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STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Russia’s
Public Diplomacy
Evolution and Practice
Edited by
Anna A. Velikaya · Greg Simons
Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations
Series Editors
Donna Lee
Manchester Metropolitan University
Manchester, UK
Paul Sharp
College of Liberal Arts
University of Minnesota
Duluth, USA
Marcus Holmes
College of William & Mary
Williamsburg, USA
More information about this series at
http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14471
Anna A. Velikaya • Greg Simons
Editors
Russia’s Public
Diplomacy
Evolution and Practice
Editors
Anna A. Velikaya Greg Simons
The Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Institute for Russian and Eurasian
Foundation Studies
Moscow, Russia Uppsala University
Uppsala, Sweden
Department of Communication
Sciences
Turiba University
Riga, Latvia
Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations

ISBN 978-3-030-12873-9 ISBN 978-3-030-12874-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12874-6
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Foreword
It is refreshing, but amenable, to write the foreword to this book—the

chapters of this edited book give hope to a new stream in studying Russian
public diplomacy in the twenty-first century. Indeed, new sociological,
cultural, economic and religious trends enable us to change diplomatic
practice. The very fact of it attracting a new generation of diplomatic prac-
titioners enables us to review the established orthodoxy of ideas and start
using parallel fields of the broad foreign policy practice. The very range of
topics covered and analysed in the book confirms it.
Public diplomacy pushes the boundaries of a common vision, changes
the contrasts of the reflection and the thoughts about the international
community. Writing about national interests, we judge about it not only
from the Russian position but also from broader European or Asian posi-
tion. This intrigues me a lot!
Political culture may be a very promising research field. Public diplo-
macy (PD) somehow reflects the overall situation of current East-West
relationships. It stands to reason that PD publications reflect the discourse
of Eastern and Western international relations (IR) scholars. As for now,
the Russian “turn to Eurasia” is becoming a dominant feature of Russian
foreign policy. Not only a few European but also more Asian partners tend
to be the newly emerging trend for Russia. This implies the need for more
Asian-oriented scholars, visits, topics and engagement. What it means is
not that the European agenda is any less important; it rather means that
Russia is slowly and purposefully changing its course differently from its
previous historical practice. It will take decades for Russian PD to gradu-
ally succeed in its new course.
v
vi FOREWORD
There are numerous factors, such as scientific and people exchanges,

exact science, history, philosophy and law, which influence a country’s
relations. Maybe PD would adjust to new world trends? Maybe it would
offer diplomats of the East and West new ideas of dealing with crises in
such countries as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya? Or would it offer
new track II ideas on the strategic arms negotiations?
Public diplomacy is receiving a much greater deal of attention in the
spheres of research and teaching owing to its growing importance and
significance among students and researchers in Russian universities. This
book has been compiled by prominent PD scholars and practitioners, rep-
resenting a multitude of different disciplines and perspectives. New trends,
ideas and problems are covered in it. Public diplomacy is a Russian soft
power instrument, and this book offers its own vision of this correlation.
Chairman of the International Trends editorial Alexey Bogaturov

board, President of the Academic Forum on
International Relations, Distinguished Scholar
of Russia
November 2018
Acknowledgements
The editors would like to acknowledge the fine work and effort put into
the chapters of this book by the authors. Each and every one of them has
managed to give a slightly different angle that makes use of their knowl-
edge and experience, where the end result is the sum of the knowledge is
greater than all of its parts. They have helped to contribute to the first
full-length book version of this interesting and, at times, controversial
topic of international communications and relations, which needs to be
discussed more particularly now when various geopolitical strains around
the globe are leaving their mark on many aspects of human existence (poli-
tics, trade and the quality of life). The authors would also like to thank
Senem B. Cevik for her numerous invaluable pieces of advice on writing
this book.
We would also like to thank the fruitful and enjoyable experience in
working with Palgrave throughout the entire process: from the quick and
positive initial response to our proposal, the review process and the pro-
cess of administration, keeping the project on track. Sarah Roughley and
Oliver Foster were quick and helpful, being bombarded with numerous
questions, but they were always there.
Certainly not least are our family members that have endured a mental
absence while the time and energy were going into producing this book.
So a big thank-you to our spouses and children for being so patient and
supportive.
November 2018 Anna A. Velikaya (Moscow) and

Greg Simons (Uppsala)
vii
Praise for Russia’s Public Diplomacy
“This book is of paramount importance in the prevailing international situation.”

—Igor Khalevinskiy, Chairman, Association of Russian Diplomats, Russia
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Anna A. Velikaya and Greg Simons
2 Russian Public Diplomacy: Historical Aspects 27

Olga Lebedeva
3 Russian Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding 45

Semed A. Semedov and Anastasiya G. Kurbatova
4 Development Diplomacy of the Russian Federation 61

Stanislav L. Tkachenko
5 Russia’s Policy and International Cooperation: The

Challenges and Opportunities of Soft Power 79
Natalia Bubnova
6 Russian Digital Diplomacy: A Rising Cyber Soft Power?103

Natalia Tsvetkova
7 Russian Public Diplomacy Through Higher Education119

Alexey Fominykh
xi
xii Contents
8 Russian Science Diplomacy133

Elena Kharitonova and Irina Prokhorenko
9 The Role of Civil Society in Russian Public Diplomacy147

Elena Stetsko
10 Multiple Facets of Russian Public Diplomacy in

International Organizations: A Case Study167
Maria Chepurina and Evgeny Kuznetsov
11 Russian Business Diplomacy in Southeast Asia183

Andrey Bykov and Kirill Solntsev
12 The Baltic Sea Region: Cooperation in Human

Dimension201
Daria Akhutina
13 Strategic Communication of Russia in Latin America219

Evgeny N. Pashentsev
14 Russia’s Public Diplomacy in the Middle East233

Vladimir Morozov and Greg Simons
15 Conclusion257
Index283
Notes on Contributors
Daria Akhutina is a Senior Advisor on economic issues and science, the

International Secretariat of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). She is
working at the CBSS at Stockholm as the Senior Advisor on economic issues
and science. Her education is in philology and, in particular, Scandinavian
languages from Saint Petersburg State University and in economics from
Stockholm School of Economics. Akhutina has been working in the field of
international relationships, people-to-people diplomacy, for 29 years, starting
career at the Union of the Soviet Friendship Societies as a responsible sec-
retary for Societies with Nordic countries. In 1996, she founded the inter-
regional NGO the Association for Cooperation with Nordic Countries –
NORDEN (renamed later the Association for Cooperation with BS
Countries – NORDEN). In 2002, Akhutina became one of the founders of
the Baltic Sea NGO Network and Forum in the framework of CBSS (chaired
the Forum twice during the years of the Russian presidency in CBSS).
Alexey Bogaturov, DrSc, is the Chairman of the International Trends
editorial board, President of the Academic Forum on International
Relations, and Distinguished Scholar of Russia. He is an advisory board
member of the Centre for Global Politics, Berlin, Germany. He has served
as the Associate Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies
(2000–2003); Dean, Moscow State Institute of International Relations
(MGIMO University); MGIMO Faculty of Political Science (2006–2007);
Department Head, MGIMO Academic Department of International
Problems’ Applied Analysis (2006–2007); and Provost of Moscow State
Institute of International Relations (2010–2012).
xiii
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Natalia Bubnova, PhD, is the leading researcher at Primakov National

Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations
(IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. She previously served for eight
years as the Deputy Director for Communications at the Carnegie Moscow
Centre. Bubnova also worked as the Marketing Director at Deloitte Russia
and was an associate professor at Marquette University in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, and the Associate Director of the University’s Centre for
International Studies. Bubnova published extensively and edited/co-
edited the books: Security and Arms Control, Disarmament and Security,
Missile Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation, Nuclear Reset, World in
Their Hands and 20 Years Without the Berlin Wall. She is also a regular
participant of TV and radio programs and had a bi-weekly column on
Russia in the Rocky Mountain News.
Andrey Bykov, DrSc, is the Deputy CEO of RSTradehouse LLC. He
was born in Altai Krai, Russia, in 1972. He graduated from the Karaganda
State University. Bykov received his PhD in history in 2006 from Saint
Petersburg State University. He has more than 10 years of teaching experi-
ence in universities and also has been the head of various departments in
Russian Touristic Company, Skyway, KNAUF. He was in charge of creat-
ing corporate academies in KNAUF CIS and the Rostec State Corporation.
He has been an expert of the Russia-Singapore Business Council since
2015. Bykov is the author of more than 50 publications. His areas of
expertise are international relations in Central Asia in the eighteenth to
twenty-first centuries and modern international relations of the Russian
Federation and Southeast Asia.
Maria Chepurina, PhD, got her PhD in political science from the
MGIMO University, Russia, and has extensive experience working within
the United Nations system and in regional international organizations.
Over the past years, she has led the work of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in
Central Asia, worked as the Advisor to the President of the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly and coordinated a large-scale international
research project on developing action lines for the OSCE at 40 (“Helsinki
+40”). She has also worked as an international elections observer in over
20 countries, including the Balkans, Central Asia, Russia and the
USA. Socially active, Chepurina is currently serving as Vice President of
the VIC Toastmasters Club at UN Headquarters in Vienna. She has co-
authored a book and over 10 academic articles. Her research interests
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xv
focus on the nexus between disarmament and development, youth educa-

