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IPP STUDIES IN THE FRONTIERS OF
CHINA’S PUBLIC POLICY
Pluralism and
World Order
Theoretical Perspectives and
Policy Challenges
Edited by
Feng Zhang
IPP Studies in the Frontiers of China’s Public Policy
Series Editor
Feng Zhang, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China
IPP Studies in the Frontiers of China’s Public Policy combines original
research and theoretical innovation to provide fresh insights into the fast-
changing landscape of China’s public policy. Books in the series, written
by scholars based inside China or commissioned by the IPP, draw on
local Chinese experiences to generate empirical findings and theoretical
insights. The field of China’s public policy is broadly defined to include all
aspects of the country’s social, economic, technological and foreign poli-
cies. The series encourage interdisciplinary approaches to public policy,
with a special but not exclusive focus on the study of south China, espe-
cially the Guangdong, Hong Kong, Macau Greater Bay Area, one of the
most vibrant regions of growth and innovation in China.
Feng Zhang
Editor
Pluralism and World

Order
Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Challenges
Editor
Feng Zhang
Institute of Public Policy
Guangzhou, China
IPP Studies in the Frontiers of China’s Public Policy

ISBN 978-981-19-9871-3 ISBN 978-981-19-9872-0 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9872-0
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
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Cover illustration: MR.Cole_Photographer
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Feng Zhang
Part I Theoretical Perspective

2 The Foundations of Political Orders 13
Richard Ned Lebow
3 Deep Pluralism as the Emerging Structure of Global
Society 29
Barry Buzan
Part II The Great Powers

4 China, the United States, and the Future Global
Order: One World, Two Contending Pluralist Visions 55
Yongjin Zhang
5 World Power Structure Over the Short and Long Run 73
Yinhong Shi
6 Pluralism and the US–China Development Partnership 97
Mehri Madarshahi
7 India’s Frustrated Search for a Multipolar Order 111
Ian Hall
v
vi CONTENTS
Part III Multilateralism and Regionalism

8 The United Nations and New Multilateralism 135
Hans d’Orville
9 East Asian Multilateralism: A Glass Half Full 159
T. J. Pempel
10 ASEAN’s Strategic Response to the US–China
Competition 179
Chew Yee Ng and Mingjiang Li
11 Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean 205
Juan Ignacio Dorrego Viera
Part IV Future Prospects

12 Contours of a Future World Order 235
Kishore Mahbubani
Index 247
Notes on Contributors
Barry Buzan is a Fellow of the British Academy, Emeritus Professor

in the LSE Department of International Relations and a Senior Fellow
at LSE IDEAS. He is an honorary professor at Copenhagen, Jilin, and
China Foreign Affairs Universities, and at the University of International
Relations (Beijing). Among his articles on China is a trilogy of pieces in
the Chinese Journal of International Politics exploring the possibilities for
China’s ‘peaceful rise’. His most recent book is Making Global Society:
A Study of Humankind Across Three Eras (Cambridge University Press,
2023).
Hans d’Orville was Assistant Director-General for Strategic Planning
(2000–2015) and Deputy Director-General (2010) of UNESCO. Prior
to that, he was Director of the Information Technologies for Develop-
ment Programme at UNDP (1996–2000), Senior Officer to the UNDP
Administrator and since 1975 in various positions UN Secretariat. Since
2014, he is an Honorary Professor at the South China University of Tech-
nology, Guangzhou and at the Guangdong University of Foreign Studies.
Born in 1949, he holds a Dr. rer. soc. and M.A. in economics from the
University of Konstanz, Germany.
Ian Hall is a Professor of International Relations at the Griffith Asia Insti-
tute, Griffith University, Queensland, Australia. He is also an Academic
Fellow of the Australia India Institute at the University of Melbourne.
His research focuses on two areas: the history of international thought
vii
viii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
and India’s foreign and security policy. He is the author and editor of
several books, including Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign
Policy (2019).
Richard Ned Lebow is Professor Emeritus of International Political
Theory in the War Studies Department of King’s College London; Bye-
Fellow of Pembroke College, University of Cambridge; and James O.
Freedman Presidential Professor Emeritus at Dartmouth College. He is a
Fellow of the British Academy and a member of The Atheneum. His most
recent books are The Quest for Knowledge in International Relations: How
Do We Know? (Cambridge 2021), and coauthored with Feng Zhang,
Justice and International Order: East and West (Oxford, 2022). In 2022,
he also published Rough Waters and Other Stories (Ethics International)
and Obsession (Pegasus), a classic English murder mystery.
Mingjiang Li is an Associate Professor and Provost Chair in Interna-
tional Relations at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His main research interests
include Chinese foreign policy, Chinese politics, China-ASEAN relations,
Sino-U.S. relations, and Asia-Pacific security.
Mehri Madarshahi worked at the United Nations Secretariat in New
York for 26 years and retired as Senior Economist. In her association with
UNESCO, she established the “Melody for Dialogue among Civiliza-
tions” Association. To promote a new global role for creative culture as a
soft power for diplomacy and to promote environmental policies in urban
settings, in 2013 she founded “Global Cultural Networks (GCN)”, and
soon after the Shenzhen-Qianhai Global Cultural Consulting company
(MAH). She was appointed as a Visiting Professor at three Chinese
universities: South China University for Technology, Guangzhou Univer-
sity on Foreign Studies, and Jinan University. Recently she is appointed as
a Non-Residence Senior Fellow at the Center for China and Globalization
(CCG).
Kishore Mahbubani a veteran diplomat, student of philosophy, and
author of nine books, Kishore Mahbubani is currently a Distinguished
Fellow at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singa-
pore. Mahbubani has dedicated five decades of his life to public service.
Mahbubani is also a former President of the UN Security Council (Jan
2001, May 2002) and the Founding Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School
of Public Policy (2004–2017). Mahbubani writes and speaks prolifically
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ix
on the rise of Asia, geopolitics, and global governance. His latest books,
Has China Won? and The Asian twenty-first Century were released in 3
March 2020 and January 2022.
Chew Yee Ng is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of International
Relations at Tsinghua University. Her research focus is on International
Security and Strategic Studies. She was previously a Research Analyst
in the Military Studies Programme at S. Rajaratnam School of Interna-
tional Studies, and an Associate in Contemporary China Studies at the
Singapore University of Social Sciences.
T. J. Pempel is Jack M. Forcey Professor (emeritus) of Political Science
at UC Berkeley where he has been on the faculty since 2001. From then
until 2006, Pempel was also director of Berkeley’s Institute of East Asian
Studies. The author or editor of 24 books and over 120 articles, his latest
book is A Region of Regimes: Prosperity and Plunder in the Asia-Pacific.
Yinhong Shi is a Distinguished Professor of International Relations at
Renmin University of China in Beijing. He mainly engages in the history
of and themes in international politics, strategic studies, East Asia security
and foreign policies of both China and the United States. He published
twenty books, including Great Tumults Before and After the Darkest Ages:
A Political and Strategic Reading of Records of the Three Kingdoms
(2022); The Dramatic Changes and Political Prudence: On Statecraft
in Foreign Relations (2019); The Traditional Chinese Foreign Strate-
gies: Lessons from the Four Earliest Classical Historiographies (2018). He
also published more than 640 articles and essays and nineteen books in
translation mainly on war and strategic history.
Juan Ignacio Dorrego Viera is a doctoral candidate at the Carlo
Cattaneo – LIUC University in Varese, Italy. He obtained an MSc in
Development Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies
(SOAS), University of London. He has also earned a Postgraduate degree
in Development and International Relations issued by the University of
London. He has graduated in Business Management at the University
of the Republic (Uruguay), where he has also earned a Postgraduate
Diploma in Economics and Management for Social Inclusion.
Juan works as a researcher for a number of institutions in Italy, Austria,
and Uruguay. He has worked as a Senior Advisor of the Director of the
Planning and Budget Office.
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Feng Zhang is Professor of International Relations and Executive Dean

of the Institute of Public Policy at the South China University of Tech-
nology in Guangzhou, and editor of IPP Studies in the Frontiers of
China’s Public Policy published by Palgrave. He studies international rela-
tions, theory and substance, with a focus on China. He is the author
of Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in
East Asian History (Stanford, 2015) and, with Professor Richard Ned
Lebow, of Taming Sino-American Rivalry (Oxford, 2020) and Justice
and International Order: East and West (Oxford, 2022).
Yongjin Zhang is a Professor of International Politics at the University
of Bristol, UK. He holds an M.Phil. and a D.Phil. both in International
Relations from the University of Oxford. His publications have appeared
in Review of International Studies, European Journal of International
Relations, Millennium, International Affairs, Third World Quarterly,
China Quarterly, Chinese Journal of International Politics, and Journal
of Contemporary China, among others.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Feng Zhang
Pluralism comes in many varieties. Probably the most well-known pluralist

position in international relations is advanced by the English School. This
conception is strongly state-centric and empirical. It presupposes states as
the dominant unit of international society and emphasizes the primacy of
state sovereignty in international relations. States share little other than
minimal concerns about survival and coexistence. Agreements among
them are largely confined to mutual recognition of sovereignty, rules
for diplomacy, and promotion of the non-intervention principle. Within
the English School pluralism is challenged by solidarism, which focuses
on the possibility of shared norms underpinning a more expansive and
interventionist understanding of international order (Buzan 2004, 46–7).
Political theorists and philosophers have advanced other conceptions
of pluralism. Value pluralism, for example, is the thesis that there are
many distinct values, not reducible to one supreme value or way of being
F. Zhang (B)
South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China
e-mail: zhangfeng@ipp.org.cn
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
F. Zhang (ed.), Pluralism and World Order,
IPP Studies in the Frontiers of China’s Public Policy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9872-0_1
2 F. ZHANG
good, and that the distinct values may also be incapable of being realized
together in the life of a single individual or society (Raz 2003, location
100). Joseph Raz deploys the concept of “genre” to make the point. We
identify something as an instance of one genre, and judge it by the stan-
dards of that genre. The thing is good because it is good by the standards
of that genre. Thus, one system of criminal justice is good to the extent
that it is a good adversarial system; another is good to the extent that it
is a good prosecutorial system. “The two systems,” Raz says, “may be no
worse than each other, each being good through being a good instance
of a different, and conflicting, kind” (ibid., location 509).
This volume, which has emerged out of an international conference
organized by the Institute of Public Policy at the South China University
of Technology in August 2021, is not an intellectual exegesis of different
conceptions of pluralism. It instead explores the implications of pluralism
for international order while sidestepping controversies surrounding the
notion of pluralism in political theory and philosophy. Contributors focus
especially on the manifestations of international pluralism in great power
relations, multilateralism, and regionalism.
The volume is divided into four parts. Part I offers state-of-the-
art theoretical perspectives on international order and pluralism. In
Chapter 2, Richard Ned Lebow provides a sophisticated overview of the
causes and mechanisms of the rise and fall of political orders that draws on
diverse disciplinary approaches including international relations, history,
philosophy, and psychology. Lebow defines order as legible, predictable
behavior in accord with recognized norms. Robust orders require a high
degree of solidarity among their members. Solidarity is the product of
social interaction and cooperation, which in turn requires appropriate
norms and predictable patterns of behavior. Declining orders reveal a
breakdown of solidarity, often attributable in the short-term to elite
violation of rule packages and the sharper contradictions they create in
perceptions between existing practices and the principles of justice on
which orders rest. Elite violation of rule packages can lead to expanding
and more acute conflict in a society but also encourage others to violate
norms that sustain solidarity. In the longer-term, decline in solidarity, and,
in part, elite violations of rule packages, can be attributed to loss of trac-
tion of principles of justice and shifts in the relative appeal of competing
principles and their different formulations.
1 INTRODUCTION 3
Lebow makes an important distinction between top-down and

