Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence 1St Edition Bevis E Mcneil Full Chapter PDF

Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence 1st
Edition Bevis E. Mcneil

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/nietzsche-and-eternal-recurrence-1st-edition-bevis-e-
mcneil/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
Eternal Bandwagon: The Politics of Presidential

Selection 1st ed. Edition Byron E. Shafer
https://ebookmass.com/product/eternal-bandwagon-the-politics-of-
presidential-selection-1st-ed-edition-byron-e-shafer/
Wrong Way Joanne Mcneil
https://ebookmass.com/product/wrong-way-joanne-mcneil/
Nietzsche as Egoist and Mystic Andrew Milne
https://ebookmass.com/product/nietzsche-as-egoist-and-mystic-
andrew-milne/
Eternal Huntress Whitney Hill
https://ebookmass.com/product/eternal-huntress-whitney-hill/
Biblioteca Nietzsche - 4 LIBROS - Obras Fundamentales:
Reflexiones sobre Moral, Religión y Existencia 1ª
Edition Friedrich Nietzsche
https://ebookmass.com/product/biblioteca-nietzsche-4-libros-
obras-fundamentales-reflexiones-sobre-moral-religion-y-
existencia-1a-edition-friedrich-nietzsche/
Philosophical Perspectives on Suicide: Kant,

Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein 1st ed. 2020
Edition Paolo Stellino
https://ebookmass.com/product/philosophical-perspectives-on-
suicide-kant-schopenhauer-nietzsche-and-wittgenstein-1st-
ed-2020-edition-paolo-stellino/
Barbara Cartland The Eternal Collection: Books 101 -

110 (The Eternal Collection Compilations) Barbara
Cartland
https://ebookmass.com/product/barbara-cartland-the-eternal-
collection-books-101-110-the-eternal-collection-compilations-
barbara-cartland/
Barbara Cartland The Eternal Collection: Books 91 - 100

(The Eternal Collection Compilations) Barbara Cartland
https://ebookmass.com/product/barbara-cartland-the-eternal-
collection-books-91-100-the-eternal-collection-compilations-
barbara-cartland/
Moral Psychology with Nietzsche Brian Leiter
https://ebookmass.com/product/moral-psychology-with-nietzsche-
brian-leiter/
Nietzsche and
Eternal Recurrence
Bevis E. McNeil
Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence
Bevis E. McNeil
Nietzsche and Eternal

Recurrence
Bevis E. McNeil
Leeds School of Social Sciences
Leeds Beckett University
Leeds, UK
ISBN 978-3-030-55295-4 ISBN 978-3-030-55296-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55296-1
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.
Cover illustration: Winter landscape, Lake Sils, Sils Maria, Engadine, Switzerland © Olaf
Protze / Alamy Stock Photo
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
For young Oscar and Milo
Acknowledgements
My thanks to Brendan George, Lauriane Piette, Vanipriya Manohar and

Lakshmi Radhakrishnan at Palgrave Macmillan for their support and guid-
ance throughout the process of writing and publishing this book.
I would like to express my deep gratitude and thanks to Professor David
E. Cooper, for his tireless support, guidance and mentoring over the years.
He has been absolutely inspirational in terms of my research, and our
many philosophical debates have always been a great pleasure.
I would like to thank my parents, Swapna and Charles, for their
unflinching belief in me at all times, and my sister Clovissa, and her family
Paul, Oscar and Milo, for their cheerfulness and constant support.
I am also very grateful to many friends and colleagues for their encour-
agement, support and advice during the writing of this book. I would
especially like to thank Maria de Angelis, Laura Ashbridge, Maresa Bailey
and David Foster, Rebecca Bamford, Kirsty Bennett, Paul Bishop, Tom
Bunce, Kam Chan and Brian Smith, Phil Clegg, Andra and Pete Craig,
Don Crewe, Christine Daigle, Susan Darlington, Mike Dixon, Nigel
Dowker, Gina Drake, Clair Draycott, Anthony Drummond, Eleanor Gill,
Tom Goodwin, Valeria Görög, Sarah Greenhalgh, John Gregson, Emily
Harding, Julie Horwill, Angelika Kaufmann, Ian J. Kidd, Judith Killow,
Paul Kirkland, Gerry Lavery, Simon McDonald, Michael McNeal, Gina
Mills, Katrina Mitcheson, Helen Outhwaite, Mike Peters, Peter Poellner,
Duncan Proctor, Conrad Russell, Stephen Sayers, Melanie Shepherd,
Dominique Sinclair, Robin Small, Karl Spracklen, Kathy Stubbs, Christina
Tan, Waqas Tufail, Neil Washbourne, Alex Weston, Barry Winter and
Mark Wynn.
vii
Contents
1 Nietzsche and the Idea of Eternal Recurrence 1

1.1 Introduction 2
1.2 The Problem of Nihilism 6
1.3 The Eternal Recurrence as the Antidote to the Problem
of Nihilism 19
1.4 The Eternal Recurrence as an Imaginative Thought
Experiment in The Gay Science 24
1.5 The Eternal Recurrence as a Cosmological Hypothesis
in the Nachlass 30
1.6 Eternal Recurrence and Ancient Greek Philosophy 33
1.7 The Eternal Recurrence in Opposition to the Linear
Christian Timeline 35
1.8 The Eternal Recurrence as a Poetic Metaphor in Thus
Spoke Zarathustra 39
1.9 Overcoming the Spirit of Revenge in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 42
1.10 Conclusion 48
2 Nietzsche’s Cosmology of Eternal Recurrence 51

2.1 Introduction 52
2.2 The Cosmology of Eternal Recurrence in Opposition to the
Linear Christian Timeline 56
2.3 Criticisms of Nietzsche’s Cosmology of Eternal Recurrence 59
2.3.1 Introduction 59
ix
x CONTENTS
2.3.2 Simmel on the Incoherency of Nietzsche’s Cosmology

of Eternal Recurrence 67
2.3.3 In Defence of Recurrence-Awareness 72
2.3.4 Evidence for the Reality of Eternal Recurrence in
The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra 75
2.3.5 The Transformative Significance of Eternal
Recurrence and the Problems of Recurrence
Fatalism and Indifference to the Doctrine 86
2.4 Nietzsche, Ancient Greek Philosophy and Eternal
Recurrence 99
2.4.1 Introduction 99
2.4.2 The Significance of the Conflagration102
2.4.3 The Three Central Stoic Theses104
2.4.4 Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics106
2.4.5 Cosmologies of Eternal Recurrence,
Thermodynamics and the Conservation
of Energy112
2.5 Conclusion118
3 Heidegger’s Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Philosophy

of Eternal Recurrence123
3.1 Introduction124
3.2 The Genesis and Significance of the Thought of Eternal
Recurrence129
3.3 The First Communication of Eternal Recurrence
in The Gay Science133
3.4 The Tragedy Begins141
3.5 The Second Communication of Eternal Recurrence
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra146
3.6 On the Vision and the Riddle149
3.7 The Convalescent155
3.8 The Eternal Recurrence, the Will to Power and the
Overhuman as Different Expressions of the Same Thought157
3.9 Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Eternal Recurrence as the
Culmination of Western Metaphysics and Nihilism169
3.10 Conclusion176
CONTENTS xi
4 Nietzsche contra Heidegger: On the Importance of

Heraclitean Play for Eternal Recurrence
and the Overhuman179
4.1 Introduction179
4.2 The Reign of the Ascetic Ideal181
4.3 Metaphysics, Christianity and Otherworldliness182
4.4 The Problem of Being187
4.5 Heraclitus, the Cosmology of Eternal Recurrence
and the Metaphor of Play190
4.6 Dionysus and Eternal Recurrence198
4.7 Conclusion201
Bibliography205
Index219
Abbreviations
APP Freeman, K. B. (2008) Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A

Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker (Lexington, Kentucky: Forgotten Books).
ATH Kahn, C. H. (1981) The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. An
edition of the fragments with commentary (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
BGE (BW) Nietzsche, F. (2000) ‘Beyond Good and Evil’ in Basic Writings
of Nietzsche, translated by W. Kaufmann (New York: Modern
library Random House, Inc.).
BT Nietzsche, F. (1967) ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ in The Birth of
Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, translated by W. Kaufmann
(New York: Vintage).
CR Haar, M. (1996) ‘Critical Remarks on the Heideggerian
reading of Nietzsche’, in Macann, C. (ed.) Critical Heidegger
(London: Routledge).
DNZ Loeb, P. S. (2010) The Death of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
EH (BW) Nietzsche, F. (2000) ‘Ecce Homo’ in Basic Writings of
Nietzsche, translated by W. Kaufmann (New York: Modern
library Random House, Inc.).
EH (DL) Nietzsche, F. (2009) Ecce Homo, translated by D. Large
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
EH (WK) Nietzsche, F. (1989) ‘Ecce Homo’ in On the Genealogy of
Morals and Ecce Homo, translated by W. Kaufmann (New York:
Vintage Book).
xiii
xiv ABBREVIATIONS
ER Loeb, P.S. (2013) ‘Eternal Recurrence’ in Gemes, K. and

Richardson, J. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp645–671.
FIN Fink, E. (2003) Nietzsche’s Philosophy (London: Continuum).
GOA Nietzsche, F. (1882–1884) Grossoktavausgabe, edited by
P. Gast, E. Horneffer and A. Horneffer (Leipzig: Nietzsche
Archive).
GS Nietzsche, F. (1974) The Gay Science: with a Prelude in Rhymes
and an Appendix of Songs, translated by W. Kaufmann (New
York: Random House).
HF Robinson, T.M. (1991) Heraclitus. Fragments: a text and
translation with a commentary (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press).
HMP Magnus, B. (1970) Heidegger’s Metahistory of Philosophy: Amor
Fati, Being and Truth (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).
HN Catanu, P. (2010) Heidegger’s Nietzsche. Being and Becoming
(Montreal: 8th House Publishing).
HP Long, A. A. and Sedley, D.N. (1987) The Hellenistic
Philosophers, Volume 1: Translations of the Principal Sources with
Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
HR Ruin, H. (2011) ‘Book Review of The Death of Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra.’ Nietzsche-Studien, 40: 382–393.
IER Loeb, P.S. (2009) ‘Identity and Eternal Recurrence’ in Ansell-
Pearson, K. (ed.) A Companion to Nietzsche (Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell), pp171–188.
INPT Ansell-Pearson, K. (1994) An Introduction to Nietzsche as
Political Thinker. The Perfect Nihilist (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
MOP Derrida, J. (1984) Margins of Philosophy, translated by A. Bass
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
NAP Danto, A. C. (2005) Nietzsche As Philosopher, Expanded
Edition (New York: Columbia University Press).
NEI Magnus, B. (1978) Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative (London:
Indiana University Press).
NER Hatab, L. J. (1978) Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence. The
Redemption of Time and Becoming (Washington: University
Press of America).
NHPC Müller-Lauter, W. (1999) Nietzsche. His Philosophy of
Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy,
translated by D. J. Parent (New York: University of
Illinois Press).
ABBREVIATIONS xv
NII Heidegger, M. (1991) ‘Nietzsche Volume II: The Eternal

Recurrence of the Same’ in Nietzsche, Volumes One and Two,
translated by D. F. Krell (New York: Harper Collins).
NIII Heidegger, M. (1991) ‘Nietzsche Volume III: The Will to
Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics’ in Nietzsche, Volumes
Three and Four, translated by J. Stambaugh, D. F. Krell and
F.A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper Collins).
NQI Schrift, A. D. (1991) Nietzsche and the Question of
Interpretation (Oxon and New York: Routledge).
NR Nietzsche, F. (2006) The Nietzsche Reader, edited by D. Large
and K. Ansell-Pearson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing).
NRV Reginster, B. (1997) ‘Nietzsche on ‘Ressentiment’ and
Valuation.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
57(2): 281–305
NSER Kain, P.J. (1983) ‘Nietzsche, Skepticism and Eternal
Recurrence.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 13, pp365–387.
NTP Clark, M. (1990) Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
OGOM (BW) Nietzsche, F. (2000) ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’ in Basic
Writings of Nietzsche, translated by W. Kaufmann (New York:
Modern library Random House, Inc.).
OGOM (KH) Nietzsche, F. (1989) ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’ in On the
Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, translated by W. Kaufmann
and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books).
PPP Nietzsche, F. (2006) The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, translated by
G. Whitlock (New York: University of Illinois Press).
PTAG Nietzsche, F. (1962) Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,
translated by M. Cowan (Washington: Regnery Publishing Inc)
RHR Loeb, P.S. (2012) Response to Hans Ruin’s Nietzsche-Studien
book review of The Death of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. [Online]
Available from:<https://www.academia.edu/504506/
Response_to_Hans_Ruins_Nietzsche-Studien_review_of_
DNZ> [Accessed 15 October 2019].
ROR Soll, I. (1973) ‘Reflections on Recurrence: A Re-examination of
Nietzsche’s Doctrine, die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen’ in
Solomon, R.C. (ed.) Nietzsche. A Collection of Critical Essays
(New York: Anchor Press/Double day), pp339–342.
SAN Simmel, G. (1991) Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, translated by
H. Loiskandl, D. Weinstein and M. Weinstein (Urbana and
Chicago: University of Illinois Press).
xvi ABBREVIATIONS
SMSB Migotti, M. (1998) ‘Slave Morality, Socrates, and the Bushmen:

A Reading of the First Essay of ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’.’
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 745–779
SWC Long, A. A. (1985) ‘The Stoics on World-Conflagration and
Everlasting Recurrence.’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy 23
(S1): pp13–37.
TAB Small, R. (2010) Time and Becoming in Nietzsche’s Thought.
(London: Continuum International Publishing Group).
TI (DL) Nietzsche, F. (2009) Twilight of the Idols, or, How to philosophize
with a hammer, translated by D. Large (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
TI (PN) Nietzsche, F. (1976) ‘Twilight of the Idols’ in The Portable
Nietzsche, translated by W. Kaufmann (New York:
Penguin Books).
TSZ (GP) Nietzsche, F. (2008) Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by
G. Parkes (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
TSZ (PN) Nietzsche, F. (1976) ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra’ in The Portable
Nietzsche, translated by W. Kaufmann (New York:
Penguin Books).
WINZ Heidegger, M. (1991) ‘Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?’ in
Nietzsche, Volumes One and Two, translated by D. F. Krell (New
York: Harper Collins).
WLN Nietzsche, F. (2003) Writings from the Late Notebooks,
translated by K. Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
WON Heidegger, M. (1977) ‘The Word of Nietzsche: “God is
Dead”’, in. M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology
and Other Essays, translated by W. Lovitt (New York: Harper
and Row).
WTP Nietzsche, F. (1968) The Will to Power, translated by
W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books).
ZH Loeb, P. S. (2011) ‘Zarathustra Hermeneutics’ Journal of
Nietzsche Studies, 41: 94–114.
CHAPTER 1
Nietzsche and the Idea of Eternal Recurrence
This chapter will outline the significance of the idea of eternal recurrence
in relation to the problem of nihilism that has consumed human beings,
following the catastrophic event of the ‘death of God’. Nietzsche advanced
the doctrine of eternal recurrence as a potential antidote to our passive
nihilism which has left us indifferent to all forms of creative, artistic and
intellectual development, as these ‘last humans’. The eternal recurrence
acts as a new centre of gravity, giving our lives new purpose and meaning,
against the meaninglessness of existence, allowing us to create values of
our own which we can live by. This chapter will also analyse three key
interpretations of the idea of eternal recurrence found in Nietzsche’s cor-
pus – as an imaginative thought experiment which tests our affirmation of
our lives; as a cosmological hypothesis of time which opposes the Christian
linear conception of time and which is associated with ancient Greek mod-
els of time; and as a poetic metaphor witnessed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
which encourages us to live ‘in the moment’ and experience the moment
of eternal recurrence, rather than merely conceptualise the idea of eternal
recurrence.
© The Author(s) 2021 1

