BONGALON VS.

PEOPLE

George Bongalon was charged with child abuse for striking and slapping a 12-year
old boy, Jayson Dela Cruz, during a religious procession in 2000. Bongalon claimed
he was merely protecting his own minor daughters after they were pelted with stones
and had their hair burned by Jayson. Both lower courts found Bongalon guilty of child
abuse.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the findings of the RTC. While it is true that
Bongalon laid hands on the boy, he did so out of anger and concern for his daughters'
safety, not to degrade or harm the boy. Thus, the Supreme Court found Bongalon
guilty only for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries instead of child abuse.

The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is
Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610.

“Child Abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting

in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.

Although the SC affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the
effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson
on the face, the SC disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse
within the purview of the above-quoted provisions.

The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands
on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a
human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The
records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly
concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered
harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked
that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

Considering that Jayson's physical injury required five to seven days of medical
attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code

Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period. The penalty for slight physical injuries is
arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of imprisonment. In imposing
the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation under

Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, because the petitioner lost his reason and
self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power

Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only... in the honest
belief of the accused.[23] It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation,
the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted
under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters,
and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn's hair, the petitioner was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion.

ROSALDES VS. PEOPLE

Facts:

Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School... was
hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher,
petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from
sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey
but instead proceeded to his seat, petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his
thigh.
Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. Michael Ryan's
body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick
Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael
Ryan cried. After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. Michael Ryan
went home crying and told his mother about the incident. His mother and his Aunt
Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain.

The petitioner was criminally charged with child abuse in the Regional Trial Court.
RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child abuse. CA affirmed the
conviction of the petitioner
Issue:

WON the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts
of the petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act
No. 7610, and not under the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

Here, petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries
suffered by Michael Ryan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase,
demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as an act of
discipline that she, as aschoolteacher could reasonably do towards the development of
the child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.

The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.

Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her
pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and
excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could
not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which
has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority

Article 233 of the Family Code provides that “The person exercising substitute
parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the
parents. In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in
child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the
child

Proof of the severe results of the petitioner's physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan
was provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly:

(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child
which includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter;
or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in
serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or
death.

In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of
an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being.

The act need not be habitual.

The CA concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a
helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left
thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the
boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of
feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears
and pushed him down on the floor."

Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner
was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth
and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.

It was also shown that Michael Ryan's physical maltreatment by the petitioner was
neither her first or only maltreatment of a child. The petitioner was also convicted by
the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of
another child named Dariel Legayada.

Thus, the Supreme Court AFFIRMS the RTC decision.

Antonieta Lucido v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 217764; August 07, 2017

Facts:

Sometime in August 2007, in Barangay Atabay, Hilongos, Leyte, AAA

was placed by her parents in the custody of their neighbor Lucido, alias
Tony-ay. The arrangement was made upon the request of Lucido that AAA
stay with her since she was living alone. AAA was eight (8) years old at
that time. During AAA's stay with Lucido, the child suffered repeated
physical abuse in the latter's hands, which included strangulation, beating,
pinching, and touching of her sex organ by Lucido. AAA was also
threatened by Lucido that she would be stabbed if she tells anyone about
what was being done to her.

Hence, in December 2007, Antonieta Lucido was accused of committing child

abuse against an eight-year-old girl, identified as AAA, under Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610. Lucido pleaded not guilty and was released on bail in
July 2009 following arraignment and pre-trial procedures where her offer to
plead guilty to a lesser offense was rejected by the prosecution.
Throughout the trial, the prosecution presented witnesses including AAA,
Dr. Conrado Abiera III, the victim’s father (FFF), and Maria Hinampas, to
establish the series of abuses AAA suffered under Lucido’s care. Lucido, in
her defense, denied the allegations and presented her testimony alongside
those of neighbors Lucia Mancio Lusuegro and Estrella L. Sanchez, arguing
that the complaint was motivated by personal vendettas.

On June 27, 2011, the Regional Trial Court found Lucido guilty of child abuse
and sentenced her to imprisonment and payment of moral damages. The
Court of Appeals later affirmed this decision with modifications regarding the
sentence and payment terms. Lucido’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
was denied.

Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in classifying the committed acts as
a violation of Republic Act No. 7610 instead of slight physical injuries.

Decision:

The SC affirms the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

This case reaffirmed the broad scope of actions punishable under Section 10(a)
of Republic Act No. 7610, emphasizing that acts of child abuse need not
directly prejudice the child’s development to be prosecutable. It underscores
the principle that the welfare of the child and protection from abuse are
paramount, and that any act constituting physical or psychological abuse falls
squarely within the ambit of the law.

Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes four (4) distinct offenses, i.e.
(a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation, and (d) being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. As correctly
ruled by the Court of Appeals, the element that the acts must be prejudicial to
the child's development pertains only to the fourth offense.

