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FEDERALISM AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS
SERIES EDITORS: SOEREN KEIL · EVA MARIA BELSER

Power-Sharing in Europe
Past Practice, Present Cases,
and Future Directions
Edited by
Soeren Keil · Allison McCulloch
 Federalism and Internal Conflicts

Series Editors
Soeren Keil
School of Law, Policing and Social Sciences
Canterbury Christ Church University
Canterbury, UK

Eva Maria Belser

University of Freiburg
Freiburg, Switzerland
This series engages in the discussions on federalism as a tool of internal
conflict resolution. Building on a growing body of literature on the use of
federalism and territorial autonomy to solve ethnic, cultural, linguistic and
identity conflicts, both in the West and in non-Western countries, this
global series assesses to what extent different forms of federalism and ter-
ritorial autonomy are being used as tools of conflict resolution and how
successful these approaches are.
We welcome proposals on theoretical debates, single case studies and
short comparative pieces covering topics such as:
– Federalism and peace-making in contemporary intra-state conflicts
– The link between federalism and democratization in countries facing
intra-state conflict
– Secessionism, separatism, self-determination and power-sharing
– Inter-group violence and the potential of federalism to transform
conflicts
– Successes and failures of federalism and other forms of territorial
autonomy in post-conflict countries
– Federalism, decentralisation and resource conflicts
– Peace treaties, interim constitutions and permanent power sharing
arrangements
– The role of international actors in the promotion of federalism
(and other forms of territorial autonomy) as tools of internal con-
flict resolution
– Federalism and state-building
– Federalism, democracy and minority protection
For further information on the series and to submit a proposal for consid-
eration, please get in touch with Ambra Finotello ambra.finotello@palgrave.
com, or series editors Soeren Keil soeren.keil@canterbury.ac.uk and Eva
Maria Belser evamaria.belser@unifr.ch

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15730
 Soeren Keil • Allison McCulloch
Editors

Power-Sharing
in Europe
Past Practice, Present Cases, and Future Directions
Editors
Soeren Keil Allison McCulloch
School of Law, Policing and Social Department of Political Science
Sciences Brandon University
Canterbury Christ Church University Brandon, MB, Canada
Canterbury, UK

Federalism and Internal Conflicts

ISBN 978-3-030-53589-6    ISBN 978-3-030-53590-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53590-2

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
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electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
­institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: Westend61 / Getty Images

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Acknowledgments

Completing this book has been quite a journey. A project like this one is
the labor of many people, and we are ever so grateful for their hard work
and dedication. We are thankful to our authors and their invaluable con-
tributions, and also for their patience and their willingness to revise, amend
and develop their chapters once we had provided feedback. At Palgrave,
we would like to thank Ambra Finotello and Anne-Kathryn Burchley-­
Brun, who have supported this project from the beginning. We also thank
the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.
The original idea for this book came from a workshop in Brussels in
2018, organized by Timofey Agarin and the Exclusion amid Inclusion
research team on Political Representation in Diverse Societies. We are very
grateful to Timofey for bringing us together and laying the foundations
for this project.
Soeren Keil would like to thank his co-editor for the enjoyable work on
this book as well as his colleagues at Canterbury Christ Church University,
in particular Professor David Bates, Dr. Sarah Lieberman and Dr. Paul
Anderson. He would also like to thank Professor Jelena Dzankic for her
humor and support, Dr. Zeynep Arkan for being a wonderful friend, and
Professor Bernhard Stahl for endless discussions on foreign policy, EU
integration and good beer and food.
Allison McCulloch first would like to thank Soeren who has been an
excellent co-editor; it’s been a pleasure to work together on this project.
She would also like to thank Dr. Siobhan Byrne, Dr. Joanne McEvoy, Dr.
Cera Murtagh and Dr. Timofey Agarin: ongoing discussions and collabo-
rations with each continue to inform and enrich my understanding of

v
vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

power-sharing. Long-distance writing sessions with Dr. Jennifer Beaudry

were a source of motivation and inspiration.
We would both like to extend a special thank you to Aidan Trembath
who provided excellent research assistance.
As academics, we get to work with our colleagues all over the world,
share our thoughts and ideas and comment on each other’s work. While
doing this, we get to read and learn about new cases, and understand bet-
ter those cases familiar to us, all while also enjoying the possibility of writ-
ing and making our own contribution. Yet, working on projects such as
this book would not be possible without the support of our families.
Often, they carry the burden of living with an academic—who are notori-
ous for working long hours and becoming more anti-social as they get
older. We hope that we did not become more anti-social over the course
of editing this book, but we appreciate the time, the support, the cups of
tea, the biscuits, cakes and cookies and the love we have been given from
them during the process. Soeren Keil would like to particularly thank his
brother Andreas Keil and his family, his partner Claire Parker and their
daughter Malindi Parker as well as Thomas, Lilly and Athena for their
welcomed distractions and permanent need for love. Allison McCulloch
would like to thank her partner David Winter and their son Xavier
McCulloch for all their love and support. Josie and Fionn also provided
their own kind of support in the form of early mornings, long walks and
lots of treats.
Finally, we dedicate this book to some of the most important people in
our lives: the people who raised us and shaped our values, beliefs, work
ethics and commitment. None of this would be possible without our par-
ents, Peter and Regina Keil and Elizabeth and Ray Prevost.
 Contents

1 Introduction: Power-Sharing in Europe—From

Adoptability to End-Ability  1
Allison McCulloch

2 Consociationalism in the Netherlands: Polder Politics

and Pillar Talk 19
Matthijs Bogaards

3 Power-Sharing in Austria: Consociationalism,

Corporatism, and Federalism 43
Peter Bussjäger and Mirella M. Johler

4 The Politics of Compromise: Institutions and Actors

of Power-Sharing in Switzerland 67
Sean Mueller

5 Power-Sharing in Belgium: The Disintegrative Model 89

Patricia Popelier

6 Power-Sharing and Party Politics in the Western Balkans115

John Hulsey and Soeren Keil

vii
viii Contents

7 Toward Inclusive Power-Sharing in Northern Ireland:

Two Steps Forward, One Step Back141
Cera Murtagh

8 South Tyrol’s Model of Conflict Resolution: Territorial

Autonomy and Power-Sharing171
Elisabeth Alber

9 A Consociational Compromise? Constitutional Evolution

in Spain and Catalonia201
Paul Anderson

10 Why Has Cyprus Been a Consociational Cemetery?227

John McGarry

11 Conclusion: The Past, Present and Future of Power-­

Sharing in Europe257
Soeren Keil and Allison McCulloch

Index275
 Notes on Contributors

Elisabeth Alber is a senior researcher and program head at the Eurac

Research Institute for Comparative Federalism in Bozen/Bolzano, South
Tyrol, Italy. She researches on comparative federalism and decentral-
ization processes, territorial autonomies and minority rights, and
deliberative democracy and participatory constitution-making. As a
visiting scholar, she has worked in Germany, the USA, Spain, Australia,
Overseas France and North Macedonia. Most recently, she also acts as a
consultant for international organizations in Moldova, Ukraine and
Myanmar.
Paul Anderson is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at
Canterbury Christ Church University, UK. His main research interests
include territorial politics, autonomy and secessionist movements and fed-
eralism/decentralization as tools of conflict resolution. He is a co-lead of
the UACES Research Network (2020–2023) ‘(Re)Imagining Territorial
Politics in Times of Crisis.’
Matthijs Bogaards is a Associate Professor in the Department of Political
Science at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. He has
previously held faculty positions in Germany and the UK. His research
focuses on democracy in divided societies, regime change, political institu-
tions and terrorism.
Peter Bussjäger is a professor at the Institute of Public Law, State and
Administrative Science at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. He is also

ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

the head of the Institute of Federalism in Innsbruck and member of the

State Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein.
John Hulsey is Associate Professor of Political Science at James Madison
University, USA. Hulsey’s research focuses on party politics in divided
societies, state-building after civil wars, state capture, ethnopolitics, the
politics of the Balkans and of Eastern Europe, the politics of empire, and
the European Union. His work has been published in Democratization,
International Peacekeeping and Communist and Post-Communist Studies.
He holds a PhD from Indiana University Bloomington.
Mirella M. Johler holds degrees in political science and law from the
University of Innsbruck. She has worked in several scientific projects on
federalism and comparative constitutional law.
Soeren Keil is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Canterbury
Christ Church University, UK. He is also a visiting professor at Centre
International de Formation Europeene (CIFE) in Nice, France. His
research focuses on the use of territorial autonomy as a tool of conflict
resolution, the political systems of the Western Balkan states and the pro-
cess of EU enlargement. His recent publications include The
Europeanisation of the Western Balkans—A Failure of EU Conditionality?
(Palgrave 2019, co-edited with Jelena Dzankic and Marko Kmezic) and
Federalism and Conflict Resolution (forthcoming with Palgrave, co-
authored with Paul Anderson).
Allison McCulloch is Associate Professor of Political Science at Brandon
University, Manitoba, Canada. Her research considers the politics of
deeply divided societies, with a specific emphasis on the design of political
power-sharing (consociational) institutions. This includes how
power-sharing governments handle political crises, the incentive struc-
tures for ethnopolitical moderation and extremism that power-­sharing
offers, and how power-sharing arrangements can be made more inclusive
of identities beyond the ethnonational divide. She is the author of Power-­
Sharing and Political Stability in Deeply Divided Societies and co-editor of
Power Sharing: Empirical and Normative Challenges (with John McGarry).
John McGarry is Canada Research Chair in the Department of Political
Studies, Queen’s University (Kingston, Ontario, Canada). He is also the
Senior Advisor on Governance and Power-Sharing to the UN
Secretary-General’s Good Offices Mission in Cyprus. His research focuses
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xi

on the politics of deeply divided places and on how power-­sharing and

autonomy can be used as tools of conflict resolution. His recent publica-
tions include Power-Sharing: Empirical and Normative Challenges (2017,
co-edited with Allison McCulloch).
Sean Mueller is an assistant professor at the Institute of Political Science,
University of Lausanne. His position is funded entirely by the Swiss
National Science Foundation (‘Eccellenza’ grant, 2020–25). Before that,
he was a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Bern and editorial
assistant of the Swiss Political Science Review. He holds a PhD in Politics
and Government from the University of Kent/UK (2013) and an
MA from the University of Fribourg/CH (2006). His main research
areas are Swiss and comparative federalism as well as subnational
politics and multilevel governance more broadly.
Cera Murtagh is Assistant Professor of Irish Politics and Comparative
Politics at Villanova University in the USA. Her research concerns conflict
and peace and gender politics, focusing particularly on the mobilization of
civic political parties and movements in deeply divided societies. Her work
has been published in a number of journals including International
Political Science Review and Nations and Nationalism. Murtagh has previ-
ously worked as a research fellow at Queen’s University Belfast on an
Economic and Social Research Council project entitled Exclusion amid
Inclusion: Power-Sharing and Non-Dominant Minorities. She holds a
PhD and an MSc from the University of Edinburgh. She has also worked
as a political journalist in Edinburgh and political researcher in the Scottish
Parliament.
Patricia Popelier is Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of
Antwerp in Belgium and Director of the research group on Government
and Law. She is Vice-President of the International Association of
Legislation; convenor of the standing research group on subnational
constitutions in federal and quasi-federal systems of the International
Association of Constitutional Law; member of the scientific commit-
tees of EURAC—Institute for Federalism (Bolzano), Sofia Legal
Science Network (SLSN) and Ossevatorio AIR (Rome); co-promoter
of the interdisciplinary Centre of Excellence TRUSTGOV; and mem-
ber of several editorial boards, including the journal Theory and
Practice of Legislation (TPLeg) and the book series Law and Cosmopolitan
Values and Diversitas.
 List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Religious-linguistic cross-cuttingness at canton-level, 1900

vs. 2000 72
Fig. 4.2 Cross-cuttingness between wealth and culture, 2016/17 72
Fig. 4.3 Cross-cuttingness between urbanity, wealth and religion,
2016/1773
Fig. 4.4 Combined SVP and SP seat shares, 1919–2019. (Note: Own
figure based on data from the BFS 2019) 81
Fig. 11.1 Functional adaptation in European power-sharing cases 262

xiii
 List of Maps

Map 2.1 The Netherlands 20

Map 3.1 Austria 43
Map 4.1 Switzerland and its 26 cantons 67
Map 5.1 Communities and Regions in Belgium 89
Map 6.1 Western Balkans 116
Map 7.1 Northern Ireland 142
Map 8.1 South Tyrol 171
Map 9.1 Spain 201
Map 10.1 Cyprus 227

xv
 List of Tables

Table 4.1 The ten popular votes held at the national level in Switzerland
in 2018 77
Table 4.2 Government composition of the 26 cantons, September
2019 [seats] 79

xvii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Power-Sharing in Europe—

