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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Political Alternation
in the Azores, Madeira
and the Canary Islands
Teresa Ruel
Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance
Series Editors
Linze Schaap
Tilburg University
Tilburg, The Netherlands
Jochen Franzke
University of Potsdam
Potsdam, Germany
Hanna Vakkala
University of Lapland
Rovaniemi, Finland
Filipe Teles
University of Aveiro
Aveiro, Portugal
This series explores the formal organisation of sub-national government
and democracy on the one hand, and the necessities and practices of
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Palgrave Pivots, the series will consider the future of territorial governance
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groups to participate in urban decision-making. Books in the series will
also examine ways of governance, from ‘network governance’ to ‘triple
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tiple helix’ governance. The series will also focus on societal issues, for
instance global warming and sustainability, energy transition, economic
growth, labour market, urban and regional development, immigration
and integration, and transport, as well as on adaptation and learning in
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opments, preferably with an interdisciplinary angle. Country-by-country
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solid comparative analyses.
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15960
Teresa Ruel
Political Alternation
in the Azores, Madeira
and the Canary Islands
Teresa Ruel
University of Aveiro
Aveiro, Portugal
ISSN 2523-8248 ISSN 2523-8256 (electronic)

Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance
ISBN 978-3-030-53839-2 ISBN 978-3-030-53840-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53840-8
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To my family.
O Amor é o meu peso.
Onde eu for, ele me levará.
(Confissões XIII, 9, Santo Agostinho)
Preface
The Atlantic insular regions of Portugal and Spain (Azores, Madeira

and Canary Islands) have remained understudied notwithstanding the
vast literature on regions and regionalism in Europe. Whereas in Spain,
the subnational dimension of politics is always present when studying
political and policy processes and outcomes, the same cannot be said
with regard to the case of Portugal, where a small but growing com-
munity of political scientists is still primarily focused on the national
dimensions of politics.
Despite the pluralist composition of regional party systems and the
holding of regular and fair elections, alternation is practically absent in
the three regions. This is perhaps the most intriguing feature of the
Atlantic insular regions of Azores, Madeira and Canary Islands. What
factors explain the absence of political alternation in these regions? A
confluence of historical, constitutional, institutional, socio-economic
and cultural factors comes into play. The lack of statutory provisions set-
ting a series of safeguards to the opposition; an regional government
organizational framework that favours strong presidential executive in
detriment of power-sharing arrangements and institutional checks-and-
balances; weak parliamentary scrutiny over executive rule; extensive
political patronage over decentralised state services and a tentacular pres-
ence of political cronies from the incumbent party in all civil society
domains (e.g. local football clubs, casinos, local economic groups in
vii
viii PREFACE
particular in the construction and tourism sectors, local branches of

commercial banks, local media outlets); weak institutionalisation of
regional party structures, often captured by family groups; an electoral
system that generates safe majorities in detriment of openness to inde-
pendent or new party formations; entrenched electoral strongholds; the
prevalence of revolving door practices that blur the public/private divide
and help to consolidate a cast of business politicians in the local power
elite; a stratified social structure shaped by the influential role of promi-
nent families in the local economy and society and the absence of mean-
ingful countervailing forces; a public spending development model
based on infrastructure and social benefits coupled with a tax benefits’
regime to private investment that generates fictitious wealth with little
distributive value; all these factors account for the absence of alternation
and credible alternatives.
This book is perhaps the first attempt at dissecting the multiple reasons
behind the longevity of incumbent parties and the lack of success of oppo-
sition parties to challenge the status quo in these singular insular regions.
The research findings substantiating this publication seem to suggest that
consistent positive economic outcomes, resulting from a successful use of
policy mechanisms and instruments available to steer the regional econ-
omy (such as the possibility of incurring in high levels of public debt,
large-scale injection of EU structural and cohesion funds and an extensive
use of public-private partnerships and other off-budget practices), were
the most relevant predictor of the continuous electoral success of incum-
bent parties; whilst factors of an institutional order, such as the degree of
party institutionalisation, lack of access to institutional resources, and an
electoral system unfriendly to newcomers, help to explain the continuous
unsuccess of opposition parties. Holding office over a long period of time
in a context of prosperity (even if attained at the expense of intergenera-
tional equity and by hiding public-private investment liabilities), not only
enables incumbents to make specific payoffs to voters through pork barrel
spending, it also undermines the chances of opposition parties to become
credible alternatives.
This publication constitutes a pioneering and innovative approach to
the puzzling phenomenon of absence of political alternation in subna-
tional units of established democracies. It offers an in-depth analysis of the
political, institutional and economic determinants of non-alternation in
PREFACE ix
three regional contexts from two consolidated southern European democ-

racies with different centre-periphery institutional arrangements. The
book also makes a comprehensive contribution to the literature on regional
political systems and may help to stimulate further research on this specific
subset of subnational units (insular regions) that are insufficiently studied
in the European context.
Institute of Social Sciences Luís de Sousa

University of Lisbon
Lisbon, Portugal
February 2020
Acknowledgments
This book is the product of several years of research of the most wonderful
Atlantic Islands, yet understudied Southern European regions. It wouldn’t
have been possible without the support and encouragement of Luís de
Sousa, Iván Llamazares and Manuel Meirinho Martins, my doctoral
supervisors.
I’m greatly indebted to my colleagues and friends. Patrícia Calca, who
kept up with me in this rewarding adventure! Thanks for your time,
encouragement and friendship! My greatest thank to Alice Cunha, Célia
Belim and Sebatian Khöler. To Guillermo Bóscan, Pablo Biderbost and
Gisselle de la Cruz who shared with me valuable methodological discus-
sions of how to overcome the lack of available data during the work in
progress stage. Thanks for your hospitality during my Visiting in the
AECPA-University of Salamanca.
My initial project implied expert interviews with the leading actors on
the democratization and decentralization processes, and also regional pre-
miers in the Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands. Unfortunately,
some of them were not available to give me his testimony, and others do
not allowed me to record and/or to publish it. I address special thanks to
João Abel de Freitas, Roberto Amaral, Eduardo Paz Ferreira, Emanuel
Rodrigues (in memorium), João Bosco Mota Amaral and Professor Juan
Hernández Bravo de Laguna for their valuable insights and significantly
xi
xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
profitable ‘oral history’ that they have shared with me, in order to under-
standing a large number of points which these three regions experienced.
It has provided an empirical foundation for theoretical innovative work
through crucial narrative politics.
To my family that was always supportive, thanks a lot! I’m thankful to
Filipe and Eva for whatever is called love, ever and ever…and forever!
Contents
Part I 1
1 Setting the Scene: Introduction 3
2 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 15
3 Mapping the Cases: The Azores, Madeira and the Canary

Islands 35
Part II 69
4 Party Competition at Regional Level 71
5 Intra-party Democracy101
6 Regional Economic Performance123
7 Conclusions145
Index153
xiii
Abbreviations
AC Asamblea Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain)

