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THE LANGUAGE OF MENTAL HEALTH
On the Self:
Discourses of Mental
Health and Education
Julie Allan · Valerie Harwood
The Language of Mental Health
Series Editors
Michelle O’Reilly, The Greenwood Institute, University of
Leicester, Leicester, UK
Jessica Nina Lester, School of Education, Indiana
University, Bloomington, IN, USA
This series brings together rich theoretical and empirical discussion at
the intersection of mental health and discourse/conversation analysis.
Situated broadly within a social constructionist perspective, the books
included within this series will offer theoretical and empirical examples
highlighting the discursive practices that surround mental health and
make ‘real’ mental health constructs. Drawing upon a variety of discourse
and conversation analysis perspectives, as well as data sources, the books
will allow scholars and practitioners alike to better understand the role
of language in the making of mental health.
We are very grateful to our expert editorial board who continue to
provide support for the book series. We are especially appreciative of the
feedback that they have provided on earlier drafts of this book. Their
supportive comments and ideas to improve the book have been very
helpful in our development of the text. They continue to provide support
as we continue to edit the book series ‘the language of mental health’. We
acknowledge them here in alphabetical order by surname.
Tim Auburn, Plymouth University, UK
Galina Bolden, Rutgers University, USA
Susan Danby, Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Debra Friedman, Indiana University, USA
Ian Hutchby, University of Leicester, UK
Doug Maynard, University of Wisconsin, USA
Emily A. Nusbaum, University of San Francisco, USA
Julie Allan · Valerie Harwood
On the Self:
Discourses of Mental
Health
and Education
Julie Allan Valerie Harwood
School of Education Sydney School of Education
University of Birmingham and Social Work
Birmingham, UK The University of Sydney
Camperdown, Sydney, NSW, Australia
The Language of Mental Health

ISBN 978-3-031-10995-9 ISBN 978-3-031-10996-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10996-6
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher,
whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation,
reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other
physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer
software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt
from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in
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Cover credit: Richard Nixon/Alamy Stock Photo
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland
AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgements
Valerie Harwood, Anna Hickey-Moody, Sarah O’Shea & Sam

McMahon, (2017). The Politics of Widening Participation and University
Access for Young People: Making educational futures.
The right of Valerie Harwood, Anna Hickey-Moody, Sam McMahon
and Sarah O’Shea to be identified as authors of this work has been
asserted by them in accordance with Sections 77 and 78 of the Copy-
right, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this
book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any
electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Reproduced with permission of The Licensor through PLSclear.
v
Contents
1 Introduction: The Psy-Self 1
Part I Tell Me My Self

2 Making Strange the History of Psychological
Discourses of the Self in Education 23
3 Schooling the (Achieving) Self 55
4 Mental Disorder in School and the Damaged Self 85
5 Happiness and Wellbeing: For the Love of the Self 115
Part II Counter-Narratives of the Self

6 The Pleasure(s) of the Self 151
7 The Capable Self 173
8 Re-Presenting the Self 205
9 Politicising the Self 235
vii
viii Contents
10 A Manifesto for Selfwork 265
References 283
Index 319
About the Authors
Julie Allan and Valerie Harwood are the authors of Psychopathology at

School: Theorising Mental Disorder in Education (2014, Routledge) and
of Medicus Interruptus in the Behaviour of Disadvantaged Children in
Scotland, in the British Journal of Sociology of Education (http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/01425692.2013.776933). They also co-edited, together
with Clara Jørgensen, The Routledge World Yearbook in Education:
Schooling, governance and inequalities (2020, Routledge).
Julie Allan is a Professor of Equity and Inclusion at the University of

Birmingham, UK, where she was formerly Head of the School of Educa-
tion. Julie’s research focuses on inclusion, disability studies and children’s
rights and encompasses both empirical and theoretical work. She has
been an expert adviser on policy, practice and research to governments,
NGOs and Council of Europe.
Valerie Harwood is a Professor of Sociology and Anthropology of

Education, Sydney School of Education and Social Work, The University
of Sydney. Valerie’s research is centred on a social and cultural analysis of
ix
x About the Authors
participation in educational futures. This work involves learning about

collaborative approaches and in-depth fieldwork on educational justice
with young people, families and communities.
List of Figures
Fig. 6.1 Montage of images of Marc-André Leclerc

by Marc-André Leclerc (Leclerc, 2015) 166
Fig. 8.1 Riva Lehrer, Circle Stories: Tekki Lomnicki, 1999 226
Fig. 8.2 Riva Lehrer, Circle Stories: Eli Clare, 1999 227
xi
List of Tables
Table 2.1 “Two Traditions” of psychological self in education

adapted from Martin and McLellan (2013)
and Sugarman (2015) 33
Table 5.1 Highest happiness ranking 2017–2019 117
Table 5.2 Lowest happiness rankings 2017–2019 117
Table 5.3 Highest happiness rankings in 2018–2020
and comparisons with 2017–2019 118
Table 5.4 Lowest happiness rankings in 2018–2020
and comparisons with 2017–2019 119
Table 5.5 Comparison of child wellbeing outcomes 121
Table 5.6 The intensification of the self 139
xiii
1
Introduction: The Psy-Self
Self esteem is themainspring that slates every child for success or failure
as a human being. (Briggs, 2001, p. 3)
Emerging adults are aware of and somewhat distressed by messaging that

casts their age-group as the most narcissistic and entitled age-group ever.
(Grubbs, 2019)
The exhausted is the exhaustive, the dried up, the extenuated and the
dissipated. (Deleuze & Uhlman, 1995, p. 12)
There has been increasing attention, in recent years, to the self in educa-
tion, through systemic educational interventions directed at self-esteem,
self-concept, self-efficacy and self-regulation. These interventions and
the accompanying “intense professional interest and scrutiny” (Zeidner
et al., 2000, p. 749), taking place through the “psy”-disciplines (Foucault,
1965, 1986, 1988; Rose, 1996)—psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy
and psychoanalysis—enable individuals increasingly to “take stock of
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
J. Allan and V. Harwood, On the Self: Discourses of Mental Health and Education,
The Language of Mental Health,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10996-6_1
2 J. Allan and V. Harwood
themselves and attempt to manage themselves according to the psy-

discourse” (Martin & McLellan, 2013, p. 9). They provide a concreteness
and quasi-scientific basis to aspects of the individual hitherto unexposed
(Martin & McLellan, 2013), with the aim of making students more
expressive, strategic and entrepreneurial, but it has also made them more
self-interested, in a manner adhering to such self prescriptions as well
as creating a series of “wounded attachments” (Brown, 1993, p. 390).
The psy-disciplines have also played an important role as an “intellectual
technology” (Rose, 1996, p. 10) that helps in the process of “making
up” (Hacking, 2007, p. 285) the persons that we know ourselves as and,
consequently, have transformed our understanding of personhood.
We have, however, become “exhausted” (Deleuze & Uhlman,
1995, p.12) by and with the constant attention upon ourselves, while
remaining “fragile” and “hooked on self-esteem” (Furedi, 2004, p. 143).
There are growing concerns about the negative impact on society of a
rise in self-orientation among students (Martin & McLellan, 2013) with
some observers tying this to student failure and environmental decay
(Brubach, 2009; Bush, 2009; Twenge, 2006). Rose (2018) highlights the
pathological consequence of the extensive attention to self in the form
of one in ten children holding a psychiatric diagnosis of mental disorder,
a figure that is greater when those diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder are included. Monbiot (2016) also attributes
the “catastrophic figures for children’s mental health” to “competitive
self-interest and extreme individualism”. However, he also placed the
blame for this on neoliberalism, suggesting that human beings who are
hard-wired for sociability are being “peeled apart”.
The Distressed Self

The high levels of distress among children (Rose, 2018) have been noted
and responded to with interventions such as mindfulness, happiness
and wellbeing lessons in schools (Guardian, 2017; happyconfidentkids.
org.uk). As Low (2021) points out, there are different kinds of mind-
fulness, some of them influenced by Buddhism, but the mindfulness
that tends to be introduced into schools is psychologically oriented.
A study by Lee et al. (2018) offered a scientific explanation for stress

among children, suggesting that levels of cortisol, the so-called stress
hormone, rose when students received a setback such as a poor grade.
Those students with a growth mindset, who believed that intelligence
could be developed, experienced a lowering of cortisol after a few days.
Those with fixed mindsets, who considered intelligence to be fixed, were
left with higher cortisol levels for longer. Official bodies such as Ofqual
(The Ofqual blog), the NHS(a) (undated) and the British Psycholog-
ical Society (Bulman, 2018) have issued guidance on minimising stress
related to examination and testing, while the NHS offers the following
guidance on stress to students in higher education:
University can be a stressful experience, as well as being fun and exciting.

