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NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES
SERIES EDITOR: GEORGE CHRISTOU

Russia, China and the West

in the Post-Cold War Era
The Limits of Liberal Universalism

Suzanne Loftus
New Security Challenges

Series Editor
George Christou
University of Warwick
Coventry, UK
The last decade has demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in
their causes and manifestations and that they invite interest and demand
responses from the social sciences, civil society, and a very broad policy
community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective,
but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the
centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has
been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional
approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of secu-
rity, in terms of human security, economic security, and environmental
security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing
political and research agenda.
For an informal discussion for a book in the series, please contact the
series editor George Christou (G.Christou@warwick.ac.uk), or Palgrave
editor Alina Yurova (alina.yurova@palgrave-usa.com).
This book series is indexed by Scopus.
 Suzanne Loftus

Russia, China and

the West in the
Post-Cold War Era
The Limits of Liberal Universalism
Suzanne Loftus
Russia/Eurasia Program,
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Washington DC, USA

ISSN 2731-0329     ISSN 2731-0337 (electronic)

New Security Challenges
ISBN 978-3-031-20088-5    ISBN 978-3-031-20089-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20089-2

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect
to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
I dedicate this book to my grandparents: Alice and Verne, Julia and John.
You are role models for all of us.
 Contents

1 Introduction  1

2 Management of the Liberal International Order 27

3 Russian-Western Relations: A Trust Never Built 59

4 The Rise of China and the China-Russia Relationship 93

5 The
 Limits of Liberal Universalism and the Crisis
in Ukraine129

6 Pluralism and Pragmatism in International Relations169

Index181

vii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Introduction
When the Cold War ended, liberal democracy and liberal market econo-
mies triumphed as the superior form of political and economic governance
over authoritarian communism. It was widely believed that nations around
the world would converge into liberal democracies as a final form of gov-
ernance and that great power rivalry would be a phenomenon of the past.
Francis Fukuyama famously described the era as the “end of history,”1 an
epoch where nations would move beyond great power conflict and focus
on the proliferation of freedom and prosperity for all. The “democratic
peace theory” influenced American and European foreign policy, asserting
that democracies seldom go to war with each other.2 In order to achieve
world peace, it was imperative to lead the world to liberal democracy
through engagement, trade, liberal policy prescriptions, and military
interventions. The idea that democracy would occur naturally as countries
liberalized their economies was also part of the Liberal tradition motivat-
ing policy at the time. Modernization theorists argued economic develop-
ment would bring about social and political change as the middle class

1
Fukuyama (2012).
2
Doyle (1983a, pp. 202–235, 1983b, pp. 323–353, 1986, pp. 1151–1169, 1997) and
Kant (1991, pp. 93–115).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
S. Loftus, Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era,
New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20089-2_1
2 S. LOFTUS

would prosper and demand more freedoms.3 These policies were thought
to be able to put an end to concerns from the Realist school of International
Relations such as “balance of power”4 politics, a natural inclination for
states to want to secure their survival by preventing any one state from
gaining enough military power to dominate all others through uniting in
a defense coalition.
Joining the “liberal international order” was meant to be in every
nation’s best interest and was believed to be able to transcend the forces
of Realism and nationalism. The “liberal international order” can be
described as the set of global, rule-based, structured relationships based
on political liberalism, economic liberalism, and liberal internationalism.5
After experiencing such euphoria in the 1990s on the “triumph of liberal-
ism,” today, 30 or so years later, the world has been experiencing a down-
ward trend in democracy observed over the past 16 years.6 In addition, the
2022 National Defense Strategy states that China is the United States’
“most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the
Department” while Russia “poses acute threats, as illustrated by its brutal
and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.”7 The world has changed dramati-
cally since “the end of history” epoch. Instead of the euphoric optimism
of the 1990s, great power competition, nationalism, and illiberalism have
taken on a more prominent role in international affairs.
In the post-Cold War era, China experienced important economic
growth, finances ambitious infrastructure development projects around
the world, and has more latent power than the United States based on the
speed at which its economy is growing and its projected population
growth.8 Unlike what was originally hoped by engaging China and inte-
grating it into the liberal international order, China did not politically
liberalize. In fact, China has become increasingly more authoritarian illus-
trated by decisions such as the Communist Party ending presidential term

Lipset (1959, pp. 69–105).

3

Tarik Oguzlu, “Balance of Power Politics Are Now More Visible Than Ever,” Daily
4

Sabah, July 23, 2020. https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/balance-of-power-

politics-are-now-more-visible-than-ever
5
Lake et al. (2021, pp. 225–257).
6
Freedom in the World (2022).
7
U.S. Department of Defense (2022).
8
Jessica C. Weiss, “A World Safe for Autocracy? China’s Rise and the Future of Global
Politics,” Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
china/2019-06-11/world-safe-autocracy
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

limits in 2018, allowing Xi Jinping to hold office indefinitely.9 Nor has it

been the best “rule follower” when it comes to its trading practices. China
has engaged in preferential treatment for state enterprises, intellectual
property rights, and cyber theft and currency manipulation. It has also
broken international law by seizing islands in the South China Sea.
As Russia overcame its troubles in the 1990s and experienced impor-
tant economic growth, it also rejected liberal democracy and forged a
more conservative identity for itself in opposition to the West. Relations
between Russia and the West gradually deteriorated throughout the post-­
Cold War era. Today, Russia has invaded the sovereign country of Ukraine,
blatantly breaking international law. Moreover, as two important powers
experiencing antagonistic relations with the West, China and Russia have
consolidated a strategic partnership for the future as they aim to promote
a “multipolar world order” and put an end to “U.S. hegemony.”10
Some argue that these global trends can be explained by the waning
power of the United States. Structural realists argue that a unipolar world
order is the least durable of all power configurations due to the natural
tendencies of the hegemon to spread itself too thin11 and engage in waste-
ful policies in the interest of re-making the world in its own image.12 The
U.S. practice of “liberal hegemony” as a foreign policy has met its limits.
Liberal hegemony can be defined as a strategy that seeks to use American
power to spread liberal values to the world. It is about spreading the classic
liberal ideals of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and markets.13 In
theory, these values are admirable and worth defending. However, spread-
ing them onto the world has unfortunately resulted in negative conse-
quences and has proven unsuccessful in many parts of the world. Not only
were military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan unsuccessful and
wasteful, but even more tactical interventions such as in Libya or softer
democracy promotion efforts such as those applied throughout the Arab
Spring or in the various “color revolutions” have had destabilizing conse-
quences.14 As a result of these policies, the United States has faced sharp

9
Max Fischer, “Xi Sets China on a Collision Course with History,” NY Times, February
28, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/world/asia/xi-jinping-china.html
10
Kendall-Taylor and Shullman (2022).
11
Waltz (2000, pp. 5–41).
12
Mearsheimer (2018).
13
Walt (2018).
14
Ron Nixon, “U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings,” NY Times, April 15, 2011.
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html
4 S. LOFTUS

criticism among those who find its interventionist behavior to be “hege-

monic” or “imperial.” The United States’ reputation as global leader has
suffered, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, now regions
fraught with instability and terrorism.
The United States’ reputation as global financial leader also took a big
hit when the world fell into a financial crisis in 2008 that had lasting con-
sequences until this day. The neoliberal economic policies that spread
across the globe in the post-Cold War era through the processes of global-
ization have had mixed results. While they helped alleviate poverty in
many parts of the world, and helped Chinese and Indian middle classes
prosper, they have led to rising levels of inequality and economic stagna-
tion in the West, which has fueled populist sentiment and political polar-
ization.15 Populist sentiment is characterized by the feeling that the
processes of globalization, liberal migration policies, and giving up ele-
ments of national sovereignty to supranational institutions have been det-
rimental to the livelihood of American and European middle classes and to
national identity.
As democratic trends continue to recede, nationalism and particularly
“civilizational” nationalism have taken on a more prominent role in inter-
national politics. Internationally, countries in the world from the
Philippines to India, Turkey, Brazil, Russia, and China, have adopted a
more nationalist and “civilizational” rhetoric in foreign and domestic poli-
tics.16 As countries modernized and experienced economic growth in the
post-Cold War era, rather than adopting more typically Western character-
istics, they have emphasized their own civilizational roots and identities—
which in turn shape their national interests. In typically non-Western
democracies, these national interests often directly contradict those of
Western liberal democracies. Due to the rise in state capacity of non-­
Western states, these contradicting national interests are likely to cause
friction—and in the worst-case scenario—war. Forces of nationalism and
realism were not carefully anticipated in the quest to universalize a single
model of political and economic governance onto the world. This book
discusses how the concept of “liberal universalism,” which is the idea that
liberal values are universal and should be spread across the world, faced

15
Pallavi Gogoi, “Analysis: How the Rise of The Far Right Threatens Democracy
Worldwide,” NPR, January 21, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/01/21/687128474/
analysis-how-the-rise-of-the-far-right-threatens-democracy-worldwide
16
Acharya (2017, pp. 271–285).
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

pushback from different national and civilizational identities, norms, and

interests. The current war in Ukraine is explained through these lenses as
a case study.
Political pluralism and international pragmatism are argued in this book
to be the best way forward in a world with rising non-Western powers
with differing sets of interests and identities. Instead of falling into a purely
structural realist or liberal argument, this book bridges the gap between
the two theoretical traditions and adds the important element of national
identity to the discussion through a constructivist framework. A more
pragmatic and politically plural international system entails heightened
respect for different civilizational identities, forms of governance, and
competing interests. It prioritizes diplomacy for navigating differing inter-
ests and adopting pragmatic solutions, even if suboptimal. It entails relin-
quishing the idea that the normative framework of liberal democracy is
universalizable. Within liberal democracies themselves, this book discusses
the need to revitalize democratic health, minimize polarization, and
address grievances. Democratic recession is argued in this book to be a
cause of poor policy choices rather than a consequence of a waning liberal
hegemon. Similarly, internationally, expecting democracy to proliferate is
deemed as too idealistic, even with the presence of a sole liberal hegemon.
Liberal democracy is homegrown and largely depends on institutional
legacy and civilizational heritage.

A Review of the Literature

The Post-Cold War Context

After the end of the Cold War, the triumph of liberal democracy over com-
munist authoritarianism encouraged Western powers to envision a future
world where all nations would converge into singular models of liberal
democracies, reaching a final form of governance in the international com-
munity that would ultimately lead to permanent peace.17 Democratization
and liberalization processes took place across the formerly Communist
world as part of the “third wave of democratization,” a global trend which
started in the late 1970s.18 At this time, Russia wanted to “transcend”
Cold War politics and build a new and inclusive security architecture on

17
Fukuyama (2012).
18
Huntington (1991, p. 13).
6 S. LOFTUS

the shared European continent. In contrast, the United States and its
European allies were hoping Russia would democratize and liberalize and
join the West as a junior partner.19 U.S. engagement strategy in relation to
China assumed that increased trade and economic linkages between them
would turn China into a “responsible stakeholder” in a U.S.-led global
order.20 This belief persisted from George Bush Senior to Barrack Obama.
The belief was based on the assumption that economic modernization in
China would be followed by political liberalization. Throughout the many
years of pursuing a policy of engagement, China was treated as a “pre-
ferred nation” and joined the World Trade Organization in 2001.
After many years of pursuing a policy of engagement with China, the
country opened its economy to the rest of the world without politically
liberalizing. China now has the second largest nominal GDP in the world,
and the largest when measured in purchasing power parity.21 WTO reviews
continue to point out the lack of necessary reforms in China and its con-
tinued unfair trading practices.22 In addition, its political regime has
become increasingly more nationalist and authoritarian.23 China has also
defied the rules of international law by seizing key islands and claiming
large swaths of the South China Sea, inconsistent with the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention.24 Despite this behavior, U.S. policy toward China
never evolved until Donald Trump took office in 2017 and started the
policy of containment, which Joe Biden continues to apply today. China is
investing in research and development, renewable energy, artificial intelli-
gence, and quantum mechanics, and is feared to eventually overtake the
West in these sectors. Today China is the principal challenger to the United
States and its leadership of the international order as it is a strong power
with a different political system able to project its influence
internationally.
Russian-Western relations deteriorated significantly after an initially
hopeful period in the 1990s. This had much to do with their differences
in how the post-Cold War European security architecture would be man-
aged as well as how international security decisions would be made. Their

Sakwa (2017a).
19

U.S. Department of State Archive (2009).

