CIVIL LAW

SBCA x UDM COLLABORATION MOCK BAR EXAMINATIONS

Made by: UDM CBO Academics Committee

Consulting Professor: Atty. Manuel Casiño

DISCLAIMER: These questions and answers were written for informational purposes only and compiled in good faith.
They are meant to supplement and not replace legal knowledge acquired over the readers' law school endeavors.

While every care has been attempted in preparing these mock bars, the San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Centralized Bar Operations and Universidad de Manila Centralized Bar Operations make no representations and give
no warranties of whatever nature with respect to these suggested answers, including but not limited to the accuracy,
adequacy, or availability of any information or facts contained therein. Hence, under no circumstances shall both
institutions be held liable for misconception incurred due to the use of these materials or reliance on information
provided in them. Use of these materials and appurtenant information herein shall still be solely the readers' risk.

QUESTION #1. Gene and Jane, Filipinos, met and got married in England while both were taking up
postgraduate courses there. A few years after their graduation, they decided to annul their marriage. Jane
filed an action to annul her marriage to Gene in England on the ground of the latter’s sterility, a ground for
annulment of marriage in England. The English court decreed the marriage annulled. Returning to the
Philippines, Gene asked you whether or not he would now be free to marry his former girlfriend. What
would your legal advice be?

Suggested answer: (2003 Bar; Marriage; Grounds for Annulment of Marriage; Articles 15 and 17, NCC;
Article 45, FC; Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989)

No, Gene is not free to marry his former girlfriend. His marriage to Jane, if valid according to the forms and
solemnities of British law, is valid here. However, since Gene and Jane are still Filipinos, although living in
England, the dissolution of their marriage is still governed by Philippine law. Since sterility is not one of the
grounds for the annulment of a marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code, the annulment of Gene’s
marriage to Jane on that ground is not valid in the Philippines.

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QUESTION #2. Ricky donated P1 Million to the unborn child of his pregnant girlfriend, which she accepted.
After six (6) months of pregnancy, the fetus was born and baptized as Angela. However, Angela died 20
hours after birth. Ricky sought to recover the P1 Million. Is Ricky entitled to recover? Explain.

Suggested answer: (2012 Bar; Civil Personality)

Yes, Ricky is entitled to recover the P1,000,000.00. The NCC considers a fetus is considered a person for
purposes favorable to it provided it is born later in accordance with the provision of the NCC. While the
donation is favorable to the fetus, the donation did not take effect because the fetus was not born in
accordance with the NCC. To be considered born, the fetus that had an intrauterine life of less than seven
(7) months should live for 24 hours from its complete delivery from the mother’s womb. Since Angela had
an intrauterine life of less than seven (7) months but did not live for 24 hours, she was not considered born
and, therefore, did not become a person. (Art. 41) Not being a person, she has no juridical capacity to be a
donee, hence, the donation to her did not take effect. The donation, not being effective, the amount
donated may be recovered. To retain it will be unjust enrichment.

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QUESTION #3. If a pregnant woman passenger of a bus were to suffer an abortion following a vehicular
accident due to the gross negligence of the bus driver, may she and her husband claim damages from the
bus company for the death of their unborn child? Explain.

Suggested answer: (2003 and 2014 Bar; Damages; Death of Unborn Child; Geluz vs. CA, G.R. No. L-16439;
July 20, 1961)

No, the spouses cannot recover actual damages in the form of indemnity for the loss of life of the unborn
child. This is because the unborn child is not yet considered a person and the law allows indemnity only for
loss of life of a person. The mother, however, may recover damages for the bodily injury she suffered from
the loss of the fetus which is considered part of her internal organ. The parents may also recover damages
for injuries that are inflicted directly upon them, e.g., moral damages for mental anguish that attended the
loss of the unborn child. Since there is gross negligence, exemplary damages can also be recovered.