You may feel stressed about starting university, exams, coursework dead-
lines, living with people you do not get on with, or thinking about the
future. Stress is a natural feeling, designed to help you cope in challenging
situations. In small amounts it can be good, because it pushes you to work
hard and do your best, such as during exams. But if you’re feeling very
stressed or feel you cannot manage stress, it can lead to mental health
problems such as depression and anxiety. It can also affect your academic
performance. (NHS(b), undated)
The eloquence of children and young people about their distress and low
self-esteem is often striking. They appear familiar, and at ease with, the
discourse of the damaged self and speak fluently about the feelings of
“worthlessness” and “self-harming” behaviours together with high levels
of “stress,” “anxiety” and “poor mental health”. The following young man
describes his transition from a bad to a very good place almost entirely
in terms of the self:
My mum was so worried about me, she said she’s never seen me at such
a low point because I was depressed and my anxiety was so bad I couldn’t
leave my room … Part of the programme was online and it made me feel
anxious just thinking about taking part, but when I was in the store on
placement it gave me a new lease of life. Interacting with the customers
has really boosted my confidence at the end of the programme. (Princes
Trust, 2021)
The naming of stress by the very young, with children as young as 9

and 10 referring to themselves as “stressed out” (Furedi, 2004, p. 1),
the identification with stress and the projection of stressed selves onto
social media seems alarming, yet it is endemic and is an everyday part of
young people’s discourse. Social media has played a significant role in this
with mixed consequences. On the one hand, the high profile campaigns
such as Heads Together, with Royal patronage (headstogether.org.uk) and
Mind , with Stephen Fry as its ambassador, has reduced the stigma asso-
ciated with mental illness and encouraged people to talk about their own
struggles with mental health. On the other hand, social media is awash
with celebrities “sharing” their selves and their lives and with influencers
who turn the attention on themselves into a marketing opportunity.
Either way, children and young people are left with the expectation that
they should be putting themselves out in the world to be scrutinised and
judged.
In and Out of Love with the Self

The excessive attention to self has led to high levels of what could be
termed narcissism, which in turn appear to have precipitated height-
ened dissatisfaction. We note here that we are not using this term in
the manner with which it has been appropriated in psychiatric discourse,
such as in relation to “personality disorders”. The rapid ascent of narcis-
sism in society has been observed and documented since the seventies
by Tom Wolfe’s (1976) New York Times piece, The ‘Me’ Decade and the
New Third Awakening and Christopher Lasch’s (1979) Culture of Narcis-
sism. Wolfe regarded this new emergence as faintly positive and hinted
at vitality, whereas Lasch read it as more defiant and anti-social. The
“narcissism epidemic”, diagnosed by Twenge and Campbell (2013, p.
iv) has four elements. The first is developmental and includes permis-
sive parenting and self-esteem focussed education, ensuring children
are born as “snowflakes,” “princesses” and “superheroes” and grow with
increasing (over)confidence and self-regard. A second strand is the media
culture which promotes shallow celebrity, together with the third, the
internet, which serves as a conduit for narcissism. Easy credit is the final
strand, enabling narcissistic dreams to come true. Although easy credit

has diminished in recent years, the three remaining strands continue to
feed and promote a “corrosive narcissism that threatens to infect us all”
(Twenge & Campbell, 2013, p. 9) and which is extremely negative and
destructive. Even the take up of the label of narcissism, for example, with
the inclusion of Narcissistic Personality Disorder in the fourth edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM -4-TR,
APA, 2000) is itself, Twenge and Campbell (2013) suggest, attention
seeking. It is interesting to note that, during the consultations for
proposed revisions to personality disorders in the current edition, DSM-
5 (APA, 2013) there was a proposal to “eliminate NPD as a specific
diagnosis”; however, “NPD had by far the most supporters” (Skodol
et al., 2014, p. 424) and was not removed.
Narcisissm has become normalised through the repetition of norms
which lead to the emergence of “boundary, fixity and surface” (Butler,
1993, p. 9). More recently, Williams (2016) has questioned whether
we are living through a narcissism epidemic and asks how worried we
should be about our self-obsession as a nation. Most concerning is the
pride that confirmed narcissists appear to take in their “condition” and
its manifestation in a lack of care for others. The most public personas
branded as narcissistic include Donald Trump, Katie Hopkins and golfer
Tiger Woods, but while the diagnostically defined Narcissistic Personality
Disorder (NPD) remains relatively uncommon (MacDonald, 2014),
there does seem to be an increase in the number of people who are
described as having “narcissistic tendencies”. For instance, Twenge and
Campbell (2013) claim one in ten people under the age of 25 and one
in 16 in the general population showed some symptoms of NPD. Bush
(2009, p. 6), describing the growth in self-regard as a “scourge that has
affected us all”, urged that we “recognize the epidemic and its negative
consequences and take corrective action”.
Children are also being described as being narcissistic. For instance,
a study by Brummelman et al. (2015) reports narcissism in children is
a demonstrated consequence of excessive parental praise. This is itself
generated through parental overvaluation, believing their child to be
better than others and communicating this to them. Brummelham and
colleagues (2015) found overvalued and overpraised children exhibited
what they term “narcissistic traits” up to six months later. Parents who
were heaping extra praise on their children were seeking to raise their
self-esteem but were merely providing “a kind of lackadaisical positive
assertion” (Williams, 2016). Brummelham et al.’s results lead them to
claim that that self-esteem is most effectively raised through parental
warmth, affection and appreciation and we note here what could be
called the praise dilemma: what is too much parental praise? Getting
the balance right is necessary due to the spectre of narcissism, which it
appears can be summoned by excessive parental praise.
In schools, there has been widespread concern that a strong emphasis
on self-esteem was leading to grade inflation, student misconduct and
student failure and creating a “runaway self-interest and entitlement”
(Martin & McLellan, 2013, p. 17) among young people. Stout (2000,
p. 14) has referred to the “feel good curriculum” that is “dumbing
down” public education in America. More generally, critical attention
has focussed on the decades of programmatic interventions directed at
the self—self-esteem, self-concept, self-efficacy and self-regulation—and
Salomon (1995, p. 106) was among those arguing that the focus needed
to change “from the study of isolated and decontextualized individuals,
processes, states of mind, or interventions to their study within wider
psychological, disciplinary, social, and cultural contexts”.
To See Ourselves as the “Psy-Experts” See Us

The level of precision in the documentation of the individual self, vali-
dated by the expertise of the psy-disciplines, particularly psychology
(Danziger, 1988), makes the inscription of difference and the recogni-
tion of deviance more possible (Martin & McLellan, 2013, Rose, 1990;
1996). It has also given the psy-experts—“engineers of the human soul”
(Rose, 1996, p. 81)—an elevated and privileged position in society.
Psychology has particular status and authority as a discipline, according
to Rose (1996), not just on a scientific and technical basis but because
of a knowledge of subjectivity that is ethical. This ethical dimension
has enabled psychology to infuse the human-oriented professions that
operate within prisons, hospitals and businesses as well as educational
institutions, offering the “promise of personhood” (Rose, 1996, p. 88).

This, in turn, has made it possible for these organisations and establish-
ments to develop their own set of knowledges relating to the practical,
technical organisation of space, time, bodies and gazes (Gordon, 1987)
and to assume all individuals to be “calculable” (Rose, 1996, p. 89)
and discernible through diagnostic practices, such as the psychological
test. The concomitant increase in research focussing on the self, while
inevitable as soon as psychologists began basing their explanations for
almost every aspect of human behaviour on the self (Danziger, 1997),
has been somewhat reductive:
In effect, the entire exercise transforms an important set of metaphys-

ical and ontological issues concerning the nature of human existence and
agency to a grossly simplified exercise in methodology. For many scien-
tific and practical purposes, the self has become a latent construct inferred
from self-ratings on a particular instrument at a specific time and place.
(Martin & McLellan, 2013, p. 12)
Rose (1996) and others (Foucault, 1991; Hacking, 2007; Rose &
Miller, 1992) have linked the influence of the psy-disciplines on the
self to enhanced technologies of government, whereby strategies and
programmes are aimed at ensuring the “conduct of conduct” (Rose,
1996, p. 12). This kind of government reaches into families and indi-
viduals, with the aim:
not just to control, subdue, discipline, normalize, or reform them, but

also to make them more intelligent, wise, happy, virtuous, healthy,
productive, docile, enterprising, fulfilled, self-esteeming, empowered, or
whatever. (Rose, 1996, p. 12)
Dissatisfaction with the self and self-oriented distress has given rise to
what has been described as a “psychiatric society” (Rose, 2018, p. 23), a
therapeutic society (Wright, 2011), or, as Furedi (2004, p. 2) suggests, a
pervasive and highly emotional “therapeutic culture” that enables indi-
viduals to identify as “vulnerable” (p. 1), with each disappointment
or setback a threat to their self-esteem and wellbeing. The therapeutic
culture, emerging as a result of a decline in tradition (Sennet, 1976),
religion and politics (Furedi, 2004), addresses problems with individuals’

wellbeing and low self-esteem through the professionalisation of relation-
ships and the dismantling of informal networks, including friendships,
courtship, intimate relations, family and community (Furedi, 2004; Rice,
1996). It focusses negatively on psychological vulnerabilities rather than
on human potential (Moskowitz, 2001), endorsing and supporting an
“interior causation” (Smail, 2001, p. 5). This leads in turn to a “disorgan-
isation of people’s private lives” (Furedi, 2004, p. 104) and recalibration
of the human condition. Psychological trauma has become routinised
as a common response to everyday events “through pathologizing nega-
tive emotional responses to the pressures of life” (Furedi, 2004, p. 6).
Consequently, trauma, “an affliction of the powerless” (Herman, 1994,
p. 33), and the accompanying helplessness, become elevated to an objec-
tive mental health condition requiring professional help. Furthermore, a
“self esteem deficit” (Furedi, 2004, p. 25) has come to be recognised as a
collective illness that afflicts entire communities and has drawn the atten-
tion of governments, policymakers and the media. A heightened sense of
individualism leads individuals to recast social problems such as isolation
as emotional and personal ones of our own making (Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002; Furedi, 2004). The self that remains is a “distinctly
feeble version of human subjectivity” (Furedi, 2004, p. 107) and that
subjectivity has, in turn, become “the source of everything” (Bracken,
2002, p. 179).
A Profound Dissatisfaction with the Psy-Self