20

21
Investopedia. “The Top 25 Economies in the World.” Accessed August 4, 2022.
22
Katie Silver, “China’s Trade Practices Come under Fire,” BBC, October 21, 2021.
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-58991339
23
Tsang and Cheung (2022, pp. 225–243) and Shirk (2018), pp. 22–36.
24
U.S. Department of State (2022).
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

differences stemmed from different worldviews and beliefs about domestic

governance. Difficulties also arose based on Russia’s vision of itself as a
great power, unwilling to bend to the dominance of others. As Russia’s
domestic political system became increasingly authoritarian, the West had
trouble accepting the Kremlin’s policy stances in the post-Soviet space and
beyond. As NATO and the EU pursued enlargement processes to former
communist states after the Cold War, Russia perceived these processes as a
“zero-sum” game, which exacerbated its security dilemma and worsened
trust. The “security dilemma” in International Relations posits that even
in the peaceful pursuit of security, states unintentionally create insecurity
and threats to others.25 A “zero sum” game can be defined as a gain for
one side equating a corresponding loss for the other side. Decision-making
in foreign policy is based on perceptions of the international security envi-
ronment as well as the intentions of the other. This often leads to escala-
tion which may then lead to war.26 As Walt argues, aggressive behavior
does not necessarily arise from evil or aggressive motivations. Yet when
leaders believe their own motives are obviously defensive in nature, they
will tend to see an opponent’s hostile reaction as evidence of an “evil for-
eign leader’s malicious and unappeasable ambitions.”27
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia and China have
developed a closer relationship based on the two nations’ views of interna-
tional relations. Russia and China envision a more “multipolar” world
order where the United States would no longer hold the position of a sole
hegemon.28 Their cooperation can be described as classic “bandwagoning”29
to balance the power of the unipole, only short of a formal defense alli-
ance. A multipolar system would be more favorable to their interests and
less dominated by a single normative ideology that is far from being their
own. Both view the United States as a declining power and have recently
come together in a joint statement on February 4, 2022, solidifying their
common vision for the future. The statement asserts that a trend has
emerged toward the redistribution of power in the world and that this new
era will ensure peace, stability, sustainable development, and the end of
American dominance and would stop the West from interfering in the
25
Jervis (1978, pp. 167–214).
26
Jervis (1976).
27
Stephen Walt, “Does Anyone Still Understand the ‘Security Dilemma’?” Foreign Policy,
July 26, 2022.
28
Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, “Best and Bosom Friends.”
29
Walt (1985, pp. 3–43).
8 S. LOFTUS

domestic affairs of other states.30 Together and apart, their influence is

significant, particularly in the Global South which depends on Russia for
energy, grain, and weapons and on China for infrastructure projects and
aid. Their approach to doing business is attractive for many countries that
do not wish to reform their domestic policies in exchange for aid, invest-
ment, or engaging in trade.
In addition to the renewed focus on strategic competition between the
great powers of the day, Freedom House indicators suggest that democ-
racy in the world has been in steady decline since the year 2006.31 Populism
in the West is on the rise partially due to the unintended consequences of
neoliberal economic policy prescriptions advocated by the IMF in the
post-Cold War years.32 Although these were quite helpful in taking much
of the world out of poverty, the adverse effects of such policies are causing
extreme challenges today such as populism and resentment felt in coun-
tries that were advised to take on these policies and experienced detrimen-
tal results.33 Eventually, liberal economic policies created vast inequality34
throughout the world which thus undermined their viability. The financial
crisis of 2008 was the culminating moment which highlighted the dangers
of excessive, un-monitored capitalism.35 The results are seen across the
European Union where some states particularly in Southern Europe were
unable to fully recover from the crisis.36 Other states in Central Europe
developed increasingly “illiberal” policies,37 and the United Kingdom
altogether left the EU. Meanwhile, across the pond, Donald J. Trump was
elected president in 2016, a figure who ran on an anti-liberal platform and
who still maintains a solid base of support in the United States.
In other parts of the world, nationalism is on the rise as is the occur-
rence of “civilizational” rhetoric in foreign and domestic politics across
nations such as India, China, Russia, Brazil, the Philippines, and countries

30
Alexander Smith, “Russia and China Forge Closer Ties as U.S. is Preoccupied with
Struggles at Home,” NBC News, February 14, 2022. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/
world/russia-china-forge-closer-ties-us-preoccupied-struggles-home-rcna15722.
31
Freedom House, “Reversing the Decline.”
32
Putzel (2020, pp. 418–441).
33
Krastev and Holmes (2020).
34
Koechlin (2013, pp. 5–30).
35
Noriel Roubini, “Laissez-Faire Capitalism Has Failed,” Forbes, February 19, 2009.
36
Zamora-Kapoor and Coller (2014, pp. 1511–1516) and Center for American
Progress (2020).
37
Rupnik (2018, pp. 24–38).
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

in Central and Eastern Europe. It appears as though the “universaliza-

tion” of Western liberal democracy and neoliberal economic policies have
unintentionally created an international and domestic backlash. With the
rising material capabilities of other states in the system, actors will be bet-
ter able to assert their interests in the international arena. Since rising
actors come from a non-Western non-liberal democratic background,
their different identities often translate to different interests. An alterna-
tive approach to international relations is particularly advisable today as
nations will increasingly clash along cultural, political, and material inter-
ests as is the case in Ukraine and as could be the case in Taiwan or any-
where else. Domestically, democracy can be saved through the
implementation of better policies and is not threatened by a supposed
global struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Universalism and National Identity

Both material and non-material factors motivate relations between states.
National identity is a powerful factor when assessing national interests.
Identity formation is a process that takes place through historical experi-
ences and relationships with others. Alexander Wendt describes that it is
through the interaction that nations have with one another that nations
develop their own affiliations, attachments, and identities.38 Social Identity
Theory posits that every nation desires positive “national self-esteem” and
tries to achieve this using different “identity management strategies.”39
These theories shed light on the behavior of states today in relation to one
another. Nations around the world regardless of their geographic position
historically always invoke national cultural distinctiveness as a way to build
national unity. The United States began by associating its heritage with
Greco-Roman civilization as can be seen in the architectural style of the
buildings in the nation’s capital. Later on, America would start to view
itself as distinct from Europe by forming the well-known idea of “American
exceptionalism.”40

38
Wendt (1999).
39
Evans (2015).
40
Frederick J Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History (1893),”
American Historical Association, Accessed August 4, 2022. www.historians.org/about-aha-­
and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/historicalarchives/the-significance-of-the-
frontier-in-american-history.
10 S. LOFTUS

As for post-colonial states, civilizational identity has always been part of

their foreign policy as a reaction to centuries of colonial rule and Western
domination.41 China and India are examples of such states, two of the old-
est and most advanced civilizations on earth. Modern-day Chinese nation-
alism began with China’s entry into the globalization process as it faced a
strong “other” in Western developed countries. Its relative weakness in
economic and military terms sparked a need for national cultural identi-
ty.42 Russia is a more recent civilization and political entity shaped by East
Slavic identity and the Russian Orthodox Church claiming an identity as
“The Third Rome.” Very much like that of Turkey, Russia’s modern civi-
lizational turn and the rise of Putinism came about after a period of poten-
tial greater integration with the West. Current national discourse in Russia
stresses its unique “Eurasian” civilization separate from European civiliza-
tion, rejecting Western values and adopting a new form of conservatism.
Globally, “civilizational nationalism” is creating an important impact as
countries such as India, Turkey, Brazil, China, Russia, and countries in
Europe have re-prioritized the element of national identity in political dis-
course. Coker has argued that these newly established “civilizational
states” are using civilizational narratives to their advantage and have often
resorted to distorting history in doing so. He views this trend as a particu-
larly exclusionary mode of international relations that underlines “other-
ness” and leaves no room for a liberal international order.43
Krastev and Holmes argue that the origins of Eastern and Central
Europe’s illiberal turn in countries such as Poland and Hungary are rooted
in the humiliation that accompanied the acknowledgment of a foreign cul-
ture as superior to one’s own and have fueled “politics of resentment.” 44
Frustrations stem from imitating a “superior western model” without fully
being able to achieve it nor being extended the same level of respect in a
post-Cold War era defined as possessing a lack of ideological alternatives.
They argue that Russia, on its side, adopted more of a “mirroring” strategy
of the West. While Russia initially tried to mimic the West, Putin’s second
term put an end to that imitation model when Russia started to use tactics
to show America that it was its equal. The point of Russia’s interference in
the 2016 American elections was simply to show that Russia could do to

41
Acharya (2017, pp. 271–285).
42
Wu (2012).
43
Coker (2019).
44
Krastev and Holmes (2018, pp. 117–128).
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

America what America had been doing to Russia. China’s imitation game
is described as “imitation by appropriation” whereby it took aspects of the
Western model that it found useful for development and rejected any
change of identity. China is now the symbol of how one can partially copy
a development model successfully while retaining national uniqueness.45
“Western civilization is unique, but not universal.” Those were the
words of Samuel Huntington in 1996.46 At the end of the Cold War,
Westerners believed that the West had led the world to modern society
and that as people in other civilizations modernized, they would also
Westernize in the process. It was assumed that as others took on similar
patterns of education, work, wealth, and class structure that Western cul-
ture would become the universal culture of the world. Huntington argued
that this line of thinking was misguided and arrogant because “modern”
civilization and “Western” civilization are not one and the same thing—
Western civilization emerged before modernity. Western civilization stems
from the classic legacies of the Greek and Roman civilizations. It is also
based on Christianity—Protestantism and Catholicism and the impor-
tance of the rift between the two. It is based on European languages such
as Latin, Germanic, and Romance languages. Separation of spiritual and
temporal authority is another feature, which contributed greatly to the
development of “freedom” in the West. The rule of law is another compo-
nent inherited from the Romans which developed into Natural Law in
medieval times and Common Law in England. As a result of the applica-
tion of the rule of law, constitutionalism and the protection of human
rights took shape against the arbitrary exercise of power. Huntington
argues that the relationship between law and shaping behavior was not as
poignant in other civilizations. Social pluralism and civil society are other
characteristics of Western civilization. Class pluralism included a strong
aristocracy, a substantial peasantry, and a small class of merchants and trad-
ers. The presence and strength of the feudal aristocracy limited absolutism
from taking a firm room in Europe. This differs sharply from empires that
existed at the same time in Russia, China, the Ottoman Empire, and other
non-Western civilizations. Representative bodies are also features of
Western civilization as social pluralism gave rise to estates, parliaments,

45
Krastev and Holmes, Lights.
46
Samuel P. Huntington, “The West is Unique, not Universal,” Foreign Affairs,
November/December 1996. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1996-11-01/west-
unique-not-universal.
12 S. LOFTUS

and other institutions that represented the interests of the various groups
in society. This then paved the way for modern democracy. Self-government
became an important characteristic as representation at the national level
was supplemented by a measure of autonomy at the local level, not seen in
any other civilization at this time. Individualism is another feature. A
strong sense of individualism emerged as a result of all the other features
and a tradition of individual rights and liberties. Collectivism is a more
prominent feature in other civilizations. While none of these are unique to
the West, the combination of them is, and has given the West its distinctive
quality.47
Based on this assessment, it is no wonder that countries that comprise
“Western civilization” have had an easier time consolidating liberal democ-
racy as a form of governance. Institutional legacies pave the way for mod-
ern governance. Understanding this reality helps defend the concept of
non-intervention as a superior foreign policy choice when it comes to
governance. A cross-cultural survey concluded that the values that are
most important in the West are the least important worldwide.48
Huntington also argued that modernization and economic develop-
ment promoted the resurgence of indigenous cultures as opposed to
Western imitations, often taking on a religious form and an anti-Western
tone. While the West believed that non-Western people should commit
themselves to Western values of democracy, free markets, limited govern-
ment, separation of church and state, human rights, individualism, and the
rule of law, what was “universalism” to the West often appeared as “impe-
rialism” to the rest.49 Acharya describes the emerging world order as a
“multiplex.”50 This entails a multi-civilizational world where one can no
longer understand global affairs in terms of the dominance of Western
civilization. It will instead be a world where interactions and mutual learn-
ing among different civilizations and states will take place. In such a world,
there is no room for “liberal hegemony” as a foreign policy or the “uni-
versalization” of the liberal normative framework of governance. Some are
quite pessimistic about this new world. Coker views this shift as an inevi-
table path to chaos. He argues that culture has become the “currency of
power” in the way that ideology was the currency of power during the

