Article

International Area Studies Review

2022, Vol. 25(4) 303–321
Under family control: The trend of © The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/22338659221120972
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Andi Yakub, Andi Ali Armunanto,

and Haryanto
Hasanuddin University, Indonesia

Abstract
The rise of sole candidates in various local head elections in Indonesia has been the subject of
many scholarly critical analyses. Most of the analyses perceive the phenomenon as a symptom
of incumbency advantages, weak electoral systems, and poor institutionalization of political parties.
This article proposes a new argument with the family-based elite perspective controlling the sole
candidates’ emergence process. We compared two regions in South Sulawesi province, explaining
the political family networks that dominate the political competition by limiting candidature. The
sole candidate elections can be understood by looking at family-based elite networks scattered in
business networks, bureaucracy, political parties, aristocrats, and grassroots mass organizations.
The families use an oligarchic elite network at the national level or a plural elite network at the
grassroots level. The two types of family institutions are centralized and dispersed structures:
Makassar has an oligarchy, while Gowa has relatively equal elite power. The family network’s
power has closed or hijacked the electoral political competition, establishing control over local
elections by creating monopolistic political networks. Political family control is essential in under-
standing the rise of sole candidate elections in political practices.

Keywords
Sole candidate, local head election, family politics, elite network, Indonesia

Introduction
This article aims to explain the new trend of local head elections in Indonesia, identified by a sole
candidate’s emergence. We present arguments that differ from the mainstream account, concluding
that sole candidates are caused by the incumbent’s strong position, the electoral systems, and pol-
itical parties’ weakness. In contrast, we argue that a sole candidate results from substantial control
by the political family networks that dominate the political competition. From the top to the

Corresponding author:
Andi Yakub, Department of Political Science, Hasanuddin University, Makassar, South Sulawesi, Indonesia.
Email: a.yakub@unhas.ac.id
304 International Area Studies Review 25(4)

grassroots level, political family networks significantly influence access and political resources in
becoming candidates. However, political control is not enough until nomination because election
results require a wider family network at the grassroots. If the families have strong control over
their voter network, it will be turn up trumps, but if families control is weak over voters
network, then the election result will be the opposite. The institutional structure of the family is
an important element in explaining the emergence of a sole candidate. The two main types of insti-
tutions are centralized and dispersed structures, of which the two case studies represent both.
The studies of a sole candidate in multiple countries generate various models. In the Western
countries, the electoral system, incumbency advantage, and competitiveness influenced a sole can-
didate’s emergence (McGrath, 2011; Squire, 2000). Meanwhile, in Australia, sole candidates were
marked by institutional changes, such as the political party system and election rules (Sharman,
2003). In Asia, the sole candidate was radical. In India, for example, candidates are prevented
from participating in elections using violence (NDTV, 2018). Some even have been criminal can-
didates for intimidating voters and other candidates (Aidt et al., 2011). Meanwhile, a Singapore
study concluded that a sole candidate results from manipulating election rules (Tan, 2013).
In Indonesia, the sole candidate studies were first conducted to analyze Local Head Elections
(Pemilihan Kepala Daerah, Pilkada) in 2015. As with previous studies in other countries,
Indonesia’s sole candidate’s conclusion also concerns the incumbency advantages (Lay et al.,
2017; Tawakkal and Garner, 2017). Other studies concluded that the emergence of sole candidates
is a form of party failure in political recruitment (Mayangsari and Permana, 2019; Rini, 2016).
Although the existing studies are numerous, they conclude that weak party institutionalization
and the incumbent’s strength are the leading causes. Political scholars tend to get trapped in discuss-
ing candidate recruitment by political parties or incumbency and ignore other factors such as power
relations that control access and political resources in a region. Only are few conclude that the sole
candidate’s emergence cannot be separated from elite political networks, which monopolize access
to candidate participation in elections, even before the election (Lay et al., 2017).
Our research in South Sulawesi province found that political family networks played many roles,
from the nomination process to local head elections. The presence of families who have political net-
works from the top to the grassroots level determines the candidacy process, which is the cause of the
emergence of a sole candidate in this province. Under the family control, political competitions took
place during the pre-election through their networks to create and monopolize regional head candi-
dates. Families have similarities in controlling the electoral competition by limiting other candidates’
space to prevent them from engaging in local head elections. The families use an oligarchic network
at the national level or a plural network at the grassroots level. Meanwhile, in elections, the family
network relies heavily on a network of voters controlled by the elite in the grassroots. The results may
vary depending on the strength of the voting network owned by the family.
The study uses a qualitative research method. Data collection was carried out on the 2018 and
2020 Pilkada in South Sulawesi province. The research location was chosen because it is an area
that has family political influence in various regions (Buehler, 2013; Haryanto, 2014), with the
highest number of candidates from family members in one province in Indonesia (Nagara
Institute, 2020). Two research sites were Makassar city, which held the Pilkada in 2018, and the
Gowa district in 2020 (see Figure 1).

The trend of sole candidates

The terminology of a sole candidate in political studies is relatively limited. Even if it exists, there is
no generally agreed concept that an election where only one candidate participates is called a sole
Yakub et al. 305

Figure 1. Map of South Sulawesi.

candidate. Existing studies call this phenomenon quite differently; some call it an unopposed elec-
tion (Tawakkal and Garner, 2017). Another scholar is categorized as a sole candidate (Santos,
2016), and the latter calls it an uncontested seat (Squire, 2000) or uncontested election (Lay
et al., 2017; McGrath, 2011). Looking at the various existing works of literature, we conclude
that the various terminologies are similar. In general, scholars discuss incumbency advantages
and electoral competition.
The studies mentioned above concluded that the sole candidates’ rate usually increases when the
incumbent runs again. However, it will decrease when it reaches term limits, where the incumbent
can no longer participate in the election. For example, legislative candidates in the case of the
United States election choose to act rationally: “running where their chances are good, choosing
to opt-out in greater numbers where their chances are less inviting” (Squire, 2000: 137). Another
scholar, Robert J. McGrath (2011: 631), concluded that “uncontested elections may be more
rightly considered the consequence of a general content citizenry’ on the incumbent’s performance.
Meanwhile, according to Campbell Sharman (2003: 698), the pre-election competition resulted in
the majority of sole candidates, with parties refraining from nominating candidates for tactical
reasons, or because of their electoral unpopularity. In Asia, an immature democracy system’s char-
acteristics make the trend of sole candidates adorned in ways that violate the rules (Aidt et al., 2011;
NDTV, 2018; Tan, 2013).
In Indonesia, the emergence of a sole candidate in the regional elections was triggered by parties’
failure to conduct political recruitment (Mayangsari and Permana, 2019; Rini, 2016). On the one
hand, political parties are becoming increasingly pragmatic toward their political interests and
ignoring cadres’ aspirations, which develop at the grassroots level. On the other hand, the weak
306 International Area Studies Review 25(4)