From Adoptability to End-Ability

Allison McCulloch

1   Introduction
The publication of a single-case study monograph on elite accommoda-
tion in the Netherlands—more than 50 years ago now—sparked what
would become one of the most enduring, contentious and debated
research programs in Comparative Politics and International Relations. At
the heart of The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in
the Netherlands, Arend Lijphart shows how the combination of three fac-
tors—the joint effort on the part of political leaders from different com-
munities to resolve conflict and maintain peace, the participation of the
leaders of all blocs in any such settlement, and the invocation of the prin-
ciple of proportionality in the substance of the settlement—worked
together to facilitate and maintain democracy amid division and pluralism
(Lijphart 1968: 111). While he did not apply the term ‘consociationalism’
to this mode of governance until subsequent publications, including a
World Politics article a year later (Lijphart 1969), Lijphart’s thesis has

A. McCulloch (*)
Department of Political Science, Brandon University, Brandon, MB, Canada
e-mail: mccullocha@brandonu.ca

© The Author(s) 2021 1

S. Keil, A. McCulloch (eds.), Power-Sharing in Europe, Federalism
and Internal Conflicts,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53590-2_1
2 A. MCCULLOCH

remained remarkably consistent over 50 years: “cooperation at the elite

level could overcome the conflict potential inherent in […] deep cleav-
ages” (2008: 2). Over time, this mode of government began to cohere
into precise institutional form to include the concurrent use of grand
coalitions, proportionality rules, veto rights and group autonomy provi-
sions (Lijphart 1977). Sharing power between majority and minority
groups through these four intersecting institutions, it is claimed, encour-
ages them to govern together with a “spirit of accommodation”
(Lijphart 1968).
Constitutional designers and external conflict mediators have tended to
support Lijphart’s starting assumption, seeing power-sharing as a pre-
ferred institutional strategy for mediating ethnic, linguistic, religious and
national divisions. While consociationalism may have originated as a
descriptive device to explain democratic stability in the Netherlands—and
later Switzerland, Austria and Belgium—it has, beginning in the 1980s
and especially since the 1990s, taken a distinctly prescriptive turn. A ‘new
wave’ of consociational cases—often emerging out of violent conflict and
adopted with international mediation support—appeared across Europe
and around the world (Taylor 2009). For those places where conflict ends
via negotiation and there are no clear victors, external mediators in par-
ticular see some form of power-sharing as being able to reconcile contrast-
ing norms of territorial integrity and self-determination, as enhancing
internal and regional security, and as promoting democracy and minority
rights (McCulloch and McEvoy 2018). At an empirical level, there appears
to be a power-sharing dividend: it supports the end of violent conflict, it
reduces group-based insecurities, and it supports minority inclusion in
democratic processes.
Not everyone agrees. Indeed, consociationalism remains hotly con-
tested today. These concerns are well-rehearsed elsewhere, but in brief,
they follow three main tracks:

1. Consociationalism is difficult to adopt: Majorities and minorities will

bring divergent institutional preferences to any negotiation on the con-
tours of the state with majority leaders favoring majoritarianism and
minority elites preferring consociation and other forms of power-shar-
ing. This inability to agree on what shape the state should take makes
consociational settlements “as rare as the arctic rose” (Horowitz
2002: 197).
 1 INTRODUCTION: POWER-SHARING IN EUROPE—FROM ADOPTABILITY… 3

2. Consociationalism has difficulty functioning: Consociation is often seen

as a dysfunctional form of democracy as it brings together disparate and
reluctant power-sharing partners, who may be divided not only by eth-
nicity, nationality, language or religion but also by ideology. This makes
the consensus that consociationalists seek very hard to find, with immo-
bilism, legislative deadlock and ethnic outbidding as more
likely outcomes.
3. Consociationalism is difficult to modify, and even harder to move beyond:
Consociation is often seen as “sticky,” that is, by locking in ostensibly
divisive identities, it is thought to block the transition to a more “nor-
mal” majoritarian politics. Parties are either not willing to change a set
of rules under which they benefit or, because they have so little in com-
mon in terms of how they envision the role of the state, they cannot
agree on new institutional arrangements. This implies an inability to
reform or exit consociational arrangements.

The ongoing debates over consociation, power-sharing and how to

design inclusive political institutions amid deep division thus remain as
salient today as they did 50 years ago. We contribute to these debates
through the application of a temporal lens on the past, present and future
of consociationalism in Europe. With these concerns front of mind, we
seek in this volume to query the performance of power-sharing in European
states across three dimensions: adoptability, functionality and what we
might call end-ability.

2   Power-Sharing from Start to Finish

Consociationalism represents a specific type of power-sharing institutional
design. Power-sharing is best employed as an umbrella term to capture
“those rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by
groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access
to state resources, among collectivities competing for power” (Hartzell
and Hoddie 2003: 320). Understood in this way, power-sharing includes
not only consociationalism but also federalism, another institutional
approach deployed in many of the European cases considered in this vol-
ume. Both consociationalism and federalism combine institutions of
shared-rule and self-rule, and both can take a variety of institutional forms.
The four consociational institutions can be designed either according to a
logic of predetermination or self-determination. Predetermined—or
4 A. MCCULLOCH

corporate—consociation “accommodates groups according to ascriptive

criteria, such as ethnicity or religion” (McGarry and O’Leary 2007: 675),
often in the form of ethnic quotas and reserved seats. Self-determined—or
liberal—consociation “rewards whatever salient political identities emerge
in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic or religious
groups, or on subgroup or transgroup identities” (McGarry and O’Leary
2007: 675). This includes the allocation of executive posts on the basis of
parties’ legislative seat-share, the use of qualified majority rules and opt-in
clauses for autonomy provisions.
Federalism, too, can appear in various institutional configurations.
Federations vary according to the number and composition of the sub-
units, the extent of competencies allocated to the subunits versus the
amount of power retained by the center, as well as by whether competen-
cies are allocated on a symmetrical or asymmetrical basis. Consociationalism
and federalism share a number of conceptual affinities but they remain
empirically distinct. Federalism often exists outside the consociational
framework, and not all consociations enact federal rules. While our pri-
mary focus in this volume is on consociational power-sharing, we also
consider the relationship between consociationalism and federalism in our
selected cases.
In this volume, we consider how consociationalism is adopted, how it
functions and how it ends (McCulloch and McEvoy 2020). To start, we
are interested in adoptability. By adoptability, we mean the conditions
under which parties agree to share power or come to see power-sharing as
an acceptable arrangement for mediating and resolving their collective dis-
putes (McGarry 2017). As noted above and as Paul Anderson and John
McGarry show in this volume (see Chaps. 9 and 10 respectively), getting
to consociational agreement is no small feat. Beyond the asymmetrical
preferences majorities and minorities might bring to the table, adoptabil-
ity also highlights how agreement on political institutions is only one of
many moving parts in a comprehensive settlement. That is, the acceptabil-
ity of power-sharing institutions is often contingent on the parties agree-
ing to other conflict-related matters; in Chap. 10, for example, McGarry
demonstrates in the case of Cyprus, it is the inability to resolve self-­
determination and security matters (such as the ongoing presence of
Turkish troops on the island) that contributes to holding up reunification
efforts. As McGarry notes in his chapter, “it is not just that a consociation
may need a comprehensive settlement that involves agreement on multiple
disputes, but [it is] how these other disputes are settled [that] will affect
 1 INTRODUCTION: POWER-SHARING IN EUROPE—FROM ADOPTABILITY… 5

the prospects for consociational adoption and maintenance.” To under-

stand why it is that consociation is difficult—but, it should be stressed, not
impossible—to adopt, we thus need to understand the adoptability of the
agreement itself, both in terms of the agreement’s constituent parts as well
as the wider environment in which power is to be shared.
We also consider the functionality of the different power-sharing sys-
tems in our selected cases. Functionality can be understood as the ability
to ‘get things done,’ a vital precondition for any institutional package. As
Joanne McEvoy and Eduardo Aboultaif (2020) suggest, “a functional
power-sharing system is one that proves useful for its intended purpose,
ostensibly to promote elite cooperation, help the state transition to
democracy and secure peace.” McGarry employs the term ‘performance’
in similar fashion, defining it as “the ability of consociations to be adopted,
maintained and to secure peaceful stability” (2019: 540). Functionality
assumes that power-sharing institutions work as intended and do not
experience regular legislative logjams or decision-making vacuums. A con-
cern with functionality gets to the heart of the debate over what a conso-
ciation is designed to do: keep peace or deliver democracy? Especially in
new-wave cases, consociationalism is often seen as a vehicle for ending
violence and securing peace. Yet, peace and democracy are connected. As
McEvoy argues, “if power-sharing governments are unable to provide suf-
ficient levels of good governance, the whole post-agreement edifice will
likely be at stake” (2017: 211). In other words, peace alone cannot be a
measure for the success of power-sharing, although it is vital for power-­
sharing to succeed at all.
While it has a reasonably strong track record at ending violence and
shoring up peace, there are reasons to be skeptical of consociational func-
tionality as it relates to democracy and good governance. Coalition-­
building between former adversaries can be a protracted process, and
parties, in the absence of trust, may lean on their veto powers, curtailing
the legislative agenda. Indeed, sometimes, consociation has been shown
to incentivize a brinkmanship-style politics, with parties seeking to extract
concessions from the other side (Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Jarstad
2008). This may result in legislative deadlock and other forms of immobil-
ism. Yet, at other times, consociation’s fear-reducing ability aligns with
politicians’ power-seeking nature to induce compromise. Consociationalism
offers a number of confidence-building measures which encourage parties
to take up their share of power and to remain in their governing posts and
6 A. MCCULLOCH

get on with the business of governing (Martin 2013; Mattes and Savun
2009; McGarry and O’Leary 2006).
Our volume highlights both moments of compromise and moments of
breakdown, sometimes within a single case. In Chap. 7, for example, Cera
Murtagh considers 20 years of consociationalism in Northern Ireland, the
trajectory of which is characterized by “crisis,” “setbacks,” “tumult” and
“staggered progress.” Yet, in likening the peace process to “two steps for-
ward, one step back,” she also sees “critical openings” for greater inclu-
sion, equality, and social justice amid crisis moments. The slow gains in
these areas are detailed in Chap. 7. The “two steps forward, one step
back” analogy will surely resonate with John Hulsey and Soeren Keil,
who, in Chap. 6, also see mixed performance in the consociational experi-
ences in the three Balkan states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and
North Macedonia. Seeing consociationalism as key to facilitating peace
after violent conflict, Hulsey and Keil nonetheless also expose its role in
limiting political competition and in enabling state capture. Indeed, the
cases considered in this volume suggest that consociation has a mixed
track record on functionality, with many contemporary systems—espe-
cially those adopted after violent internal conflict—persisting in a kind of
bounded instability whereby periods of political stability and the routines
of day-to-day governing are punctuated by grave moments of crisis and
brinkmanship, with a looming threat of institutional collapse or even
renewed violence. To understand why, we need to explore both the insti-
tutional design of power-sharing rules themselves as well as how such
institutional choices translate into political processes and outcomes in
divided settings.
How a consociational system is adopted and how it operates over time
is also connected to how it might eventually end. We thus also turn our
attention to the “end-ability” of consociationalism (McCulloch and
McEvoy 2020). By end-ability, we mean the ability of a polity to reform
its power-sharing rules and to move beyond such a system if and when the
governing partners agree to do so. A concern with end-ability stems from
an ongoing debate regarding consociational longevity. Whereas earlier
scholars, including Lijphart (1977) and Daniel Elazar, saw consociational-
ism as inherently flexible—with Elazar arguing about consociationalism
that “these processes are subject to change with relative ease when the
conditions that generated them change” (1985: 23)—others suggest an
inherent ‘stickiness’ to the system. As Donald Horowitz suggests, conso-
ciational rules “tend to rigidify conflicts and do not lend themselves to
 1 INTRODUCTION: POWER-SHARING IN EUROPE—FROM ADOPTABILITY… 7

renegotiation. Most agree that consociational institutions, once estab-

lished, are sticky” (Horowitz 2014: 12). John Nagle (2019) offers a more
colorful analogy for how consociationalism can get stuck by introducing
the concept of “zombie power-sharing.” As he sees it, in many places,
including Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Bosnia, consociationalism has
“long since ceased functioning in a way healthy to the body politic, but yet
it somehow remains dominant.” This ‘zombification,’ he suggests, means
“it is almost impossible to change, reform or accommodate new policies.”
The cases considered in this volume illuminate both sides of this debate.
In Chaps. 2 and 3, Matthijs Bogaards and Peter Bussjäger and Mirella
M. Johler demonstrate, respectively, the gradual transition away from con-
sociationalism in the Netherlands and Austria. By contrast, Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s experiences at the European Court of Human Rights
embody the concern expressed by Horowitz and others regarding a lack
of exit from consociationalism (Boldt 2012; Agarin et al. 2018). Repeated
rulings from the court suggesting the rules for the tripartite presidency
and House of Peoples, both of which require ethnic affiliation with one of
the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats), were discrimi-
natory have done little to move the country away from strict corporate
consociation rules. The early consociational experience in Cyprus, dis-
cussed in Chap. 10, demonstrates a worst-case scenario, with violence,
occupation and partition following the collapse of the power-sharing gov-
ernment in 1963. To understand why and when consociation is difficult to
reform, modify or end, we need to explore the social, political and institu-
tional conditions under which reforms—or indeed, peaceful exit—are
considered feasible.

