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PALGRAVE MACMILLAN STUDIES IN
BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
SERIES EDITOR: PHILIP MOLYNEUX

Nigerian
Consumer Credit
Law, Regulation and Market Insights

Philemon Iko-Ojo Omede

Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial
Institutions

Series Editor
Philip Molyneux, Bangor University, Bangor, UK
The Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions
series is international in orientation and includes studies of banking
systems in particular countries or regions as well as contemporary themes
such as Islamic Banking, Financial Exclusion, Mergers and Acquisitions,
Risk Management, and IT in Banking. The books focus on research and
practice and include up to date and innovative studies that cover issues
which impact banking systems globally.
 Philemon Iko-Ojo Omede

Nigerian Consumer
Credit
Law, Regulation and Market Insights
Philemon Iko-Ojo Omede
Faculty of Law
Veritas University
Abuja, Nigeria

ISSN 2523-336X ISSN 2523-3378 (electronic)

Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions
ISBN 978-3-031-11739-8 ISBN 978-3-031-11740-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11740-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
I dedicate this book to God Almighty for His grace, love and mercies despite
my human failings.
 Preface

Traditional Nigerian society was averse to debt, and living within one’s
means was a highly celebrated virtue. Households ensured they avoided
indebtedness and those who couldn’t worked hard to conceal the ‘debtor’
status. To be a debtor was stigmatized and associated with laziness,
poverty and irresponsibility. However, thrift societies sprang up and lent
money exclusively to contributing members who were highly incentivised
to repay on time to avoid the stigma associated with a debt default. At
this stage of economic development in Nigeria and most of Africa, there
was no need for huge credits as no ambitious projects, private or public,
were conceived. The majority of the population were agrarians involved
in subsistence agriculture. They lived happily in thatched mud houses and
did not have formal education, or modern infrastructure. By 1894, the
Bank of British West Africa (now First Bank of Nigeria PLC) which took
over the Africa Banking Corporation together with Barclays Bank (now
Union Bank of Nigeria PLC) set up in 1912, pioneered the role of finan-
cial intermediation in the formal context, including accepting deposits,
making payments, and advancing loans to Nigerian customers.
As an international student of Corporate and Financial Law at the
University of Glasgow nearly a decade ago, two of the questions I often
got asked by my European cohorts (Home Students) were, ‘how much is
your tuition?’ and ‘how are you paying?’ Of course, most of them were on
student loans and their tuition was about 50% less expensive than I paid
as an international student. This triggered my interest in consumer credit

vii
viii PREFACE

and access to finance in Nigeria and the Sub-Saharan Africa region. It was
incredulous to me that ‘richer’ students from the global north could split
their tuition payments over what seemed like a lifetime (several years)
while paying less overall, while ‘poorer’ students from the global south
had to pay more and usually at the point of enrolment. I wondered about
the many brilliant friends I knew back in Nigeria who would afford to
study in the UK if only affordable consumer credit was available to them.
They just couldn’t afford a lump payment for the undertaking and so
aspiration is abandoned. How many more young Nigerians will have to
forgo a world-class education due to financial exclusion?
As I began my research, I realised that the utility of consumer credit in
developing countries has been understudied. Even though there is a vast
amount of important work in the field at the international level and in
jurisdictions such as the US and the UK, most studies on credit in Nigeria
have focused on business loans to specific sectors rather than the entire
economy, and many other international studies exclude the Nigerian
credit market from their samples as is the case with the various editions
of the World Bank’s Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protec-
tion. Neoliberal economics offers a broad range of theories explaining
the factors that influence the supply and demand for credit. From the
supply side, one account blames credit scarcity on overregulation. On the
demand side, some economists question the utility of consumer credit
to the economy, especially developing ones like Nigeria. The focus of this
book, however, is on the structure of the Nigerian consumer credit market
and regulation, and how regulation impacts access to finance in Nigeria.
To paraphrase my Ph.D. supervisor, Professor IDC Ramsay, a market
comprising consumers uncertain about using credit and lenders uncertain
about recovering money lent might result in suboptimal lending patterns,
and regulation could encourage greater confidence by both parties to
commit to long-term credit and drive demand. This sentiment reflects
the reality in Nigeria and this study is an attempt to contribute ideas to
broader efforts to remediate the situation.
In the course of my research for this book, I found the commit-
ment of regulators in Nigeria to doctrines ostensibly set by International
Financial Institutions (IFIs) a major obstacle to progress on the issue of
access to credit. Throughout my interviews with policymakers in Nigeria,
Ghana and Rwanda, whether it is on their hands-off attitude to consumer
protection in the credit market or failure to address the collateral damage
 PREFACE ix

to lower-end borrowers on account of prudential regulation, every offi-

cial professed belief in IFI manuals including the structural adjustment
programme of 1986 which has since been abandoned, evolved or adapted
by the same IFIs in light of new evidence.
In Nigeria, I found out, while interacting with officials at the Central
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Ministry of Finance, that the pattern
of commitment to antiquated IFI policy is partly due to elite incentive
to maintain the status quo, administrative incompetence, and a dearth
of technical expertise within government agencies not only to manage
complex regulation but to channel critical intelligence (data, evidence,
case studies) to IFIs making rules that affect Nigerians. The CBN is by far
one of the most competent agencies of government in Nigeria, but even
that body is not wholly exempt from some of the failures highlighted.
Since I returned to work in Nigeria in 2020, I have witnessed an
escalation of the credit challenges discussed in this book, especially on
access. The impact of covid-19 on businesses has led many of my clients
to either default or renegotiate existing loans from deposit money banks.
Leading these negotiations, I’ve come to learn that the credit challenge is
often bigger than the parties in the room. Many lenders are understand-
ably unwilling to advance new credit, especially to MSMEs, and are in
a precarious position because the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN)
is both unwilling and unable to guarantee private sector loans to crit-
ical sectors of the Nigerian economy. Where the FGN manages to lend
directly or guarantee private sector loans, such schemes are beholden to
political patronage and a lack of transparency.
Through a rigorous appraisal of the latest regulatory reforms in the
Nigerian credit market and globally, a careful analysis of existing litera-
ture, and a small scale qualitative study, the book found: (a) links between
regulation and decreased lending by formal sector lenders to consumer
borrowers in Nigeria; (b) a weak coalition of change agents at the national
level to advance the interests of consumer borrowers, and thus, foresees
a role for transnational actors as change agents within the Nigerian credit
market; and (c) that International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) must approach
this role from a social protection prism that rests on a new pro-poor ‘con-
ditionality’, distinct from how conditionality has traditionally been used
in Africa.
The book engages with the problem of consumer lending primarily
from the perspective of formal lenders, and while I hope that it would give
x PREFACE

the reader a deeper understanding of the regulatory issues, it avoids broad

generalisations. I also hope that the findings of this book will stimulate
further studies on the subject.

Abuja, Nigeria Philemon Iko-Ojo Omede

 Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Tula Weis, Philip Molyneux, and Ashwini Elango
from Palgrave Macmillan for their editorial support.
I am grateful to my Ph.D. supervisor, Professor Iain Ramsay whose
expertise and excellent guidance made it possible for me to complete
this work. I am particularly thankful for his rare patience and encourage-
ment as I went through my protracted learning curve, especially having to
read my drafts multiple times. I am eternally grateful to him for taking a
keen interest in my wellbeing, discussing my career interests, responding
promptly to my queries in person and via emails, advising me on my
publishing options, introducing me to amazing professional mentors and
guiding me towards opportunities. My gratitude also goes to my Ph.D.
co-supervisor, Dr. Simone Wong for her kind advice and inspiration, and
for exposing me to socio-legal research methods. Her countless useful
tips were especially invaluable towards the completion of my qualitative
chapter.
I thank the University of Kent and Kent Law School for gener-
ously funding my research. I am grateful to Professor Toni Williams
for being so attuned to the well-being of GTAs and overseeing the
year off teaching which made progress with my research much more
possible. My profound gratitude goes to Professors Donatella Alessandrini
and Thanos Zartaloudis for their steadfast stewardship of the postgrad-
uate study group, Professor Amanda Perry-Kessaris and Professor Davina
Cooper for their invaluable research methods seminars, and to members

xi
xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

of Kent Law who gave me a community and a conducive environment

to maximise my academic potentials. I am thankful to Ph.D. examiners,
Professors Geraint Howells and Gbenga Oduntan for encouraging me
to write this book. I thank the administrative staff at Kent Law School
especially Lynn Osborne and Karen Finch for being so supportive from
the time I arrived in Canterbury in 2016, dutifully providing relevant
information and responding to email enquiries.
I am hugely indebted to my family—my parents Mr. Pius Paul Omede
and Mrs. Edna Diana Omede for their boundless love, sacrifice and
commitment to me and my siblings in every way a parent could. Many
thanks to my sister Christy and my brother Samuel for being ever
supportive, kind, tolerant, and respectful. I am grateful to my uncle, Dr.
Andrew Omede, for mentoring and igniting my academic curiosity from
a very young age. Thank you sir for knowing me as much as you do, and
charting my course before I ever dreamed of what I wanted to become.
I am grateful to my cherished friends, Onyinye J. J. Ojeh, God’stime
Eigbiremolen, Prince Ikeru, Raheem Ibrahim, Pingyao & Judy, Momoh
Sule, Musa Etubi, Omeiza Ibrahim, Jerry Ochada, Aaron Benjamin,
Simon Sanni Ahmadu, and a host of others I cannot fully mention here.
Thank you Mark Ezegbogu for your very diligent proofreading of my
drafts, and for being my bridge to the general reader. I am grateful to Mr.
and Mrs. Nzeako for leaving your doors open for me and Samuel and
giving us a second home in London. I am equally thankful to Madam
Elizabeth for being a mother to me and Samuel when we first arrived and
knew no one.
I thank my benefactors and distinguished legal practitioners M. A.
Mahmud, SAN, Abdullahi Dahiru, and M. S. Ibrahim for variously
providing me mentorship and office spaces to work.
Last but not the least, I thank the Dean, Faculty of Law, Veritas
University Abuja, Professor Josephine A. A. Agbonika, SAN for her
encouragement and support. I thank the brilliant members of the Veritas
Law family, The Rt. Hon. Chevalier Sir E. Azinge, KSG, Professor Paul
Obo Idornigie, SAN, Dr. Dennis Ekumankama, Dr. James Agbonhese,
Rev. Fr. Dr. Anthony Azuwike, Dr. Victor Odoeme, Mr. Dennis Ugwuja,
Mr. Chigozie Onah, Mrs. Amaka Onyedibe and other members of the
administrative and support staff for being the best colleagues ever.
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background of the Study 1
1.2 Research Question 5
1.2.1 Neoliberalism 8
1.2.2 Consumer Credit/Debt 10
1.3 Significance of the Study 11
1.4 Research Methodology 16
1.4.1 Background to Interviews 17
1.4.2 Summary of Interview Findings 19
1.5 Overview of Book 20
2 Rationale for Consumer Credit Regulation 25
2.1 The Utility of Consumer Credit 25
2.2 The Schools of Thought 26
2.2.1 Credit as Lubricant: The Permanent Income
Hypothesis Theory (PIH) 26
2.2.2 The PIH and Consumer Borrowing in Nigeria 30
2.3 Consumer Credit as a Perilous Product 32
2.3.1 Consumer Credit Hurts More Than It Helps
Low-Income Consumers 33
2.3.2 Consumer Credit as a Smokescreen for Rolling
Back the Welfare State 35
2.3.3 Consumer Credit Distorts Resource Allocation
Within the Economy 39

xiii
xiv CONTENTS

2.4 Rationale for Regulating Consumer Credit 40

2.4.1 Market Construction 40
2.4.2 Correcting Market Failures 42
2.4.3 Prevention of Systemic Risk and Externalities 46
2.4.4 Behavioural Economics (BE) 50
2.5 A Human Right Rationale for Consumer Credit
Regulation 58
2.5.1 Economic Rights and Human Capability 58
2.5.2 Consumer Credit as a Human Capability 60
2.5.3 An American Case Study: The Community
Reinvestment Act 1977 70
2.6 Summary 72
3 Sources of Consumer Credit Regulation in Nigeria 75
3.1 An Overview of the Nigerian Legal System 75
3.1.1 Statutory Law 75
3.1.2 Case Law/Common Law 76
3.1.3 International Law 79
3.2 Legislative Sources of Consumer Credit Regulation
in Nigeria 79
3.2.1 Market-Wide Regulation/Legislation 79
3.3 The Structure of Lending in Nigeria 110
3.4 Formal Sector 110
3.4.1 Commercial Banks 111
3.4.2 Microfinance Institutions 113
3.5 Semi-Formal Sector 115
3.5.1 Moneylenders, Hire-Purchase,
and Pawnbrokers 115
3.5.2 Cooperative Societies 120
3.5.3 Fintech Start-Ups 121
3.6 Selected Subsidiary Legislation Applicable to Fintech
in Nigeria 123
3.6.1 Mobile Money Regulations 124
3.6.2 Agent Banking Regulations 125
3.7 Summary 126
4 Consumer Credit and Customary Law in Nigeria 127
4.1 The Scope of Customary Law Under the Nigerian
Legal System 127
4.2 Forms of Consumer Credit Under Customary Law 131
 CONTENTS xv

