwest
Coast, having worked out a relatively advanced and satisfactory
culture adaptation of its own, had nothing to gain by taking over
these elementary devices; whereas to the culturally poorer peoples
of the Arctic, Mackenzie, Plateau, and in part of the California,
Plains, and Northeastern areas, they proved a valuable acquisition.
A careful analysis of Eskimo culture in comparison with north and
east Asiatic culture may reveal further instances of elements that
have spread from one hemisphere to the other. Yet the sum total of
such relatively late contributions from the civilization of the Old World
to that of the New, during the last one or two or three or four
thousand years, is not likely to aggregate any great bulk. Since the
early culture importation of the period of the settlement of America
eight or ten thousand years ago, the influences of the Old World
have always been slight as compared with the independent
developments within the New World. Even within the northwestern
segment of North America, the bulk of culture would seem to have
been evolved on the spot. But mingled with this local growth, more or
less modifying it in the nearer regions, and reaching its greatest
strength among the Eskimo, has been a trickling series of later
Asiatic influences which it would be mistaken wholly to overlook.

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Land Acquisition and Compensation in

India: Mysteries of Valuation 1st ed.

Emerging Markets Megatrends 1st ed. Edition Rajiv

An Endangered History: Indigeneity, Religion, and

Sovereignty and Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in

Daughter: A Novel Claudia Dey

A Future of Polycentric Cities: How Urban Life, Land

Philosophical Perspectives on Land Reform in Southern

Social Welfare in India and China: A Comparative

Sustainability in Energy and Buildings: Proceedings of

Land Acquisition and

ISBN 978-3-030-29480-9 ISBN 978-3-030-29481-6 (eBook)

School of Spatial Planning

to them. The final proofreading is done by Jan Russell, for which I am in

My earlier understanding of economic theory was further nurtured by

Dortmund, 2019 Sattwick Dey Biswas

2 Value: The Epistemology 27

3 Value: The Marginal Revolution 53

4 Value: The Contemporary Ideas 81

5 The Empirical Context: Cases, Legal Context, and Theory

6 Empirical Evidence: Relationship, Attributes, and Plural

7 Empirical Evidence: Negotiations, Smith’s Value, and

8 Empirical Evidence: Future and Ideal Values of Land213

AIR All India Reporter

English Bengali Explanations

Zamindar জমিদার Land lord

Fig. 1.1 Map: Locations of the case study areas 10

1.1 The Problematique

© The Author(s) 2020 1

and outcome (or an improvement3 on existing social reality, as claimed by

…fair market value is the amount in cash, or in terms reasonably equiva-

The Blue Book, published by The European Group of Valuers’

t­ ransactions (as proposed by Coase 1960; Lincoln Institute 2016) further

­ illing to pay (1871/1888, 120). Menger (1871/2007) argued that a

Therefore, a case can be made to exclude other factors in the study as

1. To understand how final market value is determined.

Fig. 1.1 Map: Locations of the case study areas

I explored the actual valuation principles employed in practice by the

(Davy 2012). This rubric represents a policy framework and a scale to

The purpose of the research interview is to explore the views, experiences,

The semi-structured interview guides were used particularly for partici-

1.3 Monorational(s) in Polyrational

Anderson (1993/1995) believes values are pluralistic enough not to be

According to the rational attitude theory of value, something is valuable if

How can we be sure that individuals have adequate understanding/

• How can we formalise plural individual standards (plural values;

Two important works (Davy 2012; Anderson 1993/1995) compel us

­uantification. This dominant way is nothing else but utilitarian.15

1.4 Utilitarianism: Unavoidable Policy Rules?

­ onorationality. The moral lens can be produced via democratic con-

or loss generated by a monorational social choice. In order to complicate

9. In the context of Davy’s plural values theory, throughout the research

Brown, D. 1971. The Groundnorms of Resumption. University of Western

ILO. 1989. Convention C169 – Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention,

Value: The Epistemology

© The Author(s) 2020 27

rated in similar context while considering preferences such as ‘colour,

197. Calendars and Astronomy

199. The Several Provincial Developments:

2 Value: The Epistemology 27

3 Value: The Marginal Revolution 53

4 Value: The Contemporary Ideas 81

5 The Empirical Context: Cases, Legal Context, and Theory

6 Empirical Evidence: Relationship, Attributes, and Plural

7 Empirical Evidence: Negotiations, Smith’s Value, and

8 Empirical Evidence: Future and Ideal Values of Land213

Fig. 1.1 Map: Locations of the case study areas 10

t ransactions (as proposed by Coase 1960; Lincoln Institute 2016) further

illing to pay (1871/1888, 120). Menger (1871/2007) argued that a

uantification. This dominant way is nothing else but utilitarian.15

onorationality. The moral lens can be produced via democratic con-