ACs Autonomous Communities
ACN Asamblea Canaria Nacionalista (Canary Islands, Spain)
AD Aliança Democrática (Portugal)
AM Asamblea Majorera (Canary Islands, Spain)
AGI Agrupación Gomera Independiente (Canary Islands, Spain)
AHI Agrupación Herreña Independiente (Canary Islands, Spain)
AIC Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias (Canary Islands, Spain)
AIL Agrupación Insular de Lanzarote (Canary Islands, Spain)
AP/PP Alianza Popular/Partido Popular (Spain)
BE Bloco de Esquerda (Portugal)
CC Coalición Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain)
CCI Centro Canario Independiente (Canary Islands, Spain)
CDS Centro Democrático y Social (Spain)
CDS/PP Centro Democrático Social/Partido Popular (Portugal)
CPR Constitution of Portuguese Republic
EC European Commission
ENP Effective Number of Parties
EU European Union
FCM Frente Centrista da Madeira (Madeira, Portugal)
FEPU Frente Eleitoral Povo Unido (Madeira, Portugal)
FLA Frente de Libertação dos Açores (Azores, Portugal)
FLAMA Frente de Libertação da Madeira (Madeira, Portugal)
FP Federación Progressista (Canary Islands, Spain)
FRIA Frente Revolucionária para a Independência dos Açores (Azores,
Portugal)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
xv
xvi Abbreviations
ICAN Iniciativa Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain)

IF Independientes de Fuerteventura (Canary Islands, Spain)
IMF International Monetary Fund
IUC Izquierda Unida Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain)
JPP Juntos Pelo Povo (Madeira, Portugal)
LAPA Liga Acção Patriótica dos Açores (Azores, Portugal)
LOAPA Ley Orgánica para la Armonización del Processo
Autonómico (Spain)
LOFCA Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades
Autónomas (Spain)
LOTRACA Ley Orgánica de Transferencias Complementarias a
Canarias (Spain)
LOREG Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General (Spain)
MAIA Movimento de Autonomia das Ilhas Atlânticas (Azores,
Portugal)
MAPA Movimento de Autodeterminação do Povo Açoriano (Azores,
Portugal)
MES Movimento Esquerda Socialista (Portugal)
MFA Movimento das Forças Armadas (Portugal)
MIRA Movimento de Independência Revolucionária dos Açores
(Azores, Portugal)
MIRAC Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria del Arquiplelago
Canario (Canary Islands, Spain)
MP Member of Parliament
MPAIAC Movimiento para la Autodeterminación e Independencia del
Arquipelago Canario (Canary Islands, Spain)
MPT Movimento Partido da Terra (Portugal)
PAN Partido pelos Animais e pela Natureza (Portugal)
PCE Partido Comunista Español (Spain)
PCE-Can Partido Comunista de Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain)
PCTP/MRPP Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (Portugal)
PDA Partido Democrático do Atlântico (Portugal)
PS Partido Socialista (Portugal)
PCP/CDU Partido Comunista Português/Coligação Democrática Unitária
(Portugal)
PCU Pueblo Canario Unido (Canary Islands, Spain)
PNC Partido Nacionalista Canario (Canary Islands, Spain)
PND Partido Nova Democracia (Portugal)
PP-Can Partido Popular (Canary Islands, Spain)
PSD Partido Social-Democrata (Portugal)
PPM Partido Popular Monárquico (Portugal)
PREC Processo Revolucionário em Curso (Portugal)
Abbreviations xvii
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spain)

PSOE-PSC Partido Socialista de Canarias (Canary Islands, Spain)
PTP Partido Trabalhista Português (Portugal)
SC Spanish Constitution
UCD Unión Centro Democrático (Spain)
UDP União Democrática Popular (Portugal)
UPC Unión Del Pueblo Canario (Canary Islands, Spain)
UPM União Povo Unido (Madeira, Portugal)
VAT Value Added Tax
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Electoral results in Azores 1976–2016 (% of vote share and

number of seats) 74
Table 4.2 Electoral results in Madeira 1976–2015 (% of vote share and
number of seats) 76
Table 4.3 Electoral results in Canary Islands 1983–2015 (% of vote
share and number of seats) 84
Table 4.4 Disproportionality, ENP and electoral competitiveness in
Azores (1976–2016) 87
Table 4.5 Disproportionality, ENP and electoral competitiveness in
Madeira (1976–2015) 87
Table 4.6 Disproportionality, ENP and electoral competitiveness in the
Canary Islands (1983–2015) 88
Table 6.1 GDP levels per each region and a relative measure of regional
state-wide GDP (regional GP divided by state GDP)
2000–2016127
Table 6.2 Unemployment in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary
Islands 1996–2016 (%) 129
Table 6.3 Regional debt in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands
1996–2016 (eur/millions) 131
Table 6.4 Citizens’ perceptions of quality of life, economic situation
and major economic issues at the regional level (2012, 2015
and 2018) 136
xix
PART I
CHAPTER 1
Setting the Scene: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
With millions I do inaugurations, and with inauguration I won elections.1
After 44 years of regional democracy in Madeira, a statement by the for-
mer regional premier for almost all of its history Alberto João Jardim is
still to be the ruling party winning formula.
The Social-Democratic Party (PSD, Partido Social-Democrata) come
into office on Portuguese regions—Azores and Madeira—with the first
regional elections of June 1976 and remained in power in Madeira since
and ruled in Azores for 20 years until the PS took over the executive in
1996 and which remained in power since them.
In the Spanish Comunidad Autonóma de Canárias, state-wide parties
(PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero Español; CDS, Centro Democratico y
Social and AP/PP, Alianza Popular/Partido Popular) became dominant
during the two decades of democracy (1983–1995) until the Coalición
Canaria (regionalist party) come into office in 1995 (in a coalition with
PP), which lasted until 2015. These cases raise the question: Why does
political alternation occurs in some political systems and not in others?
This reveals that party dominance can also occur in fully-fledged
democracies which bring us understanding of the mechanisms that parties
1
Com milhões faço inaugurações, e com inaugurações, ganho eleições (former Madeira’
regional premier, Alberto João Jardim), Público, 27 January 2009.
© The Author(s) 2021 3

T. Ruel, Political Alternation in the Azores, Madeira and the
Canary Islands, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53840-8_1
4 T. RUEL
and politicians employ to secure dominance over time in a given political

system postponing political alternation rule. Political alternation phenom-
enon has a valuable importance to representative democracies. Political
alternation is the prima facie of political contestation (Pasquino, 2011;
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000) where the opposition
has the opportunity to win and defeat the rulers (Przeworski, 2009; 2010;
Przeworski et al., 2000) through the competition for popular vote
(Schumpeter, 1942/2003).
Departing from these three Southern Europe paradigmatic cases—
Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands—this book explores the phenom-
enon of political alternation through in-depth contextual understanding
of the path of regional historical legacies at democratization and decen-
tralization processes started in the 1970s; the institutional architectures
and the scope of regional authority endowed in those regions; the specific
dynamics of regional politics; and the constellation of political parties and
actors and the regional elections results, as well as, contextual factors that
might explain why some political parties have better performances than
other at regional elections.
Throughout comparative lessons I seek to highlight the range of factors
that affect regional electoral dynamics and outcomes and to develop a
comprehensive understanding of the drivers of long-standing incumbency
or the absence of political alternation within regional democracies.
Understanding change or survival in power is one of the central chal-
lenges in political science inquiry. Politicians value office as an intrinsic
value and might keep those authority over time (Bueno de Mesquita,
Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2005; Downs, 1957). Thus, a party that wins
elections over time, while the opposition constantly fails to achieve alter-
nation rule is considered an ‘uncommon’ phenomenon in liberal democ-
racies (Pempel, 1990). This phenomenon might constitute a paradox
within democracies, to the extent that, governments act with the aim of
being re-elected. Scholars attribute re-election prospects to factors such
as, controlling political apparatus and economic performance (Downs,
1957); controlling agenda-setting and legislative initiatives (Cox &
McCubbins, 2005; Tsebelis, 2002), or distributive and clientelistic politics
(Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013). Thus, understanding of
the “politics behind the survival in office is the essence of politics. (…)
The desire to survive motivates the selection of policies and the allocation
of benefits; it shapes the selection of political institutions and the
1 SETTING THE SCENE: INTRODUCTION 5
objectives of foreign policy; it influences the very evolution of political

life” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005, p. 9).
1.2 Decentralization of the State: The Emergence

of the Regions
Territory is an essential reference of political and social life (Keating,