4.3 Forms of Consumer Credit Under Customary Law 134

4.3.1 Informal Sector 134
4.3.2 Markets Emerging in Response to Regulation
(‘Black Market’) 140
4.4 Customary Moneylenders 142
4.4.1 Family and Friends 142
4.4.2 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
(ROSCAs) 143
4.4.3 Vendor Credit 145
4.5 Jurisdiction Over Informal Credit Contracts 145
4.6 Summary 147
5 Paradigms in Consumer Credit Regulation 149
5.1 Mapping an Evolving Paradigm: The New Approach
to Credit Regulation After the Global Recession 151
5.2 The Reign of the Consumer Borrower 151
5.2.1 The Legitimation of Consumer Protection
Agencies 152
5.2.2 A Robust Understanding of ‘Fair Treatment’
in Financial Markets 153
5.3 The Collapse of the Information Paradigm 159
5.3.1 Form 163
5.3.2 Format and Plain Language 164
5.3.3 Key Fact Statements 165
5.3.4 Consumer Testing 165
5.4 From Compensation to Apprehension/Prevention 166
5.5 The New Assumptions About Consumer Borrower
Welfare 168
5.5.1 The Lost Allure of Credit and Reversal
of the Democratisation Narrative 169
5.5.2 Financialisation and the Perpetuation
of Class Disparities in Credit Access 173
5.5.3 Human Rights and Access to Consumer
Credit: From Boon to Foil 177
5.6 A New Paradigm for Credit Regulation? 179
5.7 Summary 184
6 A Synopsis of Consumer Lending Patterns in Formal
Financial Institutions and Lenders’ Responses
to Regulatory Reforms in Nigeria 187
xvi CONTENTS

6.1 Background to Interviews 190

6.2 Findings: How Formal Lending Practices Respond
to Financial Reforms 191
6.2.1 Unintended Outcomes of Financial Reforms 191
6.2.2 Prudential Regulation: Banking
Consolidation 191
6.2.3 Credit for Production 194
6.2.4 Anti-Money Laundering Regulation 198
6.2.5 From a Regime of Control to a Regime
of Transparency 200
6.3 Summary and Discussion of Findings on Lenders’
Attitudes to Consumer Credit 202
6.4 Structures of Lending and Consumer Welfare
Implications: Formality V Informality 206
6.5 Commercial Banks and Mfis 206
6.6 Informal and Semi-Formal Lenders 209
6.6.1 Family and Friends 209
6.6.2 Cooperatives 210
6.6.3 Fintech Start-Ups 212
6.7 Default Risk and Consequences Across Lending
Channels 213
6.7.1 A Familiar Tale of Corruption
and Institutional Weaknesses 218
6.8 Moneylenders and Extreme Abuses of Consumer
Rights 221
6.8.1 Formal Lenders: Same Medicine, Subtler
Methods 226
6.9 Summary 227
7 Implications of Findings for Theory and Policy 231
7.1 The Gulf Between Ideology and Policy in Nigeria 233
7.2 The Case for Consumer Credit in Nigeria 239
7.2.1 Consumer Credit as a Form of Social
Insurance 239
7.2.2 Consumer Credit and Institutional Efficiency 244
7.3 Who Should Borrow in Nigeria? 246
7.4 ‘Subprime’ Borrowers 247
7.5 Middle- and Lower-Income Borrowers 248
7.5.1 The American Model 249
 CONTENTS xvii

7.5.2 Digital Credit 252

7.6 Self-Excluding Borrowers 254
7.7 How to Protect Consumer Borrowers 255
7.7.1 From Consumer Access [as an End]
to Consumer Welfare in Nigeria 255
7.7.2 Freedom of Contract and Social Legislation:
The Doctrine of Force Majeure 257
7.8 Non-Debt Income Sources 259
7.8.1 Universal Basic Income 259
7.8.2 Consumer Debt and Labour Policy 263
7.9 Rethinking the Role of Transnational Institutions
in Initiating Policy Shift in Nigeria 265
7.10 Summary 269
7.11 Suggestions for Further Study 271

Appendices 275
Bibliography 287
Index 323
 Abbreviations

ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution

AML Anti-Money Laundering
ATM Automated Teller Machines
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Behavioural Economics
BOFIA Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio
CBN Central Bank of Nigeria
CCS Core Civil Servants
CFAN Cooperatives Financing Agency of Nigeria
CFPB Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
CPC Consumer Protection Council of Nigeria
CRA Community Reinvestment Act
DG SANCO Directorate-General for Health and Consumers
EEC European Economic Community
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
EU European Union
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FCA Financial Conduct Authority
FCMB First City Monument Bank PLC
FG Federal Government of Nigeria
Fintech Financial Technology
FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Programme
FSB Financial Stability Board

xix
xx ABBREVIATIONS

G20 Group of Worlds Top 20 Economies

GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDPR General Data Protection Regulations
GSIBs Global Systemically Important Banks
HLA Higher Loss Absorbency
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFI International Financial Institutions
IIF The International Institute of Finance
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
KYC Know Your Customer
MDA Ministries, Departments, and Agencies
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MFI Microfinance Institutions
MMO Mobile Money Operator
MNO Mobile Network Operator
M-POS Mobile Point of Sale
MPR Monetary Policy Rate
MSME Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NAPEP National Poverty Eradication Programme
NBS National Bureau of Statistics
NDIC Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation
NGN Nigerian Naira
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIBSS Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement Systems PLC
NIT Negative Income Tax
NLC Nigerian Labour Congress
NNPC Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation
NPF Nigeria Police Force
NSE Nigeria Stock Exchange
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCGS Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme
PIH Permanent Income Hypothesis
PIN Personal Identification Number
ROSCA Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
SARS Special Anti-Robbery Squad
SDG Sustainable Development Goals
SME Small and Medium Scale Enterprises
SMEDAN Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Development Agency
SMS Short Message Service
TELCO Telecommunication Company
 ABBREVIATIONS xxi

TV Television
UBI Universal Basic Income
UK United Kingdom
US United States of America
USD United States Dollars
USSD Unstructured Supplementary Service Data
WJP World Justice Project
 List of Legislation

Nigeria Substantive Legislation

Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act, Cap B3, LFN 2004
Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 2007
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), 1999
Credit Reporting Act, 2017
Evidence Act, 2011
Hire Purchase Act 1965
Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 (as amended)
Moneylenders Ordinance 1939 Cap 124, Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria, 1958
Moneylenders Law of Cross Rivers State, Cap M7, Laws of Cross River
State of Nigeria, 2004
National Minimum Wage Act, 2019
Nigerian Communications Act, 2003
Nigerian Co-operative Societies Act Cap C35, Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria, 2004
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, 1972 (as amended)
Secured Transactions in Movable Assets Act, 2017
Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 (as amended)
Nigeria Subsidiary Legislation
CBN Credit Policy Guidelines for the 1987 fiscal year
CBN Monetary Policy Circular No. 21 for the 1987 fiscal year

xxiii
xxiv LIST OF LEGISLATION

CBN’s Mobile Money Regulations 2009

CBN’s Prudential Guidelines for Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria 2010
CBN (Anti-money Laundering and Combating the Financing of
Terrorism in Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria) Regu-
lations 2013
CBN’s Guidelines for the Regulation of Agent Banking and Agent
Banking Relationships in Nigeria 2013
CBN Guidelines for Licensing and Regulation of Payment Service Banks
in Nigeria 2018.
UK
Consumer Credit Act (as amended) 1974
Credit Unions Act 1979
Misrepresentation Act 1967
Moneylenders Act of 1927
EU Regulations
Consumer Credit Directive (EEC) 87/ 102/EEC of 22 December 1986
for the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provi-
sions of the Member States Concerning Consumer Credit [1987] OJ L
042
Council Regulation (EEC) 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts [1993] OJ L 95/29
Council Regulation 2005/29/EC Concerning Unfair Business-To-
Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market and Amending
Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and
2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regu-
lation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the
Council [2005] OJ L 149/22
Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 23 April 2008 on Credit Agreements for Consumers and Repealing
Council Directive 87/102/EEC [2002] OJ L 133/66 (Consumer Credit
Directive 2008)
Council Regulation (EC) 1092/2010 of 24 November 2010 on Euro-
pean Union Macro-Prudential Oversight of the Financial System and
Establishing a European Systemic Risk Board [2010] OJ L331/1
EU Regulation Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 4 February 2014 on Credit Agreements for Consumers
Relating to Residential Immovable Property and Amending Directives
 LIST OF LEGISLATION xxv

2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010

[2014] L 60/34
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the Protection of Natural
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General
Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1
South Africa
National Credit Act 34 of 2005
US Legislation
Community Reinvestment Act 1977, PL 95–128
Consumer Credit Protection Act, PL 90–321
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010,
PL 111–203
United Nations
United Nations Guidance on Consumer Protection (New York, UN
2016)
 List of Cases

Nigeria
Abubakar Yusuf v Alhaja BA Mobolaji (1999) NWLR (Part. 631) 374 at
387
Adjei v Dabanka (1930) WACA 63 at 66–67
Afegbai v AG Edo State (2001) LPELR-193(SC)
AG Plateau State v AG Nasarawa (2005) 129 LRCN 1523 at 1531
Animashaun v CFAO (1960) LLR 151
Aromoloaron v Kupoliyi (1994)2 NWLR (Pt. 325) 221 at 237
Atere v Dada (1957) WRNLR 1 76
Atiba Iyalamu Savings & Loans Limited v Mr. Sidiku Ajala Suberu &
Anor (2018) LPELR-44069(SC)
BB Apugo & Sons Ltd v OHMB (2016) LPELR-40598(SC)
Bulet Int’l (Nig) Ltd & Anor v Olaniyi & Anor (2017) LPELR-
42475(SC)
CBN v Auto Import Export [2013] 2 NWLR (Pt.1337) 80 at 126
para G
CBN v Interstella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 303
Chief Chris Nwankwo v Chief Francis Arthur Nzeribe (2003) LPELR-
5452(CA)
Chief Peter Amadi Nwankwo & Anor v Ecumenical Development Co-
operative Society (EDCS) UA (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1027) 377
Danmole v Dawodu (1958) 3 FSC 46
Diamond Bank Ltd v Ugochukwu (2007) LPELR-8093(CA)

xxvii
xxviii LIST OF CASES

Economic & Financial Crimes Commission v Diamond Bank Plc & Ors
(2018) LPELR-44217(SC)
Edet v Essien (1989) 11 NLR 47
Eshugbayi Eleko v Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria
[1931] AC 662
Fasel Services Ltd & Anor v NPA & Anor (2009) LPELR-1245(SC)
Federal Republic of Nigeria v Dr (Mrs) Cecilia Ibru
FHC/L/297C/2009
Globe Spinning Mills Nigeria Plc v Reliance Textile Industries Limited
(2017) LPELR-41433 (CA)
Guri v Hadejia Native Authority (1959) 4 FSC 44
Khaled Barakat Chami v UBA Plc (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1191) 474 SC
In re: Diamond Bank Ltd [2002] 17 NWLR (Pt. 795) 120 at 134
para G
Itaken v Offiong & Anor (2016) LPELR-41223(CA)
Lewis v. Bankole (1908) 1 NLR 81
Lewis v UBA (2016) LPELR-40661(SC)
Mojekwu v Mojekwu (1997) 7 NWLR 283
Okonkwo v Okagbue (1994) 12 SCNJ 89
Okonkwo v Cooperative & Commerce Bank (Nigeria) Plc & Ors (2003)
LPELR-SC.58/1998
Olatunji v Owena Bank PLC (2001) FWLR (Pt. 54) 342
Onuorah v Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical Co Ltd (2005) All NLR
386.
Sonnar (Nigeria) Ltd & Anor v Partenreedri MS Nordwind Owners of
The Ship MV Nordwind & Anor (1987) LPELR-3494(SC)
STB Ltd v Contract Resources (Nig.) Ltd [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 115
at 123 paras G-H
Sunko (Nig) Ltd v Skye Bank PLC (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579) 242
UBA v SGB Ltd [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 478) 381 at 389 paras G-H
Udekwu v Abosi (1974) ECCSLR 298
Ukeje v Ukeje (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1418) 384
UNIBIZ v Commercial Bank (2005) 125 LRCN 1484 at 1495
University of Ilorin v Oyelana (2001) FWLR (Pt. 83) 2193 at 2209
Uwah & Anor v Akpabio & Anor (2014) LPELR-22311(SC)
Yakor v Governor of Plateau State & 2 Ors (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 498)
216
 LIST OF CASES xxix

