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GLOBAL DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL POLICY
Networks and Geographies

of Global Social Policy
Diffusion
Culture, Economy, and
Colonial Legacies
Edited by
Michael Windzio
Ivo Mossig
Fabian Besche-Truthe
Helen Seitzer
Global Dynamics
of Social Policy CRC 1342
Global Dynamics of Social Policy
Series Editors
Lorraine Frisina Doetter, University of Bremen, Bremen,
Germany
Delia González de Reufels, University of Bremen, Bremen,
Germany
Kerstin Martens, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
Marianne Sandvad Ulriksen, University of Southern
Denmark, Odense, Denmark
This open access series welcomes studies on the waves, ruptures and
transformative periods of welfare state expansion and retrenchment glob-
ally, that is, across nation states and the world as well as across history
since the inception of the modern Western welfare state in the nine-
teenth century. It takes a comprehensive and globalized perspective on
social policy, and the approach will help to locate and explain episodes
of retrenchment, austerity, and tendencies toward de-welfarization in
particular countries, policy areas and/or social risk-groups by reference
to prior, simultaneous or anticipated episodes of expansion or contrac-
tion in other countries, areas, and risks. One of the aims of this series is
to address the different constellations that emerge between political and
economic actors including international and intergovernmental organi-
zations, political actors and bodies, and business enterprises. A better
understanding of these dynamics improves the reader’s grasp of social
policy making, social policy outputs, and ultimately the outcomes of
social policy.
More information about this series at

https://link.springer.com/bookseries/16294
Michael Windzio · Ivo Mossig ·
Fabian Besche-Truthe · Helen Seitzer
Editors
Networks
and Geographies
of Global Social
Policy Diffusion
Culture, Economy, and Colonial
Legacies
Editors
Michael Windzio Ivo Mossig
SOCIUM Institute of Geography
University of Bremen University of Bremen
Bremen, Germany Bremen, Germany
Fabian Besche-Truthe Helen Seitzer

SOCIUM SOCIUM
University of Bremen University of Bremen
Bremen, Germany Bremen, Germany
ISSN 2661-8672 ISSN 2661-8680 (electronic)

Global Dynamics of Social Policy
ISBN 978-3-030-83402-9 ISBN 978-3-030-83403-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83403-6
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022. This book is an open access publication.
Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adap-
tation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit
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The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative Commons
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The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
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Acknowledgments
This book is based on the research conducted in the Collaborative

Research Center (CRC) 1342 “Global Dynamics of Social Policy” at
the University of Bremen. The Bremen CRC 1342 is funded by the
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Founda-
tion)—project number 374666841—SFB 1342. As the editors we are
grateful to the DFG and the CRC for having enabled us to conduct this
research and to produce this volume. First, ideas of the analyses have
been developed during a workshop on network diffusion held by the
editors in September 2020 in Bremen. Draft versions of the chapters
have been discussed during an online workshop in November 2020. We
are grateful to Gabrielle Bieser, Amelia Price, Vicki May, Ashley Fritsch,
Nils Düpont, and Dirk Stieglitz who helped us with language checking
and manuscript editing. Michael Lischka helped us with the network
graphs, Tobias Tkaczick with the maps, and Kerstin Martens with some
support on formal issues. Thanks go also to a reviewer, who gave helpful
advice, and special thanks to Heinz Rothgang who was more important
for the realization of this project than he might think.
v
About This Book
This volume presents a wide-ranging analysis of the emergence and

worldwide diffusion of social policies. Social policy diffusion is analyzed
in varying fields—affecting all aspects of life—namely, old age and
survivor pensions, labor and labor markets, health and long-term care,
education and training, and family and gender policy. Based on policy
field-specific theoretical approaches, the authors of this volume investi-
gate how the global diffusion of social policy occurs through different
network dimensions. In this perspective, networks of global trade, colo-
nial history, similarity in culture, and spatial proximity are regarded as
“pipe structures,” or structural backbones, of the diffusion process. It is
the first volume that explicitly follows this macro-quantitative perspec-
tive on network diffusion of different social policies on a global scale and
over a long historical period, beginning in 1880. Each study applies the
same method of network-diffusion event history analysis and predicts
the diffusion process for the same set of networks in order to make these
processes comparable. Moreover, diffusion of each policy is highlighted
by its spatial–temporal patterns in global maps. This volume therefore
provides a comprehensive overview of the development of modern social
policies.
vii
Contents
1 Networks of Global Social Policy Diffusion: The

Effects of Culture, Economy, Colonial Legacies,
and Geographic Proximity 1
Ivo Mossig, Michael Windzio, Fabian Besche-Truthe,
and Helen Seitzer
2 The Global Diffusion of Work-Injury Insurance: The
Role of Spatial Networks and Nation Building 39
Nate Breznau and Felix Lanver
3 Networks of Global Policy Diffusion: The
Introduction of Compulsory Education 59
Helen Seitzer, Fabian Besche-Truthe,
and Michael Windzio
4 The Global Diffusion of Adult Basic Education 83
Fabian Besche-Truthe
ix
x Contents
5 The Emergence of Healthcare Systems 111

Alexander Polte, Sebastian Haunss, Achim Schmid,
Gabriela de Carvalho, and Heinz Rothgang
6 Introduction of Long-Term Care Systems: The
Nascent Diffusion of an Emergent Field of Social
Policy 139
Johanna Fischer, Alexander Polte, and Meika Sternkopf
7 Origins of Family Policy: Prerequisites or Diffusion 169
Tobias Böger, Keonhi Son, and Simone Tonelli
8 From Geneva to the World? Global Network
Diffusion of Antidiscrimination Legislation
in Employment and Occupation: The ILO’s C111 195
Jenny Hahs
9 The Diffusion of Workplace Antidiscrimination
Regulations for the LGBTQ+ Community 227
Helen Seitzer
10 Critical Summary and Concluding Remarks 255
Carina Schmitt and Herbert Obinger
Index 269
Contributors
Fabian Besche-Truthe University of Bremen, Germany

Tobias Böger University of Bremen, Germany
Nate Breznau University of Bremen, Germany
Gabriela de Carvalho University of Bremen, Germany
Johanna Fischer University of Bremen, Germany
Jenny Hahs University of Bremen, Germany
Sebastian Haunss University of Bremen, Germany
Felix Lanver University of Bremen, Germany
Ivo Mossig University of Bremen, Germany
Herbert Obinger University of Bremen, Germany
Alexander Polte University of Bremen, Germany
Heinz Rothgang University of Bremen, Germany
xi
xii Contributors
Achim Schmid University of Bremen, Germany

Carina Schmitt University of Bremen, Germany
Helen Seitzer University of Bremen, Germany
Keonhi Son University of Bremen, Germany
Meika Sternkopf University of Bremen, Germany
Simone Tonelli University of Bremen, Germany
Michael Windzio University of Bremen, Germany
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Logistic density and cumulative logistic density function 5

Fig. 1.2 Network exposure and the hazard rate 7
Fig. 1.3 The network of global trade in 2010 18
Fig. 1.4 Network of cultural spheres in 2010 21
Fig. 1.5 The network of colonial legacies 25
Fig. 2.1 Nation-state formation as a “treatment” effect
for the introduction of work-injury law 46
Fig. 2.2 Discrete-time hazard diffusion models of work-injury
law in 150 countries, 1880–2010, Log-Odds 47
Fig. 2.3 Cumulative hazard rates of adoption by low versus high
GDP in 1900 50
Fig. 3.1 Cumulative introduction of compulsory education 68
Fig. 3.2 The global diffusion of compulsory education 71
Fig. 4.1 ABE policy adoption map 86
Fig. 4.2 ABE policy adoptions by income group 90
Fig. 4.3 ABE policy adoptions per year 96
Fig. 4.4 Interaction effects 100
Fig. 4.5 Google Ngram for “adult education” and “lifelong
learning” 103
Fig. 5.1 Adoption of healthcare systems through time 113
xiii
xiv List of Figures
Fig. 5.2 Introduction of healthcare systems over time 130

Fig. 6.1 Adoption of LTC systems (type A and B) worldwide,
until 2010 148
Fig. 6.2 World map of LTC system introductions 149
Fig. 6.3 Interaction effects 156
Fig. 7.1 The introduction of paid maternity leave 177
Fig. 7.2 The introduction of child benefits 178
Fig. 7.3 The introduction of workplace childcare regulation 178
Fig. 8.1 Ratifications of discrimination (employment
and occupation) convention, 1958 (No. 111) 202
Fig. 8.2 Level of analysis and risk set identification in network
analysis of intraorganizational ratification behavior 207
Fig. 8.3 Ratifier and cumulative ratifier proportion of C111,
1959–2010 (N = 150) 212
Fig. 9.1 Cumulative adoption rates for LGBTQ+ rights
and important dates 230
Fig. 9.2 The global diffusion of antidiscrimination regulations
in the workplace for the LGBTQ+ community 242
Fig. 10.1 The introduction of ten social policies around the world 256
Fig. 10.2 The introduction of four basic social policies by regions 259
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Countries in quartiles of degree centrality 19

Table 1.2 Correlations of (weighted) networks 26
Table 1.3 Correlations of (weighted) exposure to alters
that adopted compulsory education 27
Table 1.4 Determinants of ties in networks of countries
1880–2010 29
Table 2.1 First law regression results 54
Table 2.2 First social insurance regression results 55
Table 3.1 The introduction of compulsory education in N =
117 countries 72
Table 3.2 The introduction of compulsory education in N =
117 countries—non-normalized exposure in colonial
legacies network 77
Table 4.1 Diffusion of adult basic education 98
Table 4.2 Diffusion of adult basic education results
with non-normalized exposure in network of colonial
legacies 104
Table 4.3 Diffusion of adult basic education. Results
without considering USSR countries 105
xv
xvi List of Tables
Table 5.1 Network diffusion of healthcare systems—log-hazard

ratios 123
Table 5.2. Network diffusion of health care systems—additive
modeling approach 132
Table 6.1 Discrete-time logistic hazard model of LTC system
introduction (N = 154) 153
Table 6.2 Results—additive diffusion models 160
Table 6.3 Results—additive diffusion models
with non-normalized colonial exposure 161
Table 7.1 Global network diffusion of paid maternity leave 180
Table 7.2 Global network diffusion of child benefits 181
Table 7.3 Global network diffusion of workplace childcare 183
Table 7.4 Global network diffusion of paid maternity leave
(alternative) 187
Table 7.5 Global network diffusion of child benefits (alternative) 187
Table 7.6 Global network diffusion of workplace childcare
(alternative) 188
Table 8.1 Periodization alongside ILO milestones and (UN)
historical turning points 209
Table 8.2 Ratifier categories (according to adopter categorization
of Rogers 2003) by World Bank Income Group 214
Table 8.3 Global network diffusion of antidiscrimination
legislation in employment and occupation.
Discrete-time logistic hazard model of ratifications
of ILO C111 (N = 161/112) 215
Table 8.4 Ratifier categories (according to adopter categorization
of Rogers 2003) by legal origin 220
Table 8.5 Global network diffusion of antidiscrimination
legislation in employment and occupation.
Discrete-time logistic hazard model of ratifications
of ILO C111 (N = 161/112), non-normalized
colonial network 221
Table 9.1 The introduction of workplace antidiscrimination
regulations, N = 126 countries, 1949–2010 243
Table 9.2 The introduction of workplace antidiscrimination
regulations, N = 126 countries, 1949–2010
non-normalized colonial network 249
Table 10.1 The spread of social policies around the globe 257
1
Networks of Global Social Policy
Diffusion: The Effects of Culture,
Economy, Colonial Legacies,
and Geographic Proximity
Ivo Mossig, Michael Windzio, Fabian Besche-Truthe,
and Helen Seitzer
Introduction1
The global diffusion of social policy is an emerging field in political
science and comparative macro-sociology. Detailed, qualitative studies
can precisely highlight the mechanisms of diffusion at work, e.g.,
learning, emulation, competition, or coercion (Gilardi 2016; Obinger
et al. 2013). Even though this approach can reveal these mechanisms,
it is limited to the respective cases under investigation. At a higher
level of abstraction, researchers can apply statistical models for diffusion
research on a comprehensive set of countries and over a long historical
1This chapter is a product of the research conducted in the Collaborative Research Center
“Global Dynamics of Social Policy” at the University of Bremen. The center is funded
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation)—project
number 374666841—SFB 1342.
I. Mossig (B)
Institute of Geography, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
e-mail: ivo.mossig@uni-bremen.de; mossig@uni-bremen.de
© The Author(s) 2022 1