47
Huntington, “Unique, not Universal.”
48
Hofstede (1983, p. 53).
49
Huntington, “Unique, not Universal.”
50
Acharya (2017).
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

Cold War, putting Russia and China and their “civilization state” against
the United States and the West. Moreover, he argues that the West is in
trouble, as its two “social imaginaries” of Wilsonian liberal international-
ism and Kantian European cosmopolitanism are losing ground. The
Trump Administration expressed no belief in human rights or democracy
promotion, and European Kantian cosmopolitanism appears to have been
replaced by a pragmatism that has lost interest in the project. He under-
lines that while China and Russia celebrate their civilizations, the West is
undergoing deep self-criticism about its colonial and imperialist past that
leaves no room for a constructive revival. The future world order is headed
toward the idea of “cultural coexistence,” and order he fears will only give
more power to the great powers and ensure that little powers have no
relevance, paving the way for a world of chaos, devoid of social norms, and
lawless.51

Democracy and the U.S.-Led Liberal International Order

When the Cold War ended, the United States occupied a position of unri-
valed aggregate national power. The United States was the sole hegemon
of the international system in what could be described as a “unipolar sys-
tem.” Structural Realism suggests this type of system is the least durable of
all power configurations due to the hegemon’s tendency to overextend
itself and exceed its economic, military, demographic, and political
resources.52 Unipolarity is also argued not to be very durable due to the
tendency of weaker states in the international system to balance the power
of the hegemon by “bandwagoning” with other powers for a more equi-
table distribution of power.53 Based on this theory, the “liberal interna-
tional order” built after World War II which then widened across the globe
after the Cold War might have been a momentary outcome of hegemonic
forces and will give way as American power declines.54 Contrastingly, lib-
eral internationalists argue that the liberal international order does not
need a hegemon to sustain it. The American-led postwar international

51
Coker, Civilizational States.
52
Waltz (2000).
53
Walt (1985).
54
Graham Allison, “The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to
Conventional Wisdom,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018; Patrick Porter, “A World
Imagined, Nostalgia and the Liberal Order,” Policy Analysis, no. 843 (Washington, DC:
CATO institution 2018).
14 S. LOFTUS

order was built on a system of bilateral and multilateral alliances which do

not in themselves hold liberal properties. As this system began spreading
outwardly onto the world, illiberal states became a part of it and made it
harder to achieve consensus within it, thus fragmenting it today as states
pick and choose their connections to it.55 Challenges today thus stem from
a reaction to modernity and a crisis of leadership as opposed to declining
American hegemony.
As for the “retreat” of democracy in the world today, some are directly
tying this to relative power losses of the liberal hegemon. In line with this
argument, the 1990s may simply have been an atypical period of over-
whelming dominance by the United States and its democratic allies which
created a favorable international environment for democracy without
which it would not have prospered. In this respect, the processes of
democratization and democratic reversals happen in waves depending on
the strength of the liberal hegemon. When democratic institutions gener-
ate greater trust through delivering economic growth, peace, stability, and
public services, the demand for democracy spreads. But when existing
democracies appear less worthy of emulation, democratic reversals are
more likely to appear.56 In contrast, Levitsky and Way argue that the per-
ceptions of a democratic recession are rooted in a flawed understanding of
the events of the early 1990s. At this time, the crises occurring in authori-
tarian regimes were categorized as democratic transitions when really, they
were crises caused by diminished revenues from the USSR and the United
States. Economic crises deprived autocrats of the resources needed to sus-
tain themselves in power. These nations then experienced a reversal in the
2000s with rising commodities prices which led to a boost in state capacity
and consolidation of their autocratic regimes.57 Similarly, Diamond argues
that many of the “transitions” that took place in the “third wave of democ-
ratization” were simply a transition to semi-authoritarian rule categorized
as “hybrid regimes,” practicing electoral democracy without liberal
characteristics.58
Democracy is homegrown and highly depends on institutional legacy.
For this reason, the presence of a liberal hegemon is unlikely to change
and reconfigure domestic political regimes worldwide, as was

55
Ikenberry (2020).
56
Kagan (2018a).
57
Levitsky and Way (2018).
58
Diamond (2002, pp. 21–35, 2018).
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is important to mention

because it signifies that a decline in American power does not have to
equate to a decline in democracy as a political regime. Concomitantly, it
signifies that the relative rise of China does not have to signify the rise of
global authoritarianism. Contrary to popular belief, China is not trying to
dismantle the international order nor is it trying to spread its political and
economic model of governance onto the world. It is however trying to
gain more power and leadership within the order and is creating new non-
Western-­ led institutions such as the BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure
Development Bank, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, among
others. The growth of China’s influence abroad signifies a shift in global
norms spreading in that the world is no longer dominated by a “universal”
normative framework to which all should aspire but now has much more
room for a multi-civilizational, multicultural, multi-political structure of
international relations.
Similarly, as Russia gained power in the international system, it was
more able to project its influence around the world. As a country with a
unique historical trajectory and national identity, Russian national inter-
ests were often not in sync with Western interests, leading their relation-
ship to sour. The zero-sum nature of the European security architecture
made it practically impossible to reconcile the major normative differences
between Russia and the West. Perceptions of insecurity proliferated as a
result. Over the post-Cold War era, liberal hegemonic practices were a
powerful motivating factor for the development of Russian nationalism
and anti-Western rhetoric. Putin’s anti-liberal rhetoric is echoed in popu-
list parties throughout the West and is supported by international actors
that have criticized the liberal international order and U.S. hegemony.
Today’s great power relations are different from Cold War times. Russia
and China don’t have ideologies of their own—they are rather trying to
balance American power and create a more multipolar system that is more
in line with their national interests. The rise in their material capabilities
translates into a heightened ability to assert their national interests abroad,
which are partially shaped by their very different national and civilizational
identities. It will thus be increasingly challenging if not dangerous to con-
tinue the pursuit of “liberal hegemony” or the concept of “liberal univer-
salism” with rising non-Western powers in the system as interests will clash
and the likelihood of war will increase. Today, liberal universalism is being
challenged by alternative norms. Global norms spreading away from the
normative framework of liberalism are visible in international fora such as
16 S. LOFTUS

the United Nations General Assembly as Russia and China increase their
ties with the Global South. Countries heavily engaged in commercial ties
with the Chinese are increasingly backing away from supporting Western
harangues on China’s human rights abuses.59 In the U.S.-led vote to
remove Russia from the UN Human Rights Council after its invasion of
Ukraine, 93 countries supported the move while 100 did not, demon-
strating that national interests are taking precedence over siding with the
West in the increasingly confrontational environment between great pow-
ers. A desire to be “non-aligned” is taking shape as countries refuse to
take sides.60
Rather than liberal democracy suffering as a result of waning U.S. hege-
mony, policy choices and domestic considerations are more to blame for
these struggles. Free-market policies were initially hailed as an important
step in ensuring prosperity and broader freedoms throughout the world,
and a wide body of research attests to their economic benefits in terms of
reduced unemployment and increased economic growth. However, these
policies sacrificed social and political rights in the interest of economic
competitiveness.61 People in the rural communities in the American mid-­
west and south have expressed feelings of having become strangers in their
own land. The shutting down of coal plants and the shrinking of the man-
ufacturing sector more broadly have led to major social problems related
to alcohol and drug abuse, increasing the suicide rate in the country.
These issues have fueled politics of resentment in rural America, which
blame global trade, racial minorities, and immigrants for their job losses.
For Trump supporters, globalization and the immigration that accompa-
nies it connote job losses and a drop in social status and self-esteem.
Similarly, the rhetoric behind the Brexit leave campaign alluded to a time
before Britain joined the EU, when society was predominantly white
Anglo-Saxon, when manufacturing jobs still provided security for union-
ized workers, and when Britain was a major economic and military
world power.62

59
Piccone (2018).
60
Shivshankar Menon, “A New Cold War May Call for a Return to Nonalignment,”
Foreign Policy, Jul 1, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/01/nonalignment-
international-system-alliance-bloc/.
61
Robert Blanton and Dursun Peksen, “The Dark Side of Economic Freedom:
Neoliberalism has Deleterious Effects on Labour Rights,” LSE BPP, August 19, 2016.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-dark-side-of-economic-freedom/.
62
Norris and Inglehart (2019).
 1 INTRODUCTION 17

According to the 2017 Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, almost

56 million people across Europe voted for a left- or right-wing populist
party. 63 The vote share of these parties has been on the rise since the
1980s but gained strong momentum after the 2008 financial crisis. Many
felt left behind by changes in society which accompany neoliberal eco-
nomic displacement. As a result, levels of political trust toward European
institutions started to decline.64 This mistrust of the “elite” and of estab-
lishment institutions among a significant portion of the population has
created deep polarization in society between pro-establishment and anti-­
establishment sentiment. In fact, the anti-establishment sentiment is so
strong in the United States that only a slim majority (55%) of the popula-
tion accepts Joe Biden as having legitimately won the 2020 Presidential
Elections.65
The constituencies in Western liberal democracies are protesting against
excessive liberalism. Fukuyama argues that the problem within liberal
democracies stems from liberalism’s weakness in generating bonds of
mutual respect and affection among citizens which affects collective con-
sensus. Identity politics are a manifestation of the dissatisfaction with glo-
balization and liberalization and the damaging effects of economic crises
on the idea of an open and liberal world order. These dynamics can be
seen both on the right and on the left of the political spectrum through
the left’s incessant creation of diverse groups with varying interests and
the right’s defense of a singular national identity connected to race, eth-
nicity, and religion.66

63
Andreas J. Heinö, “Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2017,” Accessed August 5,
2022. https://timbro.se/allmant/timbro-authoritarian-populism-index2017/.
64
Diego Muro and Guillem Vidal, “Mind the Gaps: The Political Consequences of the
Great Recession in Europe,” LSE Eurocrisis in the Press, June 10, 2014. https://blogs.lse.
ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2014/06/10/mind-the-gaps-the-political-consequences-of-the-great-
recession-in-europe/
65
Maya Yang, “More than 40% in US do not Believe Biden Legitimately Won Election—
Poll,” The Guardian, January 5, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/
jan/05/america-biden-election-2020-poll-victory.
66
Fukuyama (2018).
18 S. LOFTUS

Political Pluralism, International Pragmatism,

and the Protection of Democracy
Generating bonds of mutual respect and encouraging collective consensus
is essential for the health of any democracy. Generating these starts from
the consolidation of a healthy national identity. Lepore argues that the
American experiment rests on what Jefferson called “these truths,” which
include political equality, natural rights, and the sovereignty of the people.
She makes a case for an American narrative that encompasses its constant
contradictions struggling to define the meaning of its history while stress-
ing the necessity of engaging in this struggle.67 McClay argues that a great
nation needs and deserves a great and coherent narrative, as an expression
of its own self-understanding and needs to be able to convey this narrative
to the youth. The narrative has to be truthful by being honest about the
past, but continuing to be inspired by the future.68 While identity shaping
is crucial for national cohesion, so are policy choices to minimize griev-
ances. Polarization and populist sentiment are primarily caused by a per-
ceived loss of livelihood and a perceived loss of identity for a significant
portion of the American and European middle classes. By re-investing in
society, the United States can ensure a better future for itself. By address-
ing inequality and creating job opportunities for the displaced, the United
States is more likely to encourage trust in society. Lack of trust becomes
more prevalent when the government is unable to deliver on its funda-
mental purposes.
Part of re-prioritizing domestic politics does entail shifting priorities
abroad. But this does not have to equate “isolationism.” Neoconservatives,
liberals, and other idealists view the American retreat as disastrous for the
liberal international world order and for liberal internationalism. Kagan
argues that with the absence of a liberal hegemon the world will resort to
violent multipolar competition, instability, insecurity, and domination.69
But America does not have to choose between retreat and full-on engage-
ment. In addition, the alternative to American hegemony does not sym-
bolize the end of international cooperation. There can be international
cooperation and multilateralism without liberal hegemony, a concept that
validates liberal theories of internationalism. In fact, such a form of inter-
national cooperation, with a diminished role of ideology, would increase
67
Lepore (2019).
68
McClay (2019).
69
Kagan (2018b).
 1 INTRODUCTION 19

global stability. Even John Mearsheimer, a die-hard realist has said that
promoting an open international economy and creating institutions are
likely to succeed because they can be consistent with both a liberal and a
realist foreign policy. But democracy promotion on the other hand is
not.70 Moreover, the United States would more likely preserve its wealth
and way of life by investing in research and development, technology, job
creation, and infrastructure as opposed to recklessly spending it in the
pursuit of American hegemony abroad or democratizing countries that
may not even wish to democratize. The United States can prioritize its
relations with like-minded nations as well as engage in nonideological rela-
tions with nondemocracies.
The book discusses the idea of a more “pluralist” international system
that makes room for differing sets of interests, respect for national identity,
regime type, and a more pragmatic and diplomatic approach to resolving
global problems. While not proposing a concrete model for the future, the
book uses the war in Ukraine as an example where pluralism and pragma-
tism could have avoided the catastrophic war and could potentially avoid
many more. Since the end of the Cold War, expanding the EU and NATO
was the predominant idea in the Euro-Atlantic space. Essentially, there
was no room for any alternative normative frameworks aside from the
choice of Euro-Atlantic integration or remaining outside of this frame-
work. Also, there was no notion of any “shared neighborhood” practices
with the much larger, non-Western Russian neighbor who had just expe-
rienced the collapse of its empire. Pre-2014 war society in Ukraine was
divided over EU membership and mostly over NATO membership. The
view of Ukrainians was highly dependent on their proximity to Russia and
Europe.71 Moreover, the idea of gaining autonomous status within
Ukraine was rather prevalent in the Donbas.72 This suggests that there
were different visions in Ukraine for the future path of the country as well.
Sakwa describes these two visions as the “Monist” vision and the “Pluralist”
vision. The Monist vision of Ukraine can be defined by the necessity to
gain back an identity that was lost during Russian imperialism and had
developed separately from the East Slavic Community of Russia and