How did we get to this precarious and profound dissatisfaction with our
own selves? How have even very young children come to view themselves
with such intensity and dislike? Can anything be done to help children
and young people to look up and away from themselves? This book
examines the emergence of these psychologised discourses of the self in
education and through the “psy” disciplines (Rose, 1996) and considers
their effects on children and young people, on relationships both in and
out of school and on educational practices. We ask how the particular
forms of the self emerged in education and with what effects. We also
ask whether those more negative and punitive effects can be reversed and
whether it is possible to support young people in developing an orien-
tation to the self that is more positive, productive and playful. We draw
on Hacking’s (2007) concept of “making up people” to explore the ways
of knowing individuals that result from the increasing emphasis on and
more formalised mechanisms, for evaluating the self. We also undertake
a Foucauldian genealogy of the discourses of the self (Foucault, 1997)
in education in order to explore “the games of truth and error through
which being is historically constituted as experience; that is as something
that can and must be thought” (Foucault, 1985, pp. 6–7). A genealogy
also enables us to scrutinise the “focal points of experience” (Gros, 2008,
p. 3) for children and young people. These focal points are the forms
of knowledge, the normative frameworks of behaviour and the “poten-
tial modes of existence for possible subjects” (Gros, 2008, p. 3). While
Martin and McLellan’s proposed resolution to the problem of the “gen-
eration me” (Twenge, 2006, p. 1), self-interested individuals, is a form
of re-education of the self with a greater social orientation, our ambi-
tion is to uncover counter-narratives that enable the self to continue to
flourish, but in alternative, and potentially radical, ways. In so doing
we are envisioning more optimistic possibilities for the self rather than
attempting to diminish its potency. Our optimism is influenced by our
reading of the philosophers of difference (Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze
and Guattari) and of our recognition of the powerful consequences of a
different kind of self-attention: a strategic attention to the self and of the
benefits of “the concern of the self as a practice of freedom” (Foucault,
1994, p. 281). Education, as Reay (2017) reminds us, is an uncom-
fortable space of judgement and labelling, particularly for disadvantaged
students. It is important that we find ways of enabling young people to
comprehend the dangers and disadvantages they encounter throughout
their schooling and equipping them to face these down with alternative
narratives that overturn judgements and labels. We seek to articulate how
teachers may support children and young people in giving voice to these
counter-narratives as they move through school.
The Structure of the Book

The book is in two parts. In Part one we offer a critical analysis of the
discourses of the self that operate within interventions in relation to self-
esteem, self-concept, self-efficacy and self-regulation and their incursions
into education. We examine, in this analysis, the technologies of the self
that are put to work on children and young people, that is “any assembly
[of practices and related conventions and artifacts] structured by a prac-
tical rationality governed by a more or less conscious goal” (Rose, 1996,
p. 26). Following Rose (1996, p. 18), we explore the particular “prob-
lematisations, technologies, authorities, teleologies and strategies” that
arise within the context of education. Specifically, we consider how the
personhood of the student is made or remade when the self is at the
centre and examine the consequences for all those involved.
Part two of the book has a more optimistic orientation and explores
potential ways out of exhaustion with the self-regarding self. Here we
offer counter-narratives of the self, drawn from the arts and politics
providing alternative ways of when and how the self might speak. We
seek to both re-read existing counter-narratives, for example, Foucault’s
practices of the self and Nussbaum and Sen’s capability perspective and
give voice to new forms from the arts and politics that have yet to
be recognised in this way. From these, we articulate a framework for
performing counter-narratives that “turn things on their heads … [and]
upset the established order” (Rego, 2019) but which also expand the
“bandwidth of ways of being human” (Rose, 2018, p. 181) and allow
individuals to live well.
Each of the Chapters in Part one follows a similar format and
draws on Foucault’s (1977) concept of intensification to offer a critical
commentary on the emergence of self in its various manifestations in
education and consider its effects. The following analytical questions are
addressed, using Nealon’s (2008) framework for undertaking a genealogy
of the nineteenth century. Illustrative examples are drawn from Nealon’s
analysis:
1. What mode of power is operating (e.g. biopower)?

2. Who is considered to be the primary actor (e.g. individual)?
3. What is the primary target (e.g. lives)?

4. What is the primary hinge (e.g. governmentality)?
5. What is the primary practice whereby saturation is achieved (e.g.
Norm)?
6. Where can the most intense form be seen (e.g. sexuality)?
7. What is the desired outcome (e.g. autocontrol)?
To these seven questions, we add an eight, educational, question,
namely:
8. What new educational demands or challenges arise for teachers (e.g.
increased behavioural problems)?
This framework guides the analysis of each of the Chapters in Part one
and allows us to examine how the self becomes more embedded and
saturated in educational practices and capture increasing numbers of
people.
Chapter 2, Making strange the history of psychological discourses of
the self in education, tracks the emergence of self-esteem, self-concept,
self-efficacy, self-regulation and resilience in education. It identifies the
“psy” disciplines, such as psychiatry or psychology, from which these
constituents of the self-emerged and at whom and what they were
directed. The Chapter also traces how each of these manifestations of
the self was validated and subsequently promulgated and practised to the
point of saturation. No critical evaluation of the path towards saturation
is provided here; rather, we are concerned with mapping the trajectories
of the various incarnations of the self in education.
In Chapter 3, Schooling the (achieving) self, school structures, systems
and processes, including assessment, are subjected to scrutiny. Their role
as “host institutions” for the incorporation of the self and as sites for the
production of individualising evidence is analysed. The effects of school
practices (both pedagogic and social) on the child’s self, and their fami-
lies, are also considered. We examine the impact of the incursion of the
self into education on the schools and their personnel and the overall
consequences of the intensification of the self. This includes a discussion
of different ways in which students and teachers have come to be known
to themselves and to one another.
Chapter 4, Mental disorder in school and the damaged self , expands

on the analysis offered in Harwood and Allan’s (2014) Psychopathology
at School: Theorizing mental disorder in education and directs it to a
critique of the emergence and saturation of the self. Here we illus-
trate how psychopathologisation functions as a primary hinge within
schools to operationalise the demarcation of the self as abnormal/normal
(Foucault, 2008). Through psychopathologisation, the badly behaving
child (whose behaviour might have hitherto recognised as elements
within, for instance, a reasonable cultural response, or explanations that
draw on concepts of a developmental cycle) can be re-presented as a self
that is damaged and mentally ill.
Chapter 5, Wellbeing and happiness, begins with a review of inter-
national comparisons of wellbeing and happiness from, for example,
the World Happiness Report (2019) and the UNICEF “Report Card”
(2020, 2021), documenting inequalities in child wellbeing in rich coun-
tries. The Chapter also documents the levels of stress among children
that are reported and considers the increased propensity for such (self )
reporting. The increased attention given to the promotion of wellbeing
and happiness among children is examined through the genealogical
framework of questions detailed above and includes scrutiny of the
appropriation of self-esteem as an educational goal (Martin & McLellan,
2013).
The second part of the book, Counter-narratives of the self, moves from
the critical to the political and takes up the element of resistance in
Foucault’s genealogy. In the absence of a specific framework of resistance
from Foucault, we have developed the following questions to guide the
subsequent Chapters:
a. Who or what was the point of provocation?

b. Who is the prime actor?
c. Who, or what, is the principal object?
d. What form does the resistance take?
e. What are the (speculated) effects?
We use these questions to review examples from the capable self, the
represented self and the politicised self (Chapters 7, 8 and 9) and eval-
uate them as instances of Foucault’s (1985) practices of the self or ethical
practices:
1. Determination of the ethical substance: the identification of the part of

oneself as to be worked upon.
2. The mode of subjection: how the individual recognises how he or she
operates in relation to certain rules and seeking ways of observing
these rules.
3. Self-practice or ethical work: what is done to comply with a given rule
to effect transformation.
4. The Telos: the ultimate goal to be achieved through ethical work.
Chapter 6, The pleasure(s) of the self, takes up the later part of

Foucault’s work (contained in his writing on ethics, transgression and
the history of sexuality) to detail practices of the self and the exploration
of the self as a work of art. The distinctive feature of this Chapter is
that it attempts to show how Foucault’s framework for the practices of
the self—determination of the ethical substance; the mode of subjection;
self-practice or ethical work; and the telos—could be put into practice.
It offers an orientation of the self that is positive, productive and playful
rather than one that is psychologised and pathologised.
The capable self , drawing on the capability perspective, first devel-
oped by Amartya Sen (1999a, 1999b) and further elaborated by Martha
Nussbaum (2010), is the subject of Chapter 7. Sen’s basic framework of
capabilities is outlined in relation to the analytical framework of resis-
tance documented above; Nussbaum’s development of a list of “Central
capabilities” is reviewed alongside the subsequent debates about whether
such a list could ever be definitive. We also connect with the work devel-
oped in Harwood et al. (2017) that draws on the capability approach
[Sen, and work by Wolff and De-Shalit, (2007)] to explore what it means
to be a capable self, and discuss the practice of selfwork.
Chapter 8, Re-presenting the self , selects from the vast array of works of
art which re-present the self as political and consider the dramatic effects.
Examples from a range of art forms are reviewed as acts of resistance that
reframe the self. They include James Joyce’s epiphanies of the everyday in
Ulysses; the Tamil writer, Jayakanthan whose work challenges the stigma
of mental illness; the play Biscuit Land—Changing the World, One Tic at
a Time; the film Welcome to Me and the artwork of Riva Lehrer.
Chapter 9, Politicising the self , looks at individuals in contemporary
society who have generated public selves, in Hacking’s (2007) terms,
making themselves up for specific political ends, but who may simulta-
neously have altered how they have come to know themselves as people.
Using the same framework as in Chapters 7 and 8, we consider the self-
work of four individuals in political and public life: climate activist Greta
Thunberg; Chris Sarra, an Indigenous educationist; Malala Yousafsi,
activist for female education and Stephanie Shirley, a child refugee who
became a philanthropist and autism campaigner.
We begin the final Chapter, Performing the self: counter-narratives in
everyday life, with some reflections on the extent of the damage done
to children and young people and indeed to adults and society as a
whole by the hyper-attentiveness to the self. We consider the resilience
of the psy-disciplines and associated discourses, but nevertheless assert
our ambition to interrupt these and reorient towards an alternative kind
of selfwork. We offer a manifesto for selfwork which denotes intensive,
relational activity and engages with the human and the non-human. We
speak directly to teachers through the material examples of the capable,
re-presenting and political selves, to hopefully help them to support chil-
dren and young people to find their counter-narrative voices as well as
undertaking selfwork of their own.
We offer, in this book, both a critique and an interruption of what
the philosopher Adam Smith (1976/1759, p. 145) referred to as “the
great school of self-command”. This notion of the self has grown in
authority in recent years, allowing the self to become commodified and
pathologised (Martin & McLellan, 2008; Rose, 1996) and re-presented
as damaged, traumatised and suffering, an issue poignantly described by
Nietzsche (1969):
For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his (sic) suffering, more
exactly, an agent; still more specifically a guilty agent who is susceptible
to suffering—in short, some living thing upon which he (sic) can on
some pretext or other, vent his (sic) affects, actually or in effigy … This
… constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness,
and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects … to deaden,
by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret
pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness
at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect
as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all. (p. 127)
The interruption that we offer is discursive, political and hopeful. We