tion, soft power, public diplomacy, Russian and European integration and
the United Nations.
Alexey Fominykh, PhD, the Head of International Project Office, is a
Research Fellow at Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Volga State
University of Technology (Yoshkar-Ola, Russia). He heads the Interna
tional Project Office at Volga State University of Technology and also
lectures on Department of Intercultural Communications at Mari State
University in Yoshkar-Ola, Russia. He has worked in international educa-
tion since 1999 and was among the first Russian international academic
administrators on a specialized Fulbright Program to Teachers College at
Columbia University and the University of Minnesota in 2007. He coop-
erates with the Russian International Affairs Council on research and edu-
cational projects on public diplomacy and international education, with a
special focus on post-Soviet countries.
Elena Kharitonova, PhD, is a researcher at Primakov National Research
Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO),
Russian Academy of Sciences. She previously worked for several years as a
Head of Sector in UNICEF Russia and before that in the British Council.
In her PhD dissertation, she focused on soft power concept and British
soft power. Ms. Kharitonova published several articles on soft power,
international development and other related topics, and participated
in a number of international conferences. She is working in the
Department of International Organizations and Global Political
Regulation, specializing in international development and humani-
tarian assistance, as well as public and science diplomacy.
Anastasiya G. Kurbatova, MSc, in International Relations, is a public
diplomacy researcher in The Russian Presidential Academy of National
Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA). She has eight publica-
tions on international relations and public diplomacy. She has conducted
research work on foreign policy and public diplomacy of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and in 2018 published the analytical abstract “Iran
Islamic Republic: new trends of the modern international policy” in scien-
tific magazine Observer. Since 2018 Anastasiya G. Kurbatova is a staff
member of the Federal Agency Rossotrudnichestvo, and her sphere of
occupation is European humanitarian projects and public d iplomacy. She
xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
is the executive secretary of the Expert advisory council for public and
humanitarian programs in Rossotrudnichestvo.
Evgeny Kuznetsov, PhD, a Senior Researcher at Attega Consulting, is a
former UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees) Officer and IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies) Delegate. Prior to joining Attega Consulting as
Senior Researcher, Kuznetsov worked in reporting, external relations and
project management for the United Nations, European Commission and
International Federation of Red Cross in Russia, Pakistan, Belgium,
Bangladesh and Cote d’Ivoire. He holds a PhD in History from the
European University (Florence, Italy) and its Russian equivalent from the
Tomsk State University. His research interests focus on European integra-
tion, transatlantic relations, United Nations, development and education.
Olga Lebedeva, DrSc, an associate professor in the Diplomacy
Department, is the Deputy Dean of the Department for International
Relations, MGIMO University, Moscow. She has been working at
MGIMO Diplomacy Department since 2002 and lectures on International
Relations, Matters of Diplomatic and consular service and Protocol. Her
special scientific interests include the matter of tolerance in the interna-
tional relations and public diplomacy. She cooperates with the Russian
International Affairs Council and Gorchakov Fond on research and edu-
cational projects on public diplomacy and soft power. She is the author
of more than 30 publications. She also heads the Diplomatic club in
MGIMO.
Vladimir Morozov, PhD, is a Vice-Rector at MGIMO University, as
well as an associate professor of MGIMO Diplomacy Department. He
received his PhD in History from the Moscow State Institute of
International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russia (MGIMO
University). He is Vice-Rector for Human Resources of the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations. Morozov is the founder of the MA
course “Network diplomacy” and BA courses “Negotiations and
Consulting” and “Negotiations in the 21st century: Theory and Practice”.
He is also a member of the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of
Sciences “History of the International Relations and Russian Foreign
Policy” and expert at the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations
(FASO Russia). Morozov is the author of various publications in Russian
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xvii
and foreign scientific journals on international relations, Middle East and

Israeli politics.
Evgeny N. Pashentsev, DrSc, is Professor of History. He is the leading
researcher at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation, a senior researcher at the Saint Petersburg
State University, and the Director of the International Centre for Social
and Political Studies and Consulting (ICSPSC). He is the author and
editor of 33 books and more than 150 articles published in Russian,
English, Italian, French, Serbian, Bulgarian, Romanian and Spanish.
Pashentsev has participated in more than 100 international conferences
and seminars for the last 15 years in Russia, China, Venezuela, the UK,
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Sweden,
Finland, Belgium, Estonia, Serbia, Romania, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria
and so on. He is a member of the Advisory Board of Comunicar (Spain)
and on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Political Marketing (United
States of America).
Irina Prokhorenko, DrSc, is the Head of Sector of International
Organizations and Global Political Regulation at Primakov National
Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations
(IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. She also works as a professor for
the Faculty of World Politics at Lomonosov Moscow State University and
before that as an associate professor of the Faculty of International
Relations in MGIMO University. Prokhorenko has published extensively
on different aspects of international relations theory, European integra-
tion, politics of Spain, territorial identity and politics in Europe.
Semed A. Semedov, DrSc, is the head of the “International Cooperation”
Department, The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy
and Public Administration (RANEPA), member of Rossotrudnichestvo’s
Federal Agency Scientific Council. He writes widely on issues of humani-
tarian cooperation, development diplomacy, soft power, political Islam and
Caucasus region.
Greg Simons, PhD, an associate professor, is a researcher at the Institute
for Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES) at Uppsala University and a lec-
turer in the Department of Communication Sciences at Turiba University
in Riga, Latvia. He is in the Senior Editorial Board of the Journal for
Political Marketing. His research interests include changing political
dynamics and relationships, mass media, public diplomacy, political
xviii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
marketing, crisis management communications, media and armed

conflict, and communicational aspects of the Russian Orthodox
Church. He also researches the relationships and connections between
information, politics and armed conflict more broadly, such as the
GWOT and Arab Spring.
Kirill Solntsev is the Head of International Business and Marketing,
RSTradehouse LLC, and a PhD student (Economic Policy and Public
Private Partnership) at MGIMO University. He was born in Moscow,
Russia, in 1992. He graduated from the MGIMO University with honors
(bachelor in International Economic Relations, master’s program in
International Business, Public Private Partnership) He has worked at
the Ministry of External Affairs, National PPP Centre. He is the
author of seven publications and an expert of the Russian-Singapore
Business Council. Area of his expertise is in PPP projects, doing business
with the South and Southeast Asia.
Elena Stetsko, PhD, is an associate professor in the Department of World
Politics, School of International Relations, Saint Petersburg State
University. Stetsko graduated from Saint Petersburg State University,
Department of Philosophy in 1990. She holds a PhD in Philosophy
(1996, Saint Petersburg State University, the Russian Federation). In
2001, she studied at Central European University (CEU), the course of
Economic Policy of the Developing European Markets. In 2002, she stud-
ied at Summer Ecological Programme, Umeå University (Sweden). In
2004–2005, she taught a course on International Non- governmental
Organizations at MGIMO as an invited lecturer. Her scientific interests
are related to the development of civil society and international organiza-
tions (including non-governmental organizations). Also the sphere of her
interests is the problems of integration in Europe and the post-Soviet
space (EU and EEA), political elites and leaders; international cooperation
in the field of environmental protection and development; and interna-
tional cooperation in the Arctic region.
Stanislav L. Tkachenko, DrSc, is a professor of Saint Petersburg State
University and a visiting professor of the Research Center for Economies
and Politics of Transitional Countries, Liaoning University. He received
his PhD in History from the Saint Petersburg State University and
a Doctoral Degree in Economics from the Saint Petersburg State University
of Economics. Tkachenko was appointed as a professor in the Department
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xix
of European Studies in 1994. In 2002–2007 Tkachenko was a Vice-

Rector of Saint Petersburg State University for School of International
Relations. Tkachenko is the founder and the Director of the MA
Programme “Diplomacy of Russian Federation and Foreign States” and
the President of the International Studies Association’s section “Post-
Communist Systems in International Relations”. Tkachenko published
extensively and edited these books: La Russia, I BRICS e l’Ordine
Internationale (in Italian); Monitoring of Development of Democracy (in
Russian); The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment;
and Institute of Presidential Power (in Russian). He is also a regular partici-
pant on TV and radio programs and has appeared on RBC TV, Fifth
Channel and TV Saint Petersburg, among others.
Natalia Tsvetkova, DrSc, is the Head of Department of American
Studies, Saint Petersburg State University. She writes widely on issues of
public diplomacy, cultural imperialism and propaganda. Her works include
Failure of American and Soviet Cultural Imperialism in German
Universities, 1945–1990 and Politicization of Public Diplomacy: United
States, Germany, France, Iran, China and Russia and other papers on
Cultural Cold War and recent development of public diplomacy.
Anna A. Velikaya, PhD, is an expert of The Gorchakov Public Diplomacy
Foundation and is a member of the Scientific Council of Rossotrudnichestvo
Federal Agency. She graduated from the School of International Business,
Omsk State University, and holds an MA and a PhD from MGIMO
University (thesis—“Humanitarian cooperation of the CIS states”, 2014).
She is the co-author of the books Modern International Relations, 2017,
Russian Diplomatic Academy, and Public Diplomacy of Russia and Foreign
Countries, MGIMO University, 2018. Her research interests are public
diplomacy, humanitarian politics and cooperation, nation branding, track
II diplomacy, and US politics in Central Asia.
List of Tables
Table 10.1 Member-countries representation and contribution in the UN

system178
Table 10.2 UN Security Council permanent members in top-level
positions179
Table 14.1 Overview of Russian and US digital diplomacy in MENA 252
xxi
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Motivation and the Idea Behind This Book

Approximately two years ago, the idea behind this book was hatched at a
conference held in Moscow at the Diplomatic Academy. This was prompted
by observing the increasing popular and academic interest being shown in
Russian foreign policy and public diplomacy, which produced a flurry of pub-
lications on these issues. There has been, at times, highly heated debates on
Russian foreign policy, including public diplomacy, where very wide spectra
of opinions and views have been expressed by an equally wide variety of aca-
demics, journalists, practitioners, policy makers and others. As such, we per-
ceived the need to produce a systematic study of Russian public diplomacy as
a concept and as a practice by a team of experienced authors with the requisite
knowledge and experience to address several underlying avenues of inquiry.
There are a series of questions behind the logic of the chapters and
the larger picture that the sum of the chapters seeks to address. What is
A. A. Velikaya (*)
The Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation, Moscow, Russia
Scientific Council of Rossotrudnichestvo Federal Agency, Moscow, Russia
G. Simons
Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
Department of Communication Sciences, Turiba University, Riga, Latvia
© The Author(s) 2020 1