70
Mearsheimer (2018).
71
Julie Ray and Neli Esipova, “Before Crisis, Ukrainians More Likely to See NATO as a
Threat,” Gallup, March 14, 2014. https://news.gallup.com/poll/167927/crisis-­
ukrainians-­likely-nato-threat.aspx.
72
Katchanovski (2017).
20 S. LOFTUS

Belarus. Internal debates about the establishment of Russian as a second

official language in Ukraine met resistance among this group as it was seen
to diminish Ukraine’s identity prior to Russian imperialism. In this vision
for Ukraine, Ukraine must rid the society of all elements related to this
imperial past and move westward. This vision has become increasingly
“nationalist” over the years and has alienated parts of the country that
advocated for a more pluralist vision for Ukraine, one that allowed for
more autonomy for their regions, having Russian as a second official state
language and maintaining relations with both Russia and the West through
the continuation of Ukraine’s “non-bloc status.”73 This discrepancy
between the East and the West stems back centuries as the country expe-
rienced separate historical trajectories as part of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire.
The Eastern part of the country shares a much longer history with Russia.
The binary structure of European security and normativity increased
polarization in Ukraine and increased the likelihood of great power com-
petition over its future.
The Minsk Agreement to end the initial Russian-backed separatist 2014
war in Ukraine’s East would have fulfilled the idea of increased autonomy
for the Donbas. Many argue that this would have been a “Trojan horse”
for Russia to influence Ukrainian politics. But the reality of the situation is
that the Donbas and Russia naturally held similar views for the future of
Ukraine exhibited by the voting patterns for pro-Russian political parties
in that part of the country.74 Even if integrating into Western institutions
such as the EU or NATO may not have panned out for Ukraine under
such an arrangement, alternative arrangements could have been devised to
ensure the security, development, and prosperity of Ukraine as a nation.
Frameworks such as the EU and NATO create a binarism whereby if one
is a member of these institutions they are automatically in political, eco-
nomic, and security competition with those remaining outside of this
group. This may have strongly appealed to those advocating for the
“Monist” vision for Ukraine but ignored a vast segment of the population
advocating for a more Pluralist vision and continued ties with Russia.

73
Sakwa (2017b, pp. 406–425).
74
Eurasian Research Institute. “Geography of the Presidential Elections in Ukraine”
Almaty, Kazakhstan: Eurasian Research Institute, Accessed August 4, 2022. https://www.
eurasian-research.org/publication/geography-of-the-presidential-elections-in-ukraine/.
 1 INTRODUCTION 21

A RAND study has suggested an alternative architecture for European

politics, economics, and security. This proposal was devised by groups of
experts from the West, Russia, and the states in between them. The idea
was to limit great power confrontation in the region and improve security
and prosperity. Removing the binarism is possible through pragmatism
and pluralism. RAND’s proposal includes the formation of a new consul-
tative body for major-power engagement on the regional security architec-
ture whereby Russia, the United States, and the EU would regularly
consult one another on any changes to the security architecture while tak-
ing each other’s views into consideration. Their proposal also includes
new norms for the already-existing blocs, whereby no changes are to be
made without the consent of the other power, prioritizing regional stabil-
ity. A “third-way” for states is also proposed, whereby a nation can seek
not to be part of any bloc formalized through multilateral security guaran-
tees. The proposal offers solutions for multi-directional trade between
economic blocs, establishing dialogue among the EU and the EAEU and
the in-between states, and creating new norms for current trade blocs. It
would also move efforts on status-neutral management measures for
regional conflicts and on agreed settlements.75
If such pragmatic approaches were more often taken, great power
rivalry could be avoided. This type of suggestion transcends realism and
liberalism as it acknowledges realist security concerns but finds compro-
mises to deal with them without resorting to a world devoid of coopera-
tion that prioritizes nationalism and mercantilism and pure “balance of
power politics” or “spheres of influence.” Today’s world is characterized
by a multi-civilizational configuration of nations with rising material capa-
bilities and different national interests that cannot simply go away if
ignored. To navigate the twenty-first-century challenges, this would be a
much more cautious approach to international relations.

Structure of the Book

After this introductory chapter, the book proceeds with a chapter on the
management of the liberal international order and the evolution of democ-
racy in the world. It analyzes the unintended consequences of liberal hege-
mony as a foreign policy, neoliberal economic policy prescriptions, and the

75
Charap et al. (2019).
22 S. LOFTUS

international results of attempting to imitate the Western model of gover-

nance. It then proceeds with a chapter on Russian-Western relations after
the Cold War which analyzes the main driving forces behind the deteriora-
tion of relations. It also explains Russia’s concept of self and post-­Soviet
identity. It then proceeds with a chapter on the impact and rise of China’s
global influence, a power with a non-Western identity, and its growing ties
with Russia. The last major chapter focuses on the Ukraine Crisis and how
the major themes of this book come into play in this gruesome unfortu-
nate war. It then closes with a traditional conclusion and makes the case
for more political pluralism in the international system as well as increased
attention to domestic politics in liberal democracies.

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 CHAPTER 2

Management of the Liberal International

Order

Introduction
After the fall of communism, liberal democracy, and liberal market econo-
mies were embraced worldwide as the superior form of political and eco-
nomic governance. Democratization and liberalization processes took
place across the formerly communist world as part of the “third wave of
democratization,” a global trend which started in the late 1970s.1
However, today a leading institution measuring freedom in the world has
assessed that democracy in the world has been in steady decline since the
year 2006. Despite the progress in democratization over a period of almost
40 years where the number of electoral democracies rose from 35 in 1970
to over 110 in 2014, since 2006, there has been a global democratic reces-
sion of declining aggregate Freedom House scores.2 Some scholars have
argued that current democratic trends are more of a perception than the
true representation of reality. Levitsky and Way argue that the state of
global democracy has remained stable over the last decade and has
improved markedly relative to the 1990s. They argue that the perceptions
of a democratic recession are rooted in a flawed understanding of the
events of the early 1990s. At this time, many of the crises occurring in

1
Huntington (1991, p. 13).
2
Freedom in the World (2022).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 27

Switzerland AG 2023
S. Loftus, Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era,
New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20089-2_2
28 S. LOFTUS

authoritarian regimes were mistakenly categorized as democratization

processes. Due to the important loss of support from the Soviet Union
and from the United States for anti-communist dictatorships, the end of
the Cold War was extremely destabilizing for autocrats. Deep economic
crises deprived autocrats of the resources needed to sustain themselves in
power. Then in the 2000s due to soaring commodity prices, these nations
experienced a boost in state capacity which allowed them to regain strength
and confidence in their autocratic ways. Moreover, the geopolitical envi-
ronment started to change in the 2000s as China, Russia, and other
regional powers together with soaring oil prices created more space for
autocrats to consolidate and stabilize their regimes.3 Similarly, Diamond
argues that many of the “transitions” that took place in the third wave of
democratization were simply a transition to semi-authoritarian rule
whereby regimes adopted a form of “hybrid” rule, practicing electoral
democracy without liberal characteristics.4
Others have argued that the processes of democratization and demo-
cratic reversals happen in waves. Studies have shown that democratic insti-
tutions generate greater trust when they reliably deliver economic growth,
peace, stability, and public services. The demand for democracy spreads
from one country to another in regional waves and the reversals of democ-
racy follow the same patterns. In other words, when existing democracies
appear less worthy of emulation, democratic institutions are less likely to
spread. Similarly, others have argued that the current trends in democratic
retrenchment are caused by the inevitable consequence of liberalism’s fail-
ures and the rebalancing of power politics.5 In line with this argument, the
1990s may simply have been an atypical period of overwhelming domi-
nance by the United States and its democratic allies which created a favor-
able international environment for democracy without which it would not
have prospered.6 In this sense, politics follow geopolitics. Democracies in
Greek city-states proliferated in the fifth century BCE when the Athenian
democratic empire rose to power and Sparta’s power was reflected through
the spread of Spartan-style oligarchies. Similarly, when the USSR rose to
power, communism spread globally. In the later Cold War years when the

3
Levitsky and Way (2018).
4
Diamond (2002).
5
Mearsheimer (2018).
6
Kagan (2018a).
 2 MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 29

United States and Europe gained the advantage and triumphed, democra-
cies proliferated and communism collapsed.7
If a liberal hegemon is then needed for democratic proliferation,
Structural Realism suggests that a unipolar world order, or one with a
single hegemon, is the least durable of all power configurations due to the
hegemon’s tendency to over extend itself and exceed its economic, mili-
tary, demographic, and political resources.8 Based on this theory, the “lib-
eral international order” built after World War II which then widened
across the globe after the Cold War might have been a momentary out-
come of hegemonic forces and will give way as American power declines.9
The “liberal international order” can be described as the set of global,
rule-based, structured relationships based on political liberalism, eco-
nomic liberalism, and liberal internationalism.10 Accordingly, when the
world is less American it will also be less liberal.11 Neorealists argued that
the practice of liberal hegemony, which can be defined as the active pursuit
of re-making the world into America’s image and spreading “the rule of
law, property rights and other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be,” is what
led to American decline today. According to Brown University’s Cost of
War project, America’s post-9/11 wars have incurred roughly $5.6 trillion
and around 370,000 civilian and combatant deaths.12 Unipolarity is also
argued not to be very durable due to the tendency of weaker states in the
international system to balance the power of the hegemon by “bandwag-
oning” with other powers for a more equitable distribution of power. The
“balance of power theory” in international relations suggests that states
may secure their survival by preventing any one state from gaining enough
military power to dominate all others.13
Liberal internationalists see today’s crisis differently. They argue that
today’s crisis is one of leadership and modernity and argue that liberal
internationalism always prevails in spite of the multiple crises it has endured