seek, through our counter-narratives, to break into the hegemonised self
across the psy-disciplines and this is in the spirit of moving from what we
are, expressed in the language of “I am”, which as Brown (1993, p. 407)
notes has a “defensive closure on identity”, to the more reflexive and
open notion of what we want (Brown, 1993; Garland-Thomson, 2011).
The political dimension of the interruption is illustrated in the way the
counter-narratives succeed in talking back to power (Thompson, 1984)
and to the governance structures and forms of regulation that force indi-
viduals to perform as highly self-regarding subjects. Finally, this book
offers an interruption that is hopeful and which reimagines a future for
our children and young people which allows them to be both healthy
and happy and enables them to cultivate selves that are both capable and
content.
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Part I
Tell Me My Self
2
Making Strange the History
of Psychological Discourses of the Self
in Education
Maybe the problem of the self is not to discover what it is in its

positivity, maybe the problem is not to discover a positive self, or the
positive foundation of the self. Maybe our problem is now to discover
that the self is nothing else than the historical correlation of the technology
built in our history. Maybe the problem is to change those technologies.
(Foucault et al., 2016, p. 76, emphasis added)
Taking up this provocation by Foucault, our approach in this Chapter is

to consider the historical discourses of the self in education by asking:
what might be understood if we treat the educational self as a historical
correlation of contemporary technology? This movement shifts from an
attempt to provide a historical overview of the discourses of the self in
education. This process of “making strange” is a different way of tack-
ling the historical questions. This is helpful for our consideration of
the historical discourses of the self because attempting a “history” or
even a Foucauldian genealogy of psychology and the self in education
is beyond the scope of this Chapter. Moreover, the book, The Educa-
tion of Selves by Jack Martin and Ann-Marie McLellan (2013) provides
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 23

Switzerland AG 2022
J. Allan and V. Harwood, On the Self: Discourses of Mental Health and Education,
The Language of Mental Health,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10996-6_2
a rare critical account on educational psychology and self. Indeed, this

book-length analysis provides an extremely well-argued account of the
history of educational psychology. We interact closely with it as we
examine how the dominating conception of the self in education might
just be “a historical correlation of the technology built in our history”
(Foucault et al., 2016, p. 76).
In following this line of questioning we are prompted to ask, what are
the technologies that, to paraphrase Foucault, have been built in the rela-
tively recent history of mass education that have come to be known as the
psychological self in education? By emphasising an interrogation of these
technologies and their correlation to the contemporary education forms
that are so “familiar” we can be prompted to look differently at what
appears as a natural formation of the self articulated in education. This
idea of questioning the familiar is inspired by what Foucault termed an
“ethics of discomfort” (1997a, p. 121) in a piece first published in 1979
in Le Nouvel Observateur. This approach has been used, for example, as
a generative way to differently consider the conflation of “woundedness”
with LGBTI+ young people in schools (Harwood & Rasmussen, 2004).
This welcoming of a kind of feeling for discomfort—an ethics of
discomfort—has much to do with embracing the importance of, as
Foucault writes, to “never consent to be completely comfortable with
your own certainties” (1997a, p. 127). Here we are encouraged to engage
in a type of ethics that is uncomfortable, and more actively, welcomes
discomfort. In this piece Foucault emphasises that:
One must clearly feel that everything perceived is only evident when
surrounded by a familiar and poorly known horizon, that each certitude
is only sure because of the support offered by unexplored ground. The
most fragile instant has roots. (1997a, p. 127)
What is “evident” then, to respond to this suggestion, is only so when

it is “surrounded by a familiar and poorly known horizon” (Foucault,
1997a, p. 127). Engaging in an ethics of discomfort, we say that the
psychological discourses of the self in education are only evident when
“surrounded by a familiar and poorly known horizon”. Importantly we
need to be mindful “that considering the poorly known horizon does
2 Making Strange the History of Psychological … 25
not lead to a perusal of what is truth, but rather, a deliberate questioning

that asks, how is this relation to truth formed?” (Harwood & Rasmussen,
2004, p. 309). Returning to our interrogation of the psychological tech-
nologies of the self, we are particularly concerned with recognising the
poorly known horizon in the familiar terms of self-esteem, self-concept,
self-efficacy and self-regulation. The Chapter, then, sets out to track how
such manifestations of the self are validated and promulgated and prac-
tised to the point of saturation. No critical evaluation of the path towards
saturation is provided here; rather, we are concerned with arguing that
the self, as we so often experience it in education, has become very
familiar and that this can be better understood by grasping its processes
of intensification.
Our interrogation of these psychological technologies in education
uses Nealon’s (2008) framework to guide the analysis. As we described
in Chapter 1, we respond to eight questions, seven of which are drawn
from Nealon’s (2008, p. 28) work with our addition of an eighth to
consider educational demands and challenges. Nealon (2008) uses these
seven questions to offer an analysis of how “Foucault’s D&P [Discipline
and Punish] traces a genealogical path of modern power’s mutations”
(p. 28). It provides a way to think through changes (or “mutations”) in
power, such as between sovereign power in the seventeenth century and
disciplinary power in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. Using these
questions helps to focus our analysis on dominating forms of power;
primary actor; primary target; primary hinge; primary practice; and the
most intense form. Each of these questions points us towards an analysis
that concentrates on what is dominating and in so doing, assists us to
look critically at the familiar.
It is important to take up a Foucauldian provocation to both engage
with history differently and to avoid historicism. For instance, as
Foucault explains, referring to his own research, “this is not what could
be called a historicist reduction, for that would consist precisely in
starting from these universals as given and then seeing how history
inflects them, or alters them, or finally invalidates them” (2008, p. 3).
Foucault is explaining that in the 1979–1980 lectures he set out to
attempt a different approach to history. As he states, this “is exactly the
opposite of historicism: not, then, questioning universals by using history
as a critical method, but starting from the decision that universals do not
exist, asking what kind of history we can do” (2008, p. 2). Eschewing
universals, Foucault (2008) moves his gaze to what he terms “concrete
practices”. As he outlines, “instead of starting with universals as an oblig-
atory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices I would like to
start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals
through the grid of these practices” (2008, p. 3). It is this emphasis on
practices that, arguably, is the key to this striving to do history differently
(or more accurately, a different kind of history).
The Bipolar Technology of Biopower

(The Mode of Power in Operation)
Articulating the mode of power in operation commands us to compre-
hend how this form of psychological discourse of self has become quite
so dominant in the landscapes of western schooling. When we pause to
think of this dominance, or more accurately, its extent, we can reflect
on the numerous ways in which it seeps into the everyday of schooling.
This psychological discourse of the self can be seen in a range of diverse
places, from conversations about children in schools and by parents and
caregivers, to usage in promotional material about schools themselves.
An example of the latter can be seen in this description published in the
Boarding Schools Guide in a national newspaper in Australia. Written as
material about an Australian boarding school for girls, the promotional
material states, “What girls’ schools do is purposefully develop girls to
understand their gender identity and shape their self concept, self effi-
cacy, and self confidence” (The Australian, 2021). What we are drawing
attention to here is not necessarily a critique of the claim, but rather,
with the way in which this specific educational psychology language slips
effortlessly into a description about girls’ schools and gender identity.
In another 2021 article that connects with these discourses, journalist
Jessica Powell writes in the UK Times Education Supplement about the
pandemic and “teacher burnout”. Powell includes quotes from an inter-
view with “Jamie Thom, a secondary teacher in Scotland who has also
worked in England, [who] agrees that the testing culture is at the heart
of much of the stress that teachers face” (Powell, 2021).
When you’re in the classroom environment, it’s a reciprocal relationship—

you know when a lesson is going well”, says Thom. “But when you’re
teaching online, secondary kids mute themselves and turn their screens
off, so you’re basically like a cheesy radio presenter delivering a mono-
logue. I think that’s quite demoralising. A lot of people feel that their
self-efficacy has taken a bit of a slap in the face. (Powell, 2021, citing
interview with Thom)
While this article does refer to the issue of pressures on teachers prior to
the pandemic, the piece draws attention to the complications wrought
by the pandemic, and as can be seen in Thom’s statement, the issues
with teaching in an online environment. Again, we see in this descrip-
tion how the term “self-efficacy” appears as an everyday description of
teachers’ work. That is, self-efficacy appears as a straightforward term
applicable to teachers: a common-sense term used by this teacher to
explain a “demoralising” experience.
There are other examples from a range of international contexts. For
instance, research from Brazil with initial teacher education students
attests to the value of self-regulated learning (SRL) for these university
students and the “potential to improve their effectiveness as students and
as educators” (Arcoverde et al., 2020, p. 13). A study in Tanzania also
investigated SRL using a mobile education tool in a higher education
setting, advocating the value of students using this technology and
building what it regarded as innovation in learning in Tanzania (Mwan-
dosya et al., 2019). In Indonesia, a study investigating the impacts
of the Covid-19 pandemic on student learning from home, drew on
concepts of self-regulation and mathematics software and found learning
differences between male and female high school students (Wijaya et al.,
2020). Another Indonesian study by Sulisworo et al. (2020) generated
data on student self-regulated learning during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Reporting on this data from 6571 1st-grade to 12th-grade students in
Yogarkarta, the authors state a clear link between SRL and success in
online learning (and hence learning in the Pandemic),
One of the factors that determine the success of online learning is the level
of student self-regulated learning. Thus understanding the capabilities of
SRL is essential for achieving successful education during this pandemic.
(Sulisworo et al., 2020, p. 1)
The research by Sulisworo et al. (2020) reports on a large data set on self-
regulated learning from 61 schools. This is a reasonably large number
of schools, suggesting to us the reach of these discourses in Yogarkarta,
either in terms of already existing use, or perhaps its communication via
this study. In the United States, an article in a Chicago-based newspaper
includes the terms self-efficacy and self-concept among other curricula
terminology, such as STEM and environmental education:
The district asked that programs feature one or more of the following
elements: environmental education and connecting youth with nature;
exploring various curricula such as STEM, STEAM, visual and
performing arts, and leadership; building self-esteem and self-efficacy
promoting cross-cultural experiences; and promoting active living. (Vega,
2021)
In an example from Canada, a newspaper article about an “art showcase”