B. McNeil, Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55296-1_1
2 B. E. MCNEIL
1.1 Introduction
In this book, I would like to give an overview of the eternal recurrence of
the same and its relevance in Nietzsche’s texts, which he presented as
being the pinnacle of his whole philosophy and philosophical outlook.1 I
would also like to investigate and expose the significance of the thought of
the eternal return, explaining its value and importance for us, by looking
at the very meaning and significance that the thought can endow our life
with, as the ‘heaviest thought’, through its creative cultivation and trans-
formation of the individual in their self-realisation as an ‘overhuman’
(Übermensch).
I also want to look at its role as the great counter-ideal to the ascetic
ideal which drives what Nietzsche interprets as a life-denying Christian
morality which is consumed with ressentiment and the spirit of revenge.
The idea of eternal return also acts as an antidote to the insidious indiffer-
ent nihilism which develops out of Christian morality once it can no lon-
ger sustain us. I believe that Nietzsche saw that there was a real need for
this counter-ideal to the ascetic ideal to combat and overcome both our
nihilism (and our hostility to all forms of creative, artistic and intellectual
development which results from this) and our anger and frustration with
our temporal existence.
Another important reason for why I am engaging in an examination of
Nietzsche’s idea of eternal return is because of the wide difference seen
among commentators when establishing the importance or lack of impor-
tance of the eternal return in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Whereas some com-
mentators, such as Ernst Bertram and Peter Poellner, say little about the
idea of eternal return, others, including Bernd Magnus and Martin
Heidegger, put it at the very centre of his thinking. With this book I hope
to arrive at a well-based assessment of the importance of the eternal return
in Nietzsche’s philosophy, taking the lead from Nietzsche himself, who
makes substantial claims about the importance of the idea of eternal return
in his overall vision.
1
I shall use both terms, ‘eternal return’ and ‘eternal recurrence’, interchangeably through-
out this book to represent the same thing. “‘Return’ implies a going back and completion of
a movement [i.e. to turn again]; while ‘recurrence’ implies another occurrence or beginning
of a movement.”, Ansell-Pearson, K. (1994) An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker.
The Perfect Nihilist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p 216, my words in brackets,
hereafter denoted as INPT. ‘the same’ should not be understood in terms of static content
or substance but as a process.
1 NIETZSCHE AND THE IDEA OF ETERNAL RECURRENCE 3
The structure of this book will be as follows:

The first chapter will outline the significance of the idea of eternal
return in relation to the problem of nihilism that has consumed human
beings, now that our Christian moral values, driven by the ascetic ideal,
which once supported us, are no longer able to sustain us ethically and
culturally, and so collapse. Nietzsche advanced the doctrine of eternal
return as a potential antidote to our passive nihilism which has left us
indifferent to all forms of creative, artistic and intellectual development, as
these ‘last humans’. The eternal return acts as a new centre of gravity, giv-
ing our lives new purpose and meaning, against the meaninglessness of
existence, allowing us to create values of our own which we can live by.
This chapter will also analyse three key interpretations of the idea of eter-
nal recurrence found in Nietzsche’s corpus – as an imaginative thought
experiment which tests our affirmation of our lives; as a cosmological
hypothesis of time which opposes the Christian linear conception of time
and which is associated with ancient Greek models of time and attempts to
resurrect their more holistic approach to life; and as a poetic metaphor
witnessed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which encourages us to live ‘in the
moment’ and experience the moment of eternal return, rather than merely
conceptualise the idea of eternal return.
It is important to stress that these three key interpretations of eternal
recurrence are all useful in their own way, as they help to give us a more
rounded and holistic picture of eternal recurrence. They should not, as
some commentators believe, be interpreted as necessarily being in conflict
with each other. It is perfectly possible to hold, for example, that a certain
thought is true and that it can also be deployed in a thought experiment
intended to test people’s attitude to life. The three interpretations are bet-
ter seen as approaches which, in combination, only serve to deepen our
understanding of eternal recurrence.
Chapter 2 will look in more detail at the reasons why Nietzsche fur-
nished a cosmological model of eternal recurrence. It will look at how this
more scientific and hypothetical presentation of eternal recurrence helps
to support and focus our attention on the thought of eternal return and
take it more seriously, as that thought that will enable us to existentially
overcome the complacency of our nihilistic and indifferent disposition. It
also plays the important role of presenting a model of time which is in
opposition to a Christian moral linear timeline, which only devalues our
lives and cultivates a bad and guilty conscience within us.
4 B. E. MCNEIL
In opposition to this, the eternal return allows the human being intrin-
sically to develop themselves and create new values, freeing them from any
ressentiment they may harbour against their past, and facilitating a much
more psychologically healthy outlook on their past, present and future,
including potential creative possibilities that lie ahead. This chapter will
also review contemporary criticisms of Nietzsche’s cosmology of eternal
recurrence, such as the doctrine’s incoherence, that there is no evidence
for its reality, as well as the charges that it is fatalistic and that it generates
indifference. The central role that memory plays, in providing evidence for
the reality of eternal recurrence, will also be analysed in detail.
A fruitful way to fully understand and critically engage with Nietzsche’s
idea of eternal recurrence is by comparing and contrasting it with the
Heraclitean and Stoic views, as well as engage critically with one of the
most influential interpretations of eternal recurrence in the twentieth cen-
tury, that of Martin Heidegger.
Therefore the remainder of this book will engage with these in turn,
starting with the second half of Chap. 2, which will look at the important
influence of Heraclitus’ and in particular the Stoics’ cosmologies on
Nietzsche’s cosmology. It will look at Nietzsche’s interest in the strength
of metaphorical meaning contained within them, and the Stoics’ more
holistic approach to life which he hoped to resurrect. Nietzsche’s cosmol-
ogy also mirrors the Stoics’, in the way their cosmologies represented a
series of models of time supporting the first law of thermodynamics, which
states that energy is conserved in the process of eternal recurrence (of
eternal cosmos formation and destruction by the conflagration).
However, I will show that as well as similarities, there are significant
differences between Nietzsche’s and the Stoics’ cosmologies, since
Nietzsche’s cosmology of eternal recurrence innovates beyond the Stoics’,
by taking the control of our lives out of God’s hands and placing it firmly
into ours. Whereas the Stoics accepted their fate with resignation,
Nietzsche believes that embracing eternal recurrence gives human beings
the power to choose their own fate, perhaps here anticipating the emer-
gence of the overhuman (Übermensch). Through the eternal recurrence,
human beings embrace necessity and love their fate, rather than simply
passively accepting it.
Having analysed the Heraclitean and Stoic views of eternal return in
Chap. 2, Chap. 3 will look at one of the most influential and ground
breaking interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought of eternal return, that of
Martin Heidegger, which will allow us to gain a true understanding of

eternal recurrence and critically engage with it.
Heidegger was one of the first thinkers truly to emphasize that if one
could fully understand and incorporate the thought of eternal return, then
one would have a certain power and control over the past. Only a will to
power, taken to the height of its creative and intellectual capabilities, such
as the overhuman, can wield the thought of eternal return. To affirm the
eternal return is to engage in the highest creative activity possible of the
will to power – to stamp the character of Being on Becoming. Therefore
Heidegger conflates the notions of the will to power, the eternal return
and the overhuman as different expressions of one and the same thought.
The recoining of Becoming as Being, facilitated by the thought of eternal
return, is the creative activity of the supreme will to power, the overhuman.
Heidegger’s other striking claim is that Nietzsche’s philosophy and his
thought of eternal return, although attempting to surmount Platonism
and so nihilism in all its forms, actually ends up representing the comple-
tion of metaphysics, taking nihilism to its peak, by becoming entrenched
in the very Platonism it is trying to overcome. Nietzsche’s philosophy,
following all nihilistic philosophies before his in the history of thought,
focuses on the power of beings, rather than the question of Being, which
makes his position deeply nihilistic. Therefore the eternal return, seen as
the completion of metaphysics, submits the world to human evaluation
and judgement, in order to give permanence to becoming and the process
of becoming. For Heidegger, such an anthropocentric perspective cannot
be anything other than nihilistic, since it transforms Being into value, ter-
minating any further inquiry into the question of Being.
Chapter 4 will develop my central argument more fully, which is that in
order to live a fulfilling life, free from the spirit of revenge and ressenti-
ment, one needs to embrace both the ‘playfulness’ of eternal recurrence
and the Dionysian ecstasy which accompanies this. It does this by first
giving an extensive critique of Heidegger’s position and his interpretation
of Nietzsche’s philosophy of eternal return, as well as emphasising that
Heidegger ignores the Heraclitean sense of play evident in the cosmologi-
cal model of eternal return, and how this can help develop a more playful
attitude towards our lives and creative projects. Furthermore, Heidegger
generally ignores the more creative and life-affirming Dionysian aspects of
the thought, and ultimately undermines the significance of Dionysus,
arguing that the Dionysian impulse is merely a sensual realm of Platonism
that reinforces and supports Nietzsche’s philosophical position as a
6 B. E. MCNEIL
supremely metaphysical one. He does not realise that for Nietzsche, play
is the highest form of creative activity (which includes our thinking), so
that the eternal return, as the thought of thoughts, once incorporated,
enables truly creative activity beyond the limitations of metaphysical think-
ing. Consequently the question of Being is simply no longer germane to
Nietzsche’s thinking.
I will now look at the idea of the eternal return’s relation to asceticism
and nihilism, and how Nietzsche interprets it as an antidote to them.
Following this, I will analyse three key presentations of the eternal return.
The first will look at the idea of eternal return when presented as an imagi-
native thought experiment, which enables someone who is psychologically
strong enough to incorporate the thought into themselves to endow their
life with new meaning and direction, against the meaninglessness of their
previously nihilistic existence. The second presentation will look at the
importance of eternal return as a cosmological truth and description of the
universe, and how this gives credibility to the idea as well as providing a
circular conception of time in opposition to the linear Christian timeline.
I will also look at the influence of Heraclitus’ and the Stoics’ cosmologies
on Nietzsche’s. The third presentation will look at the idea when pre-
sented as a poetic metaphor, which urges us to ‘live in the moment’ rather
than conceptualise the idea abstractly.
1.2 The Problem of Nihilism

Nietzsche believes that the dominance of Christian morality that has held
human beings in bondage for the last two thousand years can be largely
attributed to the success of the Christian practice of the ascetic ideal, an
instrument originally used by the cunning ascetic priests which brought
about a slave revolt in morals and the revaluation of values which led to
the downfall of the original noble Roman knights around the time of the
fall, corruption and decay of the Roman Empire.
The ascetic priests, reacting against their social and economic circum-
stances, found that they were unable to overthrow the source of their
misery, their oppressors, the Roman knighthood, by physical force or
action. So instead, through applying their advanced intellectual capabili-
ties and skill with dialectical reasoning, they created new values that
devalued and negated the noble knights’ moral values, by revaluing and
inverting them, which ultimately lead to their abnegation.2
However, Nietzsche argues that the ascetic ideal, as the crowning ideal
and basis of Christianity, encourages a form of self-denial which devalues
our individual earthly, sensual life rather than affirming it, depriving it of
its intrinsic value, which makes it very harmful and dangerous for the
human being.3 Nietzsche urges us to realise that although the influence of
the ascetic ideal was absolutely necessary for us to become the complex,
cultured, rational and civilised human beings we are today, it can no lon-
ger sustain us ethically and culturally (for it can now only lead to encour-
aging a deeper and more insidious form of nihilism within us) and that
therefore we are in need of a new ideal.
As Keith Ansell-Pearson notes, “The meaning of the ascetic ideal is,
paradoxically, that humanity has had no meaning apart from this ideal.”4
For Nietzsche, this is the only genuinely enduring ideal that humankind
has created so far. The dominance of the ascetic ideal means that “some-
thing was lacking, that [human beings were] surrounded by a fearful
void”5 and that human beings did not know how to justify and affirm
themselves. The human being could not find an answer to the great ques-
tion of life: ‘why do I suffer?’ It is “thus the meaninglessness of suffering,
2
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche argues that the noble knights’ moral evaluative
axes of Good and Bad were eventually superseded by the Christian moral evaluative axes of
Good and Evil. The ascetic priests reinterpreted the noble knights’ Good values as Evil (val-
ues such as self-affirmation, pride, spontaneity and impulsiveness which were seen as Good
by the knights were reinterpreted as Evil by the ascetic priests) and the knights’ Bad values
were reinterpreted by the ascetic priests as the Christian Good values but given different
names (so for example the knights’ Bad value of a protracted desire for revenge became the
priests’ Good value of justice and the knights’ Bad value of indecisiveness became the priests’
Good value of prudence). See Migotti, M. (1998) ‘Slave Morality, Socrates, and the
Bushmen: A Reading of the First Essay of ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’.’ Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 745–779, hereafter denoted as SMSB and Reginster,
B. (1997) ‘Nietzsche on ‘Ressentiment’ and Valuation.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 57(2): 281–305, hereafter denoted as NRV.
3
See INPT, p141 and Clark, M. (1990) Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), p272, hereafter denoted as NTP.
4
INPT, p141, my emphasis.
5
Nietzsche, F. (2000) ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’ in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans-
lated by W. Kaufmann (New York: Modern library Random House, Inc.), Essay III, p598,
my words in brackets, hereafter denoted as OGOM (BW)
8 B. E. MCNEIL
[and] not the fact of suffering [itself], which accounts for the misery [that
human beings have] experienced [through their] history.”6
Ansell-Pearson notes that “Christian morality has had the effect of pre-
serving the human will in the face of a suicidal nihilism experienced at the
time of the decay and corruption of the Roman Empire…[and that this]
leads Nietzsche to recognising the paradoxical fact that the ascetic ideal of
Christianity represented an artifice in the service of the preservation of
life”,7 acting as an antidote to nihilism:
The ascetic ideal [arose] out of the protective instincts of…[the] reactive
will to power [of the ascetic priest].8
The will to power, insofar as it characterizes beings like ourselves, is

Nietzsche’s psychological hypothesis for an instinctive striving for the
optimum of favourable conditions in which an agent can expend all of her
or his strength and achieve her or his “maximal feeling of power.”9 The
will to power is therefore one’s most basic and fundamental instinct for
growth and development, which involves the cultivation of one’s creative,
artistic and intellectual capabilities:
The capacity to create (fashion, fabricate, invent) is their fundamental capac-

ity. This creative element of every organic being…is the will to power.10
All values, Nietzsche explains, are creations of the will to power, and
our intellect and feelings “are dependent on our valuations, [since] these
correspond to our drives and the conditions of their existence. Our drives
can be reduced to the will to power. The will to power is the final fact to
which we descend.”11 The will to power is essentially the ‘will to will’. This
will, therefore, does not strive for some external goal to accomplish: rather,
the agent strives for self-development, self-control, command and power
INPT, p141, my words in brackets.