institutionalization of political parties has made elections more dominated by party elites’ person-
alization. Several other studies have concluded that the emergence of a sole candidate is a form of
the incumbent’s strong bargaining position (Lay et al., 2017; Tawakkal and Garner, 2017).
Based on the perspective of electoral democracy, most studies consider that a sole candidate
creates an uncompetitive space for political competition. The first is to create limited options for
people’s political choices. Second, a sole candidate in the regional head elections also eliminates
political competition between candidates, impacting crippled political processes in regional head
elections. Nevertheless, in our perspective, the struggle for power in the political realm still
occurs even though the election is conducted with a sole candidate. This perspective is similar to
Lay et al. (2017) argue that an election with only one candidate participating also involves a
power struggle. The difference is that political competition starts earlier. The local elections are
no longer about gathering as many voters as possible in a voting booth but instead shifting from
the competition to the pre-election process (Lay et al., 2017: 429). During the nomination
process, competition eliminates potential candidates by blocking all accessible entry avenues
into the political arena. The sole candidate also used various means to manipulate local elections
to prevent the emerge of a challenger.
However, our focus is different from Lay et al. (2017) in explaining the constellations in elite
networks. Conceptually we pose a more profound theoretical question about how elite networks
within political families control the nomination of candidates and the outcome of elections.
Their previous study has not examined the relationships built in them. They only focus on
looking at the strengths of the incumbent candidates in the two areas studied, Pati and Jayapura.
In their two research areas, the incumbent candidate’s economic resources, political networks,
and social capital are their main concerns to conclude the emergence of the sole candidate. In
our case of Makassar and Gowa, as we will discuss, that power comes outside the candidate and
also not only from the power of the incumbent but from the family network that controls the
entire electoral process, before and during the Pilkada. Our novelty is the explanation of the insti-
tutional structure of the political family, which is a key element that is important in explaining the
main outcome of the influence of local elite networks in sole candidate elections.

Sole candidate elections and political family in Indonesia

In democratic countries, the phenomenon of sole candidates is a common fact. However, in conso-
lidated democracies, sole candidates are a new phenomenon. As in Indonesia, the sole candidate
first appeared in the local head election in 2015, and in the last five years, there has been an increas-
ing trend of sole candidate appearance (see Table 1). In 2015, only three regions had a sole candi-
date out of 269 Pilkada. In 2017, the number increased to 9 out of 101 regions. In 2018, the number
increased, where 16 regions have a sole candidate out of 171 regions. In 2020, the number of sole
candidates had skyrocketed to 25 candidates from 270 regencies, cities, and provinces, which
carried out Pilkada. All of the sole candidates eventually won the election, except for only one
who lost in Makassar.
In Indonesia, sole candidates who compete in the Pilkada must be in pairs, the mayor or regent
and her/his deputy candidate. The sole candidate referred to in this paper is the candidate pair for
mayor/regent and vice mayor/regent who has no opponent in Pilkada. The emergence of the sole
candidate during four local election periods in Indonesia was generally caused by only one candi-
date who successfully registered as a participant. Other candidates did not emerge because they
failed to get support from political parties or citizens for independent candidates (non-party candi-
dates). Candidates must fulfil these two main conditions according to the election rules. The
Yakub et al. 307

Table 1. Sole candidate elections in Indonesia 2015–2020.

Year Regions Total

2015 Kabupaten Timor Tengah Utara, Kabupaten Blitar, and Tasikmalaya 3

2017 Kota Tebing Tinggi, Kabupaten Tulang Bawang Barat, Kabupaten Pati, Kabupaten Landak, 9
Kabupaten Buton, Kabupaten Maluku Tengah, Kota Jayapura, Kabupaten Tambrauw, dan Kota
Sorong
2018 Kabupaten Deli Serdang, Kabupaten Padang Lawas Utara, Kota Prabumulih, Kabupaten 16
Pasuruan, Kabupaten Lebak, Kabupaten Tangerang, Kota Tangerang, Kabupaten Tapin,
Kabupaten Minahasa Tenggara, Kabupaten Bone, Kabupaten Enrekang, Kabupaten Mamasa,
Kabupaten Memberamo Tengah, Kabupaten Puncak, Kabupaten Jayawijaya, and Kota
Makassar
2020 Kapubaten Humbang Hasundutan, Kota Gunungsitoli, Kota Pematangsiantar, Kabupaten 25
Pasaman, Kabupten Ogan Komering Ulu, Kabupaten Ogan Komering Ulu Selatan Kabupaten
Bengkulu Utara, Kabupaten Boyolali, Kabupaten Grobogan, Kabupaten Kebumen, Kota
Semarang, Kabupaten Sragen, Kabupaten Wonosobo, Kabupaten Kediri, Kabupaten Ngawi,
Kabupaten Badung, Kabupaten Sumbawa Barat, Kota Balikpapan, Kabupaten Kutai
Kartanegara, Kabupaten Gowa, Kabupaten Soppeng, Kabupaten Mamuju Tengah, Kabupaten
Manokwari Selatan, Kabupaten Arfak, Kabupaten Raja Ampat
Source: compiled by authors.

General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) rules state that to run as a candi-
date for the regional head, a candidate must support at least 20 per cent of parliamentary seats.
Meanwhile, the independent candidate requires 6.5–10 per cent of the voters’ total number by col-
lecting ID cards (Kartu Tanda Penduduk, KTP). These harsh requirements often hinder independ-
ent candidates.
In Indonesia’s election rules, a sole candidate must have an opponent. The sole candidate’s
opponent is the kotak kosong (empty box) that does not represent the name of any political
party’s representative or affiliation. The Election Supervisory Agency (Badan Pengawas Pemilu,
Bawaslu) concluded that the kotak kosong was designated as a way out due to the impasse in
the competition of the candidate in local elections, where for those who disagreed with a sole can-
didate, the voters could vote for a kotak kosong as an alternative (Bawaslu, 2018: 4). The goal is to
fulfil competition as a characteristic of electoral democracy.
South Sulawesi province is one of the regions with the highest number of sole candidates.
In 2018, three out of 12 regions held regional head elections with sole candidates. These areas
include the city of Makassar, Bone district, and Enrekang district. In 2020, there were two
sole candidate elections, namely Gowa and Soppeng districts, from the 12 regions that
held Pilkada. Of the three regions that carried out the election with the sole candidate in
2018, all sole candidates were supported by many parties. In Makassar, Munafri Arifuddin
and his running mate, Andi Rachmatika Dewi, supported 10 out of 11 political parties with
43 out of 50 seats in parliament. In 2020, a similar thing occurred; a vast coalition of political
parties supported the two regions that carried out the sole candidate election in South
Sulawesi. Gowa Regency registered a vast coalition, where Adnan Purichta and his
running mate, Abdul Rauf Mallgani, received support from all parties in the parliament
with 45 seats.
We found many cases of sole candidate elections in other regions controlled by political families.
For example, in 2018, there was a Jayabaya family in Lebak district, where Iti Octavia Jayabaya, an
incumbent, was the sole candidate. Iti Octavia is the daughter of Mulyadi Jayabaya, the regent of
308 International Area Studies Review 25(4)