M. Windzio et al. (eds.), Networks and Geographies of Global
Social Policy Diffusion, Global Dynamics of Social Policy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83403-6_1
2 I. Mossig et al.
period. On the one hand, such studies usually abstract from the country-
specific “micro” mechanisms; on the other hand, they provide a “macro”
perspective on the diffusion process in the overall population of countries
around the globe. The empirical studies collected in this volume follow
the second approach.
Our research was conducted in the Collaborative Research Center
1342 (CRC 1342) at the University of Bremen, which is funded by the
German Research Foundation (DFG). The members of the CRC 1342
collected an unprecedented amount of historical data on welfare policies
around the globe to allow for macro-quantitative analyzes of global diffu-
sion in different subfields of social policy covering almost all countries in
the world. This book is a collaborative effort of the quantitative projects
in the CRC 1342 that analyze the diffusion of welfare policies.
We regard diffusion as a process driven by multiplex ties between
countries in global social networks. In social network research, multi-
plexity means that subjects have network ties in various dimensions. In
our view, global trade, colonial history, similarity in culture, and spatial
proximity link countries to each other. In an epidemic, nowadays an
unfortunately well-known type of diffusion, the share of infected subjects
in the population depends on single events of disease-adoption at the
micro-level; these events, in turn, result from some kind of interaction
between subjects. Hence, networks are the “pipe structure,” or the struc-
tural backbone, of the diffusion process. We will analyze diffusion in
several subfields of social policy, investigating the question of which
network dimensions drive the process. For instance, the introduction of
certain labor regulations might depend more on economic ties, in partic-
ular, global trade, whereas cultural similarity between countries could
M. Windzio · F. Besche-Truthe · H. Seitzer

SOCIUM, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
e-mail: mwindzio@uni-bremen.de
F. Besche-Truthe
e-mail: fbesche@uni-bremen.de
H. Seitzer
e-mail: seitzer@uni-bremen.de
1 Networks of Global Social Policy Diffusion … 3
be more important for family or education policy. This volume aims

at testing the different network structures against one another in their
relevance for the diffusion process in different subfields of social policy.
These policy fields are old age and survivor pensions, labor and labor
markets, health and long-term care, education and training, and family and
gender policy.
The present chapter introduces a network diffusion model for the
analysis of social policy diffusion. We will give a detailed overview of the
networks used in the following contributions. By applying an identical
methodology to different fields of social policy, studies in this volume
contribute to comparative research on the diffusion of social policy.
Four different networks will be analyzed as explanatory variables in
this volume. The first is the network of geographical distance or prox-
imity, which is represented by the distances between the capitals of the
countries included in the sample. This network is based on the assump-
tion that diffusion processes are subject to “slowing” effects of distance
(Staudacher 2005; Berry 1972). However, geographical distances do not
represent actual network contacts but merely promote the formation,
frequency, and intensity of contacts. For this reason, we will secondly
analyze the effect of the global trade network. We assume that beneficial
economic exchange in global markets is a crucial condition for domestic
economic growth (Krugman et al. 2018), but global economic transac-
tions might be less costly if labor or educational standards are similar.
Thirdly, we will analyze the network representing “cultural spheres”
(Windzio and Martens 2021), which we assume to be of particular
importance in the subfields of family and education policy. The fourth
network represents ties of colonial legacies between states and captures
long-term, asymmetric interdependencies. In this framework, the spatial
distance network, or more precisely the spatial proximity network, serves
as a reference point for determining whether the contacts in the three
other network types exceed the breaking effect of distances and are there-
fore more relevant to the diffusion of social policy (Simmons and Elkins
2004).
The aim of this chapter is to present in detail the methodology of the
network diffusion model used in the following chapters and the networks
of geographical distances, global trade, cultural spheres, and colonial
4 I. Mossig et al.
legacies. We will give a brief overview of the current state of research

and argue that the respective networks might be relevant in explaining
diffusion processes in social policy. Subsequently, we will describe the
construction of the networks, network parameters, and visualizations.
Accounting for the change of network contacts over time, we apply longi-
tudinal exponential random graph models (ERGMs) (Harris 2014) to
analyze relevant variables influencing the probability of network ties.
The Network Diffusion Model in Event

History Analysis
Processes of social diffusion often follow a logistic growth curve. Logistic
growth processes are common in epidemiology, where they describe the
spread of infectious diseases (Shen 2020). If the mechanism of diffusion
is contagion via contact among subjects, the probability of meeting an
“infected” subject is very low at the beginning of an epidemic, but the
likelihood increases as the share of those who have already contracted the
disease rises.
Yet subjects show considerable variance in social behavior as well as
in their likelihood to contract the disease. Depending on the disease,
some subjects turn out to be immune, have very few network ties, or are
even isolated. Moreover, if other subjects recover from the disease and are
immune afterward, the increase in the probability of becoming infected
at a particular moment decreases if most subjects to whom potentially
infected persons have contacted are now immune (left-hand side of
Fig. 1.1). This applies not only to the spread of diseases (Shen 2020); we
can also describe the diffusion of innovation in this way and, accordingly,
the diffusion of different social policies as well. Even though the logistic
growth curve is a crucial characteristic of diffusion processes (Rogers
2003), the underlying structure is a network. Networks were not system-
atically included in diffusion analysis until the mid-1990s, when Thomas
Valente developed the network diffusion model (Valente 1995). At the
micro-level, events of contraction drive the diffusion process, which
means that subjects change their state from uninfected to infected, for
example, or to have adopted an innovation—in our case, a policy. Each
.25
1
cumulative logistic density
.8
.2
logistic density
.15
.6
.4
.1
.05
.2
0
0
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
values of x values of x
Fig. 1.1 Logistic density and cumulative logistic density function
single micro-level event contributes to the time-dependent aggregation

of these events to the macro-level, where we then describe the diffusion
process as a characteristic of the overall population, for example, by the
cumulative logistic growth function (right-hand side of Fig. 1.1).
At the starting point of an epidemic, all subjects are at risk of adopting
the disease. Due to the waiting time until the moment of contraction,
the underlying micro-level data are called episodes, with the starting
point being the first occurrence of an infection in the population and
the endpoint being either the contraction of the disease, the end of
the epidemic, or simply the end of the window of observation. Conse-
quently, we will apply event history models to analyze micro-level events
of policy adoption in order to reconstruct the diffusion process at the
population level. In these models, the dependent variable is the hazard
rate (in our case the rate of adoption of the respective social policy). It
is defined as the probability P, that the event at time T , occurs within
a particular interval between t and t + t, given that the event has not
yet occurred at t, that is, T is greater than or equal to t.
P(t ≤ T < t + t)

r (t) = P(t ≤ T < t + t|T ≥ t) =
P(T ≥ t)
In a discrete-time situation, we can estimate event history regression

models by using binary outcome models (Singer and Willett 2003) such
as logit, probit, or complementary log–log models. In this volume, we
6 I. Mossig et al.
will use logit models, where the hazard rate r (t ) is predicted by j time-
dummies α that indicate e.g., 25-year time intervals, to estimate the
effects of our four networks of trade, colonial history, cultural spheres,
and spatial proximity, and some control variables β’x.
1
r (t) =
1 + exp( −(α1 t1 + ... + α j t j + β1 trade + β2 colony + β3 cultur e + β4 pr oximt y + β x) )
Contagion at time t depends on exposure to subjects already infected at

t −1. Valente (1995, 43) defines exposure as the share of infected subjects
j in the (time-varying) egocentered network of subject i. The term x ij
defines a tie in the egocentered network of subject j, and a j are those
alters already infected at t. The formula below shows that exposure is a
function of t, which means that it depends on time.

( j =i x i j • a j )t
E i (t) =
( j =i x i j )t
Figure 1.2 gives an example of how exposure is calculated and repre-

sented in time-dependent episode data. The table on the right-hand side
of Fig. 1.2 represents the underlying data structure, which is comprised
of two subjects i and j. It shows the dependent variable “d” that
denotes whether the innovation was adopted at a particular time point
“t,” the network exposure (“expo.”), and one binary control variable.
For this exemplary representation, we chose a dummy variable, which
indicates that subject i belongs to the WEIRD “cultural sphere” of
western, educated, industrialized, resourceful and democratic countries as
one control variable (Henrich 2020; Seitzer et al. 2021) (see below). We
will describe this category in more detail later on. To the left of Fig. 1.2,
we see the graphical representation of network exposure in the respec-
tive episodes. Observation i is exposed to 2/6 of its alters who already
adopted a social policy at t 1, to 3/6 at t 2, 4/6 at t 3, and 5/6 at t 4. Since
subject i adopts the social policy at t 4 + 1, when 5/6 in its network are
adopters, i’s threshold is 5/6. In contrast, subject j adopted the social
policy at t 2 + 1 at a threshold of 3/6.
Fig. 1.2 Network exposure and the hazard rate
In the column “expo.” in the table to the right of Fig. 1.2, there is
a particular value of exposure for each year in which the two countries
i and j were at risk of adopting (which means that they had not yet
adopted, or T ≥ t ). The event of adoption occurs as a result of a given
exposure in the moment before adoption, so the respective exposure is
lagged by one year. At the bottom of Fig. 1.2, hazard ratios are shown
for the binary explanatory variable WEIRD. Country i is WEIRD and
has 1 event out of 4 time periods at risk and thus a hazard rate of 0.25.
Period t 1 has been dropped because of the lagged exposure, i.e., there
is no data on subjects that adopted at t ≤ 1. Country j (non-WEIRD)
has 1 event out of 2 time periods at risk and thus a hazard rate of 0.5,
so the hazard ratio is (1/4)/(1/2) = 0.5. Computing hazard ratios and
standard errors for continuous variables, such as exposure, is much more
8 I. Mossig et al.
difficult and requires the application of maximum likelihood estimation,

particularly if the model includes further covariates.
The Methodology Used in This Volume

Throughout this volume, we use discrete-time logistic hazard models. The
dependent variable is the absorbing destination state of having adopted
a social policy (= 1). Similar to Fig. 1.2, once a country has adopted the
social policy in question, it drops out of the risk set. Since j adopts at t 2
+ 1, there are no data entries for the subsequent time points. Conversely,
more entries are given for i because the adoption comes later in t 4 + 1.
Countries that adopted a policy prior to 1880 dropped out of the risk set,
and if they did not adopt until 2010, they are right-censored . In hazard
models, the consequence of left-censoring is usually that the beginning
of the episode is unknown, so we cannot properly compute time-at-risk.
Those countries are not considered in the risk set, i.e., in the underlying
sample on which hazard ratios are estimated. However, they contribute
to the estimation of the network exposure of countries that have not yet
adopted. Right-censoring, on the other hand, means that those countries
remain in the risk set throughout the entire time frame.
To test whether the diffusion of social policy occurs along particular
network contacts, four different networks build the underlying structure
through which we assume diffusion to occur. As mentioned before, these
are geographic proximity, trade relations, cultural similarity, and colo-
nial legacies. Exposure to countries that already adopted a social policy
is calculated separately for every network. Hence, while the exposure
of a country i can be very high in the global trade network, it can be
zero in the colonial legacies network simply because the country has not
had any colonial relationship. Furthermore, the exposure in the respec-
tive network is weighted by tie strength, e.g., exposure to a country
that had already adopted the social policy is higher in a geographically
close country than in one that is further away. Lastly, exposure is esti-
mated either undirected (for the networks of geographic distance, global
trade, and cultural spheres) or directed (for the network of colonial lega-
cies). For the latter, this means that if the colonial power adopted a
social policy, exposure for its (past) colonial entities increases. However,
this does not hold the other way around. For undirected networks,
exposure would take the same value regardless of direction. Generally,
(unweighted) exposure is included in the logistic hazard models as a
numeric variable ranging from 0, where no alter has adopted the social
policy, to 1, where all alters have adopted the social policy. On a similar
note, the geographical proximity network is time constant, meaning the
tie strength does not change over the duration of analysis, while cultural
spheres, trade, and colonial legacies are time-variant to account for the
declining influence of colonial powers after decolonization, changing
economic partnerships, and evolving cultural characteristics.
We take the four networks as the underlying structures for the diffu-
sion process. As we will see later in the chapter, all networks constitute
different avenues or “pipes” through which communication and infor-
mation about social policies can travel. Taken together, these networks
emphasize different specificities of countries’ interdependencies. By
including different networks, we assume to catch as many instances of
network diffusion as possible through the different mechanisms.
However, social policy diffusion can also depend on domestic factors
such as a country’s level of economic development or financial capa-
bility. The same is true for civil freedom in the political regime (Lindert
2004). Thus, we introduce Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
(Inklaar et al. 2018) and a democratization index as baseline control vari-
ables. The former was linearly interpolated for the whole time frame by
taking the minimum value for every income group based on all obser-
vations before 1800 and filling in any missing values according to the
minimum of the respective income group of the corresponding country
by assuming a logistic growth function. Provided there were no data
available, these were the values to start the interpolation into future
years. This yields a continuous measure of economic development from
1880 to 2010 for almost all countries in our dataset. For the level of
democratization, we use the basic Varieties of Democracy Regime Score
(Lührmann et al. 2018), which in the raw data ranges from 0 to 9
and was linearly interpolated for any missing data points. This method
introduces some noise to the data, as it fills missing data points with non-
natural numbers (decimals). However, filling missing data either with
10 I. Mossig et al.
the number observed before or thereafter would make the measurement