6

7
8
INPT, p141, my words in brackets, my emphasis.
9
Nietzsche, F. (1989) ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’ in On the Genealogy of Morals and
Ecce Homo, translated by W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Book),
Essay III, p107, hereafter denoted as OGOM (KH).
10
Nietzsche, F. (2003) Writings from the Late Notebooks, translated by K. Sturge
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 34 [247], pp14–15, hereafter denoted as WLN.
11
WLN, 40 [61], pp46–47, my word in brackets.
over itself, through cultivating an overall perspective or disposition for

itself. The very nature of the will to power is to embrace a ceaseless, unre-
lenting overcoming and empowerment of itself.
The concept of the will to power allows Nietzsche to reconceptualise
what we understand by the self, which is no longer interpreted as a static
unity having a pre-given permanence of being, but rather is seen as a fluid
complex of drives, impulses, instincts and affects, which can continually
self-perpetuate itself through its creative activity.
Therefore the deeply paradoxical life of the ascetic priest and the role
they played was absolutely necessary to prevent this suicidal nihilism and
to give meaning to our lives and our suffering – for the preservation of
human beings as such.
Nietzsche argues that Christianity saved the will from suicidal nihilism
by helping human beings to find life worth living, because it gave them
something to will, a goal to hope for and work towards in the form of a
disguised negation of this life, such as the promise of the chance to go to
Heaven in the ‘next life’. However, this was done only in a self-destructive
and ascetic way which ultimately devalued the significance of the autono-
mous individual and their creative capacity (depriving life of its intrinsic
value), leaving them consumed with ressentiment and cultivating a bad,
guilty conscience.12
Admittedly, two thousand years ago, Christianity gave human beings’
lives and their suffering meaning (by making it redemptive) and so saved
the will from a kind of suicidal nihilism. Ansell-Pearson notes that
12
It is Nietzschean ressentiment, and not simply the notion of resentment, which explains
the origin of our present-day morality. According to Nietzsche, the ascetic priests in their
oppression by the knights felt shame, self-contempt and ressentiment, rather than simply
indignation and moral resentment. Their defeat and powerlessness at the hands of the
knighthood caused them shame since their fundamental aspiration included enjoying the
political supremacy achieved by their victors. Whereas resentment appears to presuppose the
condemnation of its object and constitutes a reaction of disapproval to its occurrence, res-
sentiment rests on an implicit endorsement of the very values of those towards whom it is
directed (i.e. the Roman knighthood), ultimately driven by the priests’ craving for that
power, rather than by any sort of righteous indignation. Ressentiment has the associated
effect of vengefulness as a natural reaction to failure of those who expect success. Although
the ascetic priesthood could not overthrow the knighthood directly through actions, in their
revenge, the priesthood aimed to restore their challenged superiority through revaluing and
inverting the knighthood’s set of values (rather than just look to the punishment of a deed
of which they disapproved or resented). For detailed analyses of ressentiment, see NRV,
pp281–305 and SMSB, pp745–779.
10 B. E. MCNEIL
“Through its explanation of the meaning [and purpose] of Christ’s exam-

ple, including his [sacrifice] on the Cross, Christianity succeeded in giving
a [genuine] meaning to suffering. The crucifixion shows that suffering can
be redemptive and that death is not the end.”13
As Nietzsche observes, Christian morality acted as the “great antidote
against practical and theoretical nihilism”,14 but only “in a way that [ulti-
mately] deprived life of intrinsic value, that accorded it value only as a
means to its own negation.”15
This involved the actual historical event of the triumph of Christianity
and Christian morality in the late Roman Empire which led to a profound
and gradual change of consciousness, values and attitudes around the first
to third centuries culminating with the conversion of the Emperor
Constantine to Christianity.
However, Nietzsche is deeply concerned with the advent of nihilism,
which follows in the wake of the “death of God.”16 By this expression,
Nietzsche intends to indicate not only the erosion of religious belief – “the
belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable”17 – but that of a
whole traditional metaphysical-moral structure on which we built up our
understanding of the world and our existence, which gave it a meaning
and a purpose:
The belief in the absolute immorality of nature, in aim- and meaningless-

ness, is the psychologically necessary affect once the belief in God and an
essentially moral order becomes untenable. Nihilism appears… because one
has come to mistrust any “meaning” in suffering, indeed in existence. One
interpretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation
it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything
were in vain.18
With the realisation that ‘God is dead’, those values that we once held
in high regard are no longer able to support us and have lost their worth
13
14
Nietzsche, F. (1968) The Will to Power, translated by W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage
Books), p10, hereafter denoted as WTP.
15
NTP, p272, my word in brackets, my emphasis.
16
Nietzsche, F. (1974) The Gay Science: with a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of
Songs, translated by W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House), see aphorism 125,
pp181–182, hereafter denoted as GS.
17
GS 343, p279.
18
WTP 55, p35, my emphasis.
and weighty significance. As a result of this, the whole of European moral-

ity collapses in the absence of otherworldly, religious or metaphysical
grounding and sanctioning and also cannot be defended by reference to
any such set of beliefs, and is consequently abandoned, since such morality
was “built upon this faith [in a Christian God], propped up by it [and had]
grown into it”.19 Christian morality, which once stood with its faith in
God, now falls with it.20 Now any attempt “to get along with a moralism
without religious background” or without comparable metaphysical
underpinnings, is an exercise in futility, which “necessarily leads to
nihilism”.21
In other words, with the disbelief in the absolute truth of God and the
collapse of one’s foundational metaphysical values, also comes the collapse
of one’s everyday moral values and truths which were secured and guaran-
teed by one’s metaphysical values and truths. This leads to the catastrophic
event of the ‘death of God’, of human beings being overwhelmed by a
crippling nihilism. This entails a movement from the extreme philosophi-
cal, religious and moral overvaluation of human beings and their values
(which posits them as the mark, meaning and measure of life and the value
of things), towards an extreme undervaluation of human beings – where
nihilism represents not just a disbelief in God, but also a disbelief in any-
thing at all – where we have become lost to ourselves and have no values
or truths and no motivation to discover any new truths or values:
The greatest recent event – that “God is dead”, that the belief in the
Christian god has become unbelievable – is already beginning to cast its first
shadows over Europe…how much must collapse now that this faith has
been undermined because it was built upon this faith, propped up by it,
grown into it; for example, the whole of our European morality.22
Nietzsche emphasises that although “It was [originally Christian]

morality that protected life against despair and the leap into nothing [i.e.
nihilism]”, the arrival of this deeper and more insidious form of nihilism
signals that Christianity is now no longer able to provide civilisation with
19
GS 343, p279, my words in brackets.
20
See Nietzsche, F. (1976) ‘Twilight of the Idols’ in The Portable Nietzsche, translated by
W. Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books), p516, hereafter denoted as TI (PN).
21
WTP 19, p16.
22
GS 343, p279.
12 B. E. MCNEIL
the cultural and ethical foundations of its existence.23 Unfortunately this

now leaves us without a centre of gravity or sense of direction, which can
only lead to greater nihilism:
The time has come when we have to pay for having been Christians for two
thousand years: we are losing the centre of gravity by virtue of which we
lived; we are lost for a while. Abruptly we plunge into the opposite [nihilis-
tic] valuations, with all the energy that such an extreme [Christian] over-
valuation of [humanity] has generated in [us].24
The Christian overvaluation of the human being has encouraged them

to continually try to impose an order and structure upon an unordered,
chaotic and senseless universe so as to create and preserve their sense of
dignity and importance and give them a basis for significance in the world
itself. It gives them something objective to submit to and helps them to
find a meaning in themselves, where their entire mode of thinking is based
on the assumption that there exists a ‘true’, rational, orderly, permanent
or benign universe for them.
Nietzsche argues that the hyperbolic naiveté of human beings and their
need to find order and security in the world and the resulting Christian
overvaluation of themselves, where they have posited themselves as the
meaning and measure of the value of things, has necessarily led to this sud-
den nihilistic rebound, upon the realisation that these values were sup-
ported by the lie or fiction of God. Therefore such nihilism is necessary
and is bound to occur once we realise that we were basing our values on a
lie (and that therefore these values are lies).
Nietzsche sees this nihilism as the gravest of dangers, as a necessary and
inevitable consequence of our intellectual and historical development after
Christian morality can no longer support us. Instead of saving the will
from suicidal nihilism, Christianity and its values (driven by the ascetic
ideal) now actually encourage nihilism – “the great nausea, the will to
nothingness” which Nietzsche claims “was bound to grow out of…the
hitherto reigning [ascetic] ideal”.25 Nietzsche sees the arrival of this
deeper, insidious and more harmful nihilism as an inevitable consequence
23
WTP 55, p36, my words in brackets.
24
WTP 30, p20, my word in brackets.
25
OGOM (BW), Essay II, p532, my word in square brackets.
of our faith in God and a Christian morality which finds its basis in the
ascetic ideal.
Nietzsche also identifies that one of the main ways that such nihilism
develops is into what he calls a scientific will to truth, as the purest form of
the will to nothingness. The will to truth, as he uses the expression, pur-
sues and values ‘truth’ at any cost, as a transformation of the Christian
conscience into a scientific conscience, and as the latest manifestation of
the ascetic ideal. It is Christian morality itself, its concept of ‘truthfulness’,
and its pursuit for intellectual and moral cleanliness, which ultimately leads
to its own downfall. In its pursuit of the truth, it finds the absolute truth
of God lacking.
However, Nietzsche is even more concerned by the fact that when
human beings’ highest values simply no longer exist, having lost all of
their meaning and so no longer exerting any influence on them, they pas-
sively and unreflectively accept this. This insidious form of nihilism which
Nietzsche sees as being perhaps the most dangerous of all and which he
wants to counteract and overcome, is that of the passive nihilists who
exhibit cheerfulness on hearing of the ‘death of God’. Nietzsche calls
these passive nihilists the ‘last humans’.
These ‘last humans’ are the chief focus and concern of ‘Zarathustra’s
Prologue’ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In this, Nietzsche warns that the
deterioration of the human being will be so great upon the realisation that
‘God is dead’, that further achievement and progress for human beings
will become virtually impossible, and that therefore there will be a level-
ling off of the human being’s potential for creative and intellectual activity
and a creative stasis as a result of this.
Nietzsche recognises that we have all become these last humans, includ-
ing himself. As these last humans, we have become intellectually and cul-
turally impoverished human beings, who interpret any uniqueness or
difference as madness, which must be levelled out:
For the earth has become small, and upon it hops the [narrow-minded] last
human, who makes everything small26…No shepherd and one herd!
Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different
goes voluntarily into a madhouse.27
26
Nietzsche, F. (2008) Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by G. Parkes (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), p16, my words in brackets, hereafter denoted as TSZ (GP).
27
Nietzsche, F. (1976) ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra’ in The Portable Nietzsche, translated by
W. Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books), p130, hereafter denoted as TSZ (PN).
14 B. E. MCNEIL
Being firmly under the grip of such nihilism means that these last
humans have a thoroughly disillusioned conception of a world, which is
hostile to human aspiration, not because they or anything other than them
have goals of their own, but because such a nihilistic disposition is utterly
indifferent to what anyone might either believe or hope. Therefore this
form of insidious passive nihilism is anaesthetic, afflicting its victims with-
out their really being aware of it. These last humans cannot own up to the
responsibility of giving their lives a new direction or a new centre of
gravity.
Nietzsche interprets the last human as someone who is happy to pas-
sively go about her or his life and is resigned to doing nothing, not attempt-
ing to create new values by which they can live by. They only take the
world as they find it and do not challenge or question it, believing that the
nature of human beings cannot be changed and consequently they lead an
unreflective life without depth.
On hearing of the catastrophic event of the ‘death of God’ and the
destruction of the world as they know it, the last humans exhibit cheerful-
ness, and are indifferent to bettering their nihilistic disposition. This out-
look is expressed in the following section from The Gay Science:
Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning
hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: “I seek God! I seek
God!” – As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around
just then, he provoked much laughter.
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes.
“Whither is God?” he cried; “I will tell you. We have killed him – you and
I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this?…God is dead. God
remains dead. And we have killed him.28
However, Zarathustra believes like the ‘madman’ in aphorism 125 of

The Gay Science, that we must own up to responsibility of killing God and
living on without his guidance and not just become passively nihilistic, but
seek and pursue a new meaning and purpose in life. Therefore such nihil-
ism which is passively acquiesced in the will must be exposed for what it
really is.
28
GS 125, p181.
Nietzsche wants us, as these last humans, to realise that this nihilism is
the form of life which we now lead and have become, and that we must
also look to overcome such nihilism.
Importantly, Nietzsche observes that nihilism means “that the highest
[Christian] values devaluate themselves”.29 Such nihilism is a necessary
consequence, historically and psychologically, if not logically, of “the reali-
sation that the overall character of existence may not be interpreted by
means of the concept of “aim”, the concept of “unity” or the concept of
“truth”…which we used to project some value into the world.”30 These
categories have proved inapplicable and so, Nietzsche says, to those mak-
ing this discovery, “the world looks valueless.”31
With the advent of such nihilism, the highest traditional values, reason,
God, the absolute, the moral law – even truth itself – are devalued and
cease to hold sway in philosophy or over the individual. They no longer
inform or sustain us culturally or ethically. Thus Nietzsche speaks of nihil-
ism as a “rebound from “God is truth” to the fanatical faith “All is false.””32
Nietzsche blames this rebound on the fact that hitherto “we’ve measured
the value of the world according to categories [of reason] that refer to a
purely fictitious world”33 and therefore our hitherto “faith in [these] cate-
gories of reason is the cause of nihilism.”34 So although Nietzsche rejects
the Christian values which had informed and sustained European culture,
which are now untenable and have become bankrupt, he also regards the
imminent prospect of a nihilistic rebound from them, which would halt
with a radical and total devaluation of human existence, as a most dismay-
ing and equally if not more harmful and misguided outlook on life. Such
a descent into nihilism is catastrophic.
However, Nietzsche recognises that the advent of nihilism, in whatever
form is may take, “represents [only] a pathological transitional stage
[where]…what is pathological is the tremendous generalisation, the infer-
ence that there is no meaning at all.”35 The world must be considered
valueless and meaningless if value and meaning are conceived along the
lines they traditionally have been.
29
WTP 2, p9, my word in brackets.
30
WTP 12A, p13.
31
WTP 12A, p13.
32
WTP 1, p7.
33
WTP 12B, p13, my words in brackets.
34
WTP 12B, p13, my word in brackets.
35
16 B. E. MCNEIL
The world may be meaningless chaos in relation to those ideals or stan-

dards of value and order associated with the sort of traditional world-
interpretation which he considers to have been discredited – for the world
no longer constitutes this kind of meaningful cosmos of ascetic priests –
but Nietzsche stresses that this does not mean we should embrace such
indifferent passive nihilism.
Therefore, although humanity has a sense of impending catastrophe, it
also has an intimation and anticipation of new dawns, new suns and being
set adrift on new seas, to create new values.
Nietzsche realises that the end of the Christian-moral interpretation of
the world offers the possibility of another beginning – that of the emer-
gence of a new experimental and creative philosophy of highly-cultivated
‘free spirits’ and creators of new values, and the possibility of the emer-
gence of our creatively and intellectually cultivated overhuman capabili-
ties. Nietzsche uses the term overhuman (Übermensch), to describe
someone who overcomes the usual human limitations, by developing their
creative, artistic and intellectual capabilities beyond them to their peak.
Nietzsche warns that such development can be fraught with danger and
challenges:
The human is a rope, fastened between beast and Overhuman – a rope over
an abyss. ‘A dangerous across, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking
back, a dangerous shuddering and standing still…‘What is great in the
human is that it is a bridge and not a goal.36
With his presentation of the doctrine of eternal return, Nietzsche is