by secondary students seamlessly links the concept of self-efficacy with
student engagement in visual art during the restrictions imposed by the
pandemic, “It allows the students to advocate for themselves and works
on their own confidence and self-efficacy” (McKay, 2021). Once more,
we see discussion of the notion of self-efficacy easily integrated and, we
might say logically, connected. In this instance, it is about engaging in
the visual arts. Each of these examples from newsprint media in 2021,
while discussing varying education topics, made direct connections to
self-efficacy for students and for teachers. While these are only a few
examples, the point we are making is that this psychological discourse of
the self is very much a part of a familiarly used “education vernacular”.
How is it that in our contemporary moment, when it comes to talk
of the self in education, there is this tendency to lean readily into such
psychological discourses? When this occurs, as we have seen, we should
not be surprised to be presented with terminology such as self-regulation,
self-efficacy, self-esteem and self-concept. What then is the mode of
power in operation? It seems to us that the relations of power at work

have, in the Foucauldian sense, a certain capacity of disciplinary expertise
and capacity of enthrallment. These are modes of power that Foucault
termed “biopower” and are, as he describes in The History of Sexuality:
this great bipolar technology—anatomic and biological, individualising

and specifying, directed towards the performances of the body, with atten-
tion to the processes of life-characterised a power whose highest function
was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through.
(1976, p. 139)
Here Foucault is referring to “two poles of development linked together

by a whole intermediary cluster of relations” (1976, p. 139), hence the
term “bipolar technology”. The first pole he famously characterises as “an
anatomo-politics of the human body” (1976, p. 141, original emphasis).
This pole is, to put it simply, concerned with a control over the indi-
vidual body. The second pole has what we might say is a larger ambition
of control, that of “the species body” (Foucault, 1976, p. 141), and seeks
to wrangle and exert control over the population. Foucault’s own descrip-
tion of this broader ambition offers a provocative insight into how we
might think about this second pole of bipolar biopower:
the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the
biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health,
life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these
to vary… (1976, p. 139)
This second pole of biopower “dovetails” (Foucault, 2003, p. 242) into

the first. And while the first pole harnesses disciplinary powers focussed
on the singular body, the second expands to encompass the species (or
the population). To be so expansive demands “technique [that] exists
at a different level, on a different scale, and because it has a different
bearing area, … makes use of very different instruments” (Foucault,
2003, p. 242). At work here, then, is a complex arrangement of biopower
that can be conceptualised as operating together, albeit configured at two
differing poles. We can catch a glimpse of how this arrangement operates
in the example discussed above of UK teachers who decry their loss of
self-efficacy in the face of the accumulating pressures of neoliberal educa-

tion and that increased even more during the Covid-19 Pandemic. These
teachers are affected by psychological discourses at both an individual
level and at a population level.
Boarding schools that draw on these discourses to explain how gender
identity is achieved, as we also saw in another of our examples, are like-
wise influenced by biopower. There are ways that such regulation can be
achieved at the individual level and there are processes at a wider level
that promulgate and support this hierarchy of truth about the self and
education. In this way, as Foucault reminds us, “[t]he disciplines of the
body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles
around which the organisation of power over life was deployed” (1973,
p. 141). This understanding of bipolar technology of biopower helps us
to grasp the challenge of recognising that there is a poorly known horizon
surrounding these familiar discourses. If we follow the cues, we could
attempt tackling these familiar psychological terms to grasp the truths
at work, and by consequence, the poorly known horizon. To do so we
need to have insight on how the poles of biopower operate to discipline
individual bodies and regulate populations.
The Conundrum of the Self —(The Primary

Actor)
If biopower can be understood as operating in ways able to influence
both the individual, even in ways that are “virtual”, “at a distance”
(Nealon, 2008) and the population via a range of “very different instru-
ments” (Foucault, 2003, p. 342) how might we recognise the “primary
actor”? We could say the self is the primary actor, after all, isn’t the self
the focus? Or since Nealon (2008) stated the “expert” was the primary
actor in his analysis of “modern power’s mutations” in Discipline and
Punish (Foucault, 1977) we might be drawn to appoint the educational
psychologist as the primary actor. When we return to how we are inter-
acting with the historical, we come up against the problem of the familiar
and its poorly known horizon. The self or the expert of that self might
appear to be primary actor. However, what looms large when we look to

the poorly known horizon is the conundrum of the self.
The conundrum of the self accompanies the dominant psychological
discourses of self. By using this phrase “conundrum of the self ”, we are
drawing attention to the numerous other ways to think about the self
(for instance, in, philosophy, by numerous cultures, the range of reli-
gious teachings) as well as the debate that occurs in psychology about the
discourses of the self. This dominant form and its poorly known horizon
are, we argue, so intertwined that it is strategic to not accept that the
former is the primary actor, but rather, the latter (or its expert). That
is, we are proposing to place the conundrum of the self as the primary
actor. Doing so upsets the “ease of dominance”; bringing into view the
debate, conjecture and different ways of thinking about the self. This
places an emphasis on this poorly known horizon and assists us to recog-
nise how the dominant form, in a word, dominates. A persistent issue
with this domination, as we argue, is the “suppression” from view of the
many other ways we can think about the self. We move to an extended
discussion about these other ways of the self in the second part of this
book.
In terms of the dominance of the contemporary psychological
discourses of the self in education, we turn to Martin and McLellan’s
(2013) book, The Education of Selves: How Psychology Transformed
Students. Their argument about the emergence of these discourses in
education proposes two “traditions” as emerging, the “self-expressive”
and the “entrepreneurially self-managing and entitled participants in
their own education” (Martin & McLellan, 2013, p. 2). Martin and
McLellan (2013, p. 157) coin the phrase the “triple E student (expressive,
enterprising, and entitled)” to describe this contemporary psycholog-
ical self in education and the influence of the “two traditions”. In his
discussion of this book, Sugarman (2015) describes their analysis as
“delineat[ing] two traditions of thought regarding selfhood that emerged
in the latter half of the twentieth century to produce a view of learners”
(p. 177). This distinction into two traditions is useful since it supports a
critical analysis of these discourses of the self and a way to consider the
familiarity of contemporary terminology. Following this approach, we
draw on Martin and McLellan’s (2013) work, together with a discussion
by Sugarman (2015), to provide a summary of these “two traditions” and

their emergence in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 is organised to follow the argument by Martin and McLellan
(2013) and describes the “two traditions” of self that they outline.
Tradition 1 is the “expressive self ” and includes the familiar terms self-
concept and self-esteem. Tradition 2 is the “managerial self” and includes
the familiar terms self-efficacy and self-regulation. Each of the rows is
organised to highlight characteristics that assist in considering how the
conundrum of the self becomes less visible (or perhaps even vanishes) as
a “conundrum” and what becomes familiar is the surety of the psycholo-
gised expressive self and psychologised managerial self. While it is not the
case that there is a static point when the conundrum of the self becomes
less visible, or vanishes, what it is possible to say is when these psycho-
logical discourses of the self in education are at their most convincing,
seem undeniable or “natural”, the horizon surrounding them is unfa-
miliar. In this sense, we can say that there is a relationship or dependency,
one where, through dominance of one form of thought on these, others
become its poorly known horizon.
By drawing attention to “noticeable emergences”, we are not laying
claim to an origin of these forms; but rather are considering possi-
bilities that supported the emergence of these forms of psychological
truths about the self. Martin and McLellan (2013) propose that Eigh-
teenth Century Romanticism (and the legacy of Rousseau) offers such
a possibility for the emergence in discourse of the expressive self. They
also remark on the shifts in dominance of psychological forms in the
mid-twentieth century, noting an increasing dominance of cognitive
psychology and decreases in behaviourism. While this is necessarily a very
brief overview, and only certain aspects have been discussed, the point we
are making is of the shifts and ebbs, how different knowledges of the self
become prominent, while others have diminished in popularity, usage
and even, dare we say, esteem.
For the managerial self, Martin and McLellan (2013) propose,
drawing on work by scholars such as by Danziger (1997) and the case
for the influence of Locke in the seventeenth century. They write:
Table 2.1 “Two Traditions” of psychological self in education adapted from Martin and McLellan (2013) and Sugarman
(2015)
Measurable and Similarities
Technical manipulatable between
Tradition and Noticeable Mechanisms for by educational expressive and
object Emergencies Familiar Features Scientificity psychologists managerial self
Tradition 1 Eighteenth Affirmed Rise of Measurable “Possessed of an
Expressive self Century individual psychometry and cognitive inner core of
Self-concept Romanticism experience, cognitive structures and psychological
Self-esteem 1950s–1960s self-discovery, psychology saw operations capacities,
rejection of self-expression the reduction/ processes, and
behaviourism, diminishing of functions,
intensification humanistic values entirely
of humanistic separated from
psychology others and the
and cognitive world, that can
psychology retreat from
their actions and
experiences to
arrive at
self-knowledge
and
instrumentally
conceive their
expressive ends”
(Sugarman, 2015,
p. 178)
(continued)
2 Making Strange the History of Psychological …
33
Table 2.1 (continued)
34
Measurable and Similarities