UK
Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104
Chandelor v Lopus Cr Jac 4 79 Eng Rep 3 (1603)
Dimmock v Hallett LR 2 Ch App 21
Intercontinental Bank v Erastus Bankole Oladipo Akingbola and others
2009 Folio 1680
Parkinson v Lee 2 East 314, 102 Eng Rep 389 (1802)
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

Globalisation and the transnational legal order impact consumer policy in
developing countries in ways that are not fully understood.1 In Nigeria,
colonial legacies such as the inherited legal system and banking model
continue to operate with mixed outcomes for consumer borrowers. At
the same time, policies of high-income countries on trade and invest-
ment,2 security and intellectual property rights continue to influence
domestic policy and impact significantly on economic growth and living

1 CN Murphy, ‘Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood’ (2000) 76

(4) International Affairs 789–803; JE Stiglitz, ‘The Overselling of Globalization’ (2017)
52 (3) Business Economics 129–137; D Moyo, Edge of Chaos (London, Little, Brown
2018).
2 See for instance World Bank, ‘Doing Business 2019: Training for Reform (Vol.
2) (English)’ (Washington, DC, World Bank Group 2018) http://documents.worldb
ank.org/curated/en/975621541012231575/Doing-Business-2019-Training-for-Reform,
accessed 16 May 2019. See also D Alessandrini, Developing Countries and the Multilateral
Trade Regime: The Failure and Promise of the WTO’s Development Mission (Hart 2010).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
P. I.-O. Omede, Nigerian Consumer Credit, Palgrave Macmillan Studies
in Banking and Financial Institutions,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11740-4_1
2 P. I.-O. OMEDE

standards in developing countries.3 In some respects, developing coun-

tries have failed to meet the Millenium Development Goals (MDG)
partly on account of financial and credit policies imposed by high-income
countries.4
In the sphere of credit market regulation, the donor-beneficiary and
creditor-debtor relationships between developed and developing coun-
tries have resulted in the latter adopting and implementing rules and
codes of business conduct made by the former. Immediately after gaining
independence from Britain in 1960, the Nigerian government adopted
an interventionist social policy to stimulate economic development via
measures including free education and healthcare programmes, interest
rate controls, and direct allocation of credit to priority sectors and
rural areas where private financial institutions would not ordinarily direct
resources.5 These policies presented significant social and economic bene-
fits to Nigerians of all economic strata.6 These welfare programmes
between 1960 and 1983, however, were in part made possible by the oil
booms of the 1970s and massive borrowing from international financial
institutions (IFI) mainly the World Bank and the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF). This borrowing and the subsequent dependence on
foreign technical support made it possible for the IFIs to gain a foothold

3 This book focuses on transnational regulatory models for consumer credit. However,
background knowledge of the debates within the development policy community on what
is now best known as the Washington Consensus could be relevant but certainly not
mandatory for a full appreciation of the discussion in this book. Although the Consensus
has morphed into various things, it originally consisted of ten sets of policy recommen-
dations for developing countries including amongst other things fiscal policy discipline,
elimination/redirection of public subsidies, tax reforms, privatisation, liberalisation, and
deregulation (of interest rates, exchange rates, industries). See J Williamson, ‘What Wash-
ington Means by Policy Reform’ in J Williamson (ed), Latin American Readjustment:
How Much Has Happened (Washington, Peterson Institute for International Economics
1989). The Consensus has been described as a tract for neoliberalism and has had a much
negative impact on developing countries. See J Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents
(New York, W. W. Norton 2002) 53.
4 Some discussion of the Millenium Development Goals and the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals will be weaved into the central narrative of this book.
5 O Sofola, ‘The Nigerian Law of Consumer Credit and Security’ (PhD thesis, King’s
College, University of London 1988).
6 N Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers (New York,
Cornell University Press 2006) 141.
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

on the domestic policy landscape of Nigeria.7 This period (1983–1989)

also marked the rebirth of monetarism in Nigeria through the Struc-
tural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The World Bank’s solutions to the
economic problem of Nigeria consisted mainly in privatisation, liberali-
sation, and formalisation.8 Privatisation and liberalisation, according to
the institutions, would make for better competition. Credit controls and
various subsidies were removed, such that access to credit products was
left to market forces. Thus, SAP emphasised credit availability but ignored
the distributional impact on consumer borrowers.
The international institutions were right to point out the implementa-
tion failures of the state-centric model riddled by official corruption, rapid
inflation, and other macroeconomic imbalances. However, monetarism
and financial liberalisation ignore the social and economic well-being
objectives that the previous model sought to achieve by promoting
access to affordable finance. As far as SAP went, the individual welfare
of consumers was an afterthought. Although this book is not primarily
a critique of SAP, the implications of SAP continue to be relevant in
the present day for consumers of financial services in sub-Saharan Africa
and indeed all affected countries.9 By devaluing the Nigerian currency
(Naira) and implementing austerity measures, including the introduction
of tuition and surcharges for education and health services, the govern-
ment undermined access to essential services like education and health
care.10 For instance, Woods characterised the impact of SAP on consumer
welfare as follows:

Public sector job retrenchments, job losses in other areas, cutbacks in food
subsidies and welfare provisions, as well as a loss in the quality of welfare
provisions, the general economic slowdown, and the lack of any political
voice in the process of adjustment all exacted a high price on the poor in
sub-Saharan Africa.11

7 ibid. 141.
8 World Bank, World Development Report: Financial Systems and Development World
Development Indicators (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1989).
9 K Konadu-Agyemang, IMF and World Bank Programs in Africa: Ghana’s Experience,
1983–1999 (Aldershot, Hampshire, UK, Ashgate International 2001).
10 Woods (n 6) 141–155.
11 ibid 158.
4 P. I.-O. OMEDE

SAP increased the demand for consumer credit and decreased the
opportunity to access safe credit products in the newly deregulated
market. The resulting adverse conditions grossly diminished individual
and collective capacities to save, invest, and fund consumption without
borrowing.12 Beyond these immediate consequences, Nigeria continues
to follow the policy path charted by SAP despite the World Bank and
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries having made a fundamental shift in regulatory policy since the
early 2000s and particularly since the Global Recession of 2008.13 In
this book, the role of financial exclusion, predatory lending, and over-
indebtedness in frustrating the achievement of the MDG goals14 and
targets in 2015, and their ramifications for the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDG) ahead of 2030 are discussed extensively. For example,
consumer credit potentially impacts attainment of the SDGs globally,
including SDG 1 (end poverty), SDG 2 (zero hunger), SDG 3 (good
health and well-being), SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 8 (promote
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent
work), and SDG 9 (improve sustainable industrialisation and fostering
innovation).
This chapter is structured into four sections. Section 1.2 which follows
directly below sets out the research questions and clarifies the context in
which recurring terms are used throughout this book. Section 1.3 outlines
the contributions of this book to knowledge. Section 1.4 presents the

12 D Rodrik, ‘Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A

Review of the World Bank’s “Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of
Reform”’ (2006) 44 (4) Journal of Economic Literature 973–987; World Bank, Economic
Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (Washington, DC, World Bank
2005).
13 For instance, the World Bank’s Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection
2017 promotes ex ante approaches to consumer protection and embraces behavioural
science in regulatory policy. This shift in approach by the World Bank from ex post to ex
ante regulation is a departure from the neoclassical economics assumption of consumers
as rational agents. See World Bank, Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection
(Washington, DC, World Bank 2017); O Bar-Gill and E Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’
(2008) 157(1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1–101.
14 The MDG goals were as follows: Goal 1—Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;
Goal 2—Achieve universal primary education; Goal 3—Promote gender equality and
empower women; Goal 4—Reduce child mortality; Goal 5—Improve maternal health;
Goal 6—Combat HIV/AIDs, malaria, and other diseases; Goal 7—Ensure environmental
sustainability; and Goal 8—Develop a global partnership for development.
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

research methodology. It offers a background to the qualitative interviews

undertaken in the course of this study. Section 1.5 provides an overview
of the entire book by providing summaries of the structure and contents
of all the chapters in the book.

1.2 Research Question

The book poses the following research questions: What is the legal struc-
ture of consumer credit in Nigeria? And how beneficial is the evolving
international approach to consumer credit regulation to consumers of
credit products and services in Nigeria?
Implicit in the research questions are the assumptions that there is a
regulatory framework for consumer credit in Nigeria currently in oper-
ation, and there is an approach common to credit policies made by
the different international financial institutions. While domestic law on
consumer credit in Nigeria derives from legislation, case law, and to some
extent, customary law, international rules on consumer credit derive from
more diverse and fluid sources. The book will consider three sources of
transnational regulation of consumer credit. The first source is rules made
by the World Bank (The Bank) and the IMF. The Bank has two main
goals which are to ‘end extreme poverty by decreasing the percentage of
people living on less than USD 1.90 a day to no more than 3% (sic)’,
and to ‘promote shared prosperity by fostering the income growth of
the bottom 40% (sic) for every country’.15 The Bank’s strategy involves
providing ‘low-interest loans, zero to low-interest credits, and grants to
developing countries’.16 It also co-finances development projects with
‘governments, other multilateral institutions, commercial banks, export
credit agencies, and private sector investors’.17 The IMF ensures ‘the
stability of the international monetary system—the system of exchange
rates and international payments that enables countries (and the [ir] citi-
zens) to transact with each other’.18 The IMF achieves this by combining
economic and financial surveillance, technical assistance and training,

15 World Bank, ‘What We Do’ (World Bank, 3 May 2019) http://www.worldbank.

org/en/about/what-we-do, accessed 3 May 2019.
16 ibid.
17 ibid.
18 International Monetary Fund, ‘The IMF at a Glance’ (IMF , 3 May 2019) https://
www.imf.org/en/About, accessed 03 May 2019.
6 P. I.-O. OMEDE

direct lending to member countries, and providing a robust statistics and

research database to assist global economic policymaking.
As highlighted earlier, the Bank and the IMF’s goals involve inevitably
shaping domestic regulatory policies of member-states. There is no doubt
that both institutions have evolved ideologically since the Global Reces-
sion (Chapter 5). However, the legacies of SAP continue to define
consumer credit regulation in Nigeria.
The second group of influential rule-makers is transnational non-
governmental associations like the G20, the OECD, and the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision. Together, these bodies have initiated
various reforms to (i) strengthen the resilience of financial institutions,
mainly, Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs); and (ii) protect
consumers of financial products and services especially since the Global
Recession (Chapter 5).19 Rules made by these otherwise informal associ-
ations even though designed to apply voluntarily become soft law and
binding in jurisdictions unrepresented in these associations, including
many developing countries. For example, the IMF’s Financial Sector
Assessment Programme (FSAP) considers the observance of standards and
codes issued by these bodies as part of its assessment of prudential regu-
lations and supervision even where the country under assessment is not a
member of the institution issuing the standard or code.20
The third group of influential rules considered in this book are those
made by advanced countries of the European Union (EU),21 the UK, and
the US because of the amount of influence they have on other countries.
Despite this diversity of sources and institutional missions, collectively,
the international approach is defined by its commitment to neoliberal

19 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision High-

Level Summary of Basel III Reforms’ (BIS, 2017) https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/
d424_hlsummary.pdf, accessed 13 August 2019.
20 C Brummer, ‘Post-American Securities Regulation’ (2010) 98 California Law Review
327, 384; GA Onagoruwa, ‘Legitimacy Deficit of Soft Law Institutions in Cross-Border
Bank Regulation: An African Perspective’ (2014) 34 Journal of International Banking Law
and Regulation 258.
21 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 April 2008 on Credit Agreements for Consumers and Repealing Council
Directive 87/102/EEC [2002] OJ L 133/66 (Consumer Credit Directive 2008).
See also G20, ‘High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection’ (OECD
October 2011) https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/48892010.pdf, accessed
13 August 2019 which endorsed the approach.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

market policies. There are three areas of tensions between the interna-
tional approach and consumer credit policy in Nigeria. First, there is
confusion about the meaning of neoliberalism. The regulatory tools avail-
able to neoliberal governments across the world continue to change and
expand particularly after each major crisis, but the extent to which regu-
lators in Nigeria and developing countries are shaping or following this
evolution is debatable (Chapters 2 and 5). According to Hall,22 for a
shift in paradigm to occur, an idea, or a set of ideas existing on the
periphery requires proximity to power to translate to official policy. In
Nigeria, there is a dissonance between politics and policy outcomes. Elec-
tions are won and lost (and by extension appointment of regulators) on
the bases of primordial factors like ethnicity, religion, available campaign
funds, rather than the strength of party manifestoes, political ideology, or
the intellectual abilities of candidates.23 Individual actors in the financial
system are occasionally sacrificed after significant scandals,24 but the ideo-
logical backlash of the sort that leads to a paradigm shift rarely materialises
(Chapters 6 and 7). Secondly, international institutions have the means
to enforce25 their own rules in developing countries when the incentive

