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MIDDLE EAST TODAY
Political Islamists
in Turkey and the
Gülen Movement
Recep Dogan
Middle East Today
Series Editors
Fawaz A. Gerges
Department of International Relations
London School of Economics
London, UK
Nader Hashemi
Center for Middle East Studies Josef Korbel School
of International Studies
University of Denver
Denver, CO, USA
The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and
the US invasion and occupation of Iraq have dramatically altered the
geopolitical landscape of the contemporary Middle East. The Arab
Spring uprisings have complicated this picture. This series puts forward
a critical body of first-rate scholarship that reflects the current political
and social realities of the region, focusing on original research about
contentious politics and social movements; political institutions; the role
played by non-governmental organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah,
and the Muslim Brotherhood; and the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Other
themes of interest include Iran and Turkey as emerging pre-eminent
powers in the region, the former an ‘Islamic Republic’ and the latter an
emerging democracy currently governed by a party with Islamic roots;
the Gulf monarchies, their petrol economies and regional ambitions;
potential problems of nuclear proliferation in the region; and the chal-
lenges confronting the United States, Europe, and the United Nations in
the greater Middle East. The focus of the series is on general topics such
as social turmoil, war and revolution, international relations, occupation,
radicalism, democracy, human rights, and Islam as a political force in the
context of the modern Middle East.
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14803
Recep Dogan
Political Islamists
in Turkey
and the Gülen
Movement
Recep Dogan
Wisdom College
Brisbane, QLD, Australia
Middle East Today

ISBN 978-3-030-29756-5 ISBN 978-3-030-29757-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction
on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and
information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication.
Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied,
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Cover credit: Mikadun/shutterstock.com
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface
The Justice and Development Party (the AKP) and the Gülen movement
(aka Hizmet Movement) are religious groups that aim to serve Islam
and religious life. Both groups had a relationship for their mutual ben-
efit for a long time. The main issue in common for both groups was the
repression and restraining of the rigid secularists within the state institu-
tions and the military. Following the elimination of the ultra-secularists
from the state apparatus, the positive relationship between the AKP and
the movement has turned into a brutal fight, especially after the cor-
ruption investigation against the AKP government and the members
of Erdogan’s family in 2013. This book aims to discuss the ideology of
political Islamists and its effects on religion and social life. Moreover, it
seeks to understand how and why the positive image of the Gülen move-
ment has been changed from a faith-inspired community to a “terrorist
organization” by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his
ruling party, the AKP. Due to the great polarization, hatred and enmity
of the ruling Erdogan government against all members of the Gülen
movement and its huge effect on society, it has become a necessity to
analyze political Islam and its fight against the Gülen movement.
After decades of rigid secularist rule which constantly threatened the
Islamist parties as well as religious groups in Turkey, political power
was finally transferred to the political Islamist AKP, the Justice and
Development Party, in the 2002 general elections. Nevertheless, the
AKP’s Kemalist and secularist rivals in the judiciary, military, and vari-
ous parts of the state bureaucracy continued to challenge the party.
v
vi PREFACE
Thus, the Gülen Movement’s support was essential for the AKP to gain
control over the state institutions. For the Gülen Movement, aligning
with the ruling party was desirable too, because the success of politi-
cal Islamists enabled the Islamic civil society organizations, including
the movement, to grow rapidly with less interference from the secular-
ist elites, particularly during the first two terms of the AKP government.
Both groups cooperated in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer (Balyoz)
trials to neutralize the tutelary capacity of the secularist military caste.
The strategic alliance peaked during the constitutional referendum of
September 12, 2010. Although it was easy for both groups to put aside
their differences in the ideologies when fighting the common enemy,
it was not easy for both to maintain their strategic alliance when the
Erdogan government exerted itself to bring all civil society organizations
into subjection. The alliance between the AKP and the Gülen movement
thus began to fall apart in 2011; it dramatically collapsed in 2013 and
finally evolved into an intense fight in the subsequent years.
Although the clash between the AKP and the Gülen movement is usu-
ally described as a power struggle within the state, this does not give the
full picture of the situation. The most powerful reason for the split of
the two groups from each other is directly related to their understanding
of Islam or, in other words, how each group interprets Islam in theory
and practice. The split between them is, in reality, the difference between
political Islam and civil Islam. While giving the history of relations
between the AKP and the Gülen movement, the book aims to explore
the reasons that caused a dramatic split between them. It also explains
human rights violations, restrictions on the media and the destruction of
democratic institutions in Erdogan’s “New Turkey” project. Moreover,
in order to help readers to better understand the difference between
Political Islam and civil Islam, the book explains the political theology
of each group. In this respect, political theologies of the AKP and the
Gülen movement are compared to each other in order to give a clear
picture of the differences between them. The book concludes with
how this fight would shape the future of Turkey as well as how it may
direct Muslims’ understanding of Islam when they adopt the ideology of
Political Islam or the ideology of civil Islam.
Brisbane, Australia Recep Dogan

Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Political Islam 9
3 The Gülen Movement 41
4 From a Strategic Alliance to a Terrorist Organization:

The History of the Relationship Between AKP
and the Gülen Movement from 2001 to 2019 51
5 Turkey’s Future Direction Under Erdogan’s Regime 105
6 The Political Theology of Political Islamists of Turkey 141
7 The Political Theology of the Gülen Movement 177
8 Conclusion: Comparison of the Two Groups 215
Bibliography 229
Index 259
vii
Abbreviations
Aramco The Saudi-American oil company

BDP Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party
CHP The Republican People’s Party
DP Democrat Party
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ETÖ Ergenekon Terror Organization
EU European Union
FETÖ Gülenist Terror Organization
FP The Virtue Party
FRA Freedom Research Association
HSYK Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors
IHH The Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and
Humanitarian Relief
IMF The International Monetary Fund
KCK The Kurdistan Communities Union
MGK National Security Council
MHP The Nationalist Movement Party
MIT Turkish National Intelligence Agency
MNP The National Order Party
MSP The National Salvation Party
MÜSIAD The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association
NATO The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPR National Public Radio
Oda TV Oda TV which was founded in 200 is an online news portal
based in Turkey
ix
x ABBREVIATIONS
OFAC The Office of Foreign Assets Control

PEJ The Equality and Justice Party in France
PKK The Kurdistan Workers’ Party
RP The Welfare Party
SP The Felicity Party
The AKP Adalet and Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
The DENK Dutch for “think” and Turkish for “equality”, self-styled
as DENK is a political party in The Netherlands that calls itself a
“movement”
The Diyanet Turkish Directory of Religious Affairs
The NBZ The Freedom Party of Austria is a right-wing populist, nation-
al-conservative political party in Austria
The UN The United Nations
The YÖK Council for Higher Education
TURGEV Youth Education and Service Foundation of Turkey
Türksat Turkish Satellite Communications Company
TUSKON The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Islam has been interpreted in various ways by individuals since its birth
and Political Islam is one of its interpretations. Political Islam has a long
history, and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party—the AKP (Adalet
ve Kalkinma Partisi)—is a new face of it in the twenty-first century. The
main goals of writing this book are to define political Islam, especially
in the Turkish context with respect to the AKP, a political party which
has been in power in Turkey since 2002, and to try to understand the
nature of conflicts between the two Islamic groups: the AKP and the
Gülen Movement, a transnational social movement emerging originally
in Turkey in the early 1970s.
The Justice and Development Party (the AKP) and the Gülen
movement (aka Hizmet Movement) are religious groups that aim to
serve Islam and religious life. Both groups had a relationship for their
mutual benefit for a long time. The main issue in common for both
groups was the repression and restraining of the rigid secularists within
the state institutions and the military. Following the elimination of
the ultra-secularists from the state apparatus, the positive relationship
between the AKP and the movement has turned into a brutal fight, espe-
cially after the corruption investigation against the AKP government and
the members of Erdogan’s family in 2013. This book aims to discuss
the ideology of political Islamists and its effects on religion and social
life. Moreover, it seeks to understand how and why the positive image
© The Author(s) 2020 1

R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement,
Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2_1
2 R. DOGAN
of the Gülen movement has been changed from a faith-inspired commu-

nity to a “terrorist organization” by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan and his ruling party, the AKP.
Although the Justice and Development Party (the AKP) has long
benefitted greatly from the valuable support of Fethullah Gülen and his
followers in the way of democratizing the state and its institutions, the
two groups have clearly separated from each other since the 2013 cor-
ruption scandals or perhaps a little earlier.1 This separation has created
a massive impact on practicing Muslims as well as on others. Due to the
great polarization, hatred and enmity of the ruling Erdogan govern-
ment against all members of the Gülen movement and its huge effect on
society, it has become a necessity to analyze political Islam and its fight
against the Gülen movement.
Fethullah Gülen and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have great influence on
Turkish people. Both use Islamic concepts to revive Islamic life in Turkey
and receive support from Muslims. Erdogan and AKP’s elite come from
the late Necmettin Erbakan’s2 National Outlook Movement3 (Milli
Görüş), the religiopolitical movement which seeks a religious revival
through the ideology of political Islam, whereas Fethullah Gülen aims
to promote civil Islam among different segments of society without seek-
ing to establish an Islamic state. Gülen refrained from partisan politics
and employed a gradualist approach focusing on a bottom-up spiritual
progress of society. Thus, the Gülen movement has invested its capital
and energy mostly in education and dialogue. In order to avoid confron-
tation with the secularist Turkish state, the movement stayed away from
political Islamists, including the National Outlook.
Looking back to its recent history, the National Outlook Movement
pursued a political path of forming political parties that would ultimately
establish an Islamic state much like the Muslim Brotherhood4 tried in
Egypt. Erbakan adopted a discourse infused with anti-Western and
antisecularist sentiments, thus experiencing military intervention several
times. Avoiding the mistakes of the past, the reformists led by Tayyip
Erdogan, Abdullah Gül, and Bülent Arınç, ultimately split from the
National Outlook Movement and formed the AKP on August 14, 2001.
After decades of rigid secularist rule which constantly threatened the
Islamist parties as well as religious groups in Turkey, political power
was finally transferred to the political Islamist AKP, the Justice and
Development Party, in the 2002 general elections. The ruling AKP has
increased its control over the government and consolidated its power
1 INTRODUCTION 3
further in the succeeding years. At the beginning of its rule, Erdogan’s