error even greater. We suspect the benefits of the interpolation to be
greater than its disadvantages and certainly greater than having to discard
observations.
Additionally, the diffusion process in question might show time
dependency resulting from unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, we control
for time dependency by using a piecewise constant step function, based
on a baseline of, e.g., 25 years steps, starting in 1880 until 2010. Never-
theless, as different as the social policy fields are in this volume, authors
might very well find a way of defining time effects that better fit their
theories and hypotheses. One last variable that needs introduction is
trade existed . This variable stems from and directly refers to the global
trade network. Because of the historicity of the data, we are often unable
to accurately describe national units that were not established in the
respective historical period. This problem is especially apparent in the
network of global trade based upon the Correlates of War (COW) Inter-
national Trade Dataset (Barbieri and Keshk 2016). Since their collection
efforts were for the purpose of measuring trade between states, any states
considered to be non-existent at a particular moment according to the
COW definition are not included in times of non-existence. Because
our data covers the network across all 164 countries from 1880 until
2010, empty dyads in the trade network do not necessarily mean that
no trade happened. It might just mean that the country did not exist
as an independent trading partner and therefore trade with this country
was impossible. States that did exist but did not officially trade are coded
with a value of zero. To control for the possible distortion of the two
different meanings of zero ties, we include a dummy variable in all esti-
mations which signifies whether a country, according to the trade data,
existed (= 1) or did not exist (= 0).
Lastly, we face a problem with statistically non-independent observa-
tions. During the time frame under investigation, there are historical time
periods in which several countries did not exist because they were part of
a larger unit. An ideal-type example of this are countries of the former
Yugoslavia. For example, if Slovenia and Croatia both adopted a social
policy when they were part of the former Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia was
the overarching unit that actually adopted the policy, thus resulting in
the introduction of a policy when the country units Slovenia and Croatia
were non-independent observations. This is due to the way we arrange
the dataset for the diffusion analysis: the set of nodes in the network
is constant over time, which implies that Slovenia and Croatia existed
before, during, and after Yugoslavia existed. Our approach to address
this problem is to regard Slovenia and Croatia as “spatial patches,”
remaining well aware of the fact that many countries actually changed
their borders throughout history. From this perspective, Slovenia and
Croatia were spatial patches at risk of adopting a social policy before,
during, and after Yugoslavia existed. Yugoslavia will not be regarded as
a subject in our sample, but Slovenia and Croatia and all other coun-
tries formerly belonging to Yugoslavia are indeed distinct units. These
subjects are not, however, statistically independent from one another!
This does not pose a problem for the calculation of exposure through the
networks but it does cause a violation of the assumption of independence
of error terms in the maximum likelihood estimation. In the logistic
diffusion model, we address this statistical non-independence by using
cluster-robust standard errors (Zeileis et al. 2020). Our procedure has
the following advantage: it accounts for the statistical non-independence
of observations when they are part of an overarching cluster (spatial
patch) by using the corrected standard errors, but it does not impose
any standard error correction in the hazard model for country-years not
belonging to the respective cluster or to any other cluster.
The analyses in all chapters of this book follow the same rationale:
First, the exposure to already “infected” countries is calculated for each
network, as discussed above. This statistic, i.e., the weighted share of ego’s
network contacts who had already adopted the policy in question at t −1,
is then handed over to a time-discrete hazard model. In this model, the
adoption rate is regressed on exposure, controlling for GDP per capita,
the democracy index, and additional policy field-specific factors. The
resulting robust standard errors correct any statistical non-independence,
potentially affecting standard errors. In most chapters, we present the
coefficients as hazard ratios, representing influence of the predictors on
the risk of policy adoption. The results therefore allow us to determine
which of our networks represent a “pipe structure” for the contagion of
social policies, for example, through exposure to countries that already
12 I. Mossig et al.
adopted the respective policy. We can determine whether factors such as

cultural similarity or trade, for example, have a stronger effect on the
adoption of a policy, as they represent the better “diffusion channel.” To
give an example: if we enhance a diffusion model based on the cultural
spheres network with the trade network and the effect of the former
thereby loses significance afterward, then the trade network is not just a
mediator of the effect of trade on diffusion but also the more appropriate
explanatory variable.
Networks of Social Policy Diffusion

In the following, we discuss the networks we use to explain diffusion
processes in different fields of social policy. As mentioned before, coun-
tries are tied to each other in networks of geographical proximity, global
trade, cultural spheres, and colonial legacies. These network dimen-
sions are the basis of our comparative analysis of diffusion based on the
network diffusion event history model discussed in the previous section.
At first sight, our four networks seem to correspond with the mech-
anisms discussed in the diffusion literature (Obinger et al. 2013;
Starke and Tosun 2019; Gilardi 2016). Networks of colonial legacies
could correspond with coercion, global trade networks with competition,
cultural spheres networks with learning and geographical proximity with
imitation. On second thought, however, such an assignment between
network dimensions and diffusion mechanisms does not capture the
complex reality of policy diffusion. For instance, global trade networks
can also indicate cooperation and division of labor, so that the mecha-
nism at the dyadic or country level would be surely different. Moreover,
whether a policy adoption in a particular country results from learning or
imitation is hard to decide from a global, macro-quantitative perspective.
It is thus important to put the power of the network diffusion approach
into perspective. Network diffusion analysis based on multiplex networks
can reveal the relative importance of the respective “pipe structure” for
the diffusion process under investigation. But neither does it provide
information on agency and decision-making nor does it guarantee that
the networks considered in the analysis actually are the most important
structures. Possibly, other network dimensions, international organiza-

tions, or even personal networks between experts and policymakers are
more important, e.g., for learning. Our approach is thus a first starting
point in the global analysis of network diffusion of social policies.
Network of Geographic Distances
There is little doubt that geographical distance influences diffusion

processes. The closer the objects of investigation are located to each other,
the more likely they come into contact and the more likely the content of
the diffusion process—e.g., disease, innovation, or a social policy—will
be contracted or adopted. A simple and illustrative example is the spread
of a virus transmitted via personal contacts (Cliff 1979), or, alternatively,
the negative effect of geographical distance in migration (Windzio 2018)
as predicted by the gravity model (Dodd 1950). The “neighborhood
effect” is a simplified version of spatial distance, whereby a location in
the immediate neighborhood increased the risk of adoption.
The strength of neighborhood effects can be derived from the diffu-
sion rate, which in turn depends on the properties of the diffusing infor-
mation. The adoption rate usually declines with increasing complexity
of knowledge or increasing capital intensity (Staudacher 2005). Rumors
about prominent personalities spread rather quickly, while complex
scientific findings, for example, show a much slower diffusion. In addi-
tion to the speed of diffusion, the spatial area in which diffusion takes
place is a crucial factor. If geographical distances were the only explana-
tory factor, the speed of diffusion would allow conclusions about the
topology of the area and the distribution of subjects within this area.
The diffusion rate is usually not constant across time and space, rather
there are preferred routes—for example, through particularly intensive
contacts—which increase the propagation velocity along certain diffu-
sion channels and thus have a significant influence on the propagation
area (Grabher 2006).
In previous research on policy diffusion (Obinger et al. 2013),
geographical distances were used as weighting matrices in spatial regres-
sion models to capture dependencies in the form of “spatial lags” (e.g.,
14 I. Mossig et al.
Franzese and Hays 2007; Schmitt and Obinger 2013). A simple form of
a spatial weighting matrix is the neighborhood matrix. If two countries
have a shared border, the respective cell of the neighborhood matrix has
a value of 1, and otherwise 0 (Windzio et al. 2019). The neighborhood
matrix thus implies the assumption that only countries with a common
border can influence each other (Obinger et al. 2013). Not least because
of the criticism of this very narrow assumption, the distances between
capital cities were used instead of, or rather in addition to, the neighbor-
hood matrix to define “spatial lags” in the weighting matrices (Schmitt
2019; Simmons and Elkins 2004).
As a justification of the relevance of geographical proximity, it is
often argued that the intensity of communication between countries can
increase due to their proximity. This argument implies the assumption
that the exchange of information between neighboring or geographi-
cally close countries is substantially higher. Even unintended forms of
information exchange occur more easily and thus more frequently. In
addition, policy examples from neighboring or nearby countries are often
regarded as a blueprint for a country’s own national policies, so that a
high degree of mutual influence is assumed due to geographical prox-
imity (Schmitt and Obinger 2013). However, a clear assignment of
geographical proximity to one of the mechanisms from the diffusion
literature—(i) learning, (ii) competition, (iii) imitation, or (iv) coercion
(Obinger et al. 2013; Starke and Tosun 2019)—is difficult. Magetti and
Gilardi (2016) conclude that “Geography is often an important compo-
nent of diffusion, but it cannot be linked straightforwardly to any of
the […] mechanisms. Therefore, it is a catch-all indicator that usually
discriminates between them. It is best used in combination with other
indicators” (Magetti and Gilardi 2016, 93).
Similarly, Simmons and Elkins (2004) note that geographical distance
does not provide a satisfactory explanation for policy diffusion per se.
In line with their view, Beck et al. (2006) point out in a contribu-
tion with the significant title “Space is more than Geography” that,
on the one hand, taking geographical distances into account in spatial
econometrics is a methodological enrichment, but that other measures
for determining interconnectedness between states would produce more
fruitful results. Similarly, Boschma (2005) argues that proximity not
only encompasses physical–geographical proximity, but that cognitive,

organizational, social, and institutional forms of proximity exist as well.
Accordingly, neighboring countries are more likely to display similar
social structures and traditions. These similarities serve as one expla-
nation for the high correlation between culture and spatial proximity.
This argument fits well with our idea that cultural proximity can also be
an important dimension. Ties in the network of “cultural spheres” (see
below), which is correlated with spatial proximity, can be a much more
meaningful condition of diffusion. Whereas spatial proximity between
capitals is measured almost accurately, however, the network of cultural
spheres is a combination of various complex characteristics and there-
fore more prone to measurement error. According to this brief overview,
we argue that the network of geographical distances serves as a reference
point to measure the relevance of the contact networks of global trade,
cultural spheres, and colonial connections.
The calculation of distances between capitals is described in detail in
Eiser et al. (2020). The corresponding dataset is available in the Global
Welfare State Information System WeSIS (www.wesis.org). To ensure
that an increasing geographical distance indicates a decrease in the inten-
sity of contact, we calculated the inverse of distance. The value for the
contact between two countries i and j due to geographical proximity is
therefore:
xi j = 1/ capital distance
Even though there are occasional shifts of the capital in some countries,
for pragmatic reasons the distances are based on the capital cities in 2020.
Therefore, the geographical distances are a time-invariant network.
Global Trade Networks
In international comparative social policy research, trade networks are

a central indicator for mapping economic globalization processes. Both
in the first wave of globalization from 1890 to World War I (WWI),
and especially during the second wave of globalization from World War
II (WWII) to the mid-1980s, the density of trade networks increased
16 I. Mossig et al.
rapidly, and trade was the central engine of economic globalization