Technical manipulatable between
Tradition and Noticeable Mechanisms for by educational expressive and
object Emergencies Familiar Features Scientificity psychologists managerial self
Tradition 2 Locke in “self as an entity 1980s and 1990s Raft of
Managerial self seventeenth separate from “spate of technologies
“self as strategic century its actions and measures, to measure
manager” (Martin & experiences, research, and the
(Martin & McLellan, capable of psychoeduca- management
McLellan, 2013, 2008) monitoring, tional of the self by
p. 54) reflecting on, interventions the self
Self-efficacy, determining and targeting
J. Allan and V. Harwood
self-regulation evaluating its self-efficacy and

own conduct” self-regulation”
(Sugarman, (Sugarman, 2015,
2015, p. 178) p. 178)
Although for Locke the appropriate vantage point for relevant observa-
tions of the consequences of selfhood was both private and introspective,
his emphasis on observation left a powerful legacy for a wide variety
of more contemporary, empirically minded psychologists. (Martin &
McLellan, 2013, p. 25)
Following their argument, we can see here the emergence of facets of

thinking that later have been harnessed in psychology. A second notice-
able emergence flagged in Martin and McLellan’s (2013) work is the
mid-twentieth century rejection of behaviourism. And we would also
add to this argument that as certain forms of the self have become
increasingly dominant, this has occurred at the expense of other forms
of thinking about the self. We return to another quote from Martin and
McLellan (2013) which brings this discussion of the influences together:
With Rousseau and the Romantics, all of the prepsychological ingre-

dients are in place for a new psychological view of selfhood that is
related to objective truth and science on the one hand (the Lockean
legacy) and to subjective authenticity and artistic creativity on the other
(the Rousseauian legacy). The former tradition of selfhood values and
privileges methods of objective self-monitoring and rational considera-
tion. The latter tradition of selfhood values and privileges methods of
subjective experience and affective expression. (pp. 28–29)
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say, taking our line of critique,