showing us that such a transformative thought, and our philosophical task
of incorporating this burden into ourselves, as a new centre of gravity,
represents the moment where we stand, as human beings, in the middle of
our journey between animal and overhuman. This moment anticipates our
immanent development out of and beyond our current passively nihilistic
state of existence towards the overhuman. Nietzsche believes we should
celebrate this as our highest hope, for it is the bridge to a new beginning.
The overhuman represents Nietzsche’s vision of the ideal of the super
abundant, healthy human type who is the “most Yes-saying of all spir-
its…[in which]…all opposites are blended into a new unity. The highest
and the lowest of energies of human nature, what is sweetest, most
36
TSZ (GP), p13.
frivolous, and most terrible wells forth from one fount with immortal
assurance.”37 The overhuman is Nietzsche’s immanent ideal of self-
development and fulfilment, beyond the nihilistic indifference of the
last humans.
My interpretation of the overhuman rests on the central idea of how,
through wielding the eternal return, they embrace the necessity of adver-
sity as a natural part of life. This in turn propels the overhuman forward in
the development of their creative, artistic and intellectual capabilities.
However, it is only right to point out that there are many other interpreta-
tions of this ideal by important scholars which the reader should consult.38
The overhuman is that will to power which is capable, in its multifari-
ousness, of holding a maximal number of contradictory and antipodal
drives and impulses within themselves and is able to maintain control
over them:
The highest [human being] would have the greatest multiplicity of drives, in
the relatively greatest strength that can be endured. Indeed, where the plant
37
EH (WK), p305, my words in brackets.
38
For example, more favourable interpretations include Gilles Deleuze’s, who argues that
the overhuman is the most supreme and dynamic player in the ‘game of chance’ who,
through wielding eternal recurrence as a selective thought of difference and diversity, affirms
chance as necessity, and in doing so affirms only the return of active and creative forces, while
denying and expelling all reactive and nihilistic forces (Deleuze, G. (2008) Nietzsche and
Philosophy, translated by H. Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press)). Similarly
for Bernd Magnus, the ideal of the overhuman expresses effortless self-mastery, self-over-
coming and authenticity, through the expulsion of any nihilistic aspects from within them-
selves (Magnus, B. (1978) Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative (London: Indiana University
Press) pp32–38, hereafter denoted as NEI). Wolfgang Müller-Lauter takes the middle
ground by emphasising the unresolvable ambiguity of the presentation of the overhuman in
Nietzsche’s texts, as either the powerful and destructive active nihilist or the creative and
synthesising sage (Müller-Lauter, W. (1999) Nietzsche. His Philosophy of Contradictions and
the Contradictions of His Philosophy, translated by D. J. Parent (New York: University of
Illinois Press), pp72–121, hereafter denoted as NHPC). Less favourable interpretations
include Karl Jaspers’, who proffers that the overhuman ideal is simply a substitute for God,
acting as an object of faith which gives our lives meaning and purpose by providing us with
something to hope for (Jaspers, K. (1997) Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding
of His Philosophical Activity, translated by C. F. Wallraff and F. J. Schmitz (Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press), pp167–168).
Maudemarie Clark goes further still, by arguing that the ideal of the overhuman merely
represents another thinly-veiled ascetic ideal which devalues life by encouraging revenge
against life and those perceived as the cause of suffering, such as the ascetic priesthood (NTP,
pp270–277).
18 B. E. MCNEIL
[“human” shows itself] strongest one finds instincts that conflict power-
fully…but are controlled.39
Therefore the ideal of the overhuman is one of intrinsic self-

development, of harnessing one’s creative, artistic and intellectual capa-
bilities, and not a simplistic egotistical assertion of one’s superiority over
others. The overhuman, as an ever-present possibility of the human being
and as “the [new] meaning of their existence”, establishes that person’s
life as something to be enriched and affirmed, through their highest affir-
mation of life in coherence with the thought of the eternal return.40
Therefore we must, in willing the eternal return, will the return of
everything good and bad, every joy and woe, every height and abyss, since
each and every moment is intrinsic and necessary to who we are and who
we are to become. We must accept the necessity of the return of adversity
(i.e. nihilism), if we are to grasp the very meaning and significance that the
thought of the eternal return endows life with, in its heavy weightiness.
The eternal recurrence can only cohere with the overhuman’s most
intensive and expansive yes to everything that is and was. Therefore, as
Müller-Lauter observes, “the overhuman and the desire for eternal recur-
rence belong together as the most extreme expressions of Nietzsche’s
philosophical thinking.”41
Through the eternal return, the overhuman is able to creatively re-will
and reimagine the existence which hitherto they had regarded as unre-
deemable.42 In doing so, they are able to reclaim their personal past, which
had previously weighed down on them as a guilt-inducing burden and
caused great suffering, and make peace with it. Therefore the eternal
return, by exposing to the overhuman an affirmative attitude towards life,
frees them from their rage and revenge against time, by enabling them to
accept both their past and their present life as it is, and look forward to
their future creative possibilities.
In other words, although the past itself is not literally transformed or
altered in the experience of the eternal return, the overhuman’s psycho-
logical attitude towards that past is. Importantly, the eternal return, when
wielded by that will to power who is an overhuman, who is at the peak of
39
40
TSZ (PN), p132, my word in brackets.
41
NHPC, p89.
42
This will be analysed in greater detail in Sect. 1.9.
their creative and intellectual capabilities, enables them to have a certain

power and control over the past, and so transforms their attitude to it, as
well as their present and future creative possibilities, for the better.43
Therefore Nietzsche believes that “when we hear the news that “the
old god is dead””, and having banished the long philosophical shadow of
our old Christian faith and recovered from the nihilistic rebound initially
attending its renunciation, then it is “as if a new dawn shone on us; our
heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation.”44
In the ‘new dawn’ which thus breaks, “at long last the horizon appears
free to us again…at long last our ships may venture out again…[where] all
the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea,
lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an “open sea.””45
1.3 The Eternal Recurrence as the Antidote

to the Problem of Nihilism
Therefore Nietzsche proposed the doctrine of eternal recurrence to act

both as an antidote to the ever-looming danger of nihilism (in its many
forms) and as a new centre of gravity, believing it would lead to both the
overcoming of any remnants of our Christian morality which still survive
and the self-overcoming of our deeper and more insidious nihilism which
emerges from Christianity once it can no longer support us.
In this way, Nietzsche also presents the eternal recurrence as the great
counter-ideal to the life and self-denying ascetic ideal which once sup-
ported Christian morality, but which now drives us to the ruinous passive
nihilism of indifference of the ‘last humans’, who are indifferent to the
creation of new existential values and who see all creative and intellectual
activity as being a futile exercise.
43
It is worth noting that, as we shall see in Chap. 3, Heidegger provides a slightly different
interpretation of what the overhuman means (when compared to the standard interpretation
of a small cluster of individuals with this unique disposition). Heidegger argues that although
the individual is the site of the thought of eternal return’s development and may believe they
have uniquely become overhuman as a result of this, ultimately, the eternal return, wielded
by such a will to power, signals the transformation of humanity of a whole, beyond its passive
nihilism, towards an overhumanity. For Heidegger, the thought of eternal return represents
a turn in world history which leads to the transformation of humankind into an
overhumanity.
44
GS 343, p280.
45
GS 343, p280, my word in brackets.
20 B. E. MCNEIL
The doctrine of eternal return enables the individual holistically to

affirm and embrace all the joys and woes of their life in relation to time,
and in doing so affirm a new positive rather than negative and nihilistically
indifferent understanding of their existence in relation to time. This allows
them to maximise their creative, artistic and intellectual capabilities, free
from asceticism.
Nietzsche declares that he himself is “the last disciple of the philoso-
pher Dionysus [and] the teacher of the eternal recurrence.”46 Nietzsche
believes that the doctrine of eternal return of the same, which affirms all
aspects of life, is the only genuine alternative to either the Christian view
that the world has or can have a goal, purpose or final state, or the crip-
pling nihilistic view that everything is valueless and meaningless. Therefore
Nietzsche heralds life affirmation, through the eternal return, as the only
alternative to passive nihilism after the ‘death of God’. Nietzsche believes
that such a life-affirming attitude is “the highest state a philosopher can
attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence, [and to desire] the
eternal circulation”.47
When Nietzsche refers to the Dionysian, he is alluding to an ancient
Greek art-impulse, which he analyses particularly in The Birth of Tragedy
and Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks.48 In order to understand it
fully, it is important to contrast it with the Apollonian art-impulse. The
Apollonian and Dionysian art-impulses are the driving artistic forces of
nature, leading to an opposition between “the [Apollonian] art of sculp-
ture, and the non-imagistic, Dionysian art of music”.49 The physiological
phenomena analogous to Apollo are dreams; and to Dionysus, intoxica-
tion and frenzy.
Whereas Apollo is the god of higher civilisation, self-restraint and indi-
viduation, Dionysus is a god of nature and natural fertility – associated
with wine and ‘uncivilised’, orgiastic worship. These art-impulses are con-
stantly in contest with each other, until eventually they form a harmonious
union in the art form of Attic Tragedy:
46
TI (PN), p563, my word in brackets.
47
48
See Nietzsche, F. (1967) ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ in The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of
Wagner, translated by W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage), hereafter denoted as BT, and
Nietzsche, F. (1962) Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, translated by M. Cowan
(Washington: Regnery Publishing Inc), hereafter denoted as PTAG.
49
BT, p33, my word in brackets.
Under the charm of the Dionysian not only is the union between [human
and human] reaffirmed, but nature which has become alienated, hostile, or
subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with…[the human
being] …as one with [them], as if the veil of māyā had been torn aside and
were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primor-
dial unity.50
This affirmation of the Dionysian art-impulse can be linked to

Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal return, as it encourages us to affirm all
aspects of life, as well as the perishability of humankind for the emergence
of the overhuman. Nietzsche interprets the tragic disposition of the over-
human in Dionysian terms, as it represents a return to the naturalness,
earthiness, and sensuousness of existence. The overhuman, through their
creative activity, exhibits all of the innocence and seriousness of the child,
as one who embraces the Dionysian flux of creation and destruction.
Similarly, there are cosmological connotations, as Heraclitus’ metaphor
of play and of everything in the universe as being in flux, which greatly
inspired Nietzsche’s cosmology, can be linked to the Dionysian impulse of
chaos and revelry, and also the Dionysian acknowledgement of life and
destruction, which opens us to profound suffering and supreme joy.51
Therefore rather than simply resigning ourselves to our nihilistic exis-
tence, Nietzsche believes we must seek out new values:
the advent of nihilism [has] become necessary…Because the values we have

had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; because nihilism represents
the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals – because we
must experience nihilism before we can find out what value these [old] “val-
ues” really had [and before we]…require [and can arrive at], sometime,
new values.52
The genesis of the thought of eternal recurrence can be traced to an

event that occurred in early August 1881, in Sils-Maria, during Nietzsche’s
first summer in the Upper Engadine region of Switzerland. Walking along
the shore of Lake Silvaplana, he was struck by an overwhelmingly forceful
50
BT, p37, my words in brackets.
51
The important metaphor of ‘child’s play’ and its relation to the Heraclitean cosmological
notion of play, will be analysed in greater detail in Chap. 4.
52
WTP Preface, p4, my words in brackets.
22 B. E. MCNEIL
vision of the eternal recurrence of all things. Nietzsche gave the following
sketch of the eternal return:
The new heavy weight: the eternal recurrence of the same. Infinite importance
of our knowing, erring, our habits, ways of living for all that is to come.
What shall we do with the rest of our lives – we who have spent the majority
of our lives in the most profound ignorance? We shall teach the doctrine – it
is the most powerful means of incorporating it in ourselves. Our kind of
blessedness, as teachers of the greatest doctrine.
Early August 1881 in Sils-Maria,
6000 feet above sea level and much higher above all human beings! –53
Nietzsche realised that this thought was the pinnacle of his whole phi-
losophy and greatest achievement of his philosophical outlook, and he
heralded it as the “highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable.”54
The thought of eternal recurrence, when affirmed, interpreted and
incorporated in this way, is inseparable from Nietzsche’s doctrine of amor
fati – which means to love one’s fate, as a piece of fate, and in his autobi-
ography Ecce Homo he further elucidates the thought:
My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants
nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not
merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it – all idealism is menda-
ciousness in the face of what is necessary – but love it.55
Through the doctrine of the eternal return, Nietzsche wants to enable

us to confront and overcome the problem of our nihilism in the wake of
the ‘death of God’ and collapse of this centre of gravity, where unfortu-
nately we would now rather “will nothingness than not will”56 and only
have a “belief in unbelief”.57
53
Nietzsche, F. (2006) The Nietzsche Reader, edited by D. Large and K. Ansell-Pearson
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 11 [141], p238, hereafter denoted as NR.
54
Nietzsche, F. (1989) ‘Ecce Homo’ in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans-
lated by W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Book), Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Section 1, p295,
hereafter denoted as EH (WK).
55
Nietzsche, F. (2000) ‘Ecce Homo’ in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, translated by
W. Kaufmann (New York: Modern library Random House, Inc., Why I Am So Clever, p714,
hereafter denoted as EH (BW).
56
OGOM (KH), Essay III, p97.
57
GS 347, p289.
Through a teaching of the eternal return, as a new centre of gravity, and

as a potential antidote to nihilism and its many forms driven by the ascetic
ideal, such nihilism can be overcome by a psychological strength and cour-
age which overcomes the laziness and lethargy of Christian herd morality,
where now we embrace Nietzsche’s formula for greatness in the human
being, that of amor fati. Nietzsche argues that the doctrine of eternal
recurrence will bring new meaning and significance to our personal lives
by cultivating new life-affirming habits of existence:
My endeavour to oppose decay and increasing weakness of personality. I

sought a new centre…To the paralysing sense of general disintegration and
incompleteness I opposed the eternal recurrence.58
In our epoch of nihilism, the doctrine or idea of eternal recurrence

teaches us that we can no longer rely on our morality, inspired by meta-
physics, to give meaning to our lives, but instead provides the opening for
another new task presented to the human being, that of self-overcoming
ourselves as these last humans (who are deeply nihilistic) and incorporat-
ing the new ideal of the overhuman. The overhuman has developed their
creative, artistic and intellectual capabilities to their optimal peak and
overcome their passive nihilism by embracing the eternal return, as “the
ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being
who has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever
was and is, but who wants to have what was and is repeated in all eternity,
shouting insatiably da capo – not only to [themselves] but to the whole
play and spectacle.”59 In this way the eternal return acts as a bridge from
the human to the overhuman.
Therefore Nietzsche introduces the ideal in the specific historical con-
text of the ‘death of God’ and the devaluation of humanity’s highest val-
ues, and it represents Nietzsche’s preoccupation with this problem of the
further development and cultivation of the human being once the
Christian-moral view of the world has lost its authority.
I shall now look at the three main interpretations of the idea of eternal
recurrence of the same which Nietzsche presents in his texts, firstly when
58
WTP 417, p224.
59
Nietzsche, F. (2000) ‘Beyond Good and Evil’ in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, translated
by W. Kaufmann (New York: Modern library Random House, Inc.), 56, p258, my word in
brackets, hereafter denoted as BGE (BW).
24 B. E. MCNEIL
it is interpreted as an imaginative thought experiment, secondly as a cos-

mological physical model of time and finally as a poetic metaphor in Thus
Spoke Zarathustra.
1.4 The Eternal Recurrence as an Imaginative