AKP avoided direct confrontation with the secularist institutions. It
claimed to have changed, and described itself as a representative of
conservative democrats, rather than Islamists. Nevertheless, the AKP’s
Kemalist5 and secularist rivals in the judiciary, military, and various parts
of the state bureaucracy continued to challenge the party. Thus, the
Gülen Movement’s support was essential for the AKP to gain control
over the state institutions. For the Gülen Movement, aligning with the
ruling party was desirable too, because the success of political Islamists
enabled the Islamic civil society organizations, including the movement,
to grow rapidly with less interference from the secularist elites, particu-
larly during the first two terms of the AKP government. As a matter
of fact, Gülen and his followers had been treated negatively and sup-
pressed by the former secularist elites and the military caste, especially
in the aftermath of the frequent military interventions and post-modern
coups. They were subjected to many antidemocratic sanctions, accusa-
tions, and implementations by the secular state for decades. This harsh
attitude toward the movement was eased during the AKP rule until
2012. During the February 28, 1997 post-modern coup,6 a video which
leaked to the media showed that Gülen advised his sympathizers to cover
their religious identities; otherwise, they would be sacked by the secu-
larist state. In the lawsuit, opened in 2000 at the Ankara State Security
Court, Gülen was accused of undermining the secular order. The law-
suit described the Gülen movement as the strongest and most effective
Islamic group in Turkey which camouflages its methods with a demo-
cratic and moderate image. However, Gülen was cleared of all the accu-
sations through the process of the Turkish judiciary system. The Ankara
Criminal Court acquitted Fethullah Gülen of subverting the secular
regime in 2006.
Following the institution of European Union (EU)-oriented liberal
changes to the Counterterrorism Law on May 5, 2006, Gülen and the
movement he inspired were acquitted of the accusations. Similarly, the
AKP survived the military’s indirect intervention on April 27, 2007 with
the support of the Gülen Movement. Both groups cooperated in the
Ergenekon7 and Sledgehammer (Balyoz)8 trials to neutralize the tutelary
capacity of the secularist military caste. The strategic alliance peaked dur-
ing the constitutional referendum of September 12, 2010. This referen-
dum altered the composition of the judicial bodies and weakened the
power of the ultra-secularists in the judiciary. Gülen publicly encouraged
4 R. DOGAN
his sympathizers to cast affirmative votes in the referendum and in

return, Erdogan offered his gratitude to Gülen and the movement.
As a matter of fact, all three strongholds of the secular establishment
in the presidency, military, and judiciary were neutralized in 2010. As a
result, the movement was no longer an open target for the repression of
the secularist elites during the AKP rule and a grand alliance was formed
between them. After all the years of suffering from the suspicious, nega-
tive attitudes of the secularist and Kemalist elite, the movement enjoyed
the restoration of its honor through the glorification of the AKP elite.
Nevertheless, it did not last long. Indeed, it was a great opportunity for
the victims of secular oppression to have more power in the state and
public life. However, this was also the beginning of conflict between the
two groups and termination of the strategic alliance. Although it was
easy for both groups to put aside their differences in the ideologies when
fighting the common enemy, it was not easy for both to maintain their
strategic alliance when the Erdogan government exerted itself to bring
all civil society organizations into subjection. The alliance between the
AKP and the Gülen movement thus began to fall apart in 2011; it dra-
matically collapsed in 2013 and finally evolved into an intense fight in
the subsequent years.9
Each group attacked the other using the control they had gained over
particular state functions in the preceding years. The AKP used its con-
trol over the executive and legislative branches to subjugate the move-
ment; the sympathizers of the Gülen Movement contended against the
AKP through their connections in the bureaucracy. It seems the AKP
government neutralized the influence of the movement over the state
apparatus during its fight against it.
The differences in the ideology, worldview, and interpretation of
Islam have eventually caused a dramatic split between the movement and
the AKP. Familiarity breeds contempt: the dramatic differences in each
group came to be known and the split between them became an ines-
capable result. This separation turned into one of the fiercest political
battles in the history of Turkish politics.10 The conflict between these
two groups has many roots. At the ideological level, the most impor-
tant divergence is their approach to Islam for the AKP stems from the
Muslim Brotherhood tradition or the ideology of political Islam while
the Gülen Movement comes from a Sufi and Turkish brand of Islam
which has disdained from the Arab world’s Muslim Brotherhood
tradition.
1 INTRODUCTION 5
Political Islamists see Erdogan as the leader of the Muslim world;

hence, they cannot tolerate Gülen sharing the same status with him.
Secondly, Erdogan wants to be the president with unrestricted power,
with no checks and balances. He is very ambitious to hold all power
in his own hands. He perceived Gülen and the movement he inspired
as rivals to his goal; thus, he declared them the arch enemy. Through
controlling the executive and legislative power in the state, the AKP has
been purging the followers of the movement from the state as well as
from the public sphere.
Although the clash between the AKP and the Gülen movement is usu-
ally described as a power struggle within the state, this does not give the
full picture of the situation. The most powerful reason for the split of
the two groups from each other is directly related to their understanding
of Islam or, in other words, how each group interprets Islam in theory
and practice. The split between them is, in reality, the difference between
political Islam and civil Islam. While giving the history of relations
between the AKP and the Gülen movement, the book aims to explore
the reasons that caused a dramatic split between them. It also explains
human rights violations, restrictions on the media and the destruction of
democratic institutions in Erdogan’s “New Turkey” project. Moreover,
in order to help readers to better understand the differences between
Political Islam and Civil Islam, the book explains the political theology
of each group. In this respect, political theologies of the AKP and the
Gülen movement are compared to each other in order to give a clear
picture of the differences between them. The book concludes with
how this fight would shape the future of Turkey as well as how it may
direct Muslims’ understanding of Islam when they adopt the ideology of
Political Islam or the ideology of civil Islam.
Notes
1.
The 2004 National Security Council (MGK) document indicates that
Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) agreed to a
planned crackdown on the movement. The MGK document asked the
government to develop an action plan to follow the MGK’s recom-
mendations and instructed the Prime Ministry’s Implementation and
Monitoring Coordination Council (BUTKK) to coordinate the minis-
tries and monitor whether the steps were being implemented. The MGK
decision urged the Foreign Ministry, Interior Ministry and National
6 R. DOGAN
Intelligence Organization (MIT) to closely monitor and report on the

activities of the Gülen movement at home and abroad. It advised the
government to instruct the Interior Ministry and Ministry of Education
to investigate and monitor schools affiliated with the Gülen move-
ment and report their activities to the Information Technologies and
Communications Authority (BTK). A termination plan on the Gülen
movement, which was drafted back in 2004, has been in action since
then.
2. Erbakan (29 October 1926–27 February 2011) was the founder of polit-
ical Islam and National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş) in Turkey. He
was the Prime Minister of Turkey from 1996 to 1997. He experienced
military interventions a few times and was later banned from politics by
the Constitutional Court of Turkey due to violating the separation of
religion and state. On the basis of National Outlook ideology, Erbakan
established several Islamic political parties in Turkey from the 1960s
to the 2010s, namely the National Order Party (MNP), the National
Salvation Party (MSP), the Welfare Party (RP), the Virtue Party (FP),
and the Felicity Party (SP). He died on 27 February 2011.
3. It is a religio-political movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan and a
series of Islamist parties inspired by its founder on the basis of the ideol-
ogy of political Islam.
4. It is s an Islamic organization that was founded in Egypt by Hassan
al-Banna 1928. The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist religious, polit-
ical, and social movement which aims implement Islamic sharia law into
government based on an Islamic ethos of altruism and civic duty, in
opposition to political and social injustice and to British imperial rule.
5. People who follow the ideology of Kemalism also known as Atatürkism.
Kemalism was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding ideology
of the Republic of Turkey. Kemalism was a serious of reforms designed
to separate the new Turkish state from its Ottoman past and imple-
ment a western lifestyle, including the establishment of democracy and
secularism.
6. It refers to the decisions issued by the Turkish military leadership on a
National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997 which initi-
ated the process that precipitated the resignation of Islamist prime min-
ister Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party, and the end of his coalition
government.
7. It is a mythical place located in the inaccessible valleys of the Altay
Mountains. The name was given to an alleged clandestine, secularist
ultra-nationalist organization in Turkey with possible ties to members
of the country’s military and security forces. It was accused of terrorism
in Turkey. It is believed to be a part of the deep state in Turkey which
1 INTRODUCTION 7
alleged members had been indicted on charges of plotting to foment

unrest, by assassinating intellectuals, politicians, judges, military staff,
and religious leaders, with the ultimate goal of toppling the incumbent
government.
8. It is the name of an alleged Turkish secularist military coup plan dating
back to 2003, in response to the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
gaining office.
9. Demiralp, Seda, “The Breaking Up of Turkey’s Islamic Alliance: The Akp-
Gulen Conflict and Implications for Middle East Studies,” Middle East
Review of International Affairs 20, no. 1 (2016): 1–7.
10. Gursel, Kadri, “AKP-Cemaat Savasinda Neyi Savunmalıyız?” (What
Should We Defend in the AKP-Cemaat War?), Milliyet, December 8,
2013, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/kadri-gursel/akp-cemaat-
savasinda-neyi-savunmaliyiz--1804154/.
CHAPTER 2
Political Islam
2.1 Definitions of Political Islam