3   Organization of the Book

In this volume, we are interested in two broad questions, which we have
selected in order to provoke theoretical and empirical insights about
power-sharing in Europe:

• How do consociations come in and out of being?

• How do consociations work, that is, how do they resolve political
crises and other forms of deadlock between power-sharing partners?

We take up these questions through a series of country case studies, all

from the European continent, organized in loose chronological fashion.
8 A. MCCULLOCH

In Part I, we consider past cases of consociation (Netherlands, Austria), in

Part 2, we consider contemporary consociations (Belgium, Switzerland,
the Balkans, South Tyrol and Northern Ireland), and, in Part 3, we turn
our attention to possible future cases (Cyprus and Spain). Europe is an apt
focal point for such an inquiry. First, Europe represents the so-called
birth-place of consociational theory as a research program. Starting with
the four ‘classic’ cases of consociationalism—the Netherlands, Austria,
Switzerland and Belgium—exploration of European cases has set out
many of the propositions still being tested today, including on questions
of adoptability, functionality and end-ability. This is also true of the ‘new
wave’ cases in which Northern Ireland, Bosnia and North Macedonia fac-
tor large, but where conditions are notably different from the classic cases.
A focus on European cases allows us to consider whether the same theo-
retical propositions about how consociation ‘works’ still hold in new cases
as compared to the classic cases. Second, while consociational systems are
found all around the globe, there is a high concentration of consociational
cases in Europe. This allows us to highlight how and why the cases con-
verge or diverge, while holding other case attributes constant. This is not
to suggest that consociation is necessarily or distinctly European but a
specific focus on these cases allows us to isolate and identify those factors
that help to explain consociational performance at distinct stages, includ-
ing adoption, function and exit.
Further, a focus on these cases allows us to investigate the relationship
between types of power-sharing, namely between consociationalism and
federalism. With the exception of the Netherlands, all the cases considered
in this volume entail some degree of territorial autonomy. This takes a
variety of forms, including devolution to a region where power is then
shared (e.g., Northern Ireland, South Tyrol), federal systems of govern-
ment (Austria, Bosnia, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain and as proposed in
Cyprus), and decentralization processes in municipalities where national
minorities become local majorities (North Macedonia, Kosovo). The rela-
tionship between territorial autonomy, federalism and consociationalism,
we suggest, is far from straight-forward. Consociationalism and federalism
can, at times, work in tandem to support a politics of accommodation and
compromise while at other times they make it difficult to reach agreement,
even lowering the costs of non-agreement, thus affecting functionality
prospects (see Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2015: 279).
We start, in the first part of the book, with two countries that were early
adopters of consociational processes but which have both since moved
 1 INTRODUCTION: POWER-SHARING IN EUROPE—FROM ADOPTABILITY… 9

on—at least institutionally—toward other forms of power-sharing or con-

sensus democracy. In Chap. 2, Matthijs Bogaards suggests that there are
two stories to tell about the Netherlands, one about the rise and fall of
consociationalism and one about the “allegedly emancipative power of
pillars.” As to the second story, Bogaards contrasts the skepticism of pil-
larization in American political science with a decidedly more favorable
understanding of it in Dutch sociology, showing how these competing
perspectives played out in relation both to de-pillarization and to the pros-
pect of an ‘Islamic pillar’ in the 1990s. Bogaards’ analysis suggests a need
to re-evaluate the role of pillarization in consociational theory. As to the
first story, he suggests that there is no clearly delineated end-date to Dutch
consociationalism—that is, “no mirror of the Pacification of 1917.” Rather
than a wholesale and immediate transformation of the system, there was a
gradual transition away from consociationalism, prompted in part by de-­
pillarization. A similar process plays out in Austria, where, while the high-
water mark of consociationalism between 1945 and 1966 is easier to
identify, the actual decline of consociational policy-making occurred grad-
ually from the 1960s into the 1980s. In Chap. 3, Peter Bussjäger and
Mirella M. Johler detail Austria’s experience with “multi-dimensional
power-sharing” by tracing the interconnections between consociational-
ism, federalism and corporatism. They explain the ability of consociation-
alism to give way to a more competitive style of politics through these
interconnections, in particular demonstrating how the federal power-­
sharing structure served as a kind of institutional safety net allowing politi-
cal elites to move beyond the post-war ‘grand bargain.’ Both cases seem to
recall early theorizing on how consociationalism can help to develop “suf-
ficient mutual trust at both elite and mass levels to render itself superflu-
ous” (Lijphart 1977: 228). What Bogaards and Bussjäger and Johler show
in these cases is that this unfolded in a gradual, evolutionary fashion.
While the Netherlands and Austria give some credence to the ability to
move beyond consociationalism, their experiences may be less generaliz-
able to the contemporary period. Given that consociationalism has not
proven to be the “transient arrangement” anticipated in early consocia-
tional theory (Elazar 1985: 31), new-wave cases may have more to learn
from places such as Switzerland, where power-sharing has successfully
adapted to new challenges and to shifting political and societal circum-
stances, than from the Netherland and Austria, where consociationalism
proved temporary. Indeed, the cases considered in Part II have all had
extended periods of consociational practice, but none show immediate
10 A. MCCULLOCH

signs of abandoning their power-sharing systems. In Chap. 4, Sean Mueller

provides a comprehensive overview of power-sharing politics in Switzerland.
Like Austria, power-sharing in Switzerland is multi-­dimensional; as Mueller
explains, it is hard to find a Swiss institution that does not share power in
one form or another. Combining consociationalism, federalism, direct
democracy, bicameralism and a distinctly Swiss-style of collegialism, Swiss
power-sharing is the product of both ‘grand design’ and evolutionary
practice. Rather than presenting as ‘sticky,’ there appears to be a kind of
inherent flexibility to the Swiss system, with Mueller highlighting key
moments of power-sharing reform. While power-­sharing broadly has its
origins in the promulgation of the 1848 constitution, the system has
proven adaptable, with new rules introduced at various points, including
in 1874, 1891, 1918, 1959 and 2003. Thus, unlike in Austria and the
Netherlands, where consociationalism was able to gradually fade away,
power-sharing in Switzerland has proven remarkably resilient and adaptive.
If and when “de-consociationalization” (Helms et al. 2019) comes to
Switzerland, it is unlikely to entail the abandonment of power-sharing writ
large. As with Austria, federalism and collegialism provide an institutional
safety net for ensuring broad inclusion of the different linguistic, ideologi-
cal and territorial communities (though, it must be said, not everyone is
able to partake of this inclusion, with 25% of Swiss residents unable to gain
citizenship and voting rights). Any threat to collegial decision-making
comes instead from the “double polarization” of the party system, with
recent elections showing not only the left and right poles gaining in elec-
toral strength but also widening in distance from one another. The more
ideologically polarized the party system, the more difficult it becomes to
reach consensus in government. How adaptative Swiss power-sharing will
be in the face of these new developments remains an ongoing process.
Whereas federalism has functioned as an institutional safety net in
Switzerland and Austria, the same cannot be said for Belgium. Here, not
only has the country become more consociational and federal over time,
federalism and consociationalism also threaten to work at cross-purposes.
This is what Patricia Popelier demonstrates in Chap. 5. As she sees it, the
Belgian federal structure “both reinforces and undermines the consocia-
tional regime.” Federalism’s mandate of self-rule and group autonomy,
she explains, “reinforces regional identity, committing citizens to one
group or another.” While this should support consociational decision-­
making, it instead takes away “the will to cooperate and compromise.” A
combination of decentralist dynamics and anti-consociational sentiment
 1 INTRODUCTION: POWER-SHARING IN EUROPE—FROM ADOPTABILITY… 11

has thus brought Belgium to the brink of dissolution. Nonetheless,

Popelier shows that Belgium remains “viable” as a unit, but only at the
cost of complexity. Compounding these centrifugal tendencies, however,
has been the rise of party polarization with growing support for the far
right in Flanders and far left in Wallonia. As in Switzerland, it risks becom-
ing difficult to make consociation work with parties attempting to co-­
govern across multiple divides, including ethno-linguistic, territorial and
ideological cleavages.
Tensions between federalism and consociationalism also play out in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which rivals Belgium in terms of its institutional
complexity. As John Hulsey and Soeren Keil see it in Chap. 6, it is the
combination of strict corporate consociational power-sharing rules and a
radically decentralized federal system that serves as a barrier to political
change in Bosnia, especially as it concerns the composition of coalition
governments at the state-wide level. Conceding that consociationalism
helped to end the war and to keep the peace over the last 25 years, they
nonetheless worry that it has also shaped political competition “in ways
that discourage accountability through alternation in power.” They sug-
gest that the shape of the federal structure (which divides the country into
two Entities, Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and further devolves power to ten cantons in the Federation,
all held together loosely by a central state with minimal competencies) is
partly to blame. The federal apparatus makes it difficult to form state-level
governing coalitions without the support of major ethnic actors from the
entities and cantons, thus reinforcing the ethnic status quo and stifling
competition. They observe a similar process in Kosovo, where open com-
petition, at least in the Serb community, is undermined. There, the corpo-
rate rules on Serb representation in Kosovo’s central state institutions
combines with autonomy provisions for Serb enclaves to put the ethnic
Serb party, the Serb List (Srpska Lista), at a double advantage: the party is
able to both dominate the reserved seats at the center and control political
processes in North Kosovo. The Serb List consequently has few rivals,
leaving Kosovar Serbs with little to no electoral choice other than the List.
Hulsey and Keil are slightly more optimistic about the state of political
competition in North Macedonia where party turnover in coalition gov-
ernments is more frequent. They attribute this to North Macedonia’s
more liberal consociational rules and to its comparatively low degree of
decentralization. As they argue in Chap. 6, “liberal consociationalism
might not only be better for non-ethnic groups and identities to find
12 A. MCCULLOCH

accommodation in the system, but it might also increase competition

within ethnic groups and thereby offer a balance between the need for
inclusion and power-sharing amongst groups on the one side and party
competition and voter choice on the other side.” Alongside these con-
trasting institutional choices in the three cases, Hulsey and Keil also
acknowledge that the extent of violent internal conflict has some explana-
tory value for consociational functionality. North Macedonia, while not
immune to the violence that accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia, was
able, unlike Bosnia and Kosovo, to avoid the worst manifestations of it.
This also helps to explain North Macedonia’s more flexible form of con-
sociational power-sharing. Especially in the wake of violent conflict and
profound mistrust, parties are liable to seek corporate guarantees of their
share in power, as they did in Bosnia and Kosovo; in the absence of pro-
tracted violent conflict, liberal rules may suffice, as they have done in
North Macedonia (McCulloch 2014).
Internal violent conflict has also played a significant role in Northern
Ireland, both in terms of bringing the region to consociationalism as a way
to end its 30-year armed conflict, but also in terms of influencing its func-
tionality over time. More than 20 years on from the signing of the Good
Friday Agreement, as Cera Murtagh explains in Chap. 7, progress, by
which she means the ability of the system to facilitate broad inclusion
beyond the main groups to the conflict, remains “far from unidirectional”
and “vulnerable to regression.” The legacy of the conflict looms large,
with major sticking points between the parties relating to how to deal with
the past, from arms decommissioning and the release of political prisoners
to the establishment of independent commissions to investigate Troubles-­
related deaths (e.g., the Historical Investigations Unit or the Independent
Commission on Information Retrieval) (for more on independent com-
missions, see Walsh 2017). Cultural issues related to the conflict, includ-
ing flags and parades, also remain contentious. But as Murtagh evaluates,
“amidst the tumult, there have been advances,” such as the completion of
arms decommissioning, the devolution of justice and policing and more
recent advances on cultural and moral issues, such as the extension of mar-
riage equality and abortion rights, bringing the region into legislative line
with the rest of the UK as well as the Republic of Ireland. Symbolic ges-
tures have also been forthcoming, including Sinn Féin’s Martin
McGuinness shaking hands with Queen Elizabeth and the Democratic
Unionist Party’s Peter Robinson and Arlene Foster attending Gaelic
Athletic Association games. Importantly, there has been a willingness to
 1 INTRODUCTION: POWER-SHARING IN EUROPE—FROM ADOPTABILITY… 13