that what is useful in this discussion is how it draws attention to the way
these influences have been harnessed in what we take now as the familiar
notion of the self in education.
The next column in the table, what we have termed “familiar features,”
prompts us to consider what is familiar about each of these tradi-
tions of the self. What we can find familiar in the first, the “expressive
self ”, are features such as affirmed individual experience, self-discovery
and self-expression. What is strikingly familiar in the second tradition,
what Martin and McLellan (2013) call the managerial self, is a self
with the charge to look over itself. As Sugarman explains, this is the
“self as an entity separate from its actions and experiences, capable of
monitoring, reflecting on, determining and evaluating its own conduct”
Another random document with
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Antonio (flanken, al Sebastiano).
Hodiaŭ ni, vespere, tion faros;
Ĉar ili tiam estos lacigitaj
Per siaj marŝoj tie ĉi kaj tie,
Kaj ili ne singardaj povos esti,
Dormante tiel . . .
Sebastiano (flanken, al Antonio).
Bone, . . . jes, . . . vespere.
(Solena kaj stranga muziko aŭdata).
Alonzo.
Ho, kia belsoneco! kareguloj, aŭdu!
(Venas Prospero, nevidebla, supre—Venas multaj strangegaj
formoj kiuj alportas nutraĵon kaj festenilaron: ili dancas ĉirkaŭe
kun ĝentilaj salutoj, invitas la Reĝon k.t.p. por manĝi, kaj tiam ili
foriras).
Gonzalo.
Mirinde dolĉa sonas la muziko!
Alonzo.
Ĉielo gardanĝelojn al ni donu!
Strangegaj tiaj formoj kiaj estas?
Sebastiano.
Ridinda estas viva petolaĵo:
Nun kredos mi pri la unukornuloj,
Ke Arabujo naskas tronan arbon,
Sidejon de l’ Fenikso; ke la birdo
Nun reĝas tie.
Antonio.
Certe, mi mem kredos
Eĉ ion ajn,—se vi ne kredos ĉion—
Al mi do diru kion vi bonvolos,
Mi ĵuros ĝin kredinda—Ĉar neniam
Vojaĝemul’ mensogis—kvankam, dome,
Idiotuloj ridas.
Gonzalo.
Se mi dirus
En Neapolo ke ĉi tie loĝas
Kreitoj tiel formaj kiel tiuj,—
(Ĉar certe ili estas insulanoj)—
Kaj, kvankam monstroformaj, ilin notu:
Ilia ĝentileco eĉ superas
La nian, kaj aliajn.
Prospero (flanken).
Honestulo,
La veron diris vi: pli ol diabloj
Malbonaj kelkaj inter vi nun estas.
Alonzo.
Je tio mi ne povas tro miregi:
Esprimas formoj, gestoj, sonoj ĉion
(Parolon kvankam ili ne posedas)
Bonege, kion ili volas.
Prospero (flanken).
Laŭdo,
La malaperon sekvas.
(La strangaj formoj malaperas).
Francisko.
Stranga sveno!
Sebastiano.
Ne grave estas: ili nutron lasis,
Kaj ni malsatas. Kiu volas manĝi?
Alonzo.
Neniam mi.
Gonzalo.
Ne timu, nobla Reĝo.
Ĉu en knabtempo kredis ni, ke homoj
Ekzistas bovlaringon posedantaj
Kun viandpoŝ’ pendanta, aŭ aliaj
Kun kapo en la brusto? Nun, ni vidas,
Ke ĉiu revenanta rakontisto
Al ni la pruvon donos. Do, ne timu.
Alonzo.
Nu! staros mi por manĝi, spite ĉio:
Se por la lasta fojo, ne signifas . . .
Ĉar mi jam la plej bonan tempon perdis . . .
Vi, frato, kaj vi, Duko, nin imitu.
(Fulmotondro. Venas Arielo harpiforma, malfaldas flugilojn kaj
per ili kovras la tablon: la festeno malaperas).
Arielo.
Vi, tri pekuloj estas, kiujn sorto
(La granda reĝo de l’ subluna mondo)
Igis la maron, ĉiam malsategan,
Vin vomi sur ĉi tiun landinsulon;
Vin, inter homoj, plej malindajn vivi!
Vi freneziĝas kaj blindiĝas kiel
Mempendigontoj aŭ memdronigontoj.
(Alonzo, Sebastiano, kaj Antonio eltiras siajn glavojn).
Ho, malsprituloj, mi kaj kunsekvantoj
Ministroj sortaj estas: elementoj,
El kiuj glavojn viajn homo faris,
Pli taŭge laŭtan venton povus vundi,
Mortigi la marakvon per ponardo,
Ol eĉ flugilplumeron—mian blovi!
Kaj estas el ni ĉiu nevundebla.
Eĉ se vi vundi povus, tiuj glavoj
Tro pezaj estas nun por brakoj viaj,
Kaj ne leviĝi volas. Sed memoru—
(Ĉar tio estas mia nunafero)—
Ke vi Prosperon el Milan’ forpelis,
En maro lin lasante, kun filino.
Nun, al vi tri, la maro venĝis ilin.
Se vian hontindaĵon la Povegoj
Prokrastis puni, ne forgesis ili:
Marondojn, teron ili kolerigis,
Ke ĉiu kreitaĵ’ vin kontraŭstaru.
Alonzo, vi, pro tio filon perdis, . . .
Kaj mi malbonon al vi tri anoncas
Ol morta kondamnego pli teruran;
Ĉar paŝo ĝi post paŝo vin renkontos
Sur tiu ĉi dezerta terinsulo:
De l’ venĝo vin nenio povas ŝirmi,
Krom via korĉagreno pro la krimo,
Kaj, de nun, vivo pura.
(Malaperas en fulmotondron; tiam kun dolĉa muziko aŭdata,
denove venas spiritaj formoj, kiuj, moke grimacantaj, dancas
ĉirkaŭe kaj forportas la tablon).
Prospero (flanken).
Ho, mia Arielo, vi bravege
Plenumis vian rolon de harpio,
El l’ instrukci’ forgesis vi nenion;
Eĉ vivaj ŝajnis gnomoj kaj koboldoj,
Fantomoj, kiuj servas min fidele!
Nun, kunligitaj, tiuj malamikoj
Senspritaj staras en la povo mia.
Mi iros tuj—lasante ilin tiel—
La bravan princon Ferdinandon vidi
Kaj ankaŭ de ni du la karulinon. (Foriras supren).
Gonzalo.
En nom’ de io sankta, Reĝo mia,
Vi kial staras tiel mirigita?
Alonzo.
Ho, monstra! monstra estas la apero!
Parolis al mi la teruraj ondoj!
Pri tio la blovado eĉ kantadis . . .
Al mi la tondro, de l’ ĉiel’ orgeno,
La nomon de Prospero elparolis,
Min surdigante per profunda baso,
Kaj kantotem’ nur mia krimo estis!
En mara ŝlimo, tial, filo kuŝas,
Kaj pli profunde ol sondilo iam
Fundiros mi kun li. (Foriras).
Sebastiano.
De malamikoj
Malkune mi legiojn batalados!
Antonio.
Vin helpi mi tuj iros!
(Foriras Sebastiano kaj Antonio).
Gonzalo.
Frenezuloj!
Ilia kulp’, veneno malrapida,
Post longe mordas kaj turmentas ilin.
Vi, kiuj povas kuri, mi petegas,
Junuloj, sekvu ilin kaj malhelpu
Malbonon ian kiun eble farus,
Triope, koleruloj.
Adriano.
Kun mi venu! (Ĉiuj foriras).
Akto IV.
Sceno 1.—Antaŭ la ĉambreto de Prospero.
(Venas Prospero, Ferdinando, kaj Mirando).
Prospero.
Se tro severe mi kun vi agadis,
Kompenso tuja vin ĝojigos plene,
Ĉar de memvivo mi al vi fadenon
Oferas: ŝi, por kiu mi nur vivas,
Fariĝu via! . . . Sole de patramo
Devenis la punŝajna humilego
Per kiu vi suferis; l’ amon vian
Traprovi mi deziris, kaj, Reĝido,
Vi noble, eĉ fortege submetiĝis
Al laborego. Antaŭ la Ĉielo,
Tre riĉan donon al vi mi certigas,
Ho, Ferdinando! Tial, ne ridetu
Se mi, fiera je filin’ karega,
Prilaŭdas ŝin, ĉar donas mi trezoron,
Donante idon indan je feliĉo
Pli ol mi povus diri.
Ferdinando.
Vin mi dankas
Kaj fidas pli ol ian orakolon!
Prospero.
Donacon mian, vian feliĉecon
Gajnitan brave, de mi nun ricevu:
Mirando’n prenu; sed virgecon ŝian
Ol vian vivon pli respektu, Princo,
Ĝis de l’ edziĝo l’ unueco sankta
El vi du faros unu; ĉar, alie,
Malbono anstataŭus dolĉan pacon
Kaj superegan benon: via lito
Ne konus amon, sed malpacon akran,
Sovaĝan frukton de malpura vivo.
Atendu ĉaste ĝis himenaj lampoj
Vin al l’ altar’ kondukos.
Ferdinando.
Ĉar mi preĝas
Por edza feliĉec’, idaro nobla,
Kaj paca, longa vivo, puran amon
Mi tiel en mi sentas, ke nenio,
Eĉ penso nemalkulpa loĝi povus
En brusto plena je edzin’ anĝela
Karega tiel! La mallum’ ereba
Ne povon por min malvirtigi havus
Kun ŝi apuda. Forte do mi staras:
Nek tento, nek okazo min submetos
Ĝis venos kroni la feliĉon nian
Himena festo.
Prospero.
Bone vi ĵus diris.
Sidiĝu kune, ŝi nun estas via.
(Vokas) Ho! Arielo, agemulo, venu!
(Venas Arielo).
Arielo.
Povestro mia, kion vi deziras?
Prospero.
Vi kaj sekvantoj agis ĵus bonege,
Kaj mi bezonas, por alia servo,
La helpon vian. Iru, alkonduku
Ĉi tien viajn ĉiujn subspiritojn,
(Mi super ili al vi donis povon),
Vigligu ilin, per rapida movo,
Ĉar al ĉi tiuj junaj gefianĉoj
Mi volas fantazion nun prezenti;
Kaj ili ĝin atendas.
Arielo.
Baldaŭ, mastro?
Prospero.
Tuj, nun, en palpebruma daŭro.
Arielo.
Bone!
Antaŭ ol vi venu! diros,
Aŭ dufoje iru! spiros,
Obeante vin, ni iros,
Piedfingre eĉ deiros,
Supreniros, aŭ subiros,
Laŭ ke vi mem ekdeziros. . . .
Ĉu vian amon, mastro, mi akiros?
Prospero.
Spirito kara, certe, aerido!
Ne venu nun, ĝis mi alvokos. . . .
Arielo.
Bone! (Foriras).
Prospero (al Ferdinando).
Ho, Princo, zorgu ĉiam esti vera:
Ne ludu kun la ĉarma via ravo,
Aŭ sanktaj ĵuroj pajlo nur fariĝus
Por bruli en la brusto. Vin detenu,
Aŭ al promesoj diru tuj adiaŭ.
Ferdinando.
Sinjor’, ne timu, ĉar la virga neĝo
Jam koron mian tuŝis, kaj malhejtas
La flamon ĉe l’ hepato.[14]
Prospero.
Prave, bone!
(Alvokas) Nun, venu, Arielo, spiritaron
Ĉi tien alkonduku! Estu viglaj!
Nenian vorton! Nur okulojn! Vidu!
(Dolĉa muziko aŭdata; venas Iriso).
Iriso.
Cereso, venu, ho, belegulino!
Foriru el kamparo kiun kovras
Tritik’, sekal’, horde’, aveno, pizoj,—
El montoj, kie paŝtas sin la ŝafoj,
El la herbejo, kiu donas fojnon,
Brutaran nutron,—Bordoj ornamataj
Per peonioj, verda kunplektaĵo,
Sur kiuj ŝprucis la Aprila spongo,
Por fari ĉastajn kronojn al la nimfoj;—
El stiparbaro kies ombron serĉas
De amantino fraŭlo forpelita;—
El riĉa vinberejo, el marbordo
Malfrukta, ŝtona, kie vi vagadas. . . .
Ĉar, per Iriso, reĝa senditino,
Ĉiela Juno vin alvokas: venu! . . .
Kortegaj pavoj flugas tra l’ aero. . . .
Ĉi tien venu premi la herbejon;
Gracie, baldaŭ la estrin’ mem venos. . . .
Alproksimiĝu! festu la Reĝinon!
(Venas Cereso).
Cereso.
Iris’, saluton, multe-kolorita
De Juno fidelega heroldino!
Flugilo flava via sur la floroj
Dissemas mielgute dolĉan pluvon;
Per ambaŭ finoj de l’ arkaĵo blua
Ĉirkaŭprenante arbajn ebenaĵojn,
Kaj ankaŭ krutan senarbetan randon.
De tero mia skarpo brila, diru,
Tuj diru kial la Reĝino via
Venigis min sur tiun ĉi herbejon?
Iriso.
De amo vera por kontrakton festi,
Kaj ankaŭ por donacojn fari kelkajn
Al karaj geamantoj.
Cereso.
Ĉielarko,
Ĉu sekvas nun Venero kaj Kupido
Reĝinon nian? Diru. De la tempo
En kiu ili kune konspiradis
Por min senigi je filin’ amata,
Veneron kaj Kupidon mi evitas.
Iriso.
Ne timu ŝin renkonti: mi ĵus vidis
Trenatan per kolomboj, tra la nuboj,
La veturilon kie ŝi, kun knabo,
Rapidas nun al Pafos. Vane ili
Ekpensis tie ĉi malbonon fari
Al niaj geedzontoj, kiuj volas
Atendi ĉaste la himenan torĉon:
Marsamistinon venkis gevirtuloj;
Eĉ ŝia vespa filo sagojn rompis,
Kaj ĵuris ke de nun li plu ne pafos,
Sed, simpla knabo, ludos kun paseroj.
Cereso.
Reĝin’ altega, pova Juno venas:
Ŝin konas mi per l’ iro majestega!
(Venas Juno).
Juno.
Fratino malavara, kun mi iru
Por beni tiujn ĉi du noblajn korojn;
Ke ili ambaŭ estu prosperegaj,
Feliĉaj per edzeco kaj idaro!
Juno.
(Kanto).
Honor’, riĉec’, edziĝbeno,
Longa daŭro, idarpleno,
Horoj ĝojaj per alveno
Benu vin, de Juno l’ beno!
Cereso.
Terplenego, sufiĉego
En garbejo kaj grenejo,
Fruktoplena vinberejo,
Arba, planta rikoltego,
Kun printempa ĝoja daŭro,
Benu vin ĝis lasta horo!
De Ceres’ la beno estu:
Ĉe vi ke ne manko restu!
Ferdinando.
Ĉi tio estas vido majestega
Kaj ĉarme rava! Ĉu mi nun eraras
Pensante ke spiritoj estas ĉiuj?
Prospero.
Spiritoj, vere, kiujn povo mia
El propraj regnolimoj ĵus alvokis
Por fantazion al vi doni.
Ferdinando.
Ĉiam
Kun vi, miriga patro, kaj Mirando,
Mi vivu en ĉi tiu Paradizo!
(Juno kaj Cereso mallaŭte kunparoladas kaj sendas Irison
for).
Prospero.
Karulo, nun, silentu: la diinoj
Kunparoladas grave, do, atentu,
Muteme vidu, aŭ la ĉarmo svenos.
(Iriso revenas).
Iriso.
Najadoj, nimfoj de river’ vagista,
Kun junkaj kronoj kaj mieno ĉasta,
Forlasu akvan la kuŝujon vian;
Alkuru sur ĉi tiun verdan lokon.
Obeu Junon, kiu vin alvokas;
Rapidu, dolĉaj nimfoj, kaj nin helpu
L’ unuon de du koroj por ĝojigi.
(Venas akvonimfoj).
Vi, rikoltistoj lacaj per somero,
Ĉi tien venu, el la garba kampo,
Kun pajlĉapelo ĉiu kapvestita,
Por gaje danci nimfan manon prenu,
Kaj kune saltu en vilaĝa rondo.
(Venas Rikoltistoj konforme vestitaj; ili alligiĝas kun la nimfoj en
ĉarma danco, ĉe l’ fino de kiu Prospero ektremas subite kaj
severe parolas, kiam ĉiuj, meze de stranga, mallaŭta kaj
malorda bruo, peze malaperas).
Prospero (flanken).
Ha! mi forgesis pri l’ konspir’ infera
De besta Kaliban’ kaj kunkrimuloj
Por min mortigi: preskaŭ la minuto
Tuj venos. (Laŭte al la spiritoj) Bone! Ĉiuj nun disiĝu!
Ferdinando.
Pasie kiel via patro agas!
Mirando.
Neniam antaŭ tiel li koleris.
Prospero.
Vi, filo, ŝajnas al mi konsternita:
Nu, estu gaja. Nia magiludo
Nun ĉesas. La spiritoj ĝin farintaj
Aer’ maldensa tute refariĝis . . .
Kaj, kiel tia malfortika revo,
Eĉ turoj nubkronataj, eĉ palacoj,
Solenaj la sanktejoj, ja, terglobo
Kaj ĝia tutenhavo malaperos . . .
Simile al ludsceno nesubstanca,
Ne lasos ili strekon.—Nur sonĝaĵoj
Ni estas, kaj mallongan vivon nian
Ĉirkaŭas dormo.—Princo, nun, mi sentas
Interne ĉagreniĝon: min pardonu;
Kompaton pro la mia maljuneco
Mi petas, ĝis klariĝos mia cerbo.—
Pri la okazo ne maltrankviliĝu:
Se plaĉos al vi, iru en ĉambreton.
Ripozu tie. Paŝoj kelkaj donos
Al mi sentecon.
Ferdinando kaj Mirando.
Paco kun vi estu! (Ili foriras).
Prospero.
Kun penso venu, Arielo, dankon! (Venas Arielo).
Arielo.
De penskunul’ vi mastro, kion volas?
Prospero.
Spirit’, kontraŭbatali Kalibanon
Ni devas tuj. Preparu!
Arielo.
Mastro mia,
Cereson kiam ĵus mi personigis,
Tre volis mi al vi pri tio diri,
Sed tim’ je vin ofendi min haltigis.
Prospero.
Rediru kie vi kanajlojn lasis.
Arielo.
Jam, kiel mi ekdiris, la drinkuloj
Kuraĝe bataladis kun l’ aero,
Ĉar ĝi sur ilin kompreneble blovas,
Kaj, ĉar la tero kisas la piedojn,
Severe ili frapis ĝin—Neniam
Forgesis ili tamen la konspiron—
Mi tiam tambureton ludis, kiam
Ŝajnante ĉevalidoj neselitaj,
Orelojn ili streĉis, palpebrumis,
Flarantajn al muziko levis nazojn.
Mi ĉarmis ilin tiel, ke, bovide,
Forsekvis ili blekimiton mian
Tra dornstiparoj, kaj kreskaĵoj pikaj,
Tibiojn kiuj ŝire difektegis:
Kaj, mastro, fine, ilin mi forlasis
En marĉa, ŝlimpleniĝa starakvejo—
Ĝis la menton’ trempiĝas la drinkuloj
Malpuraj—
Prospero.
Brave, bone, mia birdo!
En groton mian iru nevidebla,
Alportu brilajn senvalorajn vestojn
Kaj falsan juvelaron por, ĉi tie,
Ŝtelistojn ruze kapti.
Arielo.
Tuj mi iras. (Foriras).
Prospero (Sola).
Diablo li naskiĝis, laŭ deveno,
Instruo monstron ne refari povas.
Humane volis mi lin ekbonigi,
Sed vane, ĉar kreskigas lin la jaroj,
En korpo kaj animo, pli malbelan.—
Mi tiel punos tiujn tri kanajlojn
Ke ili blekos!
(Ekvidante Arielon, kiu revenas portante brilŝajnan vestaĵon,
k.t.p.).
Ĉio ŝnure pendu!
(Prospero kaj Arielo restas nevideblaj).
(Venas Kalibano, Stefano, kaj Trinkulo, tute malsekaj).
Kalibano.
Mi petas, dolĉe paŝu, ke ne aŭdu
Eĉ blinda talpo, ĉar ni proksimiĝas
Al lia grotĉambreto.
Stefano.
Monstro, via feino, laŭ via diro, kiu estas tiel senkulpa, verŝajne agis
fripone kun ni.
Trinkulo.
Monstro, mi tute flaras malpuraĵon, kaj mia nazo tre indignas je tio.
Stefano.
Mia simile sentas sin. Ĉu vi aŭdas, monstro? Se okazos ke vi min
malkontentigos, gardu vin, ĉar. . . .
Trinkulo.
Vi tiam estos pereinta monstro.
Kalibano.
Sinjor’, daŭrigu vidi min favore;
Trankvila restu, ĉar premio via
La malfeliĉon mokos. Do, mallaŭte
Parolu. Ĉio, tie ĉi, silentas
Al noktomez’ simile.
Trinkulo.
En ŝlimejo
Botelojn niajn perdis ni hontege.
Stefano.
Tio estas ne nur malhonora kaj malbonfama, sed ankaŭ senlima
perdo.
Trinkulo.
Estas por mi pli grave ol la malsekaĵo. Pro ĝi, tamen, monstro, ni
devas danki vian naivan feinon!
Stefano.
Tuj mi iros serĉi mian botelon, eĉ se tio kostos al mi superorelan
subŝmiriĝon.
Kalibano.
Mi petas, Reĝo mia, kvietiĝu.
Ĉu vi ne vidas tie l’ enirejon
Al la grotĉambro! Nun, silente iru
Por tiun bonan malbonaĵon fari,
Per kiu via estos la insulo,
Kaj Kaliban’ al vi piedlekanto.
Stefano.
Donu al mi la manon. Mi eksentas en mi sangavidajn pensojn.
Trinkulo.
Ho, Reĝo Stefano! Nobelo, inda Stefano! Rigardu, kia vestejo tie
estas por vi!
Kalibano.
Ne tuŝu la ĉifonojn, malsaĝulo!
Trinkulo.
Ho, ho! monstro, ni bone konas tion, el kiu konsistas ĉifonejo. Ho,
Reĝo Stefano!
Stefano.
Trinkulo, tiun robon tuj demetu:
Per mia mano, nur mi ĝin posedos.
Trinkulo.
Ĝin havos l’ insulestra Via Moŝto.
Kalibano.
Azen’, ke akvoŝvelo vin dronigu
Mirantan je l’ falsaĵo! Kun mi venu.
Tuj ni mortigu lin. Se li vekiĝos,
De piedfingro ĝis krani’ je pinĉoj
Li turmentege kovros niajn haŭtojn,
Kaj igos nin hundbleki.
Stefano.
Ho, silentu,
Silentu, monstro. Ĉu la ŝnurlinio
Ĉi tiun jakon por mi ne intencas?
Ĝin tuj mi prenos, ĉar ĝi certe taŭgas.
Trinkulo.
Pravege, ŝnurlinie, nivelile!
Stefano.
Dankon al vi pro tia ŝerco: jen estas vesto pro ĝi: spriteco ne estos
senpremia dum mi staros reĝo de tiu ĉi lando. Ŝnurlinie, nivelile
ŝteli, estas bonega spritludo; jen estas alia vesto pro ĝi.
Trinkulo.
Venu, monstro, metu iom da gluo sur viajn fingrojn kaj forportu la
ceterajn.
Kalibano.
Ne tuŝos ilin mi; ni tempon perdos;
Li bernikligos aŭ nin simiigos
Kun fruntoj bestaj, tre malsupreniĝaj.
Stefano.
Monstro, uzu viajn fingrojn: helpu nin por ke ni tion forportu tien, kie
kuŝas mia barelo da vino, aŭ alie mi tuj forpelos vin el mia
reĝlando. Vigle! portu tion ĉi.
Trinkulo.
Kaj ĉi tion.
Stefano.
Jes, kaj tion ĉi.
(Ĉasa bruego aŭdata. Alvenas diversaj hundformaj Spiritoj kiuj
dispelas ilin ĉirkaŭe, incitataj de Prospero kaj Arielo).
Prospero (laŭte).
He! Monto, he!
Arielo (laŭte).
Arĝento! tien ĝi kuras, Arĝento!
Prospero.
Furio, Furio! tien! Tirano, tien! aŭdu, aŭdu!
(Kalibano, Stefano, kaj Trinkulo estas forpelitaj).
Al miaj koboldetoj tuj ordonu
Ke de l’ ŝtelistoj pinĉu ili haŭton,
L’ artikoj kaj la muskolaron premu
Per teruregaj streĉoj; ke makuloj
Tramarku ilin kiel leopardojn,
Aŭ eĉ sovaĝajn katojn.
Arielo.
Aŭdu blekojn!
Prospero.
Malŝpare ilin for de ĉie pelu.
En la nunhoro malamikoj miaj
Sin sentas tute sub la mia povo:
Finiĝos por mi laboregoj baldaŭ;
Spirito, vi tuj havos liberecon—
Dum nur mallonge sekvu kaj min servu.
(Foriras).