(Mossig and Lischka 2022). In social policy research, the share of trade
([imports + exports]/GDP) was traditionally interpreted as an indicator
of economic openness (Busemeyer 2009). Cameron (1978) was one of
the first to show an empirical association between the expansion of the
public sector and the integration into world trade for 18 Western indus-
trialized countries. According to his argument, open economies with a
high share of trade in GDP are particularly dependent on external events,
such as price developments on the world market. In order to counteract
these external dependencies, these open economies try to extend their
influence within the domestic economic sectors. Smaller economies in
particular have comparatively high trade shares as a percentage of GDP
due to the smaller domestic market and a high degree of specialization
in their own industrial structure. Accordingly, the economic openness of
smaller economies, such as the Scandinavian countries or the Nether-
lands, partially explains the disproportionate expansion of the welfare
state. In the literature, such side effects of economic globalization are
discussed in the context of the compensation thesis (Rieger and Leibfried
2003; Starke and Tosun 2019).
Since the 1980s the importance of trade networks on world market
integration declined. States have now become increasingly involved in
global competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). This competi-
tion takes place with regard to the range of low-cost location conditions
offered, for example, in terms of social security contributions or taxes
(Mossig and Lischka 2022; Düpont et al. 2022). In order to survive this
competition, policymakers considered a dismantling of the welfare state
by lowering social standards and social contributions as necessary (Swank
2010), which was referred to as a “race to the bottom” (Kvist 2004) in
the literature.
Openness or inclusion as measured by trade shares in a country’s
GDP or foreign direct investments (FDI stocks or flows) is a highly
aggregated indicator. It disregards the varying importance of different
trading partners, i.e., it does not differentiate between trading partners
that are important and unimportant to ego. In addition, indirect connec-
tions via third trading partners are neglected. However, the structure of
the network and the position of the individual states in this network
largely determine the scope of action and also influence the vulnerability
and sensitivity of interstate relations (Glückler and Doreian 2016; Maoz
2011). The significance of economic globalization and the relevance of
intensifying trade linkages for the diffusion of social policy is based on
the assumption that important trading partners influence a country’s
policies more strongly than subordinate trading partners do. As a result
of the globalization process, countries are becoming more closely aligned
with one another, although this does not necessarily mean that social
policy has to converge (Jahn 2016).
The trade networks were defined as follows: The trade data are
collected from the Correlates of War Project (Barbieri and Keshk 2016).
According to the following regulations, the edge weights were deter-
mined for each year. The volume of trade between each of the two
countries comprises the total trade in goods in one year and is there-
fore undirected. The original trade flows were converted into US$ using
the average exchange rate from 2011 to avoid an inflation-related densifi-
cation of the networks. Due to the extremely different trade volumes, we
logarithmically transformed the trade values. The edge weight of trade
interdependence between two countries i, j is therefore:

log(trade) if trade > 0
xi j =
0 if trade = 0
If a dyad shared any trade volume in any respective year, the log of this
volume was used, otherwise the edge was set to 0 as the dyad did not
share any trade in the respective year. Further decisions regarding the
construction of trading networks concern former countries that have
split up over time, e.g., Austria-Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Serbia-
Montenegro. In such countries, the trade volume of the shared years was
divided according to the GDP proportion of these countries after these
countries separated from each other. In the case of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) this refers to the period from 1922 to 1991,
in the case of the Baltic States 1941–1991, and in the case of the former
Yugoslavia the period from 1918 to 1992. “Small” states that once existed
but are not represented in the selected country sample for this anthology
were deleted (e.g., Yemen People’s Republic, Republic of Vietnam, Korea
18 I. Mossig et al.
from 1880 to 1905, Kosovo, Zanzibar). Furthermore, because there are

some missing values, we include a dummy variable in the later analysis
which depicts whether a country “existed” based on the COW defini-
tion, as explained in detail above. The network representation in Fig. 1.3
is a quadrilateral Simmelian backbone (Nocaj et al. 2015) (Fig. 1.3).
The network visualization only shows to a limited extent how inten-
sively individual countries are involved in global trade. But weighted
degree centrality can be used as a measure of network integration. In
2010, China was the country with the highest trade integration (degree
centrality of 1.92). The value 1.92 indicates that China was involved
in 1.92% of bilateral trade worldwide, followed by the USA (1.80),
Fig. 1.3 The network of global trade in 2010

Table 1.1 Countries in quartiles of degree centrality

1st Quartile 17 Countries:
(Degree: 1.92–1.27) CHN, USA, DEU, FRA, ITA, NLD, JPN, IND, GBR, KOR,
BEL, ESP, BRA, TUR, RUS, CAN, THA
2nd Quartile 24 Countries:
(Degree: 1.21–0.87) MYS, CHE, SWE, IDN, ZAF, SGP, AUS, AUT, ARE, POL,
SAU, UKR, DNK, FIN, ARG, CZE, EGY, PRT, NOR, GRC,
IRL, MEX, PAK, ROU
3rd Quartile 38 Countries:
(Degree: 0.86–0.52) HUN, VNM, MAR, ISR, NZL, IRN, CHL, NGA, BGR, DZA,
COL, SVK, SVN, PHL, BLR, LBN, BGD, QAT, TUN, KAZ,
PER, KWT, HRV, VEN, LTU, SYR, OMN, KEN, CIV, ECU,
LKA, JOR, GHA, URY, LBY, LVA, LUX, CRI
4th Quartile 81 Countries:
(Degree: 0.51–0.05) IRQ, AZE, EST, CYP, GTM, DOM, YEM, TZA, CMR, SEN,
AGO, TTO, SDN, PAN, GEO, PRY, CUB, MUS, MKD,
HND, UGA, UZB, MOZ, SLV, ZMB, BEN, ETH, TKM,
COG, MDA, ARM, ALB, AFG, GAB, KHM, BIH, ZWE,
JAM, GIN, BOL, COD, TGO, MRT, PRK, NIC, LBR, MMR,
MDG, TJK, NAM, BFA, MWI, MLI, GNQ, HTI, KGZ,
PNG, DJI, MNE, SWZ, NER, MNG, GUY, SLE, NPL, RWA,
GMB, TCD, LAO, SUR, BWA, FJI, SOM, BDI, CAF, GNB,
SLB, COM, LSO, BTN
No 2010 trade data reported for CPV, SRB, SSD, and TLS
Germany (1.69), and France (1.57). The following Table 1.1 divides the
country sample into quartiles. 17 countries (10.4% out of 164 countries)
with the highest centrality rating account for 25% of the cumulative
degree centrality. In contrast, the last quartile is occupied by 81 countries
with the lowest centrality values in global trade. Bhutan, for example,
which ranks last, only accounts for 0.05% of global trade. Lesotho
(0.08), the Comoros (0.09), and the Solomon Islands (0.10) also had
a very low-degree centrality in 2010.
The Network of “Cultural Spheres”
During the last decades, culture became an increasingly important

concept in economics and the social sciences (Rose 2019; Emirbayer
and Goodwin 1994). Despite its importance, however, culture is quite
a controversial concept. Culture exists at different levels (Basáñez 2016);
20 I. Mossig et al.
it can be very local, or it can encompass wider regions of the world—

the term can be used to refer to the character of business organizations
or of neighborhoods, cities, and nation-states (Anderson-Levitt 2007).
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” emphasized the role of cultural
conflicts after the end of the Cold War but attracted sharp criticism
for his approach because it also challenged optimistic views on cultural
diversity. He derived his typology of world cultures from the most
important world religions but did not appropriately account for the
cultural diversity within these religions and regions. Finally, he focused
on “fault lines” between cultures, where he supposed conflicts to be
most likely to occur (Huntington 1993). Given this criticism, scien-
tific investigations should think more carefully about how to classify
cultures rather than simply abstaining from analyzing this important
driving force of global politics and political and social change of nation-
states. We thus use the concept of “cultural spheres,” which distinguishes
cultures in the world but allows fuzzy boundaries, a considerable degree
of overlap, and change in cluster membership over time (Windzio and
Martens 2021). Our typology of cultural spheres results from a combi-
nation of time-varying indicators. By regarding cultures as spheres with
fuzzy boundaries, changing membership, and considerable overlap, we
avoid an essentialist concept of culture. We coded our cultural indi-
cators as binary variables and created a valued two-mode network in
which countries are linked to one another by sharing one or several
cultural characteristics, e.g., the highest quartile of the index of polit-
ical liberties or the same language group. We used the following cultural
characteristics to build the two-mode network of cultural spheres: a
country’s dominant religion, gender relations, civil liberties, rule of law,
government ideology (nationalist, socialist or communist, restorative or
conservative, separatist or autonomist, religious), dominant language
group, hegemonic language (English, Spanish, Arabic), Huntington’s
civilizations (African, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Latin American, Lone
States, Orthodox, Sinic, Western), and both long and short-term colonial
influence (Besche-Truthe et al. 2020). The more of these characteristics
two countries share, the higher their cultural proximity. In our network
diffusion models, we thus include exposure as a weighted term, which
means that exposure increases with the growing share of adopters in
the network but also with the increasing tie-strength to these adopters.
The cultural spheres network is time varying. For example, proportions
of dominant religious or ethnic groups as well as dominant language
changed over time.
To gain a better overview of the network and the resulting cultural
spheres, we clustered the network with a Louvain clustering algorithm.
According to the time-variant nature of the network, the result suggests
a five-cluster solution in 1880 but a three-cluster solution in 2010. This
supports the idea that there has been an increasing isomorphism in insti-
tutional structures around the globe (Meyer et al. 1997). Figure 1.4
Fig. 1.4 Network of cultural spheres in 2010

22 I. Mossig et al.
shows the result of a Louvain clustering procedure which results in a

three-cluster solution for the year 2010. Blue vertices represent a cluster
of mostly WEIRD (see above) and economically developed countries,
the second cluster (green) mainly consists of non-dominantly Muslim
African, Asian, and South American countries, and the third cluster
(orange) is dominated by Muslim countries. A closer inspection of
these clusters shows that there is some overlap between cultural spheres
and world regions, but this correspondence is far from being perfect
(Fig. 1.4).
Network of Colonial Legacies
Researching the history of social policy adoption means to acknowl-

edge specific historical interdependencies. A thorough and encompassing
diffusion study must consider early social policy diffusion “under the
conditions of colonialism” and “under conditions of continuing post-
colonial ties” (Kuhlmann et al. 2020, 81). Influences of these depen-
dencies can be as diverse as the mechanisms of diffusion. On the
one hand, we can assume a coercive mechanism in that the empire
just implemented policies in colonies without deliberation. The process
of social policies diffusing from the empire to dependent entities is
described as “imperial diffusion” (Kuhlmann et al. 2020). After the colo-
nial dominion ended, however, a different diffusion mechanism might
have been at work. For example, we know from diffusion research that
perceived similarity can foster orientation toward some specific “role
model” countries; Australia might look to Britain and Guinea to France
for appropriate policy solutions (Dobbin et al. 2007, 453). Further-
more, possible policy solutions can be easier to implement because of
path dependencies, such as institutional structures implemented during
colonial rule that were modeled according to the role model. However,
adverse effects can also be existent, as the institutionalization of policies
in colonies differed in light of different characteristics and the strength
of indigenous traditions (Craig 1981, 192).
Moreover, after colonization ends, the forged linkages between nation-
states can facilitate diffusion in several ways. Specialized actors enter into
transnational contact, especially in cases where nation-states are actively