Figure 2. The trend of sole candidates and family candidates in pilkada 2015–2020.

Lebak, for two periods from 2003 to 2013. The Jayabaya family members also held various vital
positions from central to local, such as parliament members. In the Tangerang district, the sole can-
didate is also a family member. Ahmed Zaki Iskandar has been a member of the Ismet Iskandar
family, the Regent of Tangerang, for two periods between 2003 and 2013. Ismet Iskandar’s
family have also become officials and politicians in the Tangerang district. In 2020, the Joko
Widodo family, the president of Indonesia, also began to appear in Surakarta and Medan cities.
The president’s son, Gibran Rakabuming, even got all parties” supports and almost became the
sole candidate in the Surakarta. However, the independent candidates, Bagyo Wahyono and
Suparjo FX, finally dared to challenge the president’s son, even though it was said that this candi-
date was only a “dummy candidate,” who was deliberately presented to give the impression of pol-
itical competition (Bahtiar, 2020). In another region, in the Kediri Pilkada, the sole candidate
Hanindhito Himawan Pramana is the son of the Cabinet Secretary, Pramono Anung. Hanindhito
received the support of all political parties in the DPRD Kediri district. It would be possible to
discuss additional examples (Shalihah, 2020), but the core point is clear: many political family
forces appear and create sole candidate elections.
The phenomenon of under family control in Pilkada shows the power of families at the national
level through a network of presidents and ministers, including other families at the local level who
have controlled the local head election before the election takes place. According to Indonesian
researcher Yoes Kenawas, it was noted that since 2015 there have been 81 candidates for regional
heads who are family members. In 2017 and 2018, there were 34 and 109 candidates, respectively.1
In 2020, at least 164 political family members spread across several local head elections in
Indonesia. Data shows that political family members are increasingly becoming candidates for
regional heads (see Figure 2). In one area, there can be battles between families. In 2020, South
Sulawesi province had the highest political family candidates, with 12 candidates (Nagara
Institute, 2020). Besides, currently, there are 108 (19.7 per cent) of the 548 administrative
regions throughout Indonesia, led by regional heads and deputy regional heads who are political
family members (Sari, 2020).
Yakub et al. 309

The works of the sole candidate election in Indonesia are quite a lot. Nevertheless, they ignore
the power relations factor in the political arena, which is also essential to explore. Therefore, it is
necessary to shift the approach of sole candidate analysis by looking at the strength of the political
families and their networks. The cases of the sole candidate election in two regions in South
Sulawesi province show all of this. The family network’s power has closed or hijacked the electoral
political competition in the Pilkada. Political families establish control over local elections by
creating monopolistic political networks.

Sole candidate in Makassar

The sole candidate election in Makassar was held on June 27, 2018, was the third direct election for
mayor after the 1998 democratization. Makassar is one of the 171 other regions that held simultan-
eous regional elections throughout Indonesia in that period. Makassar is a city with a large number
of voters; in 2018, there were approximately one million voters. In Makassar, only one candidate
participated in the local head election, although previously, one other candidate (incumbent) had
been disqualified. In the end, the sole candidate had to compete with a kotak kosong.
Interestingly, the kotak kosong finally won the election in Makassar.
The sole candidate in Makassar was Munafri Arifuddin (popularly called Appi) and his running
mate, Andi Rachmatika Dewi (widely known as Cicu). The candidate pairs of Appi-Cicu are not
ordinary people. Both of them come from an oligarchic families with political and business back-
grounds that controlled the city of Makassar. Jusuf Kalla, Aksa Mahmud, Syafruddin, and Ilham
Arief Sirajuddin are the family networks behind this candidate pairs. Appi is the son-in-law of
Aksa Mahmud, the founder of the Bosowa Group, who is also a leading politician with an extensive
political network, both at the local and national levels. Aksa Mahmud is the brother-in-law of Jusuf
Kalla, a former Vice President of Indonesia. Jusuf Kalla is the Kalla Group founder, whose business
spreads in various fields, from car showrooms, malls, and construction to power plants. When the
Makassar Pilkada was held in 2018, Jusuf Kalla served as vice president. Apart from that, Appi also
had family ties with Syafruddin, the Deputy Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Wakil Kepala
Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Wakapolri) in 2016–2018. Syafruddin also served as
Minister of State Apparatus Utilization and Bureaucratic Reform in 2018-2019. Meanwhile,
Cicu is the nephew of Ilham Arief Sirajuddin, a two-term former mayor of Makassar, from her
mother’s path. Meanwhile, from her father’s path, Cicu is the granddaughter of M. Jusuf, a
former commander of the Indonesian Army Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia,
ABRI) during President Soeharto’s era.

Contested candidature
The 2018 regional head elections in Makassar were initially followed by two candidates, Danny and
Indira, against Appi and Cicu. Interestingly, Danny-Indira ran as an independent, even though
Danny was an incumbent mayor who usually gained support from many political parties.
Previously, Danny had claimed to have received recommendations from eight parties even
though those parties betrayed and switched their support. Meanwhile, Appi-Cicu ran through the
party channel after winning most of the parliament’s support.
In Makassar, the struggle for party support before the nomination is unpredictable. Almost all
political parties do not issue their support decisions until a week before the candidate registration
deadline. This support uncertainty had made Danny-Indira register through independent channel by
collecting KTP from citizens. Although at the end of the registration period, one party supported
310 International Area Studies Review 25(4)