22 PA Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Ease of Economic
Policy-Making in Britain’ (1993) 25 (3) Comparative Politics 275–296.
23 J Campbell, ‘Nigeria: Political Parties’ Limitations’ (Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, 10 February 2014) https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-political-parties-limitations,
accessed 13 August 2019. Political parties are hardly distinguishable by reference to
ideology, which explains why politicians cross-carpet all the time.
24 E.g. the bankers behind the credit crisis of 2009 and the banking reforms that
followed.
25 The IMF and World Bank wield enormous persuasive influence on borrowing coun-
tries. They persuade borrowers through political and diplomatic pressures by some of their
wealthiest board members (e.g. the US) and their strong bargaining powers built on penal-
ties and conditionality vis-à-vis the practically desperate circumstances of their borrowers.
They can also decline to lend to applicants (borrowing states) who fail to comply with
these, which also can be construed as an indictment of the country’s economic policy. A
borrowing state in default could also be sanctioned. See N Woods, The Globalizers: The
IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers (New York, Cornell University Press 2006)
65–67, 70–71. However, the persuasive capacity of the IMF and the World Bank is not
always built on forceful measures. Rather, through a system of elite networks that straddle
national and international establishments (e.g. Ivy league trained economists with a shared
world view), described by some as ‘epistemic communities’, the IMF and World Bank can
‘penetrate’ national institutions to impose their policies. See E Adler and PM Haas, ‘Con-
clusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research
Program’ (1992) 46 (1) International Organization 367–390. For example, to counter
8 P. I.-O. OMEDE

exists (e.g. to foster international financial stability or minimise expo-

sures to sovereign default), but the motivation to impose reforms that
do not directly benefit them or their influential members (e.g. consumer
protection) is often absent. Instead of focusing on the legitimacy of
transnational rules vis-à-vis state sovereignty, this book will focus on the
merits of specific transnational regulations, the nature of the role that
IFIs perform in developing countries, and how they can perform this role
to improve Nigerian consumer credit regulation and the well-being of
low-income consumer borrowers in Nigeria. Lastly, context matters to
effective rule-making. One rule can have opposite outcomes in developing
and developed countries (Chapter 6).

1.2.1 Neoliberalism
There are, at least, three different connotations of neoliberalism as: (a) an
ideology; (b) a mode of governance; and (c) a policy package.26 As an
ideology, neoliberalism embraces strong individual property rights, rule
of law, freedom of contract, and state monopoly of violence to enforce
these rights.27 This ideology favours:

A minimised role for the state and a maximised role for the market
(the private business sector) in the belief that the market is: (a) the
most efficient and equitable distributor of resources and rewards; (b) the
best guarantor of economic growth; and (c) the most able protector of
individual liberty.28

national trade ministries’ resistance to liberalisation, the World Bank might work through
a country’s Central Bank as it did with Mexico in the 1980s, in effect playing national
institutions against each other. See B Heredia, ‘Profits and Politics’ in S Maxfield and R
Anzaldua (eds), Government and the Private Sector in Contemporary Mexico (San Diego,
CA, Center for US-Mexican Studies 1987).
26 MB Steger and RK Roy, Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, Oxford
University Press 2010) 11.
27 D Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005)
66–70; S Hall, ‘The Neo-Liberal Revolution’ (2011) 25 Cultural Studies 705–728;
P Bennett, Popular Culture and the Austerity Myth: Hard Times Today (New York,
Routledge 2017).
28 G Gall, R Hurd, and A Wilkinson, ‘Labour Unionism and Neo-Liberalism’ in G
Gall, R Hurd, and A Wilkinson (eds), The International Handbook of Labour Unions
Responses to Neo-Liberalism (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011) 1–12.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

As a mode of governance, neoliberalism connotes ‘a normative order…

[a] widely and deeply disseminated governing rationality’ that radically
transforms ‘every human domain and endeavor (sic), including humans
themselves, according to a specific image of the economic’.29 This dimen-
sion of neoliberalism is famously expressed in the Foucauldian idea of
‘governmentalities’ rooted in ‘entrepreneurial values such as competitive-
ness, self-interest, and decentralization (sic)’.30 The Marxist account of
neoliberalism also falls within this dimension. According to the Marxist
account, the main objectives of neoliberalism are ‘the restoration and
increase of the power, income, and wealth of upper classes…a phase of
managerial capitalism…’.31
The third dimension of neoliberalism and the most precise sense in
which it is used in this book expresses itself as a concrete set of poli-
cies namely, deregulation (of the economy); liberalisation (of trade and
industry); and privatisation (of state-owned enterprises).32 In this sense,
the term enables the discussion of the role of regulation in facilitating
access to consumer credit in Nigeria and strengthening the rights of
consumers within the market. This is not to say that the other dimen-
sions of neoliberalism, namely as ideology and mode of governance are
irrelevant to this analysis. However, as the goal of this book is to examine
the practical manifestation of neoliberalism in the context of the Nige-
rian consumer credit market, a debate about the ideological content of
neoliberalism is a secondary exercise to the extent that the analysis of
the utility of consumer credit to low-income individuals in developing
countries, and the expanding role of the state in global financial markets
are as ideological as they are programmatic and policy-oriented. Simi-
larly, understanding neoliberalism in the Foucauldian sense minimises
the analytical risk to obfuscate neoliberalism as advocating non-state

29 W Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York, Zone
Books 2015) 9–10.
30 Steger and Roy (n 26) 11; M Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège
de France, 1978–1979 (M Senellart ed, G Burchell tr, New York, Palgrave Macmillan
2008) 27.
31 G Dumenil and D Levy, The Crisis of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, Harvard University
Press 2012).
32 Steger and Roy (n 26) 11; A Fraser, E Murphy, and S Kelly, ‘Deepening Neolib-
eralism via Austerity and “Reform”: The Case of Ireland’ (2013) 6 Human Geography
38–53.
10 P. I.-O. OMEDE

intervention or to confuse neoliberalism for libertarianism. Accordingly,

examining policies helps to highlight the point that neoliberalism does not
seek to challenge state power and authority. Rather, it is the use of state
authority by advocates and agents of neoliberalism (in this case Nigerian
and transnational regulators) to advance amongst other things the global-
isation of financial rules.33 In other words, neoliberalism depends on state
interventions (change in laws and regulations) to come into existence.34

1.2.2 Consumer Credit/Debt

Consumer credit/debt, as used in this book, embraces:

both money that is lent and borrowed as money, without being specifically
tied to the purchase of any particular goods and services, and also any part
of the purchase price of specific goods and services that is not paid on the
spot but deferred for later settlement.35

For convenience, the term ‘individual credit’ is used throughout this

book in appreciation of the difficulty of sorting the consumer needs
of individual borrowers in Nigeria from their entrepreneurial ventures.
Indeed, the boundary between consumer credit and micro, small, and
medium enterprises (MSME) credit is fluid as individual borrowers could
apply loans to both uses. For example, an individual borrower can spend a
consumer loan on educating a child who works part-time for the family’s
small business after school hours.36
Secondly, although the study sought to emphasise the experiences of
lower-end borrowers in accessing consumer credit, it inevitably captures
people from the middle classes37 due to the wide brackets of exclusion.

33 Gall, Hurd, and Wilkinson (n 28) 1–12.

34 M Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Winchester, Zero Books
2009).
35 Committee on Consumer Credit Law, Consumer Credit: Report of the Committee
(Cmnd 4596, 1971) 13.
36 Formal lenders interviewed in Nigeria preferred ‘retail credit’ to individual or
consumer credit. Most of the respondents from the formal sector apply identical criteria
for individual and business loan assessments. Hence, several responses in the interviews
mention MSME and business plans when discussing loan approval process because the
creditworthiness assessment is practically indistinguishable.
37 For example, civil servants, people who execute government contracts, traders.
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

This is especially so for consumer credit. Accordingly, the analyses will

focus on the protection of consumer borrowers rather than consumers of
banking/financial services generally.

1.3 Significance of the Study

The book makes three significant contributions to knowledge. First,
it highlights the inattention of regulators at transnational and national
institutions to the impact of regulatory reforms post-Global Recession
on access to consumer credit in developing countries, even though
government policies since the 1970s across the world have increased the
borrowing needs of the poorest consumers. Policy debates on consumer
credit have orbited around the glut of household credit in developed
countries and overleveraged positions of financial institutions since the
Global Recession.38 The scale of economic losses and social displace-
ment occasioned by the Recession shifted regulatory attention from
deregulation, privatisation, and liberalisation in developed markets,39
to addressing systemic risks, strengthening consumer protection, and
fostering market discipline. However, the focus of this book on consumer
credit in Nigeria stems from the fact that the extent of engagement,
if not dependence, of individuals on borrowing in order to meet basic
needs in developing countries is underestimated, especially post-COVID-
19, hence the cost of borrowing and its impact on the welfare of poor
consumers has not received adequate policy attention. In many devel-
oping countries, most households and businesses have no access to formal
credit, and as a result, are exposed to unsafe credit, particularly in informal

38 BS Bernanke, TF Geithner, and HM Paulson, Firefighting: The Financial Crisis

and Its Lessons (New York, Penguin Books 2019) 11–12; E Liikanen and others,
‘High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector’
(Liikanen Report 2012) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_exp
ert_group/liikanen-report/final_report_en.pdf, accessed 13 August 2019; HM Trea-
sury, ‘Reforming Financial Markets’ (2009) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238578/7667.pdf, accessed 13 August 2019; US
Department of the Treasury, ‘Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation’
(2009) http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf, accessed
13 August 2019.
39 For instance, the Crowther report on consumer credit in the UK advocated a liberal
regulatory framework and less government intervention. See Committee on Consumer
Credit Law (n 35).
12 P. I.-O. OMEDE

markets. Unfortunately, this has neither received significant attention

from transnational regulators nor legal scholars.40
The second significant contribution is that it updates the existing liter-
ature on consumer credit in Nigeria while deploying a critical approach.
Existing studies on consumer credit in Nigeria fall into three categories.
The first category consists of doctrinal overviews of the legal framework
for consumer credit in Nigeria.41 The most significant work on the legal
framework of consumer credit in Nigeria was a doctoral book completed
in 1988, which lays out the legal structure for consumer credit in Nigeria
and mentions the economic impact of SAP on access to consumer credit.
It, however, does not engage with the economic assumptions behind
SAP and how those assumptions shaped regulation and institutional set-
up for consumer lending in Nigeria. The second category of studies
uses sociological methods to document indigenous practices of consumer
credit, particularly, indigenous lending forms and practices in pre- and
post-colonial Nigeria.42 The third category of studies includes economic
analyses. This category uses mainly quantitative methods to present micro
and macroeconomic accounts of credit supply to different sectors of the

40 There have been studies arguing for mainstream bank lending to the poor and
in poor communities across developed countries on the ground that such lending can be
profitable. See T Wilson, ‘Responsible Lending or Restrictive Lending Practices? Balancing
Concerns with Addressing Financial Exclusion’ in M Kelly-Louw, JP Nehf, and P Rott
(eds), The Future of Consumer Credit Regulation: Creative Approaches to Emerging Prob-
lems (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited 2008) 91–106; MS Barr, ‘Credit Where
It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics’ (2005) 80 (2) New York
University Law Review 513–652; IDC Ramsay, ‘Consumer Credit Law, Distributive Justice
and the Welfare State’ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 177. Financial exclusion
in developing countries is also broadly recognised as a fact by IFIs. However, the plight
of the consumer borrower in developing countries has neither been central to financial
inclusion advocacy, nor an independent argument for opening up formal sector credit
to consumer borrowers. Rather, the focus of such advocacy has been the promotion of
entrepreneurship. See International Monetary Fund, ‘Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-
Saharan Africa Restarting the Growth Engine’ (Washington, DC, International Monetary
Fund 2017). During the course of this study, despite concerted efforts, no substan-
tive studies on this topic by academics, including Nigerian scholars was found. The
limited online presence of some of the leading academic journals in Africa may be partly
accountable for this outcome.
41 See for example Sofola (n 5).
42 T Falola, ‘My Friend the Shylock: Money-Lenders and Their Clients in South-
Western Nigeria’ (1993) 34 Journal of African History 403–423; C Udry, ‘Credit Markets
in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy’ (1990) 4(1) The World
Bank Economic Review 251–269.
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