1998). The decentralization processes evolved in recent last decades in
Europe have answered territorial demands for the accommodation and
recognition of some political communities (Keating, 2013).
In the last five decades, regions have enhanced their authority scope
(Hooghe et al., 2016; Keating, 1998) and created a meso-level of govern-
ment with a range of political powers over a diversity of policy areas
(Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Keating, 1998; Marks, Hooghe, & Schakel,
2008; Swenden, 2006). Some countries have federalized their structures
(Germany), developed asymmetric forms of federalism (Spain) or advanced
into forms of regionalization/decentralization (Italy, UK and Portugal),
while others have engaged a delegation of competences to specific regions
(France). These processes have been among the most remarkable arrange-
ments of institutional change of the post-war period. These changes
underlined that the nation-state have no longer the exclusivity of political
authority and policy making (Keating, 1998; Loughlin, 2001; Swenden,
2006; Dandoy & Schakel, 2013; Schakel & Jeffery, 2013).
The rescaling of state authority has strongly strengthened the power of
regions and prompted the rise of the regional tier of government within
the states. Regions2 developed systems of political representation, delega-
tion and accountability, endowed with directly elected assemblies and
executive powers, with their own civil services, that are responsible for
decision-making over a range of policy areas (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013;
Keating, 1998; Loughlin, 2001; Marks et al., 2008; Ruel, 2019;
Swenden, 2006).
The creation of regional political institutions since the 1970s empow-
ered both regional actors who accessed political power and, voters who
could express their opinion about policies and governments across
2
‘Region’ is a contested concept (Keating, 1998). For research purposes I follow the (min-
imal) definition proposed by Marks et al. which considers ‘region’ to be “a coherent territo-
rial entity situated between the local and the national levels which has a capacity for
authoritative decision-making” (2008, p. 113).
6 T. RUEL
electoral arenas (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013; Keating, 1998; Loughlin,

2001; Swenden, 2006). As a result, new dynamics in partisan competition
arise and distinctive party systems (regionalist parties and or regional
branches of the state-wide parties) distinct from national level ones have
been established (Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Pallarés & Keating, 2003; Ruel,
2015, 2019).
The territorial scope of authority has also increased over the past
40 years. These trends have been captured by the regional authority index
(RAI)3 developed by Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel (2010). The RAI mea-
sures the authority a regional government exercises over those who live in
the region (self-rule) and the authority exercised by a regional govern-
ment or its representatives in a country as a whole (shared-rule) over time
(Hooghe et al., 2010, 2016). Regional authority varies across countries,
within countries and between regions. In 2010, the Azores and Madeira
both have a RAI-score of 19.5 (Ruel, 2019) and in regionalized Spain
Canarias’ comunidade autonóma scored 23.5 (Hooghe et al., 2010, 2016).
Decentralization of authority has created a new regional arena of com-
petition—regional—where political parties and voters have the incentive
and opportunity to mobilize and respond to regional issues (Hough &
Jeffery, 2006; Maddens & Libbrecht, 2009; Thorlakson, 2009), through
exercising the authority endowed to regional governments. Additionally,
regional authority has promoted a new space of politics which also encour-
aged the development of political careers at sub-national levels (Maddens
& Put, 2013; Stolz, 2003; Teruel, 2011). Hence, regions matter much
more directly to voters, parties and interest groups. Winning control of
regional government and securing it has a significant and growing prize
(Jeffery, 2014).
1.3 Setting the Scene: The Framework of Analysis

Political alternation corresponds to the “replacement of a government
with a completely different composition, in terms of political parties and
members, from the government that has been replaced” (Pasquino, 2011,
p. 21). Alternation is defined by the process of complete removal between
governments which “who were in government at time t-1, no longer has
3
Self-rule is operationalized through four dimensions: institutional depth; policy scope;
fiscal autonomy and representation. Shared rule is operationalized by law-making; executive
control; fiscal control and constitutional reform (Hooghe et al., 2010).
to be at time t” (Pasquino, 2011, pp. 21–22). Thus, political alternation

occurs when the incumbents (parties and members) are replaced by differ-
ent other in public office; whereas by contrast, the absence of political
alternation take place when voter’s reward the ruling party.
Political alternation is a critical outcome of liberal democracies at any
level of government. However, there have been few attempts to conceptu-
alize it or analyse the conditions involving this social and political phe-
nomena. In axiomatic terms, the occurrence or absence of political
alternation in a given political system is a result of voter’s preferences
through voting.
From the ‘new institutionalism’ perspective (March & Olsen, 1984),
institutions are central to the understanding political system as a whole.
Thus, I aim to explain one of the key-features of democracies performance,
namely political alternation at the regional level of government. To enhance
comparison I employ a common analytical framework across case-studies,
exploring and discussing several regional-based factors that might align the
understanding and explanation of the absence of political alternation
(Madeira), or long-terms of incumbency (Azores and Canary Islands). The
Azores and Madeira have had a single-party government, whereas the
Canary Islands have followed a coalition formula where a non-state-wide
party has a pivotal position in the cabinet. This study covers a period of
40 years (1976–2016) comprising both the first and the latest regional elec-
toral cycles in the three regions. It uses a common framework of analysis,
including the following dimensions: (1) pattern of party competition, (2)
intra-party democracy and (3) regional economic performance.
The understanding of puzzling outcomes requires an in-depth knowl-
edge of the cases. Data sources are rich. Firstly, she assembled new data
and evidence on historical background; secondly, institutional dimensions
are aggregated through a regional elections, party competition’s features;
government constellations and party leaders; thirdly, macroeconomic indi-
cators are set up using several sources of information. Expert interviews
were performed in order to shed light onto important events and details
that signal the path towards the phenomenon under study: political
alternation.
1.3.1 Case Studies
Comparative research has frequently overlooked Azores and Madeira. The
‘scale’ and diversity of these regions might be narrow, but the democracy
8 T. RUEL
performance within them exemplifies the puzzling political outcomes that