Danny-Indira, the Democrat Party, which had seven parliamentary seats (14 per cent) and two new
parties, the Perindo party and PSI party. The number of seat support from the Democrat party does
not meet the requirements of a minimum of 20 per cent. On the other hand, Appi-Cicu managed to
garner ten parliament parties, with 43 seats or 86 per cent.
Despite failing to use the political party channel, Danny-Indira finally registered with the KPU
Makassar as an independent candidate after collecting 117,492 KTP. However, in February 2018,
Appi-Cicu sued Bawaslu Makassar to withdraw Danny-Indira’s candidacy for violating regula-
tions. In collecting KTP, Danny was accused of using government officials in the neighborhood
(RT/RW). However, the lawsuit was rejected. Appi-Cicu then filed a lawsuit again through the
State Administrative High Court (Pengadilan Tinggi Tata Usaha Negara, PTTUN). In the
lawsuit, Danny was accused of distributing smartphones while serving as mayor to government
officials in RT/RW, hiring contract workers, and using the government tagline “dua kali tambah
baik - twice is better” for his campaign. On March 21, 2018, PTTUN ordered the KPU
Makassar to nullify Danny’s candidacy. Finally, the KPU Makassar decided to disqualify
Danny-Indira as an independent candidate and could not participate in the Pilkada. Several infor-
mants said that Danny was quite close to several election organizers in Makassar, which ultimately
urged them to take this case to the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung, MA).2 Still, for the ump-
teenth time, Danny failed to fight for the nomination legally.
The disqualification of Danny-Indira seemed controversial, and involved many interventions in
thwarting Danny’s move to become a candidate. Some rumors circulated that Danny-Indira’s dis-
qualification was due to bribes received by the KPU Makassar and PTTUN. Danny-Indira’s dis-
qualification from the competition of candidates became a polemic. After Danny-Indira was
disqualified based on the PTTUN decision, the KPU Makassar rejected the Bawaslu Makassar rec-
ommendation that won Danny-Indira’s lawsuit against the KPU Makassar. It triggered a massive
wave of protest from Danny’s supporters against the KPU Makassar, and demanded implementing
the Bawaslu Makassar recommendation. However, the KPU Makassar did not budge and continued
to disqualify Danny-Indira.
Meanwhile, the sole candidate who successfully gathered massive support from many parties,
cannot be separated from their political family’s network. Combining their family background
and an extensive political family network made the Appi-Cicu win ten parties out of 11 parties
that possessed most of the parliamentary seats in Makassar. Eight of the parties supporting the
Appi-Cicu initially recommended Danny-Indira, but all of them shifted their support toward the
close of candidate registration. Aksa Mahmud and Jusuf Kalla’s network, which has good relations
with the political and business elite networks at the national level, made Appi-Cicu quickly gain
party support, which was determined by the party elite at the national level.
Moreover, what is interesting about this contested candidature was the police’s involvement in
thwarting Danny’s candidacy. While Danny was preparing for his candidacy, he faced various
police investigations at the end of 2017 and early 2018. There were 49 cases of public reports
related to corruption investigated by the police. Most of them were close to Danny during a
search in the mayor’s office and several bureaucrats” detention. After being thrown out of the can-
didacy, Danny was finally acquitted from the corruption case, and several other cases disappeared.
Several informants stated that the target was to thwart Danny’s candidacy. M. Enra Efni, a
former corruption convict in Makassar city government, argued in an interview:

Actually, my case was finished when the BPKP (Finance and Development Supervisory Agency) exam-
ined me. I was only told to return a certain amount of money which was considered a state loss. After
that, BPKP stated that the case was finished. However, before the Makassar Pilkada, I received a call
from the police and insisted on investigating me with the official report from BPKP. At the same time,
Yakub et al. 311

some of my friends were also being investigated with different cases. There were many government offi-
cials close to Danny being investigated.3

Similarly, Abdurrahman, a local journalist, explained that:

The search for evidence of corruption at the mayor’s office has been arranged. That is why the first target
was the mayor’s office because there were many bureaucrats closest to Danny. Finally, many govern-
ment officials were suspected of corruption in the run-up to the Pilkada. Maybe the goal was to bring
Danny down or reduce his popularity.4

The Makassar case illustrates how powerless the incumbent mayor candidates face large families
over the pre-election political process. In the nomination stage, Danny cannot optimize the incum-
bency advantages for profit. The incumbency advantage is powerless in front of the family’s robust
political control and hinders the incumbent’s movement from all sides. On the other hand, the
administrators of local political parties that usually have an essential role during the candidacy
become less significant and subordinated to political families’ control with access to political
parties’ national elites. The family can play all formal institutions in influencing the political
process by relying on the existing political network’s strength. Family networks spread out in
various strategic positions, controlling all resources and access to power and controlling the pre-
election process.
Shortly, the pre-election process is critical in local head elections in Indonesia. The contested
candidature in Makassar illustrates that electoral competition has shifted to the elites’ struggle,
not by the voters. This phenomenon has begun to appear in recent years after simultaneous regional
elections were held in many regions (Lay et al., 2017). However, what happened in Makassar was
more radical: bribery and the law’s criminalization involved several bureaucracies, police, and elec-
tion administrators. If in many experiences of democratic countries, where the candidacy is a matter
of institutionalizing political parties, then in Indonesia, at least in the case of Makassar, this is a
personal preference. A network of oligarchic families controls the process of candidacy.

Under family control: oligarchic family

The disqualification that thwarted Danny’s candidacy could be explored earlier, when several
potential candidates struggled to get parties’ support for the candidacy. The involvement of the
family network was significantly influential in trying to prevent potential candidates from
running for office. The first thing that emerged in public was Syamsu Rizal’s cancellation, the
deputy mayor of Makassar from running for office. Syamsu Rizal was the most potential candidate
to fight Danny. Apart from serving as deputy mayor, Syamsu Rizal is also a popular figure who has
received a broad support from the public at the grassroots. Former campaign master for Syamsu
Rizal stated that Syamsu Rizal resigned from the candidacy after meeting Ilham Arif Sirajuddin
in Guntur prison, where Ilham Arif Sirajuddin was imprisoned because of corruption. Ilham Arif
Sirajuddin asked Syamsu Rizal to step down and give priority and unite forces for Cicu, Ilham
Arif Sirajuddin’s nephew.5
Besides that, before being disqualified, Danny had faced various legal problems, ranging from a
search of the mayor’s office to the detention of three of Danny’s trusted civil servants. At the same
time, there were rumours about the police being involved in winning over Appi-Cicu, order from
Syafruddin, who served as Wakapolri at that time. An informant stated that the night before the
search for the Makassar mayor’s office, a meeting took place at Aksa Mahmud’s residence, attended
by several political elites and police members. Another informant who was imprisoned in the
312 International Area Studies Review 25(4)