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QUESTION #4. Spouses Primo and Monina Lim, childless, were entrusted with the custody of two (2) minor
children, the parents of whom were unknown. Eager of having children of their own, the spouses made it
appear that they were the children’s parents by naming them Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude Lim.
Subsequently, Monina married Angel Olario after Primo’s death. She decided to adopt the children by
availing the amnesty given under R.A. 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. She filed
separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle, then 25 years old and Michael, 18. Both Michelle and
Michael gave consent to the adoption. The trial court dismissed the petition and ruled that Monina should
have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. Monina, in a Motion for Reconsideration argues that
mere consent of her husband would suffice and that joint adoption is not needed, for the adoptees are
already emancipated. Is the trial court correct in dismissing the petitions for adoption? Explain.

Suggested answer: (2012 Bar; Adoption; Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, G.R.
No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009)

Yes, the trial court was correct. At the time the positions for adoptions were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. Under the law, husband and wife shall adopt jointly, except in cases enumerated in the law. The
adoption cases of Michelle and James do not fall in any of the exceptions provided in the law where a
spouse is permitted to adopt alone. Hence, Monina should adopt jointly with her husband Angel.

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QUESTION #5. Manila Petroleum Co. owned and operated a petroleum operation facility off the coast of
Manila. The facility was located on a floating platform made of wood and metal, upon which was
permanently attached the heavy equipment for the petroleum operations and living quarters of the crew.
The floating platform likewise contained a garden area, where trees, plants and flowers were planted. The
platform was tethered to a ship, the MV 101, which was anchored to the seabed. Are the equipment and
living quarters movable or immovable property?

Suggested answer: (2007 Bar; Immovable Property; Article 415, NCC)

The equipment and living quarters of the crew are immovable property. Art. 415 (3) of the NCC classifies as
an immovable "everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." Both the equipment and
the living quarters are permanently attached to the platform which is also an immovable. The equipment
can also be classified as an immovable property under Art. 415 (5) of the NCC because such equipment are
"machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the industry or works." It is logically assumed that the petroleum industry may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and the platform is analogous to a building.
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QUESTION #6. X, Y, Z are siblings who inherited a 10-storey building from their parents. They agreed in
writing to maintain it as a co-owned property for leasing out and to divide the net profits among
themselves equally for a period of 20 years. On the 8th year, X wanted to get out of the co-ownership so he
could get his 1/3 share in the property. Y and Z refused, saying X is bound by their agreement to keep the
co-ownership for 20 years. Are Y and Z correct? Explain.

Suggested answer: (2015 Bar; Co-Ownership; Article 494, NCC)

Y and Z are partly correct. The law provides that none of the co-owners shall be obliged to remain in the
co- ownership and it is the right of a co-owner to ask for partition of the co-ownership anytime. One
exception to the rule is if the co-owners agree to keep the thing undivided which period shall not exceed
ten years. In this case, the agreement to keep the thing undivided shall be valid at the most for ten years.

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QUESTION #7. Josefa executed a deed of donation covering a one-hectare rice land in favor of her
daughter, Jennifer. The deed specifically provides that: "For and in consideration of the love and service
Jennifer has shown and given to me, I hereby freely, voluntarily and irrevocably donate to her my
one-hectare rice land covered by TCT No. 11550, located in San Fernando, Pampanga. This donation shall
take effect upon my death." The deed also contained Jennifer's signed acceptance, and an attached
notarized declaration by Josefa and Jennifer that the land will remain in Josefa's possession and cannot be
alienated, encumbered, sold or disposed of while Josefa is still alive.