Islam is a religion which offers a number of general principles and
guidelines to its followers in relation to individual, familial, social, and
governmental life on the basis of the Qur’an and Sunnah (Prophetic
Traditions). The interpretation of Islam by individuals, nations, and cul-
tures is different than Islam itself for it can be interpreted in many dif-
ferent ways including in relation to systems of government.1 Islamism or
political Islam is about political order and it is a powerful instance of the
global phenomenon of religious fundamentalism.2 Hence, Political Islam
is a particular approach to interpretation of Islam on the basis of certain
doctrines, beliefs, and values as the foundation of a political structure.
The supporters of this ideology use some key concepts from Islamic his-
tory such as Islamic State, Caliphate and the Sharia to constitute their
doctrines. For Political Islamists, there is no distinction between religion
and politics.3 The slogan “Islam is din and dawla” (religion and state) is
common among them. Political Islamists aim to religionize politics for
the promotion of a political order that is believed to emanate from the
will of God and is not based on popular sovereignty.4
The interaction of Islam and politics continues to draw the attention
of scholars and the concern of policy makers. Political Islamists have
come to power through duly democratic processes in their respective
countries and are eager to have a significant impact on world events.5
Their activities not only cover politics but also social, financial, economic,
© The Author(s) 2020 9

R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement,
Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2_2
10 R. DOGAN
and educational spheres. This book aims to explain the relationship

between Islam and politics in Turkey for it attracts the greatest attention
from both Muslim societies and the international community.
Islamism is often nurtured in local conditions that must be under-
stood. There have been different kinds of Islam, at different moments,
for different people, and in different settings.6 Interpretation of Islam by
individuals and groups range from reformist political and social protest
movements to ultraconservative movements focused on morality-related
issues rather than economic redistribution.7 Some Islamists are strongly
nationalist in orientation as seen in Turkey.8
Political Islam has many faces, as manifested by the diverse and diver-
gent Islamist parties and movements operating in Muslim-majority
states and beyond.9 It has cycles of success and failure, intertwined
with hope and despair. The political reverting of formerly “moderate”
Muslim-majority government (the AKP) in Turkey has disappointed
many Muslims who hope for more democratic political reforms in the
heartland of the Muslim world. Moreover, the bloody Egyptian military
coup in 2013 and brutal civil wars in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq have
destroyed the expectations and hope of many Muslims.
Political Islamic ideology proposes that Islam as a body of faith has
something important to say about how politics and society should be
ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some
fashion.10 Political Islam is an interpretation of Islam by individuals,
groups, and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides
political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining future with
the concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition.11 It dictates political
values to its followers and Muslim rulers such as the notion of justice for
all citizens. But political Islam is not independent of particular social and
political contexts in which Islamist groups and parties operate.
Political Islamists aim to implement their vision of Islamic law in
political sense; therefore, they are incapable of making political com-
promises or building coalitions with other political forces/parties. The
mainstream ideology of political Islam is anti-democratic in its nature,
because according to this ideology, the caliph, the head of Muslims,
represents God’s sovereignty and everyone must obey him. Thus,
mainstream political Islamists use democracy in an instrumentalist
fashion to come to power. But, once in power they are likely to aban-
don the democratic system in order to give all power to one person.
2 POLITICAL ISLAM 11
While Political Islamists have many goals, the ultimate one is

establishing a worldwide caliphate and Islamic state.12
Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328),13 an influential Hanbali theologian argues
that the essence of government is applying force to people so they live in
obedience and their solidarity is not ruined. Thus, the ruler can demand
obedience from his people, even if he is not just, because, an unjust ruler
is better than strife and the dissolution of society.14 It is obvious that ibn
Taymiyya advocates a particular political order that can operate against
social harmony and basic political freedoms. This approach paved the
way for the current Muslim political dictators across the Middle East
and North Africa to justify their authoritarian rule. The politicization of
religion and the induction of religion into politics are the unique char-
acteristics of political Islamists. For example, Saudi Arabia is a hered-
itary monarchy legitimized in religious terms by the Wahhabi religious
establishment.
2.2 A Brief History of Political Islam

Political Islam has a long history and has appeared in various forms in
different contexts.15 Since it is very difficult to cover all the history of
political Islam and its various forms, we have mainly focused on the
Political Islam that has emerged in the last decades of the twentieth cen-
tury until present. The representatives of this ideology have primarily
resorted to political aspect of Islam to illustrate the perceived threat of
Westernization in the Muslim world to Muslims.
Initially, Western colonialization and the evolving sociopolitical condi-
tions in the Middle East caused some Muslim leaders/groups to concep-
tualize Political Islam as a response to the west and foreign ideologies.
They advocated the notion of political power, caliphate, and unity of
Muslims to protect Islam and Muslim world.16 It was a reaction to more
powerful and more successful western state model. Moreover, many
Muslims, including traditionally educated, reformist-minded Muslim
scholars such as M. Abduh, started to question their own values with the
feelings of inferiority against the west and its civilization.
Western colonialization of Islamic lands has been interpreted by
scholars in various ways. Some scholars identified it as the clash of two
conflicting state models17 while others deemed it as the fight between
the west and the east. Muslim scholars who live in a country occupied/
colonialized by the west have developed some responses including
12 R. DOGAN
the ideology of Political Islam to protect Muslim identity and culture.

However, in reality, the decline of Islamic civilization has a long history,
starting from the tenth century when science was separated from reli-
gion and religious scholars did not produce any original work rather than
repeating/imitating the previous ones. Thus, it is not accurate to blame
the west and its colonial legacy as the only reason for the backwardness
of the Muslim world.
In the last three centuries in particular, the overall condition of the
Muslim World has become worse for it could not keep up with the west
in relevance to scientific, political freedom, economic and human rights
developments and this resulted not only in the occupation of their lands
but also to a great disparity between the West and the Muslim World
in terms of the power of science, human development and knowledge.
Instead of understanding the multitude of factors that have caused
Muslims to be in this position today, various Muslim scholars have devel-
oped a number of different ideologies including political Islam. The
interpretation of Islam that separates science from religion has been
exerting a strict control over Islamic thought and hindering its develop-
ment since long time.
There could be many reasons for the stagnation of the Islamic world
as well as its starting time. When we focus on the last three centuries,
we notice that Muslims could not have succeeded in significant changes
to their civilization. They strongly believed in the authenticity of their
religion and God’s favor upon them, and this led them to be oblivi-
ous with regards to scientific developments and the power of knowl-
edge. Moreover, Muslim elites felt that they could ignore the rest of the
world18 for they do not need to learn/take anything from the infidels.
Additionally, European expansionism in the last three centuries was trau-
matic and painful reality for Muslims, but it was too late to respond to it.
There was a great need for Muslims to adjust their civilization with
the modern world, but this could undermine the traditional structures
that constituted the base of ruling class’ legitimacy. Nevertheless, some
rulers such as Ottoman sultan Mahmud II (1785–1839) established a
new military, bureaucratic, educational and judicial institutions based on
the European model, but it was not sufficient, because, these attempts
actualized modernization partially. Additionally, many people in the soci-
ety were not happy with these changes, thus, the modernization efforts
faced strong oppositions.
Some scholars such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) and

Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905) argued that Islam itself needed to be
reformed in order to maintain its relevance to modern time and over-
come the hegemony of the west. They criticized Muslim scholars who
had closed the door of ijtihad (exerting juristic opinions) in the third
century of Islam. Because, after closing the door of ijtihad scholars had
been reduced to the role which only preserve and comment on the
interpretations of the early scholars.19 They argued that modern schol-
ars should return to original sources of Islam such as the Qur’an and
Sunnah instead of commenting on the works of early scholars. They
maintained that modern scholars should use their intellect and reason to
interpret the primary sources of Islam when the circumstances demand
as the pious early scholars did it during the first centuries of Islam. They
also argued that the internal division and conflicts among Muslims, and
the authoritarian rulers across the Islamic world made them too weak to
confront the western challenge.
Additionally, some ideas, practices, and institutions developed by
the west which could be reconciled with the principles of Islam and its
higher objectives were ignored by scholars and rulers instead of adopting
them in Islamic world. For example, democracy could be understood by
modern Muslims as “the shura” (the system of consultation) and it could
be adopted in Muslim world as a ruling system.20
For Muhammad ‘Abduh, Islam is compatible with reason with the
condition that if there appears to be any contradiction between them the
human intellect is an authority to interpret the sources to overcome it
in any way.21 He tried to interpret the Qur’an according the theories of
modern science such as Darwin’s evolution and explained the creation
accordingly. Obviously, this was a great challenge for Muslim scholars
who felt inferiority against the west and its civilization. Because, when
the theories of science are accepted as a final authority in relevance to
interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah, Islam can be reduced to the
level of Christianity which has been locked into churches since long time.
It seems, modernists such as ‘Abduh and Afghani aimed to restrict Islam
and its appliance to morality and ethics only.
Opposing to ‘Abduh and Afghani, Hasan Al-Banna (1906–1949), a
school teacher provided a radical interpretation of Islam by labeling all
modernist scholars as enemies of religion and henchmen of the colo-
nial powers.22 Shocked by the rapid westernization of Egyptian soci-
ety Al-Banna developed a doctrine of Political Islam to protect Muslim
14 R. DOGAN
identity. He was deeply affected when witnessing how Islamic values

started to be melted by western attack equipped with all the destruc-
tive arms of wealth, ostentation, gratification, strength and means
of propaganda.23 Thus, Banna and his followers struggled to pro-
tect Islamic values against the westernization for they believed that
the European model of development was marred by ostentation and
licentiousness.
Banna founded the Muslim Brothers (Ikhwani Muslimin) in the late
1920s to actualize his ideology. He conceptualized his ideology under
the influence of the conditions surrounding Egypt; British occupation,
party corruption, and political violence. He advocated Islam as a com-
prehensive system which should regulate all aspects of life including
people, government, power, justice, culture, science, economy, creed,
and worship.24 He argued that Islam has a capacity to establish a sys-
tem that allows the world to benefit from everything that is good and
to avoid that is bad and evil. Banna was assassinated by the secret police
in 1949 due to the suspicion that he and his followers might resort to
violence. However, the Muslim Brothers accepted democracy and aimed
to achieve power through peaceful means. They rejected the authori-
tarian regime like in Egypt and desired to have a Muslim version of a
political party.
Banna was succeeded by Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) who systematized
and developed the ideology of Political Islam. He redefined the con-
cept of jahiliyya (pre-Islamic Arabia) as any society failing to submit to
God’s ruling as revealed in the Qur’an, including Muslims who adhere
to the capitalist or the communist systems.25 He believed that preach-
ing alone would not be enough to establish an Islamic order, because,
tyrants, dictators, and henchmen of the colonial powers would not give
up power voluntarily. He argued that although there is no compulsion
in religion,26 it is necessary to remove the obstacles between people and
God. He deemed the tyrannical regimes as obstacles which prevent peo-
ple from following the guidance of Islam. Thus, he encouraged Muslims
to struggle against tyrannical regimes and to bring a just system that
guarantees freedom to everyone and the whole of humanity.27
Political Islam encompasses several tendencies, yet all of these are
similar with regards to the demand for the immediate implementation
of sharia and the condemnation of their opponents as secularists and
agents of the West. Usually, extremists among political Islamists reject
democracy for they regard it as an illegitimate, man-made system of
government which usurps God’s sovereignty. They aim to reach power

through armed struggle and violence. Most of the terrorist groups such
as al-Qaida and ISIS have been influenced by this extreme ideology.
2.3 Various Types of Political Islam