use crisis moments to open the door to institutional reforms, including

modifications to the method for electing the First Minister and deputy
First Minister, reducing the total number of executive portfolios and seats
in the Assembly, creating an official opposition and restructuring of the
Petition of Concern veto mechanism (Murtagh and McCulloch 2019).
While many of these reforms necessitated a willingness to cooperate on
the part of the power-sharing partners, political changes of this magnitude
have also been assisted by Northern Ireland’s status as a regional consocia-
tion. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the local parties could arrive at some
of these decisions without the well-timed and constructive mediation
efforts of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, who, as co-­
guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, have a clear stake in support-
ing power-sharing in the region. The two governments have used their
powers as co-guarantors to convene and mediate inter-party talks to facili-
tate dialogue, defuse tensions and redirect energies toward crisis resolu-
tion (McCulloch and McEvoy 2019). It is not that the stakes are low in
regional consociations; rather, they are able to deploy a set of deadlock-­
breaking mechanisms not always available to other consociations. That is,
in some regional consociations, the wider state can operate in a mediatory
capacity if and when the regional power-sharing partners find themselves
in a stalemate.
South Tyrol represents another regional consociation where the “ter-
ritorial scale of the arrangement” helps to facilitate cooperation between
communities (Wolff 2004). South Tyrol is heralded as a consociational
success story by both scholars and practitioners. In Chap. 8, Elisabeth
Alber outlines three factors for this success: mutual trust, time and adapt-
ability. As she explains, “creating mutual trust takes time. Even in the
presence of favourable conditions, as in the case of South Tyrol, it took
much more time than expected to implement the detailed autonomy and
power-sharing arrangements.” In addition to the time it takes to build
trust, time is also critical for the development of institutional capacity,
especially in the context of linguistic differences. As she notes, the system
has to manage the logistics of a trilingual public sphere, necessitating, for
example, translating German terminology into Italian legal codes and
training civil service personnel in German, Italian and Ladin.
Adaptability, meanwhile, which Albers defines as “the institutional and
procedural capacity of a system for adaptive evolution,” remains an ongo-
ing process in South Tyrol. Despite the corporate consociational features
of its power-sharing system, Alber sees the system as both internally and
14 A. MCCULLOCH

externally adaptive, though, as she admits, the time may have come for
further adaptation. A novel attempt at “participatory consociational-
ism”—the establishment of an Autonomy Convention that carried out its
work over 2016–2017 and which sought input from citizens, civil society
and politicians—highlighted the challenges of adaptability. It showcased
both the willingness of the different communities to come together in
deliberative forums in search of a common vision for the region but also
the extent to which that shared vision remains at least somewhat elusive.
Indeed, divergent opinions remain across a range of salient issues, includ-
ing the institutional framework itself, with German-speakers preferring
expanded institutional competences for the province and Italian-speakers
preferring a relaxation of the proportionality rules (Larin and Röggla
2019). The lessons Alber outlines from South Tyrol could well be read as
a dictum for the other cases considered in this volume and yet, as our
authors demonstrate, trust, time and adaptability are often in short supply
in divided places.
Looking toward the future, what might the cases considered in Part III
learn from the experiences of past and present consociations? Could, for
example, a regional consociation be in the cards for Catalonia? Paul
Anderson, in Chap. 9, does not seem too optimistic about such prospects,
suggesting that it is currently “outside the realm of feasible solutions to
the constitutional impasse.” If we understand adoptability as “the extent
to which the groups support the establishment of a power-sharing polity”
(McEvoy and Aboultaif 2020) then Anderson is right to be pessimistic. As
he explains, consociationalism requires an elite willingness to make it
work, a willingness largely absent in the Spanish state. The Spanish gov-
ernment maintains a hostility to plurinational solutions to the conflict, at
least in part out of a fear of a cascading effect amongst the other autono-
mous communities. Whereas the UK and Italy eventually came around to
accepting power-sharing solutions for Northern Ireland and South Tyrol,
respectively, the same cannot—yet?—be said for Spain. Nor does Catalonia
have a kin state to help encourage the parties toward power-sharing, as the
Republic of Ireland and Austria were able to do for the other regional
consociations considered in this volume (though it should be noted that
not all kin states play a conducive role in conflict settlement, as experiences
in the Balkans highlight). A third unfavorable factor relates to the diver-
gent opinions on independence within Catalonia itself. For Catalan sepa-
ratists, consociationalism risks being too integrationist and signaling defeat
for the independence project. For those who reject independence, conso-
ciationalism represents too strong a medicine. If consociationalism is not
 1 INTRODUCTION: POWER-SHARING IN EUROPE—FROM ADOPTABILITY… 15

at the top of any of the parties’ institutional wish lists, what might a con-
sociational lens offer for breaking the constitutional impasse? As Anderson
proposes, the parties would benefit from some movement in the direction
of consociational philosophy, even if the actual remedy falls short of con-
sociation itself. This may mean moving toward a more plurinational fed-
eration, one that might involve asymmetrical powers for those who seek
them, or a return to consensus democracy, but with the addition of more
deliberative democratic features, as a way to reinvest Catalan separatists
into the Spanish governing structure. Anderson’s chapter offers important
insights into the challenges of adoptability, where even seeing power-­
sharing as a viable option remains a formidable hurdle.
The challenge of adoptability plays out differently—but no less
acutely—in Cyprus. While Cyprus embodies the typical demographic sce-
nario seen as unconducive to consociational adoption—a bipolar divide
with a very large majority community—as John McGarry explains, the
Greek Cypriots’ reluctance to agree to a power-sharing deal goes beyond
demographic calculations. As he notes in Chap. 10, “no party in Cyprus,
Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, has ever sought to conclude a power-­
sharing deal without a comprehensive settlement.” Instead, reaching a
comprehensive settlement to reunify the two parts of the island also
requires reaching agreement on other core issues, including security, self-­
determination and property restitution and a perception that—decades
after de facto partition—any reunification deal on the table has to be “bet-
ter than the status quo.” Here, it is not just agreement on the contours of
the power-sharing relationship that continues to challenge adoption;
instead, it is the circumstances under which such an agreement becomes
viable that holds up the process.
Beyond highlighting the challenges of adoption and adoptability,
Cyprus also offers stark lessons about functionality and, unlike in the
Netherlands and Austria, how consociational experiments can come to an
abrupt and violent, rather than peaceful and gradual, end. The early
attempt at consociational power-sharing between 1960 and 1963, also
covered in Chap. 10, was widely seen as ineffective—as McGarry notes,
the words most frequently used to describe it include ‘dysfunctional’ and
‘unworkable.’ The reasons are layered: it was an agreement imposed on
the local actors, reflecting the power balance between Turkey and Greece,
rather than between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; it enacted a
form of dis-proportional representation and strong veto powers for
Turkish Cypriots, to which the Greek Cypriots were opposed; and it was
16 A. MCCULLOCH

implemented alongside competing goals of security and self-­determination,

most manifestly in terms of enosis and taksim. This early experience offers
an important lesson for contemporary attempts to revisit consociational
processes in Cyprus (and elsewhere): weak adoptability (e.g., “when one
or more of the groups have less than majority support for the deal”) begets
dysfunctionality, even if the adoption problem can be overcome (McEvoy
and Aboultaif 2020). Dysfunctional outcomes, in turn, risk the abrupt and
possibly even violent end to power-sharing. Adoptability, functionality and
end-ability are, ultimately, intimately related.
In what follows, the authors trace the ups and downs of sharing power
in their respective cases. They point to a range of variables affecting power-­
sharing adoption, including: the acceptability of consociationalism
amongst would-be power-sharing partners; the wider set of issues and
grievances power-sharing is meant to address; and the role of external
actors in imposing or supporting such adoption. They also consider the
range of factors that affect power-sharing functionality, not least of all the
conditions under which it comes to be adopted. Other factors affecting
performance include the role of violent internal conflict; the relationship
between consociationalism and other institutional responses, especially
territorial ones, such as federalism and regional consociations; and the
design of the rules themselves, especially whether they hew toward liberal
or corporate manifestations. Indeed, the distinction between liberal and
corporate consociation matters not only for the extent of political compe-
tition the system can support, as Hulsey and Keil demonstrate in Chap. 6,
but also for the extent of inclusion for “women, gender minorities, sexual
minorities, racial and ethnic minorities and linguistic minorities not
included in power-sharing pacts and those who simply do not identify with
the main ethnic groups or with ethnicity at all” (Murtagh, Chap. 7).
Finally, the chapters also illuminate how consociationalism ends, some-
times abruptly, sometimes gradually, how sometimes power-sharing gets
‘stuck’ with parties seemingly unable to move beyond—let alone reform—
it, and how modifications to the existing rules can sometimes support
more functional power-sharing over the long term. These lessons are
recapped by Soeren Keil and Allison McCulloch in the conclusion (Chap.
11). We may not definitively resolve debates more than 50 years in the
making, but the chapters that follow offer careful and nuanced analysis of
the complexities of power-sharing across a wide range of European cases,
adding more theoretical and empirical evidence to our collective under-
standing of how consociations come in and out of being and how
they function in practice.
 1 INTRODUCTION: POWER-SHARING IN EUROPE—FROM ADOPTABILITY… 17

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Democracy after Civil Wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict.
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 CHAPTER 2

Consociationalism in the Netherlands:

Polder Politics and Pillar Talk

Matthijs Bogaards

M. Bogaards (*)
Department of Political Science, Central European University,
Vienna, Austria
e-mail: BogaardsM@ceu.edu

© The Author(s) 2021 19

S. Keil, A. McCulloch (eds.), Power-Sharing in Europe, Federalism
and Internal Conflicts,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53590-2_2
20 M. BOGAARDS

Map. 2.1 Map of the Netherlands. Source: https://d-maps.com/carte.

php?num_car=4114&lang=en

1   Introduction
The Netherlands is the first case of consociationalism. It was the first
country where cooperation among political elites was identified as a cru-
cial factor in maintaining a stable system in a divided society, making
democracy possible. And, if the so-called Pacification of 1917 is viewed as
 2 CONSOCIATIONALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS: POLDER POLITICS… 21

the starting point, it is also the first country in modern history to become
consociational, predating other classic cases such as Austria, Lebanon, and
Switzerland. For these reasons alone, much can be learned from an analy-
sis of the origins, functioning, challenges, and transformation of consocia-
tionalism in the Netherlands.
This chapter has two stories to tell. The first is about politics: the rein-
vention of traditions of compromise and tolerance, the staying power of
consensus institutions, and the phenomenon of “polder politics,” described
as “an institutional structure and a spirit of peaceful deliberation aimed for
consensus in which all parties are more or less equal, do not force a one-­
sided conclusion and pragmatically acknowledge (societal) pluriformity”
(Te Velde 2010: 206).1 A relatively recent term from the 1990s, “polder
politics” is used by some to complain about backroom dealing, slow
decision-­making, and the inability to push through what are deemed badly
needed reforms, and by others to celebrate a non-adversarial style of policy
making (Hendriks and Toonen 2001).
The second, much less familiar story, is about the Netherlands as a
divided society and the alleged emancipative power of pillars. In compara-
tive politics, reinforcing cleavages of class, religion, and ideology are seen
as a threat to political stability and social harmony. Before Lijphart intro-
duced “consociationalism” in the 1960s, American political science even
held that democracy might be impossible in societies organized around
deep divisions, including the Netherlands (see Bogaards 2000). Less well
known is that several Dutch sociologists at the time emphasized the posi-
tive role of pillarization in the emancipation of the Catholics, Calvinists,
and Socialists (Daalder 1985). This positive evaluation of a segmented
form of pluralism became visible again in the 1990s when a debate emerged
about the social integration of immigrants in general and Muslim immi-
grants in particular (Maussen 2012). However, Lijphart’s recommenda-
tion of an “Islamic pillar” was heavily criticized and important questions
were raised about the desirability and feasibility of separate organizations
for and by immigrants.
This chapter starts with the socio-political side of the consociational
model: a divided society. It contrasts two approaches to pillarization, one
negative and rooted in (American) political science, the other positive and
grounded in (Dutch) sociology. In the second part, the chapter then
reviews the debate about a new ethnic (Moroccan, Turkish) or religious

1
All translations from Dutch are by the author.
22 M. BOGAARDS

(Muslim) pillar in the 1990s to show the lasting power of the emancipative
interpretation of pillarization. The final part of the chapter looks at the
political side of the consociational model, placing and tracing Dutch
democracy in three of Lijphart’s typologies of democracies. Depending on
the yardsticks used, the analysis highlights continuities or changes. The
conclusion reflects on the contemporary relevance of the Dutch case for
thinking about communal organization and politics in divided societies.