A. A. Velikaya, G. Simons (eds.), Russia’s Public Diplomacy, Studies
in Diplomacy and International Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12874-6_1
2 A. A. VELIKAYA AND G. SIMONS
Russian public diplomacy exactly? There have been many suppositions and
projections by a wide variety of sources, from think tanks to government
reports, from media reports to academic research. Some of these publica-
tions and assumptions seem to have little to do with the reality on the
ground. Many foreign and Russian scholars have researched and published
on aspects of Russian public diplomacy, mostly in the form of journal
articles or reports. But there has been no definitive book-length volume
researched and written by Russian scholars and practitioners to date.
Therefore, there is a need for a systematic approach to address the issue
comprehensively and broadly.
The next logical question concerns the measure of activity question.
What does Russian public diplomacy look like, historically and contemporar-
ily? As noted with the above-mentioned question, there seems to be a lot
of guesswork, conjecture and projection as to how Russian public diplo-
macy manifests itself; it is far from being a homogenous set of activities
and measures. In addition, given the current state of international rela-
tions that are at the current low ebb, in what some have come to charac-
terise as being a New Cold War. This gives rise to the temptation to
demonise or mischaracterise what is not understood or is “feared.” The
conflation of Russian public diplomacy as only and simply “propaganda”
misses the point of the exercise and purpose of those communications
through a system of name calling that is intended to discredit Russian
public diplomacy without addressing the questions raised in a systematic
and objective manner.
A third and final line of inquiry is the one that is leading to the ques-
tion on the measure of influence. Just how effective are Russia’s numer-
ous public diplomacy programmes and efforts? This is the hardest question
to conclusively and convincingly answer. The task is made more difficult
by the presumed “mighty” powers of Russian communications, which
have been associated deliberately at times with the communications of
the Islamic State (Simons & Sillanpaa, 2016). This has the effect of cre-
ating a myth, but one that is based on shaky intellectual and academic
grounds. One of the mistakes often made is to equate the measure of
activity as being the measure of effect of an information and communi-
cation campaign. Because an information operation or an influence
activity is conducted, it does not automatically translate into influence
and persuasive effect.
INTRODUCTION 3
The Current State of International Relations

Currently, there is a global crisis in terms of diverging interests in interna-
tional relations and geopolitical issues, which has witnessed an increase in
political tensions around the world as a result of increased competition
and conflict between countries and blocks of countries. The reasons given
for the development of the current situation vary considerably. The use of
a specific story narrative seems to take place, which makes use of very spe-
cific norms and values, as well as a dialectic struggle between two extremely
opposed political and ideological forces. A result of the situational context
is that communications can be used to shut down dialogue and interac-
tion, rather than to promote or encourage it, where emotion-laden values
and norms are used in place of “cold” and logical “facts.” The result seems
to be these messages are communicated to influence and not to inform
global audiences. In addition, the present situation is often juxtaposed
against the familiar past. A point of view is that the United States treated
the end of the Cold War more as a victory rather than an opportunity.
But the Cold War as an ideological struggle disappeared only in part, despite
Communism’s implosion. On the American side, not so much had changed
on that day (dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991). The Cold
War was over, and the United States had won it. But most Americans still
believed that they could only be safe if the world looked more like their own
country and of the world’s governments abided by the will of the
United States.1
According to the author of the New York Times opinion piece, the
United States sought to capitalise on its advantage offered by the Soviet
collapse and impose its will upon other countries in a manner that stressed
power projection, territorial control and regime change. However, a num-
ber of challenges have begun to emerge in the twenty-first century, not
least of which is the gradual rise of military and economic power in the
East and its decline in Europe. Various challengers to the United States’
role as the global hegemonic power have emerged, such as radical Islam,
China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Then Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) Director, Mike Pompeo, publicly stated that the main threats to US
1
Westad, O. A., The Cold War and America’s Delusion of Victory, Opinion, The New York
Times, 28 August 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/opinion/cold-war-
american-soviet-victory.html?ref=opinion&_r=0 (accessed 29 August 2017).
national security and national interests were international terrorism

(namely al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—ISIS); North Korea;
a resurgent Iran; Russia; and other state and non-state actors that use
information to subvert democracies (naming Wikileaks and hostile non-
state actor intelligence services).2 However, opinion does diverge on the
issue of the assumed and perceived risks, such as the Russian threat, for
example, which is matched on the opposing geopolitical side.
There is also the issue of threat perception and opinion from countries
other than those found in the European Union (EU) and the United
States. A Pew Poll conducted across nearly 42,000 respondents from 38
different countries around the globe on perceived threats to their country
during February–May 2017 presents a different picture. The most widely
perceived threats were from the Islamic State (62%) and global climate
change (61%). Threats emanating from countries saw a global average
ranked US power and influence (35%), Russian power and influence (31%)
and Chinese power and influence (31%) as the three lowest ranked threats.3
Similar polls are conducted in Russia as to perceived threats and enemies
of Russia and Russians. A poll conducted by the Levada Centre established
these perceptions for 2017:
Identifying the top enemies of Russia, the poll picks on the US, specifically
President Donald Trump for the top spot, with Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania
and Germany occupying the big ‘foes’ spaces. […]. Interestingly, the aver-
age Russian identified radical Islamism and Islamic extremism as an impor-
tant threat/enemy. They consider Trump, Ukraine, Europe, Islamic State
terror group and corruption to be the greatest threats to Russia.4
The global information environment is becoming less free and more

constrained in the resulting struggle for legitimacy versus demonisation,
giving wind to such contemporary fads as “fake” news and supposed
2
Director Pompeo Delivers Remarks at INSA, News & Information, Central Intelligence
Agency, 11 July 2017, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2017-
speeches-testimony/director-pompeo-delivers-remarks-at-insa.html (accessed 12 July 2017).
3
Globally, People Point to ISIS and Climate Change as Leading Security Threats, Pew
Research Centre, 1 August 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/01/globally-peo-
ple-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-threats/ (accessed 8 August 2017).
4
Bagchi, I., Russia Pollster Finds India among Top Friends but Perception About China
Better, The Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/russia-
pollster-finds-india-among-top-friends-but-perception-about-china-better/article-
show/64774385.cms, 28 June 2018 (accessed 7 November 2018).
INTRODUCTION 5
actions to fight this projected menace. In this increasing tense geopolitical

environment, a number of initiatives have been launched by actors to try
and discredit the negative reportage on them from foreign sources. For
example, the European Union’s East StratCom and Disinformation
Review (https://euvsdisinfo.eu/) and the corresponding initiatives in
countries such as China and Russia.5 This has come at a time when public
trust and confidence in the mainstream media have been falling.6 In such
an increasingly toxic environment, it is difficult to source reliable and
accurate news at a point in time when it is needed the most.
A similar trend is observed in Russia and other countries that seek to
create a narrative of an official national enemy in order to prime and
mobilise their publics. There is a rapidly spiralling decline in relations
between Russia and the West in terms of official state-to-state level rela-
tions too. Observers on the different geopolitical sides are increasingly
warning of the unpredictable direction of the current global crisis. The
tit-for-tat sanctions between the United States and EU versus Russia have
caused both sides to become increasingly fatigued with each other at a
time when the channels of communication between them are becoming
increasingly restricted, and political calls for a tougher stance on the other
are gaining pace.
If there is one thing that the overwhelming majority of policymakers and

experts in Moscow and Washington now agree on is that the current crisis is
that the current crisis in US-Russia relations is spiralling in its character,
systemic in its nature and lingering in its resolution prospects. The rest of
the discourse is ripped between narratives of who’s to blame for what and
interpretations on just how reasonable the US sanctions are or asymmetric
Russia’s response is.7
There are an increasing number of stories appearing in the media that

are documenting the gradually increasing tensions in Europe, which
5
For example, see the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Website on the Topic of Fake News—
http://www.mid.ru/en/nedostovernie-publikacii.
6
Harrison, A., Can You Trust the Mainstream Media?, The Guardian, 6 August 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/aug/06/can-you-trust-mainstream-media
(accessed 8 August 2017).
7
Suchkov, M. A., What the Sanctions Really Mean for Russia, National Interest, 6 August
2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-the-sanctions-really-mean-russia-21804
(accessed 8 August 2017).
emphasise a narrative of the Cold War. The New York Times ran a headline
in August 2017—US Troops Train in Eastern Europe to Echoes of the Cold
War8 or in Reuters a headline Russia: Pence Balkans Comments Expose
Washington’s Cold War Ideology.9 Warnings have begun to appear in main-
stream media headlines, such as the Washington Post’s We’re on the Road to
a New Cold War.10 Others have resisted referring to the situation of the
confrontation (in particular, originating in the wake of Euromaidan and
Crimea) between the West and Russia as a ‘new’ Cold War, yet still cate-
gorising Russia and the West as adversaries (Legvold, 2014). There are
other voices that say there is no doubt that a “new” Cold War is under way.
Henry Kissinger one of the most prominent geopolitical thinkers from
the United States for the last decades states that there is a ‘new’ Cold War
and that part of the blame rests with the West and its lack of willingness to
take non-Western actors’ security and national interests into account. The
result he claims has been an imbalance in international relations, which is
exacerbated by the West not being “honest” with itself.11 Zbigniew
Brzezinski, another prominent geopolitical thinker, also assessed that a
‘new’ Cold War had begun, referencing the point in time in line with the
events in Ukraine and Crimea in particular. Although he did not see the
situation as a threat as Kissinger does, but rather a positive sign that the
world was “standing up to” Russia.12 However, what has been described
here is only one relatively small part of a much larger and more complex
series of events and processes in the global crisis.
8
Schmitt, E., US Troops Train in Eastern Europe to Echoes of the Cold War, The New York
Times, 6 August 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/world/europe/russia-
america-military-exercise-trump-putin.html?mcubz=1 (accessed 8 August 2017).
9
Vasiljevic, S., Russia: Pence Balkans Comments Expose Washington’s Cold War Ideology,
Reuters, 3 August 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-pence-idUSK-
BN1AJ2L1 (accessed 8 August 2017).
10
Editorial Board, We’re on the Road to a New Cold War, The Washington Post, 31 July
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/were-on-the-road-to-a-new-cold-war/
2017/07/31/213af6be-7617-11e7-8839-ec48ec4cae25_stor y.html?utm_term=.
8574e2962235 (accessed 8 August 2017).
11
von Mittelstaedt, J., and Follath, E., Do We Achieve World Order Through Chaos or
Insight?, Spiegel Online, 13 November 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
interview-with-henry-kissinger-on-state-of-global-politics-a-1002073.html (accessed 30
August 2017).
12
Fischer, S., and Stark, H., We are Already in a Cold War, Spiegel Online, 2 July 2015,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-zbigniew-brzezinski-on-rus-
sia-and-ukraine-a-1041795.html (accessed 30 August 2017).
INTRODUCTION 7
There are a number of critical and inherent problems concerning