Nigerian economy and generally analyses the market efficiency aspect

with little focus on the distributional impact of credit and the role of
regulation.
This book provides a socio-legal appraisal of the distributional impact
of current credit market regulations in Nigeria and a deft account of the
impact of transnational regulation on the welfare of users of consumer
credit in Nigeria. Although this book is not the first to study credit regu-
lation from a socio-legal perspective in Nigeria, previous studies on the
link between international regulation and the behaviours of actors in the
Nigerian credit market have focused on corporate or business credit rather
than individual credit.43 This book provides an account of the role of
law in financial markets and the utility of credit to consumers, drawing
on law and economics literature.44 It introduces a new perspective to
the analysis of the use of consumer credit to borrowers in developing
countries by focusing on the welfare implications of deregulating access
to consumer credit. The traditional approach assumes that direct lending
to the poor does not reduce poverty significantly, but that lending to
micro-entrepreneurs does have trickle-down effect from non-poor middle
class to the poor.45 This thinking formed the foundation for the promo-
tion and proliferation of microfinance institutions in developing countries
as the way out of poverty. Microfinance institutions were meant to
rescue poor borrowers from exploitation by moneylenders and loan sharks
generally.
The book examines the content and impact of transnational rules
on access to individual credit in Nigeria primarily, while analyses of
the constitutional legitimacy of transnational soft law is undertaken to

43 B Adebola, ‘Corporate Rescue and the Nigerian Insolvency System’ (PhD book,
UCL 2013) 191; O Odetola, ‘Corporate Debt Restructuring and the Global Harmon-
isation Process: Emerging Trends in Africa’ (PhD book, University of Kent 2018)
207.
44 RJ Van den Bergh and AM Pacces (eds), ‘Regulation and Economics’, in Ency-
clopedia of Law and Economics (2nd edn, 2012) https://www.elgaronline.com/view/
nlm-book/9781782547457/b9_int01.xml, accessed 01 December 2019. See also TS
Ulen, ‘Methodologies of Law and Economics’, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
(2nd edn, 2017) https://www.elgaronline.com/view/nlm-book/9781782547457/b9_
int01.xml, accessed 01 December 2019.
45 World Bank, ‘Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access’ (2009) 24
(1) The World Bank Research Observer 143.
14 P. I.-O. OMEDE

provide a contextual background.46 Although IFIs have evolved a more

robust consumer protection paradigm since the Global Recession, scep-
ticism towards consumer lending remains strong amongst formal lenders
and prudential supervisors around the world.47 The Bank to its credit
has in recent years promoted digital finance as a fast route to financial
inclusion,48 but concerns remain that digital finance in Nigeria has over-
whelmingly benefitted traditional commercial bank clients as opposed to
the integration of low-income consumer borrowers. The experience in
Nigeria with the digital evolution challenges fundamentally the assump-
tion by IFIs that access to a bank account is the most important
step towards accessing formal credit. To the contrary, rules designed
to maintain global financial stability continue to discriminate against
weaker borrowers systematically even after holding savings accounts.49
First, they tend to emphasise market protection over the protection of
consumer borrowers. In Nigeria, market protection measures dispro-
portionately affect weaker borrowers while accommodating riskier but
wealthy consumers.50 Secondly, the preference of transnational and Nige-
rian regulators for producer credit over consumer credit deviates from
neoliberalism in that it subjugates borrower autonomy, but more funda-
mentally raises the question: If it is acceptable to dictate responsibilities
for MFIs, why is it unacceptable to mandate commercial banks to lend
to all categories of eligible borrowers?51 This sets the tone for analysis
of the reluctance of IFIs to recommend regulation along the lines of the
Community Reinvestment Act 1977 in the US and similar statutes that
universalise consumer lending responsibilities to all formal sector banking
institutions as opposed to the Nigerian and IFIs’ MFI-driven approach.

46 cf Onagoruwa (n 20) 258; Brummer (n 20) 327–384.

47 World Bank, ‘Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access’ (n 45) 143.
48 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, ‘A G7 Partnership for Women’s Digital Financial
Inclusion in Africa’ (July, 2019) https://docs.gatesfoundation.org/Documents/Womens
DigitalFinancialInclusioninAfrica_English.pdf, accessed 13 August 2019.
49 See, for example, analysis of the impact of Basel II and anti-money laundering
regulations in Chapters 5 and 6.
50 S Apati, The Nigerian Banking Sector Reforms: Power and Politics (1st ed., Palgrave
Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions 2012).
51 S Rutherford, ‘The Savings of the Poor: Improving Financial Services in Bangladesh’
(1998) 10 (1) Journal of International Development 1–15.
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

Besides highlighting the impact of deregulation (of access), the book

highlights the broader impact of privatisation of financial markets for
weaker borrowers in Nigeria. Privatisation made it possible for political
and business elites to convert public assets to private wealth, for instance,
taking over public schools, hospitals, and financial institutions for which,
they charge premium fees that the newly disempowered groups cannot
afford.52 By focusing on the impact of transnational rules, this study
serves as a reminder to credit regulators at the international level of the
need to take into account the context of different countries when enacting
rules intended to have universal application.
The third contribution of this book is that it draws attention to the
complicity of transnational regulation in generating fissures in regulatory
protection for different consumer groups. Regulation impacts consumers
in developed and developing countries differently. The fact of uneven
protection for consumers in developed and developing countries is widely
understood and is itself a criterion for assessing a country’s performance
on the Human Development Index,53 but the role of transnational regu-
lation in perpetuating unequal protection for consumer borrowers in
developing countries is less appreciated.54 The subordination of consumer
protection to market protection by IFIs since the Global Recession has
fed the growth of informal markets in Nigeria and widened the protec-
tion gap between consumers of formal and informal credit products.
The book finds that overall, stronger market protection measures since
the Global Recession have generated a bigger group of under-protected
consumers in Nigeria and that transnational regulation is directly instru-
mental to this outcome.55 The focus of this book is on how formal rules
cause more consumers to patronise informal lenders, rather than any in-
depth discussion of informal credit markets. This book will argue that
formal and informal markets are not binary and that both can present

52 P Lewis and H Stein, ‘Shifting Fortunes: The Political Economy of Financial

Liberalization’ (1997) 25 (1) World Development 5–22.
53 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Reports’ (UNDP
2019) http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi, accessed 5
December 2019.
54 See discussion at Sect. 7.10 at XXX.
55 PI Omede, ‘A Tale of Two Markets: How Lower-End Borrowers Are Punished for
Bank Regulatory Failures in Nigeria’ (2020) Journal of Consumer Policy https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10603-019-09439-8, accessed 28 March 2020.
16 P. I.-O. OMEDE

welfare-enhancing benefits and risks that require effective regulation to

balance.56

1.4 Research Methodology

This book adopted a socio-legal research method in answering the
research questions. This approach considers law as a ‘social phenomenon’,
and a concept that cannot be fully understood in its pure abstract form.57
Social and economic theories provide a robust framework for articulating
the case for consumer credit regulation (Chapter 2). To effectively address
the research questions, the book engages with economic neoliberalism
as an analytical framework, the influences of psychology (behavioural
science) on law, and the historical relationship of Nigeria with transna-
tional institutions.58 The book acknowledges the difficulty of articulating
a strong case for reforming consumer credit in Nigeria without addressing
the social and political spaces within which regulation is made. The emer-
gence of the current international regulatory paradigm had its roots in the
economic losses, social displacement, and public outrage that followed the
Global Recession and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic that began in
2020. The decision of regulators to act and the tools adopted to enforce
the new rules are legal, political, and economic.
The processes through which national regulators adopt international
rules involve a lot of behind-the-scenes political negotiations, lobbying
of policymakers, and subtle economic threats. Therefore, the socio-legal
approach enhances the legal analysis in this book in that, according to
Grabham, it helps to comprehend how regulations ‘are fabricated, under-
stood and circulated as law by those who have drafted them, negotiated
them, argued against them, the people for whom they form part of a

56 E Hobson, WK Sameh, and M Angus, ‘Uganda—From Regulators to Enablers:

Role of City Governments in Economic Development of Greater Kampala’ (Washington
DC, World Bank 2017) http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/860311505816
462189/Uganda-From-regulators-to-enablers-role-of-city-governments-in-economic-dev
elopment-of-greater-Kampala, accessed 5 May 2019.
57 R Wacks, Philosophy of Law—A Very Short Introduction (2nd edn, OUP 2014).
58 R Cotterrell, ‘Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?’ (1998) 25 (2)
Journal of Law and Society 171, 173.
 1 INTRODUCTION 17

terrain of common knowledge and intervention’.59 The approach also

aids this book to examine the norms, political and economic underpin-
nings of international financial regulation and simultaneously to consider
how legal forms impact outcomes such as financial access and protection
for consumers in developing countries.60

1.4.1 Background to Interviews

The book employed qualitative interviews in Chapter 6 to under-
stand the ideological influences of regulators in Nigeria, the behavioural
responses of lenders to regulation, and the socio-cultural factors that
shape consumers’ borrowing choices.

1.4.1.1 Interview Sample

Data collection was completed using the semi-structured interview
format. The interviews were conducted on a small-scale (28 participants).
Despite its small size, the sample is nevertheless appropriate for this type
of qualitative study.61 A total of nine out of twenty-one commercial
banks,62 one Islamic Bank,63 and five Microfinance Institutions with State

59 E Grabham, ‘Time and Technique: The Legal Lives of the 26-Week Qualifying
Period’ (2016) 45 (3–4) Economy and Society 379–406.
60 A Riles, ‘New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities’
(2005) 53 (3) Buffalo Law Review 973–1033.
61 Generally, there is no set minimum number of respondents for a qualitative study.
See S Baker and R Edwards, ‘How Many Qualitative Interviews Is Enough? Expert Voices
and Early Career Reflections on Sampling and Cases in Qualitative Research’ (National
Centre for Research Methods Review Paper 2012); F Garland and M Travis, ‘Legislating
Intersex Equality: Building the Resilience of Intersex People Through Law’ (2018) 36
(4) Legal Studies 587–606; PI Fusch and LR Ness, ‘Are We There Yet? Data Saturation
in Qualitative Research’ (2015) 20 (9) The Qualitative Report 1408–1416. See also S
Wong and R Cain, ‘The Impact of Cuts in Legal Aid Funding of Private Family Law
Cases’ (2018) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 1–12 https://www.tandfonline.
com/doi/full/10.1080/09649069.2019.1554784, accessed 17 December 2019.
62 First City Monument Bank Plc (FCMBa), Unity Bank Plc (UnBb), Skye Bank PLC
(now Polaris Bank, PBc), United Bank For Africa Plc (UBAd), Access Bank Plc (ABe),
Guaranty Trust Bank Plc (GTBf), Sterling Bank Plc (SBg), Union Bank of Nigeria
Plc (UBNh), Zenith Bank Plc. (ZBi). See Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘List of Finan-
cial Institutions: Commercial Banks’ (CBN 2018). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/supervision/
Inst-DM.asp, accessed 31 August 2018.
63 Jaiz Bank PLC (JBq).
18 P. I.-O. OMEDE

Operating Licences in two states,64 were interviewed from the formal

sector. This is considered substantially representative of formal lenders
whose perspective is central to the study. The sample also consists of thir-
teen other respondents including individual borrowers,65 regulators,66
and legal practitioners.67

1.4.1.2 Sampling Technique and Limitations of Study

The study used purposive sampling to interview individuals who were
likely to have knowledge of, and account for, the impact of regulation on
access to finance as well as the global context of it, namely bankers, regula-
tors, and practitioners. Suitable participants were identified and contacted
via organisational websites, responses to administered questionnaires,
and snowballing. The sample is fairly distributed geographically drawing
participants from seven locations across three of the six geopolitical zones
in Nigeria.68
The study was limited by time and funding, such that the findings
are meant to provide only a synopsis of the lending behaviour of formal
lenders and to complement the general analyses of the research topic

64 Located in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja and Kogi State respectively, they are
Fortis Microfinance Bank PLC (FMBj), Hasal Microfinance Bank (HMBk), Ife Commu-
nity Bank Ltd (ICBl), Odagba CB (OCBm), and Mutual Trust Microfinance Bank
(MTMBn).
65 They are named for ease of reference Consumer Borrower 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
Questionnaire for this set of respondents broadly covered questions on individual attitudes
to borrowing, reasons for borrowing, the type of loan obtained, whom they borrowed
from, satisfaction with the process of borrowing, and the overall satisfaction with the loan.
66 The Central Bank of Nigeria (Regulator 1), the Federal Ministry of Finance [Budget
and Planning] (Regulator 2), the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Development
Agency (Regulator 3), and the Consumer Protection Council of Nigeria (Regulator 4).
Questionnaires for regulators were structured to elicit responses on the CBN’s regula-
tory purpose (monetary policy target, credit expansion, approach to banking supervision,
informal financial markets, consumer protection, non-performing loans, and bailouts),
the role of SMEDAN (advisory role, financing, and collaboration with other agencies),
Ministry of Finance’s role (fiscal policy, public debt, employment, and social security),
and the Consumer Protection Council (data on consumer complaints, types of complaints
received, process of lodging complaints, and the typical time taken to process complaints).
67 These include three lawyers and a police officer to help shed some light on lending
practices in the informal markets. It was difficult to get hold of informal lenders for the
interviews.
68 Abuja (Federal Capital Territory), Lagos (Lagos State), Lafia (Nassarawa State),
Ankpa, Anyigba, and Abejukolo (Kogi State), and Nsukka (Enugu State).
 1 INTRODUCTION 19

undertaken throughout this book.69 One additional challenge of inves-

tigating consumer borrowing through a qualitative study is that it is
difficult to sign up participants for interviews. This was the case in Nigeria
where cultural sensitivities about money debts made it difficult to recruit
consumer borrowers and informal lenders for interviews. Consequently,
broad generalisations and policy conclusions are not made from the
responses of participants outside of the formal sector lenders. Instead,
what these interviews sought to capture are the ramifications of lenders’
reactions to specific policy reforms and the impact on some consumers’
experiences, and to bring these to the attention of policymakers as they
contemplate future reforms in Nigeria and at the transnational levels.
Certainly, there is a need for a larger scale enquiry into this topic in the
future.70