searching for role models for their institutions or for the transforma-
tion of their welfare systems. Once, a colonial link has been forged, the
influence does not recede immediately after independence. Indeed, past
studies show a strong correlation between colonial past on the one hand
and enhanced contact and influence between the two countries on the
other, such as through migration (Windzio 2018) or development aid
(Shields and Menashy 2017), for example.
To include both colonial dependencies and postcolonial influences, we
established a network of colonial legacies which is time-variant, directed,
and weighted. This means that much like social network surveys, colo-
nized countries “nominate” their colonizers. In the years of colonial
dominion, the weight of the tie is 1. After colonization ended, an expo-
nential decay parameter is estimated, representing the eroding influence
of the former colonial link. The exponential function has been chosen
because the values tend to get quite small, i.e., the influence via a link
of colonial legacy is diminishing. For example, the values of ties are 0.97
one year after colonization, 0.77 ten years after colonization, and 0.08
one hundred years after colonization. The decay parameter was calculated
with the following function:
exp(−(N o. year s since colony ends/40))
In our view, the influence of a colonial power does not simply disappear
immediately after the colony becomes officially independent. According
to our assumption, the influence of the colonial power declines much
more gradually over time after official independence is achieved. There
are different variants to compute exposure due to the colonial legacy
based on this function. We apply the function to the standardized expo-
sure as computed by the netdiffuseR package (Vega Yon and Valente
2021), which restricts the range of exposure between zero and one.
Accordingly, the theoretical assumption is that colonial legacy is very
strong and the strength of the colonial power’s influence remains almost
constant after independence. In contrast, if we do not standardize
the exposure, the influence of former colonial powers still exist, but
compared to the standardized computation of exposure, the power
24 I. Mossig et al.
declines after colonization. To date, there is no commonly accepted stan-

dard by which the influence of former colonial ties on the subsequent
history of a country can be modeled. There are even more alternative
approaches that are conceivable, e.g., that the network of colonial ties
is simply cross-sectional, but this would be a strange assumption for the
historical periods before colonization. Another approach would be to test
the influence in a time-constant way after colonization ended, whereas
the tie in the colonization network is zero before colonization. The
“right” way to capture the effect of colonial legacies might also depend
on the particular social policy under investigation. Finally, since we are
interested in comparing the effects of different networks on the diffusion
of social policy, we should keep in mind the strong correlation of expo-
sure across different networks. Hence, researchers should also interpret
their results against the background of considerable multicollinearity.
The raw data is based on the Colonial Dates Dataset (COLDAT) by
Bastian Becker (2019) in combination with the Centre d’Etudes Prospec-
tives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) (Head and Mayer 2014)
and our own data collection using Wikipedia. In line with CEPII, our
definition of colonial links is that a colonial relationship should involve
long-term, civilian administration that includes significant settlement.
We assume, for instance, that the territory of what is now known as
Armenia was “colonized” by the Persian Empire before 1828 and by
the Ottoman Empire before 1920, as well as simultaneously by Russia
between 1813 and 1918. After that time, we assume Armenia to be a
“colony” of Russia until the dissolution of the USSR in 1990. Although
these relations do not depict “classic” (exploitative) colonial relations, we
find merit in a more encompassing approach. The long rule of an empire
leaves marks on the society and the political system at large. We still
see some former USSR states that actively search for contact to Russia
and openly base their (authoritarian) policies on Russian examples, e.g.,
Belarus. Furthermore, by using the aforementioned decay parameter we
do assume a decreasing influence of former rule by empires. Nevertheless,
the colonial network poses a methodological problem when, for instance,
a social policy was adopted for the entirety of the USSR. Due to the
simultaneous adoption of policy, the exposure of former USSR states is
calculated as 0 at the time of policy adoption. That, however, would
Fig. 1.5 The network of colonial legacies

26 I. Mossig et al.
assume an incorrect threshold and therefore distort the regression esti-

mation. Hence, in contrast to Fig. 1.2, exposure was calculated without
a one-year lag in the colonial network, i.e., exposure at t is calculated as
the ratio of alters that adopted precisely at t and not t −1 (Fig. 1.5).
Correlations of Our Networks

Social networks are the structural backbone of the diffusion process. We
are interested in whether the multiplex network in the dimensions of
geographic proximity, colonial heritage, global trade, and cultural prox-
imity do actually relate to different influence channels, or whether they
tend to be rather redundant. If the correlation between ties in a network
or, more precisely, the value of different edges in the dyads are strongly
correlated, these networks tend to be redundant. As Table 1.2 indi-
cates, this is definitely not the case. Here we see a correlation matrix
of the weighted edges and find only minor correlations overall. We find
the highest correlation between networks of cultural spheres and (log)
trade (r = 0.242). As a result, these four networks are far from being
redundant.
However, the correlation of these networks is not the same as the
correlation of exposure to alters that have already adopted the informa-
tion. At the beginning of a pandemic, for example, when exposure is
generally low, it does not matter whether these networks are correlated
or not. Exposure will be low anyway. Minor differences in network struc-
ture can correspond to strong differences in exposure if, for example, the
ego-network of country i has just one more tie to an adopter in the
Table 1.2 Correlations of (weighted) networks

Geogr. Colonial ties Cultural
proximity (exp. decay) Log (trade) prox
Geogr. proximity 1.000 – – –
Colonial tie 0.007 1.000 – –
(exp. decay)
Log(trade) 0.036 −0.007 1.000 –
Cultural prox 0.071 −0.019 0.242 1.000
Table 1.3 Correlations of (weighted) exposure to alters that adopted compul-

sory education
Cultural Colonial ties Geogr.
prox (exp. decay) Log (trade) proximity
Cultural prox 1.000 – – –
Colonial ties 0.142 1.000 – –
(exp. decay)
Log(trade) 0.728 0.038 1.000 –
Geogr. proximity 0.919 0.050 0.741 1.000
(weighted) trade network than in the cultural spheres network but the
additional tie in the trade network has a particularly high weight in the
computation of exposure. Similarly important are situations when most
alters are already infected and exposure is generally high. Exposure can be
1 (maximum normalized exposure) in a network dimension where ego is
tied to 12 alters, but it can also be 1 in another network dimension where
ego is tied only to 2 alters. Table 1.3 shows the correlations of (weighted)
exposure to alters that adopted compulsory education. Indeed, corre-
lations are considerably higher. Exposure in the network of geographic
proximity is strongly correlated with the network of cultural proximity
(0.919) and also with exposure in the trade network (0.741). Moreover,
trade and cultural proximity are highly correlated as well (0.728).
Structural Features and Interdependencies

of Our Networks
How can we further characterize these networks? Networks of positive
ties often show transitive hierarchies, as epitomized by the adage “friends
of my friends are my friends.” If node i names node j as a friend, and if
j is befriended with node k, i tends to close the triad and establish a tie
to k because i regards friends of j as his or her friends as well. However,
not all networks show this pattern. A visual inspection of the colonial
ties network in Fig. 1.5 suggests that the overall share of transitive triads
of all triads is comparatively low, but the structure is dominated by so-
called “in-stars.” We use Exponential Random Graph Models ERGMs
28 I. Mossig et al.
(Harris 2014) in order to explain the basic determinants of the respec-

tive networks in a multivariate regression. We recoded the weighted edges
into binary values by setting the lowest quintile of geographic distance
to 1 (else = 0). We did the same with values of ≥ 3 of log(trade)
and values > 3 of weighted cultural proximity. These thresholds iden-
tify rather strong ties in the respective network. The motivation of this
model is to maximize the likelihood of actually observing the empirical
network x out of the huge set of networks X that the respective set of
nodes (in our case countries) could form. The outcome of interest is the
probability P of observing the empirical network x out of the huge set
X. The odds of all possible networks are represented by κ(θ), and due to
κ(θ), P is indeed a probability in the equation below, expressed in a way
that resembles a multinomial logit model.
2 g(g−1)
exp{θ z(x)}
P(X = x) = , where κ(θ) = exp{θ z(x)}
κ(θ)
n=1
The likelihood is maximized by inserting coefficients θ for the network

characteristics z(x), e.g., transitive closure, homophily, or any other kind
of explanatory variable. Because of the statistical non-independence in
networks, it is almost impossible to get reliable results by using maximum
likelihood methods, the estimation is based on Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) simulations. Given the specified regression equation, the
algorithm generates a huge set of networks by inserting θ coefficients
drawn from a random distribution and adapts these coefficients until
the equation generates networks similar to the empirical network with
respect to the underlying characteristics z(x). The resulting coefficients θ
of a converged model can be interpreted as changes in the log odds of a
tie in the respective network due to a one-unit change in the explanatory
variable z(x).
The first column in Table 1.4 shows determinants of ties in the trade
network, the second column in the network of cultural spheres, and
the third column in the network of colonial histories. We estimated a
Table 1.4 Determinants of ties in networks of countries 1880–2010 (t = 8),