bottom-up orders. Top-down orders—governments, bureaucracies, mili-
tary organizations generally—rely on rules and procedures that have
originated with, or if not, are sanctioned and enforced, by central author-
ities. Bottom-up orders are the product of iterative and self-correcting
process of trial and error with multiple feedback loops and branches in
logic. It is on the whole an emergent property. Top-down and bottom-
up orders are ideal types as they rarely exist independently of each other
and generally penetrate one another to some degrees. Most social orders
incorporate and rely on both forms. Their coexistence may be necessary
for any large social-political unit, but it is never unproblematic. Each kind
of order meets particular needs, and problems can arise where the two
intersect.
Lebow’s conception of political order emphasizes the connection
between solidarity among an order’s members and the order’s robust-
ness. It reminds us that international order is not robust if measured by
interstate solidarity; and so are domestic orders that are engulfed by civil
conflicts. With a few notable exceptions, such as the European Union and
the North Atlantic region, regional and international orders are primarily
pluralistic. In a pluralistic world, the maintenance of order requires both
top-down and bottom-up approaches. The former, through what the
English School refers to as “great power management,” is still an indis-
pensable if woefully inadequate tool in global governance (Bull 2012).
The latter, as manifested by the growing role of international institu-
tions, non-governmental organizations, and diverse private sector actors,
is proving increasingly essential to sustaining international order (Barnett
and Finnemore 2004; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992).
In Chapter 3, Barry Buzan proposes “deep pluralism” as a novel
concept to understand the emerging structure of global society, thereby
deepening our understanding of pluralistic international politics. Deep
pluralism describes a global society in which power, wealth, and cultural
and political authority are distributed diffusely within a system that has
high interaction capacity and is strongly interdependent. Both “deep” and
“pluralism” carry specific meanings. Pluralism privileges the units of the
interstate system/society over global society, valuing sovereign states as a
way of preserving the cultural diversity that is the legacy of human history.
It favors raison d’etat (or raison d’empire) over raison de système, and
operates by a logic of coexistence within a fairly thin international society.
In this context, “deep” means not just a diffuse distribution of wealth and
4 F. ZHANG
power, but also of cultural and political authority. These criteria contrast
sharply with the preceding decades of Western domination and globaliza-
tion in which wealth and power, and cultural and political authority, were
relatively concentrated.
Buzan makes a further distinction between consensual and contested
pluralisms. The former means that the main players in global society not
only tolerate the material, cultural, ideological, and actor-type differences
of deep pluralism, but also respect and even value them both as expres-
sions of diversity, which like biodiversity is to be valued in itself, and as the
foundation for coexistence. The latter means substantial resistance to the
material and ideational reality of deep pluralism. This might take various
forms: former superpowers (most obviously the United States) refusing
to give up their special rights and privileges; great powers refusing to
recognize each other’s standing, and playing against each other as rivals
or enemies. Whether deep pluralism unfolds in a consensual or contested
manner, especially as manifested in great power relations such as the esca-
lating rivalry between America and China, will shape the future character
of global society.
Buzan identifies at least five general features of deep pluralism: no
superpowers and strong anti-hegemonism; introverted great powers; a
historical legacy of post-colonial resentment, and former colonial forget-
ting; declining influence of some non-state actors; and regionalization. He
draws out some significant implications of deep pluralism for the future of
humankind, especially those concerning sustainable development. In his
view, the future of humanity will hinge to a great extent on how global
society will respond to, and be shaped by, the rising pressure from shared
fate threats. Deep pluralism also holds implications for the foreign policies
of great powers and has been applied to the case of China (Zhang and
Buzan 2022).
As Part I lays out the conceptual foundations for understanding
pluralism and international order, Part II proceeds to discuss the impli-
cations of international pluralism for great power relations. In Chapter 4,
Yongjin Zhang describes the contending pluralist visions between America
and China and explores their implications for Sino–American rivalry.
America’s vision is one of a world safe for democracy, and China’s a
community with a shared future for mankind. Zhang argues that both
visions are deeply pluralistic, but inherently problematic and fiercely
contested. He presents an alternative vision of the future global order,
1 INTRODUCTION 5
an equally pluralistic one of liberal persuasion, but one that aims at

constructing a world safe for diversity and prosperity.
If Zhang applies a blend of liberalism and constructivism to Sino-
American rivalry, in Chapter 5, Shi Yinhong adopts a largely realist
perspective on the geopolitical struggle between China and the United
States. Shi argues that the short- and medium-term structure of world
politics will be characterized by the confrontation of and rivalry between
two coalitions, respectively, headed by China and the United States. Over
the long run, as these two coalitions continue to exist, there will emerge
a vast “intermediate zone” comprised of a large number of countries
that might develop some common identities. Interestingly, Shi contends
that the future of world politics may witness more countries entering this
“intermediate zone,” outside of China or the United States. If his forecast
is right, the future structure of international politics will not be bipolar,
as some scholars contend, but pluralistic (Tunsjø 2018; Yan 2020).
In Chapter 6, Mehri Madarshahi offers a third take on Sino-American
relations. Her concern is the possibility of what she refers to as a “devel-
opment partnership” between the two countries. She argues that world
order today is facing myriad challenges including slower growth, global
warming, pandemics, and geopolitical rivalry. The best way to meet these
challenges is to revisit the US–China partnership across all the relevant
sectors. Efforts should also be made to leverage the role of non-state
stakeholders with concrete tools and capabilities to develop new initiatives
in a multipolar and pluralistic word. Madarshahi emphasizes in particular
the importance of a Sino–American partnership for tackling the challenge
of climate change.
In a pluralistic world order America and China need to share their place
with other established and emerging powers. One of the most impor-
tant rising powers today is India. In Chapter 7, Ian Hall examines Indian
foreign policy in terms of its search for a multipolar and pluralistic world
order. Such an order has long been India’s first preference, as Indian
elites believe that an order in which power is distributed between several
major powers would be more stable, peaceful, and equitable, and more
amenable to India’s interests and values. India was frustrated during the
Cold War when two superpowers emerged to dominate the international
system, and then concerned when a unipolar order replaced bipolarity
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, India’s troubled rela-
tionship with China has repeatedly driven New Delhi to align the country
6 F. ZHANG
with other major powers, complicating the process of realizing multi-

polarity. Hall analyzes India’s frustrated pursuit of a multipolar order,
undermined by a lack of relative power and the challenge of managing
ties with China.
In Part III our attention turns from great powers to multilateralism
and regionalism. Great powers are crucial actors in world politics, but
processes and mechanisms like multilateralism and regionalism are as
important to understand the nature of world politics. In Chapter 8, Hans
d’Orville offers a passionate plea for revitalizing global multilateralism
centered on the United Nations. The United Nations is the heart of
the international system. d’Orville argues that the path to a better, more
peaceful, and more sustainable future is paved with cooperation—not
competition or zero-sum approaches. International organizations around
the world have been built primarily—as stated in the UN Charter—to
promote development, protect human rights, resolve interstate issues,
and tackle global issues that transcend borders, such as financial crises,
pandemics, terrorism, criminal networks, threats to our oceans and
climate change. We must therefore continuously adapt and modernize our
multilateral institutions and better equip them to face the global multi-
crises and intergenerational challenges we face. d’Orville suggests that
multilateral organizations must be given the means to make a difference
on the ground. They need to be more open and inclusive of the voices
of young people, women, the disabled, civil society, parliamentarians, the
private sector, academia, and others.
d’Orville’s appeal for multilateralism is made at the global level. In
Chapter 9, T. J. Pemple offers a lucid analysis of multilateralism at the
East Asian regional level, a region that is becoming increasingly crucial to
global prosperity and security. Pemple shows that East Asia has become
steadily more regionally interconnected through ever deepening networks
of transportation, communication, travel, trade, investment, and supply
chain production. Many of these links were developed, not by govern-
ments, but by the private sector, leading to claims that East Asia is
under-institutionalized. Pempel advances three counter-claims. First, the
problem-solving expectations for such institutions are unrealistic. Second,
in several non-trivial areas regional multilateralism has achieved substantial
successes. Third, criticisms of soft institutionalism and loose rules down-
play the long-term potential inherent in such bodies. Ultimately, the test
of the efficacy of East Asian multilateralism is whether it can dampen
1 INTRODUCTION 7
the geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalry between China and the US-
centered alliance system in the region. Here, it is premature to draw any
firm conclusions.
In East Asia the most important process of regionalism has taken place
in the Southeast Asian region as embodied by the institutional success of
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). In Chapter 10, Chew
Yee Ng and Li Mingjiang offer an analysis of ASEAN’s strategic response
to Sino–American rivalry. They argue that this rivalry has posed a signif-
icant challenge for ASEAN and its member states. They are facing a
situation in which the US security role is very important for regional
stability and at the same time economic ties with China are also crucial. As
a result, most regional states are adopting a hedging strategy, combining
elements of engagement and balancing. They also try hard to main-
tain ASEAN centrality in managing regional multilateralism as a strategic
response to US–China competition. This chapter thus nicely complements
Pempel’s in bringing in a Southeast Asian strategic dimension to regional
multilateralism.
There are, of course, important advances of regionalism outside East
Asia. In Chapter 11, Juan Ignacio Dorrego Viera examines progress of
regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean. These regions experi-
ence a complex geoeconomic and geopolitical transition process shaped
by dramatic changes in the international context, the reconfiguration
of the regional political map, and the exhaustion of the regionalization
attempts of the past two decades. At the same time, China has gradually
increased it presence in the region while a series of global and regional
systemic factors seem to drive the Latin American subcontinent toward
an interregionalism with the Asia Pacific zone. This chapter suggests that
in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of Latin Amer-
ican regionalism, we need to take into consideration the dynamics of a
changing international environment as well as region-specific uncertain-
ties and risks.
In Chapter 12 of Part IV, our concluding chapter, veteran diplomat
Kishore Mahbubani offers a seasoned Asian practitioner’s take on the
future world order. He identifies three major paradoxes facing world
order today. First, the current benevolent world order is a Western-
inspired and Western-created world order. Yet, it is the West which has
been weakening and undermining it. Second, even though the West is
weakening and undermining the current world order, the West is going
against its own long-term interests when it undermines this world order.
8 F. ZHANG
Third, if the West changes course and decides that it is in its long-term
interest to strengthen the current world order, it only has to return
to some fundamental Western principles to strengthen the world order.
Mahbubani suggests the importance of making world order more demo-
cratic by reforming key United Nations institutions such as the Security
Council and the General Assembly. He thus echoes the pleas of earlier
contributors, especially those of d’Orville in Chapter 8 and Pemple in
Chapter 9.
It is now commonplace to say that the world has entered a new era
of disorder, marked by an interstate war (Russia’s invasion of Ukraine),
great power rivalry (especially that between America and China), and a
host of other challenges including pandemics and climate change (Haass
2018). This volume has singled out the structural feature of pluralism
and explored its implications for international order. It has not tried to
be comprehensive, but focused on the dynamics of great power relations,
multilateralism, and regionalism. Our contributors have found plenty to
be concerned with in the myriad challenges to international order in the
years ahead, yet they eschew alarmist conclusions. There is still scope for
the great powers to better manage their relations, and equally important,
much space for multilateralism and regionalism to play their increasingly
important roles in stabilizing world order. We can be cautiously hopeful
about the future world order.
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Press.
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https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poac014.
PART I
Theoretical Perspective
CHAPTER 2
The Foundations of Political Orders
Richard Ned Lebow
My writings embed the study of political behavior in psychology, history,

and philosophy. Psychology offers insights not only into individual and
group behavior, but also into human motives beyond appetite. It also
problematizes the concept of reason and situates it in cultural context.
History reveals how culture and epoch determine which human drives
dominate and how they are channeled. Yoked to psychology, it alerts us
to how each culture and epoch confront different kinds of challenges
that have profound implications for political behavior. Political philos-
ophy directs our attention to the big questions of human existence, most
notably, how should society be organized and who should rule?
In The Rise and Fall of Political Orders, I treat the origins, evolution,
and decay of orders at a very abstract level because I believe that micro-
and macro-outcomes in the social world are context-dependent (Lebow
2018). Context is determining because decisions and policies are gener-
ally path dependent. Outcomes in turn are often the product of path
R. N. Lebow (B)
King’s College London, London, UK
e-mail: nedlebow@gmail.com