researching the question as to whether a ‘new’ Cold War exists or not.
One of these is that this is a relatively new and recent phenomenon.
Therefore, there has been insufficient time, in some regards, for a thor-
ough and thoughtful analysis of the current situation. The seemingly obvi-
ous point where the crisis broke through to popular public attention came
with events occurring on the Crimean Peninsula in the spring of 2014.
However, the greater problem is the very highly politicised nature of
the current global crisis, where narratives and knowledge production are
used by the competing sides to bestow legitimacy upon their causes and to
erode the perceived legitimacy of their opponents. A result of this situa-
tion is that there are parallel subjective discussions on the issue, where the
participants rarely, if ever, meet face to face. These become echo chambers
and forums of confirmation of a pre-determined perspective or point of
view rather than a critical investigation and analysis of genuine critical
questions on matters that have a great impact upon global society cur-
rently, with prospects of a worsening situation in the near future.
In 2008, Richard Sakwa published a paper on the debate concerning
the dynamics of Russian foreign policy and the “regime question” (con-
cerning Vladimir Putin’s rule). Sakwa contends that Cold War patterns of
thinking began to emerge in connection to the discussion of Russia and its
role in the world. For example, Richard Shirreff and Maciej Olex-
Szczytowski’s report Arming for Deterrence: How Poland and NATO
Should Counter a Resurgent Russia from 2015 that assumes Russia’s hos-
tile military intent against the West is based upon notions of opposing sets
of norms and values. The report goes as far as to categorically state that
“Russia has thus become the most serious geopolitical and military threat
to NATO” (page 1). This characterisation very much fits with Buzan’s
(2006) characterisation of a possible “new” Cold War based on the prem-
ises of the “old” Cold War. The end of the “old” Cold War saw the US
military as being put in an awkward position in terms of its assumed oppo-
nent, which was understood as a mass army based on the Warsaw Pact.
However, it soon found itself on unfamiliar grounds in getting caught in
various insurgencies, which it has not proved particularly well suited for in
either doctrine or tactics. The possible emergence of a “new” Cold War
would place it on much more familiar grounds with a conventional state-
based opponent.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, invasion of Donbas, and continued threats

to Ukraine and other European countries not only menace the stability of
the post-Cold War order in Europe, but also pose a fundamental challenge
to the assumptions about the strategic environment that have undergirded
the NATO alliance for the past quarter of a century. (Kroenig, 2015, p. 49)
The logic used to reach such conclusions, by many concerned, is a path

of understanding one’s own security and interest objectives. However, this
is often done without understanding the other actor’s sets of security and
interest objectives, the information and knowledge available to them in
reaching the policy and strategy decisions that are made. Therefore, it is
critical to understand not only what drives the “us” side but also the
equivalent factors that influence the “other.” The main case study used in
the “new” Cold War research involves the scenario of Russia against the
West (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—NATO and the European
Union in particular). However, other Cold War scenarios do exist, such as
in the Middle East (Gause, 2014), as a result of Obama’s “Asia Pivot”
(Ross, 2012), Latin America and other geopolitical hot spots. Hence, it is
hoped that this book may serve as some modest and small step towards an
understanding through providing the opportunity for those that seek to
understand more completely and comprehensively the complex state of
international relations from the perspective of the workings of Russian
foreign policy through its public diplomacy.
Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

This section intends to introduce public diplomacy as a concept and a
practice in the most generic sense; the intention is to provide the reader
with a general introduction in order that they can then contextualise
Russia’s definition and practice. These concepts and practices, such as
public diplomacy, soft power and branding, will be brought up in the
chapters of this book. Public diplomacy is an activity that governments
and individuals engaged in long before the actual term was first officially
coined. The term came about in the United States during the period of
the Cold War in 1965, when the Dean of Diplomacy at Tufts University,
Edmund Gullion, launched the Edward R. Murrow Centre for Public
Diplomacy. This was at least, in part, an attempt to distance the practice of
international information and exchange from the tainting effects of the
then dominant term “propaganda” (Cowan & Cull, 2008, p. 6). Cull
INTRODUCTION 9
(2008) argues that there are five components to public diplomacy—listen-

ing, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange and international broadcast-
ing. These are all instruments in the creation and facilitation of networks
and relationships.
Public diplomacy has been viewed by some scholars as a communicative
instrument in a broad understanding of governance in order to manage
international relationships, reputations and events within the context of
the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. “Public diplomacy operates
through actions, relationships, images and words in three time frames:
24/7 news streams, medium-range campaigns on high-value policies, and
long-term engagement” (Gregory, 2008, p. 276). As to a precisely defined
term, there is no universal consensus among the academic community,
and it is highly contested. Each academic discipline tends to view public
diplomacy from its own perspective, together with the inherent strengths
and weaknesses (Sevin, 2017, pp. 20–29). Traditionally, public diplomacy
has been about government’s effort to communicate to global publics in
an effort to inform, influence and engage them in support of national
objectives and foreign policy. However, it has evolved to include “the way
in which both government and private individuals and groups influence
directly and indirectly those public attitudes and opinions that bear directly
on another government’s foreign policy decisions” (Snow, 2009, p. 6).
Therefore, there is an element of international competition between states
for influence and power in a competitive environment via acts of commu-
nication that involve both word and deed.
Although public diplomacy and soft power are not the same thing
(Hayden, 2012, p. 286), they are key tools used in the process. There are
clear connections and links between branding and soft power with public
diplomacy. For example, Nye (2008, p. 97) states that the “soft power of
a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it
is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home
and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and
having moral authority).” These aspects are open to interpretation, given
that global audiences are not homogenous in their held sets of beliefs,
values and norms. Hayden notes and acknowledges soft power as being an
extremely vague concept, and whether it is a resource or behaviour that is
being referred to. However, he provides a means of analysing soft power
and public diplomacy. “First, scope represents the idealised audiences to
soft power efforts—who matters as important to an agent’s attempts to
cultivate some kind of influence, whether through agenda-setting,
ersuasion, or some other form of attraction” (2012, p. 278). It is also

p
noted by Hayden (ibid.) that scope also refers to the manner in which
audiences are engaged as subjects to be influenced, persuaded and
convinced.
Branding a nation is a relatively recent concept, which has gained atten-
tion and attraction. How countries represent themselves on the global
stage is where brand management (as practised in the commercial world)
and public diplomacy meet. “It is public diplomacy, twined with brand
management, that underpins the idea of Competitive Identity” (Anholt,
2007, p. 12). One of the questions posed by Peter van Ham (2008,
p. 128) is whether a branding campaign launched by a state can induce
people to “buy” the “product” offered, which for intents and purposes
relates to the goals (real and perceived) of its foreign policy. Further, van
Ham argues that “image and reputation may have said to become essential
parts of the state’s strategic equity. Similar to commercial brands, image
and reputation are built on factors such as trust and customer satisfac-
tion.” Therefore, a brand is a bridge within the practice of public diplo-
macy as a means of accumulating a reserve of soft power through creating
value in the relationship between the communicator and the audience. As
noted by van Ham, “place branding, as part of soft power, centres around
concepts like values, norms, and rules in international politics” (2008,
p. 145). There do, however, exist two conceptual differences between
nation-branding and public diplomacy. Firstly, the level of effort required
for a nation-(re)branding project far exceeds the scale of that required for
most public diplomacy campaigns (by necessity a much more holistic
approach). “Second, nation-branding accentuates a country’s identity and
reflects its aspirations, but it cannot move much beyond existing social
realities” (Melissen, 2005, p. 20). In other words, it is a form of reshaping
of a country’s self-image and shaping an identity that is intended to make
the rebranded country more unique and noticeable in the global competi-
tion for attention and influence.
Russian Communications as a Threat

This section is far from being exhaustive owing to the constraints of space,
the topic is worthy of no less than a large article through to a book-length
work in order to do the topic justice and it is also not the primary concern
of this introduction. But the topic of perceptions and projections of
Russian communications needs to be addressed, at least briefly. This
INTRODUCTION 11
follows from, and is influenced by, the strained current state of interna-
tional relations that in turn influences how politics, mass media and aca-
demia react and reflect on the issue. As noted above, Russian
communications, including public diplomacy, have associations of decep-
tive and harmful intent on the target audience. Therefore, not at all involv-
ing mutually beneficial exchanges, but more concerns the deliberate
subversion of the fabric of ‘democratic’ society.
The term “hybrid warfare” has been used to describe the general intent
and framework of Russian communications, although it is a very poorly
defined term that has a multitude of meanings. “Evidence” of the exis-
tence of Russian hybrid warfare came with the so-called Gerasimov doc-
trine, an article by the Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov. However,
anyone who read the original text (in Russian) understood that this was a
call to develop a scientific approach to counteracting Western hybrid war-
fare against Russia.13 As such, the projections and assumptions are more in
line with the practice and intent of information operations. Writings that
create a link between information operations and public diplomacy have
been published, such as Lord’s (2007) chapter on the need to reorganise
US public diplomacy to meet the new needs of the Global War On
Terrorism. As the specific term “information operations” (IO) has been
mentioned, it is necessary to give a precise definition of the term and prac-
tice. The US Department of Defence offers a good definition of IO.
The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare,

computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception
and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related
capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and
automated decision-making while protecting our own. (Paul, 2008, p. 2)
This definition reveals the offensive and defensive nature of the opera-
tions and intent from the perspective of the US military; it reveals the very
broad nature of those operations and certainly many of these have been
associated with Russia’s international communications. Paul (2008, p. 10)
also notes that IO is subordinate to and supportive of strategic
13
Gerasimov, V., Ценность науки в предвидении: Новые вызовы требуют переосмыслить
формы и способы ведения боевых действий (The Value of Science in Anticipation: New
Challenges Need to Rethink the Forms and Methods of Warfare), Военно-промышленный
курьер (Military-Industrial Courier), 27 February 2013, http://www.vpk-news.ru/arti-
cles/14632 (accessed 19 October 2015).
c ommunications and public diplomacy. How does this apply to Russia? A

lot of blame has been attributed to Russia as a country and to Vladimir
Putin as the President, which includes “meddling” in various elections,
threatening various neighbouring countries, “undermining” the West and
its institutions and poisoning political opponents abroad. As such, it cre-
ated anxiety and worry. This situation has also led to increased political,
economic and military tensions, hence the gradual invocation of the con-
cept of a “New Cold War.”
While these accusations are worrying, there has also been noted a ten-
dency to make use of association or assertions, which is noted in such criti-
cal media as Consortium News or Media Lens. The use of less than
transparent organisations as Prop Or Not14 or the more recent Institute of
Statecraft’s Integrity Initiative,15 have revealed the role of these organisa-
tions in shaping the information and knowledge environment. There are
an increasing number of accounts beginning to doubt the depth and scale
of Russian “operations,” such as the level of involvement in the US 2016
presidential elections,16 even while the Mueller Investigation continues.
This makes the information environment highly contradictory and confus-
ing in an atmosphere of competing subjective and politicised interpreta-
tions of “reality.”
This is not to say that Russia does not pursue its interests and opportu-
nities, which may or may not coincide with the West. It is the characterisa-
tion of the communications that can be misleading, such as contacts
between diplomats and political candidates before or during an elections,
which is common practice by most countries and including Western
democracies. As seen in the US 2016 election, this was projected as being
evidence of Russian interference with Trump, while at the same time
14
For their website, see http://www.propornot.com/p/home.html, for critique, see
https://consor tiumnews.com/2018/01/28/unpacking-the-shadowy-outfit-
behind-2017s-biggest-fake-news-story/.
15
For their website, see https://www.integrityinitiative.net/about, for critique, see
https://grayzoneproject.com/2018/12/17/inside-the-temple-of-covert-propaganda-the-
integrity-initiative-and-the-uks-scandalous-information-war/. For an example of their infor-
mation activities approach, see https://undercoverinfo.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/
fco-application-form-2018-v21.pdf.
16
Maté, A., New Studies Show Pundits Are Wrong About Russian Social-Media
Involvement in US Politics, The Nation, 28 December 2018, https://www.thenation.com/
article/russiagate-elections-interference/?fbclid=IwAR0_YEkSC-k0bMpVqxxo6%2D%2Dk
Boa5QBezqd21uuKWnw-YvXW5mWhZljhILzc (accessed 5 January 2019).
INTRODUCTION 13
ignoring the links and connections Hillary Clinton had with Russia.17
Rather than strictly being a reality, it is concerning a subjective interpreta-
tion of the reality for the appearance of political credibility and legitimacy,
which is what happens in Russia too.
External Perceptions and Interpretations of Russian

Public Diplomacy
Given the above-mentioned context of the poor state of international rela-
tions in the contemporary times, the issue of Russia’s international com-
munications is a high-profile topic, where foreign audiences often have a
strong opinion. There are divergent views on the quality and quantity of
those communications by non-Russian observers, some of the views
expressed are deeply negative and suspicious, and others can be more
objective, and there are those that take a more positive view. Given that
this book is almost entirely the work of Russian academics and practitio-
ners, it is necessary to provide the viewpoints of other observers on Russia’s
foreign policy and public diplomacy.
In this informational conflict that is a result of the current New Cold
War, there are two primary camps—those that project Russia as a security
threat and those that dismiss the threat. Both of these arguments have the
potential to influence policy and decision makers for better or worse.
Naturally, real enemies pose a challenge and threat in terms of their man-
agement. However, the process can be clear and logical. An imagined
enemy, on the other hand, can prove to be more dangerous. The reason is
that potential real threats can be overlooked or ignored, and resources are
wasted on countering something that does not exist.18 A variety of views
of Russia’s role in foreign policy and the related implied security dimen-
sions, where the evaluation and interpretation of international communi-
cations form a crucial aspect of the narratives.
17
Rogers, E., The Media Is Ignoring Ties Between the Clinton Campaign and Russians,
Opinion, The Washington Post, 13 February 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/post-partisan/wp/2018/02/13/the-media-is-ignoring-ties-between-the-clinton-
campaign-and-russians/?utm_term=.d7eea0d7d0b6 (accessed 6 January 2019).
18
Kinzer, S., Russia is Not the Enemy, Boston Globe, 20 September 2015, http://www.
bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/09/19/russia-not-enemy/O0nCDUXrXAYLliutmqUtlN/
story.html?p1=Article_Trending_Most_Viewed (accessed 22 September 2015).
One of the narratives19 of the information war is that Russia is a threat,

not only to its immediate neighbours (Lucas, June 2015; Darczewska,
May 2014; Berzins, April 2014) but also to the wider West.20 There are a
number of aspects in common to this particular line—Russia is winning an
insidious propaganda war against, democracy, freedom and the West. In
addition, Russia is dividing the West and shall gradually take (by open
military action or subversion) country after country. For the purposes of
this book, propaganda is defined as being, in the most neutral sense, “to
disseminate or promote particular ideas” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012,
p. 2). However, the term and practice of propaganda is rarely perceived in
a neutral sense. “Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape
perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a
response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett &
O’Donnell, 2012, p. 7). Therefore, to counter this given threat, various
logic is offered to remedy the situation, such as all countries need to unite
under NATO,21 increase military spending, increase a sense of political
unity and purpose and to increase funding for counter-propaganda.
The counter-message, which is derived from various sources in Western
and Russian media outlets, state that the narrative of the Russian threat is
a myth,22 Russia is not an enemy23 and that the threat is in fact Western
19
A narrative is a spoken or written account of connected events, whether this is true or
false is immaterial. Whether it is believed or not is of importance. If accepted a narrative, in
addition to helping to explain events, also has the effect of restricting how those events can
be described (narrowing the ability to credibly provide alternative accounts).
20
Panichi, J., EU Splits in Russian Media War, Politico, 17 September 2015, http://www.
politico.eu/article/eu-russia-propaganda-kremlin-media/ (accessed 18 September 2015);
Ennis, S., Russia in ‘Information War’ With the West to Win Hearts and Minds, BBC News,
16 September 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34248178 (accessed 16
September 2015).
21
Williams, Carol J., Sweden Rethinking Neutrality Amid Fear of Russian Aggression, LA
Times, 2 September 2015, http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-sweden-rus-
sia-nato-neutrality-20150902-story.html (accessed 4 September 2015).
22
Escobar, P., The Myth of a Russian ‘Threat’, Sputnik, 25 August 2015, http://sput-
niknews.com/columnists/20150825/1026161727/myth-of-russian-threat.html (accessed
28 August 2015).
23
Kinzer, S., Russia is Not the Enemy, Boston Globe, 20 September 2015, http://www.
bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/09/19/russia-not-enemy/
O0nCDUXrXAYLliutmqUtlN/story.html?p1=Article_Trending_Most_Viewed (accessed 22
September 2015).
INTRODUCTION 15
propaganda against Russia.24 The main argument used by this side is that
there is an information war in progress, which is being waged in the global
information space. They claim that many of the assertions made by the
other side are not supported by clear and objective references. For exam-
ple, it is cited in Sputnik that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin
Dempsey states that Russia is a threat, yet also simultaneously concludes
that he does not know what Russia intends. The weakness of the Russian
threat narrative is used to undermine the credibility of those claims.
The above-mentioned dimensions of the information war seem to have
created a number of different and not necessarily related conclusions. One
of those conclusions, which is related to the side of Russia and those argu-
ing against Russia as a threat is that when Russia plays by the West’s rules,
it tends to lose the “game” to those that have established it. Therefore,
Russia needs to establish its own rules of the “game” if it hopes to be able
to be triumphant.25 By “rules of the game,” it is implied that the actor that
establishes the geopolitical rules in engaging in international politics and
affairs possesses an advantage over their competitors and rivals. Since the
end of the Cold War, the United States has been holding this position—
the actor who determines the rules of the game (i.e. managing and influ-
encing international affairs). A second conclusion, which seems to be
increasingly projected by more neutral or non-aligned sides is that there is
an increasing risk of inadvertent war as a result of the increasingly danger-
ous geopolitical games that are being waged through informational and
proxy wars.
24
Adam Johnson, US Leads World in Credulous Reports of ‘Lagging Behind’ Russia,
FAIR, 1 September 2015, http://fair.org/home/us-leads-world-in-credulous-reports-of-
lagging-behind-russia/ (accessed 4 September 2015); Hahn, G. M., Putin is Crazy and Sick:
The Lows of American Rusology, Russian and Eurasian Politics, Islamism, Jihadism, 19
September 2015, http://gordonhahn.com/2015/09/19/putin-is-crazy-and-sick-the-
lows-of-american-rusology/ (accessed 22 September 2015); O’Phobe R., A Media Primer
on the Art of Writing Russian Scare Stories, The Blogmire, http://www.theblogmire.com/a-
media-primer-on-the-art-of-writing-russian-scare-stories/ (accessed 16 September 2015).
25
When Russia Plays by the West’s Rules, It Loses, Sputnik, http://sputniknews.com/
analysis/20150827/1026262657/russia-europe-us-geopolitics-imperialism.html, 27
August 2015 (accessed 31 August 2015); Gerasimov, V., Ценность науки в предвидении:
Новые вызовы требуют переосмыслить формы и способы ведения боевых действий (The
Value of Science in Anticipation: New Challenges Need to Rethink the Forms and Methods of
Warfare), Военно-промышленный курьер (Military-Industrial Courier), http://www.vpk-
news.ru/articles/14632, 27 February 2013 (accessed 19 October 2015).
The standing of the information war between Russia and the West at
this point in time, according to the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas
Linkevicius, Russian messages and narratives fill the information void from
the lack of communication by Western counterparts in post-Soviet space.26
A lot of misunderstanding of the Russian effort is generated by blurring
distinctions and through the use of popular catch phrases and slogans. An
example of the blurring of distinctions can be found in the work of Eellend
and Frank (2015) in FOI’s Strategic Outlook 6, where they discuss Russia’s
aims on page 17, but then concentrate on tactics rather than any grand
strategic objectives that may be behind those tactics. A weakness of this
report was the absence of any references, which has the effect of rendering
the information to the level of opinion as it is not possible to verify the
sources used to generate the information. Without understanding the
desired end state, the value of the individual parts is of little knowledge
value. There is also the issue of reference to popular catchphrases and slo-
gans, such as “lying 24/7” or that everything is just “propaganda” or to
“litter the news with half-truths and quarter truths” (Aron, 2015). This
has the effect of obscuring the task and ability of objectively looking at the
problem in order to derive an appropriate solution.
Coming more strictly and directly to the subject of academic assess-
ment and interpretation of public diplomacy reveals a diverse understand-
ing and evaluation. Although the framing of Russia’s public diplomacy is
not vastly different in terms of the earlier-mentioned categories. Saari
(2014) notes the rising importance and use of public diplomacy in Russian
foreign policy; she also notes that global publics tend to be segmented
between countries associated with the Near Abroad (former Soviet repub-
lics of the USSR) and those countries that are beyond. In her analysis,
Saari notes the use of key narratives of public diplomacy that are intended
as the basis of a mutual relationship, such as the presence of mutual inter-
est and the respect for national sovereignty. Post-Soviet Russian public
diplomacy is evaluated as being more akin to the Soviet-era “active mea-
sures” rather than with the association of soft power.
Russia’s interests and goals with its public diplomacy programmes are
acknowledged by Rawnsley (2015), who focuses upon the aspect of inter-
national broadcasting. He compares China and Russia, together with their
26
Taylor, G., Lithuanian Foreign Minister Says Russian Propaganda Fills Void from West,
Washington Times, 8 December 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/
dec/8/linas-linkevicius-lithuanian-foreign-minister-says/ (accessed 10 December 2015).
INTRODUCTION 17
ambition “to correct” what are perceived as being distorted information