Advise Jennifer on whether the deed is a donation inter vivos or mortis causa and explain the reasons
supporting your advice. (2013 BAR)

Suggested answer: (2013 Bar; Modes of Acquiring Ownership; Donation; Articles 728 to 729, NCC;
Austria-Magat v. CA, G.R. No. 106755, February 1, 2002)

The donation is a donation inter vivos. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during
the lifetime of the donor, though the property shall not be delivered till after the donor’s death, this shall
be a donation inter vivos (Art. 729). The Civil Code prefers inter vivos transmissions. Moreover, mortis causa
donations should follow the formalities of a will (Art. 728). Here there is no showing that such formalities
were followed. Thus, it is favorable to Jennifer that the deed is a donation inter vivos. Furthermore, what
is most significant in determining the type of donation is the absence of stipulation that the donor could
revoke the donation; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be “irrevocable,” a quality
absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is the essence of the
act, to the extent that a testator cannot lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation. The provisions of
the deed of donation which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of the donor and that
there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber, dispose, or sell the same should be harmonized with its
express irrevocability (Austria-Magat v. CA, G.R. No. 106755, February 1, 2002).

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QUESTION #8. Baldomero leased his house with a telephone to Jose. The lease contract provided that Jose
shall pay for all electricity, water and telephone services in the leased premises during the period of the
lease. Six months later. Jose surreptitiously vacated the premises. He left behind unpaid telephone bills for
overseas telephone calls amounting to over P20,000.00. Baldomero refused to pay the said bills on the
ground that Jose had already substituted him as the customer of the telephone company. The latter
maintained that Baldomero remained as his customer as far as their service contract was concerned,
notwithstanding the lease contract between Baldomero and Jose. Who is correct, Baldomero or the
telephone company? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: (1996 Bar Questions Relativity of Contracts)

The telephone company is correct because as far as it is concerned, the only person it contracted with was
Baldomero. The telephone company has no contract with Jose. Baldomero cannot substitute Jose in his
stead without the consent of the telephone company (Art. 1293, NCC). Baldomero is, therefore, liable
under the contract.
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QUESTION #9. Dino sued Ben for damages because the later had failed to deliver antique Mercedes Benz
car Dino had purchased from Ben, which was--by agreement--due for delivery on December 31, 1993, Ben,
in his answer to Dino’s complaint, said Dino’s claim has no basis for the suit, because as the car was being
driven to be delivered to Dino on January 1, 1994, a reckless truck driver had rammed into the Mercedes
Benz. The trial cort dismissed Dino’s complaint, saying Ben’s obligation had indeed, been extinguised by
force majeure. Is the trial court correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: (1994 Civil Law Bar Exam EXTINGUISHMENT; LOSS OF THE THING DUE)
No, the trial court erred in its decision to dismiss Dino’s complaint. Article 1262 of the New Civil Code
states that an obligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing shall be extinguished if it
should be lost or destroyed without fault of the debtor, and before he has incurred in delay. In the given
case, the debtor was in delay when the car was destroyed on January 1, 1994 since it was due for delivery
on December 31, 1993. Since there was a delay in the delivery of the car Dino purchased, loss of the thing
due by fortuitous events or force majeure cannot be used by Ben as a valid defense. Extinguishment of
liability for fortuitous event requires that there was no delay incurred by the debtor.

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QUESTION #10. Kristina brought her diamond ring to a jewelry shop for cleaning. The jewelry shop
undertook to return the ring by February 1, 1999. When the said date arrived, the jewelry shop informed
Kristina that the job was not yet finished. They asked her to retur five days later. On February 6, 1999,
Kristina went to the shop to claim the ring, but she was informed that the same was stolen by a thief who
entered the shop the night before. Kristina filed an action for damages against the jewelry shop which put
up the defense of force majeure. Will the action prosper or not?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: (2000 BAR QUESTION LOSS OF THE THING DUE; FORCE MAJEURE)
The action will prosper. Since the defendant was already in default not having delivered the ring when
delivery was demanded by plaintiff at due date, the defendant is liable for the loss of the thing and even
when the loss was due to force majeure.