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9872-0_2
14 R. N. LEBOW
dependence, confluence, accident, and agency. Even when actors behave

rationally—not always the norm—they may be framing their decisions in
terms of other problems and goals, making their choices appear less than
fully rational. Outcomes and their follow-on effects are the products of
complex, often non-linear, interactions among multiple actors. For this
reason, actor expectations, even if the result of careful assessments, may
be confounded. And understanding why actors behave as they do is only
a starting point; we also need to know how their choices and behavior are
aggregated. The best analytical strategy is to develop ideal types and use
them as starting points for narrative explanations or forecasts that build
in context.
The Rise and Fall of Political Orders appeared in the aftermath of the
Brexit referendum in Britain and Donald Trump’s presidential victory in
the U.S. Many Americans believe their constitutional order is at risk, and
many Europeans believe their supranational project is threatened. Most
studies of the viability of the postwar order focus on the most immediate
threats and their shorter-term consequences. I direct my attention more
to the causes of these causes, which have developed or unfolded over
decades, or even centuries.
I develop a theory of order that posits a set of relationships among
values, hierarchies, and principles of justice, and identify the underlying
conditions of resilience and fragility. This includes the subset of conditions
in which economic inequality is most unacceptable. They have to do with
the relative importance society puts on appetite versus honor and equality
versus fairness, the thickness of the rule packages governing elite behavior,
and the extent to which they conform to them.
Such an understanding of political order indicates that wealth and its
display assume different meanings—positive and negative—in different
social contexts where they may also have divergent consequences for
political stability. To fathom these relationships, and others important for
order and disorder—and more importantly, for human fulfillment—we
must go beyond economics to sociology, political science, philosophy,
and history, and beyond theories that attribute outcomes to so-called
structural factors, whether they be the market or the balance of power.
Attempts to explain the behavior and contentedness of people in terms of
their economic interests and relative affluence does not take us very far
and blinds us to the more important question of what values and goals
people adopt and pursue. This is equally true of politics, where leaders
2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL ORDERS 15
and peoples make different choices. Goals and strategies are culturally and
historically specific, not something that is universal and readily specified.
To capture the variety of these goals, my Cultural Theory of Interna-
tional Relations elaborates the Greek understanding of the psyche and
demonstrates its relevance to foreign policy and international relations in
a series of case studies. Its principal claim is that thumos —infelicitously
but unavoidably rendered in English as “spirit”—has been neglected by
modern social science yet remains an important source of human behavior
(Lebow 2008). It builds on the Greek insight that self-esteem is an impor-
tant human need, and one that often rivals and trumps appetite. For
Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, people achieve self-esteem by excelling
in activities valued by their society; we could add family and peer group
to the list. They feel good about themselves when they win the appro-
bation of those who matter to them. People often project their needs
for self-esteem onto their states and thumos accordingly encourages the
striving for national status and distinction. It is a major source of national
solidarity and international conflict.
Cultural Theory of International Relations develops a paradigm of
politics based on thumos and presents it as an ideal type that can be used
to understand international relations. I maintain that thumos, along with
appetite and the emotion of fear, generate distinct logics of conflict, coop-
eration, and risk-taking, and give rise to different kinds of hierarchies.
Thumos- and appetite-based hierarchies appeal to different principles of
justice: fairness versus equality. In the real world—in contradistinction
to the ideal type worlds of my theory—appetite, thumos, and fear, are
always present to some degree and responsible for domestic and foreign
policies that sometimes appear contradictory. The relative importance of
these three motives is a function of the degree to which reason restrains
and educates thumos and appetite. Fear rises in importance as reason
loses control of either and self-restraint gives way to self-indulgence. At a
deeper level, changes in the relative importance of appetite and spirit are
due to shifts in values and material conditions within societies.
I have a second, parallel agenda that has to do with political theory. I
offer my research as an example of how to repair the rift between polit-
ical science and political philosophy. The latter owes its origins to the
fact that no one can make a rule and expect others to follow it without
providing some kind of reasoned argument about why it is necessary or
advisable. Every argument gives rise to a counter-argument, and every
claim a counter-claim. There is no politics without argument, not even
16 R. N. LEBOW
war is an alternative because once hostilities cease argument resumes.

Arguments, moreover, are more than window dressing for rule by fiat.
Good arguments—defined in terms of their appeal—are an important
source of influence.
There is no political order without an argument that explains why that
order is worthwhile. And no political order is immune from counter-
claims by those who want to replace or reform it. A key concern of these
arguments is who should rule. In this respect, political theory is polit-
ical science because arguments about who should rule are part of the
explanation for who does rule.
This idea harks back to Aristotle, whose political science deeply informs
my project. It is also apparent in the great works of nineteenth- and
twentieth-century political theory and political science, many of which I
also draw on. Yet the deep connection between political theory and polit-
ical science seems to have been largely severed in the postwar era—with
the recent development of international political theory a notable excep-
tion. Partly this is because political science overvalues arguments about
methods, especially statistical or rationalist ones, often at the expense of
talking about or trying to understand politics. And partly it is because
political theory has isolated itself. Some political theorists too readily
assume that their task is solely to ascertain how things should be, and
to communicate this “guidance” to the political world. They believe that
if we reason well about politics, we will arrive at the truth about how
politics should be conducted, and there is no reason why the real polit-
ical world cannot be brought into correspondence with the truth. These
assumptions are mistaken, even arrogant.
Pre-Kantian political theory was more interpretative and less didactic.
It was humble about our ability to ascertain the truth about politics and
justice, it saw the partial truth on different sides in arguments about
justice. It saw how these arguments serve to persuade and to legitimate; it
recognized the empirical force of ideas, often very flawed ideas. I return to
that older practice of political theory—a practice that integrated political
theory and political science by tending to the real-world force of ideas and
arguments. Nothing is more elemental than political order, and nowhere
is the force of ideas more apparent and important. My core argument
is that there is no political order without an argument about why that
order is just—an argument that works, that persuades, at least some. And
there is no political order that is invulnerable to counterarguments, which
is why no political order is permanent. In short, ideas and arguments
about justice are the fundamental cause of political order and disorder.
By bringing this elemental and profound insight back into focus, I give
hope of rejoining political science and political theory.
Problems of Political Order

I suggest that order can be defined as legible, predictable behavior
in accord with recognized norms. Robust orders also require a high
degree of solidarity among their members. The two conditions are related
because it is social cooperation that produces legible and predictable
patterns of behavior. Any definition of order must accordingly incorporate
the organizing principle of social rank. It is another source of norms and
solidarity, but also of conflict. Finally, we must recognize that orders are
based on, and draw strength from, their ability to advance fundamental
human needs, which include physical and material security, self-esteem,
and social contact. We might define order as a hierarchical arrangement,
supported by most of its members, that fosters security, self-esteem, and
social contact, encourages solidarity, and results in legible, predictable
behavior.
I distinguish between top–down and bottom–up orders. Top–down
orders—governments, bureaucracies, military organizations generally—
rely on rules and procedures that have originated with, or if not, are
sanctioned and enforced, by central authorities. Bottom–up orders are
the product of iterative and self-correcting processes of trial and error
with multiple feedback loops and branches in logic. It is on the whole an
emergent property. Top–down and bottom–up orders are ideal types as
they rarely exist independently of each other and generally penetrate one
another to some degree. Most social orders incorporate and rely on both
forms. Their coexistence may be necessary for any large social-political
unit, but it is never unproblematic. Each kind of order meets particular
needs, and problems can arise where the two intersect.
What are the nature of order and the similarities and differences
between physical and social orders? Equilibrium is inappropriate to the
study of social phenomena and the most stable orders are those that
undergo significant, incremental change. Given the open-ended nature
of the social world, political orders and their evolution cannot be under-
stood in isolation from their economic, social, and intellectual contexts.
For the same reason, universal, falsifiable propositions about order are all
but impossible. We can nevertheless identify some general reasons for the
18 R. N. LEBOW
construction, evolution, decline, and reconstitution of orders and identify

some of the dynamics associated with these processes. Toward this end, I
rely on Weberian ideal type descriptions of societies.
My analysis of order and disorder rests on four substantive assump-
tions. First, disorder at the top–down level is the default, and all robust
orders at this level are temporary. Second, robust orders, top–down
or bottom–up, must be justified with reference to accepted principles
of justice. Third, orders become threatened when those principles are
challenged, or the discrepancy between them and practice becomes
apparent and unacceptable. Fourth, orders require solidarity to soften the
consequences of hierarchy.
Principles of justice are central to my analysis of the rise, evolution,
decline, and reconstitution of orders. Justice is a fundamental human
concern, but so too is order because of the security, material, and
emotional benefits it can provide. If justice is the foundation of order,
order is necessary for justice. In an ideal world, they would be mutually
reinforcing, but this is never the case. They are always to some degree at
odds, and difficult trade-offs must be made between them. Those who
advocate reforms on the grounds of justice invariably meet opposition
from those who assert the status quo is essential to order and stability.
The difficulty of predicting the consequence of changes and a general
preference for the evils we know over those we do not, may help explain
why people are often willing to put up with orders they consider unjust.
By far the two most important principles of justice are fairness and
equality. There are other principles, but they are more limited in scope
and most can be reduced to fairness or equality. Commutative justice
refers to relations between individuals or institutions regarding contracts
and the equitable exchange of goods. It is restricted to a specific domain,
and the norms and laws governing it rest on the principles of fairness or
equality, usually some combination of the two. The same is true of proce-
dural justice that refers to the methods used to settle disputes and allocate
resources. Here too, norms, laws, and arguments are invariably justified,
or invoke, in the case of arguments, principles of fairness or equality.
What are the origins of social and political orders? It is possible that
hominids of all kinds inherited a propensity to live in social groups
because it greatly enhanced the prospect of survival. For apes and other
primates, social groups provide security and facilitate hunting. Human
communities may have arisen for the same reasons. Social orders among
humans and animals require high degrees of cooperation, and appear to
rest on behavior we associated with the principles of fairness and equality.

Different primate groups and human societies rely on different degrees
and combinations of these principles.
Among humans, interest, honor, and fear generate different logics
of cooperation, conflict, and risk-taking. They also provide different
motives for adherence to rules and norms. They need to be theorized
in tandem because of the interaction effects. Compliance for reasons of
fear, interest, or honor can over time make it habitual. This, in turn, can
make enforcement easier for either top–down or bottom–up orders. The
relative importance of each mechanism for compliance varies within both
kinds of order but there is much more variance among top–down orders.
Modernity has also affected them in more fundamental ways.
Interest, honor, and fear also prompt different responses to similar
challenges. Prediction is made more difficult still by the likelihood that
two or all three of these motives are in play at the same time, making
responses very sensitive to priming and context. My theory of politics
stands in sharp contrast to reductionist approaches like realism or evolu-
tionary psychology that attempt to explain foreign policy, or human
behavior, in the case of the latter, with reference to a single motive or kind
of adaptation. Advocates of these approaches are compelled to import a
deus ex machina to account for behavior seemingly at odds with their
mono-causal accounts, as in the case of altruism for the “selfish gene”
hypothesis.
We need to analyze the decline and collapse of orders. They are fragile
because they are hierarchical. A small number of actors receives much
more in the way of rewards than the majority. Stratification encourages
exploitation. Elites have power and prestige that they can usually translate
into material, social, and sexual rewards. Those at the bottom have little
to no power or prestige and must labor more and receive less. Why do
people, or collective agents, accept, endorse, and offer up their labor,
wealth, and even their lives, for orders in which others reap most of the
benefits?
I believe answers are to be found in the powerful emotional and
substantive rewards that orders provide. Most people believe they are
more secure, better off, and have higher status within orders than they
would outside of them, even though they may be worse off relative
to many, perhaps most, other members of their society. Social integra-
tion confers identity, enhances self-worth, and enables social relationships
20 R. N. LEBOW
and intimacy. Elites, moreover, are generally astute enough to prop-