are taking place at regional level: regional democracies without alternation
in office and/or long terms of incumbency. By contrast, some studies have
point out the distinctive strengths of the non-state-wide party (Coalición
Canarias) within regional and national politics in the Canary Islands
(Field & Botti, 2013; Pallarés & Keating, 2003). However, the ‘story
behind’ has been hidden as a result of the fact of most of the research is
often written in Portuguese and Spanish which limits their impact among
a broader audience.
This book provides an innovative study, beyond the ‘usual suspects’4 to
a wide English audience. It provides theoretical contribution by set up a
conceptual discussion of a major political phenomenon of alternation and,
empirical evidence using in-depth case-studies. It offers a comprehensive
study of political alternation by exploring and explaining the long-lasting
processes, historical and political; the different historic experiences and
path towards democratization and consequently decentralization across
the three cases; the interactions of several factors of regional institutional
architectures—parties, actors, economy and social short-cuts—for a com-
prehensive understanding of regional dynamics and their main political
outcomes. The major purpose of this book is to contribute to the com-
parative literature on regional democracy.
An intimacy and in-depth knowledge with the cases is privileged over
the relation among variables, in order to achieve the major goal: contextu-
alize institutional and social backgrounds and encourage causal-process
analysis of complex entities (Ragin, 1987). I follow a comparative strategy
anchored in case-study research. Accounting for empirical regularities in
order to evaluate and interpret cases to each other in the light of theories,
requires understanding, explaining and interpreting diverse historical out-
comes and processes and their significance for current institutional
arrangements and political outcomes (Ragin, 1987, pp. 1–6). I underline
the main similarities and differences between the cases through dense nar-
ratives, accounting for a range of characteristics, together with the interac-
tion within long-lasting processes (Della Porta, 2008; Gerring, 2001;
Mahoney & Goertz, 2006).
Focusing on regional units, help us to examine the spatiality uneven
nature of major processes of political transformation (Snyder, 2001,
4
The regional studies tend to focus on the ‘usual suspects’ such as Catalonia and the
Basque Country in Spain and Scotland and Wales in the United Kingdom.
p. 94), avoiding what has been labelled as ‘methodological nationalism’

(Jeffery & Wincott, 2010; Martins, 1974).5 Looking within the state
using a regional scale of analysis, this book explores region-level questions
in a way that will produce an effective understanding of a broader phe-
nomenon of political alternation exhibited at the regional-level of politics.
I do this on the basis of an innovative approach examining three regions
within two Southern European countries. The case selection has followed
the ‘most similar and most different’ research design. The Azores, Madeira
and the Canary Islands are three regions set in a larger structure of two
multilevel states (Portugal and Spain). Each region is endowed with
regional authority. They each have a system of representation and regional
executive; and legislative powers over a range of policy areas, such as edu-
cation, health, infrastructure, environment and culture. The absence of
alternation and long-terms of incumbency have turned the regions into
party’s strongholds. Thus, these three cases are suitable to examine the
drivers of the type of democracy that has evolved in some regions
of Europe.
The major purpose of this book is to contribute to the comparative
literature on regional democracy, placing the diverse factors that might
explain political outcomes of regional polities, through the three cases
studies. The main findings suggest that institutional factors such as party
competition and electoral competitiveness impact on the prospects of
political alternation. The ruling party’s leaders have transformed Azores,
Madeira and the Canary Islands into party strongholds in response to
regional autonomy, which in turn jeopardized opposition parties to chal-
lenge the incumbents. Likewise, long terms of incumbency clearly have
tangled strong political leaders with long-standing economic relationships
which have developed the ability to control political apparatus and eco-
nomic performance. In addition, holding public office enhanced party
leader survival and organizational autonomy within party structures.
These factors reveal to be strong predictors for incumbents survival in
office over time within the three regional democracies—Azores, Madeira,
and the Canary Islands.
5
The assumption that the nation-state is the obvious focus for social science analysis.
10 T. RUEL
1.3.2 The Structure of the Book

The book is organized in two parts: Part I sets the mise-en-scène of the
research puzzle (Chap. 1) and then presents a theoretical framework and
the literature review regarding the main topics of the book (Chap. 2)
which are critical to the framing of research topic of political alternation.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to mapping the cases—Azores, Madeira and the
Canary Islands—, setting a comparative overview of the historical back-
ground and the major historical events that triggered into decentraliza-
tion. Furthermore, it is outlined the regional institutional
architectures—institutions, electoral rules and party systems—and the fis-
cal arrangements that regions are endowed with in order to manage their
sources and allocation of resource within territory.
Part II offered the empirical research across the cases. Chapter 4 com-
prises the patterns of party competition through the exploration of their
properties from the regional elections results. Additionally, turnout in
regional elections is discussed. Chapter 5 takes into account the internal
organizational structure of political parties regarding the vertical integra-
tion within the territory, the candidate selection and the rules governing
the party leader selection. Chapter 6 illustrates the economic performance
of regional-scale democracies and some indicators are presented and ana-
lytically discussed (regional GDP, unemployment and public debt). As a
complement, it describes the regional citizen’s perceptions towards
regional economy through three time series provided by the Eurostat
Flash Barometer (2012, 2015 and 2018). In the end, she offers a conclu-
sion that reveals the findings across the three case-studies, offers a com-
parative analysis, and discusses the impacts of this type of outcomes to
democracies.
This book is about political alternation. It’s about parties and politi-
cians. It’s about power and resources employed to secure dominance over
time at the Ilhas Afortunadas6 (Fortunate Islands).
6
Gaspar Frutuoso nicknamed Atlantic islands (Azores, Madeira, Canary Islands and the
Cape Verde) in the XVI century as Ilhas Afortunadas (Saudades da Terra, 1873).
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CHAPTER 2
Theoretical Framework
and Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Alternation, rotation in office or turnover is terms frequently used as syn-
onymous, but their distinctions have not been addressed or analyzed. The
topic of political alternation has been neglected by democratic theory,
partly due to the assumption that this phenomenon is taken for granted in
fully-fledged democracies.
“The emergence of alternation in office is the most surprising aspect of
democratic history” (Przeworski, 2009, p. 77). However, “the silence of
democratic theory, even in its most modern versions about alternation in
office is astonishing. Neither Kelsen (1988/1929), nor Schumpeter
(1942/2003), Downs (1957), Dahl (1971, 1989), nor Bobbio (1987)
ever mention it”. None have paused to consider its consequences. In par-
ticular, these theorists who have emphasized the role of political parties in
organizing and representing public opinion and who have seen electoral
competition among parties as the essential feature of democracy
(Przeworski, 2010, p. 78) have overlooked the topic of political alternation.
The attempt to understand how parties and politician prolong their
tenure in office over time requires establishing a dialogue with several
streams of literature that addresses the major elements that frames and set
the mechanisms underly the phenomena.
© The Author(s) 2021 15

T. Ruel, Political Alternation in the Azores, Madeira and the
Canary Islands, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53840-8_2
16 T. RUEL
2.2 What Is Democracy?: A Minimalist Approach

Democracy is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie, 1956).1 That is, it
means many different things to different people. The term derives from
the Greek—demos—meaning ‘the people’, and—kratos—which denotes
‘authority’. The classical understanding of democracy was that it vested
power in the ‘will of the people’ in order to promote the ‘common good’.
Definitions and concepts build on this understanding, but commonly only
provide a meaning that is useful in relation to the specific research goals of
a given author and the specific cases under analysis (Collier & Lewinsky,
1997, p. 11). Democracy theory has generated many definitions of what
democracy should be and what really is, essentially because, as Whitehead
observes, “our values may differ or because our political concepts may lack
ultimate logical or empirical validation, but also because our political cog-
nition is inherently critical and reflexive” (2002, p. 18).
Democratic theory is profuse. No consensus exists on how to define
democracy. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore all of this lit-
erature’s theoretical approaches. Many scholars placed on a continuum
ranging from minimalist (procedural) to maximalist variations of democ-
racy (Dahl, 1989; Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Przeworski, Alvarez,
Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000; Schumpeter, 1942/2003). This book takes a
perspective focused on assembling the major constellation of attributes
that bolster political alternation as an expected outcome of liberal democ-
racies. Accordingly, I follow the minimalist approach which endorses the
analytical stringency, precision and clarity (Przeworski et al., 2000, p. 13)
to the research puzzle.
One of the first influential theorists to contribute to the understanding
of democracy was Joseph Schumpeter in his seminal work Capitalism,
Socialism and Democracy (1942/2003). The Schumpeterian approach
rejects the classical prescriptive definitions, which state that the people,
through their ‘common will’, elect representatives to realize the common
good. He asserts that “the democratic method is an institutional arrange-
ment for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by
making the people themselves decide issues through the elections of indi-
viduals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (Schumpeter,
1942/2003, p. 250). Thus, he assumes that there is a common good and
1
Contested concepts are “concepts the proper use of which inevitably evolves endless
disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users” (Gallie, 1956, p. 167).
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 17
citizens have sovereignty to pursue political decisions and act through