7
Diamond (2018).
8
Waltz (2000, pp. 5–41).
9
Graham Allison, “The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to
Conventional Wisdom,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018; Porter (2018).
10
Lake et al. (2021, pp. 225–257).
11
Ikenberry (2020, p. 10).
12
James Carden, “Why Liberal Hegemony?” The Nation, November 12, 2018. https://
www.thenation.com/article/archive/liberal-hegemony-foreign-policy/
13
Walt (1987, pp. 17–29).
30 S. LOFTUS

throughout history.14 The liberal international order does not need a

hegemon to sustain itself and can continue to thrive. In this line of argu-
mentation, the American-led postwar international order has been built
on a system of bilateral and multilateral alliances, and this cooperative
security does not itself have liberal properties. It was liberal only in the
sense that it was an alliance of liberal democracies during the Cold War.
After the Cold War, as globalization spread, illiberal states became a part
of the liberal order, and the order thus widened in scope, making it more
difficult to achieve political consensus within it. The post-World War II
liberal international order has thus been fragmented, thereby allowing
states to pick and choose their connections to it.15 But even liberal inter-
nationalists agree with realist criticism on “liberal hegemony” as a foreign
policy in that it does not represent true liberal internationalism as it was
intended.16 In this regard, the world does not need the United States to
hold disaggregate amounts of power to maintain the international order
and the democratic ideal.
Reconciling these two theories largely depends on how one defines
“the liberal international order.” If it is defined as a system of rules-based
multilateral institutions, this does not need a liberal hegemon to sustain
itself, as it is rational for states to cooperate on matters of mutual and
international concern.17 However, if the definition includes the values of
liberal democracy, specific liberal market prescriptions, and the promotion
of these values worldwide, the system does need a liberal hegemon to sus-
tain itself, for these values and systems are not naturally universal and
require an element of compulsion. That being said, this policy is unlikely
to work on the long term due to pushback from national particularism as
well as the overextension of the hegemon’s resources in the pursuit of this
policy. The spread of liberal democracy through interventions has been
destabilizing. It has also not worked in places such as Afghanistan and
Iraq. In addition, interventions on a softer scale have also become conten-
tious, as local leaders start to fear their grip on power is being threatened,
as was the case with American democracy promotion in the Arab Spring.18
This issue can take on an even greater threat if Western support of local
14
Ikenberry (2020, p. 40).
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Keohane (2005).
18
Ron Nixon, “U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings.” NY Times. April 15, 2011.
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html
 2 MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 31

democracies becomes a zero-sum struggle with a neighboring autocracy

which considers its neighbors to be a matter of national security concern,
such as in Ukraine and Taiwan. Such issues risk the start of World War III
over the wrong ideological framework. In reality, disagreements are not
based on a fight between democracy and autocracy as it is often framed in
the West, but a fight for national interests and influence.
Democracy is homegrown and depends more on domestic institutions
than the presence of a liberal hegemon. The struggles the world is seeing
with democracy today are not a result of declining American hegemony
but a result of flawed domestic policies as well as cultural distinctions in
societal governance. Many nations around the world have been employing
more “nationalist” or “civilizationalist” rhetoric in their domestic politics
as they prioritize retaining their cultural particularities and identity.
Similarly, within liberal democracies in the West, excessive liberal policies
in the name of globalism and economic efficiency have led to a cultural
backlash among middle-class constituencies. While the middle classes in
countries such as India and China greatly benefited from neoliberal eco-
nomic policies as their countries experienced rapid economic growth, the
middle classes in Western nations suffered as a result of rapid technological
innovation and manufacturing jobs being outsourced to Asia. Moreover,
these policies significantly increased inequality in society which directly
contributed to growing populist and anti-establishment sentiment and a
renewed emphasis on retaining a “lost” “white” and “Christian” identity
amidst a hyper-globalized world. The idea of “civilizational nationalism”
was invoked in Trump’s anti-liberal rhetoric.19
Populist parties have increasingly gained influence across Europe and
the United States and other parts of the world, using the narrative that the
establishment is to blame for popular discontent and excessive immigra-
tion which threatens their jobs and identity.20 This has exacerbated politi-
cal polarization in Western societies between those who benefit from
policies of globalization and those who appear to lose from them as well
as between those who yearn for traditional Western society versus those
who advocate for a technocratic liberal international order.21 In other parts
of the world, “politics of resentment” in relatively new democracies have
also arisen based on resulting frustrations from imitating a “superior

19
Acharya (2020, pp. 139–156).
20
Jay et al. (2019).
21
Kimmage (2020, p. 384).
32 S. LOFTUS

­ estern model” without fully being able to achieve it nor being extended
w
the same level of respect. Nations such as Poland and Hungary have
shifted course and have established a more nationalist identity.22
China experienced rapid economic growth with its state-led economic
model and authoritarian political system and is demonstrating that alter-
native forms of governance are also viable and can lead a country to great
prosperity as well. This does not mean that countries will want to imitate
China’s form of governance; it simply represents an alternative normative
framework away from liberal democracy. The rise of China will affect
global norms in this way. In addition, many third-world nations are find-
ing it easier to do business with China without having “liberal strings
attached” which usually require domestic reform in return for aid or
investment. Their growing ties are visible in international forums such as
the United Nations General Assembly, where countries increasingly back
away from supporting Western harangues on China’s human rights abus-
es.23 Russia has also benefited from the 2000s commodities boom and has
become increasingly assertive and authoritarian. Russia has increasingly
resorted to destabilizing Western societies through the use of asymmetric
tactics to try and lessen the influence of political liberalism, which it
believes to be an American-led ideology used for global domination. In
addition, the fact that 35 countries abstained from condemning the
Russian invasion of Ukraine shows that Russia has important influence
abroad. Many developing countries have refused to join the West in its
response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. In the U.S.-led vote to remove
Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, for example, 93 countries
supported the move while 100 did not. It is also important to note that
those 100 countries are home to 76% of the world’s population.24

A Brief History of the U.S.-Led Liberal

International Order
According to a general consensus definition between scholars, an order is
an organized group of international institutions that help govern the
interactions among the member states.25 The vision for the U.S.-led liberal

22
Krastev and Holmes (2020).
23
Piccone (2018).
24
United Nations (2022).
25
Mearsheimer (2019), Brands (2016, p. 2); Ikenberry (2001, p. 23, 45).
 2 MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 33

international order has its roots in the Wilsonian tradition, which is based
on a belief that through the processes of multilateralism and moderniza-
tion, nations of the world would transform politically and socially, leading
to peace in the world. Woodrow Wilson had a vision for international
cooperation which encompassed collective security and free trade, which
would be bound together by rules and norms. However, the interwar
years made it difficult to create such cooperation and were instead plagued
by the Great Depression and the rise of fascism and totalitarianism in
Europe. These issues coupled with the tragedies of World War I also cre-
ated an environment in American domestic politics that favored non-­
involvement in world affairs.26
A grand shift in liberal international ideas then took place in the late
1930s and 1940s as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal became more
expansive and progressive. Universal rights and protections gained
momentum, as did the solidarity of Western liberal democracies around
the world. The idea was to sustain a vision for the world in pursuit of eco-
nomic and social advancement, which would be led by the United States.
Under Harry S. Truman, Roosevelt-era liberal internationalism was incor-
porated into a wider project of American hegemonic leadership during the
Cold War era. After World War II, regional and global institutions led by
the United States were created to foster cooperation and shared norms
and promote peace. These institutions included the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which later became the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the United Nations (UN), the European Union
(EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The purpose
of these institutions was to provide a rule-based structure for political,
economic, and security relations. The liberal idea motivating these institu-
tions was that such cooperative frameworks would encourage economic
prosperity and prevent war. As part of this process, the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference was held in July 1944 at the Mount
Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, where delegates
from 44 nations created a new international monetary system known as
the Bretton Woods system based on free trade and the free convertibility
of currencies.

26
Office of the Historian (2022).
34 S. LOFTUS

At this moment, the U.S.-led international order comprised the liberal

democracies of the West and was based on open trade, cooperative secu-
rity, multilateralism, democratic solidarity, and American leadership.27
Liberal democracies were the foundation of that order, but they also had
ties to other nations. Being inside the order was part of a type of bargain,
supporting the United States in its fight against communism in exchange
for access to its markets and security protection. This order existed along-
side the USSR-led communist order throughout the Cold War in a bipolar
power structure. There was a clear purpose to the order in the context of
the Cold War—a feature that greatly increased domestic support for it as
well as enhanced collaborative relations within it.28 European integration,
a process occurring simultaneously and based on the same principles, was
seen as a desirable alternative for European nations who had lost their
empires and whose power did not match that of the United States or the
Soviet Union.
U.S. foreign policy at this time was that of “containment” toward the
Soviet Union, or, halting the spread of Communism rather than actively
engaging in the spread of democracy. At this time, there were few attempts
to replicate the successes of Germany and Japan, where the United States
engaged in active societal transformations after the War. While efforts
were made to promote democratic and free-market values around the
world, there was no element of compulsion. U.S. interventions to over-
throw unfavorable regimes at the time were not intended to transform
society but to bolster anti-communist leaders. When the Cold War ended,
the United States felt free to use its unrivaled power to resolve interna-
tional problems that were of strategic concern much like it had in Germany
and Japan four decades prior. This occurred alongside the processes of
globalization and the spread of the U.S.-led liberal international order
outward to the rest of the world. Formerly communist nations were now
transitioning to democracies and to liberal market systems. Great power
rivalry was at a low ebb and the United States held a strong advantage due
to its economy, military, and size and was completely unrivaled by any
other nation.

27
Ikenberry (2020).
28
Ibid.
 2 MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 35

Problems with Universalism

The post-Cold War presidents in the United States “universalized”
American foreign policy and the idea of the “West.”29 Fukuyama famously
described this period as “the end of history” whereby all nations would
converge into a single prototype of liberal democratic free-market societ-
ies—a recipe for peace in the world.30 Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and
Barrack Obama all shared this vision and believed that international poli-
tics were a mechanism for increasing democracy and openness. The idea of
the “West” was no longer thought to be a unique trait belonging to
Western civilization, but a way of life that could be adopted and universal-
ized by nations coming from distinctive cultural heritages.
The features that characterize Western civilization include a legacy
based on the classical civilizations of Greece and Rome, Christianity,
European languages, separation of spiritual and temporal authority, the
rule of law, social pluralism and civil society, self-government, and indi-
vidualism.31 These features were believed to be “universal” features that all
nations should strive to adopt even though their historical legacies have
shaped and formed different systems and values. All three of these post-­
Cold War presidents were optimistic about liberal internationalism.32
Clinton was optimistic about economic openness and implemented the
Washington Consensus. He aligned the new world order with the process
of NATO enlargement and the growth of the European Union, all
designed to halt the processes of nationalism and war. While the enlarge-
ment of the EU met little resistance, NATO enlargement was met with an
initially reluctant foreign policy establishment in the United States. George
Kennan, the architect of U.S. containment policy toward the Soviet
Union, was the strongest critic and argued that enlargement eastward
would receive a catastrophic counterreaction from Russia. He stated in an
interview in 1998, “I think it is the beginning of a new Cold War…I think
the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their poli-
cies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever.

29
Kimmage (2020).
30
Fukuyama (2012).
31
Samuel P. Huntington, “The West is Unique, not Universal,” Foreign Affairs,
November/December 1996. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1996-11-01/
west-unique-not-universal
32
Kimmage (2020).
36 S. LOFTUS

No one was threatening anybody else.”33 Nevertheless, the process of

enlargement was aimed at integrating the economies in Europe, creating
institutional peace and cooperation as well as democracy promotion. For
these reasons, such security concerns were dismissed based on the idea
that expanding liberal democracy would be successful and ultimately cre-
ate peace in Europe. Bush’s focus on the other hand was more geopoliti-
cal, but was nevertheless based on the same premise that liberalism was
universal. Bush and his team believed promoting liberalism internationally
would be the antidote to terrorism and war and therefore believed it was
necessary to impose liberty by force if need be, particularly in the Middle
East. After invading Afghanistan in 2001 as a response to the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks, it was advised that the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq
would be the next appropriate step in this global pursuit of freedom. Both
of these wars lasted much longer and turned into unsuccessful processes of
re-engineering societies that the United States didn’t understand very
much about. Obama’s focus was on the promotion of institutions and
partaking in wars of choice to achieve his goals of lifting people out of
poverty and promoting multilateralism and human rights.34 Obama now
appears as a transition between the ultra-fanaticism of the Bush adminis-
tration and the belief in retrenchment advocated by Donald J. Trump.
Obama wanted to “lead from behind”35 and avoid getting involved in
long, messy wars, particularly because he believed it was time to “pivot to
Asia”36 to check the rise of China. U.S. involvement in Libya and Syria
which took on this “leading from behind” characteristic however turned
out to be no less destabilizing than Bush’s full-on interventions, they were
however less costly in terms of resources and American lives.
Although the three presidents attempted to “universalize” Western val-
ues, this did not occur in practice. “Liberty” did not overtake the Middle
East, Russia and China did not liberalize, and the forces of nationalism did
not dissipate. These policies inadvertently led to a deterioration of rela-
tions with Russia, thereby increasing instability in Eastern Europe. The