about these countries in the mainstream global information space and to
convey the intentions of foreign policy, concluding that this approach runs
the “risk” of blurring the line between public diplomacy and propaganda.
Propaganda and public diplomacy have been linked together in previous
research beyond the strictly Russian context, such as the communications
surrounding the war on terrorism and the mediatisation of international
politics (Brown, 2003). Other scholars seek to equate Russian public
diplomacy with “propaganda” and “active measures,” such as Kragh and
Åsberg (2017). However, they fail to even define public diplomacy as
either a concept or a practice, thereby rendering the exercise as one where
the content is massaged to fit a pre-determined conclusion (i.e. that all
Russian communications and foreign policy are harmful and deceitful).
However, they fail to provide clear and hard evidence to support the
claims. Van Herpen (2016) also builds the logic and argument based on
dismissing Russian notions of soft power and public diplomacy as being
“propaganda” and of a harmful nature.
A blog on the University of Southern California’s Centre on Public
Diplomacy seeks to answer the questions, what is Russian public diplo-
macy and how does it function. It begins with a warning as to how the
issue should not be approached. “‘Russian public diplomacy’ may sound
like an oxymoron to many in the West these days. But dismissing the
entire effort of an increasingly well-oiled state and media machinery as
‘futile propaganda’ does not do Russia justice and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, increases the risk that Western governments (and allies) will con-
tinue making the same mistakes that have contributed to the rapid
escalation of the current international crisis.”27 Osipova goes on to say that
initially Russian public diplomacy sought to imitate Western models of the
practice, but in the wake of various conflicts and crises most notably 2008
Georgian-Russian War and the current Ukraine crisis have prompted a re-
evaluation of the model of communication that serves them best and have
begun “de-Westernising” their approach and tailor it to suit Russia’s spe-
cific needs and approach. The Russian approach to creating its unique
conceptualisation and application of public diplomacy and even soft power
27
Osipova, E., Russia’s Public Diplomacy: In Search of Recognition (Part One), USC
Centre on Public Diplomacy, 3 November 2014, https://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/
blog/russia%E2%80%99s-public-diplomacy-search-recognition-part-1 (accessed 7 November
2018).
has been noted by Just (2016), who also notes the contradictions in words
and deed, such as the current Ukrainian conflict, have a tendency to create
limitations on the effectiveness of the communications owing to the con-
tradictions that are seen.
Others take a more pragmatic and goal-oriented approach to under-
standing Russian public diplomacy. For example, there is the assertion that
the primary goal being to project a more positive and attractive image of
Russia among the international community, through such mechanisms as
issue management. The end goals being diverse, from gaining greater lee-
way in foreign policy, counter negative stereotypes and images of Russia,
attract foreign direct investment to Russian business and industry and
much more.28 Russia’s ability to communicate with international audi-
ences has improved considerably in recent years. Russian international
communications and especially their public diplomacy are pragmatically
based, on specific interests and concrete goals.
Russian public diplomacy attempts to influence foreign publics
through relational marketing techniques. The means is related to persua-
sion, rather than propaganda, owing to the approach and outcomes.
Persuasion “is interactive and attempts to satisfy the needs of both per-
suader and persuade” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012, p. 1). This may
include politically indirect means, such as discussing or promoting cul-
tural or economic relationships, advantages and opportunities. It can also
take the form of a direct political appeal through the use of values and
norms, such as Russia being a challenger to US global hegemony (Simons,
2013, 2014, 2015). The message type and format have the potential to
appeal to different publics, quite often as a result of resonance to dissatis-
fied or marginalised individuals and groups present in Western societies
(the exact nature of those publics shall be discussed further on in this
chapter). There is some aspect of soft power present, but this can also be
mixed with hard power and forms of coercion at times (Simons, 2015).
These demonstrate a relative sense of flexibility in practice and approach
to different publics, different situational contexts and different goals.
The flip side is that such flexibility can also lead to perceived contradic-
tions in the message in an increasingly interconnected global network of
people and ideas.
28
Public Diplomacy: Russia, no date given, http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/
Russia (accessed 7 November 2018).
INTRODUCTION 19
Brief Chapter Descriptions

This edited book contains some 13 chapters (in addition to the Introduction
and the Conclusion) by different authors on the nature and the role of
Russian public diplomacy. These chapters are mostly written by Russian
authors who possess a significant amount of academic and practical experi-
ence and knowledge on a very broad range of aspects, both historically
and contemporarily, of Russian public diplomacy practice and thinking.
They manage to not only bring their views, knowledge and experience but
also make available Russian language knowledge and thinking on these
topics and thereby make them more accessible to a wider audience. The
chapters authors take the more neutral approach (i.e. less symbolically
loaded) by emphasising Russia’s public diplomacy efforts are about realis-
ing the goals of Russian foreign policy through creating functional and
mutually beneficial political and economic relationships through creating
a more positive image and reputation of Russia on the international stage.
Olga Lebedeva in Chap. 2, “Russian Public Diplomacy: Historical
Aspects” considers public diplomacy actors in Russia, including not only
states and diplomats but also individuals, groups and institutions involved
in intercultural and inter-communal exchange, which influence interna-
tional relations within the framework of relations between two or more
states. This reflects the broad understanding and approach that has been
played by public diplomacy, from a Russian point of view, over time. Public
diplomacy evolves with time, space and circumstance, but there are also
some continuities as well as differences by Russian actors in the foreign
policy arena when observing from a longer-term perspective. This chapter
begins with the history of the emergence of public diplomacy from the
beginning of the formation of the Soviet Union and the creation of Union
Society for Cultural Relations up to the present time, even though the
practice of Russian public diplomacy stretches far further back in time than
this point.
In Chap. 3, Semed A. Semedov and Anastasiya G. Kurbatova on “Russian
Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding” deal with discovering the con-
nection between the country’s public diplomacy and nation-branding
efforts. The issues of defining target audience, key regions and main
instruments of these efforts are identified and analysed. In terms of gener-
ating a national brand, the stereotypes, images and reputation not only
stem from the efforts of Russia to project a positive brand. There are also
the efforts of other countries in projecting a negative brand image of
Russia in a zero-sum global game of competitive reputation and brand,

where a good brand can offer advantages over one’s rivals in international
relations and affairs.
Chapter 4, “Development Diplomacy of the Russian Federation” by
Stanislav L. Tkachenko reveals that development assistance recently became
a major asset for Russia’s public diplomacy. The aim of development diplo-
macy (DD) is to accelerate the other state’s social and economic develop-
ment and to create mutually beneficial international relationships in
international affairs, and increase Russia’s influence and reputation. A
newly observed trend for Russian diplomacy is the drift towards 3D
(Diplomacy, Defense, Development), which is a side-effect of the growing
conflict between Russia and Western powers. In the case of Russian
Federation, contemporary development diplomacy and public diplomacy
(PD) are closely interrelated since key targets of DD is the same as of
PD—political elites and public opinion of targeted states. The relationship
between DD and PD, especially since beginning of current conflict in
spring 2014, is the focus of this chapter.
Natalia Bubnova tackles the topic of “Russia’s Policy and International
Cooperation: The Challenges and Opportunities of Soft Power” in Chap.
5. The role of soft power in international relations is steadily increasing
from a non-Western centric point of view. A common Russian understand-
ing, of what soft power is exactly and how it should be approached opera-
tionally, still is currently lacking. The potential and expectations of what
international cooperation and the pursuit of the accumulation of soft
power make these topics popular in Russia after a relatively slow start in
recognising them. This is very much an aspect under rapid theoretical and
operational development and consideration.
In Chap. 6, Natalia Tsvetkova discusses “Russian Digital Diplomacy: A
Rising Cyber Soft Power?” The chapter engages in Russia’s digital diplo-
macy with its political goals, examples and its contribution to Russia’s
development of public diplomacy. Russia’s digital diplomacy has evolved
through two stages of development so far, with its origins in the early
2000s. Russia redefined its foreign policy aims and goals significantly in
2013, and consequently Russia’s digital diplomacy efforts reflected this
change. As noted, initially, the digital diplomacy efforts were influenced by
the thinking and efforts of the experience of the United States in this field.
However, Russia has moved on from this starting point and has been
developing a “native” approach. In spite of the alarm sounded by some
INTRODUCTION 21
Western commentators, the efforts of Russia’s digital diplomacy seem to