rational orientations. Schumpeter advocated a systematic critique of this
view, reflecting the fact that citizens are not sufficiently informed or ratio-
nal enough to carry out these tasks. Contrarily, they are more likely to
form irrational opinions or have their options manipulated against their
own interests (Schumpeter, 1942/2003, pp. 271–272), to the extent the
‘will of the people’ is not genuine, it’s artificially manufactured by leaders.
Thus, Schumpeter emphasizes that democracy is not a mechanism for
identifying the ‘will of the people’. It is an institutional mechanism of
competitive selection of rulers. That is to say, democracy is a political
method, an institutional arrangement for arriving at political, legislative,
and administrative decisions. Hence it cannot be an end in itself
(Schumpeter, 1942/2003, p. 242). He describes the democratic method
as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle
for the people vote” (1942/2003, p. 269). This formulation definitively
eliminates assumptions concerning the common good, which emphasizes
the institutional mechanism of competition and delinks democracy’s legit-
imacy from the ‘will of the people’. The Schumpeterian perspective rein-
forces that democracy is a recognized method for the “free competition
for a free vote”, available to communities of any size (Schumpeter,
1942/2003, p. 271) where the citizens have the opportunity to produce
governments, that is, accept or reject the people who are to rule them
(Schumpeter, 1942/2003, p. 285), through vote.2
In the wake of the Schumpeterian understanding of the merits of elec-
toral competition, William Riker highlighted the virtues of liberal democ-
racy as a form of government. On Liberalism against Populism (Riker,
1965/1982), Riker stands in the Schumpeterian tradition, featuring vot-
ing as major attribute, to the extent it involves some kind of popular par-
ticipation in government (Riker, 1981, p. 95). Voting as a method of
aggregating values encloses some properties as necessary conditions to the
2
Schumpeter adds other conditions: (1) appropriate leadership; (2) the effective range of
policy decision should not be extended too far; (3) the existence of a well-trained bureau-
cracy of good standing and tradition, endowed with a strong sense of duty and a no less
strong esprit de corps; (4) political leaders should practice a good amount of democratic
self-control and mutual respect; (5) a large measure of tolerance for difference of opinion,
and (6) all the interests that matter must be nearly unanimous not only in their allegiance to
the country but also to the structural principles of the existing society (Schumpeter,
1942/2003, pp. 289–296).
18 T. RUEL
concept of democracy, namely: (1) participation (in government) where

implicitly all the citizens have the possibility to rule and be ruled; (2) lib-
erty, the quintessential condition of free expression of political opposition,
a means of minimizing the wrath of the majority; and legal and political
equality to take part in the governing of a state (Riker, 1965/1982,
pp. 6–8). Moreover, Riker’s argument suggests that holding public office
is pro tempore and voting is the mechanism to control officials and avoid
tyrannical majorities (Riker, 1965/1982, p. 10). Thus, voting and term
limits in power are the sufficient conditions to protect liberty (Riker,
1981, p. 9).
Robert Dahl offered one of the most comprehensive contribution on
this domain and well-established in the literature in his book Polyarchy:
Participation and Opposition (1971). Dahl’s approach distinguished dem-
ocratic regimes from polyarchy, as a set of institutional arrangements that
allows public opposition and establishes the right to participate in politics.
Polyarchy is an “ideal system and the institutional arrangement that has
come to be regarded as a kind of imperfect approximation of an ideal”
(Dahl, 1971, p. 9). It is defined as a “system of political control in which
the highest officials in government of the state are induced to modify their
conduct so as to win elections in political competition with other candi-
dates, parties and groups” (Dahl, 1989, p. 219).
In these terms, Dahl formulated a set of institutional guarantees that
enlighten polyarchies: (1) the existence of elected officials who control
policy and government decisions, (2) the regular practice of free elections,
where elected officials are chosen and removed; (3) the inclusiveness of
suffrage which guarantees the right to vote to all adults; (4) the right to
run for office in the terms of being elected; (5) the protection of freedom
of expression such that citizens can express themselves without fear of
reprisals; (6) the existence of alternative sources of information regulated
and protected by law; (7) the protection of freedom of association, to
include political parties and interest groups, (8) and institutions for mak-
ing government policies depend on the votes and other expressions of
preference (Dahl, 1971, 1989).
Dahl’s polyarchy relies on two concepts: political contestation and polit-
ical participation. Political competition is necessary to democratic rule. All
democratic political systems must afford the opposition some chance of
winning and taking office through free and fair elections; have protections
for expression and association freedoms, and have an institutionalized
party system. Political participation is guaranteed through popular
sovereignty and the protection of the right to vote as well as extensive citi-
zens’ participation (Dahl, 1989, pp. 221–223).
More recently, Przeworski has defended Schumpeter’s accounts of
democracy as a method of leadership selection. Przeworski assumes that
Schumpeterian approach takes for granted that alternation in office will
occur, based on the assumption that elections will provide political mod-
eration and office holders know that they may be tomorrow’s opposition,
so, it impels them to act with restraint (1999, pp. 45–46). Przeworski
defines democracy simply as “a system in which parties loses elections”
(1991, p. 10) and “those who govern are selected through contested elec-
tions” (Przeworski et al., 2000, p. 15). He considers that a democracy’s
operational terms should provide the selection of the executive and legisla-
tive branches through contested elections; the presence of more than one
party and chances for political alternation, after a reasonable interval (two
terms). Thus, competitive election is a condition in which incumbents face
a chance of being voted out of office (Przeworski et al., 2000, pp. 15–28).
Przeworski’s work is the first to identify alternation in office as the
prima facie evidence of contestation (Przeworski et al., 2000, p. 16) if the
voters so decided (Przeworski, 2010, pp. 166–167). Contestation entails
three main features, namely: i) ex-ante uncertainty, where there is some
positive probability that at least one member of the incumbent coalition
will lose in a particular round of elections, that is, the eventual outcome is
unknown ex-ante; ii) ex-post irreversibility, that whoever wins elections
will be allowed to assume office; and iii) repeatability, the elections must
be repeated regularly and all political outcomes must be temporary
(Przeworski et al., 2000, pp. 17–18). Nevertheless, holding elections is
not a sufficient condition for a regime to qualify as democratic. It is neces-
sary to guarantee that the losers are allowed to compete, win, and assume
office (Przeworski et al., 2000, p. 18).
Further research has followed Schumpeterian strand. For example,
Giuseppe Di Palma has characterized democracy as a political regime that
is “premised on free and fair suffrage in a context of civil liberties, on com-
petitive parties, on the selection of alternative candidates for office and on
the presence of political institutions that regulate and guarantee the roles
of government and opposition” (1990, p. 16). Similarly, Norberto Bobbio
described the democratic system as one in which power is exerted in the
name of or on behalf of the people by the virtue of the procedure of elec-
tions (1987, p. 25). Birgham Powell also distinguished the value for dem-
ocratic processes of competitive elections where several political parties
20 T. RUEL
organize political alternatives facing voters and in which citizens are eligi-
ble to participate (1984, p. 93).
Several criticisms have been made regarding the minimalist defining
features of democracy, namely, the excessive focus on the electoral attri-
bute—“fallacy of electoralism” (Diamond, 1999, p. 9)—to the extent
that, contestation had neglected other dimensions (for example civil liber-
ties or inclusiveness) that should be accounted for as a ‘building block’ of
democracy properties.
Recently, research on the quality of democracy has deserved attention
from political scientists (Beetham, Bracking, Kearton, & Weir, 2002;
Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Morlino, 1998; Schmitter & Karl, 1991).
These research agenda has drawn some important insights into clarifying
democracy’s conceptual framework. For instance, Schmitter and Karl have
discussed around “What democracy is … and is not”. The authors stressed
that democracy is not only a unique and equal set of institutions, it is a
“system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their
actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through competi-
tion and cooperation of their elected representatives” (1991, p. 76).
Additionally, O’Donnell emphasizes participation, claiming that in a
“democratic regime, the access to the main governmental positions is
decided by elections that are competitive, free, egalitarian, decisive and
inclusive, and those who vote have the right to be elected […] and at least
two competitive parties have a reasonable chance to make their views
known to all voters” (O’Donnell, 2004, pp. 14–15).
These democracy definitions discussed here acknowledge, in particular,
the electoral attribute and thus, as the institutional driver to selection of
rulers through competitive popular vote.
2.3 Party Competition