Islam is a religion which encompasses every aspect of life,28 and it offers
principles, guidelines, and rulings to its followers in order to provide
them happiness in both worlds. The interpretation of Islam can be differ-
ent according to time, culture and conditions. Political Islamists focus on
political aspects of Islam with their own interpretation and understand-
ing. They argue that Islam has views on politics in relevance to govern-
ment and in order to practice Islam in its totality the sharia should be
implemented in an Islamic State.29 Political Islam is not a single ideology
that all political Islamists would agree on. In other words, it is impossi-
ble to accept a monolithic phenomenon with regards to political Islam,
because, it is not independent of particular social and political contexts in
which religious groups and parties operate.
Occasionally, religion has been used by individuals, groups, or organ-
izations to dictate political action in the state. Since the Prophet rep-
resented various roles in his unique personality such as being a head of
state, a judge, a commander of army and a law maker, Muslims could
not separate religion from the state. Islam is like an instrument for politi-
cal Islamists to achieve their targets. They seek solutions for today’s soci-
etal challenges by referring to the foundations borrowed from Islamic
tradition.30
Political activities in the name of Islam confuse Muslims. Because,
although they are obsessed with implementing the sharia and enforcing
God’s sovereignty in the state, they may easily contradict basic Islamic
teachings in their daily life due to their extreme interpretation of Islam.
More than 90% of Islam is related to personal practice and it can be
applied without having an Islamic state. It is a great hypocrisy to advo-
cate political aspect of Islam before practicing majority of it in daily life.
In this regard, Australia, America, and European countries are much
better in terms of allowing individuals to practice their faith. Opposing
to this, Muslims countries do not give much freedom to citizens with
regards to basic human rights. Even, political Islamists who suffered
from the secular state apply the same oppression toward their opponents.
The case of AKP, the ruling party in Turkey is a good example for this.
16 R. DOGAN
Political Islamists do not believe democracy for they argue that it is

against God’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, they do not hesitate to advo-
cate democracy until attaining political power. By using Islam and its
key concepts in politics the AKP has obtained a massive political power
and justified its authoritarian and antidemocratic approaches in the state.
Initially, the AKP represented a moderate version of Islam claiming that it
changed its radical Islamic understanding. It avoided direct confrontation
with secularists. Once, Political Islamists obtained the power they aban-
doned democratic system. They believe that every means in the way of
obtaining political power is permissible. Thus, they use force, apply vio-
lence and practice antidemocratic implementations to achieve their objec-
tives. They use religion and its key concepts to legitimize their actions.
During the period of the Umayyad31 and Abbasid32 reigns, the reli-
gious and political spheres were not clearly separated. The state would
impose its own understanding of Islam on society and punish scholars
who opposed it. Although scholars (ulama) had religious authority on
society in certain decree and the state generally recognized it they would
be punished when they criticized the state. There was a peace between
scholars and rulers when the formers accepted the legitimacy of rulers
and the later recognized the religious authority of scholars. In order
to prevent anarchy, political breakdown and divisions among Muslims,
scholars recognized and justified rulers who were not just. They were
extremely sensitive in protecting social fabric that could be torn asun-
der if they would engage in direct opposition to political authority.
Nevertheless, some scholars did not hesitate to criticize unjust rulers and
their wrongdoings.
Unfortunately, some scholars developed the defense of the politi-
cal status of rulers to the extent that they could not defend the rights
of individuals. For example, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) argues that a ruler
whether just or unjust needs to be obeyed, because, it is better than strife
and the dissolution of society.33 He believes that the state has authority
to use force to bring solidarity in society. This approach supports dic-
tatorship and injustices done by the state. Usually, rulers desire to con-
trol scholars to use religion for their own benefits. In many parts of the
Islamic world, state controls scholars. Religion with its own doctrines
and concepts do not shape politics rather politicians and state use reli-
gion to protect their power.
The politicization of religion is not restricted to Islam only. Judaism
and Christianity were/are politicized by some groups throughout
history. So, nothing unique in the history of Islam that sets it apart
from other religious traditions in terms of the relationship between reli-
gion and politics. Islam has been misinterpreted by politicians and rul-
ers to the extent to cover up their corruption and justify their violence.
They use religion for political purposes. For example, Saudi Arabia is a
country ruled by a hereditary monarchy and it has been legitimized by
the Wahhabi scholars. The state is governed by Saudi royal family and
Wahhabi scholars. Saudi family administers the politics and Wahhabi
scholars control religious affairs. Politicians and scholars support each
other to run the state smoothly.
Although oppression and persecution are not always inherent in polit-
ical Islam the state may resort it to secure political power or cover up
the corruption. For example, initially, the AKP advocated democracy and
human rights but it started to abandon democratic values after obtain-
ing the power. Political Islamists of Turkey applied oppression and per-
secution against opponents to establish monopoly in the state. Although
it has come to power through democracy the AKP government has
adopted antidemocratic practices since 2013 to destroy its opponents in
Turkey and consolidate its own power. Political Islamists aim to destroy
the far enemy, the United States and its allies in long term.
2.4 The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey

Political Islam has been a very effective oppositional ideology in coun-
tries where Muslims are suffering due to their Islamic identity. The rise
of political Islam in Turkey can be connected to the reforms undertaken
in the late Ottoman period. Trying to modernize the state and its institu-
tions the late Ottoman Sultans offered some reforms but it did not suc-
ceed much. In 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk implemented a revolution
by military force to transform and westernize the state. He and a small
military-bureaucratic elite imposed their secularist vision on a reluctant
traditional society by overwhelming and intimidating any opposition
without negotiating with the people.34 The secularist elite attempted a
radical break with the Ottoman past by condemning and discarding
everything related to it. They carried out a series of reforms such as abol-
ishing the caliphate and introducing the Latin alphabet instead of Arabic
one to cut Turkey’s ties to its Islamic past. They shut down religious
institutions, banned traditional attires, and secularized the education
system.
18 R. DOGAN
After the collapse of Ottoman, a number of ideological movements

struggled for power. Each had its unique approach to save the country
and offered solutions to citizens. Political Islamists knew that Islam had
major effect on population, thus, they aimed to obtain political power by
using the power of religion on society. The secular elites and the Turkish
nationalists perceived political Islamists as a major threat for the state,
thus, they aimed to remove Islam from politics as well as from society.
They advocated that the Sharia was incompatible with European ideals of
modernity, thus, it caused Ottoman to collapse. Therefore, they tried to
change the identity of Turkish people through the secular education and
linguistic reforms. They removed religion from politics. Through these
reforms, the secularists aimed to free Turkish-Muslims from the restric-
tions of traditional Islamic concepts and practices. They believed that by
modernizing all aspects of state and society they could create a modern
national state and a new type of free individuals.
After the abolishment of the caliphate, religious groups in Turkey as
well as in other parts of the Islamic world developed some strategies to
restore Islamic life in society and politics. In this regard, some groups
aimed to promote political Islam for they believed that Islam could only
be practiced properly in a state governed by the sharia. They argued that
if political power was achieved, they could shape religious identity by a
top-down approach. It is very doubtful if Islam accepts an idea which
imposes itself into society through using force but, political Islamist
adopted a top-down logic to restore religious life.
Although religion was banished from the public sphere and strictly
supervised by the state it could not be completely suppressed or elim-
inated. Thus, the state aimed to control religious education and life
through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet) in Turkey.
However, religious life in Turkey continued to have strong social roots
with the past through religious-social movements. In spite the secu-
lar state excluded Muslims from the political sphere political Islamists
established their own parties and movements to obtain power in the
state. Indeed, when the secular elites tried to marginalize Muslims, this
attitude caused them to develop a hidden Islamic identity within the
Kemalist state.35
The state did not want autonomous groups to develop outside of its
control for it regarded it as a potential threat to its ability to carry out
its modernization effort and consolidate its political control. Thus, any
opposition to regime’s ideology whether individual or social was quickly
suppressed by the state. Trying to shape the society through force and
oppression the state alienated the large majority of population.36 In
response to antidemocratic practices of the state Political Islamists aimed
to provide a political voice to the public. Over time, they developed
goals and ideologies in the secular state.
Realizing that it was not possible to remove religion from public life,
the state aimed to control it starting in the second half of twentieth
century. By controlling the religious understanding in society, the state
desired to create a religious identity on the basis of Turkish nationalism.
For this purpose, it established the Diyanet to supervise and regulate reli-
gious affairs according to the needs of modern Turkey. Moreover, the
state closed the dervish lodges, prohibited religious cloaks in public,
changed the alphabet into the Latin script, and adopted the Gregorian
calendar.
The secular state aimed to replace the integral role of Islam with the
modern principle of nationalism. Thus, Turkish nationalism became the
basis for politics, strategies, and philosophies in Turkey. The state estab-
lished some institutions such as the Study of Turkish History to connect
people to their national past. The institution tried to prove that Turks’
origins went back to central Asia. It also argued that Turks created many
civilizations in all the lands they lived.37
In order to cut citizens’ connection with the Islamic past, the secular
state aimed to develop a sense of national history. Secular elites thought
that if the state could provide a sense of pride in their national history,
Turkish people would not need to refer to their Islamic past. With the
same mentality, non-Turkish words such as Arabic and Persian words
were eliminated by the Turkish Language Society. To make Turkish citi-
zens more conscious in regards to their pre-Islamic past, the new educa-
tion system focused on the principles of the Turkish revolution.38
The establishment of a multi-party system in 1946 was an impor-
tant turning point in the rise of political Islam in Turkey.39 The sec-
ular elites lost their monopoly on political power. Moreover, political
parties in Turkey had to recognize Muslim identity in order to attract
votes from the larger parts of the society. Although Political Islamists
had gone into hibernation since 1923, they formed an anti-communist
alliance with the state, thus gaining legitimacy and prestige within the
state again around 1950. Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, the head of Turkey’s
Directorate of Religious Affairs in 1950s, stated that Islam absolutely
rejects communism as well as every kind of ideology and practice
20 R. DOGAN
related to it. Indeed, it is impossible for a true believer to reconcile