33
Thomas L. Friedman, “Foreign Affairs; Now a Word from X,” New York Times, May 2,
1998. https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/02/opinion/foreign-affairs-now-a-word-­­
from-x.html
34
Kimmage (2020).
35
Charles Krauthammer, “The Obama doctrine: Leading from behind,” Washington Post,
April 28, 2011. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-obama-doctrine-leading-
from-­behind/2011/04/28/AFBCy18E_story.html
36
Lieberthal (2011).
 2 MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 37

Arab Spring ultimately resulted in armed conflicts, repression, and

increased terrorism in the region. The process of re-engineering Afghan
society ended in catastrophic failure 20 years later, and Iraq turned into a
failed state which invited the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
And while the intervention in Libya was not unilateral and had UNSC
permission, the intervention was strangely similar to one of regime change
without giving any thought to the aftermath. It has been argued that the
West had historically engaged in repeated covert attempts to be rid of
Muammar Gaddafi, and used the uprisings in Libya to support rebel forces
and rid Libya of its leader. It is also questionable how much “genocide”
was actually going on from the side of government forces prior to the
intervention.37 Libya had always been rather problematic for the West, as
it refused to open up economically with its vast energy reserves and failed
to establish itself as a reliable partner in the U.S. “War on Terror.” Libya
was also one of the strongest voices opposing the expansion of NATO and
U.S. military power onto the African continent.38 During the NATO
intervention, Gaddafi and his convoys were attacked by a NATO aircraft
and he was then captured by the National Transitional Council (NTC)
rebel forces and killed shortly afterward.39 No serious plan to keep the
society stable was implemented after the intervention, which created a
leadership vacuum that was filled by countless rebel groups and terrorists,
rendering Libya a failed state. The instability spread to Mali and the rest of
the Sahel, now a region fraught with terrorism and conflict. While China
and Russia did not veto the resolution, during the course of the interven-
tion they called for an immediate ceasefire as many countries began to
question how NATO was leading its intervention campaign. The large-­
scale U.S., British, and French ground and air attacks were widely seen
internationally as disproportionate, careless of civilian lives, and extending
beyond the agreed plan to impose a defensive no-fly zone.40 Then, when
the moment came to decide on the removal of Syrian President Bashar
Al-Assad, China, along with Russia, resisted a Western push for a Security

37
Capasso and Cherstich (2014, p. 381).
38
Davidson (2017, pp. 91–116).
39
Reuters Staff. “Air strike hit 11 vehicles in Gaddafi convoy—NATO.” Reuters. 21
October 2011. https://www.reuters.com/article/nato-libya-gaddafi-idAFL5E7LL2L
820111021
40
Simon Tisdall, “The consensus on intervention in Libya has shattered,” The Guardian,
23 March 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/23/libya-
ceasefire-consensus-russia-china-india
38 S. LOFTUS

Council Resolution. Lavrov was heard stating, “We would never allow the
Security Council to authorize anything similar to what happened in
Libya.”41 Interestingly, this is precisely when Russia began to shift into a
more authoritarian direction as the leadership feared the West had similar
plans for Russia. Mass effort to lessen Western influence was then imple-
mented into society such as restrictions on media freedoms and labeling
every Western-financed institution as a “foreign agent.”42
Carothers illustrates the declining value of democratic aid both as a
perception and as a reality.43 The loss of global democratic momentum has
encouraged the perception that democratic aid is either not helpful, waste-
ful, or politically inappropriate. The fact that some of the largest invest-
ments in democratic aid were made in countries such as Iraq and
Afghanistan, which resulted in tremendous failures, have de-legitimized
its utility. Bush’s emphasis on democracy promotion along with Western
support of the color revolutions triggered heightened sensibilities about
democracy aid in Russia and other post-Soviet countries. Domestic prob-
lems in the West also affect global perception as to whether liberal democ-
racy truly is the right path for development. Another issue undermining
democratic aid is simply feebler policy commitment as it has become risk-
ier for many politicians due to its potential for unleashing sectarian conflict
as in Iraq and Libya or for giving rise to populist anti-Western politicians
in Hungary and parts of Latin America.44 In addition, U.S. political sup-
port for democracy promotion abroad has also waned since the Iraq War
and other high-profile shocks in the Middle East.45 In Egypt, the adminis-
tration did nothing as then-President Hosni Mubarak intensified political
repression. In Palestine, the United States pressured the Palestinian
Authority to hold democratic elections in 2006 which led to the victory of
the militant group Hamas. In the Arab Spring, only one democracy
resulted from the uprisings while democratic reversals, crackdowns, and
state implosions occurred elsewhere. As a result of these setbacks, the

41
Sui Lee Wee, “Russia, China oppose ‘forced regime change’ in Syria,” Reuters, 1
February 2012. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-china-russia/russia-china-oppose-
forced-regime-change-in-syria-idUSTRE81007L20120201
42
Loftus (2018).
43
Carothers (2015, pp. 59–73).
44
Ibid.
45
Larry Diamond, “Democracy Demotion: How the Freedom Agenda Fell Apart,”
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-06-11/
democracy-demotion
 2 MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 39

American public simply lost enthusiasm for democracy promotion. In

September 2001, 29% of Americans agreed that democracy promotion
should be a top foreign policy priority. In 2013 that number fell to 18%46
and 17% in 2018.47

The Rise of Populism and Resentment

of Liberal Policies

The spread of neoliberal economic policies around the world was helpful
in taking much of the world out of poverty, but the adverse effects of such
policies are causing extreme challenges today such as the rise of populism48
and resentment in countries that were advised to take on these policies
leading to detrimental results.49 Eventually, liberal economic policies cre-
ated vast inequality50 throughout the world which thus undermined their
viability. The point of no return was the 2008 financial crisis, which deeply
underscored the dangers of excessive, un-monitored capitalism.51 The lin-
gering effects of the crisis have weakened the appeal of liberal democracies
on a global scale.52 In the EU, economic stagnation in Southern Europe
sparked resentment and feelings of German domination as it demanded
continentwide austerity, with a focus on cutting debt. Austerity measures
proved to be disappointing for nations across the EU as they failed to
recover properly from the crisis and subsequent recession in Europe.53
Due to the lack of a common fiscal policy, some EU states were unable to
pull themselves out of the recession, which led to utterly disastrous results
for Southern Europe.54 In Central Europe, nationalists defied Brussels and
the idea of the liberal international order. Since then, the rise of “illiberal”