Thought Experiment in The Gay Science
The thought of thoughts, the eternal return of the same, is first intro-
duced by Nietzsche towards the conclusion of Book IV of The Gay Science,
in aphorism 341, as the greatest or heaviest weight:
The greatest weight. – What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after
you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: “This life as you now live
it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times
more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and
every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life
will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence – even
this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and
I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and
again, and you with it, speck of dust!”60
The second half of the aphorism looks at potential responses to the

demon’s message:
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the
demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous
moment when you would have answered him: “You are a god and never
have I heard anything more divine.” If this thought gained possession of
you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in
each and every thing, “Do you desire this once more and innumerable times
more?” would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well
disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing
more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?61
In this famous passage, what Nietzsche is asking us is how we would

personally react to the demon’s offer of the eternal return of our lives and
what the psychological and existential consequences of our response would
60
GS 341, pp273–274.
61
GS 341, pp273–274.
be. The demon addresses us in our ‘loneliest loneliness’, a moment when

we are at our most vulnerable and at our lowest ebb, in the hardest time
of our life. He would thus have our full attention as we would be most
open and susceptible to his suggestion, since our critical powers would be
at their most minimal. In fact, this aphorism suggests that we are in a situ-
ation where we show a particular vulnerability to suggestions that we
would normally otherwise dismiss.
How we personally respond to the words of the demon is extremely
significant, since we are being asked if we have the psychological strength
and courage to will and embrace the eternal return of our lives in the high-
est highs as well as the lowest lows, knowing that all things will take place
again and again. The demon is asking us if we are willing and prepared to
desire and “live [this life] once more and innumerable times more” and if
we have the strength (and willingness) to incorporate this profoundest of
truths into ourselves and endure such a thought, and if we are therefore
then able to live our lives according to this ideal – for would we greet the
demon’s offer as a divine blessing or would we gnash our teeth in regret?62
Nietzsche stresses that we must affirm the eternal recurrence of every
moment of our existence, because every interconnected moment is neces-
sary to who we are now, to who we have become and who we are
to become.
The thought of repetition forces attention on the value of all temporal
moments as lived, and our attitude towards our concrete temporal life and
whether or not we can affirm the necessity of every moment as such. In
effect, the demon is asking us if we are able to affirm every aspect of our
lives as making us who we have become and who we will become. Therefore
the doctrine of eternal recurrence is presented here as an imaginative
thought experiment, since it is not saying that our lives actually or literally
do eternally return, but asking us for our response to this if we imagine
that it did (without critical reflection).
This imaginative thought experiment therefore has the practical use of
acting as a test of our capacity for our affirmation of our life in its entirety
and in all its parts, as if it were the case that our lives eternally returned.
Our hypothetical reaction and answer to the demon’s message in apho-
rism 341 of The Gay Science and the question “Do you desire this [life]
once more and innumerable times more?” – if we accepted and responded
to the message and question uncritically – would now reflect our actual
62
GS 341, p273.
26 B. E. MCNEIL
psychological attitude towards ourselves and our lives.63 Therefore the eter-
nal return, as a test of our affirmation of life, eludes any conception of time
we have based on our traditional moral-metaphysical constructs.
It can be seen as a demonic thought, where it is as if we are being pos-
sessed by demonic inspiration. It is a demonic voice which is used to
emphasise the momentous shock and significance and the tremendous
‘moment’ of the thought of thoughts – of eternal recurrence – which is
very disconcerting and unnerving. The voice of the demon is not an
angelic one that consoles us nor a miraculous voice that brings us salva-
tion, but one that continuously challenges and tests us and the validity of
our values. It asks us if we could genuinely affirm every moment of our
lives holistically as necessary to who we are and who we are to become in
the future. Depending on how we respond to the demon’s message, the
thought has the power to either crush or transform us.
If we can welcome and incorporate the thought of the eternal return,
then it has the power to transform us and our psychological outlook on
the past, present and future. If we have the psychological strength to
incorporate and endure the thought, then it will transform us by becom-
ing the heaviest weight and burden (which Nietzsche calls literally ‘the
heavy-weight’ thought) which endows our existence with new meaning
and significance. By empowering us in this way, it gives us a responsibility
towards ourselves and power over ourselves as life-affirming will to powers.
By embracing the thought of eternal return, which acts as a new centre
of gravity, we give our life a new sense of purpose and guidance, as well as
“a precision and clarity of…direction”, replacing that centre of gravity
which Christian morality once provided.64 In this way, the thought of the
eternal return changes the human being who incorporates it into them-
selves and endures it for the better, because by realising that they cannot
have some parts or moments of their life without all of the others, they
positively alter their psychological attitude to their past (overcoming any
ressentiment or vengefulness they may harbour against it) and present, as
well as enhancing their outlook on the future of their temporal life (and
their future creative possibilities) in a positive life-affirming way.
What the doctrine of eternal return teaches us is that “the will must will
the return of one’s life with every pain and every joy, every thought and
every sigh, and everything unutterably small and great all in the same
63
See GS 341, p274, my word in brackets.
64
WTP 46, p29.
succession and sequence [which will therefore include the return of nihil-
ism itself].”65 We must do this, because “everything we have done, and the
manner in which we have done it, is necessary to who we are.”66 Nietzsche
urges that we consider each moment as internally necessary to the texture
making up our life.
The instinctual demonic voice presents to us the thought of the eternal
return, the thought which encapsulates the problem of our nihilism at this
historical point of crisis and the need for new legislation to take us beyond
our nihilism in the wake of the death of God, showing us that we need
legislating from a new point of gravity. Therefore “the doctrine of return
is presented here as the ‘greatest weight’ because it endows our personal
existence with meaning and significance” against the meaninglessness of
nihilism, and marks our capacity to affirm life in whatever way it spontane-
ously unfolds, enabling us to be equal to whatever life throws at us.67 The
incorporation of this profoundest of truths motivates us to create existen-
tial values and habits of our own, not based on any prior metaphysical
values or truths. In other words, it encourages and enables us to create our
own meaning and purpose in our lives.
Therefore, through the incorporation this heavy burden into ourselves,
our willingness imaginatively to relive our life eternally can be seen as a
measure of our affirmation of our life. The thought of the eternal recur-
rence presents the possibility of a return to the naturalness, the sensuous-
ness and earthliness of the self, which does not look for morally redemptive
ideals which bring us salvation from our lives, but rather promotes an
honest affirmation and acknowledgement of our existence in all its parts,
by embracing life as a whole. It acts as a call to our ability to affirm the
world as a necessary self-repetition. The eternal return tests our attitude
towards our life, to see whether it is an affirmation of life where we embrace
the innocence of creative becoming or whether we see our temporal life
and existence as a punishment which entails suffering, based on a negative
and nihilistic conception of time.
Nietzsche considers only two reactions that we may have to the demon’s
question, either one of complete exhilaration of a will to power with a life-
affirming perspective or one of total despair of a will to power with a life-
denying perspective. A joyful reaction, which is clearly the response
65
66
INPT, p112.
67
INPT, p112.
28 B. E. MCNEIL
Nietzsche promotes and wants us to have to the demon’s message, would

indicate a fully affirmative attitude towards one’s (presumably, non-
recurring) life, which reflects the attitude of a psychologically strong and
self-integral human being. By having a joyful reaction to the demon’s mes-
sage, the human being embraces a holistic approach and attitude towards
their life and realises that they cannot have some parts or moments of their
life without all of the others.
In this way they maintain their self-integrity as a more whole human
being by realising that they must accept all of these parts of their life, as
essential to making them who they are and who they are to become, and
must therefore continually self-overcome the worst (and more nihilistic)
parts of themselves if they are to become truly overhuman. In doing so
they are encouraged to develop their artistic, creative and intellectual
capabilities to their peak. It is only the psychologically stronger human
being who can bear the eternal return as the primal affirmation of creative
freedom.
For such a self-disciplined human being, true affirmation of life demands
the recognition of intrinsic structural relations between joy and woe. Since
every moment of our lives is equally important, we must accept the neces-
sity of the most difficult moments as well as the most joyous moments.68
A life-affirming will to power must creatively and actively affirm the eter-
nal return of every aspect of their existence. By affirming the shining
heights of their joyous experiences, with the most painful moments of
their existence full of suffering, a person may direct themselves towards
the creation of truths, knowledge and values of their own which they can
live by.
Alternatively, a gnashing of teeth and a negative answer to the question
“do you desire this [life] once more and innumerable times more?” would
indicate a negative and nihilistic attitude towards one’s life – the answer of
someone psychologically fractured and incomplete, that of a will to power
with a life-denying perspective, such as a Christian self or the passive nihil-
ist (i.e. last human).69 It would be the response of someone who has not
fully understood the import of the thought of the eternal return and its
significant transformative powers (and how it can endow and enrich our
personal lives with meaning and significance). Someone who ultimately
68
A will to power with a life-affirming perspective does not try to blot out any aspect of
their past or resent their past, but acknowledges that they are a development out of that past.
69
GS 341, pp273–274, my word in brackets.
experiences the thought of the eternal return with despair and paralysis, as
a thought which crushes them and weighs down on them intolerably, is
someone without the psychological strength to bear such a tremendous
thought.70 By not wanting to affirm and will the eternal return of our lives,
we fail to rise to the stature of our character and become who we are. We
do not recognise our own power or realise our true nature because we fail
to affirm all aspects of life and embrace the innocence of becoming.
A negative response characterizes someone who sees life as a form of
punishment and a test of their devotion to God, and who interprets the
eternal return as signifying their entrapment within their mortal life with
no guarantee of the possibility of escaping it by reaching Heaven in the
Afterlife. They are stranded in a nihilistic Christian-moral conception of
time, so that they become angry and frustrated about how they are lost in
time and how it plays with them like a child. Ultimately, Nietzsche argues,
they seek to take their revenge on time and temporal life, where they
“drag the past a few steps further through time and never live in the
present”.71 They become fixated with anger towards the past, seeing their
life as a mistake and punishment for their sins. The spirit of revenge has
taken hold of their lives.
They interpret eternal recurrence as the eternal perpetuation of their
deepening suffering and guilt for existing and as perpetuating their bad
and guilty conscience, where there is no redemption or salvation from
their guilt-ridden sinful existence. Worse still, such a negative response to
the demon’s question could also come from someone who has become an
insidious passive nihilist and who possesses a will to nothingness (i.e. a last
human). The passive nihilist only sees the eternal recurrence as a return of
the meaninglessness and valuelessness of the world, having not realised
how the thought can transform them and their psychological outlook on
their lives.
They see the eternal recurrence as the never-ending return of their
nihilism, as the endless repetition and perpetuation of their indifference
and lack of motivation towards any creation of values or meaning in the
world. They see it as an eternal confirmation of all creation, and all attempts
70
In a similar way to how the last human (in ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’ in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra) and the dwarf (in ‘On the Vision and the Riddle’ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra)
envisage only the eternal return of nihilism and a meaningless life and existence.
71
GS 335, p266.
30 B. E. MCNEIL
at being creative, as being futile and ‘in vain’ – as well as signifying an end-
less repetition of their impotence and inability to create values:
Let us think this thought in its most terrible form, existence as it is, without
meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness:
“the eternal recurrence”. This is the most extreme form of nihilism: the noth-
ing (the “meaningless”), eternally!72
By amplifying their feelings of helplessness, and their feelings of the

meaninglessness and valuelessness of the world, the thought of eternal
return can only weigh down on them as an unbearable and unendurable
thought.
The thought for the last human is conceived as the literal repetition of
the meaninglessness of life, so they can only gnash their teeth at experienc-
ing the thought of the eternal return with anguish and despair at the rep-
etition of their wretched existence.
Importantly, it appears that both of these reactions, of joy or despair,
are perfectly relevant and acceptable to the situation that is presented in
aphorism 341 of The Gay Science, without need for reference to the cos-
mological ‘truth’ value of the doctrine. Therefore it certainly appears that
this aphorism advances an interpretation of the recurrence which makes
no appeal whatsoever to the physical structure of the world and to which
the two reactions Nietzsche exclusively envisages are perfectly appropriate.
I now turn to the question of the thought’s cosmological truth.73
1.5 The Eternal Recurrence as a Cosmological

Hypothesis in the Nachlass
Nietzsche also presents his doctrine of the eternal return as a cosmological
hypothesis – as a physical theory of the universe and as the actual infinite
repetition of our lives and the world in every detail. It is important to
establish why Nietzsche furnished an actual cosmology of eternal recur-
rence which could be experienced and identify his possible influences.
72
WTP 55, pp35–36.
73
In Chap. 2, I will explore Paul Loeb’s innovative reinterpretation of The Gay Science 341,
which argues that one can indeed find a cosmological presentation of eternal recurrence
embedded within this aphorism.
We must also ask whether or not Nietzsche genuinely believed that the
eternal recurrence could be a valid cosmology, empirically grounded, and
whether or not he therefore deliberately aimed to furnish a viable proof for
his doctrine of the eternal recurrence, or if instead there were other rea-
sons behind his presentation of a cosmological understanding. For if
Nietzsche did not genuinely embrace the eternal recurrence as an actual,
empirical reality, or even a physical possibility, then we must ask for what
reasons did he pursue it?
The eternal return, interpreted as a cosmological hypothesis of the lit-
eral repetition of our lives, holds that everything that has already hap-
pened in the universe, and everything that is happening at this very
moment, and everything that will happen in the future, has already hap-
pened and will happen again, preceded and followed by exactly the same
events in exactly the same order, an infinite number of times. Each of these
cycles is absolutely identical with every other. In this cosmological inter-
pretation, one sees “the world as a circular movement that has already
repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game in infinitum.”74
This cosmological conception, and Nietzsche’s attempts at furnishing a
scientific proof to support it, presents the image of a continual cycle of
becoming and of a continual flux of forces, change and motion, where
there is no beginning in time nor any final state, which gives us a picture
of a world of forces which never reaches equilibrium and which never rests.
For Nietzsche, such a model of time has its uses, by being in direct
contrast to the Christian linear moral conception of time, which has a defi-
nite beginning and a definite end.75 Nietzsche rejects this linear concep-
tion, arguing that if the world aimed at a final state or goal at all, then
given the infinity of past time, it would already have been reached, but
since no final state has been achieved, none should be inferred.
If the world is to be thought of as eternally recurring, and if this is to
receive evidential support, then it must be through the support of prem-
ises which then entail the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Nietzsche’s
unpublished notebooks, the Nachlass, do in fact contain many references
to the eternal recurrence as a mechanical and physical theory of the world
74
WTP 1066, p549.
75
In relation to this, Nietzsche makes the astute observation that any modern scientific
conception of time is no better than the Christian conception, as the scientific will to truth is
merely the latest and noblest manifestation of the ascetic ideal, as a development out of this
Christian conception.
32 B. E. MCNEIL
and the universe. Here, Nietzsche sought a cosmological proof, a theory