himself to communist ideas and practices.40
The view of Akseki was tangible evidence of state-controlled Islam.
The state used Islam and its values against communism. Hence, Islamist
elites declared themselves as the Left’s sworn enemies. In 1948, Necip
Fazıl Kısakürek urged the state to support “religious and spiritual ten-
dencies” in the fight against communism.41 Sezai Karakoç took a lead-
ing role in mobilizing the masses against the Left and argued that the
Qur’an describes rightists as the “community of God” and leftists as the
“community of Satan.”42
The Nation Party (Millet Partisi), a 1950s Islamist party, enjoyed
open support from Kısakürek and other Islamists, but it was shut down
by the secular state in 1954 as a result of its religious activities. The rul-
ing Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti—DP) allowed religious life and
Islamic values to be successful in the political arena. Seeing the potential
danger to its secular ideology, the Turkish military attempted a coup in
1960 and created the National Security Council (MGK) to impose its
secular ideology on politicians.
In order to counter the Soviets’ influence, the United States began
a policy of supporting Islamism in the Middle East in the second half
of the twentieth century. Thus, the military pressure was relieved in
1961 and religious groups had freedom again in Turkey. The works of
prominent Islamists like Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna, and Abul Ala
Mawdudi began to be translated into Turkish. Turkey’s national intel-
ligence service supported Islamist publications to prevent leftist move-
ments from growing.
During this time, political Islamists managed to form their own sep-
arate political party MSP (the National Salvation Party) under the lead-
ership of Necmettin Erbakan, a former professor of engineering who
had studied in both Turkey and Germany. The United States and Saudi
Arabia supported Islamic movements in the region. For this reason, in
1969 Bülent Ecevit, a general secretary of CHP (Republican Public
Party) stated that Political Islamists pretended to be loyal to the ummah
of Islam, but, in actual fact, they were loyal to the ummah of Aramco
(the Saudi-American oil company).43
Erbakan’s party made considerable gains in the 1973 elections by
receiving 11.8% of the vote. It became a key party in the formation of
a coalition government in the Turkish Parliament.44 Between 1973
and 1980, the MSP (the National Salvation Party) formed coalition
governments with the CHP (Republican Public Party) and later with the
Nationalist Action Party and the Mainland Party.
Erbakan was representative of political Islam in Turkey beginning in
1960s. He believed that Turkey was in moral decay due to the hegem-
ony of western culture and influences, and that society should be puri-
fied from these effects. He wanted to gain control of the government
gradually by establishing his own political party. However, the Turkish
military often interfered with ruling parties and declared a memo-
randum demanding the formation of a democratic government in line
with Ataturk’s secular vision. The fight between Political Islamists and
the Turkish secular state began in 1960, and continued through the
February 28, 1997 coup and its aftermath. The closure of Welfare and
Virtue parties from the National Outlook background had significant
influence over the development of the AKP in terms of organization and
political strategy.
Since 1970, Political Islamists have established six significant polit-
ical parties: (1) the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi—MNP)
(1970–1971); (2) the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi—
MSP) (1972–1980); (3) the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi—RP) (1983–
1998); (4) the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi—FP) (1997–2001); (5) the
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi—SP) (2001–2019); and (6) the Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP) (2001–2019).45
The main reason that the ideology of political Islam grew in Turkey
was that the secular state restricted and sometimes banned the religious
rights for its citizens for a long time. Muslims who were persecuted by
Kemalist rulers and secular elites due to their Islamic identity wanted to
save themselves from the oppression. Thus, they established their own
political parties on the basis of the ideology of political Islam.
In 1970, Political Islam emerged as a political movement under the
leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, who founded the Milli Görüş (the
National Outlook) movement. However, it was strongly scrutinized
by the Kemalist authorities. In 1971, Turkey’s military authorities shut
down the Party. Erbakan escaped to Germany but came back a year later
and founded the MSP. By joining the coalition government of Prime
Minister Bulent Ecevit, Erbakan obtained partial political power. He had
an opportunity to restore society to Islamic principles and religious life.
He wanted to reach Turkish communities in Europe by calling them to
identify themselves as Turkish-Muslims. He emphasized to “just order of
society” meaning to apply Islamic principles in the state.
22 R. DOGAN
During the 1970s, violence and political chaos were dominant in

Turkey for political groups were in constant fights against each other.
Thus, the Constitutional Court banned Erbakan’s MSP with the rea-
son that it threatened national security and unity. Party members were
prohibited from politics and they were sent to exile. Indeed, all Islamic
parties were under pressure, and they were banned or closed down on
several occasions. In spite of many negative experiences in the past,
Political Islamists have re-emerged in various guises.
The conflict between leftists and rightists in Turkey caused young peo-
ple to commit violence in the name of their ideology, which eventually
prompted the military to intervene in 1980 to restore order.46 In order
to combat communism and leftist ideologies, the military supported
Islamic education. Religious education became a compulsory subject
in all schools with the permission of the Turkish military, for the state
aimed to control the process of Islamization. The military hoped that by
permitting religious education under state control, they could defeat left-
ist ideologies and Islamic radicalism.
During this time, Erbakan established the Welfare party (Refah
Partisi) in 1983 and returned to the political arena. The way to polit-
ical power was cleared once again for Political Islamists. The ideology
of Turkish Islam was used by the state as a key determinant of Turkish
nationalism. Although the constitution defined Turkey as a secular state,
religious groups continued to expand their ideology. Turkey enjoyed reli-
gious and economic freedom under the ruling of Prime Minister Turgut
Özal.47 The reforms taken during his time allowed religious groups to
finance the construction of private schools and universities in Turkey.
This also opened up a political space for the followers of political Islam,
who expanded their influence through media outlets and newspaper
chains.48
Since 1970, Political Islamists under different names49 have been
advocating a new economic and social order based on Islamic principles.
They seek to return to traditional values and institutions. They regard
secularism as the biggest threat to Islamic culture.50 They argue that the
solution for Turkey’s problems is to return to Islamic principles and the
Muslim way of life. They stress the need for greater social justice and
equality.
In the early 1990s, Political Islamists under the leadership of
Necmettin Erbakan achieved success in the political arena by winning
19% of the vote and the mayor’s office in 28 municipalities, including
Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. They obtained political
power by focusing on social issues rather than religious themes. When
they came in first with 21.6% of the vote in the 1995 national elections,
the secular elites and the military felt great unrest and anxiety, for they
could not accept that the state would be run by an Islamist party. After
his success in the political arena, Erbakan started to advocate the Sharia
and criticized the secular system. He openly stated that the Sharia will be
back, and the only question was whether the process would be bloody or
not.
Instead of reducing social tensions, political Islamists polarized
Turkish society, leading the military and the MGK to present a list of
recommendations to curb anti-secular activity on February 28, 1997.51
Eventually, Erbakan had to resign in 1997 due to a postmodern coup,
and the Welfare Party was closed down in 1998. The military and sec-
ular elites imposed on society that religion could not be used to con-
solidate the nation. The postmodern coup indicated that religious
movements or political Islamists could not succeed in the political
arena by open agenda. This fact forced political Islamists to rethink
their strategy through intense internal debate. After the debate, polit-
ical Islamists were divided into two groups: the “traditionalists”
(Gelenekçiler), centered on Erbakan, and “reformists” (Yenilikçiler)
who chose Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the mayor of Istanbul, as their new
leader.
2.5 A State-Controlled Political Islam in Turkey

Religion has a great effect on society. Occasionally, Islam was used by
the Turkish state to maintain cohesiveness at times of political and social
instability and conflict. Turkey has witnessed many upheavals, conflicts,
polarizations, and disputes among various groups. In general, although
the secular state ignored Islam in politics, it did not hesitate to use it
to suppress national, political and social instability. The emergence of
Islamic movements in civil society created a need for them to be repre-
sented in the political arena. Thus, the state opened the way for Islamic
parties under its own control. This approach paved the way for the suc-
cess of the AKP in Turkish politics. The success of political Islamists in
Turkey has proven that Islam is an important element in Turkish society,
to the extent that they decide who will rule the country. Hence the AKP
is an Islamic party it continuously wins elections.
24 R. DOGAN
The main idea in a controlled-Islam is creating citizens who are