46
Drake (2021).
47
Pew Research Center (2018).
48
Putzel (2020, pp. 418–441).
49
Krastev and Holmes (2020).
50
Koechlin (2013, pp. 5–30).
51
“Laissez-Faire Capitalism Has Failed,” Forbes, February 19, 2009. https://www.forbes.
com/2009/02/18/depression-financial-crisis-capitalism-opinions-­­columnists_recession_
stimulus.html?sh=21e91c7e22ef
52
Kagan (2018a).
53
McKee et al. (2012, pp. 346–350).
54
Max Bergman, “The Effects of the Crisis: Why Southern Europe?” American Progress,
May 13, 2020. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/europes-lost-decade-demands-
progressive-response/
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 In incident and character-drawing the play is rather elemental.
Sartorius is the stock capitalist of drama—a figure as invariable as
the types in Jerome K. Jerome’s “Stageland.” And the other persons
of the play—Harry Trench, the altruist with reservations; William de
Burgh Cokane, his mentor in orthodox hypocrisy; Lickcheese,
Sartorius’ rent-collector and rival, and Blanche herself—all rather
impress us as beings we have met before. Nevertheless, an
occasional flash reveals the fine Italian hand of Shaw—a hand albeit,
but yet half trained. That Blanche is a true daughter to Sartorius,
psychologically as well as physically, is shown in a brief scene
wherein she and a serving maid are the only players. And the
“grand” scene at the close of the play, between Blanche and Harry,
smells of the latter-day Shaw to high heaven. Harry has come to her
father’s house to discuss their joint affairs and she goes at him
savagely:
“Well? So you have come back here. You have had the
meanness to come into this house again. (He blushes and retreats a
step.) What a poor-spirited creature you must be! Why don’t you go?
(Red and wincing, he starts huffily to get his hat from the table, but
when he turns to the door with it she deliberately gets in his way, so
that he has to stop.) I don’t want you to stay. (For a moment they
stand face to face, quite close to one another, she provocative,
taunting, half-defying, half-inviting him to advance, in a flush of
undisguised animal excitement. It suddenly flashes upon him that all
this ferocity is erotic—that she is making love to him. His eye lights
up; a cunning expression comes into the corner of his mouth; with a
heavy assumption of indifference he walks straight back to his chair
and plants himself in it with his arms folded. She comes down the
room after him.)...”
It is too late for poor Harry to beat a retreat. He is lost as
hopelessly as John Tanner in “Man and Superman” and in the same
way.
The scene savors strongly of Nietzsche, particularly in its frank
acceptance of the doctrine that, when all the poets have had their
say, plain physical desire is the chief basis of human mating. No
doubt Shaw’s interest in Marx and Schopenhauer led him to make a
pretty thorough acquaintance with all the German metaphysicians of
the early eighties. “Widowers’ Houses” was begun in 1885, four
years before Nietzsche was dragged off to an asylum. In 1892, when
the play was completed and the last scene written, the mad
German’s theories of life were just beginning to gain a firm foothold
in England.
 “THE PHILANDERER”
SHAW calls “The Philanderer” a topical comedy, which describes it
exactly. Written in 1893, at the height of the Ibsen craze, it served a
purpose like that of the excellent revues which formerly adorned the
stage of the New York Casino. Frankly, a burlesque upon fads of the
moment, its interest now is chiefly archeological. For these many
moons we have ceased to regard Ibsen as a man of subterranean
mystery—who has heard any talk of “symbolic” plays for two years?
—and have learned to accept his dramas as dramas and his
heroines as human beings. Those Ibsenites of ’93 who haven’t
grown civilized and cut their hair are now buzzing about the head of
Maeterlinck or D’Annunzio or some other new god. To enjoy “A Doll’s
House” is no longer a sign of extraordinary intellectual muscularity.
The stock companies of Peoria and Oil City now present it as a
matter of course, between “The Henrietta” and “Camille.”
But when Shaw wrote “The Philanderer” a wave of groping
individualism was sweeping over Europe, the United States and
other more or less Christian lands. Overeducated young women of
the middle class, with fires of discontent raging within them,
descended upon Nora Helmer with a whoop and became fearsome
Ibsenites. They formed clubs, they pleaded for freedom, for a wider
area of development, for an equal chance; they demanded that the
word “obey” be removed from their lines in the marriage comedy;
they wrote letters to the newspapers; they patronized solemn pale-
green matinées: some of them even smoked cigarettes. Poor old
Nietzsche had something to do with this uprising. His ideas
regarding the orthodox virtues, mangled in the mills of his disciples,
appeared on every hand. Iconoclasts, amateur and professional,
grew as common as policemen.
 Very naturally, this series of phenomena vastly amused our
friend from Ireland. Himself a devoted student of Ibsen’s plays and a
close friend to William Archer, their translator, he saw the absurdity
and pretense in the popular excitement, and so set about making fun
of it.
In “The Philanderer” he shows a pack of individualists at war with
the godly. Grace Tranfield and Julia Craven, young women of the
period, agree that marriage is degrading and enslaving, and so join
an Ibsen club, spout stale German paradoxes and prepare to lead
the intellectual life. But before long both fall in love, and with the
same man, and thereafter, in plain American, there is the devil to
pay. Julia tracks the man—his name is Leonard Charteris—to
Grace’s home and fairly drags him out of her arms, at the same time,
yelling, shouting, weeping, howling and gnashing her teeth.
Charteris, barricading himself behind furniture, politely points out the
inconsistency of her conduct.
“As a woman of advanced views,” he says, “you determined to
be free. You regarded marriage as a degrading bargain, by which a
woman sold herself to a man for the social status of a wife and the
right to be supported and pensioned out of his income in her old age.
That’s the advanced view—our view....”
“I am too miserable to argue—to think,” wails Julia. “I only know
that I love you....”
And so a fine temple of philosophy, built of cards, comes
fluttering down.
As the struggle for Charteris’ battle-scarred heart rages, other
personages are drawn into the trenches, unwillingly and greatly to
their astonishment. Grace’s papa, a dramatic critic of the old school,
and Julia’s fond parent, a retired military man, find themselves
members of the Ibsen club and participants in the siege of their
daughters’ reluctant Romeo. Percy Paramore, a highly respectable
physician, also becomes involved in the fray. In the end he serves
the useful peace-making purpose delegated to axmen and hangmen
in the ancient drama. Charteris, despairing of eluding the erotic Julia
shunts her off into Paramore’s arms. Then Grace, coming out of her
dream, wisely flings him the mitten and the curtain falls.
It is frankly burlesque and in places it is Weberfieldian in its
extravagance. It was not presented in London in 1893 because no
actors able to understand it could be found. When it was published it
made a great many honest folk marvel that a man who admired
Ibsen as warmly as Shaw could write such a lampoon on the
Ibsenites. This was the foundation of Shaw’s present reputation as a
most puzzling manufacturer of paradoxes. The simple fact that the
more a man understood and admired Ibsen the more he would laugh
at the grotesqueries of the so-called Ibsenites did not occur to the
majority, for the reason that an obvious thing of that sort always
strikes the majority as unintellectual and childish and, in
consequence, unthinkable. So Shaw got fame as a paradoxical
sleight-of-hand man, as Ibsen did with “The Wild Duck” in 1884, and
it has clung to him ever since. At present every time he rises to
utterances a section of the public quite frankly takes it for granted
that he means exactly the opposite of what he says.
It is unlikely that “The Philanderer” will ever take the place of
“East Lynne” or “Charley’s Aunt” in the popular repertoire. In the first
place, as has been mentioned, it is archaic and, in the second place,
it is not a play at all, but a comic opera libretto in prose, savoring
much of “Patience” and “The Princess Ida.” In the whole drama there
is scarcely a scene even remotely possible.
Every line is vastly amusing,—even including the sermonizing of
which Mr. Huneker complains,—but all remind one of the “I-am-
going-away-from-here” colloquy between “Willie” Collier and Miss
Louise Allen in a certain memorable entertainment of Messrs. Weber
and Fields.
 “CAPTAIN BRASSBOUND’S
CONVERSION”
CAPTAIN BRASSBOUND’S CONVERSION” is a fantastic comedy,
written with no very ponderous ulterior purpose and without the
undercurrents that course through some of Shaw’s plays, but
nevertheless, it is by no means a bit of mere foolery. The play of
character upon character is shown with excellent skill, and if the
drama has never attracted much attention from aspiring comedians it
is because the humor is fine-spun, and not because it is weak.
The scene is the coast of Morocco and the hero, Captain
Brassbound, is a sort of refined, latter-day pirate, who has a working
arrangement with the wild natives of the interior and prospers in
many ventures. To his field of endeavor come two jaded English
tourists—Sir Howard Hallam, a judge of the criminal bench, and
Lady Cicely Waynflete, his sister-in-law. Lady Cicely is a queer
product of her sex’s unrest. She has traveled often and afar; she has
held converse with cannibal kings; she has crossed Africa alone.
Hearing that it is well-nigh suicidal to venture into the Atlas
Mountains, which rear their ancient peaks from the eastern skyline,
she is seized by a yearning to explore them. Sir Howard
expostulates, pleads, argues, and storms—and in the end consents
to go with her.
It is here that Brassbound enters upon the scene—in the
capacity of guide and commander of the expedition. He is a strange
being, this gentleman pirate, a person of “olive complexion, dark
southern eyes ... grim mouth ... and face set to one tragic
purpose....” A man of blood and iron. A hero of scarlet romance, red-
handed and in league with the devil.
 And so the little caravan starts off—Sir Howard, Lady Cicely,
Brassbound and half a dozen of Brassbound’s thugs and thieves.
They have little adventures and big adventures and finally they reach
an ancient Moorish castle in the mountains, heavy with romance and
an ideal scene for a tragedy. And here Brassbound reveals his true
colors. Pirate no longer, he becomes traitor—and betrays his
charges to a wild Moroccan chieftain.
But it is not gold that leads him into this crime, nor anything else
so prosaic or unworthy. Revenge is his motive—dark, red-handed
revenge of the sort that went out of fashion with shirts of mail. He
has been seeking a plan for Sir Howard’s destruction for years and
years, and now, at last, providence has delivered his enemy into his
hands.
To see the why and wherefore of all this, it is necessary to know
that Sir Howard, before reaching his present eminence, had a
brother who fared upon the sea to the West Indies and there
acquired a sugar estate and a yellow Brazilian wife. When he died
the estate was seized by his manager and his widow took to drink.
With her little son she proceeded to England, to seek Sir Howard’s
aid in her fight for justice. Disgusted by her ill-favored person and
unladylike habits, he turned her out of doors and she, having no
philosophy, straightway drank herself to death. And then, after many
years, Sir Howard himself, grown rich and influential, used his riches
and his influence to dispossess the aforesaid dishonest manager of
his brother’s estate. Of the bibulous widow’s son he knew nothing,
but this son, growing up, remembered. In the play he bobs into view
again. He is Captain Brassbound, pirate.
Brassbound has cherished his elaborate scheme of vengeance
for so many years that it has become his other self. Awake and
sleeping he thinks of little else, and when, at last, the opportunity to
execute it arrives, he goes half mad with exultation. That such
revenges have come to seem ridiculous to civilized men, he does not
know. His life has been cast along barren coasts and among
savages and outcasts, and ethically he is a brother to the crusaders.
His creed still puts the strong arm above the law, and here is his
chance to make it destroy one of the law’s most eminent ornaments.
Viewed from his standpoint the stage is set for a stupendous and
overpowering drama.
But the saturnine captain reckons without the fair Lady Cicely. In
all his essentials, he is a half-savage hairy-armed knight of the early
thirteenth century. Lady Cicely, calm, determined and cool, is of the
late nineteenth. The conflict begins furiously and rages furiously to
the climax. When the end comes Brassbound feels his heroics grow
wabbly and pitiful; he sees himself mean and ridiculous.
“Damn you!” he cries in a final burst of rage. “You have belittled
my whole life to me!”
There is something pathetic in the figure of the pirate as his
ideals come crashing down about his head and he blindly gropes in
the dark.
“It was vulgar—vulgar,” he says. “I see that now; for you have
opened my eyes to the past; but what good is that for the future?
What am I to do? Where am I to go?”
It is not enough that he undoes his treason and helps to save Sir
Howard. What he wants is some rule of life to take the place of the
smashed ideals of his wasted years. He gropes in vain and ends,
like many another man, by idealizing a woman.
“You seem to be able to make me do pretty well what you like,”
he says to Lady Cicely, “but you cannot make me marry anybody but
yourself.”
“Do you really want a wife?” asks Cicely archly.
“I want a commander,” replies the reformed Brassbound. “I am a
good man when I have a good leader.”
He is not the first man that has fallen beneath the spell of her
dominating and masterful ego, to mistake his obedience for love, and
she bluntly tells him so. And thus they part—Brassbound to return to
his ship and his smuggling, and Cicely to go home to England.
As will be observed, this is no ordinary farce, but a play of
considerable depth and beam. Shaw is a master of the art of
depicting such conflicts as that here outlined, and Brassbound and
Cicely are by no means the least of his creations. With all the
extravagance of the play, there is something real and human about
each, and the same may be said of the lesser characters—Sir
Howard; the Rev. Leslie Rankin, missionary and philosopher;
Drinkwater, Brassbound’s recruit from the slums of London; the
Moorish chiefs; Captain Hamlin Kearney of the U. S. S. Santiago,
who comes to Sir Howard’s rescue, and the others.
The chief fault of the play is the fact that the exposition, in the
first act, requires an immense amount of talk without action. The
whole act, in truth, might be played with all of the characters
standing still. Later on, there is plenty of movement, but the play as a
whole is decidedly inferior to the majority of the Shaw dramas. The
dialogue lacks the surface brilliancy of “You Never Can Tell” and
“Candida” and the humor, in places, is too delicate, almost, for the
theme. The piece, in fact, is a satirical melodrama disguised as a
farce—a melodrama of the true Shaw brand, in which the play of
mind upon mind overshadows the play of club upon skull.
 “CÆSAR AND CLEOPATRA”
BECAUSE he put it forth as a rival to “Julius Cæsar” and “Anthony
and Cleopatra,” Shaw’s “Cæsar and Cleopatra” has been the football
in an immense number of sanguinary critical rushes. His preface to it
is headed “Better than Shakespeare?” and he frankly says that he
thinks it is better. But that he means thereby to elbow himself into the
exalted position occupied by William of Avon for 300 years does not
follow. “In manner and art,” he said, in a recent letter to the London
Daily News, “nobody can write better than Shakespeare, because,
carelessness apart, he did the thing as well as it can be done within
the limits of human faculty.” Shaw, in other words, by no means lacks
a true appreciation of Shakespeare’s genius. What he endeavors to
maintain is simply the claim that, to modern audiences, his Cæsar
and his Cleopatra should seem more human and more logical than
Shakespeare’s. That this is a thesis susceptible of argument no one
who has read “Cæsar and Cleopatra” will deny.
“The sun do move,” said the Rev. Mr. Jasper. Shaw says the
same thing of the world. In Shakespeare’s day knighthood was still in
flower and the popular ideals of military perfection were medieval. A
hero was esteemed in proportion as he approached Richard Cœur
de Lion. Chivalry was yet a very real thing and the masses of the
people were still influenced by the transcendentalism of the