2   Pillars as Problem

Consociational theory, following early work by American scholars such as
Almond, posits that when “a society is divided by sharp cleavages with no
or very few overlapping memberships and loyalties—in other words, when
the political culture is deeply fragmented—pressures toward moderate
middle-of-the-road attitudes are absent” (Lijphart 1969: 208–209).
Although “it remains a matter of debate to what degree the Netherlands
did have cross-cutting cleavages or not” (Daalder 1984: 113), there is
little doubt that Dutch society was organized in “pillars,” defined by the
sociologist Kruijt (1957: 15) as “legally equal blocs of social organizations
and subcultures based on a belief system within a larger, plural, but racially
and ethnically mostly homogenous democratic society (nation).”2
Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists, Socialists and Liberals read their own
newspapers, listened to their own radio programs, watched their own tele-
vision programs, spent their leisure time with their own kind of people in
their own associations—including sports clubs—maintained separate trade
unions, sent their children to their own schools, even universities—with
liberal and Socialist offspring meeting in public schools—and voted for
their own parties. The degree and extent of pillarization can be measured.
Kruijt (1957) distinguishes between: (1) the institutional level of pillariza-
tion or the number of social activities for which pillar organizations exist;
(2) the participation rate or the membership of pillar organizations
expressed as a percentage of all persons eligible from that particular group;
(3) the internal degree of integration or the extent to which the various

2
A similar notion is that of “segmented pluralism,” defined by Lorwin (1971: 141) as “the
organization of social movements, educational and communications systems, voluntary asso-
ciations, and political parties along the lines of religious, socio-economic, and political
affiliations.”
 2 CONSOCIATIONALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS: POLDER POLITICS… 23

parts of a pillar are integrated. Some pillars were more “pillarized” than
others, with the Catholic pillar seen as the prototype (Thurlings 1978).
The number of pillars is contested—Lijphart is alone in sometimes detect-
ing a fourth, Liberal pillar (Pennings 1990: 71).3 Finally, there were
important local differences and changes over time (Blom 2000).
Lijphart (1968a, 1975) devotes several chapters of his case study of the
Netherlands to mapping pillarization. His main aim is to demonstrate the
absence of the cross-cutting cleavages that would explain political stability
in American pluralist theory of the time. Or at least, partly. The two
Christian pillars were socio-economically diverse and this softened the
class cleavage. Lijphart’s account of pillarization is not the only one. At
least five other interpretations can be identified (See Daalder 1985;
Pennings 1990). First, those who see pillarization as a defensive mecha-
nism, as a “church strategy against secularization” (Rigthart 1986: 174)
or, in the words of Bornewasser (1988: 1987), “as a modern means to a
traditional end: to protect the faithful against the dangers of a moderniz-
ing world.” Second, those who see it as a control theory, which sees pil-
larization as a deliberate elite strategy to sharpen societal divisions to
entrench their own positions of power (Van Doorn 1956; Van Schendelen
1978, 1984). A fragmented culture calls for leadership and political lead-
ers have cleverly exploited this. Until the changes of the mid-1960s, politi-
cal elites benefited from stable electoral support (Houska 1985) and a
deferential and passive citizenry that came with the encapsulation of their
followers in pillars. Third, Neo-Marxist readings are even more critical,
blaming pillars for dividing the working class (See Stuurman 1983). The
fourth and fifth interpretations of pillarization are more positive as they
focus on pillars as promotors of emancipation and modernization respec-
tively. They will be discussed in the next section.

3   Pillars as Promoters of Emancipation

and Modernization

The argument that pillarization furthered the “emancipation” of reli-

giously and socio-economically defined groups that suffered from histori-
cal disadvantages can already be found with Kruijt (1956: 43), who judged

3
More often, though, Lijphart writes about three pillars, the third “general” pillar com-
bining Socialists and Liberals, differently from most of the literature which sees the Socialists
as the third pillar.
24 M. BOGAARDS

the struggle for emancipation through pillarization a “just” cause. The

most famous statement is by Verweij-Jonker (1962). In her analysis of
four emancipatory movements, she concentrates on the Catholic and
Calvinist subcultures and on workers and women.4 With the exception of
women, all groups organized in their own political party, which stood at
the apex of a pillar structure that prominently included media and trade
unions. All four emancipatory movements were united in their desire for
“freedom,” even though this meant different things to the different
groups. The Catholics were long considered “second class citizens”
(Bakvis 1981: 24) who, until the mid-1800s, could not practice their reli-
gion freely and were underrepresented in the professions, administration,
and politics. The Calvinists always had been in a minority position with
respect to the dominant Protestants. Success was defined as emancipation,
which in turn meant equal opportunities, and was seen as proof of integra-
tion (Verweij-Jonker 1962: 122).5
The book by Hendriks (1971, see also Janse 1985), The Emancipation
of the Calvinists, is a good example. It tells the story of how mostly poor
and simple, religiously conservative (Calvinist) masses, increasingly out of
touch with the more progressive dominant state church, used religious
zeal to overcome their marginal position in society. The goal of their leader
Abraham Kuyper was “to end discrimination” (p. 13). The Calvinists are
described as an “ethnocentric emancipation minority,” which means that
the aim is integration, not assimilation, with the group’s distinctive traits
recognized as meriting equal treatment (p. 251). This resembles the early
definition of emancipation by Van Doorn (1958: 202) as “the principal
and practical attainability of equal positions.” Much the same narrative has
been developed for the Catholics (see especially Goddijn 1957;
Thurlings 1978).6
Finally, pillarization has been interpreted as a specific form of modern-
ization. In the view of Ellemers (1984: 140), pillarization “became a self-
perpetuating mechanism … It became the accepted way of dealing with
problems of modernization.” In other words, the Dutch modernized

4
Following Bakvis (1981), the collection of Protestant Churches known in the Netherlands
as “Gereformeerden” is identified as “Calvinist” here. “Protestant” refers to the
“Hervormde kerk.”
5
In the 1960 census, Catholics made up 40 per cent of the population, Protestants (Dutch
Reformed) 28 per cent, and Calvinists 9 per cent (Daalder 1966: 215).
6
A practical opportunity presented by pillarization is the multiplication of positions,
thereby increasing participation (Lorwin 1971: 157).
 2 CONSOCIATIONALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS: POLDER POLITICS… 25

within and through their pillar organizations. Ellemers (1984) even links
pillarization to national integration, although Pennings (1990: 83) quali-
fies this claim by writing about “segmented integration: a process of orga-
nizational and mental scaling up within their own circle.”
In the middle of the 1960s a rapid process of depillarization got under
way. The boundaries between the pillars became blurry, their internal
coherence weakened, secularization reduced the role of the church, while
voters and citizens became restive (Van Mierlo 1986). For example, survey
data show that if the majority of respondents in 1966 still thought that
youth organizations and broadcasting channels should be organized on
the basis of religion, four years later this had decreased to a minority
(Middendorp 1979: 183). Interestingly, though, denominational schools
remained very popular. The parliamentary elections of 1967 are seen as a
watershed because of increased electoral volatility and the success of a new
party, D66, established on a platform of democratic change. Although
Daalder (1996: 5) detects a “self-destructing logic” in the process of pil-
larization, by which he means the proliferation of sectoral organizations
that increasingly worked together within sectors and across pillars, no
claim is made that consociationalism itself contributed to or resulted in the
weakening of socio-cultural divisions. Depillarization was a societal pro-
cess, not a political one, though it had political consequences.
Already at the time of writing in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the
literature on pillarization saw this phenomenon as largely historical and
unlikely to be repeated in any form in the future. Emancipation was seen
as completed (Verweij-Jonker 1962). Once modernization had reached a
certain stage, “the old principles failed to solve newly emerging problems”
(Ellemers 1984: 142). New social movements were too diverse, internally
heterogeneous and openly anti-institutional. In the phrase of Hellemans
(1985: 253), “the old movements are depillarizing and the new move-
ments do not pillarize any more.” It is therefore ironic that pillarization,
at least in public debate, made a come-back in the 1990s in the context of
policies targeted toward non-Western migrants and their descendants.7

7
In 2006, out of a total population of 16.5 million, 1,722,500 were classified as non-
Western. Of these 364,000 were Turkish, 332,000 Surinamese, 323,000 Moroccan, and
129,400 were from the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (Nicolaas and Sprangers 2006: 25).
26 M. BOGAARDS

4   An Islamic Pillar?

At the end of 1991, beginning of 1992, the issue of an Islamic pillar was
discussed in the media. The main question was whether an “Islamic pillar”
was a desirable form of social organization and would foster the integra-
tion of Muslims in Dutch society.8 This debate was kicked off by an inter-
view with Lijphart in the leading Dutch quality newspaper, which was
published under the title “‘Give Muslims Separate Schools’: Prof. Lijphart
Advocates the Use of Pillarization for Integration” (Versteegh 1991). In
this newspaper interview, Lijphart showed himself to be a proponent of
pillarization of ethnic minorities from foreign descent, especially of
Moroccan and Turkish guest-workers and their children. This should hap-
pen through the establishment of their own schools and other pillar orga-
nizations. Lijphart is quoted as being even more in favor of schools based
on nationality, that is, Moroccan and Turkish schools instead of schools
based on faith, as “national differences are more important than those
based on belief systems, although they sometimes coincide” (Versteegh
1991). In such Moroccan and Turkish schools, what is known as “educa-
tion in their own language” should have an important role as an expres-
sion of their culture. In national politics, ethnic parties would play only a
minor role, but in the big cities, where ethnic minorities are present in
larger numbers, they should be more involved in local government,
according to Lijphart.
The sociologist and Christian-Democrat Zijderveld (1991) came out
strongly opposed to ethnic pillars because these would lead to “ghettoiza-
tion.” Instead, Zijderveld favored pillarization on a religious basis, that is,
an Islamic pillar. No education in the minority language and culture, but
Islamic schools and an Islamic party. It is this notion of an Islamic pillar,
also supported by Lijphart, which dominated the debate. The proponents
formulated their plea as a call for action. Minorities have the right to their
own organizations, but not the duty to form a new pillar, stressed Lijphart
(1992a). This is an especially sensitive issue because of Lijphart’s involve-
ment with South Africa in the early 1980s, at a time that the South African
government tried to come up with new ways to legitimate apartheid.9 The
formula of “separate but equal” has lost all credibility as it all too often
8
On a Muslim pillar in Belgium, see Torrekens (2019).
9
Lijphart now regrets using the term “voluntary apartheid” in a positive manner to
describe distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures, one of the favorable factors for con-
sociational democracy (Bogaards 2015: 91).
 2 CONSOCIATIONALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS: POLDER POLITICS… 27

turns out to mask “exclusion and inequality.” In a reaction published

under the title “Against Forced Pillarization,” Lijphart (1992a) stresses
that group formation should be voluntary and that individual members of
an ethnic or religious group should be free to join any group or organiza-
tion. A few years later, Lijphart (1995) wrote powerfully about the advan-
tages of the self-determination of segments and the downside of
predetermination.10
The aim of renewed pillarization, paradoxical as this may sound, is inte-
gration. The lesson that Zijderveld draws from Dutch history can be sum-
marized as “integration through emancipation in isolation.” The
assumption, more implicit than explicit, is that a minority pillar will lead to
emancipation and integration through the same process that worked for
Catholics and Calvinists a century ago. That pillarization at the end of the
past century would have the same effect as in the beginning of the past
century is, however, hotly contested. For one thing, how would an Islamic
pillar function in a depillarized society? Some contend that new, smaller
pillars can very well exist in a depillarized society (Ellemers 1998: 431),
but others are more skeptical.11 Sunier (1999), for example, sees Muslim
mobilization limited to the religious sphere in a depillarized society with a
welfare state. The historian Rigthart (1992: 14) accuses Lijphart of “sloppy
and a-historical thinking.” That Catholic and Calvinist subcultures even-
tually integrated into modern Dutch society is despite—rather than
because of—pillarization, posits Rigthart (1992: 15). Pillarization is not a
means of integration and especially nowadays would lead to the opposite:
the long-term isolation of ethnic minorities (see also In ’t Veld 1992;
Chavannes 1991). This concern was shared by secular politicians, who
feared “parallel societies” and disintegration (Van Dam 2011: 113).