Muslims in their private lives but secular in the public arena. The Turkish
form of political Islam is controlled and disseminated by the state. It is
understood that Islam cannot be removed from society, thus, the state
aims to create the Turkish-Islamic synthesis in the public area first and
then in politics later. It is not surprising that the AKP has been ruling in
Turkey since 2002, for the state paved the way for its gaining power in
politics.
During times of unrest, the state focuses on Islam as a means to unite
the people of Turkey. By propagating its own version of Islam (Turkish
Islam) through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the state aims to
ignite nationalist-Islamic feelings. Currently, the AKP and Directorate
of Religious Affairs are working together to design the interpretation of
Islam in Turkey. In order to prevent radical groups or fanatic religious
movements, the secular state allowed the study of Islam in the educa-
tion system under its own control.52 By this strategy, the state hoped
that Islam was not left to radical groups. However, the current sit-
uation in Turkey proves the opposite. The inclusion of religiously ori-
ented parties into mainstream politics has caused the revival of radical
groups in Turkish politics. Unfortunately, the secular state represented
two extreme contradicting approaches: shutting down Islamic parties,
or allowing, supporting, and propagating them as a state politics. Both
approaches have failed.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Western leaders,
and in particular the United States, eagerly sought a group which could
represent moderate Islam, thus, the AKP became the main beneficiary
of this realignment. This approach provided an opportunity to politi-
cal Islamists to establish their own party and obtain continuous success
in the political arena. However, the United States and the west made a
mistake by deeming Erdogan and the AKP as representatives of mod-
erate Islam. The current situations in Turkey and the great support of
the AKP to ISIS terrorist group and other radical groups prove this
mistake.53 Indeed, Political Islamists of Turkey are strongly related to
radical groups all over the world. The AKP does not seem to be a coun-
ter-model to radical Islam in the Middle East for it becomes increasingly
radical and authoritarian.
Political Islamists of other countries fell prey to the misconcep-
tion that they would attain power throughout the Middle East just as
the AKP did in Turkey. The AKP differs from its Islamist counterparts
in Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, because Islamist parties in those countries

have had little experience of even being allowed to run in elections. After
13 years in power, Turkey’s Political Islamists are performing a wholesale
eradication of democratic values. The AKP’s main loyalties are its own
business cronies, especially in the media, construction, and mining sec-
tors. They believe that the silencing of every kind of political and social
opposition is entirely legitimate.54
2.6 The AKP and Rise of Political Islam

After being divided into two groups Political Islamists followed two
leaders; the traditionalists continued to follow Erbakan while reformists
chose a new leader for themselves Recep Tayyip Erdogan who was the
mayor of Istanbul. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was born
in 1954. His family was conservative and pious. Erdogan was sent to
the Istanbul Imam Hatip School (religious school), which set him on
course for a life of Islamic activism and politics, with an outlook marked
by anti-semitism, nationalist pride, and hostility toward foreign, espe-
cially Western, influences.55 Erdogan’s conservative, pro-Islamic profile
benefited from the ideological groundwork laid by the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood party. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) was
established by Erdogan from the ashes of the banned Welfare Party.
In breaking away from the Virtue Party, the AKP was able to follow
a populist style agenda that would serve the interests of the secular elite
and the party’s religious population. Erdogan declared that the AKP
would work to serve as a bridge between traditional and modernizing
Turkey. He defined the party as a group of conservatives whose agenda
propagated neoliberal economic policy and democratic reforms. Within
this framework the AKP protected itself from military and Kemalist
confrontation.
The AKP emerged at a time when two previous political Islamist par-
ties had been closed down by the Constitutional Court.56 The Kemalists
and secularists displayed their determination to eliminate any Islamic
party as well as their social and economic networks.57 Thus, the AKP
realized that it needed the west and the values of democracy and the rule
of law in order to defend itself against the Kemalist/secularist center.58
The adoption of a pragmatic strategy influenced the development and
strategy of the AKP. With a pragmatic approach, the AKP was able to
enter, survive, and prosper within the political sphere.
26 R. DOGAN
The reformists argued that the ideology of political Islam needs to be

changed in its approach, particularly toward democracy, human rights,
and relations with the West. The new party or the new form of political
Islamic ideology acted as if it was open to cooperation with the secu-
lar establishment and the west. Until obtaining a monopoly in power,
the Justice and Development Party (the AKP) emphasized democracy,
respect for human rights and the rule of law. The party advocated mem-
bership in the EU (European Union) to reduce the influence of the
military as well as to consolidate its own power.
The AKP officially endorsed these democratic norms and the goal of
EU accession through its support of the Copenhagen Criteria.59 But the
secularists perceived it as making a ground for political Islamists to con-
quer the state. The AKP used the pro-EU position to broaden its domes-
tic appeal and gain international approval. Without these tactics, the
AKP would be vulnerable to sharing the same fate as Virtue and Welfare
parties.
There were a number of reasons for the AKP elites to place a strong
emphasis on democracy and human rights as well as advocating EU
membership. First of all, if the party did not respect secularism it would
not have a chance of sustained and effective participation in the Turkish
political system.60 Moreover, the AKP needed the west and democracy to
defend itself against the radical secularists in the judiciary, at high levels
of the state bureaucracy, in the mainstream media and especially in the
military. In order to naturalize the power of the military in Turkish poli-
tics, the party regarded the EU as a natural ally.61 The possibility of mili-
tary intervention and fear of closure by the Constitutional Court shaped
the AKP’s strategies.
Realizing the advantages of speaking the language of modernity and
of integration with Europe, the AKP declared its priority as economic
stability, EU membership, democracy and human rights. In reality, this
was a tactical shift of political Islamists in their political strategy. In this
regard, Erdogan and the AKP restrained Islamic slogans and stressed
on common themes. They promised to continue Turkey’s cooperation
with the IMF, advocated the centrality of NATO and partnership with
the United States, they even declared Israel as an important partner to
Turkey’s national security.
Through their new approach and strategy, political Islamists increased
their power with the emergence of new economic and social forces in
Turkish society. They spread out their ideology in society through
personal engagement with secular business leaders, intense media efforts

and help for the poor. Furthermore, as a political strategy, Erdogan
stayed in prison for three months in luxury conditions to convince soci-
ety that he was persecuted due to his political opinions. He knew that
Turkish society would always support oppressed ones. So, Erdogan made
a good political investment by entering prison and acting as an oppressed
one.
The AKP’s conservative ideological position as a center-right posi-
tion was not only as a means of political survival, but also to broaden its
electoral bases. It continued to increase its vote share by winning 47%
of the popular vote and 340 seats in parliament in 2007 and 48.9% of
the popular vote and secured 327 seats in parliament in 2011. With its
three consecutive electoral victories, the AKP consolidated its power and
emerged as the dominant single party in the government. This changed
the political agenda of the AKP.
Since 2002 religion has been on the rise. Political Islam has become
more and more visible in the political arena in Turkey.62 Religion encom-
passes people’s values, aspirations, and their concerns for what is right
and wrong in this world.63 It has a direct relationship with culture, pol-
itics, economics, and social relationship. However, interpretations and
implementations may create huge differences in the depiction of Islam.
The AKP has been trying to combine Islam with its political ideology in
order to give meaning to life.
The AKP (Justice and Development Party) was originated from the
National Outlook Movement which had been led by Necmettin Erbakan
since 1970.64 It reflects the recognition of a group of politicians with
pro-Islamic background. The National Outlook regards the west as the
center of all evils. It argues that the west is corrupting, degenerating,
and destroying the national identity and Islam.65 Political Islam is tradi-
tionally built in opposition to the west and its values. Although the AKP
has Erbakan’s National Outlook origins, its leaders constantly denied
any connection with Erbakan’s Islamic agenda, because it was illegal to
form a party on the basis of religious ideas. Nevertheless, the ideology
of political Islam is deeply effective in the AKP’s deep-seated philosophy.
Previously, it functioned under the shadow of fear of the military and the
state bureaucracy, but its suppressed identity has emerged after removing
the secular and Kemalist threat.
Despite the AKP’s claim of being a conservative democratic party,
it has a political Islamist agenda and reconciled itself to operating
28 R. DOGAN
within the framework of Turkish secularism. Initially, it gave priority to