of the nature of the physical universe, by formulating the theoretical pre-
suppositions and consequences of the doctrine, its proof, its probable con-
sequences in case it were true, its role in history and some suggestions as
to how it might be endured.76 He advanced his doctrine of the eternal
return as “the most scientific of all possible hypotheses.”77 Furthermore, in
The Gay Science, we witness Nietzsche urging us to embrace the new phys-
ics of our time if we wish to create new values of our own and “new tables
of what is good”.78 He sees the scientific or mechanical perspective as both
a useful and truthful view of the world.
Indeed, Nietzsche looked for philosophical assurances of his idea of
eternal recurrence in science, believing that through using and appealing
to the science or physics of his time he would be able to establish scientific
confirmation of his discovery of the eternal recurrence, before its public
disclosure to the world. This, he hoped, would appeal to and encourage
the interest of people in academic and scientific circles. Certainly, Nietzsche
made it very clear that he wished to embrace the physics of his time to
increase the general awareness and acknowledgement of his doctrine of
eternal recurrence.
However, there are a number of contemporary criticisms of Nietzsche’s
cosmology of eternal recurrence, spearheaded by Georg Simmel’s ground
breaking and highly influential critique in 1907. I will look at these criti-
cisms in more detail in Chap. 2, and attempt to defend Nietzsche’s doc-
trine against them.
As well as seeing the importance of presenting a scientific hypothesis of
eternal recurrence to provide what he saw as a true description of the uni-
verse, it is also clear that Nietzsche and his cosmology took great inspira-
tion from the ancient Greek cosmologies, particularly those of Heraclitus
and the Stoics. Nietzsche wished to replicate the strength of metaphorical
meaning found in these ancient cosmologies in his own, as well as foster
their more holistic approach to life in us. I now turn briefly to the ancient
Greeks’ inspirational models of recurrence.
76
See INPT, p112.
77
WTP 55, p36.
78
GS 335, pp265–266.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
— Moi aussi.
— Comme ça se trouve ! dis-je ironiquement.
— N’est-ce pas ? appuie Javotte, en échangeant avec moi un
sourire de complicité.
Ceci est encore un petit lien entre nous. En cet instant, elle
m’appartient encore un peu. Tout à l’heure, pour elle, je ne serai plus
rien. Paul a ouvert la porte. Son visage s’est détendu. Il me l’enlève ;
c’est ce qu’il voulait. Pour le reste, ils s’expliqueront. Du premier
coup d’œil, il a compris, deviné que j’étais le danger, l’adversaire. Il
va se défendre. C’est son droit. Ce droit, il vient de l’affirmer sans
paroles d’une façon aussi peu discrète que possible. Je ne puis m’y
tromper. Et moi, où vais-je ? Qu’adviendra-t-il de tout cela ?
Quant à Javotte, au moment de me quitter, elle semble avoir
repris toute son insouciance. Elle se retourne pour me dire :
— Au revoir… A bientôt !
Mais je suis si exigeant que je voudrais quelque chose de plus.
J’entends Paul qui lui dit, en descendant l’escalier :
— Cette pauvre Mme Toledo ! Elle a de si gros bras que,
lorsqu’elle retire ses longs gants noirs, elle a toujours un peu l’air de
retirer ses bas.
Elle rit bruyamment. Elle ne lui tient pas rigueur de sa conduite.
La situation est renversée. C’est lui qui a l’avantage, maintenant, par
le seul fait qu’ils s’en vont ensemble. Espérais-je qu’elle partirait
seule ? N’est-il pas naturel qu’il l’accompagne ? Ne la reconduit-il
pas ainsi chaque fois ? Ils sont camarades, ils sont intimes ; que ne
sont-ils pas ?… Et moi, je serai toujours le même, toujours inquiet…
Je suis venu m’accouder au balcon pour les suivre des yeux. Alors,
Javotte lève la tête. Elle devine que je suis triste, et, pour me
consoler, elle me jette, dans un sourire, un regard chaud comme un
baiser.
XVI
L’ATTENTE
Paul a changé. Maintenant, quand nous nous retrouvons le soir

dans la petite salle à manger, ce n’est plus l’homme heureux qui
dissimule sa joie, qui baisse les paupières, comme on tire un rideau
sur une fête clandestine. S’il marche, il semble nerveux ; s’il
s’assied, il semble prostré. Il prend un journal, le rejette et regarde le
feu. Lui parle-t-on ? il sursaute. Se croit-il seul ? il soupire, et sa
bouche, involontairement détendue, demeure ouverte. Or, ceux qui
vivent la bouche ouverte ne gardent pas longtemps un secret.
Tout à l’heure, après le déjeuner, comme nous étions seuls, il m’a
dit :
— Cette vie-là n’est plus possible ! Voilà quinze jours qu’elle me
fait droguer…
Je le regardais un peu narquois, avec cette pensée : « Ah ! ah ! tu
y viens, mon bonhomme. » Il ajouta :
— Au début, c’était charmant ; nous nous rencontrions chez les
Salaberry, des gens très accueillants, très gentils… nous faisions de
la musique ; puis je suis allé chez elle. Sa mère qui est souffrante, sa
sœur qui est très timide nous laissaient seuls… Alors l’intimité est
venue… Nous nous promenions dans les bois… c’était délicieux…
Elle aime le romanesque ; elle me disait : « Je ne sais pas si je
pourrai vous voir demain. Vous trouverez ce soir, à dix heures, à tant
de pas de telle borne kilométrique, sous une pierre, un billet qui vous
fixera »… Tu vois l’air d’aventure que cela prenait avec l’atmosphère
de ce pays… Un soir, je ne me souvenais plus du nombre de pas,
trois, quatre, ou cinq. Je culbutais tous les cailloux et, troublé par
l’émotion, je ne trouvais rien ; enfin je mis la main sur le précieux
billet… quelle détente !… Un autre jour, je l’attendais embusqué
derrière une haie ; elle ne venait pas… au dernier moment, un pâtre
à cheval, au galop, se montre sur la route, s’arrête à l’endroit précis
où je me trouvais et me passe par-dessus la haie une lettre
changeant l’heure du rendez-vous… Tous les gens du pays sont à
sa dévotion ; sa séduction s’exerce jusque sur eux… Son père, de
son vivant, faisait beaucoup de bien ; son oncle est curé
d’Espelette… Si c’est à lui qu’elle se confesse, il doit en savoir plus
que moi sur son compte, car, pour ma part, je suis aussi perplexe
qu’au premier jour… Je ne comprends rien du tout à cette fille…
J’ai fait un effort pour lui demander :
— Es-tu son amant ?
— Tu es fou ! Ah ! tu ne la connais pas ! C’est un être
insaisissable, c’est l’instant, le caprice, la flamme au vent… C’est
bien pour cela que j’y tiens, d’ailleurs… Ce qui est effrayant en elle,
c’est que tout le monde lui plaît ; nul ne la rebute ; elle n’a
d’antipathie pour personne ; il n’est pas d’hommage qui lui paraisse
négligeable ; en tout être, elle voit quelqu’un à conquérir… Que se
passe-t-il depuis quinze jours dans ce cerveau ? Quel but poursuit-
elle ? Je l’ignore. J’attends une lettre, je ne reçois rien. Je vais chez
elle, elle n’y est pas. Si je la rencontre chez les autres, il y a toujours
du monde : si je veux la reconduire, elle se dérobe, prétextant qu’on
nous a déjà trop remarqués ensemble. Est-ce qu’elle vient ici
quelquefois, quand je n’y suis pas ?
— Quelquefois, oui.
— Tu as de la chance.
J’ai souffert de ne pouvoir lui répondre avec la même franchise,
de ne pouvoir m’ouvrir à lui. C’est une des conséquences les plus
pénibles de cet état de choses que la confiance, l’abandon ne
puissent plus exister de moi à Paul. Quand il est parti, j’y songe et je
m’interroge. Maintenant qu’il a parlé, je me sens enfermé dans un air
plus épais, plus équivoque. Je ne puis plus ignorer ces promenades
sentimentales, ce commencement d’idylle interrompue seulement le
jour où Javotte a jeté les yeux sur moi. La situation me paraît être
celle-ci : Paul a choisi Javotte et Javotte m’a choisi.
Alors, pendant que les scrupules m’assiègent, pendant que je me
débats de nouveau entre l’amour et l’amitié, de petits faits que je
croyais avoir oubliés ressuscitent dans ma mémoire ; des souvenirs
viennent à mon secours qui veulent apaiser ma conscience. Lui-
même, Paul, fut-il toujours pour moi un ami sans reproche ? Un soir
récent que je me sentais mal, les bonnes étant couchées, je m’étais
levé pour appeler ma mère. Il pouvait être onze heures. Dans le
couloir, la porte de Paul restée ouverte laissait passer un rayon de
clarté. Assis à sa table, il lisait ou écrivait des lettres selon son
habitude. Je revins me mettre au lit ; mais ma mère ne m’ayant pas
entendu, au bout d’un instant je dus me relever pour l’appeler de
nouveau. Cette fois, dans le couloir, le rayon de clarté avait disparu :
Paul, craignant qu’on le dérangeât, avait fermé sa porte et éteint sa
lumière.
J’ai de son égoïsme vingt témoignages de ce genre. Mais ce qui
me surprend, ce n’est pas qu’ils soient si nombreux, c’est que je les
accueille. N’avais-je pas décidé que tout cela était effacé ? Hélas !
nos pardons ne sont jamais définitifs, nos griefs ne sont jamais
morts. On peut les enfouir au plus profond de soi-même, les oublier,
ils sont toujours là ; ils n’attendent pour reprendre vie que l’occasion,
comme ces graines qui dorment des années au sein même de la
terre et que le plus léger choc suffit à éveiller.
Il est presque trois heures. Javotte ne va pas tarder. « Est-ce que
je pourrais passer un seul jour sans vous voir ! » m’a-t-elle dit hier en
me quittant. En effet, elle vient presque chaque jour. Elle a conquis
ma mère par ses prévenances, par son empressement à lui être
agréable. Quand elle se rend à Bayonne, elle ne manque jamais de
venir prendre ses commissions. Et si ma mère pense que, tout de
même, ses visites sont un peu trop fréquentes, elle n’ose pas le dire.
Pour moi, je ne reconnais plus mes heures unies, monotones,
toutes pareilles. Elle a changé la vue et l’impression que j’ai de
l’existence quotidienne. Je regarde ma journée comme une région
pleine d’embûches au milieu de laquelle il y a un moment éclatant.
Dès que je m’éveille, je pense à ce point lumineux dont la pendule
me rapproche et m’éloigne tour à tour et selon que ce point est
devant moi ou derrière moi, je suis animé par l’espoir ou le regret.
Rien d’autre. Je ne commence à vivre que lorsqu’elle est là. Elle
arrive, et toutes les parties de mon être plongées dans l’ombre
s’éclairent subitement ; alors, le temps ne met jamais assez de
lenteur à me séparer d’elle, et je voudrais, de mes mains, retenir
chaque seconde qui, à peine éclose, à peine le présent, est déjà le
passé.
Mais si je l’attends, ces mêmes secondes si brèves, si fuyantes,
l’attente qui les allonge et retarde leur course m’en fait une charge,
un fardeau. En regardant le cadran, à chaque instant, je me réjouis
qu’un fragment de la journée soit aboli, et telle est mon impatience
insensée que le temps alors ne travaille jamais assez vite à détruire
ma vie.
Il est trois heures : elle devrait être là. Mais elle vient quelquefois
plus tard. Elle ne m’a pas fixé d’heure. Je préfère qu’elle ne me fixe
pas d’heure parce que, l’heure dépassée, je ne vivrais plus. Dans un
instant elle sera là. Pourquoi suis-je inquiet ? Pour quelle raison ? Je
ne sais pas… Je suis inquiet.
Ah ! elle n’est pas de celles qu’on attend paisiblement, assis dans
un jardin, en traçant du bout de la canne son nom sur le sable !
Attendre, quelle insoutenable angoisse pour un malade ! On se dit :
« Soyons calme, soyons calme », et le cœur bat si fort qu’on en peut
suivre à travers les vêtements les palpitations désordonnées ; on a
les mains moites et froides, la gorge serrée, les tempes brûlantes ;
on s’efforce de penser à autre chose, de ne pas penser du tout ; on
se dit : « Comptons : un, deux, trois, quatre », on se donne mille
raisons d’être raisonnable et on s’affole.
Pourtant, quelle journée mieux que celle-ci conviendrait à
l’attente ? Il y a une telle patience dans l’air ! La vie est comme
suspendue. Rien ne bouge. Le soleil s’efface dans un ciel tout voilé
de mélancolie : il en tombe sur le paysage une lumière un peu
sourde, qui berce et qui endort les sens. Le long de la route éteinte,
un char à bœufs, des gens, quelque rare voiture passent dans une
atmosphère ouatée, qui amortit, étouffe les sons, comme on étouffe
la sonorité d’un cristal en le touchant de la main. Journée sans
timbre où tant de puissances poétiques sont retenues captives par
chaque bruit qui se tait ; journée monotone et vaporeuse où les
formes immobiles et comme irréelles semblent vues à travers un
songe, dont le mystérieux silence tient à la fois du silence de la lune,
du silence de la neige, journée si douce, si morne, si enveloppante
et si bien faite, avec sa pénombre de chapelle et son gris de
Toussaint, pour envahir d’un sentiment fataliste une âme que se
partagent le désir et la mort.
Il est quatre heures. Le chat dort sur le fauteuil près de la fenêtre.
Parfois il se réveille, ouvre sur moi des yeux glauques où mincit la
prunelle et qui appartiennent encore au sommeil ; il se hausse sur
ses pattes, fait le pont, le dos bombé, bâille et se recouche en rond.
Il est cinq heures. Elle ne viendra pas. Je me répète ironiquement
cette phrase : « Est-ce que je pourrais passer un seul jour sans vous
voir ? » Elle ne viendra pas. Alors, quand l’espoir vous quitte, on sent
tout son être se rétrécir ; on a perdu toute importance, toute
confiance en soi ; on est une chose à chaque seconde plus réduite,
plus négligeable, plus humiliée.
Il est six heures. Sur une branche, près de la fenêtre, un rouge-
gorge chante parce que le soir est doux et que le printemps vient. La
nuit se fait peu à peu. Voici Paul qui rentre.
— Comment, pas de lumière ! s’écrie-t-il. Il fait noir ici comme
dans un four ! Comment vas-tu ? Moi, ça va mieux.
Il est gai. Ma voix tremble un peu pour lui demander :
— Tu l’as vue ?
— J’ai passé tout l’après-midi chez elle. J’ai eu la bonne idée d’y
aller en sortant d’ici. Elle a été charmante… Ah ! quand elle veut !…
Le lendemain, j’ai dit à ma mère :
— Écoute ; j’ai réfléchi au sujet de Javotte. C’est une gentille
amie, gaie, dévouée ; mais tu sais comme je suis, comme je
m’attache facilement. Il pourrait se faire qu’à la longue je cesse de
voir en elle une simple camarade, une petite sœur de charité, alors
j’en souffrirais. Je ne veux pas souffrir ; je me dois à mon métier de
malade ; j’ai bien réfléchi et je te demande, quand elle viendra, de la
recevoir, de lui faire comprendre cela gentiment. J’aime mieux
couper court pendant qu’il en est temps encore.
Elle m’a dit, émue :
— Tu as raison et j’y pensais tous ces jours-ci… Sans doute tu
manques de distractions ; mais ce ne sont pas des distractions de ce
genre qu’il te faut. Je ne peux pas te dire combien je suis soulagée
de voir que, de toi-même, tu as pris le parti le plus sage. Sois
tranquille, je lui ferai comprendre doucement, sans la blesser… et
elle comprendra très bien…
Dans la journée, Javotte est venue. Avant de la recevoir, ma
mère m’a demandé :
— Tu es bien décidé ? Tu ne regrettes rien ?
— Je ne regrette rien ; et, tiens, prends cette médaille qu’elle
m’avait donnée ; tu la lui rendras… Surtout, parle-lui gentiment. Je
ne voudrais pas lui faire de la peine.
— Sois tranquille.
Mais à peine m’avait-elle quitté que j’aurais voulu la rappeler.
Sans bruit, à pas de voleur, je me suis glissé dans la chambre de
Paul, qui est située au-dessus du salon où elles causent. Je me suis
étendu sur le parquet ; j’ai collé mon oreille entre deux lames Il ne
monte vers moi qu’un murmure confus. Je fais, pour écouter, un
effort qui me tire le cerveau. Il me semble toujours que je vais
surprendre une exclamation, un mot, quelque chose, et seul le
murmure indistinct continue de traverser le parquet. Au bout d’un
certain temps, j’entends remuer des sièges, puis la porte s’ouvre.
Déjà je suis dans le couloir, haletant. Ma mère dit :
— J’espère que vous ne m’en voudrez pas, ma petite Javotte, et
que vous comprendrez…
Et la douce voix, la voix caressante, que je n’entendrai plus,
répond :
— Oui, oui, je comprends bien… je comprends bien…
Je voudrais m’écrier : « Non, non, ne partez pas ; montez,
Javotte… Je ne peux pas vous laisser partir ainsi. Voyez comme je
souffre de vous perdre !… » Aucune parole n’est sortie de ma
bouche. J’ai regagné ma chambre, pendant que Javotte s’en allait.
Ma mère revient. Elle me retrouve sur ma chaise longue, un livre à la
main, simulant l’indifférence.
— Tout s’est bien passé ?
— Le mieux du monde.
— Tu lui as rendu sa médaille ?
— Je lui ai rendu sa médaille… Oh ! elle ne s’est pas fait prier…
Si tu avais vu comme elle l’a empochée !
Le mot m’a choqué. Je voudrais ne pas parler et qu’on ne me
parlât pas. Je voudrais ne voir personne, souffrir sans témoin,
poussé par cet instinct qui porte les bêtes blessées à se cacher. J’ai
dit doucement :
— Maintenant, laisse-moi un peu seul, veux-tu ?
Je suis demeuré seul tout le reste de l’après-midi. A l’heure du
facteur, quand Olive est montée, elle avait un petit sourire de
triomphe.
— Ah ! ah ! elle n’a pas été reçue, la Javotte !
Comme je ne réponds pas, elle ajoute :
— Alors, comme ça, M. Paul ne lui suffisait plus ? Quel toupet !…
— Olive, va-t’en, tu m’ennuies.
Mais elle continue :
— Oh ! vous savez, sur la Javotte, on en raconte des histoires qui
vous amuseraient bien. Moi, je m’en moque ; mais vous n’auriez
qu’à demander à Paquito ; celui-là qui vous a arrangé votre
paravent. Il en sait des choses, Paquito !… Il a travaillé dans leur
maison. Un matin qu’il avait besoin de prendre un meuble dans sa
chambre, il entre sans frapper. Elle était couchée. Alors il a dit :
« Mademoiselle, c’est pour ce meuble ; si ça vous dérange, je
reviendrai. — Oh ! qu’elle a fait, vous ne me gênez pas du tout. Elle
s’est assise sur son lit et elle lui a dit : « Tenez, regardez comme je
suis bien faite. » Et vous savez, Paquito n’est pas menteur !
Ah ! j’ai bien la tête vraiment à écouter ces potins ridicules qui se
colportent au village !… Mais, malgré moi, je songe à ce corps dont
elle est orgueilleuse, à cette poitrine de pure forme antique, qui,
chez les filles de ce pays, fait l’émerveillement des artistes. Je songe
à sa voix de velours, son teint de perle chaude, à ses grands yeux
troublants dont le regard, en se posant sur moi, emplissait mon cœur
d’une volupté si lourde que cela me faisait mal, que je me sentais
défaillir…
Et je l’ai renvoyée !…
XVII
LE DÉSIR
Paul, tout à fait rassuré, est parti pour une semaine à Bordeaux.
Je me trouve plus calme que je ne l’aurais cru. Enfin, c’est fait ; il le
fallait. Je vais reprendre ma vie sombre, tout unie, sans espérance :
mais je ne connaîtrai plus ces palpitations insupportables, cette
angoisse à croire que mon cœur va éclater, ce supplice de l’attente.
Je suis plus calme, plus courageux que je ne l’espérais ; du moins,
je me le dis, car les premières heures sont toujours dures, et je reste
si endolori !…
Le silence de Javotte, la facilité avec laquelle elle a accepté son
congé, d’abord me surprennent un peu. Je pensais qu’elle ferait
quelque tentative pour me revoir. J’attendis vainement, le premier
jour, un signe d’elle ; puis, le deuxième jour, comme déjà je
n’espérais plus, je reçus, par la poste, une lettre dont l’enveloppe
vulgaire, l’adresse tracée d’une main inconnue, ne m’avertirent pas
qu’elle était d’elle. Dedans, il y avait une seconde enveloppe que
j’ouvris d’une main tremblante en reconnaissant son papier, son
écriture. L’étreinte du chagrin obscur, tenace, inavoué, se desserrait,
se dénouait mystérieusement, et cette chose pesante, cruelle,
accablante que je portais, fondait soudain, se faisait légère, légère,
n’existait plus. Je me sentais stupide et délivré. Une joie que j’avais
cessé d’appeler affluait en moi ; mon sang était plus chaud et ma vie
augmentée.
Je lisais :
Mon ami,
Mon chagrin a été plus grand que vous ne le supposez