10
The terms liberal and corporate consociationalism capture the same distinction. Also,
there is a clear preference for liberal consociationalism here (what Lijphart called self-deter-
mination). See further McCulloch (2014).
11
Turning the causal arrow around, Bracke (2013: 224) suggests that the discourse on
Islam and Dutch society after 1989 reflects a cultural shift that hastened depillarization. In
this reading, there were limits to the inclusiveness of the social-cultural side of consociation-
alism: whereas Christian and ideological pillars were allowed, a new Muslim pillar would not
be tolerated and the advantages enjoyed by the (remnants) of the old pillars would be denied
to the newcomers. This is an interesting thesis, but not more than that at the moment as
empirical evidence is lacking. If correct, it would reveal a deliberate limit to the inclusiveness
of consociational democracy, though different from the militant consociational democracy
Bogaards (2020) sees in Belgium’s cordon sanitaire around the extreme right.
28 M. BOGAARDS

Christian politicians and scholars have a different view.12 Probably the

first argument in favor of a Muslim pillar in the Netherlands was made by
Klop (1982) in the magazine of the research institute of the Christian
Democratic Party, the author’s employer. Referring to the experience of
the Calvinists and using similar terminology, Klop (1982: 531) argues that
Muslims should enjoy the same “right to a gradual development within
their own circle,” calling upon the government to facilitate the emergence
of an “open pillar” and warning that if Muslims in the Netherlands are
denied the facilities enjoyed by other religions during pillarization, the
result might be a “closed” pillar of Muslims that turn away from a society
that does not allow them to practice their religion to the full. At the end
of the millennium, Klop (1999: 8) repeated his plea for “open pillars as a
way to integrate non-Western migrants” although he recognizes that this
model is not being widely followed by the people it is intended for.
The main contributors to the exchange were Dutch academics. The
debate was about Dutch citizens with a migrant background, not with
them. This fits a pattern: “The call for a separate Islamic pillar reflects
more the need for spokesmen and contacts of current administrations than
a desire coming from the Muslim population itself” (Leezenberg 2006:
196). Also, little attention was paid to the feasibility of new minority pil-
lars. Shadid and Van Koningsveld (1995) highlight four factors that com-
plicate the emergence of an Islamic pillar. First, they doubt that a
sufficiently large number of Muslims will be ready to identify with and
become active in an Islamic pillar. Tellingly, the overwhelming majority of
Muslim parents send their children to public and Christian schools, not to
Muslim schools. Second, the internal heterogeneity of the Muslim com-
munity in the Netherlands would lead one to expect the emergence of
several Muslims pillars. Third, the pool of religious, social, and political
leaders is limited. Parties that appeal to voters with a migration back-
ground only appeared on the scene in the second decade of the new mil-
lennium.13 NIDA was formed in 2013 and since 2014 is represented in the
city council of the country’s second largest city, Rotterdam. On its

12
As late as 2003, the small protestant Christian Union party could devote its annual con-
gress to the question of “integration and pillarization: reflections on the multicultural soci-
ety,” featuring prominent discussions of an Islamic pillar (ChristenUnie, various
authors 2003).
13
Before Turkish and Moroccan politicians made their careers within mainstream parties,
which stayed “away from individuals who are ‘too ethnic’” (Michon and Vermeulen
2013: 610).
 2 CONSOCIATIONALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS: POLDER POLITICS… 29

website, the party characterizes itself as “an emancipation movement

inspired by Islam.”14 In 2014, two members of the national parliament
with a Turkish background split from the Labour Party and formed
DENK. The party presents itself “as an emancipation movement of people
with a migration background,” but its votes mostly come from Turkish-
Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch voters (Otjes and Krouwel 2019: 1153).
Finally, Shadid and Van Koningsveld (1995) argue that Islam is a religion,
not a church, and therefore lacks the organizational core around which
the Catholic pillar was built.15 Pillarization left behind an opportunity
structure that could be used by new groups (Duyvené de Wit and
Koopmans 2005: 57). However, there is very little evidence of the emer-
gence of an Islamic pillar, concludes Rath (1999: 59): “there is no ques-
tion of an Islamic pillar in the Netherlands, or least one that is in any way
comparable to the Roman Catholic or Protestant pillars in the past.”
So far, the story has focused on the sociological perspective. That is no
coincidence: the political aspects of a Turkish/Moroccan/Islamic pillar
were either neglected or treated as a corollary. The political complement
of pillarization is only addressed by In ’t Veld. The problems caused by
pillarization seem to be forgotten, as is the self-negating prediction that
was necessary to hold the country together. However, according to con-
sociational theory, the political pluralism brought about by the new pillar
would require political accommodation. And indeed, Lijphart’s plea for
minority parties and the involvement of minorities in local government in
the big cities seems to hint at a wholesale recommendation of the conso-
ciational package: segmental pluralism plus its political accommodation.
Hoogenboom and Scholten (2008) are the only scholars to systemati-
cally connect the two sides of the coin in their analysis of the impact of the
legacy of pillarization on the organization of migrants in the Netherlands.16

14
See: http://www.nidarotterdam.nl/onze-oproep/.
15
For an early overview of the organization(s) of Muslims in the Netherlands, see Rath
et al. (1996).
16
Vink (2007) offers a similar overview of the development of government policies toward
non-Western migrants. He likewise notes the absence of a Muslim pillar and the very limited
efforts, at best, to create one. In his attempt to debunk the “pillarization myth,” however, he
ignores the debate about the desirability of a Muslim pillar from the early 1990s and also
omits any mention of the earlier sociological literature on pillars as a force of emancipation.
For an even more comprehensive attempt to dispel the “myth” of pillarization and de-pillar-
ization, which begins and ends with the recommendation to stop using the term, see Van
Dam (2011).
30 M. BOGAARDS

They do so by, first, examining the evidence for the emergence of an

Islamic pillar (distinct outlook, exclusive organizations, integration of
Islamic organizations into one pillar, key role for pillar elites) and, second,
the rules of the game. Hoogenboom and Scholten identify three episodes
in policy toward Dutch citizens with a non-Western background: migrants
as socio-cultural minorities (up to 1989), migrants as socio-economic
minorities (1989–2001), and migrants as socio-cultural individuals (since
2001). The first period was heavily influenced by the legacy of pillariza-
tion, with Dutch policies actively promoting exclusive migrant organiza-
tions based on the ideal of “identity-based integration” (integratie met
behoud van eigen identiteit). In other words, new Dutch citizens would
integrate into Dutch society while cultivating the differences that set them
apart. This followed the logic of “group-based emancipation” (p. 114). In
the second period, the focus shifted to socio-economic issues but the end-­
effect, if not goal, remained the same: socio-cultural emancipation. Only
in the third period did socio-cultural differences become a problem, a
problem for socio-economic success and for integration. Using the lan-
guage of bonding and bridging, Scholten and Holzacker (2009: 94) show
how the early appreciation of Dutch government policy for migrants
bonding in their own culture and organizations has turned into the con-
viction that bonding is “an obstacle to bridging and a threat to national
cohesion.” In the Netherlands, it is quite common nowadays to talk about
the failure of multiculturalism.17
For each period, Hoogenboom and Scholten (2008), in addition to
analyzing governmental policy toward migrants, also examine the seven
rules of the game that Lijphart (1968a) deemed typical of the politics of
accommodation. Tellingly, they refer to these as the “rules of the pillariza-
tion game,” as if political behavior logically follows from the functional
demands of pillarization. And in their account, there is indeed a striking
similarity: the logic of pillarization and the consociational rules of the
game vis-à-vis non-Western immigrants prospered and withered together.18

17
In their comparative study, Wright and Bloemraad (2012: 90), though, find “no evi-
dence that multiculturalism hinders socio-political integration, at least among first genera-
tion migrants, and much to suggest it fosters political inclusion.”
18
This leads Tillie (2008: 153–155) to call for a return to some of Lijphart’s rules of the
game, especially businesslike politics and pragmatic tolerance, to make a multicultural soci-
ety work.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
elegant, and though smaller than the other two, yet sufficiently
spacious. It is of a circular form, supported by Corinthian pillars, and
prettily decorated. It is here, where are performed comic operas, and
little pieces, in which are blended dialogue and music. The singers
are very good, and the actors respectable. “Le Caliph de Bagdad,”
“la Maison à vendre,” and “la Folie,” are the performances, which
have attracted the greatest crowds this winter. Mademoiselle Phyllis
is the principal performer. She is a very pretty woman, with an
excellent voice, and an elegant person.
“Feydeau,” as it is commonly called, is much frequented by the
fashionables of Paris, and is by many preferred even to the larger
theatres. “Vaudeville” is an extremely pretty little theatre, where short
lively pieces are acted, enlivened with songs, all of which have an
epigrammatic turn. Celebrated authors, distinguished public
characters, and temporary occurrences, are often the subjects of
these pieces. The philosopher of “Ferney,” is well represented in one
of these called, “Voltaire,” as are, “Florian,” “Gesner,” “Scarron,” &c.
in the pieces called, by their respective names. When lord Cornwallis
honoured this little theatre with his presence, couplets were instantly
sung in celebration of the peace; and a farce has lately been acted
here, called, “le Peintre françois à Londres,” in which a very
handsome compliment is paid to the english character. Madame
Henry is the heroine of “Vaudeville.” She is a good actress, and one
of the most beautiful women I have yet seen in France.
“Le théâtre de Louvois,” is larger than “Vaudeville;” but smaller
than “Feydeau.” Here plays are acted mostly of two or three acts; but
they sometimes perform longer pieces. I saw at this house, a few
nights since, a comedy taken from Fielding’s Tom Jones. It was a
sentimental drama, and neither ill written, nor ill acted; but the
ridiculous use of the following expression, “Tom, mon cher Tom[46],”
in the midst of a very pathetic scene, had such an effect on my
muscles, that I could not recover my gravity for the rest of the
evening. Apropos; the french have a most extraordinary aptitude to
make mistakes in translating, and adopting our english appellations.
In a serious drama, or in a novel taken from our language, the
vulgarism of addressing a young lady, by the name of, “miss,” is
retained in french; and the absurd manner in which the word is
pronounced, united to the coarse familiarity of the expression, often
destroys the effect of the best imagined passages. In the same
manner, “Mrs.” instead of being translated “madame,” is written
“mistriss;” and if “a lord William,” or a “lord Charles” is mentioned, he
is sure to be called in the next page, “le chevalier baronet,” &c. A
respectable old steward receives the childish name of “Dick,” a
heroine is “miss Peggy,” and a renowned warrior, “sir Jack,” or
“admiral Billy.” I resume my subject. The actors of “Louvois,” are
tolerably good; the house is about the size of our little theatre in the
Hay market, and the pieces represented here are often entertaining.
“Le théâtre de la rue Favart,” to which “l’opera Buffa,” or the Italian
opera has lately removed from “la salle olympique,” is a handsome
building, the boxes of which are so far more lively than those of the
other theatres, that they are open. In most of the play-houses at
Paris, the boxes are separated by a partition on each side, like the
division of the private ones in London. This is not done at “Favart,”
and the effect is favourable to the appearance of the theatre; the
company not being concealed from view, as at the other
“spectacles.” Madame Bolla has lately made her appearance on this
stage, and has excited a considerable degree of public curiosity. She
is generally much admired; and when her name is announced, the
house is sure to be full. The music is excellent, the orchestra is well
chosen, and some of the actors are uncommonly good. The “opera
Buffa” is particularly patronized by madame Bonaparte, who has a
box here, and seldom fails to attend, when any favourite piece is
performed. The first consul is likewise said to be partial to this house.
Besides the six principal theatres, which I have already
enumerated, and which are not only the most frequented, but also
the most central, being all situate in, or near “la rue de la Loi;” there
are several others scattered about the town, which are full every
night. The buildings of many of them are pretty, and the acting far
from indifferent.
The “théâtre de Montansier,” in the Palais royal, is devoted to little
farces, and to that sort of comedy, which rather forces an involuntary
laugh, than claims a smile of serious approbation. The blunders of a
clownish servant, the tricks of Scapin, or the caricature of some
reigning fashion, and now and then a sentimental piece of one act,
(for “sentiment” is the order of the day, at Paris) constitute the kind of
amusement, usually offered at this house. At this theatre are lobbies,
or foyers as they are called, in which the ladies of the “Palais royal”
roam at large, as at Covent-garden and Drury-lane. On this account,
“Montansier” is not much frequented by women of character; though
now and then it is the fashion, even for the first females of the place
to make parties, and go there.
“Le théâtre de Molière,” as it was called, till last week, when it
assumed, I know not why, the name of “théâtre National et Étranger,”
is situate in “la rue St. Denys.” It is a very elegant little theatre, and
the backs of the boxes are covered with glass, by which means the
audience are reflected, and doubled on every side. I saw here, a few
evenings since, “le Lovelace Anglois, ou la Jeunesse de Richelieu,”
an excellent comedy, which, to my great surprise, was very well
performed by the actors of this house.
“L’Ambigu-comique,” at the most distant part of the Boulevard, not
far from the ci-devant Bastille, is much frequented, on account of its
splendid processions. A piece called, “le Jugement de Solomon,”
has been so extremely popular, as to render it very difficult to get a
seat, when it was performed. After several fruitless attempts, I
succeeded last night in gaining admittance; and I must confess, that
I was much disappointed. The theatre is little and dirty; and the stage
is too confined for the shows presented on it, to produce any effect.
“Le Jugement de Solomon,” notwithstanding its great celebrity,
seemed to me a very tiresome, dull, uninteresting piece of tawdry
parade.
“Le théâtre des jeunes Artistes,” is also on the Boulevard, very
near “l’Ambigu-comique.” “La salle,” or the hall, appropriated to the
purpose, though small, is neat and prettily decorated. Here I saw a
pantomime in five acts; the hero of which was the renowned “Puss in
Boots,” or “le Chat botté,” as he is called by the french. Need I add,
that I was completely ennuyé. The actors are really young beginners,
or “jeunes artistes;” and I fear, from the promising appearance of
three or four of the female performers, (none of whose ages
exceeded sixteen) that this theatre is a nursery for other places,
besides the play-houses.
“Le théâtre du Marais,” I have not yet visited; but I am told, that the
building is elegant. A detachment from the company, which I have
already mentioned as acting at “le théâtre de Molière,” performs at
this house.
There are likewise, “le théâtre de la Gaieté, rue Thionville,” “le
théâtre des jeunes Élèves,” et “le théâtre sans Pretension,” on the
Boulevard. I have not seen them; but I hear they are exactly on the
same plan, and in the same state as “le théâtre de l’Ambigu-
comique.”
Besides these numerous play-houses, there are several
exhibitions of horsemanship, on the plan of Astley; and there is
likewise a very curious optical deception, called, “la Phantasmagorie
de Robertson.” The latter is very well worth seeing. After viewing in
the outward room various electrical machines, mechanical
inventions, and other curiosities, you are led into a dark apartment,
in which the ghosts of distinguished characters are supposed to
appear. This is extremely well managed; and the principle of optical
deceptions is exemplified, and clearly explained. A man of the name
of Fitzjames also appears as a ventriloquist; and after he has thrown
his voice into different parts of the room, he declares, that the power
of doing so is not a natural gift, but simply a habit acquired, of
varying the sound of the voice. The same man gives a most
admirable imitation of the meeting of a jacobinical club; and in
hearing him, you really imagine, that the demagogues of those
bloody days are still haranguing with all the absurdity and madness,
which characterised them. In addition to the amusements which I
have specified, there are innumerable puppet-shows, théâtres de
société, mountebanks, tumblers, fights of wild beasts, jugglers, rope-
dancers, and quack-doctors.
Having given you this general sketch of the spectacles of Paris, I
shall, in my future letters, only mention such particular performances,
as by their merit or their popularity, may deserve your attention.
I am, &c.
 LETTER XV.
The play of Henry IV, read by le Texier.