structural reforms and integration with the EU over a religious agenda,
but it merely represents a tactical shift in its political strategy. The AKP
realized the advantages of speaking the language of modernity and of
integration with Europe. The emphasis on democracy and human rights
enabled the AKP to protect itself against the secularists and Kemalists.
The AKP (Justice and Development Party) is Turkey’s experiment
with an Islam-based ruling party, which came to power in 2002 with
an overwhelming electoral majority. It was the center of curiosity with
regards to what an Islamic party would do when it has full govern-
mental control in a democratic and secular system. The success of the
AKP, the new representative of Political Islam in Turkey, in the last two
decades demonstrates the growing strength of political Islam and its
well-developed strategy.
Islam is an integral part of Turkish society, so it is an important ele-
ment in the political system. Knowing this fact, Political Islamists of
Turkey used Islamic concepts and slogans in order to be successful in
elections. Their rise to power did not occur against the secular state.
Despite the restrictions and exclusions of Islam from politics, religion has
played an important role in Turkish politics. Indeed, the complex rela-
tionship between Islam and the state has formed the unique nature of
political Islam in Turkey. It is not wise to think that the AKP won elec-
tions and continues to maintain its political power even though the sec-
ular state opposes it strongly. The increasingly authoritarian ruling party
seems to be a new project of the state which aims to design Turkish poli-
tics, economy, and social life.
Political Islamists developed significant financial and organizational
autonomy from the state but at the same time cultivated symbiotic rela-
tions with the state. Initially, they demonstrated considerable ability
to cooperate with secular political actors, and so many scholars praised
them for their ability to harmonize Islam with pluralism and democracy.
However, in recent years, their exclusionary behavior and a tendency
to compromise with authoritarian state structures blackened their dem-
ocratic contributions. Since 2013, Turkey has been undergoing a dras-
tic democratic reversal under the AKP government. It seems Political
Islamists, under the leadership of Erdogan, conquered the state under
the guise of democratizing it.
Although the AKP initially defined itself as a “conservative demo-
cratic party,” not as an Islamist party, the ongoing success in elections
and great public support has revealed its real agenda. It is crystal clear
now that the AKP benefitted from democracy until gaining undisputable
power in the state. Indeed, the AKP does not hide its anti-democratic
ideology and practices anymore. Democracy or the democratic approach
was a trick to deceive the secularists in the state, the west, and even
Islamic movements of Turkey which supported the AKP, believing that it
would democratize the state.
For political Islamists, it is more important who governs the state,
who controls it, and represents it rather than how to make the state more
responsive and accountable. Indeed, democratizing the state is a con-
tinuous process of social and political-institutional changes; therefore, it
cannot be actualized without having equal and democratic relationship
between the state and its people on the basis of accountability mecha-
nisms.66 After obtaining a monopoly in power, they covered up the cor-
ruption allegations by designing the state institutions according to their
own benefits. It seems they do not wish to be accountable while govern-
ing the state.
Turkey has been suffering long in its democracy journey, especially
due to a democratic reversal in recent years when the AKP has become
authoritarian through being singlehandedly run by Erdogan. The
absence of effective civil society mediation has contributed to the gov-
ernment’ oppressiveness during and after the pro-secular Gezi protests in
2013.67 The AKP interpreted this homegrown reaction against its heavy-
handed policies as a western-international conspiracy. Erdogan applied
the same strategy when major corruption allegations against the govern-
ment surfaced.
Erdogan promotes the idea that Turkey needs a super-presidential
system of government in order to make himself an untouchable sultan.
The ambition of Erdogan to superpowerful presidency has increased
the tension in Turkish society. After controlling the state institutions
and obtaining a monopoly in power, Erdogan uses the power of the
state against his opponents. He has created a tremendous fear in society,
because whoever opposes him, he/she ends up in jail.
Conquering the state from within as well as conquering its institu-
tions are deeply desired goals of Erdogan and the AKP. To the present,
they have achieved their targets in the state. A takeover of the state in
the name of Islamization is no more than making it an authoritarian
state in which the caliph exercises his superpower without being held
accountable. Political Islamists focus on nationalist themes and use the
30 R. DOGAN
notion of speaking for the nation to suppress the critics for their politics.
Additionally, they support religious groups in Turkey as well as in other
parts of the world to secure their power and maintain their political suc-
cess in general elections.
Although religious groups have been supported by political Islamists
through being provided advantages within the state, they have lost their
autonomy and freedom by developing symbiotic interdependencies
with the state. This is the main strategy of Erdogan to declare himself as
the caliph of all Muslims and guarantee their pledge of alliance to him.
Apparently, he deemed the Gülen movement as just a religious commu-
nity which could subordinate to his caliphate, but, when the movement
did not accept his demands, he declared it as his biggest enemy. Thus,
Erdogan waged a war against Gülen and his sympathizers to consolidate
his power and secure the way toward the super-presidential system of
government. In this regard, he periodically and methodically, has trans-
ferred and fired thousands of officials, taken on the movement’s educa-
tional institutions, usurped the wealth of businessmen who supported
the movement and put thousands of people in jail including women with
their little children and elder ones who are in their eighties. Currently,
the witch hunt against the Gülen movement members is unprecedented.
It is particularly puzzling that such a tragic situation followed the dec-
ade-long political alliance between the AKP and the Gülen movement.
Since 2013, the AKP has pursued a more aggressive form of politi-
cal Islam. It is no secret now that the party has aimed to achieve full
control of the executive and legislative branches of government. Political
Islamists want to appoint their men to all important institutions in the
state as they have a desire to change Turkish society with the Wahhabi
form of Islam. Although the Turkish form of Islam is more moderate
and pluralistic, the AKP and Erdogan chose the Wahhabi form of Islam
because it suits them better in terms of their authoritarian tendencies.
Although the EU agreement process validated the AKP’s presence
in politics, it required Turkey to acknowledge politically sensitive issues
such as cultural rights for the Kurds. Thus, the AKP chose not to actively
pursue or implement EU driven reforms as it did in the past. After con-
solidating its power by increasing its vote share, the party was able to
move away from EU reforms toward its own agenda. Turkey never suc-
ceeded in becoming a liberal democracy up to western standards.68
The EU’s unwillingness to accept Turkey as a full member
strengthened negative feelings against the west among many Turks.
Moreover, when the Arab uprisings occurred, Erdogan believed that

Turkey would be a regional leader and even a global power. In this
regard, he strengthened Turkey’s ties with Russia, as an alternative to
the EU. He privatized state-owned enterprises and implemented mas-
sive public and private construction projects. In the middle of Ankara,
he constructed his Palace, a 1100-room, $1 billion palace. During this
time, the massive protests happened against Erdogan and his party,
especially when he wanted to turn the Gezi Park in Istanbul’s Taksim
Square into a mall. However, Erdogan made it clear that he was ada-
mant to stay in power for good, using any means, including violence and
oppression.
Political Islamists have controlled the judiciary by appointing their
loyalists to this institution. They destroyed separation of powers in the
state by appointing their followers to all important positions in the state
institutions. Instead of reviving democratic institutions and the notion
of accountability, the AKP has grown increasingly authoritarian. It
has oppressed the media, restricted freedoms, and grown intolerant of
opposition.
Contrary to the expectations of many, President Tayyip Erdogan
made an authoritarian turn, for he has always lacked sufficient commit-
ment to liberal principles.69 Until 2011, his ambitions to be a super-
powerful president were prevented by the secularists and Kemalists. His
authority was balanced by some of the AKP elites and the Gülen move-
ment. However, after the 2011 electoral victory, Erdogan gradually elim-
inated these constraints and established a one-man rule based on populist
Islamism.70 Naturally, the AKP has authoritarian tendency as part of its
ideology. It has developed its own interpretation of Islam to legitimize its
politics. It tries to recreate modern codes of urbanity, civility, and univer-
salism, blending them with its own religious features.
In order to create an Islamic bloc, Erdogan uses Islamist rhetoric. In
1996, as mayor of Istanbul, he named himself “a servant of Shariah”
and the “imam of Istanbul.”71 The AKP’s efforts to Islamize the edu-
cational system and the judiciary, two strongholds of Turkish secular-
ism, indicate their true ideology. The AKP argues that people should be
able to express their Islamic identity in the state institutions. Their desire
for more freedom in expression of religious identity has turned into a
hidden pressure on nonreligious groups to act according to the party’s
ideology. For example, the headscarf for women and beard for men are
encouraged in Turkey now.
32 R. DOGAN
In recent years, the Turkish political system has been colonized

by political Islamists. They have reached a stage where they have been
developing an alternative intellectual model in order to establish their
hegemony. They have undermined the foundations of Turkey’s secu-
lar order; thus, the secularists often criticize them as the biggest threat
to the secular and nationalist nature of the Turkish state. The usage of
Islamic concepts such as sharia, ummah, caliphate, and Islamic state by
the political Islamists indicate that they are neo-Ottomanists. For exam-
ple, in order to increase his popularity among Muslims, Erdogan often
uses two issues: the Israeli Palestinian conflict and anti-Zionism.
The AKP’s politics are very much derived from Islamic lifestyles. The
party leadership participates in religious activities and aims to increase its
voter base by recognizing religious life in state and public life. Religious
identities, institutions, and networks are important in the continuous
success of the AKP. It can be argued that the AKP is a religious party
established by political Islamists and seeks regime change by implement-
ing its religious worldviews. Its main goal is Islamization of the state and
society.
Political Islamists interpret religion to create an Islamic state and
Shariah to lead and rule society with a political understanding. Their ide-
ology stands for an ideology derived from theology to shape politics and
society according to the values and rules of Islam, even imposing them
on the public.72 It is an attempt and specific way to rule and organize
society according to the ideology. Islamic political thoughts are shaped
and transformed by cultural factors, economic structures, and political
institutions in which they operate.73 Political Islamists of Turkey seek to
reconstitute identities, institutional structures, ways of life, and the moral
code of society through participating, influencing, or controlling cul-
tural, educational, and economic spheres.
Religious norms and issues have important place in its politics. The AKP
pursues Islamic politics by acting in conformity with the religious demands
and concerns of the people. It defines politics, the meaning of life, identity,
and community through Islamic values. It aims to institute Islamic law in
the political and social sphere and makes political claims on the basis of
religion. It is deeply involved in Islamic social ethics and cultural norms,
and stresses the religious values and interests of its pious electorate.74
Political Islamists have deep interest in religious rights in terms of
defending the freedoms of those who care about issues such as the head-
scarf, the Imam Hatip schools and Quranic study courses for primary
and high school students. They use Islamic language especially during
the elections in order to convert Islamic sentiments into votes. Islamic
identity plays a significant role in the worldview of many Turkish people
and this is the main reason why the AKP has been in power since 2002.75
Political Islamists of Turkey have been enriching their power under
the rule of AKP. Many opportunities in the state as well as in public
sphere are opened for them. They have now reached the higher eche-
lons of bureaucracy and become owners of large companies and media
groups.76 They have benefited much from the opportunities created by
the processes of globalization and integration with the EU in the last
decades. They strive for the revitalization of Islamic civilization to cope
with the west, and in this regard, they see Turkey as the center of the
Muslim world.77 They have anti-western feelings due to the memories
of the nineteenth-century Ottoman political experience, the First World
War and the War of Independence.
The AKP represents a political ideology for capturing power to shape
and direct the state, the society, and individuals. It desires to restore the
caliphate so it can unite Muslims under its banner. Erdogan’s leadership
and his diplomatic style, as exemplified in the Gaza crisis in 2008 and
in Davos in 2009, address Islamist aspirations and expectations to the
extent that he emerges as the most influential leader in the eyes of the
ordinary people in the Muslim world.78
Erdogan use religious concepts and Islamic slogans. He often begins
his remarks with Quranic citations to attract votes from Muslim popu-
lations. For example, he showed the Qur’an at public rallies during the
June 2015 electoral campaign. He does not hesitate to use religion as
political tool. While he was the mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan stated that
democracy is like a streetcar: you use it until you arrive at your desti-
nation, and then you step off. He even publicly criticized the statement
that sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the people. For him, sover-
eignty unconditionally belongs to God. He believes that a state cannot
be secular and Islamic at the same time, it is either an Islamic or a secu-
lar. He stated that thank God, I am for Sharia, one cannot be a secular-
ist and a Muslim at the same time, and for us, democracy is a means to
an end.79 It seems the AKP is not different from the previous political
Islamist parties in terms of ideology and worldview, but it is definitely
better than them with regards to camouflaging its real agendas.
Islam and religious communities have played an important role
in Turkish politics since the Ottoman period. Sufi masters and other
34 R. DOGAN
religious leaders formed congregations by their teachings. The AKP