agate discourses with the goal of legitimizing the orders from which
they benefit. These discourses invoke metaphorical carrots and sticks, the
former by raising the prospect of internal chaos or conquest by some
external foe if order is not maintained, and the latter, by exaggerating the
material and psychological benefits of belonging. When these discourses
find traction, they reinforce elite sanctioned practices, and may make
them habitual. Discourses also attempt to shape expectations of what is
reasonable for orders to provide.
Most orders survive because they deliver at least in part what they
promise or convince people that they do. When orders consistently fail
to meet expectations, people are likely to become disenchanted and more
willing to support moderate, even radical, change. Discontent and change
are also promoted by shifts in principles of justice. These two underlying
causes of decline are often related. Agency is critical to both, but espe-
cially to perceptions of a growing gap between the theory and practice of
orders—top–down or bottom–up.
I identify and explore pathways to disorder that are novel to the social
science literature and derived from my analysis of thumos- and appetite-
based worlds. Both worlds are sufficiently competitive that actors are
tempted to violate the rules by which honor or wealth is attained. When
enough actors do so, those who continue to obey the rules are at a serious
handicap. There is a strong incentive to defect for all but the most ethi-
cally committed actors. This problem is best alleviated by the proliferation
of multiple pathways to honor and standing, which allow more people to
achieve these goals. Competition may nevertheless be intense in many of
these pathways, especially high-status ones.
Competition in appetite-based worlds need not be zero-sum because
the total wealth of a society can be increased. Actors nevertheless often
frame the acquisition of wealth as a winner-take-all competition even
when cooperation would result in larger payoffs. Lack of self-restraint
in the form of defection encourages others to follow suit. So too does
conspicuous consumption, which is the principal means by which actors
in appetite-based worlds seek status.
Rules for achieving honor or wealth can be violated by actors at any
level of their respective hierarchies. The most serious problem, I main-
tain, is defection by those at the top. It reduces the incentive others have
for playing by the rules and can set in motion a vicious cycle that signif-
icantly weakens the order in question. Here too, I follow Aristotle, who
argues that the principal cause of the breakdown of orders is the unre-
stricted pursuit by actors—individuals, factions, or political units—of their
parochial goals. Their behavior leads others to worry about their ability
to satisfy their spirit or appetites, and perhaps fear for their wellbeing or
survival. Fearful actors are likely to implement precautions that run the
gamut from bolting their doors at night to acquiring allies and more and
better arms. Mutually reinforcing changes in behavior and framing often
start gradually but accelerate rapidly and bring about a phase transition.
When this happens, actors enter fear-based worlds.
Lack of restraint, especially by high-status actors, subverts the prin-
ciples of justice associated with their hierarchies. Unconstrained spirit,
which intensifies the competition for honor, gives rise to acute and disrup-
tive conflict within the dominant elite. It has wider consequences for the
society because it not infrequently leads to violence and reduces, if not
altogether negates, the material and security benefits clientalist hierarchies
are expected to provide for non-elite members of society. Unconstrained
appetite also undermines an elite’s legitimacy and arouses resentment and
envy in other actors. It encourages others to emulate elite self-indulgence
and disregard the norms restraining the pursuit of wealth at the expense
of the less fortunate. In the modern world, both kinds of imbalance are
endemic. The two pathways to decline can be synergistic, making decline
that much more likely once societies have traveled a certain distance down
these pathways.
Top–Down and Bottom–Up Orders

Earlier I defined order as legible, predictable behavior in accord with
recognized norms. I claimed that robust orders require a high degree of
solidarity among their members. Solidarity is the product of social inter-
action and cooperation, which in turn requires appropriate norms and
predictable patterns of behavior. Declining orders reveal a breakdown of
solidary, often attributable in the short-term to elite violation of rule pack-
ages and the sharper contradictions they create in perceptions between
existing practices and the principles of justice on which orders rest. Elite
violation of rule packages can lead to expanding and more acute conflict
in a society but also encourage others to violate norms that sustain soli-
darity. In the longer-term, I attribute decline in solidarity, and, in part,
elite violations of rule packages, to loss of traction of principles of justice
22 R. N. LEBOW
and shifts in the relative appeal of competing principles and their different
formulations.
All but the smallest of orders (e.g., hunter-gatherers, kibbutzim) are
to varying degrees hierarchical. One of the fundamental paradoxes of
top–down orders, and societies more generally, is that there is always a
minority who receives more of whatever is valued and a majority that
receives less. The paradox is made more acute by the fact that in so many
societies, Western and non-Western alike, those who receive less are often
the strongest supporters of their orders. I suggest multiple reasons for
this curious phenomenon, among them the fewer life choices available
to the disadvantaged. It makes them more concerned with preserving
the few they have, more risk averse, and often more fearful of change.
Because they are less educated, and perhaps less confident or arrogant,
they are also more likely to internalize the discourses elites propagate to
justify the existing order and their privileges. When those who are disad-
vantaged—by far the majority in any order—do become disenchanted,
they may become more risk prone, and more willing to support change.
Orders rapidly lose their legitimacy in this circumstance and are likely to
confront a crisis.
Top–down and bottom–up orders draw strength from their ability to
satisfy fundamental human needs. These include physical and material
security, self-esteem, and social contact. We might refine our definition
of order and describe it as a hierarchical arrangement, supported by
most of its members, that fosters security, self-esteem, and social contact,
encourages solidarity, and results in legible, predictable behavior. To some
degree, people understand the relationship between order and human
fulfillment. Many are motivated to overvalue the benefits they receive and
undervalue those they lack. This bias helps to rationalize acceptance, even
support, of the status quo. It may also help to explain why those at the
bottom of the hierarchy are often so hostile to those who criticize their
orders.
The principles of justice that enable and sustain orders find expression
in discourses and practices. Discourses define justice and its associated
norms and practices. They also attempt to justify discrepancies between
the behavior required by these principles and how people act. In the U.S.,
popular discourses have, over time, undermined some of these practices
for ordinary people, while elite discourses, most notably, neoliberalism,
have done so for many in the elite. These popular discourses might
be regarded as counter-discourses as they undermined existing prac-

tices supportive or order. The irony here is that these counter-discourses
were sponsored by the elite in the case of neoliberalism, and to some
extent propagated by them in the case of popular discourses. We tend to
conceive of counter-discourses as products of those opposed to the status
quo, and this is often correct. The American experience suggests that
counter-discourses may be produced by those who support the existing
order and hope to profit from it. This was certainly true of presidential
speeches, television sitcoms, and popular music. It is not only capitalism,
but successful orders of all kinds, that generate immanent critiques.
I distinguish top–down from bottom–up orders, and government from
society. Governments are always top–down, but so are many institu-
tions of civil society. This is true, for example, of many schools, and
certainly the authoritarian ones I attended for a decade beginning in
the mid-1940s. Society precedes government, and often outlives it, and
regimes not imposed by force only come into power by to some degree
instantiating societies’ values. Societies can constrain government in the
sense of providing incentives for it to conform to valued norms and
practices. Governments can over time transform society. Strong govern-
ments like France and so-called totalitarian regimes like the Soviet Union,
China, and North Korea have successfully fostered top–down social
transformations. Such success is always Janus-faced. It creates greater
expectations among populations about what government can and will do
for them, creating more alienation when and if they fail to deliver. This
phenomenon was pronounced in the Soviet Union and most communist
countries in Eastern Europe. It is a serious risk in contemporary China.
The society–state difference is important to keep in mind when
analyzing the origins of states and their decline. As noted, societies
precede states and generally survive them. Chaos is the opposite of order;
it is characterized by the absence of rule-based behavior, functioning insti-
tutions, lawlessness, and often, unpredictability. True chaos would require
the collapse of both top–down and bottom–up orders and this rarely
happens. When it does, some kind of bottom–up order quickly forms,
often initially, of a rapacious, gang-based kind. Order and predictability
do not necessarily co-vary. Hobbes’ state of nature is lawless and violent
but all too predictable. So too are Brazilian favelas and the streets of
Mogadishu.
One of the most important political facts of the last one hundred years
is how long-lived societies are in comparison to states, and how much
24 R. N. LEBOW
more so compared to regimes, many of which have a short life. Societies

too can decline, but it is usually a much slower process. My analysis of
decline focuses largely on political orders: states and their regimes. But I
implicate societies in this process because social change can be, and often
is, the principal underlying cause of regime or state decline.
Top–down order relies on a combination of enforcement and voluntary
compliance It rests on the Hobbesian assumptions that government—or
a hegemon in international affairs—is necessary to coordinate mutu-
ally beneficial cooperation and punish those who do not conform. And
further, that most actors conform because they see the utility of this
arrangement. Top–down political orders often appear more robust than
is warranted. They may function well in a limited range of circum-
stances—those in which they can minimize or control uncertainties—but
even here their seeming authority may be misleading. Charles Perrow
(1984) describes how tightly coupled complex systems (e.g., nuclear
power plants, electrical grids, air traffic control, major hospitals) only
function effectively when operators make informal arrangements among
themselves to circumvent many of the rules and replace them with simpli-
fied, informal procedures. Bottom–up order may be more essential in a
society with highly regimented the top–down orders. They are also less
tolerated by such orders, as the communist experience in the Soviet Union
and communist countries of Eastern Europe testify (Lebow 2013).
Top–down systems can suffer catastrophic failures when confronted
with unanticipated developments. This is because efforts to respond,
based on existing repertoires or informal procedures, may not be at all
appropriate to the challenge. They can also have the unintended and
counterintuitive effect of exaggerating the problem, as they did at the
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear plants (Perrow 1984; Nuclear
Energy Agency 2008). A nice political example is provided by efforts of
the Polish Communist Party in the 1950s to control dissent at their new
steel city of Nowa Huta. The Party’s heavy-handed efforts a repression
provoked more resistance and compelled it to negotiate with the workers
and ultimately gave rise to the Solidarity movement (Lebow 2013).
During the Cold War, I warned of the potential for catastrophe in
American nuclear command and control; efforts to prevent accidental or
unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons might make such an event more
likely in a crisis situation because of the interactions between a complex
mechanical system and emotionally aroused human operators (Lebow
1985). Highly structured top–down orders entail another kind of risk:
they socialize actors in ways that minimize their ability or willingness to

act independently.
Bottom–up orders reveal different kinds of vulnerabilities. They can
be more rapid in response to local challenges, even extreme ones, but
may find it difficult to respond to those that require considerable outside
resources. Disasters like floods and fires illustrate the strengths and weak-
nesses of bottom–up orders. Local communities quickly organize, often
without reliance on officials, to fill sandbags or provide quarters, clothes,
and food for people who have been evacuated. If there is much destruc-
tion, they in turn become dependent on others for supplies and funds for
rebuilding (Dickerson and Ferré-Sadurní 2017). Bottom–up orders are
also at a serious disadvantage in conflicts with top–down orders because of
the respective power balance. When boundaries between bottom–up and
top–down orders are ill-defined or poorly recognized in practice, there is
a risk of conflict and disorder where they come into contact.
Top–down and bottom–up orders rarely exist independently of each
other and generally penetrate each other to some degree. Most societies,
incorporate and rely on both forms. Their coexistence may be necessary
for any large social-political unit, but it is never unproblematic. Each kind
of order meets particular needs, and problems arise, as noted, where the
two intersect. In a fascinating book about recess in American schools,
Anna Beresin (2010) found that pupils allowed free time in the school-
yard organized their own rules about space, games, and comportment.
Recess order is bottom–up and emergent, in contrast to classroom order,
clearly imposed from above. Jostling, name-calling, and fights arose in the
liminal space between the orders, when students spilled out of the class-
room or were forced following recess to go back in. This phenomenon
is widespread. In healthcare, a substantial proportion of medical errors
occur during handovers from one department or professional to another.
This is because the so-called “systems” for patient care “are a patch-
work of poorly connected—or entirely unconnected—constituent parts
that don’t work well together (Bohmer 2009).” These problems are likely
to be most pronounced when bottom–up orders hand off to top–down
ones, or vice versa.
Robust orders of scale require synergy between their top–down and
bottom–up components. Like Yin and Yang, these seemingly opposing
forms can be made to some degree complementary, interconnected, and
interdependent (Wang 2021). They may even give rise to each other, as
top–down orders do with bottom–up ones in the tightly coupled systems
26 R. N. LEBOW
that Perrow (1984) describes. There is also good reason to suppose that
societies came before governments, and that top–down orders were based
on and outgrowths of bottom–up ones (Scott 2017). The most robust
top–down orders may be those that build on and copy bottom–up rules
and practices. What works on the street, in everyday life or in face-to-
face encounters in different professional domains, is often the product of
trial and error, implicit and explicit communication among actors, and
common attempts to maximize certain shared values or goals. To the
extent that these values and goals are widely shared, their adoption by
top–down orders and efforts to regularize and enforce them can win
popular approval and enhance efficiency.
Top–down and bottom–up orders roughly—but only roughly—coin-
cide with state and society. Governments and most of their associated
bureaucracies are unambiguously top–down orders and most, but by
no means all of civil society, can be characterized as bottom–up order.
The distinction is not a binary but a continuum with a fair number of
institutions—depending on the society, of course—found in the middle.
The tensions that arise within and between bottom–up and top–down
orders encourage us to recognize that life is more complex than our
conceptions of it acknowledge, that peoples’ behavior is often motivated
by multiple motives they do not fully acknowledge or grasp, that the
consequences of behavior are often unknowable in advance but people
must act as if they are predictable, and the political order is something we
require but do not really understand. We act to uphold or benefit from
it and may unwittingly do the reverse. Shakespeare is telling us—and I
follow him—that political order cannot adequately be represented by a
single, coherent, and consistent formulation. Such formulations blind us
to tensions and contradictions and the behavior and uncertainty to which
they give rise. Knowledge requires us to go beyond them, not to resolve
the tensions, as that is rarely possible in practice, and often ill-advisable
in theory, but to foreground them and make them central to our defi-
nitions and analysis. What may appear intellectually sloppy and inelegant
may have the virtue of being philosophically profound and conceptually
useful.
As I unpacked my definition of order, its tensions became increas-
ingly evident. I consider this one of the rewards of the exercise. The
tensions are internal and external. My definition embodies compo-
nents (e.g., predictability, solidarity, hierarchy) that sometimes work at
cross-purposes. More of one component may mean less of another—or
not—depending on the circumstances. The external tensions arise from