Danny case told us in an interview that the police said that the legal case being handled was an
instruction from the Wakapolri, who wanted the case to be at the time of the investigation resolved
before the Pilkada. He explained that:

I heard from the police who investigated me that the target was Danny as mayor. The investigators are
trying to figure out Danny’s connection to my case. The investigator also told me that my case was
ordered to be resolved immediately before the election. He said it was an order from one of the
police chiefs in Jakarta.6

One of the Babinkantibmas (police officers on duty in the neighbourhood) also expressed a
similar sentiment in the Manggala kecamatan (sub-distric) when trying to convince residents in
the Panakkukang area to vote Appi-Cicu. He told us:

If you want to choose the mayor, sir, choose the one who prays well, not who likes to gamble. Mr Appi
(while giving a thumbs up), this is the worship, sir. He is an excellent mayoral candidate. That is why
police support him. (Author asks: Appi is the nephew of the Wakapolri, right?) Yes, there is an order to
support him, but Mr Appi is really a good person.7

After being disqualified, several corruption cases previously accused Danny was not proven in
court. One of campaign team members stated that Danny requested assistance from the Minister of
Agriculture, Amran Sulaiman, a minister close to Joko Widodo, the President of Indonesia.8 Amran
Sulaiman promised to help as long as Danny helped him: winning Sudirman Sulaiman, Amran
Sulaiman’s younger brother, in the South Sulawesi gubernatorial election, which was also held
in 2018. Amran Sulaiman’s presence in Danny’s case illustrates that political families are very
influential in controlling the legal process to benefit local elites in the election.
The control of the Appi family is also seen in the change in party support. For example, on
September 25, 2017, the PDIP party issued an official letter of assignment to Danny to run as a can-
didate (Rizki, 2017). However, on January 9, 2018—the day before registration day—PDIP actu-
ally submitted a recommendation for support to Appi-Cicu (Djafar, 2018). Other examples, such as
the PPP party and the PAN party, which also did the same thing as the PDIP party, submitted a letter
of recommendation to Danny but towards the end of registration they turned to Appi-Cicu. The
change in support from the PDIP and PPP parties from Danny to Appi was the intervention of
Jusuf Kalla and Aksa Mahmud. These two oligarchic families at that time were the National
Campaign Team of Joko Widodo and Ma’ruf Amin for the 2019 presidential election, where
these parties were also supporters of presidential candidates.
The control over this party is due to Jusuf Kalla’s relationship with Budi Gunawan, one of the
most influential figures in the PDIP party in Jakarta. Meanwhile, the change in PPP’s support was
also through Jusuf Kalla’s personal relationship with Suharso Monoarfa, the chairman of the PPP
party and a former minister whom Jusuf Kalla trusted when he was vice president. All funding for
political costs for these parties was provided by Aksa Mahmud. Jusuf Kalla and Aksa Mahmud also
used the same method for seven other parties that supported Appi-Cicu. The Appi family’s control
over these parties has been known for a long time, even their family is referred to as a political cartel
in Makassar (Patadungan, 2015).
Family control can also be traced to all the difficulties Danny faced when he was disqualified by
PTTUN. The PTTUN decision was criticized by legal experts from a leading university in Makassar
who argued that the decision was unreasonable (Santoso, 2018). Therefore, several issues devel-
oped among journalists and local activists that Jusuf Kalla used his political network with the
Yakub et al. 313

Supreme Court judges originating from South Sulawesi to influence the PTTUN decision.
According to the informant, Aksa Mahmud’s role was to provide funds for the action.9
Furthermore, on election day, control of political families continued. When a local survey insti-
tute, Celebes Research Center (CRC), announced the results of a quick count that favoured kotak
kosong, police intervention took place everywhere. The reason was that a photo circulating on
social media showed an image of Appi-Cicu’s vote losing to the kotak kosong at the Mangkura
polling station, where Appi voted. Syafruddin then commented on the CRC quick count results
by saying it was a hoax and an attempt to gain public opinion. The news was published in
Republika online news. Later, Syafruddin and the National Police’s public relations officer
denied this news. The news finally disappeared from the Republika news page and was inaccess-
ible. As a result of Appi’s defeat at the polling station where he voted, the recapitulation of votes at
the polling station was closed, and journalists were prohibited from covering all activities by the
police (Wijaya, 2018).
The phenomenon in the Makassar case illustrates how the oligarchy family’s power controls the
electoral process. We conclude that the oligarchic family is an elite family that has built “crony cap-
italism” since the early decades of democratization in Indonesia, and continues to this day. The
impact on the democratization process in Indonesia is that it creates predatory patronage, especially
in elections. The case in Makassar showed that the power of the oligarchic families controls the
regional head election process. As shown in Table 2, an oligarchic family formed by the state’s
power and business, controls the various stages on the emergence of a sole candidate in the area.

Table 2. Comparison of party and elite support.

Family
Regions Sole Candidates Party Support Elite Support Characteristic

Makassar Munafri Arifuddin and Golkar, Hanura, Nasdem, PPP, Jusuf Kalla Oligarchy
Andi Rachmatika PDI-P, PKPI, PBB, PAN, Aksa Mahmud
Dewi Gerindra, and PKS Syafruddin
Ilham Arif
Sirajuddin
Gowa Adnan Purichta Yasin PPP, Nasdem, PAN, PKB, Syahrul Yasin Limpo Pluralist
Limpo and Abdul Democrat, PDI-P, Perindo, Amir Uskara
Rauf Mallagani Golkar, PKS, and Gerindra Anshar Zainal Bate
Malingkai Maknung
KH Abu Bakar
Paka Andi
Hikmawati
Rafiuddin
Usniah Talenrang
Haji Nyampa
Ashar Ashari
Zainal
Sahabuddin
Sewang
Baharuddin Makka
Asrul
Source: compiled by authors.
314 International Area Studies Review 25(4)

The oligarchic family can also control the legal process, which violates the law itself. This manipu-
lative pattern will likely be solid in Indonesia when involving family networks in electoral pro-
cesses. The Makassar case also explains that Indonesia’s democratization process has been
hijacked by local oligarchs.
In short, the Makassar case explains that political families can control the political process
through oligarchic networks, consisting of political and business elites who have influence and
access, and control over resources and power, both at the national and local levels. Access to eco-
nomic and political resources is the source of patronage of local elites toward state institutions,
which makes these elites easily manipulate and control the processes in elections. The family’s
strong influence on politics can be seen from its ability to determine who are the members of the
political network that are going to compete in political competition. Family power can also influ-
ence decisions on formal institutions involved in the political process. It is similar to experiences in
other Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines (McCoy, 2009). Our findings prove that
political families had expanded their influence through the candidates and institutions involved
before the elections, which positively influenced the political process and democratization at the
local level.
Despite the kotak kosong won, and Appi-Cicu lost in the election of Makassar. It is not that the
power of the family does not exist, but the characteristics of the family control determine the elec-
tion’s result. Several studies try to explain the victory of the kotak kosong due to the grassroots
movement being influenced by both political awareness and the mobilization by Danny as
mayor (Harianto et al., 2020; Ilham and Purwaningsih, 2020; Mulya et al., 2022; Purwaningsih
and Widodo, 2021). These scholars’ conclusions strengthen our findings on the characteristics
of the oligarchic family structure in Makassar, which caused Appi-Cicu to lose as the sole candi-
date. In family structures that do not have elite networks at the grassroots are difficult to win the
election.