temporal exponential random graph models, N = 164
Effects on network ties
Trade Culture Colony
Edges −2.2137* −1.6452* −5.9938*
Structural factors
Gwesp.fixed.0.693 1.0127* 1.0263* –
Gwdsp.fixed.0.693 −0.1569* −0.2130* –
2-in-stars – – 0.1207*
Dyadic factors
Edgecov(spatial prox.) 0.1488* 0.0956 0.5812*
Edgecov(cultural prox.) 0.9971* – –
Edgecov(colonial tie) 0.9816 −0.3214* –
Edgecov(trade tie) – 0.8275* 0.8158*
Political-economic factors
Same regime −0.9179* 0.129 −0.0440
Absdiff(GDP/1000 USD) −0.0182* −0.0055 −0.0078
Indegree(GDP/1000 USD) – – 0.0147
Outdegree(GDP/1000 USD) – – −0.0385*
Degree(GDP/1000 USD) 0.0332* – –
Memory term (tie stability) 2.1166* 1.5484* –
hypothesis value outside the confidence interval, p < = 0.001
* Null
Source WeSIS database, own computation
temporal ERGM for the period from 1890 to 2010 in 20-year intervals
and eight measurement occasions using bootstrapping methods (Leifeld
et al. 2016). The term “edges” is the intercept of the regression model
and represents the log odds of the network density, given that all covari-
ates are constrained to zero. The positive significant effect of gwesp
(geometrically edgewise shared partners) indicates that transitive closure
much more likely occurs in the empirical network than in a corre-
sponding random network. In contrast, gwdsp (geometrically dyadwise
shared partners) shows a significantly negative effect and points to the
lower probability of open triads (Harris 2014). Aside from these network
structural effects, ties in the trade network depend on spatial proximity
(0.1488* ) and cultural spheres (0.9971* ) but not significantly on colo-
nial legacies. They occur less often if two countries have the same level
of democratization (same regime) and the higher the absolute difference
30 I. Mossig et al.
in GDP per capita between ego and alter is. Unsurprisingly, global trade
is an issue of economically well-performing countries since high levels
of GDP increase the degree (0.0332* ). We also estimated the memory-
term of “tie stability” (Leifeld et al. 2016), which indicates the stability
of ties and non-ties, and thereby accounts for how strongly the state of
the network at t depends on its previous state at t −1 (Table 1.4).
Column 2 in Table 1.4 shows the effects on the log odds of ties
in the network of cultural spheres. Again, we find the pattern of high
transitivity (gwesp) and a negative tendency toward open triads (gwdsp).
Having a tie in the network of colonial legacies has a negative effect
on cultural similarity (−0.3214* ), which means that countries colonized
other countries that were culturally rather different. Contrariwise, a tie in
the network of global trade increases the log odds of a tie in the cultural
spheres network—which we also do not interpret in a strict causal sense
because the direction of the influence could also be reversed (0.8275* ).
Our model does not indicate that political regime type in terms of
levels of democratization and economic development corresponds with
culture: if two countries have the same level of democratization, the
log odds of a tie in the cultural spheres network is only insignificantly
increased. The absolute difference in GDP is insignificant as well. Again,
the memory-term indicates a significant effect of the lagged network.
Finally, we analyze the network of colonial legacies, which has quite
a specific topology as shown in Fig. 1.5. This network is rather special
since there are few “hubs” with many ingoing ties, and there is a clear
distinction between node sets of senders and receivers. We find a positive
effect of 2-in-stars. This means that two ingoing ties occur significantly
more often than expected by chance, which is obvious from the visual
representation in Fig. 1.6. In addition, there are positive effects of spatial
proximity and ties in the trade network. While there is no effect of same
regime, effects of GPD per capita are negative on outdegree. Accordingly,
richer countries name other countries as colonizers less often: overall,
richer counties have a considerably lower risk of being colonized.
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wrote on slips of paper the names of all boys who had reached the
age of twenty, and putting these into a receptacle, drew them out one
by one and called every fifth man for military service. So hateful was
this forced duty to the Filipino youths that many of them would run
away into the mountains and hide, become outlaws in order to
escape it. But the civil guard would go after them and when they
were captured they would be put in jail and watched until they could
be sent to their capital.
The monastic orders had behind them a powerful church
organisation the heads of which took an active and official part in the
administration of government. The Archbishop and the Bishops
formed part of what was known in Manila as the Board of
Authorities; and they, with the Provincials of the orders, belonged to
the Council of Administration, a body analogous to the Council of
State in Spain or France, charged with advising the Governor-
General on matters of urgent moment, or in times of crises. The
Friars, Priests and Bishops constituted a solid, permanent and well-
organised political force which dominated all insular policies, and
the stay in the islands of the civil or military officer who attempted to
pursue a course at variance with that deemed wise by the orders, was
invariably shortened by monastic influence. Each order had in
Madrid a representative through whom the Court of Spain easily
could be reached without the intervention of any authority.
Upon the morals of the Friars I can only touch. That some of them
brought up families of sons and daughters is beyond question. Such
were guilty of violating their vows of celibacy rather than of
debauchery. On this point the moral standard of the Filipino people
was not rigid, and women were rather proud than otherwise of the
parentage of their Friar-fathered children who were often brighter,
better looking and more successful than the average Filipino. The
truth is that this charge was urged with more eagerness and
emphasis after the Filipinos began to appeal to the American
government than during Spanish times, and when the standard of
morality in the Filipino priesthood of the period was considered, it
seemed as if the accusers thought the charge would have more
weight with those they sought to influence than it did with
themselves.
The three great orders of St. Francis, St. Augustine and St.
Dominic owned, in different parts of the Islands, more than 400,000
acres of the best agricultural land, and this they rented out in small
parcels to the people. Their income from these immense holdings
was not what a prudent and energetic landlord would have realised,
but they paid no taxes, while the Filipino was taxed in every possible
way.
In the province of Cavite alone the Friar estates amounted to
131,747 acres, and it was in the province of Cavite, which is just
across the bay from Manila, that the two insurrections against Spain,
or rather against Friar domination, began.
When we arrived in Manila all but 472 of the 1,124 Friars had
either been killed or had fled the country. In each of the uprisings
many of them lost their lives, and many more were taken prisoners.
Indeed, the last of them were not released until the rapid advance of
the American troops in our own encounter with the insurrectos
made it necessary for the insurgent army to abandon all unnecessary
impedimenta. All the Friars remaining in the Islands had taken
refuge in Manila.
Strange to say, this resentment against the Friars interfered in no
way with the Filipino’s love for the Church. With a strong and real
emotion he loves the religion which has been given him; and the
elaborate and beautiful forms of the Roman Catholic Church are
calculated, especially, to make a powerful appeal to his mind. It is
really an astonishing commentary on the character of these people
that they should be able to rise against the men who administered
the sacraments which they so deeply loved and revered. Or, is it more
of a commentary on the conditions which caused the uprisings?
Without exception the Spanish Friars had been driven from their
parishes, and the most burning of all the burning political questions
which the Commission met and had to settle, was whether or not
they should be permitted to return. It was impossible to make the
people understand that the government of the United States and the
government of Spain were two different matters, and that if the
Friars were returned to their parishes they would exercise no secular
functions of any kind. The people had the proverbial dread of the
“burnt child” and no amount or kind of reasoning could move them
from the position they had taken, nor could any of them, from the
highest to the lowest, talk calmly and rationally about the subject.
The one point upon which the Filipinos were united was that the
Friars should never be reinstated.
Universal agitation, uneasiness, fear, hatred, a memory of wrongs
too recently resented and resented at too great a cost; these were the
factors which made necessary the stand which the Commission
finally adopted. The question with the Friars became one, largely, of
getting value for their property, their title to which was never
seriously disputed, and it was decided that on condition of their
leaving the Islands, the insular government would undertake the
purchase of their vast estates. The intention was then to make some
arrangement whereby the lands might be sold back to the people in
homestead tracts, and on terms which the poorest man might be
able, in time, to meet.
It was to negotiate this transaction, involving the expenditure of
$7,000,000 that my husband was sent to Rome the following year as
an emissary of the United States government to the Vatican. This was
in the time of Pope Leo, and it made a most interesting experience
which I shall detail in another chapter.
The first thing, really, that the Commission undertook when they
arrived in Manila, was the settlement of a definite dispute between
the Church and the People as to which had the right to administer
the affairs of the Medical College of San José. Their manner of
procedure in this case instituted in the Islands a new and never-
before-thought-of system of evenly balanced justice, and made a
tremendous sensation.
The case was called: “T. H. Pardo de Tavera, and others, for
themselves and other inhabitants of the Philippine Islands—against
—The Rector of the University of Santo Tomas, a Dominican monk,
and the Holy Roman Apostolic Catholic Church, represented by the
Most Reverend, the Archbishop of Manila, and the Most Reverend,
the Archbishop of New Orleans, Apostolic Delegate.” Its importance,
under the conditions then existing, can hardly be exaggerated.
San José was one of the oldest institutions in the Islands; it was
founded, as a matter of fact, in 1601, by virtue of a legacy left by a
Spanish Provincial Governor named Figueroa who provided that it
should always be managed by the head of the Jesuits in the Islands.
It was originally a college for the education of Spanish boys, but
through various vicissitudes, including the expulsion of the Jesuits in
1766, it had changed from one thing to another until, finally, it had
become a college of physicians and pharmacists and was made a
department of the University of Santo Tomas, the Rector of which
was a Dominican Friar. One of the Philips had granted to the college
a Royal charter, and within the last hundred years the Crown had
asserted its right of control. So when the American government took
over all the public property in the Philippines, General Otis closed
San José, but he did not issue an order as to its management. The
Church was petitioning for a restitution of what it regarded as its
rights in the property, and the Commission was called upon to settle
the controversy.
They conducted their examinations in open meetings so that all
might see the full and free workings of a wholly equitable system,
and the Filipinos were enabled to behold, for the first time, the, to
them, astonishing spectacle of high ecclesiastics presenting in open
court the arguments upon which they based their claims.
The first hearing Mr. Taft describes as “an historic scene.”
“There were the two Archbishops in their archiepiscopal cassocks,”
he writes, “with purple girdles and diamond crosses, accompanied by
a Secretary of the Dominican order robed in white; while opposed
was a Filipino lawyer, Don Felipe Calderón, who derived his
education in the University of Santo Tomas. Accompanying him were
a lot of young Filipino students and others of the Medical Association
interested in wresting San José from the University. The Archbishop
of Manila made a speech in which he was unable to restrain the
feeling of evident pain that he had in finding the rights of the Church
challenged in this Catholic country. He made a very dignified
appearance.”
And at the second hearing:
“Both Archbishops were again present, and the same scene was re-
enacted except that we had rather more of a formal hearing. We had
them seated on opposite sides of a table, just as we do in court at
home, and had seats for the spectators.
“Señor Don Felipe Calderón, who represents the Philippine people,
was given an opportunity to make the first speech. He had printed
his argument and read it, having given us translated copies with
which we followed him. His argument was a very strong one, lawyer-
like and well-conceived, but he weakened it by some vicious remarks
about the Dominican order. The Archbishop of Manila, once or
twice, felt so much outraged at what he said that he attempted to
rise, but Archbishop Chapelle prevented him from doing so. At the
close of the argument Monsignor Chapelle asked for ten days in
which to prepare an answer and we granted him two weeks. The
scene was one I shall always carry with me as marking an interesting
period in my Philippine experience.”
The Commission did not settle the question. After careful
consideration and many hearings, they left the property in the hands
of the Dominicans, but appointed a Board of Trustees to prepare and
present an appeal to the Supreme Court of the Islands, appropriating
at the same time, five thousand dollars to pay the expenses of the
litigation.
Archbishop Chapelle did not like this decision and telegraphed to
Secretary Root asking him to withhold his approval. Then he asked
the Commission to modify the law and give him an opportunity, in
case the decision in the Supreme Court should go against the Church,
to appeal to the Congress of the United States. This the Commission
refused to do on good and sufficient grounds, whereupon the
Archbishop cabled to the President, declaring that the decision as it
stood would retard pacification. Although he had always been
strongly opposed to the continuation of military government, we
were much amused to learn that in his cable to the President he took
occasion to remark, significantly, that “General MacArthur is doing
splendidly.”
But if Archbishop Chapelle was displeased with the action of the
Commission, the Filipino press was delighted, and the editorial
encomiums heaped upon them can only be described as brilliant. The
Diario de Manila, the next morning, was absolutely unable to
express itself, and it concluded a more or less incoherently eulogistic
editorial with the words: “The decision satisfies everybody; it raises a
question which threatened to drag itself over the hot sands we tread,
cleanses it of all impurities, and makes it the beginning and the end
of a most transcendental principle of sovereignty and law.” The
Filipino or Spanish editor is nothing if he is not hyperbolic.
When we arrived in Manila it was a source of great worry to us that
we could not send our children, eight and ten years old, to school.
The Jesuits had a school for boys in the Walled City, and Mr. Taft
considered for awhile the possibility of sending Robert there, where
he might, at least, learn Spanish; but so strong was the feeling
against the Friars that this would have been taken by the people as a
certain indication that the President of the Commission was leaning
toward the Church in his deliberations on the vital subject. As I have
said, they could not look upon this question, in any of its bearings, in
a reasonable light.
We eventually settled Helen in a convent where she made an effort
to learn Spanish, and Robert we turned over to Mrs. LeRoy, the wife
of Mr. Worcester’s Secretary, who was a graduate from the
University of Michigan and a most excellent teacher.
Mr. and Mrs. LeRoy went to the Philippines as bride and groom.
They were classmates, graduated together, and this was their first big
venture into the world. They were a valued part of our little pioneer
circle, and it was with the greatest dismay that we learned, after
about two years in the Islands, that Mr. LeRoy had developed
tuberculosis. He had either brought the germs with him from the
United States or had contracted the disease there, where, indeed, it is
most prevalent. He continued to act as Secretary for Mr. Worcester
beyond the time when he should have gone to another climate to
devote himself to a cure, but finally, when he realised that the
sentence was upon him, he decided to leave the Islands, and my
husband was able to secure for him, because of his splendid
efficiency, a position in the Consular service under Mr. Hay, at
Durango, Mexico. This post was chosen because it is in a dry,
mountainous region where the ravages of tuberculosis are supposed
to be checked.
Mr. LeRoy was an exceedingly well-informed and studious man.
He was a natural linguist, spoke Spanish with ease, and soon was
able to acquire enough Tagalog to enable him to go among the people
and get their point of view at first-hand. He immediately became
interested in writing a history of the Islands and wanted much to go
to Spain to examine Spanish-Philippine documents at Seville and
other places, but he was never able to do so.
In the days when death faced him in New Mexico, whither he had
gone after leaving Durango, he wrote, as Grant wrote, on a book
which he hoped might furnish some means to his wife after his
death. He died before he was able to complete what Mr. Taft says is a
very accurate, comprehensive and interesting history of the
Archipelago from the beginning down to, and including, Dewey’s
victory, the taking of Manila and the work of the first Commission.
He had planned to give a full account of the work of the second
Commission, with which he was so intimately connected, but his pen
dropped before his purpose was fulfilled. His history has been only
recently published.
Mrs. LeRoy later went to Washington, and Mr. Taft appointed her
to one of the few clerical positions not covered by the Civil Service
law. This is in the Land Office where she signs the President’s name
to land patents. She is the only person in the government who has
the right and power, given by special act of Congress, to sign the
President’s name to a document.
Throughout the autumn of 1900 the insurrection dragged itself
along; behind any bush the American soldiers were likely to find a
lurking “patriot”; and the uncensored reports of the “brave stand” of
the Filipinos were being sent out daily by Democratic reporters, to
help along the anti-expansionist cause, represented by Mr. Bryan, in
the United States.
The insurrectos were being assured by their incitants to violence
that the eyes of the world were upon them. They were being told that
they were winning undying renown throughout the civilised
universe; and they believed it. They read with avidity all the anti-
imperialistic newspapers which came out to the Islands and accepted
as a true estimate of themselves the laudations therein contained.
Besides, the promoters of the insurrection pretended to translate
from other languages still more extravagant praises, and they
certainly were enjoying a most exalted opinion of themselves.
We understood that Aguinaldo was trying to concentrate for one
spectacular move shortly before election, in order to add to the
chances of a Democratic victory; and there was some cause for alarm.
The Filipinos are born politicians and many of them knew much
more about the campaign between Bryan and McKinley than the
Americans in the Islands knew.
Apropos of this: Archbishop Chapelle told Mr. Taft that Aguinaldo
had, through Archbishop Nozaleda, requested an interview with him.
Monsignor Chapelle went to General MacArthur and asked that
Aguinaldo be allowed to enter Manila. The General readily gave his
consent, and even offered the revolutionary Dictator the hospitality
of his own roof. Aguinaldo, in due military form, acknowledged this
courtesy and fixed the time for his arrival in Manila. He clearly
indicated that he was discouraged and had decided to solicit
permission, through Archbishop Chapelle, to leave the Islands. But
just then the news of Bryan’s plan for calling an extra session of
Congress to settle Philippine independence came out, so the
insurgent general sent word that he had decided not to come. No
American knew just where he was, but he probably got the papers
and telegrams just as soon as any of us.
I remember the sixth of November as a very nervous day. We had
received all manner of reports from home; we were so far away that
mail and newspapers were a month old when they reached us; and
the cable reports had been contradictory in the extreme. We really
were on our tiptoes with excitement. And the worst of it was that
because of the thirteen hours’ difference in time between
Washington and Manila, we lived through the day knowing that the
United States was asleep, and went to bed just about the time voters
began to go to the polls. We kept getting all manner of doubtful
telegrams throughout the next morning—when it was night in the
United States and the votes were being counted—but just at one
o’clock, as we went to lunch, Mr. Taft received a despatch from
General Corbin in accordance with his previous agreement. It read:
“Taft Manila McKinley Corbin.” It had been sent from the War
Department in Washington at eleven o’clock the night of the election
and had taken just forty-five minutes in transmission. This was
record time for a cablegram then between Washington and Manila,
despatches having to be sent by numerous relays.
CHAPTER VII
“DAYS OF THE EMPIRE”
There was a trying period of unrest and uncertainty in our early