always had close relations with these groups and tried to control them.
They know that without support of the religious groups they cannot
maintain their political power. Additionally, without destroying all oppo-
nents, the AKP cannot change the political system in Turkey. Thus,
Erdogan has close relations with religious groups, divinity schools,
Directorate of Religious Affairs, and other effective elements in Turkish
politics to secure his power and presidency. He has a strong desire to
control religious groups and affairs in Turkey. In order to obtain his
objectives, he has collaborated with religious scholars, community lead-
ers, religious groups, and the Directorate of Religious Affairs.
Notes
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2. Tibi, Bassam, Islamism and Islam (New Haven and London: Yale
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3. Voll, John O., “Political Islam and the State,” in The Oxford Handbook
of Islam and Politics, ed. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 56.
4. Tibi, Bassam, Islamism and Islam (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 2012), 1.
5. Esposito, John L., and Emad El-Din Shahin, “Introduction,” in The
Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, ed. John L. Esposito and Emad
El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1.
6. Said, Edward W., “Impossible Histories: Why the Many Islams Cannot Be
Simplified,” Harper’s Magazine 35 (2002): 69.
7. March, Andrew F., Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an
Overlapping Consensus (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011), 7.
8. Çınar, Menderes, “From Moderation to De-moderation: Democratic
Backsliding of the AKP in Turkey,” in The Politics of Islamism Diverging
Visions and Trajectories, ed. John L. Esposito, Lily Zubaidah Rahim, and
Naser Ghobadzeh (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave, 2018), 127–153.
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“Introduction: Theological Contestations and Political Coalition-
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Middle East Policy (June 2002): 61.
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influenced from the western culture with respect to industry, technol-
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36 R. DOGAN
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32. It was the third Islamic dynasty to succeed the Umayyad. It ruled Muslims
between 750 and 861. After that though lacking in political power, the
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The Case in East and Southeast Turkey,” Social Indicators Research 49,
no. 1 (2000): 83–113.
39. Rabasa, Angel, and F. Stephen Larrabee, Political Islam in Turkey (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute,
2008), 57.
40. Ahmad, Feroz, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye (1945–1980) (The Turkish
Experiment in Democracy) (İstanbul: HilYayın, 2007), 464.
41. Yılmaz, Murat, “Darbeler ve İslamcılık” (Coup d’états and Islamism), in
İslamcılık (Islamism) (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 632.
42. Karakoç, Sezai, Diriliş Neslinin Amentüsü (The Creed of the Reborn
Generation) (İstanbul: Diriliş Yayınları, 1979), 13.
43. “Ecevit Kayseri İçin Konuştu” (Ecevit Spoke for Kayseri), Milliyet, last
modified June 11, 1969.
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,
1039
Temperature of head in,
1036
1037
Trophic disturbances and disturbances of respiration,
1044
Vertigo in,
1034
Vomiting in,
1030
1034
Will, impairment of, and defects of speech,

1038
Treatment,
1066
Ergot, cannabis indica, and hyoscyamus, use,
1068
Leeches, use,
1068
Morphia and potassium bromide, use,
1068
Surgical,
1066
UMORS OF THE
S
PINAL
ORD AND ITS
NVELOPES
1090
Definition,
1090
Diagnosis,
1098
from caries of spinal vertebræ,
1099
from hysteria,
1100
from metallic and infectious diseases,
1100
from spinal congestion, hemorrhage, and meningitis,
1098
from traumatism, sclerosis, aneurism, and neuritis,
1100
localization of spinal tumors,
1100-1106
Duration and termination,
1106
Etiology,
1090
Age and sex, influence of,

1090
Traumatism, influence of,
1090
Pathology,
1096
characters, seat, and varieties of tumors,
1096-1098
vascular changes,
1098
Symptoms,
1091
Ataxia and atrophy in,
1094
Bladder, urinary and sexual disorders,
1096
Eye disorders,
1096
Headache in,
1096
Mental disturbances in,
1096
Pain, seat and characters,
1091
1092
Paralysis and paresis,
1091-1093
Reflexes, altered in,
1094
Sensation, alterations of,
1091-1093
Sense of constriction about waist,
1091-1093
Spasms and twitchings in,
1091
1092
1094
Temperature of body in,
1095
Vomiting in,
1096
Treatment,
1106
Tumors, phantom, in hysteria,
255
Turpentine, use of, in neuralgia,
1229
Tympanites, hysterical,
240
Typhoid fever as a cause of abscess of the brain,
799
of anæmia of the brain,
781
Typhus fever as a cause of hyperæmia of the brain,
768
U.
Ulcer of foot in tabes dorsalis,
839
Ulcerations in nervous diseases,
58
Ulcers, perforating, of the foot,
1273
Unconsciousness, in cerebral meningeal hemorrhage,
712
Unilateral catalepsy, symptoms,
324
epilepsy,
482
facial atrophy, progressive,
693
preponderance of symptoms in cerebral anæmia,
784
spinal paralysis,
1165
Urine, state of, in brain tumors,
1045
in cerebral hemorrhage and hemiplegia,
961
in chronic lead-poisoning,
682
in epilepsy,
480
in general paralysis of the insane,
195
in hysteria,
253
in myxœdema,
1272
in neuralgia,
1212
1213
in symmetrical gangrene,
1260
in tabes dorsalis,
835
in the chloral habit,
662
in the opium habit,

654
658
659
Uterine and ovarian irritation as a cause of reflex paralysis,
807
Uterus and ovaries, neuralgia of,
1240
V.
Vaginismus, hysterical,
246
Valleix's painful points in migraine,
408
Varieties of hystero-epilepsy,
290
Vaso-constrictors, action of,
1243
Vaso-dilators, action of,
1244
Vaso-motor cerebral disturbances in general paralysis of the insane,
179
disturbances in writers' cramp,
520
nerves, origin of,
1246
ASO-MOTOR
EUROSES
1242
Course,
1254
Diagnosis,
1252
Pathogenesis,
1242
Physiology,
1242
Local vascular tone in,
1242
Medullary centres in,
1250
Origin of the vaso-motor nerves,
1246
Vaso-constrictors,
1243
Vaso-dilators,
1244
Vaso-motor reflexes,
1248
Vaso-motor tracts,
1249
Prognosis,
1255
Symptoms,
1252
Acrodynia,
1254
Angio-spasm and angio-paralysis,
1252
Cutaneous angio-neuroses,
1252-1254
Digiti mortui and gangrene,
1252-1254
Erythromelalgia,
1253
Functional, derangements of internal viscera,
1254
Ruptured capillaries in,
1253
Sensation, disturbances of,
1252
1253
Taches cérébrales in,
1253
Treatment,
1255
Amyl nitrite and nitro-glycerin,
1256
Chloral hydrate and chloride of potassium in,
1256
Rest, massage, and electricity in,
1255
Vaso-motor and trophic neuroses,
1241
Definition,
1241
Reflexes,
1248
Symptoms of general paralysis of the insane,
189
Theory of pathology of hysteria,
211
Tracts of the spinal cord,
1249
Venous congestion in cerebral hyperæmia,
768
Ventricles of brain in cerebral anæmia,

Political Islamists In Turkey And The Gulen Movement 1St Ed 2020 Edition Recep Dogan full chapter pdf docx

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Political Islamists in Turkey and the

Gülen Movement 1st ed. 2020 Edition

Political Participation in Iran from Khatami to the

Islam and Muslim Resistance to Modernity in Turkey 1st

Women in the Kurdish Movement : Mothers, Comrades,

Activism, Change and Sectarianism in the Free Patriotic

Autistic Community and the Neurodiversity Movement:

Political Economy of Development in Turkey: 1838 –

Democratic Representation in Plurinational States: The

Coordination, Cooperation, and Control: The Evolution

More information about this series at

Middle East Today

Cover credit: Mikadun/shutterstock.com

Brisbane, Australia Recep Dogan

3 The Gülen Movement 41

4 From a Strategic Alliance to a Terrorist Organization:

5 Turkey’s Future Direction Under Erdogan’s Regime 105

6 The Political Theology of Political Islamists of Turkey 141

7 The Political Theology of the Gülen Movement 177

8 Conclusion: Comparison of the Two Groups 215

Aramco The Saudi-American oil company

OFAC The Office of Foreign Assets Control

© The Author(s) 2020 1

of the Gülen movement has been changed from a faith-inspired commu-

further in the succeeding years. At the beginning of its rule, Erdogan’s

his sympathizers to cast affirmative votes in the referendum and in

Political Islamists see Erdogan as the leader of the Muslim world;

Intelligence Organization (MIT) to closely monitor and report on the

alleged members had been indicted on charges of plotting to foment

2.1 Definitions of Political Islam

© The Author(s) 2020 9

and educational spheres. This book aims to explain the relationship

While Political Islamists have many goals, the ultimate one is

2.2 A Brief History of Political Islam

the ideology of Political Islam to protect Muslim identity and culture.

Some scholars such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) and

identity. He was deeply affected when witnessing how Islamic values

government which usurps God’s sovereignty. They aim to reach power

2.3 Various Types of Political Islam

Political Islamists do not believe democracy for they argue that it is

2.4 The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey

After the collapse of Ottoman, a number of ideological movements

related to it. Indeed, it is impossible for a true believer to reconcile

During the 1970s, violence and political chaos were dominant in

2.5 A State-Controlled Political Islam in Turkey

The main idea in a controlled-Islam is creating citizens who are

in Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, because Islamist parties in those countries

2.6 The AKP and Rise of Political Islam

The reformists argued that the ideology of political Islam needs to be

personal engagement with secular business leaders, intense media efforts

within the framework of Turkish secularism. Initially, it gave priority to

Moreover, when the Arab uprisings occurred, Erdogan believed that

In recent years, the Turkish political system has been colonized

religious leaders formed congregations by their teachings. The AKP

11. Denoeux, Guilain, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,”

25. Qutb, Sayyid, Ma’alim fi’l-Tariq (Damascus: Dar Dimashq, 1964), 201.

Temperature of head in,

Trophic disturbances and disturbances of respiration,

Will, impairment of, and defects of speech,

Aramco The Saudi-American oil company

OFAC The Office of Foreign Assets Control

2.4 The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey

2.5 A State-Controlled Political Islam in Turkey

2.6 The AKP and Rise of Political Islam

11. Denoeux, Guilain, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,”

25. Qutb, Sayyid, Ma’alim fi’l-Tariq (Damascus: Dar Dimashq, 1964), 201.