Liberal democracies are characterized by competition for power and polit-
ical parties are the political bodies that makes democracy “the only game
in town” (Przeworski, 1991). Party competition is a manner of alternation
of parties in office (Schlesinger, 1984).
Departing from Sartori’s classical definition of a party system as “the
system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition” (1976,
p. 44), party system determines, lato sensu, which parties would be perma-
nently excluded from government while, others always govern (1976,
p. 139).
Researchers have long sought to classify party systems, from Duverger

(1954) to Dahl (1966), Blondel (1968) to Rokkan (1968) to Sartori’s
typology (1976) or Mair (1997).
Political parties are the intermediate structures between society and
government capable of placing, through elections, candidates for public
office (Sartori, 1976, p. 64), and thus, distinctive types of party systems
might produce distinctive opportunities for alternation in power.
Giovanni Sartori’s framework of analysis establishes the patterns of
competition in the European party systems through the number of parties
and their ideological distance. He settled the ‘counting rules’ to assess
relevant parties within the party system. Political parties are relevant when
they have coalition or blackmail potential. Coalition potential depends on
parties’ ability to form governmental coalitions and/or support govern-
ment, whereas blackmail potential refers to the impact on direction of
party competition. That is to say, parties are considered relevant when
they influence the competition and the formation of government. The
relevance of political parties is understood in light of the party systems
format, i.e., the number and the relative strength of interacting units and
the direction adopted by the electoral ‘outbidding’. The format of party
systems is grouped into two parties, those with up to five parties (limited
pluralism) and those with six parties or more (extreme pluralism) (Sartori,
1976, pp. 119–129).
A two-party system is characterized by two major political parties which
“usually take form of a choice between two alternatives” (Duverger, 1959,
p. 215) and that alternate in power. These two parties have the same
chances of winning elections and form single-party governments without
coalitions. By contrast, in a multiparty system there are three to five politi-
cal parties of different size. None of them have enough electoral strength
to govern alone. In multiparty systems, the coalition partnership depends
on ideological polarization within parties. Sartori distinguished moderate
pluralism from polarized pluralism. In moderate pluralism, the relevant
parties in the system are ideologically close and cabinet-oriented. The sys-
tem of moderate pluralism is characterized by centripetal competition
where the main parties tend to converge to the center of the left-right
spectrum in order to capture the median voter. Polarized pluralism sys-
tems have relevant anti-system parties. The left-to-right spectrum is occu-
pied by one party or a group of parties and the competition tends to be
pushed from the center to the extremes (Sartori, 1976, p. 135).
22 T. RUEL
Predominant party format is critical to my research reasoning. A pre-

dominant party system is characterized by one party rule using a single-
government formula over a long period of time,3 controlling an absolute
majority of seats in the legislature (Sartori, 1976, p. 124). That is, it
reflects “a power configuration in which one party governs alone, without
being subject to alternation, as long as it continues to win electorally an
absolute majority” (Sartori, 1976, p. 196). This type of party system sig-
nals a low degree of contestation in which, despite the existence of free
and fair elections, a political party controls the public office over an
extended period of time while other parties are “without hope of being in
government” (Ware, 1996, p. 159).
Following Sartori’s understanding, Peter Mair provides a contribution
framed by the structures of competition. Structures of competition cap-
ture the stability among political parties’ interactions regarding partisan
composition of government. Structures of competition can be either
closed (and predictable) or open, depending on the patterns of alternation
in government, the degree of innovation or familiarity in government for-
mation, and the range of parties gaining access to government. The struc-
ture of competition is closed when there is either total or absence of
alternation; the governing formula is stable and familiar; and the access to
government is restricted to a few parties. That is to say, protagonists and
the patterns of their alliances are stable. By contrast, the structure of com-
petition is open when governments have partial political alternation; the
governing alternatives lack stable composition and all parties have the pos-
sibility to participate in government (Mair, 1996, pp. 1–22).
The Sartorian typology of party systems and the structures of competi-
tion offered by Mair set up the configuration of the political party’s inter-
actions within the system. They either define parties’ likelihood to get into
power and/or the parties or coalitions that would be systematically
excluded from government. These contributions are important endeavors
to signal and understand the puzzling outcomes of party competition and
the likelihood of political alternation in a given political system.
3
Sartori considers the length of incumbency (three consecutive legislatures at least) and
the threshold of 50% of seats (1976, p. 196).
2.4 Political Alternation: A Bird Eye View

Alternation in government is not in itself a blessing. Let us admit that it is
desirable in general and in the abstract that, where a country is divided
between two blocs, each of them should some day come to power, one of them
should not be condemned to the ungrateful role of a perpetual opposition. But
having said that, we should not change government unless the new oneholds out
more hope than the old.
(Aron, 1982, p. 3)
In Western democracies it is assumed that political parties compete for

power and incumbents will be regularly replaced. In competitive polities,
political alternation is the ‘gold standard’ and an indicator of the existence
of competition for popular vote (Schumpeter, 1942/2003).
Diverse empirical perspectives have supported the conceptualization of
political alternation. Nevertheless, conceptual boundaries are vague and
ambiguous. Setting up a definition, establishing its properties and the cut-
off points, goes beyond prescriptive impetus. Addressing a political phe-
nomenon requires the identification and delimiting of ‘what-is’ at stake
(Mair, 2008; Sartori, 1970).
Every research starts by addressing the phenomenon under study, the
‘basic unit of thinking’ (Sartori, 1970). The ‘good practices’ of concept
formation states that when a researcher wants to have a more general con-
cept, she tends to lessen the properties or attributes she considers (exten-
sion); or when she wants a narrower concept she adds more attributes
(intension). Thus, when a list of attributes of a concept increases, the set
of objects to which this concept applies will narrow and conversely the
more limited the characteristics and properties of a concept, the larger the
class of ‘things’ to which it refers (Gerring, 2001; Goertz, 2006; Mair,
2008; Sartori, 1970). The major goal of concept formation is to capture
the meaning and have a denotative concept able to travel when applied to
different contexts to avoid ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori, 1970).
Etymologically, alternation comes from the Latin word alternate which
means ‘the act of changing from one thing to another’ (Oxford English
Dictionary, n.d.). In a democratic context, political alternation is anchored
on the normative assumption that people (demos) have the expectation to
use their power (kratos) to throw the incumbents by opposition, in a given
election.
24 T. RUEL
Aristotelian assumption serves as departing point to understand the