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QUESTION #11. On March 13, 2008, Ariel entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS) with Noel where the
former sold his titled lot in Quezon City with an area of three hundred (300) square meters to the latter for
the price of P300,000.00. The prevailing market value of the lot was P3,000.00 per square meter. On March
20, 2008, they executed another "Agreement To Buy Back/Redeem Property" where Ariel was given an
option to repurchase the property on or before March 20, 2010 for the same price. Ariel, however,
remained in actual possession of the lot. Since Noel did not pay the taxes, Ariel paid the real property taxes
to avoid a delinquency sale.

On March 21, 2010, Ariel sent a letter to Noel, attaching thereto a manager's check for P300,000.00
manifesting that he is redeeming the property. Noel rejected the redemption claiming that the DAS was a
true and valid sale representing the true intent of the parties. Ariel filed a suit for the nullification of the
DAS or the reformation of said agreement to that of a Loan with Real Estate Mortgage. He claims the DAS
and the redemption agreement constitute an equitable mortgage. Noel however claims it is a valid sale
with pacto de retro and Ariel clearly failed to redeem the property. As the RTC judge, decide the case with
reasons.
Suggested answer: (Extinguishment of Sale; 1991, 1993, 1995, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2016 BAR)

I will decide in favor of Ariel and allow the reformation of the agreement. The DAS and the redemption
agreement constitute an equitable mortgage and Ariel may ask for the reformation of the agreement to
that of a Loan with Real Estate Mortgage as allowed by Article 1605 of the Civil Code. The circumstances
clearly show that the agreement is an equitable mortgage, such as the: (a) price of the lot was inadequate
since it was only sold at P300, 000 when the prevailing market value of such was P900, 000; (b) the vendor,
Ariel, remained in the actual possession of the property after the purported sale; and (c) Ariel was the one
who paid the real property taxes.

Under the circumstances, a presumption arises under Art. 1602, CC that what was really executed was an
equitable mortgage. Moreover, Art. 1603, CC provides that in case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a
sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage.

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QUESTION #12. What is the difference between "guaranty" and "suretyship"?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: (Guaranty and Suretyship; 1997, 2010)

Guaranty and Suretyship are distinguished as follows:
1. The obligation in guaranty is secondary; whereas, in suretyship, it is primary.
2. In guaranty, the undertaking is to pay if the principal debtor cannot pay; whereas, in
suretyship, the undertaking is to pay if the principal debtor does not pay.
3. In guaranty, the guarantor is entitled to the benefit of excussion; whereas, in suretyship the
surety is not entitled.
4. Liability in guaranty depends upon an independent agreement to pay the obligations of the
principal if he fails to do so; whereas, in suretyship, the surety assumes liability as a regular
party.
5. The Guarantor insures the solvency of the principal debtor; whereas, the surety insures the
debt.
6. In a guaranty, the guarantor is subsidiarily liable; whereas, in a suretyship, the surety binds
himself solidarity with the principal debtor. (Art. 2047)

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QUESTION #13. Pablo sold his car to Alfonso who issued a postdated check in full payment therefore.
Before the maturity of the check, Alfonso sold the car to Gregorio who later sold it to Gabriel. When
presented for payment, the check issued by Alfonso was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason that
he, Alfonso, had already closed his account even before he issued his check. Pablo sued to recover the car
from Gabriel alleging that he (Pablo) had been unlawfully deprived of it by reason of Alfonso’s deception.

Will the suit prosper?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Nature And Form Of Contract (1991, 1993, 2002, 2006, 2017 Bar; citing EDCA
Publishing Co. v. Santos[1990] )