quand, hier, votre mère m’a reçue sans me permettre de monter
auprès de vous. Si mes visites vous ont jusqu’ici causé quelque
fatigue, je viens vous en demander pardon, car Dieu m’est
témoin que je désire avant tout votre guérison. Très attirée par
votre intelligence, votre cœur, votre sensibilité, votre souffrance,
votre tristesse, j’éprouvais chaque jour le désir de vous apporter
un mot affectueux, une fleur, un sourire, une larme même, une
larme surtout aux heures de découragement. Mais je m’incline
devant votre volonté et, malgré toute l’amertume que j’en
ressens, je suis prête à tout pour votre bien.
Donnez-moi, vous, la preuve d’amitié qui me sera la plus
précieuse en me disant très franchement s’il faut que je ne vous
envoie plus un mot, s’il faut que je ne cueille plus une fleur à
votre intention, s’il faut que vous ne m’entendiez plus passer,
causer, chanter sous votre fenêtre.
Moi qui, dans la vie, ai rêvé de consoler, de soutenir,
d’apporter de la joie, je suis condamnée à ne faire que des
malheureux ; c’est atroce. Je suis odieuse à moi-même et sous
cette gaîté apparente qui m’étourdit souvent, je cache bien des
heures d’abattement.
Pardonnez-moi, mon ami, de vous dire ici, quand je devrais
ne parler que de vous, la peine qui m’étreint. Est-il vrai, est-il
possible, que vous ne vouliez plus me voir ? Si cela est, rien ne
m’empêchera, croyez-le, de vous garder au fond de mon cœur
un souvenir tristement affectueux, rien ne m’empêchera de
réciter chaque soir pour vous l’Ave Maria qui guérit. Cette
médaille que vous m’avez rendue me devient doublement
chère, puisque vous l’avez gardée, trop peu de temps, hélas !
Est-ce à cause des initiales mêmes que vous avez craint de la
conserver ?
Je serai cet après-midi de bonne heure chez Mme Toledo,
villa Suzanne, en face de vous. J’y attendrai impatiemment un
mot de réponse et, quelle que soit votre décision, je ferai ce que
vous m’ordonnerez. Ne redoutez pas de me froisser, de me
peiner ; ne prenez conseil que de votre état, ne considérez que
vous seul ; mais sachez que, quoi qu’il advienne, vous serez
toujours celui que j’ai compris, celui que j’ai deviné, celui que
j’aime de toutes les forces de mon cœur.
Javotte.
Par une coïncidence favorable, ma mère est allée, après le

déjeuner, en voiture à Espelette, où elle doit voir le notaire pour une
procuration. Après son départ, j’ai fait porter par Olive ce mot à
Javotte : « Je vous attends. » Elle est venue aussitôt. Elle est là,
devant moi, éblouissante dans sa robe noire. Mais, au lieu de cette
gaieté, de cette hardiesse qui l’animent à l’ordinaire, il y a en elle je
ne sais quoi de contraint, d’irrité, de mélancolique.
— Méchant ! méchant ! comment avez-vous pu faire cela ? Me
faire dire par votre mère de ne plus revenir ! J’étais furieuse. Je
pensais : « Les hommes sont des lâches, des faibles, des
menteurs. » Et ma pauvre médaille ? Vous ne voulez donc plus rien
de moi ? J’ai d’abord décidé que je ne vous écrirais pas, que je ne
vous donnerais plus signe de vie… et puis… et puis… Dites-moi
pourquoi vous avez fait cela, pourquoi vous m’avez fait cette peine…
J’ai pris ses mains doucement. Elle est loin d’être dans la calme
disposition d’esprit qu’annonçait sa lettre ; je la sens toute révoltée.
Je lui dis :
— Mon amie, rendez-vous compte que je suis malade, que je
suis sans forces, que je ne peux pas supporter les émotions,
l’attente, le doute, que je suis trop faible, que je ne veux pas
souffrir… C’est à vous de m’épargner… Je vous assure… En ce
moment vous êtes sincère ; je veux vous croire : mais vous avez la
jeunesse, la beauté, cent amis et toutes les distractions, tandis que
je suis seul dans une chambre. Songez à mon sort quand vous
m’avez quitté et que vous m’avez dit : « Est-ce que je pourrais
passer un seul jour sans vous voir ? » songez à ce que j’éprouve
quand le lendemain se passe et que vous ne venez pas.
— Ah ! c’est pour cela ! C’est parce que je ne suis pas venue
mardi ? Mais si je ne suis pas venue, comment n’avez-vous pas
compris que c’est contre mon gré et parce que, chaque jour, au
moment d’aller chez vous, je me répète : « C’est trop, tu abuses,
Mme Gilbert va trouver que tu abuses. » Il m’avait semblé qu’elle était
plus réservée à mon égard et qu’elle n’osait pas me dire d’espacer
mes visites. C’est pourquoi je me suis privée !… Ah ! si je m’étais
écoutée !… Mais j’ai dû me faire violence !… Vous ne me croyez
pas ? Il ne me croit pas !… Songez donc comme je suis inquiète
quand je vous quitte. Je crains toujours que votre mère ne soit
fâchée. Je me dis : « Elle va être contre moi, elle ne voudra pas que
je revienne. Un malade, c’est faible, ça écoute son entourage !… »
Oh ! je ne lui en voudrais pas ; elle croirait bien faire, la pauvre
femme ! Mais s’il est vrai que je ne vous apporte que du tourment,
que ma présence ne vous fait aucun bien, dites-le-moi. Osez me dire
cela, osez-le.
— Je ne sais pas… Je le crains.
— Alors, c’est bien, c’est tout ce que je voulais savoir.
Elle a un brusque mouvement pour se retirer. Je l’ai retenue
aussitôt par la main. La soudaineté de notre effort contraire la jette
dans mes bras. Il n’en faut pas plus pour nous troubler et pour
qu’elle reste. A cause de cette façon soudaine qu’elle a de
s’enflammer, ses yeux ont cet intense éclairage qui souvent m’a
frappé. Elle sait bien qu’elle m’a repris ; elle sait la puissance de son
regard sur moi. Les heures de fièvre, ma résolution de ne plus la
revoir, le regret des heures passées, je sens tout cela se confondre
dans un singulier vertige. Elle est tout contre moi, et je respire dans
son haleine je ne sais quelle odeur d’amour et de péché.
Il faut parler ; il faut dire quelque chose. Le silence devient
dangereux. Le désir qu’elle met en moi ne saurait lui échapper. Or,
ce désir, il semble qu’elle le voie grandir avec le petit frisson qu’on a
du haut d’un pont à contempler un fleuve accru dont les eaux
montent et qui fait un peu peur. Enfin, elle me demande :
— Votre mère est absente ?
— Elle est à Espelette, chez le notaire.
— Tant mieux ; j’aime bien votre mère, mais j’avais besoin d’être
seule avec vous… Savez-vous ce que j’ai fait hier ?… Je suis
passée sous votre balcon, pour savoir laquelle de vos deux fenêtres
était ouverte, parce que, quand c’est celle de droite, on peut vous
apercevoir ; mais c’était celle de gauche. Est-ce que je mens ?
— Non, c’est exact.
— Tenez, il y a un chien qui vous empêchait de dormir, le chien
de Harriben le jardinier… Votre mère m’avait dit : « Il y a ce maudit
chien qui aboie vers trois heures du matin quand passent des
contrebandiers. » Comme vous vous étiez plaint, on l’enfermait une
nuit et puis cela recommençait. Eh bien ! est-ce que vous l’entendez
depuis trois nuits ? Vous avez trouvé cela tout naturel ; cela ne vous
a pas intrigué que le bruit ait cessé tout à coup ?… Je ne vous
l’aurais certes pas dit, si vous ne paraissiez douter de moi… J’y suis
allée. J’ai vu Harriben ; j’ai donné des ordres… car ici, Monsieur,
chacun m’obéit.
— C’est vrai ; depuis trois nuits, je n’entends plus rien.
— Et c’était précisément le jour où vous me reprochez de n’être
pas venue ; j’avais passé la matinée à m’employer pour vous.
— Qu’est-ce que cela prouve, sinon que vous êtes bonne ?… Je
n’en doutais pas… Quand le facteur est mort, le mois dernier, je sais
que vous êtes demeurée une nuit à son chevet pour que sa pauvre
femme pût prendre quelque repos. Qu’est-ce que cela prouve ; sinon
que vous êtes bonne pour tout le monde ?…
— Je suis bonne pour tout le monde, c’est cela… quoi que je
fasse, mes qualités et mes défauts vous servent contre moi… C’est
admirable !… Mais comment pouvez-vous comparer ce que je fais
pour vous à ce que je fais pour les autres ? Quand ouvrirez-vous les
yeux ?… Voyons, pourquoi vous mentirais-je ? Quelle raison aurais-
je, si vous m’étiez indifférent, de vous parler ainsi ?… Réfléchissez.
Pourquoi viendrais-je ici presque chaque jour ? Est-ce que j’y suis
forcée ? Qu’est-ce qui m’attire, sinon ceci que je vous préfère à
tous ?… Vous me dites vous-même que j’ai des distractions, des
amis… Oui, tous les malades sont mes amis… mais vous, aveugle,
n’êtes-vous pas celui chez qui je viens comme une intruse, comme
une mendiante qui force la porte ?… Alors que chez les autres on
me fait fête et que j’entre avec sécurité et le cœur tranquille, c’est ici
que je viens avec de l’émotion, de la crainte, du bonheur…
Je n’ai pu m’empêcher de dire :
— Et Paul ?
— Votre ami ? Ah ! J’attendais ce nom !… Nous nous sommes
promenés ensemble, oui… nous avons fait de la musique ensemble,
oui… Maintenant, le pauvre garçon, pour ne rien vous cacher, je
crois qu’il souffre, cela me fait de la peine ; mais rappelez-vous ce
que je vous ai dit la première fois : « Je n’appartiens à personne. » Il
n’est rien pour moi.
— Est-ce bien sûr ?
Elle se tord les mains.
— Il ne me croit pas !… Il ne me croit pas !…
— Soit, admettons-le… Je l’admets, malgré l’intimité
sentimentale qui a existé entre vous… Je l’admets, après ce que
vous venez de me dire ou plutôt de me répéter… Mais, songez-y,
lorsque vous me verrez convaincu que Paul n’est rien pour vous, s’il
vous arrivait, écoutez-moi bien, s’il vous arrivait de lui donner à
entendre, à lui aussi, que vous l’aimez, songez au mal que vous
pourriez nous faire à l’un et à l’autre, à cette affreuse jalousie qui
nous dévorerait, songez que vous commettriez là, vis-à-vis de moi
surtout, une action vilaine et lâche parce que je suis faible, parce
que je suis blessé, parce que je suis malade ; s’il en était ainsi,
voyez, je suis sans force, mais j’ai un si frénétique désir de ne pas
souffrir que je quitterais Val-Roland sur-le-champ et que je ne vous
reverrais plus.
— Pourquoi me dites-vous ces choses méchantes ? Comment
accepterais-je de vous l’ordre ? Vous savez bien que vous seul
comptez pour moi… Le matin, quand je m’éveille, est-ce que mon
premier souci n’est pas pour le temps qu’il fait ? Je pense à vous…
S’il fait beau, je me dis : « Tant mieux, ce beau temps va hâter sa
guérison », et je suis gaie. S’il pleut, je songe : « Voilà qui va
augmenter sa tristesse », et cela m’assombrit. Au fond, vous le
savez bien, vous savez bien que je suis sincère… dites que vous le
savez ?…
Je vois sa poitrine se soulever avec force. Comme elle voudrait
que je la croie ensorcelée, cette enchanteresse ! Je ne sais plus que
penser ; mais ce dont je suis certain, c’est qu’il importe que je
paraisse incrédule, si je veux jouir encore de la voir bouleversée, si
belle de passion, de fureur amoureuse. Ne va-t-elle pas, pour me
vaincre, se jeter sur mon cœur ? Je me tais ; les minutes passent ; et
je ne sens plus que le poids du silence et la force de mon désir.
— Dites que vous me croyez ?… dites que vous me croyez ?…
— Je voudrais tant vous croire !…
D’une voix presque basse, la lèvre agitée d’un léger
tremblement, sans oser me regarder, elle me demande :
— Que faut-il faire pour que vous ne doutiez plus jamais, que
faut-il faire ?… quelle preuve puis-je vous donner ?… Quelle preuve
voulez-vous ?
Alors, il est arrivé ce qui devait arriver. Nous étions seuls, à l’abri
de toute surprise. Pâle d’une pâleur ardente, pleine de trouble et de
peur, tenant ses paupières closes sur je ne sais quoi d’immense,
comme un soleil caché, elle m’a donné la seule preuve d’amour
qu’une femme puisse donner et, du bonheur qui fondait ainsi sur
moi, les mots que je pourrais dire s’arrêteront là…
XVIII
LA JALOUSIE
Ma mère souffre ; c’est visible. Quand Javotte vient, elle ne se