efforts to apply the definition to historical worlds. Our categories never
quite fit protean reality, or they do in ways that differ across societies.
The several components of my definition may also have different inter-
action effects. Both sets of tension tell us important things about the
nature of the order and politics, more so, I believe, than simple, seemingly
consistent definitions that attempt to ignore or finesse these tensions.
References
Beresin, Anna R. 2010. Recess Battles: Playing, Fighting, and Storytelling.
Jackson, Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press.
Bohmer, Richard M. J. 2009. Designing Care: Aligning the Nature and
Management of Health Care. Cambridge: Harvard Business Press.
Dickerson, Aitlin, and Louis Ferré-Sadurní. 2017. Like Going Back in Time:
Puerto Ricans Put Survival Skills to Use. New York Times. https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/10/24/us/hurricane-maria-puerto-rico-coping.html?
hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=
photo-spot-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0. Accessed 22
Aug 2021.
Lebow, Katherine. 2013. Unfinished Utopia: Nowa Huta, Stalinism, and Polish
Society, 1949–56. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Lebow, Richard Ned. 1985. Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Lebow, Richard Ned. 2008. A Cultural Theory of International Relations.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lebow, Richard Ned. 2018. The Rise and Fall of Political Orders. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD). 2008. Chernobyl: Executive Summary.
Nuclear Energy Agency. https://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/chernobyl/c0e.html.
Accessed 22 Aug 2021.
Perrow, Charles. 1984. Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies.
New York: Basic Books.
Scott, James C. 2017. Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Wang, Robin. Yinyang (Yin-yang). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://
www.iep.utm.edu/yinyang/. Accessed 22 Aug 2021.
CHAPTER 3
Deep Pluralism as the Emerging Structure

of Global Society
Barry Buzan
Introduction
This chapter sets out the case for deep pluralism as the emerging structure
of global society in the coming decades. The bare-bones definition of
deep pluralism is a global society in which power, wealth and cultural
and political authority are distributed diffusely within a system that has
high interaction capacity and is strongly interdependent (Buzan 2011;
Buzan and Lawson 2015; Buzan and Schouenborg 2018; Acharya and
Buzan 2019). By global society, I mean a set of primary institutions in the
English School sense, that operate not just in the interstate domain, but
span across that and the transnational and interhuman domains (Buzan
2004, 2023). The next section sets out a general sketch of what deep
B. Buzan (B)
London School of Economics, London, UK
e-mail: b.g.buzan@lse.ac.uk

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9872-0_3
30 B. BUZAN
pluralism will look like during the next one or two decades. The section
following ‘The General Character of Deep Pluralism’ takes a brief look at
the likely dynamics of deep pluralism in terms of its major dialectics.
The General Character of Deep Pluralism

In one sense deep pluralism is a theoretical concept about structure,
and in another it is an empirical projection of global trends. In a struc-
tural theoretical sense, deep pluralism can be compared and contrasted
to both the premodern structure, which also had diffuse wealth, power
and cultural and political authority, but not within a system that had high
interaction capacity and was strongly interdependent; and the opening
phase of modernity, where wealth, power and cultural and political
authority were concentrated in a small group of mainly Western states
plus Japan and Russia, but within a system that had high interaction
capacity and was strongly interdependent. In this sense, deep pluralism is
a distinctive global system/society unlike any we have experienced before.
Both ‘deep’ and ‘pluralism’ carry specific meanings. Pluralism privileges
the units of the interstate system/society over global society, valuing
sovereign states as a way of preserving the cultural diversity that is the
legacy of human history. It favours raison d’etat (or raison d’empire)
over raison de système, and operates by a logic of coexistence within a
fairly thin international society. In this context, ‘deep’ means not just a
diffuse distribution of wealth and power, but also of cultural and polit-
ical authority. These criteria contrast sharply with the preceding decades
of Western domination and globalisation in which wealth and power, and
cultural and political authority, were relatively concentrated.
In the last few decades, quite a lot of thought has gone into how
to conceptualise what was agreed to be an important shift in the
nature and structure of GIS. Various labels have been put forward to
capture the novelty and complexity of this emergent construction: pluri-
lateralism (Cerny 1993), postmodern international system (Buzan and
Little 2000), heteropolarity (Der Derian 2003), no one’s world (Kupchan
2012), multinodal (Womack 2014), multiplex (Acharya 2014), decen-
tred globalism (Buzan 2011), polymorphic globalism (Katzenstein 2012),
and multi-order world (Flockhart 2016). This array of concepts offered
different emphases in their interpretations of the shift that was underway.
Some assumed globalisation to be the main trend, and so emphasised
the relative disempowerment of states and the rise of non-state actors
3 DEEP PLURALISM AS THE EMERGING STRUCTURE … 31
of various kinds. Others emphasised the diffusion of wealth and power

and the relative decline of the West. Most saw a more complex, multi-
faceted type of world order than a simple Realist vision of a system of
states jockeying for wealth and power. A reversion to the old realist idea
of multipolarity could not capture the main architecture of what was
happening even though there was a diffusion of power. Acharya and
Buzan (2019) offered the concept of deep pluralism, in an attempt to
aggregate the vocabulary. They noted that deep pluralism could unfold
in two ways. Contested pluralism means that there is substantial resis-
tance to the material and ideational reality of deep pluralism. This might
take various forms: former superpowers (most obviously the US) refusing
to give up their special rights and privileges; great powers refusing to
recognise each other’s standing, and playing against each other as rivals
or enemies. Consensual pluralism means that the main players in GIS not
only tolerate the material, cultural, ideological, and actor-type differences
of deep pluralism, but also respect and even value them both as expres-
sions of diversity, which like biodiversity is to be valued in itself, and as
the foundation for coexistence (Acharya and Buzan 2019). Consensual
pluralism might also be supported by a degree of intersubjective realisa-
tion of common interest in dealing with the set of inescapable shared-fate
issues that increasingly confront humankind as a whole.
We are now entering into deep pluralism, and as we do so, are begin-
ning to experience the dawn of modernity in a more truly global form,
not just the Western-dominated transition of the first round of modernity.
That said, empirically, we do so under the specific historical circumstances
of reaction against the collapse of the short-lived heyday of neoliber-
alism, economic globalisation and supposed unipolarity, during which
the liberal order over-extended itself. Under the imperative of neoliber-
alism, it pushed for a global economy that incorporated too many illiberal
regimes, and whose governance mechanisms were inadequate. From a
liberal perspective, there were some big gains from this experiment in
terms of lowering production costs and spreading development, but some
big costs too, both in destabilising the societies and polities within the
liberal core, and empowering authoritarians in China and Russia. The idea
that liberalism and democracy would be transplanted everywhere by the
spread of capitalism proved totally wrong. Now populists both inside and
outside the West want to pull down globalisation (especially economic)
and reinstate the domestic/international divide in a more robust form.
32 B. BUZAN
The much-used term ‘emerging economies’ captures the wider array

of states and societies now finding success in increasing the wealth and
power they can extract from modernity. As they do so, pluralism gets
both wider as more countries shift from periphery to core; and deeper, as
more varieties of capitalism and modernity unfold. This is where the full
picture of second-round modernity begins to crystallise, because it has
now spread well beyond the founding elite, and established itself effec-
tively in a range of societies outside the West. Multiple modernities and
varieties of capitalism come into clearer meaning, as do the sustainable
forms of global political economy. Now that we are actually beginning to
experience deep pluralism, one can see at least some of its specific features
more clearly. These are generally driven by a mix of structural logic (i.e.
they could be expected in any instance of deep pluralism), and historical
circumstances (i.e. arising from the particularities of the recent history
that led here). There are at least five such general features, and they are
not wholly mutually exclusive:
. No superpowers and strong anti-hegemonism

. Introverted great powers
. A historical legacy of post-colonial resentment, and former colonial
forgetting
. Declining influence of some non-state actors
. Regionalisation.
No Superpowers and Strong Anti-Hegemonism

In much day-to-day public discourse about world politics, and even in
some academic literature on current affairs, the term superpower is used in
a very loose and poorly defined way. At its most ridiculous, one even hears
talk of ‘regional superpowers’, which amounts to an entirely unnecessary
and unhelpful inflation of meaning. There is a lot of talk of China as a
rising superpower, carrying the implication that we are moving once again
into a world of two superpowers (bipolarity in the neorealist jargon). To
support a dramatic claim, going against this conventional wisdom—that
we are moving into a system with no superpowers—requires clear defini-
tions. For this purpose, I adapt and update the ones given by Buzan and
Wæver (2003):
Superpowers – The criteria for superpower status are demanding in that

they require broad spectrum capabilities exercised across the whole of the
international system/society. Superpowers must possess first class military-
political capabilities (as measured by the standards of the day), and the
economies to support such capabilities. They must be capable of, and also
exercise, global military and political reach. They need to see themselves,
and be accepted by others in rhetoric and behaviour, as having this rank.
Superpowers must be active players in processes of securitisation and dese-
curitisation in all, or nearly all, of the regions in the system, whether as
threats, guarantors, allies or interveners. Generally, superpowers will also be
fountainheads of ‘universal’ values of the type necessary to underpin inter-
national society. Their legitimacy as superpowers will depend substantially
on their success in establishing the legitimacy of such values. Taking all of
these factors into account, during the nineteenth century Britain, France
and more arguably Russia had this rank. After the First World War, it was
held by Britain, the US and the Soviet Union. After the Second World
War it was held by the US and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War it
was held only by the US. The US is just about still the sole superpower,
though its leadership legitimacy and ideological credibility are fraying fast.
China is not yet in a position to treat the world as its region or to be
accepted as a superpower.
Great Powers – Achieving great power status is less demanding in terms of

both capability and behaviour. Great powers need not necessarily have big
capabilities in all sectors. Neither do they need to be actively present in the
securitisation processes of all areas of the international system, though they
do need to be a significant factor beyond their own region. Great power
status rests mainly on a single key: what distinguishes great powers from
merely regional ones is that they are responded to by others on the basis
of system-level calculations about the present and near future distribution
of power. This might imply that a great power is treated in the calculations
of other major powers as if it has the clear economic, military and political
potential to bid for superpower status in the short or medium term, but
great powers are sufficient in themselves to affect global calculations, and
they may of course be declining superpowers. This single key is observable
in the foreign policy processes and discourses of other powers. It means
that actual possession of material and legal attributes is less crucial for great
powers than for superpowers. Great powers will usually have appropriate
levels of capability, though even before China could meet that standard
it demonstrated an impressive ability over nearly a century to trade on
future capabilities that it had yet to fully deliver (Segal 1999). They will
generally think of themselves as more than regional powers, and possibly
34 B. BUZAN
as prospective superpowers, and they will be capable of operating in more

