e.
Admissibility of Evidence
i. De Jesus v. Sanchez-Malit, A.C. No. 6470, July 8, 2014
Facts: In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office
of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March
2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of
a public market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and
registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for
perjury and for collection of sum of money. She claimed that respondent
was a consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan,
and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned.
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused
complainant legal and financial problems. One contract was a lease
agreement notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999
without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found
out that the agreement had not been signed by the lessees when she
lost her copy and she asked for another copy from respondent. The
other contract was a sale agreement over a property covered by a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant
entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998.
Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise
complainant that the property was still covered by the period within
which it could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant
subsequently submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs)
notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino),
complainant�s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the
principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named
attorney-in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino�s Affidavit
corroborated complainant�s allegations against respondent.
She maintained that the additional documents submitted by complainant
were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the
procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC
(2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).
Issue: Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in
evidence by complainant are inadmissible for having been obtained in
violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Held: Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows:
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that
�evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules.� There could be no dispute that
the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question,
therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility
of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only
provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on
confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that
procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said
records inadmissible in evidence.
On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the
exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and
seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person
from interference by the government or the state.
The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of
appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the
constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the
Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from
evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are,
therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in
the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.18
iii. Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999
ii. People v. Samontanez, G.R. No. 134530, December 4, 2000
Facts: In the early morning of November 25, 1995, Corazon delas Alas
saw her daughter, eighteen (18) year-old Lolita delas Alas, off to school
from their residence in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu,
Batangas. That was the last time Corazon had seen her alive because
at 8:00 o’clock in the evening of the same day Lolita’s lifeless and
naked body was found in the middle of a sugar cane plantation in Sitio
Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. Lolita was apparently
raped before the attacker ended her life.
Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the grisly crime. However,
police investigation reveals that Roberto Samontañez was seen at
around 6:30 o’clock in the evening on November 25, 1995 while he was
in the act of coming out of the sugar cane plantation.
On November 28, 1995, Roberto was fetched by the police authorities
of Nasugbu, Batangas from his workplace at Hermogenes Trading in
Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. During the investigation at the
Nasugbu Police Headquarters in Nasugbu, Batangas, Roberto admitted
to the police that the other personal belongings of Lolita delas Alas were
inside his bag that was left at his workplace in Mendez, Cavite. A follow-
up investigation conducted by the Nasugbu police authorities at
Hermogenes Trading in Mendez, Cavite led to the recovery of the said
personal belongings of the victim.
On January 11, 1996, Roberto Samontañez was formally charged in
court with the crime of rape with homicide.
The prosecution rested its case on November 30, 1997. During the
scheduled hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998 for the presentation of
evidence of the defense, the accused took the witness stand and
reiterated his previous plea of guilty to the crime charged in the
information.
Issue: W/N the pieces of evidence obtained from the accused
admissible.
Held: No. Lastly, the trial court lamentably considered pieces of
evidence that are inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial "fruit
of a poisonous tree". The facts show that the appellant Roberto
Samontañez was actually arrested by police authorities of Nasugbu,
Batangas on November 28, 1995 at his workplace in Barangay Galicia
III, Mendez, Cavite. It does not appear from the record that the
appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights during the police
custodial investigation which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of
the 1987 Constitution. It also does not appear that he was assisted by
counsel during the said custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid
waiver, any confession obtained from the appellant during the police
custodial investigation relative to the crime, including any other
evidence secured by virtue of the said confession is inadmissible in
evidence even if the same was not objected to during the trial by the
counsel of the appellant. Thus, the personal belongings of the victim
namely: Omax wristwatch, gold ring and Joop cologne were recovered
and found inside the bag of the appellant when the police authorities
returned to the appellant’s place of work at the Hermogenes Trading in
Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite after they illegally obtained a
confession from the appellant. In the case of People vs. Alicando,38 the
Court had opportunity to reiterate the rule that evidence gathered by
virtue of an illegally obtained confession is inadmissible.
The only other evidence of the prosecution are the testimonies of Carlito
Samontañez and Melecio Mendoza, both of which merely seek to
establish the presence of the appellant near the vicinity of the crime
scene on or about the time when the crime took place. Ultimately, the
conviction of the appellant for the crime charged in the case at bar
rested primarily on his plea of guilty which appeared to have been
improvidently made and hence, contrary to the letter and spirit of
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, supra.
iv. Reyes y Capistrano v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 6, 2018
Facts: That on or about the 6th day of [November] 2012 in the
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the
Court of Appeals, dated December 14, 1994, which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July
27, 1992, finding petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide.
That, the said accused, being then a member of the Lucena Integrated
National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police
headquarters, where authorities are supposed to be engaged in the
discharge of their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with
the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim fell, by banging his
head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said
Ike Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly
caused his death.
The evidence show that, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan,
who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together
with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports
that it was showing the nude dancers. After the three had seated
themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer
appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed
her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.2
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard,
Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took
a picture.3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my
job." Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter
that he would kill him.5 When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull
out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions.6
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the
matter. Three of the policeman on duty, including petitioner Navarro,
were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked
Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went
to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the incident.
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the
exchange between petitioner and the deceased.
Issue: W/N the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which
prohibits wire-tapping.
Held: Yes. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony
of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness, having a
grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in
the conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable.27
Trial courts, which have the opportunity observe the facial expressions,
gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent
to determine whether his or her testimony should be given credence.28
In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court
erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena..