Sole candidate in Gowa

The sole candidate election in Gowa was held two years after the Makassar elections, in December
9, 2020. However, what happened in Gowa was different from Makassar. The sole candidate
defeated the kotak kosong with a landslide victory of 91 per cent. Gowa is a neighboring area of
Makassar with 772,684 population and about half a million voters by 2020. The district is primarily
highland areas. All areas in Gowa are still embracing their royal culture. In each area, such as a
kecamatan, a cultural ruler (aristocrat) called Karaeng (Buehler and Tan, 2007). Usually, this
Karaeng controls access to economic and political resources in the kecamatan, including placing
its family network as the village head in the area.
The sole candidate in Gowa was Adnan Purichta Yasin Limpo (widely known as Adnan) and his
running mate, Abdul Rauf Mallagani (popularly called Kio), who have served in the previous
period since 2015. Adnan is the son of Ichsan Yasin Limpo, the previous regent of Gowa, who
served for two terms. His father developed Adnan’s political network during his two periods
leading the Gowa district. Before Adnan’s father, his uncle, Syahrul Yasin Limpo, was also the
regent of Gowa for two terms and governor of South Sulawesi for ten years. Since 2019,
Syahrul Yasin Limpo is the minister of agriculture who replaces Amran Sulaiman.
Meanwhile, Kio is a bureaucrat who started his career as an agricultural extension agent and
most recently served as an important official in the district of Gowa. Kio was the son of
Mallagani, a Karaeng who influenced the highlands of Gowa. The noble families’ network
made Kio quickly gain control of several sub-districts resources and voters located in the highlands
of Gowa.
Yakub et al. 315

In 2020, Adnan was supported by all parties in the parliament, with 45 seats in the local head
election. The supporting parties include the PPP, Nasdem, PAN, PKB, Democrat, PDIP,
Perindo, Golkar, PKS, and Gerindra. Adnan-Kio left no opportunity for other candidates to
compete through party channels by taking all parties in parliament. In the end, Adnan-Kio
became the only candidate because no other candidate had registered through an independent can-
didate. The family network’s immense power allowed Adnan-Kio to quickly snatch victory for their
second term, almost without competition.

Uncontested candidature
In Gowa, the sole candidate’s journey was smooth. The sole candidate encountered almost no
significant obstacles in candidacy. Even though Adnan’s father, Ichsan Yasin Limpo, died in
2019, many local media thought it would weaken political support for Adnan-Kio in the 2020
Pilkada. Ichsan Yasin Limpo is the driving force behind Adnan’s political machine, control-
ling access and political resources that the family has controlled for decades. According to
Adnan’s political advisor, who was interviewed in this research, during the early days of can-
didacy, Adnan preferred the independent path for the 2020 Pilkada.10 At that time, Adnan had even
prepared a support ID card as a minimum requirement for independent candidate registration.
Another reason was that Adnan thought that he no longer had sufficient sources of funds to pay
dowries to political parties as a result of his family’s financial budget’s exhaustion due to his
father’s loss in the South Sulawesi gubernatorial election in 2018. Adnan’s situation indicates that
he is not sure about the incumbency advantages he has to go for the candidacy.
However, a meeting initiated by his uncle, Syahrul Yasin Limpo, changed Adnan-Kio’s political
journey from an independent path to party channels. The meeting was fronted by Mallingkai
Maknun, Baharuddin Makka, Ansar Bate, Asrul, and Ichsan Yasin Limpo loyalists. The meeting
of these family networks wanted Adnan-Kio to be nominated through political parties.
According to Eno, Adnan’s political advisor, before Pilkada, Syahrul Yasin Limpo visited Gowa
several times to direct Adnan-Kio through party channels. Eno observed:

The minister of agriculture (Syahrul Yasin Limpo) came to Gowa to direct the team by gathering various
elites (family network). After Syahrul’s arrival, several party elites finally expressed their support, start-
ing with Amir Uskara. Syahrul was also get support from Sahabuddin Sewang, the richest family in
Gowa. That is why Adnan finally got many resources with the help of many elite families in Gowa.11

The first political party to express support for Adnan-Kio was the PPP party under the leadership
of Rafiuddin, who was also the chairman of the DPRD Gowa and is known to be very close to the
Yasin Limpo family. Furthermore, the PKB party, through Fauzi Andi Wawo, a member of the
DPRD in South Sulawesi province, and Hafid, who have broad access to the national political
elite, control large groups of voters in Gowa. After that, other parties such as PDIP, Golkar, and
Gerindra announced their support to Adnan-Kio. The Gerindra party previously planned to bring
in the party chairman, Darmawangsyah Muin, for the candidate. However, due to the lack of
voter support for Darmawangsyah, the Gerindra party decided to join the Adnan-Kio supporting
party on the day of candidate registration.