No, the suit will not prosper because Pablo was not unlawfully deprived of the car although he was
unlawfully deprived of the price. The perfection of the sale and the delivery of the car was enough to allow
Alfonso to have a right of ownership over the car, which can be lawfully transferred to Gregorio. Art. 559
applies only to a person who is in possession in good faith of the property, and not to the owner thereof.
Alfonso, in the problem, was the owner, and, hence, Gabriel acquired the title to the car. Non-payment of
the price in a contract of sale does not render ineffective the obligation to deliver. The obligation to
deliver a thing is different from the obligation to pay its price.
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QUESTION #14. Hernando, died intestate leaving several parcels of land in Pampanga. Allen sought to be
included in the distribution and partition of Hernando’s estate. Allen’s father, Crispin, was Hernando’s son.
He alleged that while his parents were not married, they did not suffer from any impediment to marry. His
parents were planning to marry before his father died. Lastly, Allen alleged that as Crispin’s natural child,
he has a legal right to acquire a portion of Hernando’s estate. Rule on Allen’s contention.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Allen’s contention is tenable. According to the case of Aquino v. Aquino, a child whose parents did not
marry each other can inherit from their grandparent by their right of representation regardless of the
grandparent’s marital status at the birth of the child’s parents. In this case, even if Allen’s parents were
never married, he has a right to inherit from Hernando as his direct ascendant by his right os
representation. Thus, although Allen has a right to inherit, he has the burden proving his filiation as
provided under Art. 982 of the Civil Code. (Aquino v. Aquino, G.R. Nos 208912 & 209018, Dec 7, 2021).

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QUESTION #15. Adela and Beth are co-owners of a parcel of land. Beth sold her undivided share of the
property to Xandro, who promptly notified Adela of the sale and furnished the latter a copy of the deed of
absolute sale. When Xandro presented the deed for registration, the register of deeds also notified Adela of
the sale, enclosing a copy of the deed with the notice. However, Adela ignored the notices. A year later,
Xandro filed a petition for the partition of the property. Upon receipt of summons, Adela immediately
tendered the requisite amount for the redemption. Xandro contends that Adela lost her right of redemption
after the expiration of 30 days from her receipt of the notice of the sale given by him.

May Adela still exercise her right of redemption? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: (Lease of Rural and Urban Lands (1990, 1994, 2005 BAR)

Yes, Adela may still exercise her right of redemption notwithstanding the lapse of more than 30 days from
notice of the sale given to her because Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code requires that the notice in writing
of the sale must come from the prospective vendor or vendor as the case may be. In this case, the notice of
the sale was given by the vendee and the Register of Deeds. The period of 30 days never tolled. She can
still avail of that right.

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QUESTION #16. Anna and Brad got married in 2012. However, after a year of their marriage, Anna
noticed that Brad was frequently absent from their family home and was incapable of fulfilling his
marital obligations. This prompted Anna to file a declaration of nullity of marriage on the psychological
incapacity of Brad, but the psychologist was unable to personally examine Brad and the psychological
report was based only on Anna’s narration. Anna contends that the personal examination of Brad by a
psychologist is not mandatory. Rule on Anna’s contention.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Anna’s contention is correct. According to the case of Tan-Andal v. Andal, the testimony of a psychologist or
psychiatrist is not mandatory in all cases. Clear and convincing evidence to cause the declaration of nullity
of marriage would suffice. Psychological incapacity is not a medical but a legal concept that refers to a
personal condition that prevents a spouse to comply with the fundamental marital obligations only about a
specific partner that may exist at the time of the marriage but may have revealed through behavior after
the ceremonies. In this case, if Anna has clear and convincing evidence to cause the declaration of nullity
of marriage even without the psychological report, hence, the petition may prosper. (Tan Andal v. Andal,
G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021).
(2012 Bar Examinations)
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QUESTION #17. Jo-Ann asked her close friend, Aissa, to buy some groceries for her in the supermarket.
Was there a nominate contract entered into between Jo-Ann and Aissa? In the affirmative, what was it?
Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: (Obligations of Partnership/Partners to Third Persons; 1993, 1994, 2010 BAR)
Yes, there was a nominate contract. Art. 1898 of the New Civil Code provides that by the contract of
agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of
another, with the consent or authority of the latter. On the assumption that Aissa accepted the request of
her close friend Jo-Ann to buy some groceries for her in the supermarket, what they entered into was the
nominate contract of Agency.