than one region. But while these characteristics will be typical of great
powers they are not strictly speaking necessary so long as other powers
treat them as potential superpowers. Occasionally, a declining power will
be given honourary great power status.
Regional Powers - Regional powers define the polarity of any given RSC
[regional security complex]: unipolar, as in Southern Africa, bipolar in
South Asia, multipolar as in the Middle East, South America and South-
east Asia. Their capabilities loom large in their regions, but do not register
much in a broad-spectrum way at the global level. Higher level powers
respond to them as if their influence and capability were mainly relevant to
the securitisation processes of a particular region. They are thus excluded
from the higher level calculations of system polarity whether or not they
think of themselves as deserving a higher ranking...
In a general sense, the very definition of deep pluralism, with its emphasis
on the diffusion of wealth, power and political and cultural authority,
leans against the idea of there being one or more superpowers within
it. Superpower status depends on one or more states being able to
acquire disproportionate weight within the system. I have also argued that
as modernity spreads, it will fuel a strong anti-hegemonism, stemming
partly from reaction against the two-century hegemony of the first-round
modernisers (and in particular fuelled by post-colonial resentment against
them on which more below), and partly from the fact that rising powers
generally cultivate anti-hegemonic attitudes. Since many are rising as the
second round widens and deepens, and since the first-round modernisers
are not going away (they are mainly in relative, not absolute, decline), it
will necessarily be difficult, if not impossible, for the US to retain super-
power status, or China to reach it. Indeed, the US seems to be losing
the political will, and the support of its electorate, to play the superpower
role, and a reasonable case can be made that China does not want the
role. Unlike the US, which projects ‘universal’ values, and thinks everyone
should become like America, China’s exceptionalism is much more inward
looking, stressing its uniqueness by the frequent use of the term ‘Chi-
nese characteristics’ (Cui and Buzan 2016). The prospect is of a world of
several great powers and many regional ones. The US and China might
well be primus inter pares, but they will not be superpowers.
In a technical sense, this system might look multipolar, and that will
be the context in which any cooperation on great power management
of global society has to be approached. But because of strong anti-

hegemonic sentiments it is unlikely to feature the Realist type struggle
to dominate the whole system normally associated with the idea of
multipolarity. What is emerging will be novel in a number of respects.
Increasingly, power, wealth and cultural and ideological authority will be
wielded by non-Western as well as Western actors (Buzan and Lawson
2015; Acharya and Buzan 2019). Although they are all embedded in a
highly interdependent global economy, and a single planetary environ-
ment, none wants to, or can, lead or dominate GIS. It seems likely that
while the US and China will be primus inter pares, they will not be in an
entirely different class from India, the EU, and possibly Russia, Brazil and
Japan. They will be great powers in the sense that their influence extends
beyond their own regions, and that they have to be taken into account
at the global level, but the world will not be their region in the sense of
the definition given above, and therefore neither will be a superpower.
Their contest seems to be more about adjusting spheres of influence in
Asia, and about bringing the US down a peg or two in its pretensions
to global primacy and leadership. It does not, at least in the short and
medium term, or possibly the long term, look like a contest for global
primacy.
Indeed, under emerging deep pluralism, the very idea of global
hegemonic leadership, which has been closely associated with Western
hegemony for more than two centuries, seems likely to be delegitimised.
Such a world will feature different economic and political ideologies and
systems, including the remnants of the liberal order. This will be a novel
system/society, and not only because we have got used to living in a GIS
with a high concentration of power dominated by superpowers.
Introverted Great Powers

The argument that deep pluralism will look like a multipolar system, but
not behave as one, is reinforced by the fact that the particular historical
conditions of this transition point in modernity, suggest that all of the
likely great powers will be introverted in their outlook and behaviour.
Nothing in the theory says that deep pluralist systems are necessarily
populated by introverted great powers, though the diffusion of wealth,
power and authority perhaps make that more likely than not. The concept
of ‘autistic’ great powers has been around in the IR literature for a long
time. In states it can be understood as where reaction to external inputs
36 B. BUZAN
is based much more on the internal processes of the state—its domestic

political bargains, party rivalries, pandering to public opinion (whether it
be nationalist or isolationist), and suchlike—than on rational, fact-based,
assessment of and engagement with the other states and societies that
constitute international society (Senghaas 1974; Buzan 2007; Luttwak
2012). To some extent ‘autism’ in this sense is a normal feature of states.
It is built into their political structure that domestic factors generally take
first priority, whether because that is necessary for regime survival, or
because the government is designed in such a way as to represent its citi-
zens’ interests. Autism, however, is a complex phenomenon, and its use
as an analogy may not be the ideal way to capture the fairly simple quality
of introversion and self-referenced behaviour in states.
There is a growing interest in the new great powers and their roles
and responsibilities in international society (Gaskarth 2015; Falkner and
Buzan 2021). Introversion will be strong in the current and near future
set of great powers for two reasons. First, the old, advanced industrial
great powers (the US, the EU, Japan) are not going to go away, but they
are exhausted, weakened both materially and in terms of legitimacy, and
are increasingly unable or unwilling to take the lead. No clearer illus-
tration of this could be desired than the surprising 2016 successes in
attracting voter support of both the Brexit campaign in the UK, and
Trump’s ‘America first’ campaign in the US (Buzan and Cox). The EU
has weak foreign and security policy institutions anyway, and is too mired
in its own local problems of the Euro, Brexit, migration, Turkey and
Russia to have much diplomatic energy or legitimacy left for raison de
système. It is barely maintaining raison de région. Japan is preoccupied
with recovering its status as a ‘normal country’ and trying to deal with
the rapid rise of a China that seems committed to maintaining historical
hostility against it. The rising great powers (China and India, possibly
Brazil) are very keen to claim great power status, and might provide
new blood to the great power camp. But they are equally keen not to
let go of their status as developing countries. They want to assert their
own cultures against the long dominance of the West, and some, notably
China, are cultivating a nationalism based on historical grievance. But
while they know what they are against, the rising powers have as yet
shown little clear idea about what kind of alternative GIS they want. That
combination leads them to give priority to their own development. They
argue, not unreasonably, that their own development is a big and difficult
job for them, and that developing their own big populations is a suffi-
cient contribution to GIS in itself. On that basis, they resist being given
wider global managerial responsibilities. Russia is not a rising power, and
is too weak, too unpopular, too self-centred and too stuck in an imperial
mind-set, to take a consensual global leadership role. The cycle of prickly
action–overreaction relations typical of introversion is already visible in
US–China, Russia–EU, US–Russia and China–Japan relations.
Great powers are in part defined by their wider responsibilities to raison
de système. If, as seems likely, it becomes accepted that developing coun-
tries can also rank as great powers, then the general consequence will be
a granting of great power rights to more states, alongside a reduction in
great power responsibilities. To the extent that states, and especially great
powers, have introverted foreign policies, they not only fail to uphold
raison de système, but also lose touch with their social environment, and
are blind to how their policies and behaviours affect the way that others
see and react to them. In such conditions a cycle of prickly action–
overreaction is likely to prevail, and building trust becomes difficult or
impossible. Everyone sees only their own interests, concerns and ‘right-
ness’, and is blind to the interests, concerns and ‘rightness’ of others.
If this diagnosis turns out to be correct, then we are unlikely to see
responsible great powers. The absence of responsible great powers in
conditions of deep pluralism points to a contested deep pluralist GIS,
weak, and possibly quite fractious. Russia is the most extreme exem-
plar of a great power putting raison d’etat first, and caring little about
raison de système. China seems to be abandoning its earlier position
of peaceful rise/development, and following the Russian playbook of
bullying neighbours and cultivating victimhood nationalism. China and
Japan, with their unresolved history problem, make a classic case of
introverted relations (Buzan and Goh 2020), and China’s relations with
India seem headed in the same direction. The US and China are pushed
more towards contested deep pluralism by domestic political impera-
tives: seeking domestic unity in the face of a challenger to US primacy
for the US; hardening and sealing itself to reduce outside influence and
consolidate CCP control, in the case of China.
Introverted great powers means that the exercise of great power
management responsibility under deep pluralism will be more diffuse and
more complicated than under the relatively concentrated domination of
the US over the last few decades, or the relative simplicity of the bipolar
Cold War. One factor is the wider diversity of great powers created by the
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daaraan gevoegde verdere aanzienlijke gestoelten, is zeer behaagelijk;
zijnde alle die gestoelten bevallig bruin gekleurd.
Onder den avondgodsdienst wordt het ruim verlicht door vier koperen
kaarskroonen.
Voor eenige jaaren is deeze kerk van binnen aanmerkelijk vernieuwd:

uitwijzens het volgende versjen, dat men tegen een der wanden leest:
In uw vernieuwde kerk, o Huizen! staan Gods knechten,

Verkondigende aan u des Heeren dierbre rechten.
Een ander versjen luidt dus:
Die Godes woord aanhoort, en daarnaar niet en leeft,

Is als ’t bezaaide land dat geene vruchten geeft.
De Pastorij en het Schoolhuis zijn beiden aan het oogmerk zeer

voldoende: in het school worden alle de dorps-kinderen, van wat
Godsdienst ook, ontvangen.
Wees- of Arm huizen worden hier niet gevonden: de Weezen en Armen

worden by de inwooners besteed. [3]
De Doopsgezinden hebben er voords eene zeer nette vergaderplaats, tot

wier vernieuwing de Heer Jacobus van Hoorn, in zijn leven Leeraar der
Vereenigde Waterlandsche en Vlaamsche Doopsgezinden te Amsteldam,
veel toegebragt heeft.
Wereldlijke gebouwen zijn hier niet voorhanden; het Rechthuis wordt

gehouden in eene herberg, dat een zeer aanzienlijk en spacieus gebouw
is.
KERKLĲKE REGEERING.
Deeze bestaat uit den Predikant, zijnde thans de Wel-Eerwaarde Heer

Dirk van den Ham, behoorende onder de Classis van Amsteldam;
benevens twee Ouderlingen en twee Diaconen, van welken jaarlijks één
Ouderling en één Diacon afgaat, en door een anderen vervangen wordt,
ter keuze van Schepenen, uit de nominatie van een dubbeldgetal door
den Kerkenraad zelven gemaakt.
WERELDLĲKE REGEERING.
Deeze is wederom als op alle de andere dorpen van Gooiland, zie het
geen wij deswegen onder onze beschrijving van Hilversum, enz. gezegd
hebben.
Er zijn te Huizen twee Kerkmeesters, die door Schout en Schepenen

verkozen worden, en voor hun leven aanblijven.
Bijzondere voorrechten heeft Huizen niet; ook liggen deszelfs

inwooners onder geene bijzondere verpligtingen.
In den schaarbrief, waarvan wij elders spreeken, leezen wij wegens dit
dorp:
„Eerstelijk dat gedeelte van de heyde, ’t geen doorgaans gelegen is ten

zuidoosten van Gravenveld, en ten zuidoosten van de Landerijen die
opwaarts met eekenhout beplant zijn, genaamt duinen, strekkende in de
lengte van de Huizer Neng af, van daar zuidwaarts op tot aan de
plantagie van de Wed. de Heer Hendrik Thierens, en grenzende tot aan
het veld van de Wed. den Heere Abm. Scheerenberg: loopende in de
breedte van Gravenveld, en de voornoemde zogenaamde duinen,
zuidoostwaards op tot aan de plantagie, behoord hebbende de Heer van
Hoorn, de Wed. de Heer Cornelis Nagtglas, en tot de velden van
andere particulieren aldaar in het rondte gelegen, daar onder begrepen
de heijde genaamt de Catheet, tot aan het land van de Wed. de Heer
Scheerenberg voornoemd.”
BEZIGHEDEN
Bestaan voornaamlijk in de rederij; en den zo hoogstnuttigen [4]landbouw;
er wordt, gelijk elders in Gooiland, veel boekwijt gewonnen; men legt er
zig ook niet weinig toe op het teelen van lange raapen, en andere
aardvruchten: eenige andere Huizenaars geneeren zig met het weeven
van grof doek, en grove wol tot seilen; het spinnen van katoen tot pitten
voor kaarsen en lampen gaat er ook sterk in zwang, en alle de vruchten
huns arbeids worden voornaamlijk te Amsteldam vertierd.
De visscherij is er mede een tak van bestaan, waartoe de Zuiderzee,