1.4.2 Summary of Interview Findings

The book71 found that a lot of Nigerians borrow for consumption
smoothing purposes, but only a fraction has access to formal sector loans.
Formal sector loans are not necessarily affordable, and yet, relative to
many informal sector loans, are safer. Reforms introduced to recapitalise
commercial banks, check bank fraud and terrorism, and attract interna-
tional investment capital have produced some unintended consequences
such as a distortion of the supply of credit to different segments of the
market with many safe products reserved for the wealthy urban consumers
while poor and rural borrowers turned to unregulated products in the
informal markets. The findings particularly highlighted the impact of
BASEL II and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regulations and how as
part of their compliance strategy, commercial lenders in the formal market

69 Also known as ‘triangulation’, it involves the employment of multiple external

methods to collect and analyse data. See NK Denzin, ‘Triangulation 2.0’ (2012) 6 (2)
Journal of Mixed Methods Research 80–88; C Stavros and K Westberg, ‘Using Triangu-
lation and Multiple Case Studies to Advance Relationship Marketing Theory’ (2009) 12
(3) Qualitative Market Research 307–320.
70 A study of the issues raised in this book from a consumer borrower perspective will
further the reader’s understanding of scope of the issues raised in this book. A detailed
description of the ethics approval process, interview format, data storage, and analytical
tool is provided in the appendix to this book.
71 The qualitative findings are supported by other studies discussed throughout the
book.
Another random document with
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del Remey; la dona era la Munda, qui portava en una má un farcell
ab la roba de la Verge y en l’altra las claus de la capella, que durant
tot l’any estavan depositadas á la rectoria, ja que la ermita sols en
senyaladas festas estava oberta al públich.

Al arribar á la partició dels dos camins, la Montserrat s’adoná de que

deixava bon tros enrrera á la Munda que, atacada d’aufech, li
pantejava’l pit per l’esfors de voler seguir lo rápit caminar de sa jove
mestressa, qui retrocedint unas quantas passas, li digué
carinyosament:

—¡Pobre Munda! May me recordo de que tu no pots seguir lo meu

pas… Per aixó, jo havia dit de venir ab en Biel, pero com ha passat tot
lo sant dematí per escombrar y espolsar la ermita, he tingut por de
que aquesta tarde, faria falta á la parroquia… Pero ja veurás: tu te’n
pots anar á esperarme á ca’n Busqueta y jo com no tinch que fer més
que vestir á la Mare de Deu, ab mitja horeta torno á baixar…

—¿Y are? ¿ves si te’n anirias sola?… Desseguida ’t pensas que no ’t

puch seguir; y encara ’t voldria guanyar á pujar montanyas… Vos
penseu que perque una se posa vermella y sua una mica ja no es bona
per res… —exclamá la Munda aixugant sa cara amarada de suhor y
fent un violent esfors per calmar l’esbofegament de son pit que
semblava una manxa.

—No, dona, no… Ja sé que fas més tu ab un giravol de faldillas, que jo

en tot un dia… Pero aixó es á casa… A peu plá… No ab aquesta costa
que á mí també’m fa suar… ¡Oy! ¡y ab la calor d’avuy! ¡Vaja! ¡Vaja!
ves á veure un rato á la teua cosina, que de segur que fa dias que no
l’has vista y digas que deixi venir á la teua fillola á dinar á la rectoria
demá que es la diada de la Mare de Deu… Encara no haureu
comensat á enrahonar que jo ja estaré llesta… ¡Vaja dónam lo farcell
y las claus! —feu ab certa autoritat la noya. Y com vegés que la
Munda s’hi resistia, li prengué’l mocadó dihent:— ¡No sias tan
tossuda!… Y si tantas ganas tens de cansarte, quan hajes reposat un
rato á ca’n Busqueta, ¡puja! ¡Ja saps ahont soch!

Y apretant lo pas, la Montserrat se dirigí resoltament cap al camí de

la ermita, mentres que tot rondinant la Munda emprenia lo de la casa
de pagés.

La noya Gil, estava feta á pujar montanyas coneixia’l camí y en deu

minuts se trobá á la petita esplanada de l’esglesieta.

Una volta en ella, deixá’l farcell y las claus dessobre del padrís
adossat en lo llindar de la porta, y tirant enrera los petits rinxets, que
mitj tapavan son espayós front, aixugá ab son mocadoret de butxaca,
la suhor que casi, casi, en aquells moments, hi corria tan
abundosament com poca estona avans per la cara de la Munda.
Després feu un fort respir que aixamplá sos pulmons fadigats per la
rapidesa de la ascenció y girantse d’espatllas á la fatxada de la capella
s’atansá al rónech y ennegrit muralló que la voltava pera espargir los
ulls envers aquellas vessants de montanyas cobertas d’exuberant
vejetació, entre las que sobressurtian las clapas de las masias y de
algun que altre molí que anava escalonantse fins á topar en l’ample
faixa de las casas de Larrua, semblant desde’l mirador de la ermita,
una estensa pinzellada blanca, trencada en son centre pe’l perfil del
campanar de la parroquia y en son límit pe’l blau moradench del
mar, que llepant las columnas de ferro del Balneari se perdia fins á
confondres en la línea del cel.

La Montserrat contemplá per breus moments lo panorama que’s

desplegava devant de sos ulls y al girarse envers al ponent, per ahont
s’aixecavan las magestuosas serras del Montnegre, l’espigat turó de
Burriach y las montanyas de las Tres puntas, besada en aquell
instant per los enlluhernadors raigs del sol que pausadament
descendia á la posta, la sobtá la idea de que no tenia temps que
perdre y apartantse del mur, se dirigí á la capella qual porta obrí y
torná á tancar al esser dintre. En aquell moment, á la noya Gil li
sapigué greu de haver deixat á la Munda: aquell silenci per cap remor
interromput, la capella fosca, puig que tancada la porta, sols rebia
llum pe’l esquifit rossetó col·locat dessobre del portal de entrada, la
sorprengueren al trobarse sola; més passada la primera impressió y
un colp los ulls acostumats á aquella mitja claror, que sobradament
bastava pera deixarli veure aquellas parets y altars d’ella tant
coneguts, la Montserrat animosa de mena, se somrigué d’ella
mateixa y avansant cap al presbiteri, s’agenollá pera saludar á la
Verge del Remey á la que desde nina havia tingut sempre especial
devoció. Com gran part de las Mares de Deu trobadas, aquesta imatje
era casi negra, tenia uns dos pams y mitj d’alsada y sostenia á son
Fillet ab la má esquerra, mentres que en la dreta hi ostentava un pom
daurat. Vestia un trajo de domás vermellisch en forma de paperina y
un mantell de color de café resseguit de una puntilla de plata penjava
de sas espatllas. Alguns gerros ab flors de paper, y gran munió de
presentallas de cera y quadrets ab lo retol de Exvoto, en los que s’hi
veyan pintats portentosos miracles deguts á la valiosa intercessió de
tan divina Senyora, manifestavan lo fervor del poble de Larrua
envers á aquella santa Imatje, á la que’ls antepassats del sigle XI per
haverla trovada en aquell lloch, hi aixecaren la modesta, pero
macissa capella románica, en que sempre més hi havia estat
venerada.

Acabadas sas oracions, la Montserrat prengué la roba destinada á la

Imatge y pujant los dos grahons del presbiteri, obrí la portella
situada á la part dreta del retaule del altar ahont s’hi trobava la petita
sacristia, ab sa corresponent calaixera, contenint los ornaments més
necessaris pera la celebració de la Missa y un tram d’escapsats
esgrahons de pedra, per ahont se pujava al reduhit camaril de la
Verge, debilment il·luminat per duas estretas llencas que en forma de
sageteras, estavan obertas en la paret del absís y per las que
atansanthi’l cap, se veya lo muralló que circuhia la plasseta de la
capella, per aquella part casi tocant ab la paret de la ermita, lo qual
tenia per fondo las accidentadas vessants de las altas serraladas de la
costa.

La Montserrat posá desobre de un petit banch de fusta lo farcell que

portava y besant la má de la Verge y las duas del Jesuset comensá á
despullarlos, en lo moment que li semblá sentir remor de passos y de
veus, á prop seu. Un bon xich esparverada y altra volta un tros
arrepentida de haver deixat á la Munda, la nevoda del rector de
Larrua, doná una mirada á son entorn y una altra al baix de
l’esglesia, sens que sos ulls descubrissen lo més insignificant motiu
pera son sobressalt. La porta continuava tancada; la capella deserta;
las presentallas immóvils en las parets; los raigs de claror del sol
ponent que entravan pe’l rossetó del chor, seguian marcant petitas
clapas de llum, en las dauradas esculpturas del altar, que repercutian
dessobre las deterioradas llosas del paviment; sols esforsant l’ohido,
s’apercibia lo roséch dels córchs, endinsantse en lo vell fustám de la
ermita…

Estava sola, més eix mateix pensament, li semblá que contribuhia á

aumentar son esglay y desitjosa de acabar mes promptament la seua
tasca, s’apressá en ella y ja á punt de nuar al bon Jesús lo cordonet de
sa tuniqueta de domás blanch, brodada ab canyutillo d’or, torná á
sentir clara y sense lloch á duptes, la remor del trapitx y veus que
feya poca estona l’havian atemorisada, encara que en aquell moment
bon xich més clar que ho havia sentit avans. Passaren alguns
moments y la remor la sentí casi al costat seu… Instintivament la
Montserrat s’abrassá ab la imatge de la Verge que tambalejá
dessobre de son pedestal de fusta, y bategantli apressuradament lo
cor feu un esfors violent pera girar lo cap envers ahont se sentia’l
soroll.

La esporuguida noya se refeu tot seguit. La remor que l’havia

esglayada venia de la part de fora y atravessant per las escletxas
obertas á la paret, lo ressó penetrava clar y vibrant dins l’absís de la
capella. Sens dupte era gent que tot passejant havia pujat fins á la
plataforma de la ermita. No tenia perque sobressaltarse d’aquella
manera; Larrua y sos entorns eran pacífichs y jamay havia sentit
parlar de cap malifeta que pogués atemorisarla. La Montserrat, més
tranquilisada, se desprengué de la Imatge que fins aquell moment
havia tingut fortament abrassada, y’s preparava á desenmatxucar las
arrugas fetas per sos brassos al trajo de la Verge quan barrejada ab la
veu que feya alguns minuts tornava á sentir, n’apercebí una altra que
tot d’una feu afluhir á son cor tota la sanch de sas venas, imprimint
en sa cara la grogor de un cadavre. Per un moment, la noya Gil
tingué por que anava á cáure en terra, que los grahons de fusta
dessobre dels qu’estava enfilada, s’ensorravan sota sos peus; pero la
veu torná per segona volta á ressonar en l’absís y la Montserrat sens
casi alé per respirar, baixá los dos grahons de la tarima y atansantse
á la paret del fondo, passá sos ulls esbarats per las duas escletxas que
donavan al camp. Son ohido no la havia enganyada: la veu que al
mateix temps que en sas orellas l’havia sentida ressonar al bell mitg
de son cor, era la del amich de sa infantesa, la del home que ella
havia estimat ab una fé inquebrantable, la d’aquell Felip que feya tres
anys no havia vist y esperava que no havia de tornar á veure may
més; al menys tan aprop com lo veya en aquell instant y molt menos
al costat de una altra dona, retenint sas mans entre las seuas;
parlantli á tret de galta, paraulas que arribavan fins á ella, claras,
vibrants, fibladoras com los colps de un látigo, que á un mateix
temps li fuetejava lo cor y la cara.