Here, AAA was maltreated by petitioner through repeated acts of strangulation,

pinching, and beating. These are clearly extreme measures of punishment not
commensurate with the discipline of an eight (8)-year-old child. Discipline is a
loving response that seeks the positive welfare of a child. Petitioner's actions
are diametrically opposite. They are abusive, causing not only physical injuries
as evidenced by the physical marks on different parts of AAA's body and the
weakness of her left knee upon walking, but also emotional trauma on her.

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared to provide a strong deterrence

against child abuse and exploitation and to give a special protection to children
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.
 People of the Philippines vs. Salvador Tulagan

Facts:
Salvador Tulagan was charged in two criminal cases. In the first, SCC-6210, he
was charged with sexual assault for forcibly inserting his finger into the vagina
of nine-year-old AAA in September 2011. In the second case, SCC-6211, he
was charged with statutory rape for, by means of force and intimidation, having
sexual intercourse with AAA on October 8, 2011, against her will and consent.
Tulagan pleaded not guilty to the charges. During the trial, the prosecution
presented testimonies from AAA and her aunt BBB, among others, and a
medical examination report showing signs of sexual abuse. The defense relied
on Tulagan’s alibi and a claim of a familial dispute leading to false accusations.
Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) found
Tulagan guilty as charged, modifying the penalties and damages awarded.
Tulagan appealed to the Supreme Court, maintaining his innocence and
challenging the credibility of the testimonies against him.

Issues:
Whether Tulagan’s appeal meritorious?

Decision:

The instant appeal has no merit. However, a modification of the

nomenclature of the crime, the penalty imposed, and the damages awarded in
Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, and a reduction of the damages
awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, are in order. Factual
findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect due to the unique
opportunity afforded them to observe the witnesses when placed on the stand.
Consequently, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial
court in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would
affect the result of the case.

Clearly, the objective of the law, more so the Constitution, is to provide a special
type of protection for children from all types of abuse. Hence, it can be rightly
inferred that the title used in Article III, Section 5, "Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse" does not mean that it is only applicable to children used as
prostitutes as the main offense and the other sexual abuses as additional offenses,
the absence of the former rendering inapplicable the imposition of the penalty
provided under R.A. No. 7610 on the other sexual abuses committed by the
offenders on the children concerned. Justice Caguioa asserts that Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is clear - it only punishes those who commit the act
of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse. There is no ambiguity to speak of that which
requires statutory construction to ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting the
law.

In light of the foregoing disquisition, the SC held that Tulagan was aptly
prosecuted for sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in
Criminal Case. No. SCC-6210 because it was alleged and proven that AAA was
nine (9) years old at the time he inserted his finger into her vagina. Instead of
applying the penalty under Article 266-B of the RPC, which is prision mayor, the
proper penalty should be that provided in Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period. This is because AAA
was below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense,
and that the act of inserting his finger in AAA's private part undeniably amounted
to "lascivious conduct." Hence, the proper nomenclature of the offense should be
Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

Jaime Capueta y Ataday vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:

This case originates from a charge against Jaime Capueta y Ataday for violation
of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act), specifically accused of
committing acts of lasciviousness against a 6-year-old minor, referred to as
“AAA”.

The information detailed that Capueta, with lewd design, wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously committed acts of child abuse by touching the minor’s legs, arms,
and private organ. Capueta pleaded not guilty, leading to a full trial.

During the trial, the prosecution presented AAA, her mother BBB, and Barangay
Tanod Arnel Cariaso as witnesses. The evidence showed that on the afternoon of
November 16, 2008, Capueta molested AAA at his sister’s house. After the
incident, AAA informed the mother, which led to Capueta’s arrest and subsequent
police investigation. The prosecution offered various documentary evidence,
including the victim’s birth certificate establishing her age.

Capueta defended himself by claiming he accidentally fell on AAA while

descending stairs and denied any malintent or contact with AAA’s private parts.
Despite his narrative, the Regional Trial Court found him guilty of the crime,
underlining the inconsistencies and unconvincing nature of his defense against the
straightforward and credible testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses.

The case proceeded to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC’s decision,
albeit with modifications to the penalty imposed, based on the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

Issue:
 Whether Capueta was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610.

Decision:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari, affirming the
decisions of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals with modifications related to
the awarding of damages. The Court highlighted the credible testimony of AAA,
who consistently recounted the incident, and deemed it sufficient to support a
conviction. The Court found all elements of sexual abuse under RA 7610
substantiated, namely the commission of lascivious conduct, with the victim
being under 18 years of age and specified as being exploited or subjected to
sexual abuse under the law.

The Court also addressed the petitioner’s contention about the sufficiency of the
information, reiterating jurisprudence stating that what controls are the facts
alleged in the body of the information, not the title or the specific law cited. The
Court held that the facts alleged clearly constituted the offense charged, hence the
petitioner’s right to be informed of the accusation against him was not violated.

The Court reiterated the doctrine that the credibility of minor victims of sexual
abuse is given weight, especially when their testimony is consistent and
categorical. It also confirmed that the actual recital of facts in the information, and
not the designation of the offense, determines the sufficiency to inform the
accused of the charges against them.

The elements necessary for a conviction under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 include
(1) lascivious conduct or sexual intercourse
(2) with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse, and
(3) (3) the child being below 18 years of age.