gelijk gezegd is, de gelegenheid aan de hand geeft: meestal wordt er bot
gevangen: deeze wordt met karren langs de Vecht gevoerd, onderweg,
en ook niet weinig te Utrecht verkocht; eenige anderen zeilen met hunne
vangst naar Zeeburg, alwaar zij dezelven in platte bennen op wagens
laaden, en ze daarmede rondsom Amsteldam, in de Diemermeir en
elders verkoopen: daar zij met hunne geladene wagentjens niet in
Amsteldam mogen komen, draagen sommige van deeze visschers, (hun
voordeel met den verkoop binnen de stads poorten meenende te kunnen
doen,) hunne bennen ter poorte in, en venten de bot langs de huizen uit;
doch daar zij dus doende de markt-pachten niet betaalen, wordt hen niet
zelden alles wat zij te koop aanbieden afgenomen: dit is buiten
tegenspraak schadelijk, echter moet dat schadelijke minder zijn dan het
voordeel, ’t welk zij met de gezegde verkoop weeten te doen; want hoe
dikwijls hun ook het lot van beroofd te worden moge treffen, ’t kan hun
niet doen besluiten dien verboden handel te staaken.
„Sedert eenige jaaren”, leezen wij, „heeft men er ook begonnen bokking
te droogen, die, hoewel zij te Amsteldam, onder den naam van
Harderwijker bokking, vertierd wordt, en waartoe eene bijzondere
marktplaats,” (op het Koningsplein,) „gesteld is, echter zo smaaklijk niet is
als de oprechte Harderwijker visch, ’t welk aan de wijze van rooken
toegeschreven wordt”: er wordt des winters ook veel spiering gevangen
en vertierd.
Wegens de afzonderlijke geschiedenis van Huizen, kan niets bijzonders

gezegd worden, ook heeft het dorp in onze jongstledene beroerten weinig
deel gehad.
Bijzonderheden zijn er voor den vreemdeling niet te bezichtigen.
LOGEMENTEN.
Het Rechthuis; men vindt er nog eene en andere herberg van minderen
rang.
REISGELEGENHEDEN
Maandag, Dingsdag en Woensdag, vaart een zeilschuit, vise versa, op

Amsteldam: des winters bij besloten water rijdt er op dezelfde dagen een’
wagen. [1]
[Inhoud]
Het dorp Blarikum.
Dit dorpjen, waarde Nederlander!
Doet zien wat noeste vlijt vermag;
Zij doet alom het graan ontspruiten,
Daar men weleer slechts heide zag.
HET
DORP
BLARICUM.
Onder de Gooische dorpen, bekleedt dit zekerlijk een van de minste

standen, gelijk het dan ook weinig stofs, tot eene beschrijving van
hetzelve, oplevert.
Deszelfs
LIGGING.
Is omtrent één en een half uur gaans ten Zuidoosten van Naarden,
strekkende de huizen zig bijna tot aan de grensscheiding van Holland
en Utrecht uit: hoe zeer onaanmerklijk het zij, is het echter ongemeen
aangenaam gelegen; allerbevalligst groen, en, door zijne ruime
bebouwing, zeer luchtig: ’t heeft in de daad alle landlijk schoon.
Bijkans een quartier uur gaans van daar ten Noordwesten, slegts weinig
schreden van den weg naar Naarden, vindt men den bekenden
Tafelberg, wiens verhevenheid eene groote verscheidenheid van
gezichten verschaft, die het oog ongemeen bekooren, en het hart van
den gevoeligen aanschouwer tot aanbidding van den Schepper der
Natuur sal dwingen.
Van de naamsoorsprong deezes dorps hebben wij, noch in de

voorhanden zijnde schrijveren over het Gooiland, noch [2]door onze ter
plaatse gedaane informatien iet kunnen ontdekken; hetzelfde is ’t geval
wegens zijne stichting.
Wat aangaat de
GROOTTE.
Wij vinden dat in de quohieren der verpondingen voor Blaricum

aangetekend staat: 101 zwad, 9 voeten weiland, en 195 morgen, 353
roeden geestland.
„Het is,” zegt de schrijver van den Tegenwoordigen Staat van Holland,
„in honderd jaaren genoegzaam niet vermeerderd of verminderd,
staande in de oude lijst der verpondingen maar één huis minder dan in
de laatste van 1732, volgends welke Blaricum op 108 huizen begroot
wordt;” sedert echter is het verminderd, want men schat het getal der
huizen thans, niet hooger dan 100; deezen worden bewoond door
nagenoeg 500 menschen, die meest allen van den Roomschen
Godsdienst zijn.
Het
WAPEN
Van Blaricum is drie blaauwe korenbloemen op een zilveren veld.
KERKLIJKE en GODSDIENSTIGE GEBOUWEN.
Hoewel de Gereformeerde Gemeente op dit Dorp zeer klein zij, heeft

dezelve echter eene eigene Kerk, waarin op den eenen zondag vóór- op
den anderen na-den-middag de openbaare Godsdienst wordt verricht.
Deze Gemeente is gecombineerd met die van Laaren, behoort onder de
Classis van Amsteldam, en wordt thands bediend door den
Weleerwaardigen Heer Carel Aeijelts, wiens woonplaats te Blaricum
is. De Kerkenraad deezer gecombineerde Gemeente bestaat, behalven
uit den Predikant, uit één Ouderling en één Diacon te Blaricum,
benevens één Ouderling en één Diacon te Laaren.
Het Kerkjen heeft uitwendig niets aanmerklijks; er staat een oude
vierkante toren op; van binnen is het mede allereenvoudigst, volstrekt
zonder eenig cieraad, behalven eene kleine kaars-kroon en twee
koperen boogen boven de ingangen van het Doop-hek. [3]
Op het Kerkhof binnen den omtrek, dien voorheen het choor der Kerk
heeft beslaagen, is een grafkelder, doch die thands van boven geheel
met gras begroeid is. Op denzelven ligt een gedeelte van een’ grafzerk,
waarop gebeiteld is het wapen en de naam van Johan Stachovwer
Urij Heer Van Schiermoncoog.
De Pastorij te Blaricum is vrij goed, gelijk ook het Schoolhuis; doch er is

noch wees- noch arm-huis, en dit zoude er ook indedaad vrij overtollig
zijn: die weinigen onvermogenden om voor zich zelven den kost te
winnen, worden of in hunne eigene wooning verzorgd, of bij Burgers
besteed—de Diaconie-armen door den Diacon, met voorkennis en
goedvinden van den Predikant en Ouderling—de zogenaamde pot-
armen door de Armmeesters.
De Roomschen hebben er eene goede statie, die door een wereldsch

Heer bediend wordt, zijnde thans de Weleerwaarde Heer Henricus
Huisman.
Wegens de
WERELDLĲKE REGEERING,
Hebben wij slechts dit volgende ter neder te stellen: de Burgers hebben
er, wat het bestuur der Dorps-zaaken betreft, hunne eigene Regeering;
doch met opzicht tot de rechts-zaaken handelt deeze Regeering in
vereeniging met die van Laaren, en heeft dan dezelfde maat van magt
als de Regeering der andere Gooische Dorpen. De Leden dezer
Regeering zijn te Blaricum zo wel als te Laaren bijkans allen van den
Roomsch-catholijken Godsdienst.
Voorrechten of verpligtingen heeft Blaricum niet: Zie wegens
deszelfs aandeel in de meente onder onze beschrijving van Laaren.
De
BEZIGHEDEN
Der bewooneren bestaan meestal in den landbouw, zo als dezelve over

het algemeen in Gooiland ter hand genomen wordt: er gaan ook nog 18
à 20 getouwen, ter bereidinge van grove stoffe: midsgaders eene
menigte van spinwielen, deels om die getouwen aan den gang te
houden, deels ter vervaardiging van katoen-garen. [4]
De
GESCHIEDENIS
Van Blaricum, bevat op zig zelve niet veel bijzonders; in de Spaansche

beroerten, welken ons land zo vreeslijk geteisterd hebben, heeft het in ’t
lot van geheel Gooiland gedeeld, en ’t is overbekend, hoe jammerlijk het
weerelooze landvolk moet lijden, als zij door den soldaat bezocht
worden; indedaad, de boer heeft meer dan eenig stedeling gegronde
reden om den oorlog te vervloeken.
In 1672 toen de geduchte Franschen ons land als overstroomden, heeft

Blaricum, als de overige gedeelten van Gooiland, den twist tusschen de
beheerschers der aarde moeten bezuuren; met minder gevoelige
neepen, is het in onze jongstledene beroerten vrijgekomen.
Maar zeer veel heeft dit Dorp geleden in het jaar 1696: op den 26 Maart
diens jaars, even na den middag, ontstond er in hetzelve een
allergeweldigste brand, waardoor binnen den tijd van twee uuren over
de dertig huizen benevens de Kerk en toren waren in de asch gelegd,
de zerken in de Kerk van één sprongen, en de lijken in de graven tot
stof verteerden.
Bijzonderheden zijn hier niet te bezichtigen, niettegenstaande de
alleraangenaamste ligging des dorps, een bezoek van den Landvriend
overwaardig is.
Eigenlijke
LOGEMENTEN
Zijn er niet, men vindt er eenige weinige herbergen, waarin de

wandelaar zich kan ververschen.
Er zijn ook geene reisgelegenheden: men is verpligt zig van daar naar
Naarden te begeeven, om met de gelegenheden, welken te dier plaatse
gevonden worden, naar elders te vertrekken. [1]
[Inhoud]
’t Dorp Laaren
Zo lang het landlijk schoon den Batavier behaagt,

En hij naar golvend graan, naar groene velden vraagt,
Zo lang hij naar de stem van Neêrlands heil zal hooren,
Zo lang zal LAAREN ook den Batavier bekooren.
HET
DORP
LAAREN.
Dit zeer aangenaame dorp, wordt gehouden voor het oudste van geheel
Gooiland, ofschoon ter plaatse zelve geene blijken daarvan voorhanden
zijn; dit is zeker dat het één der vermaaklijksten van alle de Gooische
dorpen genoemd mag worden.
Deszelfs
LIGGING
Is meer zuidwaards van Naarden, dan Blaricum, doch de afstand van die
stad is genoegzaam even groot als dezelfde afstand van ’t gemelde dorp,
naamlijk omtrent één en half uur.
De ligging over het algemeen is vermaaklijk, ’t is zeer ruim uitgebouwd, en

daardoor ten uitersten luchtig; de boomrijkheid [2]verrukt er het oog op de
treffendste wijze; ’t is voords vol akkers, en met bebouwde hoogten
omringd, allen welken taamlijk vruchtbaar zijn in graangewassen.
Onder de uitgestrektheid gronds, welke hier (als elders in Gooiland,) het

oog zo zeer verrukt, telt men eene genoegzaame hoeveelheid, die men
Meente, of Gemeene weide noemt: een onzer waardigste begunstigers in
deeze, zegt daarvan het volgende: „In het district van Gooiland, vindt men
niet alleen groote streeken heide, geschikt tot beweiden der schaapen, en
slaan van plaggen, maar ook ligt bij elke plaats een groot stuk weiland, ’t
welk gewoonlijk de Meent genaamd wordt; van deeze Heide en Meent,
hebben zij die Erfgroojers zijn, dat is die uit voorouders herkomstig zijn,
welke in dien tijd reeds in dit district woonachtig waren, toen met het recht
tot de beweiding der opgenoemde Meente kreeg, het vruchtgebruik, het
welk gewettigd is door eene goedkeuring van Hertog Albrecht van
Beieren, in den jaare 1404; en Hertog Jan van Beieren, wilde in zeker
Handvest van den jaare 1407, dat de gemeente in Gooiland zoude
gebruikt worden gelijk van ouds de gewoonte was—ondertusschen
schijnen echter van tijd tot tijd geschillen tusschen de Graaflijkheid en die
van Stad en Lande ontstaan te zijn, welke geschillen nu als geeindigd
beschouwd worden, door eene conventie van den jaare 1731, waarin
gecommitteerde Raaden zig verbinden: 1o) „voor het toekomend de
uitgiften of verkoopingen van Landen en Gronden van de Gooische Heide,
niet anders te doen als na dat die van Gooiland daar over zullen zijn
gehoord, en derzelver consideratien daar over zullen zijn ingenomen; 2o)
dat de erfpachten die voor de consenten jaarlijks zullen worden betaald,
ofte de penningen die van de verkopinge van eenige gronden of landen
komen te provenieeren, zullen bij de Graaflijkheid, en bij die van Gooiland
genoten en geprofiteerd worden elks de helft: 3o) dat zo ras de
afzandingen op Gooiland wederom vrij zullen gesteld zijn,
Gecommitteerde Raaden en die [3]van Gooiland gesamenlijk een begin
zullen doen maaken met de Gooische Heide aftezanden, ter plaatse daar
zulks dienstig en meest profijtelijk zal geoordeelt worden, zonder dat aan
iemand anders permissie om te zanden zal worden verleent, en dat tot
meerdere bevoordering van de voorsz. gemeene afzanding de landen en
gronden die van de voorsz. Gooise Heide in tijd en wijlen, het zij bij koop
consent ofte erfpacht mogte worden verkregen, niet zullen mogen werden
afgezand”——en het is ook gelijk wij verneemen onder die voorwaarde,
als mede dat hetzelve niet met hout mag beplant worden, dat de streek
Lands of Heide achter ’s Graveland liggende (zie onze beschrijving van
dat dorp,) is uitgegeven.
„Jaarlijks word, op den 27 maart, te Naarden eene vergadering van Stad