have some signs of success.
The topic of Alexey Fominykh’s Chap. 7 is “Russian Public Diplomacy
Through Higher Education.” Russian governmental initiatives to attract
foreign nationals to study in Russian colleges and universities, and the
outreach practices of Russian universities abroad as a part of the public
diplomacy effort, are the focus of this chapter. Significance is attached to
the role of higher education in Russia’s public diplomacy efforts, which is
evidenced by the increase in the number of government scholarships for
international students, for example. This is a measure of the increasing
competition for foreign students in the race to influence young hearts and
minds by those countries seeking influence in the current geopolitical
environment. There is a clear interdependence between educational and
diplomatic entities that constructs a distinct style of international educa-
tion practices in Russian universities and Russia’s public diplomacy.
Elena Kharitonova and Irina Prokhorenko cover the topic of “Russian
Science Diplomacy” in Chap. 8. The international community is facing
many common global challenges that require collaborative decisions and
responses based on scientific evidence. However, relations between Russia
and the West have seriously deteriorated in the past several years, with
some observers referring to the emergence of a “New Cold war.” Science
diplomacy has become an increasingly popular form of communication
and interaction in the last decade. Russia’s approach to science diplomacy,
in terms of conceptual development, organisational structure and opera-
tional approach, is very much a work in progress. As such, this creates a
sense of uncertainty and limits the full potential that can be realised in
Russia’s science diplomacy efforts.
“The Role of Civil Society in Russian Public Diplomacy” by Elena
Stetsko is the issue of Chap. 9. Civil society as a concept and its institutions
required ideological and practical adaptation to Russian realities rather
than an imitation of leading Western countries such as the United States.
Currently, the place and role of NGOs have been determined by the struc-
ture of society and public administration with some NGOs acquiring the
status of institutes and/or instruments of public diplomacy. These organ-
isations have been somewhat successful in terms of their public diplomacy
role in pursuing Russian foreign policy goals. However, this has been not
a problem-free experience as the notion of civil society’s role in public
diplomacy is very much a concept and practice under development. Not
to mention the daunting role they have before them in trying to develop
a positive international image of Russia. A number of differences can also

be noted in the practice and approach of Western NGOs’ role in public
diplomacy.
Chapter 10, “Multiple Facets of Russian Public Diplomacy in
International Organizations: A Case Study,” by Maria Chepurina and
Evgeny Kuznetsov covers the role of international organisations, and
especially the United Nations system. Russia has since the Soviet times
attempted to maintain a strong presence within key bodies of the United
Nations system, by nominating its top diplomats and experts to serve in
various leading roles in the organisation. This is seen as a possible invest-
ment in influence and a means of increasing Russia’s say in key global
issues and events. Yet there are a number of problems in Russia’s renewed
interest in gaining influence via certain international organisations. One of
the responses is the creation of other international organisations with
international partners and other countries to compete with US-led inter-
national organisations in order to pursue Russian foreign policy goals
through this branch of public diplomacy.
“Russian Business Diplomacy in Southeast Asia” by Andrey Bykov and
Kirill Solntsev is the subject of Chap. 11. An analysis of the trade and eco-
nomic relations between Russia and South and Southeast Asia is the focus
of this chapter, and the “Turn to the East” policy trend. Business diplo-
macy has been playing an increasingly important and significant role
within Russian foreign policy and the goals it pursues. This is seen within
the context of both interstate relations and major international integration
associations. The chapter notes crucial differences in the practice of busi-
ness diplomacy from the Western countries’ approach.
The topic for Chap. 12 by Daria Akhutina is “The Baltic Sea Region:
Cooperation in Human Dimension.” The Baltic Sea Region (BSR) has
been an area of significance and importance to Russia for centuries owing
to different political, economic, trade, military and geopolitical reasons.
Recently, the BSR-Russia cooperation moved into the plane of relations
on a people-to-people level, which is influenced, in part, due to the poor
level of state-state relations. The role of cooperation at the civil society
level includes a wide range of different actors. There is a great deal of
potential for people-to-people diplomacy as an integral part of soft power
and its positive impact, but it remains underestimated and not adequately
applied. There is a distinct lack of holistic and systematic approach, which
is often consisting of poorly planned activities with no tangible long-
lasting results.
INTRODUCTION 23
Evgeny N. Pashentsev tackles the increased global conflict and compe-

tition in Chap. 13 titled “Strategic Communication of Russia in Latin
America.” Aspects of the Strategic Communication of Russia in Latin
America are analysed. Attention is paid to the key messages of the leader-
ship of Russia to the countries of the region, the current practice of public
diplomacy and the perception of Russia in Latin America. With the appar-
ent winding down of the Global War On Terrorism, which diverted US
attention away from Latin America, the situation permitted a number of
foreign countries including Russia to gain influence in the region. Russia
sought to develop relations in the region for political and economic rea-
sons, which, in the case of economic motivation, has increased with
Western economic sanctions on Russia. However, in spite of intentions,
Russia’s efforts have faced a number of problems and obstacles.
The final Chap. 14 by Vladimir Morozov and Greg Simons moves to
another region of the globe of increased geopolitical competition in
“Russia’s Public Diplomacy in the Middle East”. Russia has been steadily
regaining a presence and influence in the Middle East and North Africa
after a long absence precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991. Political, economic, transport and trade, energy, geopolitical and
military/security interests and goals are pursued by Russia in the region.
This chapter delves into the broad nature and types of programmes and
goals pursued by Russia in the region with an equally diverse host of dif-
ferent countries and audiences. Russia has been able to capitalise on vari-
ous mistakes made by the United States in the region. Russia is far from
being the largest external actor in the region, but is making progress with
its varied public diplomacy approaches.
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INTRODUCTION 25
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CHAPTER 2
Russian Public Diplomacy: Historical Aspects
Olga Lebedeva
The modern world regards public diplomacy as a process of communica-

tion with the public pursued by a foreign state, using both state and
non-state actors with a view to indirectly shaping public opinion and
foreign policy decision-making in that state. Public diplomacy methods
and techniques have been used in foreign policy for centuries, but it
wasn’t until the twentieth century that they started acquiring a serious
role in the national strategy underpinned by a solid research, legislative
and resource base. Throughout centuries, the term “diplomacy” mainly
implied negotiations, official state-to-state relations and formal commu-
nications (notes, letters and other instruments), and these elements
haven’t ceased to constitute the backbone of traditional diplomacy,
which can be defined as “the management of international relations by
negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted by ambas-
sadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist” (Nicolson,
1941, p. 1).
With the advent of the information age, traditional diplomacy
started to increasingly go hand in hand with public diplomacy, also
known as people’s diplomacy. The term was introduced by Edmund
O. Lebedeva (*)
Department for International Relations, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia
© The Author(s) 2020 27