role of alternation. Based on Hansen (1991), alternation is the essential
prescriptive mechanism that couples democracy to liberty, as it illuminates
that everyone “would rule and be ruled in turn”:
A basic principle of democratic constitution is liberty. That is commonly

said, and those who say it imply that only in this constitution do men share
in liberty; for that, they said, is what every democracy aims at. Now, one
aspect of liberty is being ruling in turn. … Another element is to live as you
like … So this is, the second defining principle of democracy, and from it has
come the ideal of not being ruled, not by anybody if possible, or at least only
in turn. (Cited in Hansen, 1991, p. 74)
However, the method for the selection of public officers was predomi-
nantly lot in an equal procedural chance to govern, with short terms in
office and restrictions on reelection. By contrast, modern democracies are
representative, and elections are the mechanism to ruler’s selection
(Manin, 1997). As Lipset argued, in democratic regimes is provided regu-
lar constitutional opportunities for changing governing officials and a
social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population
to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political
office (1963, p. 27).
In representative democracies, political alternation is described as a
natural outcome of democratic competition (Ieraci, 2012, p. 530) or an
intrinsic outcome of party competition (Sartori, 1976, p. 186), but then,
little research has been done on it.
In the operationalization of the Mair scheme of the structures of com-
petition he had advanced three indexes, as an attempt to look at changes
in government (degree of government alternation). In proposing the
index of government alternation (IGA), Mair adapted Pedersen’s volatility
index to the measurement of ministerial volatility, which in practice, mea-
sured the degree of government staff changes (total, partial or none)
within cabinet; the innovative governmental formulas was captured by the
index of innovative alternation (IIA) which accounted for the number of
innovative governments, and the index of openness (IO) measured politi-
cal parties’ access to government (Mair, 2007, p. 140). In those opera-
tionalization purposes, Mair has, en passant, stated that “government
alternation involves the introduction into office of new (previously non-
governing) political parties” (Mair, 2007, p. 140). However, Mair defined
individual governments in a coalition format and considered government

alternation exclusively in terms of changes in partisan composition (when
a party leaves the cabinet or joins the cabinet), rather than when elections
of a prime minister and replacement occur without a partisan change.
Changes in party composition and political alternation had been mistak-
enly understood as synonymous. Modifications in partisan composition of
governments (partly, wholesale or total) and a prime-minister replacement
without a partisan change are events that might occur in the absence of
political alternation.
Some conceptual ambiguity prevailed until the beginning of the twenty-
first century when some scholars started to develop contextual-based
research in order to establish a fine-grained structure of meaning and its
referents regarding political alternation concept. The study conducted by
Kaiser et al. (2002) assumed that the possibility of alternation is a function
of accountability. The authors’ argument departed from the assumption
that “political systems which grant the minimum chance of alternation in
power can be expected to take voters preferences and to be responsive
regarding policy outputs” (2002, p. 315). Alternation is, according to the
authors, restricted to the change of the major governing party whether it
is governing alone or in a coalition (2002, p. 316). Thus, they emphasized
some institutional factors that favor alternation, not on the question of
whether it will occur. Electoral system disproportionality and low number
of relevant parties fosters change in governmental coalitions; a bipartisan
and predominant party systems offers a strong chance of total changes in
government (2002, p. 318).
In the same vein, Horowitz et al. (2009) have looked at change in the
ruling leader or leaders in post-communist countries, measuring the fre-
quency of government turnover. They distinguished leadership turn-
over—change in rulers—and ideological turnover—change in rulers’
ideological and policy preferences, and their contrasting effects on differ-
ent institutional and policy outcome (2009, p. 110). The authors estab-
lished two possible thresholds for government turnover: “one rule would
be to count turnover as occurring if these remaining or overlapping parties
are in the minority within the coalition. A stricter rule would count an
alternation only if the remaining parties are not necessary to form the new
majority coalition” (2009, p. 111). Thus, government alternation is
framed as partisan composition change. Notwithstanding such efforts to
operationalize alternation, the definition is still equivocal in which political
26 T. RUEL
alternation appears to be tangled with governmental change and cabinet

turnover.
Przeworski et al. (2000) labeled political alternation the prima facie
evidence of contestation. In Self-government in our times (2009) and
Democracy and the limits of self-government (2010) Przeworski offered a
discussion of an understanding of the merits of alternation for civic peace,
self-government, and political participation. His argument started with
some ‘big prescriptions’ for electing government and the merits of repre-
sentative democracies: “representative governments were designed as a
bulwark against despotism, to disable governments from doing much of
anything, bad or good, by checking and balancing powers and protecting
the status quo from the will of majority” (2010, p. 162).
In practice, he emphasizes that “peaceful alternation (without blood-
shed) was rare until the last quarter of twenty century. As suddenly and
unexpected, and especially since 1990, alternation became more and more
frequent, and then less sudden and expected, enforced by the claim that if
we are ruled by others, we can be ruled by different others, in turn” (2009,
p. 164).
Alternation is the expression that opposition has the opportunity to win
in a given electoral competition (Przeworski, 2005, pp. 266–7) and defeat
the rulers (2010, p. 169). Thus, he set a major conceptual cut-off point of
alternation definition: rulers might be replaced in power, through elec-
toral competition, by the opposition parties.
Likewise, Curini and Zucchini (2012) made a major input through the
conceptual disentangle among cabinet turnover and political alternation.
They clarified that cabinet turnover does not necessarily imply govern-
ment alternation to extent that, the rotation of leaders from incumbent
parties or the replacement of some cabinet members cannot be consid-
ered, lato sensu, an example of change in power (2012, p. 828). Rather,
government alternation implies a new coalition and the preferences of the
incoming cabinet should be far enough from the status quo in many poli-
cies areas (Curini & Zucchini, 2012, pp. 828–829).
Ieraci (2012) also recognized the normative value of government alter-
nation as natural outcome of democratic competition, although not all
democratic political systems display it. The author argues that a “perfect
government alternation mean an unbroken series of complete change of
the incumbent, i.e., one party or coalition of parties substituting another
after a crisis or an election” (2012, p. 530). The author has elaborated an
index—the government turnover index (GTI)—to measure the effective
degree of government alternation among parties in the contemporary