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On the Self: Discourses of Mental

Health and Education Julie Allan

24 Self-Help Books for Mental Health Headway

Headcase: LGBTQ Writers & Artists on Mental Health and

Mental Health in Prisons: Critical Perspectives on

The Balanced Brain: The Science of Mental Health Nord

Voices in the History of Madness: Personal and

The Politics Of Authenticity And Populist Discourses:

The Dao of Madness: Mental Illness and Self-Cultivation

Mental Health Disorders Sourcebook Angela Williams

The Language of Mental Health

Cover credit: Richard Nixon/Alamy Stock Photo

Valerie Harwood, Anna Hickey-Moody, Sarah O’Shea & Sam

1 Introduction: The Psy-Self 1

Part I Tell Me My Self

Part II Counter-Narratives of the Self

10 A Manifesto for Selfwork 265

Julie Allan and Valerie Harwood are the authors of Psychopathology at

Julie Allan is a Professor of Equity and Inclusion at the University of

Valerie Harwood is a Professor of Sociology and Anthropology of

participation in educational futures. This work involves learning about

Fig. 6.1 Montage of images of Marc-André Leclerc

Table 2.1 “Two Traditions” of psychological self in education

Emerging adults are aware of and somewhat distressed by messaging that

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

themselves and attempt to manage themselves according to the psy-

The Distressed Self

A study by Lee et al. (2018) offered a scientific explanation for stress

University can be a stressful experience, as well as being fun and exciting.

The naming of stress by the very young, with children as young as 9

In and Out of Love with the Self

strand, enabling narcissistic dreams to come true. Although easy credit

To See Ourselves as the “Psy-Experts” See Us

institutions, offering the “promise of personhood” (Rose, 1996, p. 88).

In effect, the entire exercise transforms an important set of metaphys-

not just to control, subdue, discipline, normalize, or reform them, but

religion and politics (Furedi, 2004), addresses problems with individuals’

A Profound Dissatisfaction with the Psy-Self

The Structure of the Book

1. What mode of power is operating (e.g. biopower)?

3. What is the primary target (e.g. lives)?

Chapter 4, Mental disorder in school and the damaged self , expands

a. Who or what was the point of provocation?

1. Determination of the ethical substance: the identification of the part of

Chapter 6, The pleasure(s) of the self, takes up the later part of

The interruption that we offer is discursive, political and hopeful. We

Garland-Thomson, R. (2011). Misfits: A feminist materialist disability concept.

Monbiot, G. (2016, October 12). Neoliberalism is creating loneliness. That’s

Maybe the problem of the self is not to discover what it is in its

Taking up this provocation by Foucault, our approach in this Chapter is

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 23

a rare critical account on educational psychology and self. Indeed, this

What is “evident” then, to respond to this suggestion, is only so when

not lead to a perusal of what is truth, but rather, a deliberate questioning

The Bipolar Technology of Biopower

When you’re in the classroom environment, it’s a reciprocal relationship—

In an example from Canada, a newspaper article about an “art showcase”

power in operation? It seems to us that the relations of power at work

this great bipolar technology—anatomic and biological, individualising

Here Foucault is referring to “two poles of development linked together

This second pole of biopower “dovetails” (Foucault, 2003, p. 242) into

self-efficacy in the face of the accumulating pressures of neoliberal educa-

The Conundrum of the Self —(The Primary