montre plus. J’évite de prononcer son nom ; mais, présente ou
absente, elle nous divise. La douce intimité, la paix confiante de
cette maison se sont enfuies. A chaque instant, je le constate. Ainsi,
tout à l’heure, comme je n’avais pu retenir un mouvement de
mauvaise humeur au moment où Olive me remettait le courrier qui
ne contenait que de vagues prospectus, ma mère m’a dit :
— Tu es nerveux : je le comprends ; tu t’es tellement ennuyé
aujourd’hui !…
— Pourquoi ennuyé ?
— Tu sais bien ce que je veux dire.
— Tu veux dire que je suis nerveux parce que Javotte qui ne
devait pas venir n’est pas venue ? C’est bien cela ? Dis-le sans
détour.
— Mais je le dis.
Voilà où nous en sommes. Je ne puis plus parler ou me taire,
être sombre ou rasséréné sans qu’elle lise le nom de Javotte dans
mon animation comme dans mon silence, dans mon espérance
comme dans mon découragement.
Et le pire, c’est qu’elle a raison.
Je déplore sa clairvoyance. Je souffre de la voir souffrir. Quant à
ces petites piqûres, si elles m’impatientent, je fais un effort pour ne
pas le montrer. Comment me fâcherais-je ? C’est l’envers des
grandes affections d’être un peu despotiques. Il serait trop commode
d’attendre d’un cœur tous les dévouements, tous les sacrifices et de
ne pas admettre qu’il devienne ombrageux, même lorsqu’il se
trompe en redoutant de perdre la place qu’il occupe dans votre vie.
Et puis, le voudrais-je, comment me défendre ? On est armé contre
les injures, on résiste à la violence ; mais que faire contre la
faiblesse ? Quand je vois, à table, qu’elle laisse passer les plats
sans y toucher et que son pain reste intact ; quand, dans sa
chambre, sur sa table de nuit, mes yeux ne peuvent éviter le flacon
de chloral dont le niveau baisse, comment me défendre contre cela ?
Comment supporter que son cher visage soit crispé par la
souffrance chaque fois que Javotte vient, comment demeurer
insensible quand elle répond à mon interrogation inquiète : « Je n’ai
rien, je n’ai rien… » en détournant des yeux qui ont pleuré ?
Plusieurs fois, le médecin s’est présenté, probablement appelé
par elle. Je ne l’ai pas reçu. A quoi bon ? Je ne veux pas le voir. Je
ne veux pas savoir.
D’ailleurs, qu’apprendrai-je ? Que ce surmenage sentimental
m’épuise ? Je ne l’ignore pas. J’ai eu deux syncopes cette semaine.
Mon cœur bat, tout le jour, comme un marteau de forge et, dans ma
poitrine, c’est bien un feu de forge, enfermé, dévorateur, qui envoie à
mes pommettes ce double reflet de brasier. Je me consume, je me
consume et, quelque matin, il ne restera plus de moi qu’un petit tas
de cendres chaudes…
Pourtant, bien que je vive dans l’insécurité, l’inquiétude et le
tourment, je vis ! Il est des moments où il me vient de Javotte une
détresse plus angoissante que l’agonie ; il en est d’autres où ce
qu’elle m’apporte de félicité me bouleverse plus que ne le ferait le
miracle de ma guérison. Je suis incendié de fièvre, j’ai la gorge
serrée, j’étouffe, je n’en puis plus ; mais je vis ! Je vis plein de
témérité et de terreur. La lune qui monte, pleine derrière les
peupliers et, soudain, comme une coupe se déverse, répand sur la
route sa lumière ensorcelante, la mer qui expire sur le rivage avec
un bruit lointain d’acclamations, la douleur, la musique, les plus
beaux poèmes, jamais ne remueront l’inconnu de mon être,
n’empliront mon âme de trouble, de vertige et parfois d’une envie de
mourir comme le fait, d’un regard, cette créature que j’aime. Je
l’attends ; l’heure passe ; il me semble que je vais la perdre ; c’est un
supplice sans nom. Mais elle arrive : tout s’apaise, et je remets avec
ivresse entre ses mains mon cœur haletant, délivré.
Parfois, quand elle est restée une partie de l’après-midi auprès
de moi ; quand s’est satisfait, engourdi, le besoin que j’ai de sa
présence, il advient que je me crois saturé d’elle. Je m’imagine un
instant que je ne l’aime plus. Mais à peine est-elle partie que je
cours au balcon pour la suivre des yeux. C’est généralement l’heure
où le soleil, après une belle journée, commence à pâlir de fatigue.
Ma vie n’est plus en moi ; elle palpite dans l’ombre légère qui danse
autour de sa robe. A chaque pas qu’elle fait, un à un, se retirent
avec elle les biens qu’elle m’apporta. Le doux, le triste enivrement,
qui me cachait mon sort, me quitte. Je la vois encore. Son
éloignement allonge mon regard. Je ne la vois plus… Alors, chaque
fois, je retrouve la chambre désenchantée ; je me sens diminué,
dépossédé, appauvri ; j’ai perdu la lueur secrète qui m’éclairait. Je
suis comme l’acteur qui vient de jouer dans une apothéose un rôle
de roi et qui, derrière le décor, n’est plus qu’un petit homme éteint et
déguisé.
Je rends mal ce que j’éprouve. Je sens bien, je sens trop ce que
j’ai à dire, mais le dire !… Si j’en étais capable, il ferait chaud entre
ces feuillets et, sous chacun d’eux, en prêtant l’oreille, on entendrait
ce cœur qui bat si fort. Une certaine griserie de l’esprit peut conduire
à l’attitude où se rencontrent la voix, le souffle, l’éloquence qui me
manquent. Mais cette attitude, à peine vais-je y atteindre que je dois
m’arrêter, trahi par mes forces. Un spasme intolérable me noue tout
l’être ; je m’évanouirais. Les mots qu’il faudrait sont là ; un diamant
sombre est en moi, je vais l’extraire, et l’outil me tombe des mains.
Je voudrais me donner tout entier ; je ne le puis. A chaque instant, il
manque à ce que j’écris un ton au-dessus ; et pourtant, à cause de
la nuit qui l’environne, me vie atteint cette heure émouvante et
mystérieuse où, dans chaque hameau, au bord de la rivière, sur un
chemin de halage, à la lisière des bois, au sein de la montagne,
monte le chant d’un batelier, d’un artisan ou d’un pâtre attardés, un
de ces chants modulés et graves qui font s’incliner l’âme vers le jour
qui finit. Ne pourrai-je tirer de moi un de ces beaux chants du soir
dont on écoute longtemps planer le vol dans l’espace ?…
Avec Paul, c’est une guerre sourde. J’ai, suspendue sur moi, sa
jalousie frémissante. Il ne soupçonne pas la vérité ; mais ces visites
que Javotte me rend lui sont insupportables. Il se respire dans cette
maison une odeur de mensonge qui le tient en éveil ; et, d’ailleurs,
quand on passe devant un homme qu’éclaire l’amour, est-ce qu’on
ne reçoit pas un peu de cette caresse dorée que vous renvoie,
l’hiver, d’une façon contenue, un mur frappé par le soleil ?
De mon côté, je ne puis soutenir l’idée qu’ils se rencontrent, qu’ils
se voient ou seulement qu’il rôde autour d’elle. Le poison est en
nous ; il fait son œuvre et, bien que nous nous efforcions de garder
un ton naturel, amical, nous nous sentons hostiles, ennemis. Il épie
une ombre sur mon visage ; moi, embusqué derrière un sourire, je
défaille quand il vient à moi, illuminé par une heure passée auprès
d’elle, quand je retrouve sur ses gants le parfum de Javotte. Et,
tandis qu’il jette son chapeau sur un meuble avec une insouciance
feinte ou qu’il sonne pour le thé, tandis que je prononce : « Belle
journée, mon vieux ! » nous sommes repliés sur nous-mêmes, prêts
à bondir l’un sur l’autre, prêts à hurler, à nous mordre.
Cette situation équivoque ne saurait se prolonger. Nos silences
deviennent oppressants, et il tombe sur nos visages cette lumière
fausse qui précède l’orage.
C’est samedi. Javotte vient de me quitter. Paul rentre. Le voici
dans ma chambre. Sa voix n’a pas de timbre ; il est découragé,
triste, abattu. Je le considère, pendant qu’il s’assied dans le fauteuil,
près de la fenêtre qu’emplit la nuit.
— Elle n’est pas venue aujourd’hui ?

Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence 1St Edition Bevis E Mcneil Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence 1St Edition Bevis E Mcneil Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence 1st

Edition Bevis E. Mcneil

Eternal Bandwagon: The Politics of Presidential

Wrong Way Joanne Mcneil

Nietzsche as Egoist and Mystic Andrew Milne

Eternal Huntress Whitney Hill

Philosophical Perspectives on Suicide: Kant,

Barbara Cartland The Eternal Collection: Books 101 -

Barbara Cartland The Eternal Collection: Books 91 - 100

Moral Psychology with Nietzsche Brian Leiter

Nietzsche and Eternal

ISBN 978-3-030-55295-4 ISBN 978-3-030-55296-1 (eBook)

My thanks to Brendan George, Lauriane Piette, Vanipriya Manohar and

1 Nietzsche and the Idea of Eternal Recurrence 1

2 Nietzsche’s Cosmology of Eternal Recurrence 51

2.3.2 Simmel on the Incoherency of Nietzsche’s Cosmology

3 Heidegger’s Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Philosophy

4 Nietzsche contra Heidegger: On the Importance of

APP Freeman, K. B. (2008) Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A

ER Loeb, P.S. (2013) ‘Eternal Recurrence’ in Gemes, K. and

NII Heidegger, M. (1991) ‘Nietzsche Volume II: The Eternal

SMSB Migotti, M. (1998) ‘Slave Morality, Socrates, and the Bushmen:

Nietzsche and the Idea of Eternal Recurrence

© The Author(s) 2021 1

The structure of this book will be as follows:

Martin Heidegger, which will allow us to gain a true understanding of

1.2 The Problem of Nihilism

The will to power, insofar as it characterizes beings like ourselves, is

The capacity to create (fashion, fabricate, invent) is their fundamental capac-

INPT, p141, my words in brackets.

INPT, p141, my words in brackets.

over itself, through cultivating an overall perspective or disposition for

“Through its explanation of the meaning [and purpose] of Christ’s exam-

The belief in the absolute immorality of nature, in aim- and meaningless-

and weighty significance. As a result of this, the whole of European moral-

Nietzsche emphasises that although “It was [originally Christian]

the cultural and ethical foundations of its existence.23 Unfortunately this

The Christian overvaluation of the human being has encouraged them

However, Zarathustra believes like the ‘madman’ in aphorism 125 of

The world may be meaningless chaos in relation to those ideals or stan-

With his presentation of the doctrine of eternal return, Nietzsche is

Therefore the ideal of the overhuman is one of intrinsic self-­

their creative and intellectual capabilities, enables them to have a certain

1.3 The Eternal Recurrence as the Antidote

Therefore Nietzsche proposed the doctrine of eternal recurrence to act

The doctrine of eternal return enables the individual holistically to

This affirmation of the Dionysian art-impulse can be linked to

the advent of nihilism [has] become necessary…Because the values we have

The genesis of the thought of eternal recurrence can be traced to an

Through the doctrine of the eternal return, Nietzsche wants to enable

Through a teaching of the eternal return, as a new centre of gravity, and

My endeavour to oppose decay and increasing weakness of personality. I

In our epoch of nihilism, the doctrine or idea of eternal recurrence

it is interpreted as an imaginative thought experiment, secondly as a cos-

1.4 The Eternal Recurrence as an Imaginative

The second half of the aphorism looks at potential responses to the

In this famous passage, what Nietzsche is asking us is how we would

be. The demon addresses us in our ‘loneliest loneliness’, a moment when

Nietzsche promotes and wants us to have to the demon’s message, would

By amplifying their feelings of helplessness, and their feelings of the

1.5 The Eternal Recurrence as a Cosmological

and the universe. Here, Nietzsche sought a cosmological proof, a theory

Paul a changé. Maintenant, quand nous nous retrouvons le soir

1 Nietzsche and the Idea of Eternal Recurrence 1

2 Nietzsche’s Cosmology of Eternal Recurrence 51

2.3.2 Simmel on the Incoherency of Nietzsche’s Cosmology

3 Heidegger’s Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Philosophy

4 Nietzsche contra Heidegger: On the Importance of

Therefore the ideal of the overhuman is one of intrinsic self-