experience in the Philippines, during which we lived in a state of
suspense which can hardly be described; a state of suspense which
included among its various elements the excitement of an
intermittent guerilla warfare and frequent threats of native uprisings
in Manila. Established order and a fixed governmental policy, so
necessary to the tranquillity of the normal citizen, were non-existent,
and one experienced a sense of complete detachment which made
plans for even the immediate future seem entirely futile. To unpack
all one’s things; to establish a satisfactory home and give one’s
attention to its ornamentation; to supply one’s self with the
necessities of a long residence in the tropics; in other words, to settle
down to the pursuit of a usual mode of existence; all these things had
to be done, but, needless to say, they were not done with the
enthusiasm incident to a feeling of permanence, nor did such
enthusiasm begin to manifest itself in the local atmosphere until
after the re-election of Mr. McKinley in 1900 when it became certain
that the American flag was in the islands to stay as long as its
presence there should be deemed requisite to the peaceful
development of the country and the fitting of the people for self
government.
There were those who saw long years ahead,—not all Americans,
by any means,—and soon the American spirit began to make itself
felt in business, in schemes of civic progress, in social life, in
everything. We were there for a purpose which was at last defined, so
we cheerfully confronted chaos and went to work.
We were sorry to note that the election of Mr. McKinley and the
consequent establishment of the American status in the Philippines
did not change the military attitude toward the manner of solving the
governmental problems. The Commission was definitely pledged to
the rapid adjustment of affairs on a civil and generally representative
basis, but the military authorities still maintained that military rule
would continue to be a necessity for an indefinite period.
However, the Civil Commission went on its way mapping out a
programme of peaceful pacification and carrying it into effect as
promptly as possible, while its activities engaged universal attention
and formed the chief topic of conversation wherever two or more
people were met together. Society became frivolous enough, but
nobody ever got very far away from the questions of absorbing
interest with which many of us were so closely associated.
Our first Christmas surely would have saddened us in our peculiar
exile had we been able to realise its approach, but this was not
possible. The “Christmas spirit” does not thrive in a temperature of
eighty-odd degrees, and I think I would have taken little interest in
preparations for the holidays had not my children been there to
remind me that Christmas is Christmas no matter what the
thermometer may say about it. It was still the most important day in
the year for them and it was almost pathetic to see them trying to
defeat the climate through sheer force of their imaginations. It was a
“green Christmas” with a vengeance, and very hot.
Our friends at home had not forgotten that we were more than a
month’s journey away and letters began to arrive as early as
November in each of which some mention was made of a box which
would be sent from Cincinnati in time to reach us before Christmas
and, naturally, we began at once to imagine its contents. For weeks
our children’s favourite amusement was exchanging guesses as to
what sort of gifts their affectionate relatives had sent them. Nor were
their Aunt Maria and I any less excited. There were transports every
two weeks in those days and we were not at all disappointed not to
receive our box on the early December ship. There would be another
one in on Christmas day and it would be much nicer, we thought, to
get it then, and never a doubt did we have that it would come. Mr.
Taft had a messenger ready to get it and bring it to the house as soon
as it could be landed.
From our balcony we watched the transport steam up the bay; we
felt the interest that only a Christmas box from home, ten thousand
miles away, could excite; we forgot that it was eighty in the shade; it
was really Christmas. We waited as patiently as we could for our
messenger, but when he arrived he had only sympathy to offer us.
The box had not come. It was a most depressing disappointment,
and the children were inconsolable. However, everybody cheered up
about dinner time. I had done what I could with red ribbons and
greenery, with cotton wool and diamond dust to create the proper
atmosphere; then we had invited a number of homeless young
secretaries and others to take Christmas cheer with us, and though
the cold storage turkey was tough and the cranberry sauce and plum-
pudding were from Commissary cans, we managed a near approach
to a Yuletide air, and little Charlie went to bed with his Escolta toys
quite as happy as he would have been had he been at home in his
own country. I assured the three children that the box from home
would come in on the next transport and promised that we would
then have Christmas all over again. But I reckoned without
knowledge of the shipping methods of the transport service.
Transports came and transports went; our hopes were dashed to
earth any number of times and it was endless weeks before our
carefully prepared and holly-decked presents finally arrived.
On New Year’s morning General MacArthur gave a reception at
Malacañan Palace. It was such an affair as is spoken of in social
circles everywhere as “the event of the season.” It was a very special
event to all the members of the Commission and their families,
because not one of us had ever been invited to the Palace before.
There was much discussion of the serious subject as to what the
civil government officials should wear at the New Year’s reception
and, if gossip can be relied upon, it came very near causing several
family riots. The men naturally inclined toward the comfort of their
white linens, but they were overcome by argument and it was
eventually decreed that they should present themselves in frock coats
and silk hats. This may sound reasonable, but it wasn’t. It was
intensely funny, however, and that helped some. A silk hat which has
reposed in a box throughout a rainy season in the Philippines is a
curious object. It is not the glossy, well turned and dignified article
which a silk hat should be. Its rim is warped, its nap is dulled and
roughed beyond repair; it is very sticky, and it has an odour all its
own. In Judge Ide’s hat some mice had made a nest and had eaten a
small hole through its one-time shiny crown, but it was the only one
he had and, as silk hats are not carried in Philippine shops, he had,
perforce, to wear it.
My husband communed with himself during the process of getting
into his heavy frock coat with all its stiff and its woollen accessories,
—for the first time in seven months and in the bright white heat of a
tropic morning,—but we were finally ready and on the way, in our
diminutive Victoria behind the prancing black stallion ponies of
uncertain disposition.
When we arrived at Malacañan, quite early as we thought, we
found ourselves in a long block of carriages which moved up slowly
and, one by one, discharged their occupants under the porte-cochère
of the Palace. Considerations of rank and precedence had escaped
our minds for the moment and this was evidently a very important
matter. However, we found a capable staff of military aides who
knew just where everybody belonged, and they adopted the method
of marshalling the crowds into a room on the first floor and letting
them out in the proper order of precedence. In consequence we
found a more or less annoyed throng awaiting our arrival. We had
plenty of rank, my husband being the ranking civil officer in the
Islands, but as everybody in Manila had been invited, the process of
forming the line was a long and laborious one and many were the
caustic comments of the delayed and rankless multitude. It reminded
one forcibly of similar receptions at the White House, except that in
Washington everybody knows the rules of precedence governing
diplomatic circles and recognises the necessity for following them,
while in Manila it was a departure which did not meet with full and
general approval.
General MacArthur and his staff were receiving at the head of the
grand staircase on the second floor, and, as the spacious rooms
became filled with military men in dress uniforms, with gaily attired
women and black-coated civilians, the scene was sufficiently
dignified to make one feel that a brilliant local society was an
established fact. But there was no denying that it was hot and that
the Army officers in trim white duck had the frock-coated, camphor-
ball-scented and profusely perspiring civil government officials at a
disadvantage.
Nowadays—and always after that first experiment—the man in a
temperate-zone costume is a sadly conspicuous figure at a social
gathering in Manila. The accepted formal evening dress is white
linen with either a short mess jacket or a dinner coat of the usual
pattern, while for morning or afternoon affairs a man may wear
anything his laundryman can turn out for him. As a matter of fact, in
the early days in Manila women, as well as men, enjoyed
emancipation from the tyranny of clothes. It was a case of
discovering how unnecessary many supposed necessities are. There
were no fashionable gowns to be had, therefore simplicity, or a more
or less rundownedness of one-time respectability, became the
fashion. There were no hat shops, so women ceased to wear hats. We
went shopping on the Escolta in the early morning hatless; we went
to luncheon parties hatless, and in the later afternoon we made our
calls and drove on the Luneta minus the millinery which is
considered so dear to a woman’s heart. I do not say that the women
liked it; there were many plaintive protests; but it was one of the
crosses of their environment which saved them numerous jealous
pangs as well as much expense. It is different now. The importer of
fashionable millinery and sumptuous garments has invaded the field
and the women in Manila to-day are about as finely gowned and
hatted as they are anywhere, but I doubt if they are as care-free and
comfortable as we were in “the days of the Empire.”
It was expected that the New Year’s reception at Malacañan was
intended to inaugurate a gay season of hospitality at the Palace, as
General MacArthur announced a dinner and reception to follow early
in January. But they were unquiet times; for various reasons there
were many postponements; then came the death of Queen Victoria,
whereupon the British community went into mourning, and, as it
was deemed courteous to observe a period of social inactivity, it was
many weeks before we again went to Malacañan.
The campaign of pacification, due to the election of McKinley, the
activity of the army, and the actual legislation and organisation work
of the Commission, was making great progress throughout the
Islands and hardly a day passed that did not bring news of the
capture or surrender of insurgent officers and forces in the
provinces, while in Manila they were being arrested and imprisoned
by the hundreds. They were given an opportunity to take the oath of
allegiance and those who persisted in their refusal to do so were
banished to Guam. This vigorous policy was having a marked effect
upon the spirit of the insurrection and it was rapidly approaching
total collapse.
The peace movement was greatly assisted, too, by the activities of
the Federal party, a strong political organisation, pledged to the
acceptance of American control and American principles, which
numbered among its leaders and adherents many of the best men in
the Philippines. In its directory were Chief Justice Arellano, Don
Benito Legarda, Dr. Pardo de Tavera and General Ambrosio Flores, a
one-time leader of the insurrection.
Perhaps the most extraordinary demonstration any of us ever saw
in Manila took place on Washington’s birthday in 1901. The
Commission had already begun its long task of instituting provincial
and municipal governments and its members had just returned from
a trip into the country north of Manila where they had been received
with great enthusiasm, and where the people had shown every
indication of a glad determination to stop all hostilities and settle
down to peaceful pursuits under the representative and democratic
system which the Commission was inaugurating.
On the evening of February 20, General MacArthur gave a
splendid reception at Malacañan, where Americans and Filipinos
mingled together in perfect amity, the Filipinos being in the majority.
They seemed greatly pleased with the spirit of the occasion which
served to demonstrate in a particular manner the fact that America
was in the Philippines as a friend rather than as an arbitrary ruler;
that there was to be none of the familiar colour or race prejudice, so
far as we were concerned, in the association of the two peoples; that
the best thing to do was to acknowledge a mutual aspiration and
strive for its fulfilment in friendly co-operation; and there was a
heart-lift for us all, Americans and Filipinos alike, in the whole tone
of the evening. On the night of the 21st, the Partido Federal gave a
famous dinner at a new hotel where a French chef prepared the
menu. Before this my husband had jokingly written to Secretary Root
that he thought some sort of pension should be provided for the
widows and orphans of the men who fell in action before the fearful
onslaughts of native hospitality, but at the banquet of the Federal
party there were none of those mysterious viands to which the
Commissioners had been trying to accustom themselves in the
provinces, and in consequence the quality of mutual enjoyment was
not strained, the Filipino, unlike the Japanese, being as fond of
foreign cookery as he is of his own. The speeches were all of the
friendliest character and the “dove of peace,” verily, seemed to be
hovering near.
A TYPICAL FILIPINO MENU AND