Crusades. And so, when Shakespeare set out to draw a conqueror
and hero of the first rank, he evolved an incarnation of these far-
fetched and rather grotesque ideals and called it Julius Cæsar.
To-day men have very different notions. In these piping times of
common-sense, were a Joan of Arc to arise, she would be packed
off to a home for feeble-minded children. People admire, not
Chevalier Bayard, but Lord Kitchener and U. S. Grant; not so much
lofty purposes as tangible achievements; not so much rhetoric as
accomplishment. For a man to occupy to-day the position held by
Cæsar at the beginning of the year 44 B.C. he would have to
possess traits far different from those Shakespeare gave his hero.
Shaw endeavors to draw a Cæsar with just such modern marks of
heroism—to create a Roman with the attributes that might exalt a
man, in this prosaic twentieth century, to the eminence attained by
the immortal Julius 1900 years ago. In other words, Shaw tries to
reconstruct Shakespeare’s Cæsar (and incidentally, of course, his
Cleopatra) just as a latter-day stage manager must reconstruct the
scenes and language of Shakespeare to make them understandable
to-day. That his own Cæsar, in consequence, is a more
comprehensible, a more human and, on the whole, a more possible
hero than Shakespeare’s is the substance of his argument.
The period of the play is the year 48 B.C., when Cleopatra was a
girl of sixteen and Cæsar an oldster of fifty-two, with a widening bald
spot beneath his laurel and a gradually lessening interest in the
romantic side of life. Shaw depicts the young queen as an
adolescent savage: ignorant, cruel, passionate, animal, impulsive,
selfish and blood-thirsty. She is monarch in name only and spends
her time as any child might. Egypt is torn by the feud that finally
leads to the Alexandrine war, and, Cleopatra, perforce, is the
nominal head of one of the two parties. But she knows little of the
wire-pulling and intriguing, and the death of her brother and rival,
Ptolemy Dionysius, interests her merely as an artistic example of
murder. The health of a sacred cat seems of far more consequence
to her than the welfare of Asia Minor.
Cæsar comes to Alexandria to take a hand in the affairs of Egypt
and, incidentally, to collect certain moneys due him for past services
as a professional conqueror. Cleopatra fears him at first, as a most
potent and evil bogey-man, and is so vastly surprised when she finds
him quite human, and even commonplace, that she straightway falls
in love with him. Cæsar, in return, regards her with a mild and cynical
interest. “He is an important public man,” says Max Beerbohm, “who
knows that a little chit of a girl-queen has taken a fancy to him and is
tickled by the knowledge, and behaves very kindly to her and rather
wishes he were young enough to love her.” He needs 1600 talents in
cash and tries to collect the money. In truth, he has little time to
waste in listening to her sighs. Pothinus, of the palace—an early
Roman Polonius—is appalled.
“Is it possible,” he gasps, “that Cæsar, the conqueror of the
world, has time to occupy himself with such a trifle as our taxes?”
“My friend,” replies Cæsar affably, “taxes are the chief business
of a conqueror of the world.”
And so there comes fighting and the burning of the Alexandrine
library and the historic heaving of Cleopatra into the sea and other
incidents more or less familiar. Through it all the figure of Cæsar
looms calm and unromantic. To him this business of war has become
a pretty dull trade: he longs for the time when he may retire and
nurse his weary bones. He fishes Cleopatra out of the water—and
complains of a touch of rheumatism. He sits down to a gorgeous
banquet of peacock’s brains and nightingale’s tongues—and asks for
oysters and barley water. Now and then Cleopatra’s blandishments
tire him. Again, her frank savagery startles and enrages him. In the
end, when his work is done and his fee pocketed, when Cleopatra’s
throne is safe, with Roman soldiers on guard about it, he goes home.
“I will send you a beautiful present from Rome,” he tells the
volcanic girl-queen.
She demands to know what Rome can offer Egypt.
“I will send you a man,” says Cæsar, “Roman from head to heel
and Roman of the noblest; not old and ripe for the knife; not lean in
the arms and cold in the heart; not hiding a bald head under his
conqueror’s laurels; not stooped with the weight of the world on his
shoulders; but brisk and fresh, strong and young, hoping in the
morning, fighting in the day and revelling in the evening. Will you
take such an one in exchange for Cæsar?”
“His name? His name?” breathes the palpitating Cleopatra.
“Shall it be Mark Anthony?” says Cæsar.
And the erotic little Cleopatra, who has a vivid remembrance of
Anthony’s manly charms, born of a fleeting glimpse of him, falls into
her elderly friend’s arms, speechless with gratitude.
Unlike most of Shaw’s plays, “Cæsar and Cleopatra” is modelled
upon sweeping and spectacular lines. In its five acts there are
countless scenes that recall Sardou at his most magnificent—scenes
that would make “Ben Hur” seem pale and “The Darling of the Gods”
a parlor play. And so, too, there is plenty of the more exciting sort of
action—stabbings, rows, bugle-calls, shouts and tumults. What
opportunity it would give to the riotous, purple fancy of Klaw and
Erlanger or the pomp and pageantry of David Belasco!
Shaw makes Cleopatra a much more human character than
Cæsar. In the latter there appears rather too much of the icy sang
froid we have grown accustomed to encounter in the heroes of the
brigade commanded by “The Prisoner of Zenda.” Some of Cæsar’s
witticisms are just a bit too redolent of the professional
epigrammatist. Reading the play we fancy him in choker collar and
silk hat, with his feet hoisted upon a club window-sill and an Havana
cigar in his mouth,—the cynical man-of-the-world of the women
novelists. In other words, Shaw, in attempting to bring the great
conqueror down to date, has rather expatriated him. He is scarcely a
Roman.
Cleopatra, on the contrary, is admirable. Shaw very frankly
makes her an animal and her passion for Cæsar is the backbone of
the play. She is fiery, lustful and murderous; a veritable she-devil;
and all the while an impressionable, superstitious, shadow-fearing
child. In his masterly gallery of women’s portraits—Mrs. Warren,
Blanche Sartorius, Candida, Ann Whitefield and their company—
Cleopatra is by no means the least.
The lesser characters—Brittanus, the primitive Briton (a parody
of the latter-day Britisher); Apollodorus, the Sicilian dilletante;
Ftatateeta, Cleopatra’s menial and mistress; Rufio, the Roman
general (a sort of Tiber-bred William Dobbin); and the boy Ptolemy—
all remain in the memory as personages clearly and certainly drawn.
In view of the chances that the play affords the player and the
stage manager it seems curious that it was so long neglected by the
Frohmans of the day. Between Shaw’s Cæsar and Shakespeare’s
Cæsar there is a difference wide enough to make a choice
necessary. That a great many persons, pondering the matter calmly,
would cast their ballots for the former is a prophecy not altogether
absurd. Just as the world has outgrown, in succession, the fairy tale,
the morality play, the story in verse, the epic and the ode, so it has
outgrown many ideas and ideals regarding humanity that once
appeared as universal truths. Shakespeare, says Shaw, was far
ahead of his time. This is shown by his Lear. But the need for
earning his living made him write down to its level. As a result those
of his characters that best pleased his contemporaries—Cæsar,
Rosalind, Brutus, etc.—now seem obviously and somewhat painfully
Elizabethan.
 “A MAN OF DESTINY”
THAT characteristic tendency to look at the under side of things and
to explore the depths beneath the obvious surface markings, which
Shaw displays in “Cæsar and Cleopatra,” “Arms and the Man” and
“The Devil’s Disciple,” is shown at the full in “The Man of Destiny.”
The play is in one act and in intent it is a mere bravura piece, written,
as the author says, “to display the virtuosity of the two principal
performers.” But its picture of Napoleon Bonaparte, the principal
character, is a startlingly novel one, and the little drama is
remarkable alike for its fantastic character drawing, its cameo
craftsmanship, its ingenious incident and its fairly dazzling dialogue.
There is more of the quality called “brilliancy” in its one scene than in
most three-act society comedies of the day. Some of its episodes are
positive gems.
The Napoleon of the play is not the emperor of popular legend
and Meissonier’s painting, but the young general of 1796, but
recently come to opportunity and still far from immortality. The scene
is the parlor of a little inn on the road from Lodi to Milan and the
young general—he is but twenty-seven—is waiting impatiently for a
packet of despatches. He has defeated the Austrians at Lodi, but
they are yet foes to be feared and he is very eager to know whether
General Massena will make his next stand at Mantua or at
Peschiera. A blundering jackass of a lieutenant, the bearer of the
expected despatches, comes staggering in with the information that
he has been met on the road and outwitted and robbed of them by a
boyish young officer of the enemy’s. Napoleon flies into a rage, very
naturally, but after all it is an incident of the wars and, the papers
being lost, he resigns himself to doing without them.
Almost simultaneously there appears from upstairs a handsome
young woman. The lieutenant, seeing her, is instantly struck with her
remarkable resemblance to the youthful officer who cajoled and
robbed him. Napoleon pricks up his ears and orders the half-witted
lieutenant out of the room. And then begins a struggle of wits. The
young woman and the young officer are one person. Bonaparte
knows it and demands the dispatches. But she is a nimble one, this
patriot in skirts, and it seems for a while that he will have to play the
dragoon and tear them from her bodice. Even when she yields and
he has the papers in his hands, she is the victor. There is one letter
that he dare not read. It is a billet-doux from a woman to a man who
is not her husband and it has been sent from Paris by a well-
meaning blunderer that the husband may read it and learn.
Josephine is the woman, the director Barras is the other man—and
Napoleon himself is the husband.
Here we have Bonaparte the man, facing a crisis in his affairs
more appalling than any he has ever encountered on the field of war.
There is no gleam of a crown ahead to cheer him on and no crash of
artillery to hearten him. It is a situation far more terrifying than the
fight about the bridge at Lodi, but he meets it squarely and
resolutely. And in the end he outplays and vanquishes his fair
conqueror.
She tells the blundering lieutenant that the officer boy who
outwitted him was her brother.
“If I undertake to place him in your hands, a prisoner,” she says,
“will you promise me on your honor as an officer and a gentleman
not to fight with him or treat him unkindly in any way?”
The simple-minded lieutenant promises—and the young woman
slips out and once more discards her skirts for the uniform of a
young officer. Then she reappears and surrenders.
“Where are the dispatches?” demands Napoleon, with heavy
dissembling.
“My sister has bewitched the general,” says the protean stranger.
“General: open your coat; you will find the dispatches in the breast of
it....”
 And lo! they are even there—and all agree that as papers
bearing the gristly finger-prints of a witch, they must be burnt.
Cæsar’s wife must be above suspicion.
“I read them the first thing....” whispers the witch’s alter ego; “So
you see I know what’s in them; and you don’t.”
“Excuse me,” replies Napoleon blandly. “I read them when I was
out there in the vineyard ten minutes ago.”
It would be impossible to exaggerate the humor and delicacy of
this little play. Napoleon, it must be remembered, is still a youngster,
who has scarcely dared to confess to himself the sublime scope of
his ambitions. But the man of Austerlitz and St. Helena peeps out,
now and then, from the young general’s flashing eyes, and the
portrait, in every detail, is an admirable one. Like Thackeray, Shaw is
fond of considering great men in their ordinary everyday aspects. He
knows that Marengo was but a day, and that there were thousands
of other days in the Little Corporal’s life. It is such week-days of
existence that interest him, and in their light he has given us plays
that offer amazingly searching studies of Cæsar and of Bonaparte,
not to speak of General Sir John Burgoyne.
 “THE ADMIRABLE BASHVILLE”
THE ADMIRABLE BASHVILLE, or Constancy Rewarded,” a blank
verse farce in two tableaux, is a dramatization by Shaw of certain
incidents in his novel, “Cashel Byron’s Profession.” Cashel Byron,
the hero of the novel, is a prize-fighter who wins his way to the hand
and heart of Lydia Carew, a young woman of money, education and
what Mulvaney calls “theouries.” Cashel sees in Lydia a remarkably
fine girl; Lydia sees in Cashel an idealist and a philosopher as well
as a bruiser. The race of Carew, she decides, needs an infusion of
healthy red blood. And so she marries Byron—and they live happily
ever after.
Bashville is Lydia’s footman and factotum, and he commits the
unpardonable solecism of falling in love with her. Very frankly he
confesses his passion and resigns his menial portfolio.
“If it is to be my last word,” he says, “I’ll tell you that the ribbon
round your neck is more to me,” etc., etc.... “I am sorry to
inconvenience you by a short notice, but I should take it as a
particular favor if I might go this evening.”
“You had better,” says Lydia, rising quite calmly and keeping
resolutely away from her the strange emotional result of being
astonished, outraged and loved at one unlooked-for stroke. “It is not
advisable that you should stay after what you have just——”
“I knew that when I said it,” interposes Bashville, hastily and
doggedly.
“In going away,” continues Lydia, “you will be taking precisely the
course that would be adopted by any gentleman who had spoken to
the same effect. I am not offended by your declaration; I recognize
your right to make it. If you need my testimony to further your future
arrangements, I shall be happy to say that I believe you to be a man
of honor.”
An American pugilist-actor, struck by the possibilities of the story,
engaged a journeyman playwright to make a play of it, and Shaw, to
protect his rights, put together “The Admirable Bashville.” The one
performance required by the English copyright law was given by the
Stage Society at the Imperial Theater, London, in the summer of
1903.
“It was funny,” says James Huneker, who witnessed the
performance. “It gibed at Shakespeare, at the modern drama, at
Parliament, at social snobbery, at Shaw himself, and at almost
everything else within reach. The stage setting was a mockery of the
Elizabethan stage, with two venerable beef-eaters in Tower costume,
who hung up placards bearing the legend, ‘A Glade in Wiltstoken
Park,’ etc. Ben Webster as Cashel Byron and James Hearn as the
Zulu King (whom Cashel entertains by an exhibition of his fistic
prowess) carried off the honors. Aubrey Smith, made up as Mr.
Shaw in the costume of a policeman with a brogue, caused
merriment, especially at the close, when he informed his audience
that the author had left the house. And so he had. He was standing
at the corner when I accosted him.”
Shaw explains that he wrote the extravaganza in blank verse
because he had to hurry over it and “hadn’t time to write it in the
usual prose.” To anyone “with the requisite ear and command of
words,” he says in another place, “blank verse, written under the
amazingly loose conditions which Shakespeare claimed, with full
liberty to use all sorts of words, colloquial, technical, rhetorical and
even obscurely technical, to indulge in the most far-fetched ellipses,
and to impress ignorant people with every possible extremity of
fantasy and affectation, is the easiest of all known modes of literary
expression, and this is why whole oceans of dull bombast and drivel
have been emptied on the head of England since Shakespeare’s
time in this form by people who could not have written ‘Box and Cox’
to save their lives.”
 “The Admirable Bashville” may be seen in the United States
before long. Not long ago the London Daily Mail reported that the
eminent comedian and gladiator, Mr. James J. Corbett, was casting
eager eyes upon it and that Shaw rather liked the idea of his
appearing in it.
“He is a man who has made a success in one profession,” the
dramatist is reported to have said, “and will therefore understand that
there are difficulties to be encountered in making a success in
another. Look at the books written to-day, and then consider which
you would rather have—a man who can do nothing or a really
capable prize-fighter.”
All of which you will find, much elaborated, in “Cashel Byron’s
Profession,” which was written in 1882.