La Montserrat pensá en apartarse d’aquell lloch; pero pareixia que

sos peus se li havian clavat en terra; volgué cridar y la llengua se li
paralisá dins de sa boca sens saliva; per un moment cregué que una
má de ferro, la subjectava en aquella paret ab una forsa
sobrehumana; més de sobte, ab sas duas mans geladas cubrí
esveradament sos ulls fixats en la forana parella; los nirvis de sos
polsos bategaren violentament devall de la pell que’ls subjectava; sas
camas tremolaren; un segament estrany doblegá sos genolls y sens
apartar las mans de sos ulls, se deixá cáure mitj asseguda sobre’l
primer grahó de la tarima que sostenia lo pedestal de la Verge.
Llarga estona passá la Montserrat en la mateixa posició: las camas
arronsadas, lo cos inclinat, lo cap caygut, las mans nerviosament
apretadas sobre’ls ulls… Son pensament lluytava en vá pera donar un
nou curs á sas ideas; volia pensar en sa casa; en aquella Imatge de la
Verge que acabava de vestir; en la seua mare; en lo convent ahont
havia passat los venturosos anys de sa infantesa, en las casas de
Larrua… Més tot era inútil; sa pensa com tancada dins d’un circol de
ferro, no li representava més que la parella que sos ulls tancats,
fotografiava més directament en lo clixé de son cervell. Los recorts,
las personas que son cor angustiat evocava, obehint al esfors de sa
voluntat, se presentavan en son magí, pero no hi prenian cos;
quedavan en segon terme, pera esfumarse y desapareixer, deixant
sempre en primera línea inundats per los últims raigs del sol ponent,
lo grupo d’en Felip y d’aquella dona, á qui ella no coneixia; á qui no
havia vist may y que no obstant, semblava que ab caragols de cer, la
tenia clavada en sa imaginació…

Més com no es possible que’l temps passi en vá, ni que las sensacions
per violentas que sian, deixin de tenir las seuas intermitencias,
transcorregut lo primer período, lo convenciment de que era precís
tornar á Larrua y la temensa de que la fosca no la sorprengués entre
aquellas parets, la mogué á aixecarse y la obligá á obrir los ulls que
durant tant llarga estona havia tingut fortament tancats. Allavoras al
passar la mirada per son entorn, al trobarse als peus d’aquella imatje
de María que ab sa mirada dolsa y reposada pareixia inundar á aquell
lloch ab una atmósfera de pau y serenitat; al fixar sos ulls en l’infant
Jesús, qui ab sa maneta estesa pareixia que li donava sa benedicció,
com los dos ángels que aguantavan los ciris del altar, semblava que
estavan ab los brassos oberts á punt de protegirla; la austeritat de la
nau de pedra que s’aixecava dessobre de son cap; la quietut que la
voltava, tan sols interrumpuda per l’aleteig de las orenetas y moixons
qu’entrant tranquilament pe’l rosetó de damunt de la porta, cercavan
en lo trespol del chor, lo niu de sos petits, feu pensar á la Montserrat,
que tal volta havia estat víctima de un horrorós somni, de una
estravagant alucinació de sos sentits, que ella no sabia esplicarse,
pero que havia passat per son magí… Tal volta degut al dejuni
d’aquell dia y que ella havia extremat per ésser consagrat á la Verge…
tal volta pe’l cansament de la pujada… per la impresió de trobarse
sola… potser per un ram de bojeria que li havia pujat al cervell…

Ningú li havia innovat que en Felip fos á Larrua… Per forsa havia
d’ésser una visió de sa pensa exaltada, desgraciadament massa plena
del recort d’aquell home al qui tant havia estimat… al qui estimava
encara…

Aclaparada per la horrible impresió que havia rebut, la Montserrat

s’apressá á donar un parell d’estiradas al vestit que havia posat á la
imatge de la Verge y sens detenirse á recullir, ni plegar lo que li havia
tret, mormolá maquinalment un Ave María y encara bategantli lo
cor, baixá dos trams de grahons de la sacristia y los dos del presbiteri
y dirigintse envers la porta, la obrí de bat á bat, desitjosa de trobarse
fora d’aquellas parets, frissosa de que la llum y l’ayre espargissen son
cap enterbolit…

Més la pobra noya, no havia acabat encara: en Felip, qui, abocat á la

llenca del mur de devant de la porta de la capella, acabava de donar
lo darrer adeu á la Clarita, que baixava á reunirse ab la seua filla y la
cambrera á la masia de ca’n Busqueta, al sentir lo ruido que feren al
obrirse las rovelladas frontissas de la macissa porta de la ermita, se
girá en rodó y al veure apareixer en son llindar, la esbelta y hermosa
figura de la Montserrat, sobtat per la sorpresa, atret per aquella
bellesa esculptural, desarrollada en los tres anys que no l’havia vist,
tan hermosa per la forma, com per las virtuts que atresorava, més
resplandeixent en aquell instant, per lo contrast ab la dona venal que
acabava de deixar, l’hereu Bach, sens temps de reflexionar en la
indignitat de sa conducta, ni sols pensar que la Montserrat pogués
haverla vista ni sentida, deixantse portar tant sols per l’amor que per
una d’eixas estranyas anomalias que sovintejavan més de lo que
sembla en lo cor del home, hi era en lo seu més adormit que acabat,
corregué envers la noya y agafantli avans de que ella hagués pogut
prevenirho abduas mans entre las seuas, li digué ab veritable
apassionament:

—¡Montserrat! ¡Montserrat meua! Tens dret á dirmho tot. ¡He sigut

un ingrat! ¡un infame ab lo meu procedir! pero ab tot lo meu
miserable comportament t’he estimat y ¡t’estimo! Sí; may ho havia
reconegut com ara. Ni los plahers, ni las distraccions, ni las donas
que he vist en altres pahissos, m’han fet oblidar de tu, ni deixar
d’estimarte un sol instant. Per culpa meua ’t vaig perdre… jo era
massa jove pera resistir á la autoritat del meu pare, pero avuy…

La Montserrat no’l deixá acabar. Refeta de la sorpresa, convensuda

de que la vissió, havia estat realitat palpable, fuetejada en los seus
sentiments purs, immaculats com los de un ángel del cel, pero altius
y dignes; ab més glóbulos en sas venas de la sanch del seu avi, valent
lluytador de un ideal polítich, que de la seua mare pacienta sufridora
de sas penas; la neta dels Villadó, lluytant ab tota la forsa de son
amor trahit y de sa dignitat ofesa, per desferse de las mans d’en
Felip, li digué apoch apoch, contrastant la calmosa dicció de sas
paraulas, ab la agitació nerviosa de tot son cos y la visible alteració de
sa veu:

—Mira, Felip, la creencia ferma, indestructible que la meua mare

desde nina, arrelá fondament en mí, de una vida eterna, ahont hi
tinch que trobar al Deu qu’estimo sobre totas las cosas, me feu
soportar lo trossejament del meu cor per la teua traydoria, com més
tart me feu conformar ab la pérdua de la mellor de las mares. Donchs
mira, —feu la Montserrat exaltantse per moments y clavant á n’en
Felip sos ulls il·luminats per la indignació,— si are’m diguessen, que
per heure aquest cel que ha estat la esperansa y conhort de la meua
vida, m’era precís casarme ab tú, ¡fins hi renunciaria per no véuret
un moment més al meu costat!

Al sentir dels llabis de la neboda de Mossen Jaume, las darreras

paraulas que acabava de proferir, l’hereu Bach que fondament la
coneixia, endeviná tot seguit lo que havia passat, y sentint que la
rojor de la vergonya envermellia sas galtas, afluixá instantáneament
las mans ab que la subjectava y sens trobar una sola paraula de
disculpa, baixá los ulls en terra y feu dos passos enrera, entant que la
Montserrat, espantada de que la gelosía y la indignació haguessen
pogut fer passar per sa cristiana y fervorosa pensa los conceptes que
acabava de pronunciar, se dirigí resoltament envers al camí de la
masía, per ahont semblantli la corda de salvació que’s tira al
náufrech entre las onas de la tempestat, hi vegé pujar penosament á
la Munda…
En Felip restá per uns moments abatut, anorreat. En lo fons d’aquell
ser d’argila, com un brillant entre’l llot, hi estava soterrada la imatge
de la Montserrat, á punt de que’l més petit frech la fes apareixer
il·luminant ab sos reflexos lo fanch que la empresonava; mes la
casualitat acabava d’aixecar entre’ls dos una infranquejable
resclosa… en Felip coneixia sobradament á la enamorada de sa
infantesa pera abrigar la més petita esperansa de reconciliació…

Per llarga estona fixá sos ulls emboyrats per una llágrima envers la
baixada per ahont la Montserrat desaparegué envolta entre las
primeras ombras de la nit. Sa vista la segui perfidiosament fins que
son trajo negre restá confós entre las foscas siluetas dels arbres y
entre’ls arsos y pedras del camí, esvahintse en mitj de la immensa
taca negre que las tenebras estenian dessobre la llarga restallera de
las casas de Larrua. Allavors, com si la Montserrat s’hagués endut ab
ella l’imán que per alguns moments havia avivat las adormidas fibras
d’aquell cor, un sarcástich somriure contragué sos llabis febrosenchs,
y aixecant lo cap exclamá nerviosament:

—Tots s’empenyan en que rodi… ¡donchs rodaré!

 Fi de temporada.
Passada la festa de la Nativitat de la Mare de Deu, de la crème dels
forasters, tan sols quedavan á Larrua los que hi tenian propietats:
una vintena de familias, que las unas pera esperar á fer lo vi y altres
per la desanimació que habitualment regna á Barcelona al més de
Setembre, hi feyan temps esperanthi las festas de la Mercé, en lo seu
fort per l’any 1879, época de la nostra narració. La gran sala del
Balneari, no era, donchs, lo saló animat y bulliciós que havém vist á
mitjans de Juliol. Hasta á ben entrada la vetlla, no’s donava forsa al
gas, puig fins allavoras no comensava á anarhi alguna que altra
familia, que arrebossada ab abrichs més ó menos lleugers pera
resguardarse de la humitat, anava á esperarhi l’hora de ficarse al llit,
enrahonant una estona quan la reunió era sols de senyoras, y acudint
als passatemps de la época de Carlos IV, ó sía jugant á jochs de
prendas, quan á algun dels pochs joves que encara s’hi esqueya ó
algun cap de familia, deixant lo billar, los escachs, lo tresillo ó la
tassa de café barrejada de política, li plahia alguna vetlla engruixir lo
rotllo de las senyoras. L’ exemple es lo discurs més persuassiu y quan
aixó succehia, fácilment s’hi atansavan los demés, logrant animar un
tros d’aquell saló, que pareixia s’havia engrandit, al véurehi sols una
trentena de noyas y senyoras, assegudas al voltant del piano y una
dotzena d’homes escampats en las tres ó cuatre taulas de joch ó de
pendre café, que’l vent y humitat de las vetlladas de las darrerias de
Setembre havia fet entrar desde las galerias á un dels ánguls del saló.
Allí lo vespre en que hi torném á portar als nostres llegidors, s’hi
trobavan reunits, al voltant d’una de las taulas de marbre, ab peus de
ferro, lo propietari senyor Llansás, l’advocat don Joan Puigvernat,
l’antich corredor de lletras, senyor Campins, lo negociant de farinas
senyor Gori y’l engenyer del Estat don Esteve Torressants, los quals
tot prenent sa tassa de café, comentavan los darrers partes de las
edicions del matí de El Diluvio y de La Crónica de Cataluña,
relativament á la presentació de insurrectes á la Isla de Cuba y de las
satisfaccions que’l gobern exigia ab motiu dels successos de Santo
Domingo; y de la conducta que’s creya seguiria respecte á en
Cánovas, lo allavors jove ex-ministre senyor Romero Robledo.

—Be, be; ¿ahont los han llegit vostés aquestos partes? —preguntava
lo senyor Llansás, qui feya pochs moments acabava de arribar al
rotllo— jo vull véurels confirmats per lo Brusi: perque jo no’n faig
gayre cas de lo que diuhen tots los altres diaris…

—Pero home, si’ls partes en tots los periódichs son iguals. Que uns se
digan de La Prensa Asociada, que’ls altres se donguin lo tó de
telegramas particulars, en lo fons tots diuhen lo mateix —feu lo
senyor Campins.

—Be, be; vosté vagi creyentho aixís; pero jo li asseguro que hi ha

moltas noticias que’l Brusi las té de més bona tinta. Jo, lo que no
llegeixo en lo Diari de Barcelona com si no ho hagués vist en cap
periódich, encara que ho hagi llegit en tots los demés.

—Ja li dich jo —interposá somrihent lo senyor Gori— que si per un

atzar lo Brusi deixés de sortir un dia qualsevulla, mitj Barcelona se
quedaria sens esma. Tots haurian d’esperar á que tornés á
reapareixer, pera sapiguer que es lo que haurian de pensar, ja qu’en
Manyé s’encarrega de discorre per la major part dels seus abonats.