European democracies. It shows some factors might favor or hinder gov-
ernment alternation, such as party system format or institutional factors
(2012, p. 530).
Gianfranco Pasquino overcame this conceptual ambiguity that has per-
sisted over time. He challenged the ex-ante assumptions, and presented, in
a low level of abstraction, the most comprehensive insight into the con-
cept formation of political alternation. Il potere dell’alternanza—Teorie e
richerche sui cambi di governo set up the conceptual boundaries, the main
attributes and the cut-off points of the concept, that is, what is alternation
and is not. Pasquino defined political alternation as the “replacement of a
government with a completely different composition, in terms of political
parties and members, from the government that has been replaced” (2011,
p. 21). That is, alternation designates the process of complete removal
among governments which “who were in government at time t-1, no lon-
ger has to be at time t” (2011, pp. 21–22).
That is to say, political alternation takes place when political parties and
its members are completely removed from office, in particular by opposi-
tion parties. The mechanism which drives into political alternation is polit-
ical competition at elections time. Cabinet change or government turnover
are ascertained by political actors (according to intra or extra-institutional
factors), but it is not an outcome of voters’ preferences. Returning to
Aristoteles, political alternation involves ‘rule and being ruled in turn’.
Public office is an intrinsic goal to politicians and winning office and
survival in it are the essence of politics (Downs, 1957; Bueno de Mesquita
et al., 2005). Most extensive work has been doing on this strand have fol-
lowed different bulks of literature, based on government formation and
party dominance centered on country-studies. Several democracies have
experienced periods of single-party dominance. Paradigmatic cases include
such as Italy in the post-war period with Christian-Democrats (1946–1992);
Japan from 1960 through the mid-1990s; Sweden from 1932 to 1976;
and Israel until 1977. Party dominance occurs when a party controls
power over a long period of time, “for a generation or more” (Duverger,
1954, p. 308), that is “significantly strong than the others” (Sartori, 1976,
p. 193).
A political party that wins elections over an extended period of time,
while opposition constantly fails to meet alternation rule is considered
‘uncommon’ within liberal democracies (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010;
Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Pempel, 1990; Vampa, 2018). As Pempel
28 T. RUEL
highlights, despite “free electoral competition, relatively open informative

systems, respect for civil liberties, and the right of political association, a
single-party has managed to govern alone or as a primary and on-going
partner in coalitions, without interruption for a substantial period of time”
(1990, p. 1). This dominance is revealed over the electorate, political par-
ties, over government formation and over public policy agenda (1990,
pp. 3–4).4
Several explanatory factors have been put in place for democracies that
have experienced long periods of single-party dominance in power, in
particular the median voter position (Downs, 1957; Riker, 1976; Sartori,
1976; Cox, 1997); electoral rules (Duverger, 1954; Greene, 2007;
Lijphart, 1994); socioeconomic coalitions (Pempel, 1990); resource
availability and incumbency advantages (Greene, 2007; Levintsky & Way,
2010) and the historical legacies (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010;
Vampa, 2018).
Some scholars have investigated the duration of cabinets; political and
ideological determinants of cabinet survival and termination (King et al.,
1990; Laver, 2003; Warwick, 1994), while others have focused on leader
duration at chief executive (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997), presidents
(Samuels, 2004) or party leaders (Andrews & Jackman, 2008).
The regional democracy literature has focused its attention, particu-
larly, on variations in regional elections (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013, Hough
& Jeffery, 2006; Jeffery & Hough, 2003; Pallarés & Keating, 2003;
Schakel, 2017); party system congruence (Thorlakson, 2007); and
regional government formation (Bäck, Debus, Müller, & Bäck, 2013;
Däubler & Debus, 2009; Debus, 2008; Deschouwer 2009; Falcó-Gimeno
& Verge, 2013; Ştefuriuc 2009). Drawing on theories of government for-
mation literature developed at national level has emphasized the interac-
tion among national and regional levels, highlighting the congruence or
incongruence between governments formed across levels. Recently,
Schakel & Massetti (2018) have accounted for the sources of regional
government composition and alternation, underlining the impact of insti-
tutional factors, for instance the electoral rules or the scope of political
authority on the likelihood of government alternation. Evidence point out
4
Pempel established four dimensions of party dominance: (1) a party must be dominant in
numbers, it must hold more legislative seats than its opponents; (2) a party must enjoy a
dominant bargaining position over other parties; (3) a party must be dominant in terms of
time in power and (4) a party must be dominant in the public office (1990, pp. 3–4).
that strong regional parties, once in office, tend to prolong their tenure in
office (2018, pp. 719–720).
Furthermore, institutional variables have been identified as major fac-
tors that influence the distinctive behavior of regions within multilevel
states. These include social cleavages and local identities (De Winter &
Tursan, 1998; Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Jeffery & Hough, 2003; Rokkan
& Urwin, 1983); electoral rules, electoral calendars and coattails effect
(Alesina & Rosenthal, 1995, 1989; Anderson, 2006; León, 2012); eco-
nomic swings from national to regional levels and the formal or informal
linkages within national and regional levels of authority (Key, 1953;
Snyder, 2001; Gibson, 2005).
However, political alternation at regional level is not a common feature
in Western democracies (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013; Schakel &
Massetti, 2018).
2.5 Chapter Final Remarks

In this chapter I revise theories and concepts critical to frame my argu-
ment. Setting the key-concept and connecting perspectives that are impor-
tant to address the topic of this book—political alternation. Political
alternation definition is still equivocal in which political alternation appears
to be tangled with governmental change or cabinet turnover. Nevertheless,
the literature has made some efforts to operationalize it. In the end, I’ve
underlined the major research advances through the regional politics
literature.
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Political Alternation in the Azores,

Madeira and the Canary Islands 1st ed.

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The Atlantic insular regions of Portugal and Spain (Azores, Madeira

particular in the construction and tourism sectors, local branches of

three regional contexts from two consolidated southern European democ-

Institute of Social Sciences Luís de Sousa

1 Setting the Scene: Introduction 3

2 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 15

3 Mapping the Cases: The Azores, Madeira and the Canary

4 Party Competition at Regional Level 71

6 Regional Economic Performance123

AC Asamblea Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain)

ICAN Iniciativa Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain)

PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spain)

Table 4.1 Electoral results in Azores 1976–2016 (% of vote share and

Setting the Scene: Introduction

© The Author(s) 2021 3

and politicians employ to secure dominance over time in a given political

objectives of foreign policy; it influences the very evolution of political

1.2 Decentralization of the State: The Emergence

Territory is an essential reference of political and social life (Keating,

electoral arenas (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013; Keating, 1998; Loughlin,

1.3 Setting the Scene: The Framework of Analysis

to be at time t” (Pasquino, 2011, pp. 21–22). Thus, political alternation

performance within them exemplifies the puzzling political outcomes that

p. 94), avoiding what has been labelled as ‘methodological nationalism’

1.3.2 The Structure of the Book

Ruel, T. (2015). Madeira Regional Election 2015: A polity tyrannized by majori-

© The Author(s) 2021 15

2.2 What Is Democracy?: A Minimalist Approach

citizens have sovereignty to pursue political decisions and act through

concept of democracy, namely: (1) participation (in government) where

2.3 Party Competition

Researchers have long sought to classify party systems, from Duverger

Predominant party format is critical to my research reasoning. A pre-

2.4 Political Alternation: A Bird Eye View

In Western democracies it is assumed that political parties compete for

Aristotelian assumption serves as departing point to understand the

A basic principle of democratic constitution is liberty. That is commonly

individual governments in a coalition format and considered government

alternation appears to be tangled with governmental change and cabinet

degree of government alternation among parties in the contemporary

highlights, despite “free electoral competition, relatively open informative

2.5 Chapter Final Remarks

Aron, R. (1982). Alternation in government in the industrialized countries.

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1 Setting the Scene: Introduction 3

2 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 15

3 Mapping the Cases: The Azores, Madeira and the Canary

4 Party Competition at Regional Level 71

6 Regional Economic Performance123