en Lande gehouden, wanneer gelijk ook op de buitengewoone
vergaderingen, uit alle de plaatsen van Gooiland, één of twee
Buurtmeesters of ook wel één Buurtmeester met één of twee Leden uit
het Gerecht, ter bijwooninge dier vergaderinge, worden afgevaardigd.
„De opgezetenen van dit district, of liever de Erfgrooiers, zijn niet bepaald
tot het beweiden van hunne bijzondere Meent, maar ieder Erfgooier mag
schaaren of zijne beesten weiden op welke Meent hij wil, doch alleen dan
wanneer hij zig op zulke eene plaats met der woon begeven heeft.”
In den jaare 1762, is, deeze Meente betreffende, eene breede Willekeur
of Schaarbrief, uitgegeven, waarin desaangaande alles geregeld is; en
wegens het weiden van schaapen op de heiden, onder anderen bepaald
wordt, dat Blaricum zal hebben; „Eerstelijk de heijde welke gelegen is
beoosten de Huijser weg, die van Huijsen op Laaren loopt, strekkende ten
oosten tot aan het Tafelbergje, en voorts een drift van 20 roeden breedte
benoorden het Tafelbergje, om op haare verdere heijde te kunnen komen:
verder al de heijde welke ten suijdoosten van het Tafelbergje, van daar op
de Leeuwberg, en van daar op de Kruisberg, tot aan de Blaricummer enge
gelegen is, en van de Kruisberg noordwestwaards op tot aan Craailoo, en
westwaards [4]op tot aan den ordinairen weg die van Craailoo op Laaren
loopt: nog de heijde die over denzelven weg westwaards op, benoorden
de suijder Botweg tot den nieuwen Amersfoortschen weg is liggende, ook
de inschikkeling, loopende ten westen van het Craailoosche bosch, daar
onder begreepen, zo verre het selve aldaar gelegen is, tusschen Craailoo
en den voorn. nieuwen Amersfoortschen weg, en den suijdelijksten
Huijser Botweg, (des dat Laaren van ter plaatse, of daar de
Nengscheiding tusschen Laaren en Blaricum is liggende, langs de Neng
van Laaren westwaards op tot aan den Naarder weg op Laaren, behoude
een streek heijde ter breedte van 50 roeden, en van denselven Naarder
weg tot suijdwestwaards op aan de voorn. Amersfoortschen weg, eene
breedte van 100 roeden, of ter breedte van de Laarder Neng af tot aan
den suidelijksten Huijser Botweg.)
„Beneden de Neng tusschen Laaren en Blaricum, sal het dorp Blaricum

behouden en genieten al het gemelde veld van den Koedijk af, (liggende
aan de Gemeente, tot half wegen het veld tusschen het eijnde van de
nieuwe Camp en de Limietpaal, staande aan de Gooijer gracht over de
Emenesser gemene steeg, en sal het voorn. veld tusschen de Laarder
Neng, en de voorn. Gooijer gracht in sijne breedte, sijn bepaling en
scheijding bekomen aldus: met te moeten roijen beneden aan, en van de
Neng alwaar haarlieder beschrijving is, van daar lijnrecht, tot aan de
Gooijer gracht, daar men het midden heeft van het veld, liggende
tusschen het suijdelijkste eijnde van het nieuwe Camps bosch, en de
voorn. Limietpaal; al ’t gunt aldus ten noordoosten van dese scheijding
ligt, sal aan Blaricum behooren, en is tot voorkoming van ’t verduijsteren
deser scheiding goedgevonden dat een teken zal worden gesteld
beneden aan de gemelde Nengen, ter plaatse van henlieder
bescheidinge, en een ter plaatse voor gemeld aan de Gooijer gracht,
roijende lijnrecht op malkanderen.”
In een volgend artijkel wordt gezegd, [5]
„Laaren zal beweiden alles wat om haar Nengscheiding ligt, exempt, dat
aan Huijsen, Blaricum, Naarden en Bussem hier voor reeds is toegeschikt
—— —— verder sal de scheiding tusschen Hilversum en Laaren zijn, uit
het Stigt van de huisen van de hooge Vuurt af te sien, en so voords
tusschen de Limietpaalen No. 8 en 9, en van daar op den westerhoek van
de Laarder Wasmeer, en van daar lijnregt op een grooten steen, leggende
tusschen Hilversum en het Laarder Kerkhof daar de voetpaden van
Hilversum op Laaren in één loopen, en van daar op Ardjesberg en
Langehul, des te verstaan dat alles wat van deeze scheijding ten noorden
gelegen is aan Laaren, en ten suijden van dezelven aan Hilversum
gelaten wordt.”
Van den naamsoorsprong hebben wij weder geenig bericht

hoegenaamd, kunnen inwinnen, even weinig als van de stichting des
dorps: de oorzaak derzelver, de oorzaak der stichtinge van eenig dorp,
zeker, kan ook zodanig toevallig weezen, dat men juist geenen eigenlijken
stichter deszelven met naame zoude kunnen noemen, al ware het ook dat
men nog eene eeuw of anderhalf vroeger geleefd hadde; vooral is zulks
waar omtrent onze Nederlandsche Dorpen: onze Republiek is ten allen
tijde een Land geweest, grouwzaam geschud door inwendige
beroeringen, derhalven heeft het zekerlijk niet zelden vrienden van den
vrede genoodzaakt, of liever, doen besluiten, de steden of den omtrek
derzelven te verlaaten, ten einde op een afgelegen pleksken hunne
hartsgodinne, de lieve Vrede, naar hun genoegen te kunnen dienen: de
voorgangers kunnen volgers gehad hebben; vooral is zulks zekerlijk het
geval geweest, wanneer die voorgangers zig bij hunne uitwijking wèl
bevonden hebben; en op die wijze zal er, waarschijnlijk, menig
Nederlandsch dorp ontstaan weezen; ook is het zeer denkelijk, dat de
bewooners deezes Lands, in vroegere tijden, even als nu, genoodzaakt
geworden zijnde hun eigen onderhoud te zoeken, vooral door dat ons
Land, door de daarin aanhoudende troubelen, zig nimmer sterk heeft
kunnen toeleggen op [6]het beschermen en aankweeken van de vindingen
des vernufts, van fabrieken als anderzins, de gelegenheid des Lands wel
rasch onderzocht, en bevonden zullen hebben, dat zij op deeze plaats
met de visscherij, op geene met de melkerij, op eene andere met den
landbouw, op weêr eene andere met het baggeren, aan een eerlijk
bestaan konden komen, alwaarom ieder zijn keuze uit die eigenschappen
gedaan kan hebben, en zig ter uitoefeninge van die keuze op de
geschiktste plaats nedergezet zal hebben, mogelijk met meer dan één
huishouden te gelijk; de gezegde eigenschappen des Lands hebben de
onderneemeren zekerlijk wèl doen slaagen, en zulks kan hun weldra
medestanders hebben toegebragt; op die wijze kunnen zeer rasch
gehuchten ontstaan zijn; de welvaart zal hun eenige aanmerking hebben
doen verdienen; de beheerschers des Lands zullen hun als een eigendom
benaderd, eene regeeringsform gegeven hebben, en op die wijze kunnen
veele dorpen ontstaan weezen, zonder dat men bepaaldlijk kan zeggen,
deezen of die zijn de aanleggers derzelven geweest: men voege hierbij,
dat de Godsdienst, in ons Land, ook altijd zijne standvastige, ijverige, en
des loflijke aanhangers gehad heeft, en men daarom al rasch bedacht
geweest zal zijn, om in de genoemde bijeenschoolinge van landgenooten,
eene kerk van deeze of geene gezinte aanteleggen, waardoor derhalven
de buurt tot een dorp zal verheven weezen.
De
GROOTTE
Van Laaren, vinden wij aangetekend op, (wat de schotbaare landen

betreft,) 107 zwad, 7½ voet weiland, 126 morgen, 37 akkers, 12½ dam
weiland, 126 morgen, 656 roeden best geestland, 129 morgen, 622
roeden slecht geestland, en 15 vullingen: in 1732 stonden er volgends de

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Pluralism and World Order: Theoretical

Perspectives and Policy Challenges

Migration and Nationalism - Theoretical and Empirical

Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and

Risks, Identity and Conflict: Theoretical Perspectives

Producing Figurative Expression: Theoretical,

Succeeding and Adult Dyslexia: Personal Perspectives,

Stakeholder Engagement in a Sustainable Circular

The Economics of Immigration Beyond the Cities:

Local Integration of Migrants Policy: European

Pluralism and World

IPP Studies in the Frontiers of China’s Public Policy

Cover illustration: MR.Cole_Photographer

Part I Theoretical Perspective

Part II The Great Powers

Part III Multilateralism and Regionalism

Part IV Future Prospects

Barry Buzan is a Fellow of the British Academy, Emeritus Professor

Feng Zhang is Professor of International Relations and Executive Dean

Pluralism comes in many varieties. Probably the most well-known pluralist

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Lebow makes an important distinction between top-down and

an equally pluralistic one of liberal persuasion, but one that aims at

with other major powers, complicating the process of realizing multi-

The Foundations of Political Orders

Richard Ned Lebow

My writings embed the study of political behavior in psychology, history,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 13

dependence, confluence, accident, and agency. Even when actors behave

war is an alternative because once hostilities cease argument resumes.

Problems of Political Order

construction, evolution, decline, and reconstitution of orders and identify

rest on behavior we associated with the principles of fairness and equality.

and intimacy. Elites, moreover, are generally astute enough to prop-

Top–Down and Bottom–Up Orders

be regarded as counter-discourses as they undermined existing prac-

more so compared to regimes, many of which have a short life. Societies

they socialize actors in ways that minimize their ability or willingness to

not—depending on the circumstances. The external tensions arise from

Deep Pluralism as the Emerging Structure

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 29

The General Character of Deep Pluralism

of various kinds. Others emphasised the diffusion of wealth and power

The much-used term ‘emerging economies’ captures the wider array

. No superpowers and strong anti-hegemonism

No Superpowers and Strong Anti-Hegemonism

Superpowers – The criteria for superpower status are demanding in that

Great Powers – Achieving great power status is less demanding in terms of

as prospective superpowers, and they will be capable of operating in more

of global society has to be approached. But because of strong anti-

Introverted Great Powers

is based much more on the internal processes of the state—its domestic

Voor eenige jaaren is deeze kerk van binnen aanmerkelijk vernieuwd:

In uw vernieuwde kerk, o Huizen! staan Gods knechten,

Een ander versjen luidt dus:

Die Godes woord aanhoort, en daarnaar niet en leeft,

De Pastorij en het Schoolhuis zijn beiden aan het oogmerk zeer

Wees- of Arm huizen worden hier niet gevonden: de Weezen en Armen

De Doopsgezinden hebben er voords eene zeer nette vergaderplaats, tot

Wereldlijke gebouwen zijn hier niet voorhanden; het Rechthuis wordt

Deeze bestaat uit den Predikant, zijnde thans de Wel-Eerwaarde Heer

Er zijn te Huizen twee Kerkmeesters, die door Schout en Schepenen

Bijzondere voorrechten heeft Huizen niet; ook liggen deszelfs