PLACE CARD
The next morning, the 22nd of February, the Federal party, many
thousands strong, marched through a flag-decked city to the Luneta
where a speakers’ stand had been erected for the celebration of the
day. There were scores of bands, each, as usual, playing its own tune
in its own way regardless of what the others were doing; the
populace, in its gayest attire, crowded in the wake of the procession;
the spirit of festivity was rampant; and altogether it was a most
interesting scene.
As close as ten thousand people could get to a speakers’ stand ten
thousand people massed themselves, and they listened in respectful
silence to the words of both the American and Filipino speakers, each
one of whom made a spirited appeal for peaceful co-operation in the
solution of the problem which America had acquired through no
fault or desire of her own and which she could not, in honour,
abandon. General Wright was the American speaker of the day and
the frank friendliness of his speech was translated, paragraph by
paragraph as he delivered it, by Mr. Arthur Fergusson, the Secretary-
interpreter for the Commission, whose extraordinary command of
Spanish made it possible for him not only to translate the words
themselves, but to infuse into them the poetic fervour of the Spanish
tongue. Never was Washington’s birthday so celebrated, and it
marked a new era of mutual toleration which was to grow into
sympathetic understanding disturbed only by the agitation of the few
whose aspirations were in no way in those days shared or condoned
by the many.
The method adopted by the Commission for organising provincial
governments was extremely simple. The people were instructed to
send delegates from all the towns in a province to meet the
Commission on a given date at the provincial capital. Having
gathered this popular assembly in the largest available hall Mr. Taft,
or some other member of the Commission, would proceed to read
and explain the new Provincial Code which covered every
governmental function and which provided for the appointment by
the Commission of a provincial governor, a treasurer and a secretary.
It was the intention of the Commission to name a Filipino for
governor in each province, thereby giving them an immediate
opportunity for the exercise of self-government, but in several
instances they were almost unanimously petitioned by the people to
appoint to this office the American Army officer who had been in
command in the district. Considering the attitude of the Filipinos
toward military rule and their eagerness to substitute a purely civil
form of government, it was really astonishing that they should have
wished to retain any representative of the hated régime, but
personality counts for a great deal with the Filipinos, and the Army
officer who displayed tact and kindly justice in his dealings with
them was sure to win for himself a peculiar popularity.
For treasurer an American was almost invariably chosen. During
Spanish times the Filipinos had not learned much about the proper
use of public funds and they have had to be very painstakingly taught
that government money is for government purposes only. To our
poignant and everlasting shame object lessons had to be given them
by the drastic punishment meted out to certain American treasurers
who were unable to resist temptation. The penalty prescribed in
Philippine law for the misuse of public funds or the falsification of a
public document is terribly severe, and there is a little band of white
men in Bilibid prison in Manila to-day because of their venality and
breach of trust. Our mission in the Philippines is based upon the
highest principles and we have always striven to maintain a high
moral tone in the government personnel, so it is particularly painful
to the small American community when, as happened too often at
first, an American went wrong.
Though the Commission proceeded with the establishment of civil
government in a conspicuously simple manner as much cannot be
said of the Filipinos. They were bent upon making the most of a rare
opportunity for the enjoyment of great and ceremonious festivity.
On the 23d of February, following the extraordinary celebration of
Washington’s birthday, the Commission, accompanied by a
considerable number of prominent Filipinos and by several of the
ladies, took a government launch and steamed across the Bay to the
town of Balanga, the capital of the province of Bataan which lies
directly opposite Manila where the sun goes down in tropic
splendour behind the Meriveles Mountains. This trip was a new
experience for me and was the beginning of my long acquaintance
with Filipino hospitality.
As we approached the Bataan shore there were splashes of brilliant
colour all over the surface of the Bay, which, on nearer view, turned
out to be the decorations of a great fleet of bancas coming out to
meet us. There must have been a hundred or more and, while they
were of all sizes, some of them were large enough to hold twenty and
thirty rowers. The banca is a long, narrow dugout which usually
looks as if it were just about to sink. Some of these had outriggers,
some had not, but each and every one of them was loaded to
capacity, and each was covered with the most gorgeous decorations.
Bunting and paper flowers of every hue were mixed with long palm
leaves and branches of bamboo and everything in the nature of an
ornament that could possibly be used, while from every angle and at
every point fluttered small American flags, some of them homemade
and only approximately correct. Then there were two huge flat affairs
with decorated awnings over them which we found were nothing less
than rafts prepared for our own use, the water in the little harbour
being too shallow for our big steam launch. These rafts were made of
split bamboo flooring lashed to the tops of large bancas and, though
they looked exceedingly unsafe, we found they would hold as many
as could stand upon them without being pushed over the edge.
In ten minutes this gay and unusual fleet had surrounded us; the
rafts came alongside and over our rails clambered the reception
committee, a half dozen Filipinos in more or less nondescript, heavy
black clothes with silk hats! Where these garments came from I have
no idea. Most of the hats looked like heirlooms, just as the silk hats
of our own husbands looked, but the chief concern of their owners
seemed to be their protection. Never have I seen silk hats so
cautiously handled.
Having got safely aboard the launch each man went through a
deliberate process of straightening himself out and carefully
adjusting his attire before he advanced to the stern of the launch
where we waited to receive him. Then there were some set speeches
of welcome in which the chief sentiment seemed to be that never had
the province of Bataan been so highly honoured and that, therefore,
it and all it contained was, with feelings inexpressible, laid at the feet
of the honourable Commission. Mr. Fergusson translated the flowers
and figures of oratory and all the soaring flights of sentimental
generosity into literal English, then, with equal solemnity and
impressiveness, he rendered Mr. Taft’s matter of fact, though cordial,
replies into a marvellous flow of Spanish eloquence.
TRIUMPHAL ARCH AT BATAAN
This formality disposed of, the reception committee invited us to

step upon the pavilioned raft and be wafted ashore. It sounds like a
dignified proceeding, but of course it was not. We had to climb over
the rails of the launch and, more or less, slide to a secure footing on
the frail floor of the curious craft. Contrary to my secret expectations
it kept afloat and we were soon landed at a little fishing village down
on the beach, where Army ambulances waited to take us to the town
of Balanga, a mile inland. Just outside of Balanga we passed under a
great bamboo arch, the sort of thing the Filipinos erect and ornament
with great skill and ingenuity. This one was so thickly decorated,
however, with small American flags that little of its intricate frame-
work was visible. A piece of white bunting stretched across the top of
it bore, in large letters, the inscription: “Glory Honor to the
Commission.”
We drove into the town and found the place en fete. I never saw so
many American flags in one place in my life. Four thousand of them
had been bought in Manila for the occasion; and four thousand flags
go a long way in decorating a small provincial town. There was not
much of the town left uncovered.
When we got to the provincial building where the meeting was to
be held, we found all the delegates gathered from the different
villages a-tiptoe in an atmosphere of intense excitement. Bataan had
never been a rich province and we discovered that few of the
Filipinos understood Spanish. They spoke only Tagalog. This was
due to the fact that the province had been for generations under the
control of the Dominican Friars who did not believe in encouraging
the natives to learn Spanish. In consequence, all the speeches had to
be translated from English to Spanish, from Spanish to Tagalog, and
vice versa. Felipe Calderón, the Manila lawyer who handled the San
José College case for the People, acted as Tagalog interpreter, and I
have often wondered just how much of the familiar Spanish
hyperbole was convertible into the phrases of that primitive
language. It made the proceedings very long and tedious, but we sat
through them and they finally came to an end with much cheering
for the newly appointed officials.
The Filipinos were greatly pleased at having the Commissioners
bring their wives and daughters along. It was new to them and they
were not slow to grasp its significance. Much to the disgust of the
military authorities present, we all shook hands with everybody and
assumed the friendliest kind of attitude. That the Army officers did
not approve of our cordiality toward the Filipinos can hardly be
wondered at. They had been subjected to the risks of a campaign of
ambush and assassination for many months, and even then they
were trying to bring in a band of about one hundred and fifty
insurrectos, with as many rifles, who were hiding in the Meriveles
Mountains and preying upon the people; so, it was natural for them
to think that a policy of disdain and severity was the only one suited
to the apparent unreliability and deceitfulness of the native.
However, these same officers very shortly admitted to us, though
rather unwillingly, that our mode of dealing with the people had had
an extraordinary effect on the general tone in Bataan.
It was about this time that President McKinley communicated
through Secretary Root the intention of the Administration to
abolish the military governorship and to install a civil Governor
under the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief, and to
create civil departments also. When Mr. Taft received a cable from
Secretary Root advising him of this fact, he went to see General
MacArthur for the purpose of discussing with him the mode of
procedure and to get his ideas as to how and when the transfer of
power should be made.

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Networks and Geographies of Global

Social Policy Diffusion Michael Windzio

Malware Diffusion Models for Wireless Complex Networks.

Handbook of solid state diffusion volume 1 Diffusion

Networks for Social Impact Michelle Shumate

Race and Crime: Geographies of Injustice First Edition

Computer Networks, Global Edition Andrew S. Tanenbaum

International Impacts On Social Policy: Short Histories

Social Problems: Community, Policy, and Social Action

Foundations of Social Policy: Social Justice in Human

Networks and Geographies

More information about this series at

Fabian Besche-Truthe Helen Seitzer

ISSN 2661-8672 ISSN 2661-8680 (electronic)

This book is based on the research conducted in the Collaborative

This volume presents a wide-ranging analysis of the emergence and

1 Networks of Global Social Policy Diffusion: The

5 The Emergence of Healthcare Systems 111

Fabian Besche-Truthe University of Bremen, Germany

Achim Schmid University of Bremen, Germany

Fig. 1.1 Logistic density and cumulative logistic density function 5

Fig. 5.2 Introduction of healthcare systems over time 130

Table 1.1 Countries in quartiles of degree centrality 19

Table 5.1 Network diffusion of healthcare systems—log-hazard

© The Author(s) 2022 1

M. Windzio · F. Besche-Truthe · H. Seitzer

be more important for family or education policy. This volume aims

legacies. We will give a brief overview of the current state of research

The Network Diffusion Model in Event

Fig. 1.1 Logistic density and cumulative logistic density function

single micro-level event contributes to the time-dependent aggregation

P(t ≤ T < t + t)

In a discrete-time situation, we can estimate event history regression

Contagion at time t depends on exposure to subjects already infected at

Figure 1.2 gives an example of how exposure is calculated and repre-

Fig. 1.2 Network exposure and the hazard rate

difficult and requires the application of maximum likelihood estimation,

The Methodology Used in This Volume

the number observed before or thereafter would make the measurement

adopted the respective policy. We can determine whether factors such as

Networks of Social Policy Diffusion

structures. Possibly, other network dimensions, international organiza-

Network of Geographic Distances

There is little doubt that geographical distance influences diffusion

only encompasses physical–geographical proximity, but that cognitive,

Global Trade Networks

In international comparative social policy research, trade networks are

rapidly, and trade was the central engine of economic globalization

from 1880 to 1905, Kosovo, Zanzibar). Furthermore, because there are

Fig. 1.3 The network of global trade in 2010

Table 1.1 Countries in quartiles of degree centrality

The Network of “Cultural Spheres”

During the last decades, culture became an increasingly important

it can be very local, or it can encompass wider regions of the world—

Fig. 1.4 Network of cultural spheres in 2010

shows the result of a Louvain clustering procedure which results in a

Network of Colonial Legacies

Researching the history of social policy adoption means to acknowl-

transnational contact, especially in cases where nation-states are actively

exp(−(N o. year s since colony ends/40))

declines after colonization. To date, there is no commonly accepted stan-

Fig. 1.5 The network of colonial legacies

assume an incorrect threshold and therefore distort the regression esti-