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QUESTION #18. Mr. A owned a parcel of lot in Laguna which is a property of public dominion. The subject
lot was inherited by his wife Maria upon his death who transferred the beneficial ownership to XYZ
corporation.

Later on, the property was classified as alienable or disposable. Maria asserted that XYZ corporation owns
the subject lot since the corporation and its predecessors have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession over it for more than 50 years. However, the Republic asserted that the lot is
incapable of acquisition by prescription in the absence of an express declaration by the State that the
subject property is no longer intended for public use.

Rule on the Republic’s contention.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contention of the Republic is tenable. According to the case of Republic v. Pasig, even if a land is
classified as alienable or disposable without the express declaration of the state that the land is no longer
intended for public use, it remains as property of the public dominion. In this case, the facts are bereft of
any showing that the subject lot was expressly declared by the State as no longer intended for public use.
Further, it is immaterial that XYZ corporation has been in possession over the property for 50 years. The
period for counting the period of prescription is reckoned upon the requisite declaration of the state. Thus,
XYZ corporation has not acquired the subject lot by acquisitive prescription. (Republic of the Philippines v.
Pasig Rizal, G.R. No. 213207, Feb. 15, 2022)

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QUESTION #19. Mr. Popoy offered to sell his Manila Polo Club shares to Ms. Queenie for ₱2,500,000.00. Ms.
Queenie accepted on the condition that their agreement will not take effect until after one (1) year. Mr.
Popoy then acceded and both of them shook hands. Excited about the prospect of acquiring Mr. Popoy's
shares, Ms. Queenie approached the former and offered to pay him an earnest money equivalent to 1 % of
the purchase price, which Mr. Popoy accepted. After one (1) year, Ms. Queenie approached Mr. Popoy
seeking the enforcement of their agreement for Mr. Popoy to sell his shares to her. Mr. Popoy refused to
honor their agreement, claiming that the same was covered by the Statute of Frauds because it was not
reduced into writing and hence, unenforceable.

Is the position of Mr. Popoy correct? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the position of Popoy is incorrect. According to Article 1482 of the Civil Code, whenever earnest money
is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price and as proof of the perfection of
the contract. Moreover, according to the case of Averia v. Averia, statute of frauds only applies to purely
executory contracts; partial performance removes the contract from the ambit of the statute of frauds and
not to partially or completely executed contracts.

Here, the payment of the earnest money is tantamount to partial execution of the contract which
precludes the application of the statute of frauds. The contract has been partially performed and a benefit
was already accepted when the Mr. P accepted earnest money from Ms. Queenie. Therefore, the position of
Popoy is incorrect. (Civil Code Article 1482; Averia v. Averia, G.R. No. 141877)

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QUESTION #20. ​In fear of reprisals from lawless elements besieging his barangay, X abandoned his
fishpond, fled to Manila and left for Europe. Seeking that the fish in the fishpond were ready for harvest, Y,
who is in the business of managing fishponds on a commission basis, took possession of the property,
harvested the fish and sold the entire harvest. Thereafter, Y loaned money from another person to buy new
supplies of fish fry and to prepare X’s fishpond for the next crop.

What is the Juridical relation between X and Y during X's absence and what legal effects will result if X
expressly ratifies Y's management and what would be the obligations of X in favor of Y?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: (Quasi-Contracts; 1992, 1993, 1995, 2004 BAR)

The juridical relation is that of the quasi-contract of "negotiorum gestio" wherein Y is the "gestor" or
"officious manager" and X is the "owner." (Art. 2144). Y must render an account of his operations and deliver
to X the price he received for the sale of the harvested fish. (Art. 2145) In turn, X must pay Y as the former
must answer for obligations contracted with third persons in the interest of the owner. (Art. 2150) Express
ratification by X provides the effects of an express agency and X is liable to pay the commissions habitually
received by the gestor as manager. (Art. .2149)

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