That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any
civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. Sec. 4. Any
communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
private communications.29 Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice
recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he
personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played in the
court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are
those of the persons such are claimed to belong.30 In the instant case,
Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording;31 that
the tape played in the court was the one he recorded;32 and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.33 A sufficient
foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by
the prosecution.
v. People v. Delociembre y Andales, G.R. No. 226485 (Resolution),
June 6, 2018
Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly possess and have in her custody and control 0.04 gram
of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet which substance was found positive to the
test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug, in
violation of the above cited law.
A group of police officers from Cardona, Rizal, including Police Officer 1
(PO1) Jefferson Monteras (PO1 Monteras), was patrolling the diversion
road of Barangay Looc, Cardona, Rizal when two (2) teenagers
approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a
dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay
Mambog. After a few minutes, a woman, later identified to be Reyes,
who matched the said description and smelled like liquor passed by the
police officers. The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to
bring it out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng
babae?" and at that point, turned her back, pulled something out from
her breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her right hand.8 PO1
Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the
police station where he marked it with "LRC-1." Thereat, he prepared
the necessary documents, conducted the inventory and photography
before Barangay Captain Manolito Angeles.9 Thereafter, PO1 Monteras
proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and turned over the
seized item for examination to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza
(PSI Villaraza), who confirmed10 that the substance inside the sachet
tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.11
Issue: W/N the sachet of shabu the sachet of shabu purportedly seized
from Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in
evidence.
Held: Yes. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 3 (2),25 Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides
that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other
words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.26
One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a
search may be [e]ffected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest.27In
this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made � the process cannot be reversed.28
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect
to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure
In order to deem as valid a consensual search, it is required that the
police authorities expressly ask, and in no uncertain terms, obtain the
consent of the accused to be searched and the consent thereof
established by clear and positive proof,49 which were not shown in this
case.
In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu
purportedly seized from Reyes on account of the search is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree.50 And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from
criminal liability.
vi. People v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9181, November 28, 1955
Facts: In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon

That on or about the 7th day of April, 2010, in Quezon City the said
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other,
without lawful authority did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport, or act as broker in the said transaction, a
dangerous drug, to wit: Five (5) pieces of transparent heat sealed
plastic sachet marked as "EXH-A-1 MPA 4/7/2010, EXH-A-2 MPA
4/7/2010, EXH-A-3 MPA 4/7/2010, EXH-A-4 MPA 4/7/2010["] and "EXH-
A-5 MPA 4/7/2010" with twenty one point forty one twenty nine
(21.4129) grams of white crystalline substance containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also known as "shabu", a dangerous
drug.
The prosecution alleged that on April 7, 2010, a buy-bust team
composed of Senior Officer II Christopher Macairap7 (SOII Macairap),
Inspector Officer I Junef Avenido (IO1 Avenido), and IO1 Renata Reyes
(IO1 Reyes) was organized to conduct an entrapment operation against
Bernie, alias "Axe," who was reportedly "operating" within the area of
Quezon City.8 Accordingly, SOII Macairap instructed their informant to
purchase twenty-five (25) grams of shabu worth P150,000.00 from
Bernie and arrange a meeting with him, to which the latter agreed.
Thus, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, the buy-bust team, together with
the informant, proceeded to the target area in NIA Road, Quezon City.
Upon arriving, the informant introduced IO1 Avenido, the designated
poseur-buyer, to Bernie and his companion, Dhats. Dhats then handed
over a folded cardboard paper with a Lotto 6/49 logo containing a white
crystalline substance to IO1 Avenido, who, in turn, paid Bernie using the
marked money. As Bernie was about to count the money, IO1 Avenido
executed the pre-arranged signal by taking off his cap, and
consequently, accused-appellants were apprehended.
RTC: Convicted; CA: IN totot RTC; SC: Upheld conviction; MFR in SC:
Granted: Dissatisfied, accused-appellants moved for reconsideration,22
arguing, among others, that the police officers failed to comply with the
mandatory procedures in the handling and disposition of the seized
drugs as provided under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.23
Issue: W/N the shabu seized has integrity and evidentiary value.
No. In this case, the Court finds that the police officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby
putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from accused-appellants.
An examination of the records reveals that while the requisite inventory
of the seized drugs was conducted in the presence of accused�-
appellants and an elected public official, the same was not done in the
presence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ. More
significantly, the apprehending officers failed to proffer a plausible
explanation therefor.
Without a doubt, procedural lapses committed by the police officers,
which were unfortunately unacknowledged and unexplained by the
State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against
the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
had been compromised.43 The procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to
the conviction of illegal drug suspects.44 As such, since the prosecution
in this case failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the acquittal of accused-appellants is
perforce in order.
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the
positive duty to prove compliance with the procedure set forth in Section
211, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the
initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived
deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court.
City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and
another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having
conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos.
Trial of the case started, and in several hearings the prosecution had
been presenting its evidence.
During the progress of the trial, while the prosecution was questioning
one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of
Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial
confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to
the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban
interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on
the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the
other accused Panganiban.
The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but
on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be
permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior
proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and
circumstances.
Issue: W/N the lower Court's committed grave abuse of discretion in its
order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial
confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban
without prior proof of conspiracy.
Held: Yes. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if
Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused
Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy
between them without the conspiracy being established by other
evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41;
People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and
should have been admitted as such.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the
proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing that:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during
the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in
furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case,
long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred
confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by
Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which
the Court issued motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to
Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused
Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter.
But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own
objection to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove
conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of
such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions,
circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that
ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a
mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for
objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed
waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the
evidence