The first one came from the PPP party; then, the PKB party and other parties followed. The Gerindra
party was the last one because they wanted to nominate the party leader, but the popularity was low.
He said he was not connected to the elites in various sub-districts with many followers. Finally,
instead of having no candidates, they also go to Adnan.12
316 International Area Studies Review 25(4)

At the time of the Pilkada, some people were trying to run as candidates. Still, these candidates
did not proceed because they could not gain access to grassroots political parties and elite networks.
The death of the king of Gowa, Andi Maddusila Andi Idjo, a strong rival of the Yasin Limpo family
for decades in Gowa, is one of the main reasons why Adnan-Kio has no equal opponent. On the
other hand, internal consolidation within the Yasin Limpo family has strengthened. For example,
Dewi Yasin Limpo, Adnan’s aunt, did not participate in the 2020 Pilkada even though this aunt
and nephew had become political opponents in the previous regional elections. The absence of
competitors and the solid political consolidation built from a network of political families indicated
that Adnan-Kio did not get political opponents until the candidate registration period.
Unlike the Makassar case, in Gowa, the sole candidate could optimize their network through
control and access to elite networks at the grassroots. In this case, there was no contest at all in
the candidature process. The political process only found a compromise point agreed upon by all
elite networks, especially the elite of political parties, business people, and Karaeng families that
were geographically dispersed. Uncontested candidature in the Gowa case smoothly, without
legal manipulation and means of violence, as happened in Makassar. The family network that
was rooted for a long time could consolidate properly without any conflicts because the family-
based elites could mobilize support for just one candidate. This absence of competition explains
that political families’ power has built a well-established political and socio-economic foundation,
thus causing a potential counterweight that was not powerful enough to challenge the political fam-
ilies. The control of political families at the local level in new democracies creates “closed games”,
making it difficult for new challengers to emerge (Behrend, 2011). One of the elements of these
foundations is the network of pluralist families scattered throughout the district.

Under family control: pluralist family

Gowa district is an area that has a different political character from Makassar. The elite network in
Makassar is driven by oligarchic families, whose political power structure is a pyramid. The oppos-
ite happened in Gowa, where political power in this region is plural, with elite networks spread out
and almost evenly distributed in various regions. Thus, it is more challenging to compromise among
the elite in this position. However, Adnan-Kio managed to get support from almost all grassroots
family networks spread across various kecamatan in Gowa. It is because the Yasin Limpo family
has built and maintained its elite network since the reign of Syarul Yasin Limpo for ten years, fol-
lowed by Ichsan Yasin Limpo ten years later, and Adnan for the last five years. Since long ago, this
family has also controlled several major parties, especially the Golkar party (Buehler and Tan,
2007). Kaswandi, secretary of the Golkar party in Gowa, explained:

Even if Adnan did not ask for support from the Golkar party, we would automatically support him
because the Golkar party has always had good relations with the Yasin Limpo family. They are a
family that helped raise the Golkar party in South Sulawesi. So even though Adnan did not ask for
our support, I think we would all support him in maintaining our good relationship with the Yasin
Limpo family.13

Adnan-Kio’s success in garnering support for pluralist political family networks was because the
movement was made through elites holding grassroots power in Gowa. The main character behind
Adnan-Kio was Amir Uskara, a political figure with a vast network in Gowa, even at the national
level. Amir Uskara serves as deputy chairman of the PPP party’s central board in Jakarta. Amir
Uskara, through his political networks’ power, provided Adnan-Kio with great strength in his
efforts to gain support from the political elite in Gowa. Amir Uskara was close to the Yasin
Yakub et al. 317

Limpo family when Syahrul Yasin Limpo was still the regent of Gowa. This closeness continued
when Syahrul became governor, and his position as regent was replaced by his younger brother
Ichsan Yasin Limpo.
Besides Amir Uskara, other figures who also significantly influenced Adnan-Kio supporters’
political network were Baharuddin Makka and Asrul, senior bureaucrats with solid networks and
influential positions in the government bureaucracy in Gowa. These two bureaucrats were loyalists
of Ichsan Yasin Limpo and became the main figures in mobilizing civil servants. Malingkai
Maknung, who was in the Adnan-Kio team, also expanded the political network. Malingkai
Maknung is very close to the Yasin Limpo family and has been friends with Syahrul Yasin
Limpo for a long time. Together, they have pursued a career as a bureaucrat. Malingkai
Maknung has a broad political network in community organizations, aristocracy, and the bureau-
cracy. Malingkai Maknung’s power influenced the lobbying process for mobilizing and unifying
community organizations, youth organizations, and Karaeng networks in various regions.
Anshar Zainal Bate is another figure who plays a significant role in this elite network. A senior pol-
itician and successful businessman who has served for five terms as the chairman of the Gowa
DPRD and is now a member of the DPRD for South Sulawesi province. Ansar Zainal Bate also
had a role in strengthening the support of other grassroots elites for Adnan-Kio. KH Abu Bakar
Paka, chairman of the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in the Gowa
district, is a community leader who joined the family network. KH Abu Bakar Paka is the spiritual
teacher of Ichsan Yasin Limpo. Every month Ichsan Yasin Limpo provides financial support for
Koran teachers and annually dispatches ten members of KH Abu Bakar Paka to go on Umrah to
Mecca.14
The Gowa kingdom’s support through the queen, Andi Hikmawati Andi Kumala Idjo, the chair-
man of the PDIP party in the Gowa district, also significantly influenced Adnan-Kio. Previously,
the royal family had always been political opponents of the Yasin Limpo family. However, the rec-
onciliation process took place after Andi Maddusila Idjo’s death and the king of Gowa was replaced
by Andi Kumala Idjo. The Yasin Limpo family and the kingdom of Gowa agreed to end the conflict
between them. Andi Hikmawati Andi Kumala Idjo stated:

One of the influences of the elite is the role and participation of families like us. My royal family, includ-
ing my husband as the King of Gowa, joined in visiting the community in each kecamatan to campaign
for Adnan. There is no day without a visit. For example, today to the highlands, then tomorrow to the
lowlands again.15

Our research results also found that Adnan-Kio dominated all group networks in Gowa. One of
the organizations that significantly influenced MUI because it included a network of religious tea-
chers and imams (mosque leaders and caretakers). Samsuar Saleh, stated that this network contrib-
uted significantly to Adnan-Kio’s victory, with an estimated vote count of around 30,000.16
Coupled with the network of farmer groups that also have widespread voters throughout Gowa,
it is estimated that around 92,000 farmers—prior to the Pilkada, 23,000 Gowa farmers received
free fertilizer assistance from Syahrul Yasin Limpo, the minister of agriculture.
Adnan-Kio also received support from the political elite, who controlled voter groups in several
areas in Gowa. Some of them are the family of Rafiuddin, chairman of the Gowa DPRD from the
PPP party, who controlled the voter network in the highlands, especially the kecamatan Tinggi
Moncong and kecamatan Tombolo Pao. Usniah Talenrang’s family controlled the voter network
in the kecamatan Bonto Nompo. The Nyampa family controlled the voter network in kecamatan
Bajeng and kecamatan Pallangga. Ashar Ashari Zainal’s family controlled voter networks in keca-
matan Biringbulu and kecamatan Tompobulu. The Sahabuddin Sewang family from the business
318 International Area Studies Review 25(4)

community is the most influential businessman family in Gowa and has been close to the Yasin
Limpo family for a long time. Sahabuddin Sewang has been a contractor for infrastructure projects
in Gowa since Syahrul Yasin Limpo became regent. Most of these families are Karaeng. Thus, as
shown in Table 2, Adnan-Kio was able to gain all support from plural elites at the grassroots in
Gowa. Adnan himself stated that:

Gowa has very strong family ties, and the family determines the electoral vote. The elections in
Makassar are individual, while the polls in Gowa are different. In Gowa, family ties are very influential.
If we hold the head of the family ties (Karaeng), the other family members cannot run away. Because
maybe this is the difference between urban life and rural life.17

The Yasin Limpo family built relations between other families with political and socio-economic
foundations. The characteristics of the Gowa kingdom’s legacy from the past are still strong with
the Karaeng territory base, which is still reflected today. In Gowa, political families are plural in
nature, meaning that all elites have almost equal power. So that the role of each family becomes
significant and its existence is needed. Apart from their control over the grassroots, some families
also have access to resources and capable political networks. They tend to be more compromised
and without any significant conflicts. That made it easier for Adnan-Kio to take all region-based
family supports. The strong support of the families for Adnan-Kio ultimately left no opportunity
for other candidates, so that political parties had no other option but to support the candidate.
The establishment of political and socio-economic foundations of the Yasin Limpo family made
the potential challenger to this political family was even weaker. The network consolidation of plur-
alist families spread throughout the district strengthens the Yasin Limpo family’s political founda-
tions that have persisted for decades. An essential element in forming political families is the
maintenance of networks. The people who benefit from each other’s involvement in business
and politics can help maintain the network. Ultimately family control of potential networks to
mobilize support when elections such as parties, business networks, bureaucracy, and aristocrats
become very important and more prominent (Aspinall and As’ad, 2016). The case of the political
family in Gowa is a similar phenomenon to experiences in another Southeast Asian country such as
Thailand (Ockey, 2015).
Research in Gowa found that the family network structure was more plural in nature, where the
strength of each family was almost equal. Alliances between families produce a robust pluralist
family structure, both for controlling political competition during candidacy or controlling voter
networks during elections. The combination of control over political resources as well as control
over voters results in tremendous power from the family network to control the process and
outcome of the regional head election. Behrend (2011) argues that strong family control causes
voters to choose political families without coercion because those families have provided services
while the opposition has no such records. This is what makes the sole candidate in Gowa more
strong than Makassar.

Conclusion
The sole candidate elections in Makassar and Gowa were the intervention and influence of political
family networks that could control the election competition. The two cases provided a different
experience from the general conclusions of sole candidates who have dominated the existing
studies. These cases explain that it is not the incumbency factor that causes the emergence of a
sole candidate. In Makassar, the incumbency advantage cannot compete against the oligarchic pol-
itical family networks that control political parties and state institutions. In contrast to Makassar,
Yakub et al. 319

pluralist families in Gowa can control voter communities spread across society. These two cases
further emphasize the trend of family politics that has grown dramatically over the recent years
in Indonesia’s local politics (Kenawas, 2020; Purdey, 2016).
The institutional structure of the families of the two cases is theoretically different from each
other: the oligarchic families are mainly composed of elites at the top of the pyramid of societal
structures that are part of crony capitalism, while the pluralist families are mostly elites in small
areas and some of them are non-governing elites. The two types of family institutions are centra-
lized and dispersed structures: Makassar has an oligarchy, while Gowa has relatively equal elite
power. These two family institutional structures are important explanatory elements in understand-
ing the emergence of a sole candidate. Both motives are the same in controlling election competi-
tion but differ in expelling challengers. The oligarchic families could use their resources to control
political parties and even control the law, resulting in potential challengers being knocked out of the
competition. Meanwhile, the mechanism of the pluralist family is to control the elite network of
society at the grassroots so that closed games.
Despite having strong control and influence in the emergence of sole candidates, these two types
of political families experienced different experiences with election results. The oligarchic families
in Makassar were unable to win over their candidate, while the pluralist families in Gowa were suc-
cessful. Theoretically, we can conclude that family political control is dynamic. In one case, they
managed to control the local election candidacy process while winning the result. In another case,
they could only control before the election, but they were unable when the voting took place. The
family that does not have strong control over the voter network cannot win the election automat-
ically by controlling the network of political parties and business elites. The factor that explains
this dynamism is the form of the family’s institutional structure.
While recognizing the limitations of our analysis, we believe that most of the case study findings
have explained the relationship of family politics with the emergence of the sole candidate. We have
also explained the structures that form family institutions and control local elections. Theoretically,
these two types of family institutions can explain the phenomenon of political families and sole can-
didates in other areas. Some further research questions that can be asked are whether the institu-
tional structure of families has the same pattern in many regions in Indonesia in controlling
political parties, incumbent regional heads, and voters at the grassroots. This includes broader atten-
tion to family political dynamism in other areas. These answers can help build generalizations by
analyzing the relationship between these factors and the trend of sole candidates in many
Indonesian regions.

Acknowledgement
We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers, as well as Yoes Kenawas for their valuable comments on
this paper. We also thank Ahmad Fauzan Baso for helped the data collection and Muhammad Ikhsan prepared
the figures.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD
Haryanto https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3595-9492

Notes
1. Yoes Kenawas, personal communication, 10 March 2021.
320 International Area Studies Review 25(4)

2. Interview with Abdurrahman and Mahathir, the local journalists, Makassar, 17 March 2018.
3. Interview with M. Enra Efni, Makassar, 7 December 2019.
4. Interwiew with Abdurrahman, Makassar, 29 January 2018.
5. Interview with Zainal Arifin, a campaign team of Appi-Cicu, Makassar, 30 January 2018.
6. Interview with M. Enra Efni, Makassar, 7 December 2019.
7. Interview with Jupri, Makassar, 20 Juni 2018.
8. Interview with Suardi, Makassar, 26 June 2018.
9. Interview with Ammang, Makassar, 13 July 2022.
10. Interview with Eno, Gowa, 6 December 2020.
11. Interview with Eno, Gowa, 6 December 2020.
12. Interview with Samsuar Saleh, head of the Bawaslu Gowa, Gowa, 7 December 2020.
13. Interview with Kaswandi, Gowa, 13 January 2022.
14. Interview with Misbah, Gowa, 15 July 2022.
15. Interview with Andi Hikmawati Andi Kumala Idjo, Gowa, 18 January 2022.
16. Interview with Samsuar Saleh, Gowa, 7 December 2020.
17. Interview with Adnan Purichta Yasin Limpo, Gowa, 2 February 2022.

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