Paris, february 10, 1802 (21 pluviôse).

my dear sir,
I went this evening to hear le Texier, so well known in London, read
la Partie de Chasse de Henry IV. The reputation of the reader, and
the singularity of being present at the recital of a comedy in the
french republic; the fame of which formerly depended on the
attachment of the people to the cause of monarchy, and particularly
to the house of Bourbon, drew an unusual crowd, and I had great
difficulty in obtaining admittance. “La salle,” or hall of “le Brun,” in the
rue de Cléry, in which subscription concerts are usually performed,
was the place appropriated to this purpose; and though the room is
extremely large, it was soon filled in every corner. The benches were
in a few minutes occupied, and many persons were obliged to stand
during the whole performance. Le Texier, to my great astonishment,
appeared much confused. Though accustomed, for so many years,
to appear before the public, he had all the horrours of a young
beginner. I know not, whether his alarms arose from the numerous
audience which he saw collected, from any apprehension he might
entertain as to an interruption from the police, or from the criticisms
which he expected from the french, who, more conversant in the
language, in which he was about to read, than those to whom he
was used to address himself, might be less indulgent. From
whatever cause his fears arose they were very apparent. His hand
trembled, the sweat dropped from his brow, his voice faltered, and in
some scenes, he forgot material passages. It is unfair to pass any
judgment on a person so circumstanced, I shall therefore only
observe, that I saw with regret, that though much applauded, he was
but little admired. As to me, I have often been so highly amused and
delighted with his readings in England, that I was more than
commonly disappointed.
“La Partie de Chasse de Henry IV” seems to have lost none of its
popularity; for, notwithstanding the very imperfect manner in which it
was read, the most unbounded applauses testified the approbation
of the audience, at the recital of those passages, which were
formerly in the mouths of every one. A person unacquainted with
Paris, would have been apt to conclude, from what passed this
evening, that the french were all royalists. But it must be
remembered, that, in the first place, the greater part of those
assembled on this occasion, were drawn there by their particular
sentiments; secondly, that any thing new, no matter what, is sure to
be well received; and lastly, that Henry the IVth, besides being the
favourite of the ladies of all parties, was at the beginning of the
revolution considered as a kind of popular character, whom even the
most violent democrats held up to public admiration. He was likewise
a military hero; and, after all, there is nothing so much esteemed in
France, as martial merit. Perhaps it was this part of his character,
which induced general Moreau to attend the reading of a play, of
which so renowned a warrior was the subject.
This celebrated general sat in the gallery, with a lady of
considerable talents, in whose company I afterwards supped. The
lady in question entertained the company, with a lively account of the
bon mots, brilliant thoughts, and happy expressions of her warlike
companion; but as madame is particularly famed for the richness of
her fancy; and as, notwithstanding his decided merit as a soldier, no
one ever before heard of the conversation talents of Moreau: it was
universally allowed, that the general was not a little indebted for his
favourable testimony to the imagination of his fair reporter.
To return to le Texier. His play concluded without any interruption;
and though the words “vive le roi” were omitted, the song of “vive
Henry IV” was repeated and received with enthusiasm, by the
audience.
Adieu. How strange a nation are the french! the more I see of
them, the more I find it difficult to discover their real sentiments. I am
rather inclined to think, that they have no decided political opinions at
all; and that their passions, the fashion of the day, or the accidental
humour of the moment, make them at one time stern and visionary
republicans; then hot headed royalists; and at another, quiet,
submissive, unreflecting tools of the ruling power, whatever it may
be. But I must not allow myself to enter on such topics: I therefore
take my leave, and bid you, for the present,
Adieu.
 LETTER XVI.
Party at a fournisseur’s.—Ball at a ci-devant noble’s.

Paris, february the 15th, 1802 (25 pluviôse).

my dear sir,
I received an invitation to spend yesterday evening at the house of
an individual, who is supposed to have made a very large fortune as
a “fournisseur,” or army contractor; and whose wife is one of the
“élégantes” of the new set. I send you, therefore, a faithful account,
as descriptive of that class of society, to which the name of “les
nouveaux riches” is given.
A handsome porte cochére[47] led to a well lighted and elegant
stair case, by which we approached the salon; where madame ⸺,
and some friends who had dined with her, were seated. As, among
the very few houses at which I visit at Paris, the greater part are of
“l’ancien régime,” I have become so accustomed to dark rooms, old
furniture, and dismal hangings, that I was quite astonished at the
splendour of the apartment, into which I was now ushered. An
elegant girandole of cut glass, made with the greatest taste, and
filled with innumerable wax lights, gave such a lively appearance to
the room, that, for a few moments, I supposed myself in London. The
chairs were made with classical propriety in antique shapes, and the
colours were well assorted. The carpet (a luxury not often met with in
this town) was of the finest Brussels manufactory; and the walls were
ornamented with designs on the plan of “Echart.” We were received
with much politeness by the lady of the house, who is a beautiful
woman, and who, whatever her original situation may have been, is
at present graceful in her manner, highly accomplished, and well
acquainted with the literature of her own country.
Monsieur was neither very handsome, nor particularly brilliant;
but he was very civil, and took no little pride in showing us the suite
of rooms which adjoined to the salon, and which were all, like the
latter, splendidly lighted.
The apartment next to that in which we were received, was
covered with pictures representing a naval engagement; and the
inscription underneath proved, that they had belonged to the
unfortunate Louis XVI. A large claw table was placed in the centre of
the room; and our host, though a good republican, forgot not to
inform us, that it had cost him a large sum of money; having been
taken from the Thuilleries, where it had long been in the use of Marie
Antoinette. Next to this was the bed-room, which was particularly
splendid. The canopy of India muslin, so fine that it appeared like a
net, to which was added a rich embroidery of gold. The stand of this
elegant couch was of mahogany, ornamented with antique figures
correctly carved. The boudoir, which adjoined, almost, exceeded in
luxury that of madame ⸺, already described in a former letter. The
sofa was of crimson velvet, edged with silver; and the sides and top
of this little bijou were entirely covered with the finest mirrors.
Beyond the boudoir was another bed-room, furnished in a different
manner, but with equal taste and equal extravagance. The party
consisted of five or six ladies, who were, perhaps, more expensively,
than correctly dressed, of two of the ministers, and of some
foreigners of distinction. A musician of eminence performed on the
harpsichord; and accompanied madame ⸺ and one of her friends,
who both sung very prettily.
The evening would have been pleasant, had there not been a
degree of form, which to me was not a little annoying. About twelve
o’clock supper was announced; which was served on the ground
floor, in a small salle à manger, which was also elegantly furnished.
The supper was good, and the servants who waited were attentive.
I saw, this evening, for the first time, general Berthier. He is a little
man, plainly dressed, with cropped hair. His countenance is
expressive, when he speaks; but his figure is diminutive, and his
appearance by no means military. He is extremely polite,
gentlemanly, and affable. I am told, he is by birth “gentil homme;”
and by his manner it is easy to see, that he must have passed the
early part of his life in good company.
 After giving you this account of a party at one of the new houses,
you will, perhaps, not be displeased, if I conclude my letter with a
short description of a ball given by a person, formerly of very high
rank, and still of considerable fortune.
The antichamber, through which it is always necessary to pass at
a french assembly, is rather a disgusting sight. The servants,
differently occupied, some playing cards, some sleeping, and others
criticising the dress of those who pass by them, do not attempt to
rise, and even those of the house seldom give themselves the
trouble of moving, at the arrival of their master’s guests. If the valet
de chambre is near, the company are announced; if otherwise, they
are allowed to find their way to the apartment of those whom they
are visiting. At the ball, of which I am now speaking, in addition to the
antichamber devoted to the use I have mentioned, the second
drawing room was filled with filles de chambre, milliners, and
mantuamakers, whom the good nature of our hostess permitted to sit
there, that they might view the dancing, and learn the fashions. I
observed, that several of these soubrettes did not direct their
attention solely to the female part of the company.
After passing through these rooms, we found ourselves at last in
the salon, which was extremely well lighted with patent lamps. These
are much used at Paris, and almost generally substituted for wax.
The oil used here is less offensive than that which is bought in
London; and, when a sufficient number of reflectors are placed about
a room (which is not very commonly the case) it becomes very
brilliant; but the heat is always oppressive.
The company assembled on this occasion were all of the old
noblesse; and no nouveau riche, no person connected with the
government, and very few foreigners, were permitted to contaminate
this quintessence of “bonne compagnie.” I perceived many of those
faces which I had remembered in London among the emigrés of
distinction; and the lady of the house did not forget to enumerate the
families of dukes, comtes, marquis, marechals, &c. which formed her
society. It is but justice to this class of company, to observe, that the
ladies (whether from a natural sense of propriety, from habits
contracted during their residence in foreign countries, or from the
wish of distinguishing themselves from their plebeian fellow citizens,
I shall not pretend to inquire) are infinitely more correct in their dress,
than those of any other set at Paris. I saw here several elegant
women, who were tasteful, without being indecent; and though,
perhaps, a hundred persons were assembled (which is considered a
very large party in this town) there was only one female present, of
whom it could be said, that she was too liberal in the display of her
charms; and she was the subject of general conversation, and
general censure.
The ball began with two cotillons, or french country dances, which
were very gracefully performed by eight gentlemen and ladies, who
vied with each other in skill and activity. The rest of the company
were seated on benches, which were placed in gradations against
the wall. A walse was then played; about fifteen couple stood up;
and the gentlemen, placing their arms round the waists of their
partners, moved round the room in a circle, while the young men not
so employed formed a group, and filled the centre. The air
appropriate to this dance is extremely pretty, and the figures of the
ladies are seen to great advantage. Yet, notwithstanding the quiet,
respectful manner of the parisians, I must still continue of the opinion
of Werter; that no modest woman ought to dance the walse, unless
her partner be either her husband or her brother.
After a short interval, I perceived a string of young men crowding
together, and forming a line. I learnt with surprise, that this was the
preparation for an english dance; and that the gentlemen were taking
places for their partners. Though gallantry is, I suppose, the cause of
this mode of determining precedency, it is extremely dangerous; and
the ladies of Paris ought, like our fair country women, to take the
trouble of arranging, themselves, so important a question. One or
two duels have already taken place, this winter, owing to the
disputes occasioned by the zeal with which these “preux chevaliers”
contended for the honours of priority; and the evil will daily increase,
if this manner of taking places be continued.
Walses and cotillons succeeded alternately, for the rest of the
evening. About two o’clock in the morning, supper was announced.
The table, not being large enough to afford seats for all the company,
was solely occupied by the ladies. The entertainment consisted of
soups, hot dishes, légumes, fruit, and pastry; after which, as a
remove, two large plates, one of turbot, and one of salmon, made
their appearance. These, to an english eye, seemed very singular;
but I hear, all good french suppers conclude with fish.
After supper, the ball recommenced, and continued till six in the
morning. On summing up the occurrences of the evening, I
remarked, that, though the women were handsome, the company
elegant in their dress, and genteel in their manner; though the music
was admirable, and the refreshments plentiful and good; yet there
was something wanting; I mean that gaiety of heart, and that flow of
spirits, which, according to all accounts, the french formerly
possessed.
The ladies danced to perfection; but they seemed to do so rather
for triumph than amusement; and any stranger, coming suddenly into
the room, would have supposed, that he saw before him the élèves
of the opera house, not the daughters of the proud noblesse.
Dancing is, indeed, more a science than an entertainment, at Paris;
and while those who were engaged seemed to study every step, and
to make all their motions by rule, the by-standers looked on, and
criticised with the same professional attention. There was little or no
conversation: the loud laugh, involuntary tribute of joy, was not
heard; nor the innocent prattle of unsuspecting, happy youth. I know
not whether this total change of character is to be attributed to the
heavy misfortunes which the higher classes have experienced, or to
some other cause; but certainly nothing is more obsolete than french
vivacity. I have now passed more than three months in Paris; and
have not yet seen among its inhabitants[48], one instance of
unbounded mirth. When it happens to me to be in english, american,
or other foreign companies, I am always surprised at the fun and
jollity of the persons around me.
Before I conclude my letter, I ought, perhaps, to mention, that I
saw, at this party, the celebrated Kosciusco, whose heroic exertions
in the cause of polish liberty have rendered him so justly celebrated.
I am happy to say, that he is perfectly recovered from his wound, and
that he has no longer any marks of lameness. He is not now in the
vigour or the bloom of youth; but his eye is finely expressive. I am
sure, Lavater, in seeing it, would have said, “That eye is the eye of a
poet, a genius, or a patriot.” I had not the pleasure of being
introduced to him, and can therefore only speak to you of his
exterior.
I am, &c.
 LETTER XVII.
A play acted for the first time, called “Edouard en Ecosse,” the hero of
which was the english pretender, full of royalist sentiments, performed
twice, and highly applauded; “God save the King,” played on the
French stage; plot of the play, which was forbidden on the third day.