—Donchs; ni que se’n rigui, que mitj Barcelona se quedaria sens

esma! Perque en havent llegit lo Brusi, jo ja no m’hi amohino en fer
conjecturas: lo mateix si’s tracta d’Espanya, que del extranger,
perque no hi ha un criteri més clar, ni més just, ni més…

—Vaja donchs, Llansás, —interrumpí’l senyor Puigvernat— vosté ja

pot donar per segur los partes sobre la presentació d’insurrectes y
sobre las satisfaccions de Santo Domingo, perque jo ja fá dos ó tres
dias que’ls hi vaig llegir en lo Brusi, y á lo que’s veu, á vosté ó li van
passar desapercebuts ó no se’n recorda. Y vegi, jo apesar de haverho
llegit en lo Diari de Barcelona, y en lo Diluvio, y en lo Correo Catalán
y en tots los altres; encara no la veig ben clara aquesta qüestió!…

—Donchs no hi té que posar distingos, Puigvernat —interposá’l

senyor Gori donant una xuclada á son cigarro-puro y un altra á la
seua tassa de café.— Santo Domingo donará las satisfaccions que’l
gobern li ha exigit, perque á més de no convenirli la resistencia, ha
vist massa ab lo garbo que se las ha arregladas á Cuba en Martínez
Campos.

—Tant garbo tingués per ésser ministre, com per manejar lo sabre, ja
aniriam bé! —saltá’l senyor Campins— pero d’aixó ¡si que n’está
desmanegat! Per lo menos hi ensopega deu vegadas cada dia, posant
en evidencia la seua nulitat per gobernar al país…

—Vostés volen que’ls homes públichs, sian universals en perfeccions;

y aixó no pot ser! —exclamá ab aire declamatori’l senyor Llansás,—
los aconteixements portan los homes y avuy per avuy, l’estat
d’Espanya reclamava á en Martínez Campos en lo poder, com
induptablement dins de quatre dias hi reclamará á en Cánovas, quals
dots de gobern son innegables. Ja varen veure lo que diumenge’n
deya en Manyé…

—Sí, sí; es fácil que pugi, perque nosaltres, avuy per avuy, ¡no’l volém
lo poder! —saltá vivament lo senyor Campins, tirant damunt de la
taula lo número de la Crónica de Cataluña, com si hagués sigut la
cartera d’Estat— y no’l volém perque no hi há qui puga fer res de bó,
ab la manera com en Martínez Campos, ha posat la administració
espanyola…

—Home, ¡parli ab més propietat! —saltá acalorantse lo senyor

Llansás— y digui com l’han posada los desacerts dels republicans, las
algaradas dels cantonals de Cartagena y las dels carlins á la
montanya. Vostés los sagastins, no’s preocupan més que de fer veure
lo blanch negre… de predicar en la oposició una moral, que oblidan
completament lo dia que tenen en la má los medis de posarla en
planta. Ben clar los hi deya en Manyé l’altre diumenge, es més fácil
criticar que fer ¡y si no fos més que criticar! lo pitjor es calumniar. ¡Y
vostés ho fan! ¡si senyor! En materia de fer mal al gobern tot los hi
apar legal… Totas las armas las hi semblan bonas, encara que obrin
feridas d’aquellas que no las curan ni’ls pastels d’en Serrano, ni las
xarramecas d’en Sagasta… Créguim, lo dolent es dolent sempre; y la
calumnia es y será una arma de mala lley per totas las personas de
bon sentit.
—Pero que vostés també saben usarla quan los hi pot convenir y
sobre tot quan están en l’oposició —interrompé’l senyor Torressants.

—¡Protesto, de que may los diaris conservadors hagin estampat en

sas páginas las calumnias dels diaris lliberals!

—Home, las mateixas, mateixas… no… ¡pero serán unas altras! —feu
irónicament lo senyor Puigvernat.

—Vosté es un escéptich en politica, y á tots los partits posa en lo

mateix nivell y, créguim Puigvernat, lo seu ecepticisme, es tant injust
y tan apassionat, com las nostres exaltacions. ¡Vostés son los que
més mal fan á Espanya!

—Dispensi, dispensi Llansás —feu calmosament lo senyor Puigvernat

— vosté no ha dit be lo que acava de sentar. Protesto del dictat
d’escéptich ab que acaba de afavorirme ab lo seu acalorament. Jo no
soch un escéptich en política: soch senzillament un home que te’l cap
blanch y que per lo mateix, ha vist moltas cosas, ha assistit á molts
daltabaixos polítichs y sap lo que’s pot esperar de tota aquesta gent
famolenca del pressupost de la nació, que fan de la politica lo seu
modo de viure, anteposant lo seu profit, la seua vanitat y las
mesquinas petitesas de partit, als interessos de la Espanya, y sobre
tot als de las provincias, y en particular Catalunya que éssent la qui
més contribuheix á las cargas del Estat, es la que per fas ó per nefas,
paga sempre los plats trencats, sens trobar may un sol gobern, que’s
preocupi de lo que verdaderament nos es útil y necessari pera’l
desarrollo de nostras produccions, de las que sols per aumentar los
impostos, nos hi saben trobar los mérits. ¡Escéptich jo! Aquest
calificatiu se’l poden molt mellor aplicar á vostés y á tots los que més
gallejan de polítichs lo dia d’avuy. ¿Qué’n saben vostés
d’entussiasmarse y sobre tot de sacrificarse per la patria? Los qui
com jo de jovenets havém presenciat l’any trenta tres, los
entussiasmes per la jura de la reyna Isabel, los qui havém vist los
deliris per María Cristina y las bojerias per Espartero, tots los
entussiasmes d’avuy, nos semblan parodias fetas ab veus de falset,
per inconsciens ninots de cartró! Demani avuy lluminarias per lo que
vosté més cregui que ha de plaure al poble: (ja veu las que s’han fet
per la tornada del rey, y lo mateix pera las del seu casament) y
pregunti á algú dels meus anys, las que’s feren per la jura de la reyna,
ahont fins á las finestretas dels quints pisos s’hi veya lo seu grasolet
d’oli cremant. ¡Alló eran entussiasmes! Y que no eran sols per fer
pacíficas lluminarias! Miri, jo encara no tenia vint anys, quan á las
ordres del general Mina, varem pujar á Sant Llorens dels Piteus. Lo
fret era horrorós, la boyra no’ns hi deixava veure á quatre passas de
distancia y ab tres ó quatre pams de neu, pujavam per uns camins
inaccessibles ¡ab uns canons, que lo que menos sabiam era de
manejarlos! ¡Y com rediantre los haviam de pujar per aquells
espadats de cabras! Més en Mina nos sapigué tocar l’amor propi,
dihentnos:

—¡No es en la Rambla de Barcelona luciendo el traje de miliciano,

donde se defiende la libertad! ¡Aquí! ¡Aquí! delante el peligro, ante
las dificultades, es donde se honra el uniforme que se viste! Aquí es
donde se defiende la constitución!. Y’ls canons rodaren y’ls
milicianos y las tropas, pujarem amunt, y fentnos matar com á gats,
traguerem á en Miralles ab tota la seua partida ¡que’ls hi asseguro
que també sapigueren fershi á mossegadas! Alló era lluytar y
sacrificarse per una idea!
—Home, ¡si aixó s’ha fet y’s fará sempre! —interrumpiren á l’hora’l
senyor Campins y’l senyor Gori— ¿Creu vosté, que ara mateix á las
Vascongadas y á Alcolea, no hi han hagut rasgos com lo que vosté
acaba de relatar?

—Si, ¡per l’exércit! ¡los hi concedeixo! pero no per homes com jo, que
en aquella época voluntariament abandonavam las comoditats de
una posició desahogada, per los perills y calamitats de la guerra.
Parli, párlili á la joventut d’avuy, de deixar las comoditats de casa
seua y de exposarse la vida pera defensar á tals ó quals institucions y
veurán com mirántsel com si no estigués bó del cap, se’n entornarán
pacificament á fer l’ensa á la cantonada de casa en Llibre ó á menjar
un beefteach á ca’n Justin. Aixó relativament á la joventut, que en
quant á nosaltres, fa ja molts anys que mentres no’ns toquin lo qu’es
del nostre interés personal, no se’ns endona un grá d’anís de tot lo
mal dels demés, valdament deixin al vehí sense camisa! Vosté,
refregantse las mans devant d’una filípica d’en Manyé; vosté d’un
discurs d’en Sagasta y vosté d’un refilet d’en Castelar —feu lo senyor
Puigvernat senyalant alternativament als senyors Llansás, Campins y
Gori— se quedan tant satisfets com si verament haguessin fet alguna
cosa de profit. Aquest indiferentisme, ha de portarnos á mals
irremediables, particularment pe’ls catalans, que com no hem de
viure de la política, nos interessa pensar y obrar de molt distinta
manera que la gent de Madrid…

—¡Clach! ¡Clach! ¡Clach! —prorromperen á l’hora los quatre polítichs

de la taula, entant que don Esteve Torressants deya en tó mofeta.—
Ja’s veu prou que apesar dels seus cabells blanchs s’ha deixat
embuhir de las ideas catalanistas del seu fill, amich Puigvernat. Una
moda com un’altra… Quatre poetas, quatre caps calents que somnian
al só de l’arpa, del fluviol y de la tenora, portarnos als temps dels
concellers, dels gremis, dels…

—Mirin, senyors —interrompé sériament lo senyor Puigvernat— jo

no sé ahont poden portarnos las ideas que sustenta’l meu fill; pero lo
que si’ls hi diré, es que quan en mitj de l’atmósfera ó indiferent ó
pestilenta, en que hi veig vegetar á una grandíssima part de la
joventut barcelonina, sento al meu noy y als seus amichs parlar plens
d’entussiasme, de las reivindicacions de Catalunya, y no solsament
parlar, que aixó no costa gayre, si no gastarse’ls seus estalvis y
cremarse’ls ulls y emplear las horas del seu esbarjo, fundant
periódichs y revistas, y escorcollant arxius y encontradas de la nostra
terra, me sembla que torno á ser jove, que encara ha quedat viu
quelcóm d’aquells folls entussiasmes que feren heroismes en los
penyals del Bruch y en los espadats de Sant Llorens dels Piteus. Qué
volen que’ls hi digui? Vostés m’han acusat d’escéptich, y jo crech una
desgracia l’esperit analítich y matemátich del nostre sigle: jo vell,
prefereixo somniar ab los poetas, que endinzarme en lo que’n diuhen
ciencia dels racionalistas. Jo rendeixo cult als ideals de bona mena
per exagerats que sían, perque en lo cor humá, la extremositat del
sentiment es lo que ha fet als héroes, desde’ls mártirs en la religió als
mártirs de la pátria. Jo tinch la seguretat de que será més profitosa á
Catalunya, tota aquesta jovenalla dels Jochs Florals que té per divisa
Patria Fides Amor, que tota aquesta altra fornada de joves-vells que
á vint anys fan gala de no créure en Deu y d’estar desenganyats de la
patria, dels amichs y de las donas! Creguin que se’n pot esperar molt
poch d’aquesta joventut á la moda francesa… Bon exemple es lo que
li ha passat al pobre don Joaquim ab lo tarambana d’en Felip.
—Lo fill d’en Bach? —feu ab estranyesa lo senyor Gori.

—Te rahó que vostés han arrivat avuy de pendre’ls banys de las
Escaldas francesas… Preguntiu, preguntiu al senyor Torressants que
com á vehí n’está enterat, fil per randa, de tot aquest negoci…

—Pero ¿qué vosté avans d’anársen no sabia que’l noy de’n Bach, era
l’amich íntim ab la dona d’en Casals? —preguntá lo senyor Llansás.

—Veurá, d’aixó quan nosaltres nos en anarem á mitjans d’Agost, se’n

deya alguna cosa… es á dir, se’n parlava molt… pero en concret…
També podia ésser enrahonaments… xismografías… apreciacions…

—Ba, ba; ja veig que vé dels llims amich Gori —feu lo senyor Campins
fregantse las mans ab la satisfacció que acostuma á donar á molta
gent lo poguer treure á relluhir alguna cosa desgradable del próxim.
— Ja veig que está á las foscas y’l vaig á orientar ab duas paraulas.
Donchs figuris, que sembla que la Clarita, ¿sap? li convingué anar á
Mataró, y á en Felip també n’hi vingueren ganas… Res, la cosa més
natural… pero algú que no li trobá tant (que may falta un bon amich)
se cuydá d’avisarho á en Casals, que aquell dia havia anat á
Barcelona… Y que succehí alló dels dramas… que’l marit los trobá en
una conversa que no fou del seu agrado… que l’home se sortí de tino
y com apar que té tan bons punys com bonas carns… ne va fer feyna.
Res de pistolas, ni de desafíos… sembla que en Casals aixó dels
lances de honor los deixa per las comedias… Que li agradá més fershi
á colps de bastó… Y que ho feu á lo salvatje y que del devassell de
bastonadas n’ha sortit la Clarita ab un ull mitj perdut y en Felip tan
estomacat que de primer moment diu que fins cregueren que
agonitzava… Figuris que aixó va ésser á las derrerías d’Agost y ha