Paris, feb. 21, 1802 (2 ventose.)

my dear sir,
I went three evenings ago to see the first representation of a new
play, called “Edouard en Ecosse[49].” The subject was of course the
arrival in the isle of Sky of the english pretender, and his escape
thence. The applications which were likely to be made to the present
situation of France, drew an immense crowd. I went early to “le
théâtre françois,” and was fortunate enough to obtain a seat. If
before the curtain drew up I was struck with the singularity of my
situation as a british subject, about to see on the stage of the French
Republic a play founded on such a topic, my surprise increased
when the performance began. I soon perceived that the whole merit
of the piece depended on the interest which an unfortunate prince,
banished from the throne of his ancestors, was calculated to produce
on the minds of the audience; and if such was the design of the
author, he was more than commonly successful. The passages in
favour of royalty, and particularly those which expressed pity for the
proscribed, were applauded with inexpressible warmth. The dialogue
was well written, and so artfully worded, that it was difficult for any
man, whatever his political sentiments might be, not to join in
commiserating the fate of Edward. The story was simple, and as well
as I can trace it from memory, I will give it to you.
The young pretender, after being defeated by his enemies, and
abandoned by his friends, takes refuge, disguised as a peasant, in
the isle of Sky. Having passed three days without food, he is driven
by want into a house, the door of which he finds open. Here
exhausted with fatigue and hunger, he falls asleep. In this situation
he is discovered by lady Athol, (the mistress of the mansion) wife of
the governor of the island, and the particular favourite of king
George. He wakes, and, after an interesting dialogue, confesses
who he is. He then asks of lady Athol “a little bread for the son of him
who once was her sovereign.” Long divided between the sentiments
of humanity and those of duty and gratitude, lady Athol cannot resist
this last pathetic appeal, and having supplied him with some
refreshment, she determines to protect him. In the midst of this
scene Argyle, who is commissioned by the british government to
take the pretender, arrives, and seeing Edward, expresses some
suspicion. To remove this, lady Athol, with that presence of mind
which women often possess on such trying occasions, declares, that
the person he now sees in the dress of a peasant is her husband,
Lord Athol, (whom Argyle had never seen) and who, having been
shipwrecked, was just arrived in this pitiful plight. Argyle believes the
story, and having paid his compliments to the supposed governor,
leaves him to take that repose, of which he concludes he must stand
in need, after the accident which he had experienced.
Edward afterwards appears in the dress of lord Athol, and in that
character is obliged to preside at a supper, to which Argyle and
some other english officers had been previously invited. One of the
latter, a violent partisan and rough soldier, proposes, as a toast,
“death to all the enemies of George.” Edward, after a violent
struggle, throws down his glass, and rising from the table, exclaims,
“I will not drink the death of any man.”
After this scene, which was rendered very interesting to the
English, by our “God save the king” being played on the french
stage, and to the whole audience by the last phrase, which was
received with unbounded applause, the real lord Athol arrives. In this
dilemma the courage of lady Athol does not desert her. She makes
signs to her husband, who discovers the truth, and recollecting that
Edward had once saved his life at Rome from the hand of an
assassin, he determines to rescue him from the danger of his
present situation. He accordingly pretends to confess to Argyle, that
in assuming the name of Athol, he (Athol) had deceived him, and
that he is the pretender after whom he is seeking. In this character,
therefore, Athol is arrested, and in the mean time Edward, conducted
by the faithful steward of lady Athol, makes his escape in a boat. The
whole then is disclosed, and on the arrival of the duke of
Cumberland, Athol is pardoned for this pious fraud, the duke
declaring that he is convinced that the king himself, would, under
similar circumstances, have acted in the same manner.
There is a kind of counterplot or episode, in which the celebrated
miss Murray appears as the sister of Athol, but her character is not
material to the general story of the play. Argyle, who is in love with
her, asks her of her Edward (while he appears as Lord Athol) and
this puts him into another dilemma, from which he is also saved by
the presence of mind of lady Athol. Mademoiselle Contat played lady
Athol most admirably, and the part of Edward was performed in a
very interesting and natural manner by St. Fall, who rose infinitely
above himself in the character assigned him.
From this imperfect account you will at least be able to observe
what occasions were given both in the scenes and in the dialogue,
for such applications, as the friends of royalty took care to make, and
which were applauded with a degree of ardour, which I never saw
equalled either in England or France.
What a strange people are the French? Do I see the same nation
who put Louis XVI to death, and who have, with such daring
courage, opposed the return of the house of Bourbon, shed tears at
a similar story, and enthusiastically support the sentiments of this
play, founded not only on an attachment to monarchy, but on
principles of indefeasible right? Again, do I see the same people,
who a few years back permitted their best and worthiest citizens,
however guiltless, to fall in crowds under the axe of the guillotine,
and at the nod of a contemptible petty tyrant; I say, do I see the
same people commiserate the sufferings of an abdicated prince, and
loudly applaud a sentiment which justly declares, that to wish the
death of any one is a base, an unmanly, and an unnatural action?
But I am going out of my element. I return to the play. It was received
with more and more admiration at every line, and when the curtain at
last dropped, the applause increased, and continued for several
minutes uninterruptedly.
The author was called for, and proved to be one of the actors of
the house, who, as if inconsistencies of all kinds were to be
reconciled on this occasion, was formerly a violent jacobin.
The play was acted a second night, with the omission of “God
save the king,” and the sentiment about the toast; and to day it is at
last forbidden.
The royalists are excessively irritated at the prohibition, but how
was it possible to suffer in a republic a performance, every word of
which expressed respect for royalty, and pity for a proscribed family?
In England, where, thank God! liberty is less shackled than in this
country, and where our ideas of government are more fixed, should
we suffer on our stage a play which recommended republican
doctrines? The answer is plain. I believe this is the right way of
judging every question. Viewing it in this light, I think, that if the
consuls had any fault, it was in suffering “Edward” to be acted. In
stopping it they have only done their duty.
I am, &c.
 LETTER XVIII.
The carnival.—Masks in all the streets.—Account of the different
characters, processions, &c.—Masqued ball at the opera house.

Paris, february the 25th, 1802 (6 ventose).

my dear sir,
The streets of Paris have, since sunday last, exhibited a very
singular appearance to the eye of an englishman. The carnival is
now begun; and the people, being permitted by the present
government to return to all their old habits, are celebrating this
season of the year with that gayety, whim, and eccentricity, which it
has long been a kind of religious duty, in catholic countries, to
display on such occasions. From six in the morning till midnight, the
principal streets are crowded with masks of every description; and
while a certain number are contented with exhibiting their fun and
their dresses on foot, others are mounted on horses, attended by
servants, also in costume, and some are seated in carriages of every
description. In short, Paris has been one continued scene of jubilee,
and it is difficult to pass through the principal avenues of the town,
on account of the vast crowds of singular figures, who press forward
on every side, and arrest the attention of spectators. Harlequins,
Columbines, beaux, abbés, lawyers, and monks, present themselves
every where; and while they circulate in detached parties,
mamalukes, turks, and indian savages, correctly dressed, well
mounted, and attended with bands of music, move in numerous
bodies. These, and motley groups of masks of all kinds, filling the
inside, top, and every part of hackney coaches, landaus, sociables,
curricles, cabriolets, and german waggons, form lengthened
processions on the Boulevard, in the rue St. Honoré, and in the
neighbourhood of the Palais royal; while the latter, the Thuilleries,
and Champs Elisées, are filled with pedestrian and motley coloured
wits, who, attacking each other with poissard eloquence, amuse not
a little the surrounding multitude.
It is difficult to convey an idea of the show, variety, and eccentricity
of the dresses. In the extraordinary processions, which I have
already mentioned, several handsome carriages were employed,
drawn very frequently by four, sometimes by six, and, in more
instances than one, by eight horses. Caricatures of all sorts were
exhibited; and it was curious to see the costumes of friars, nuns, full
dressed marquis, powdered abbés, and mitred prelates, appearing
as masquerade disguises in those streets, where, twelve years
before, the same dresses excited the serious respect of every one.
The people showed considerable fun in many of the grotesque
figures which they assumed; and I was particularly pleased with a
fellow, who, imitating our english print, was dressed as a monk, and
literally carried on his back a young girl enclosed in a truss of straw,
with these words written on his burden, “Provision pour le
convent[50].” Besides innumerable Eves, beautiful Venusses, and
handsome legged damsels, dressed as boys, Diana had many a fair
representative, clad in flesh coloured pantaloons, and gracefully
perched on the edge of a coach box, embracing with one arm a
Hercules, and with the other an Adonis. I think you will admire, as I
did, the admirable choice of such a dress, and such a posture, for
the goddess of Modesty. The moral conduct of each lady was,
doubtless, not less appropriate than her outward appearance to the
character which she assumed.
This amusement has already continued some days, and will, I am
told, last at least ten more. It is difficult to ascertain how the body of
the people, who alone take part in these sports, can support both,
the loss of time, and the expense which the dresses, carriages, &c.
must necessarily occasion. It is indeed reported, that the government
pays the whole cost, and that the principal characters are hired to
amuse the mob; but a respectable gentleman, who was intimately
connected with the minister of police under the old régime, assures
me, that the same thing was said at that time; and that nothing was
more false, though the masks were then as splendid and as
numerous as they are at present. I believe, the truth is simply this,
that the french are so fond of pleasure, of amusement, and
spectacles of all kinds, that there is no sacrifice which they will not
endure, in order to be able to indulge this favourite passion. A
parisian will dine for six days on a sallad, that he may go on the
seventh to a ball or a play; and I have no doubt that the emperors,
caliphs, and janissaries, whom I have seen to day in such oriental
splendour, have many of them still, like good christians, begun to
mortify the flesh, even before the commencement of Lent. This
necessary sobriety, united to the regulations of the police, which are
admirable, prevents any disorder or riots in the streets; and
notwithstanding the swarms of idle masqueraders, who wander at
present about this great city, I have not yet heard of a single
accident, or of the slightest disturbance.
The carnival is celebrated in the same manner by the higher
classes in the evening; and there is a masquerade every night at the
opera house. I went there yesterday, and observed more gayety
among the persons assembled, than I have yet seen in France. The
pit being joined to the stage, gave a large space, which was entirely
filled. The gentlemen do not usually wear masks, and their persons
are only covered with a domino. It is one of the privileges of the
ladies to conceal their faces, and to attack, without being known, the
beaux of their acquaintance. This custom takes from the splendour
of the masquerade, as very few persons are fancifully dressed, and
almost all are occupied in seeking adventures. Nor was the
conversation livelier than on such occasions in England: the small
number of individuals who pretended to assume characters, trusted
to their dresses, rather than their wit, for the support of their parts.
There were “english jockies,” who had never heard of Newmarket,
and who could speak no language but the french; haughty dons, who
could not answer a question in Spanish; actors, who could not repeat
a single line either of Racine, Corneille, or Voltaire; beys of Egypt,
who knew not the course of the Nile; grand signors, who heard, for
the first time, that wine was forbidden by the Koran; and monks, who
did not know to what order they belonged. Yet, notwithstanding these
little defects, the evening was lively; and though there was no form,
there was no disturbance.