A. A. Velikaya, G. Simons (eds.), Russia’s Public Diplomacy, Studies
in Diplomacy and International Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12874-6_2
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
players. The IBM 704 computer has been programmed to inspect the
results of its possible decisions several moves ahead and to select
the best choice. At the end of the game it prints out the winner and
thanks its opponent for the game. Rated as polite, but only an
indifferent player by experts, the computer is much like the checker-
playing dog whose master scoffed at him for getting beaten three
games out of five. Chess may well be an ultimate challenge for any
kind of brain, since the fastest computer in operation today could not
possibly work out all the possible moves in a game during a human
lifetime!
As evidenced in the science-fiction treatment early machines got,
the first computers were monsters at least in size. Pioneering design
efforts on machines with the capacity of the brain led to plans for
something roughly the size of the Pentagon, equipped with its own
Niagara for power and cooling, and a price tag the world couldn’t
afford. As often seems to happen when a need arises, though, new
developments have come along to offset the initial obstacles of size
and cost.
One such development was the transistor and other
semiconductor devices. Tiny and rugged, these components require
little power. With the old vacuum-tubes replaced, computers shrank
immediately and dramatically. On the heels of this micro-
miniaturization have come new and even smaller devices called
“ferrite cores” and “cryotrons” using magnetism and supercold
temperatures instead of conventional electronic techniques.
As a result, an amazing number of parts can be packed into a tiny
volume. So-called “molecular electronics” now seems to be a
possibility, and designers of computers have a gleam in their eyes as
they consider progress being made toward matching the “packaging
density” of the brain. This human computer has an estimated 100
billion parts per cubic foot!
We have talked of reading and translating. Some new computers
can also accept voice commands and speak themselves. Others
furnish information in typed or printed form, punched cards, or a
display on a tube or screen.
Like us, the computer can be frustrated by a task beyond its
capabilities. A wrong command can set its parts clicking rapidly but
in futile circles. Early computers, for example, could be panicked by
the order to divide a number by zero. The solution to that problem of
course is infinity, and the poor machine had a hard time trying to
make such an answer good.
Aeronutronic Division, Ford Motor Co.
This printed-circuit card contains more than 300 BIAX memory elements. Multiples
of such cards mounted in computers store large amounts of information.
There are other, quainter stories like that of the pioneer General
Electric computer that simply could not function in the dark. All day
long it hummed efficiently, but problems left with it overnight came
out horribly botched for no reason that engineers could discover. At
last it was found that a light had to be left burning with the scary
machine! Neon bulbs in the computer were enough affected by light
and darkness that the delicate electronic balance of the machine had
been upset.
Among the computer’s unusual talents is the ability to compose
music. Such music has been published and is of a quality to give rise
to thoughtful speculation that perhaps great composers are simply
good selectors of music. In other words, all the combinations of
notes and meter exist: the composer just picks the right ones. No
less an authority than Aaron Copland suggests that “we’ll get our
new music by feeding information into an electronic computer.” Not
content with merely writing music, some computers can even play a
tune. At Christmas time, carols are rendered by computers specially
programmed for the task. The result is not unlike a melody played on
a pipe organ.
In an interesting switch of this musical ability on the part of the
machine, Russian engineers check the reliability of their computers
by having them memorize Mozart and Grieg. Each part of the
complex machines is assigned a definite musical value, and when
the composition is “played back” by the computer, the engineer can
spot any defects existing in its circuitry. Such computer maintenance
would seem to be an ideal field for the music lover.
In a playful mood, computers match pennies with visitors, explain
their inner workings as they whiz through complex mathematics, and
are even capable of what is called heuristic reasoning. This amounts
to playing hunches to reach short-cut solutions to otherwise
unsolvable problems. A Rand Corporation computer named
JOHNNIAC demonstrated this recently. It was given some basic
axioms and asked to prove some theorems. JOHNNIAC came up
with the answers, and in one case produced a proof that was simpler
than that given in the text. As one scientist puts it, “If computers don’t
really think, they at least put on a pretty creditable imitation of the
real thing.”
Computers are here to stay; this has been established beyond
doubt. The only question remaining is how fast the predictions made
by dreamers and science-fiction writers—and now by sober
scientists—will come to be a reality. When we consider that in the
few years since the 1953 crop of computers, their capacity and
speed has been increased more than fiftyfold, and is expected to
jump another thousandfold in two years, these dreams begin to
sound more and more plausible.
One quite probable use for computers is medical diagnosis and
prescription of treatment. Electronic equipment can already monitor
an ailing patient, and send an alarm when help is needed. We may
one day see computers with a built-in bedside manner aiding the
family doctor.
The accomplished inroads of computing machines in business are
as nothing to what will eventually take place. Already computer
“game-playing” has extended to business management, and serious
executives participate to improve their administrative ability. We
speak of decision-making machines; business decisions are logical
applications for this ability. Computers have been given the job of
evaluating personnel and assigning salaries on a strictly logical
basis. Perhaps this is why in surveys questioning increased use of
the machines, each executive level in general tends to rate the
machine’s ability just below its own.
Other games played by the computer are war games, and
computers like SAGE are well known. This system not only monitors
all air activity but also makes decisions, assigns targets, and then
even flies the interceptor planes and guided missiles on their
missions. Again in the sky, the increase of commercial air traffic has
perhaps reached the limit of human ability to control it. Computers
are beginning to take over here too, planning flights and literally
flying the planes.
Surface transport can also be computer-controlled. Railroads are
beginning to use the computer techniques, and automatic highways
are inevitable. Ships also benefit, and special systems coupled to
radar can predict courses and take corrective action when
necessary.
Men seem to have temporarily given up trying to control the
weather, but using computers, meteorologists can take the huge
mass of data from all over the world and make predictions rapidly
enough to be of use.
We have talked of the computer’s giant strides in banking. Its wide
use in stores is not far off. An English computer firm has designed an
automatic supermarket that assembles ordered items, prices them,
and delivers them to the check stand. At the same time it keeps a
running inventory, price record, and profit and loss statement,
besides billing the customer with periodic statements. The
storekeeper will have only to wash the windows and pay his electric
power bill.
Even trading stamps may be superseded by computer techniques
that keep track of customer purchases and credit him with premiums
as he earns them. Credit cards have helped pioneer computer use in
billing; it is not farfetched to foresee the day when we are issued a
lifetime, all-inclusive credit card—perhaps with our birth certificate!—
a card with our thumbprint on it, that will buy our food, pay our rent
and utilities and other bills. A central computer system will balance
our expenses against deposits and from time to time let us know
how we stand financially.
As with many other important inventions, the computer and its
technology were spurred by war and are aided now by continuing
threats of war. It is therefore pleasant to think on the possibilities of a
computer system “programmed” for peace: a gigantic, worldwide
system whose input includes all recorded history of all nations, all
economic and cultural data, all weather information and other
scientific knowledge. The output of such a machine hopefully would
be a “best plan” for all of us. Such a computer would have no ax to
grind and no selfish interests unless they were fed into it.
Given all the facts, it would punch out for us a set of instructions
that would guarantee us the best life possible. This has long been a
dream of science writers. H. G. Wells was one of these, suggesting a
world clearinghouse of information in his book World Brain written in
the thirties. In this country, scientist Vannevar Bush suggested a
similar computer called “Memex” which could store huge amounts of
data and answer questions put to it.
The huge amounts of information—books, articles, speeches, and
records of all sorts—are beginning to make it absolutely necessary
for an efficient information retrieval system. Many cases have been
noted in which much time and effort are spent on a project which has
already been completed but then has become lost in the welter of
literature crammed into libraries. The computer is a logical device for
such work; in a recent test such a machine scored 86 per cent in its
efforts to locate specific data on file. Trained workers rated only 38
per cent in the same test!
The Boeing Co.
Engineers using computers to solve complex problems in aircraft design.

The science of communication is advancing along with that of
computers, and can help make the dream of a worldwide “brain”
come true. Computers in distant cities are now linked by telephone
lines or radio, and high-speed techniques permit the transmission of
many thousands of words per second across these “data links.” An
interesting sidelight is the fact that an ailing computer can be hooked
by telephone line with a repair center many miles away and its
ailments diagnosed by remote control. Communications satellites
that are soon to be dotting the sky like tiny moons may well play a
big part in computing systems of the future. Global weather
prediction and worldwide coordination of trade immediately come to
mind.
While we envision such far-reaching applications, let’s not lose
sight of the possibilities for computer use closer to home—right in
our homes, as a matter of fact. Just as early inventors of mechanical
power devices did not foresee the day when electric drills and saws
for hobbyist would be commonplace and the gasoline engine would
do such everyday chores as cutting the grass in our yards, the
makers of computers today cannot predict how far the computer will
go in this direction. Perhaps we may one day buy a “Little Dandy
Electro-Brain” and plug it into the wall socket for solving many of the
everyday problems we now often guess wrong on.
Royal McBee Corp.
Students at Staples High School, Westport, Connecticut, attend a summer session

to learn the techniques of programming and operating an electronic computer.
The Saturday Evening Post
“Herbert’s been replaced by an electronic brain—one of the simpler types.”
Some years ago a group of experts predicted that by 1967 the

world champion chess player would be an electronic computer. No
one has yet claimed that we would have a president of metal and
wire, but some interesting signposts are being put up. Computers
are now used widely to predict the result of elections. Computers
count the votes, and some have suggested that computers could
make it possible for us to vote at home. The government is
investigating the effectiveness of a decision-making computer as a
stand-by aid for the President in this complex age we are moving
into. No man has the ability to weigh every factor and to make
decisions affecting the world. Perhaps a computer can serve in an
advisory capacity to a president or to a World Council; perhaps—
It is comforting to remember that men will always tell the computer
what it is supposed to do. No computer will ever run the world any
more than the cotton gin or the steam engine or television runs the
world. And in an emergency, we can always pull out the wallplug,
can’t we?
“History is but the unrolled scroll of prophecy.”
—James A. Garfield
2: The Computer’s Past
Although it seemed to burst upon us suddenly, the jet airplane

can trace its beginnings back through the fabric wings of the Wrights
to the wax wings of Icarus and Daedalus, and the steam aerophile of
Hero in ancient Greece. The same thing is true of the computer, the
“thinking machine” we are just now becoming uncomfortably aware
of. No brash upstart, it has a long and honorable history.
Naturalists tell us that man is not the only animal that counts.
Birds, particularly, also have an idea of numbers. Birds, incidentally,
use tools too. We seem to have done more with the discoveries than
our feathered friends; at least no one has yet observed a robin with a
slide rule or a snowy egret punching the controls of an electronic
digital computer. However, the very notion of mere birds being tool
and number users does give us an idea of the antiquity and lengthy
heritage of the computer.
The computer was inevitable when man first began to make his
own problems. When he lived as an animal, life was far simpler, and
all he had to worry about was finding game and plants to eat, and
keeping from being eaten or otherwise killed himself. But when he
began to dabble in agriculture and the raising of flocks, when he
began to think consciously and to reflect about things, man needed
help.
First came the hand tools that made him more powerful, the
spears and bows and arrows and clubs that killed game and
enemies. Then came the tools to aid his waking brain. Some 25,000
years ago, man began to count. This was no mean achievement, the
dim, foggy dawning of the concept of number, perhaps in the caves
in Europe where the walls have been found marked with realistic
drawings of bison. Some budding mathematical genius in a skin
garment only slightly shaggier than his mop of hair stared blinking at
the drawings of two animals and then dropped his gaze to his two
hands. A crude, tentative connection jelled in his inchoate gray
matter and he shook his head as if it hurt. It was enough to hurt, this
discovery of “number,” and perhaps this particular pioneer never
again put two and two together. But others did; if not that year, the
next.
Armed with his grasp of numbers, man didn’t need to draw two
mastodons, or sheep, or whatever. Two pebbles would do, or two
leaves or two sticks. He could count his children on his fingers—we
retain the expression “a handful” to this day, though often our
children are another sort of handful. Of course, the caveman did not
of a sudden do sums and multiplications. When he began to write,
perhaps 5,000 years later, he had formed the concept of “one,” “two,”
“several,” and “many.”
Besides counting his flock and his children, and the number of the
enemy, man had need for counting in another way. There were the
seasons of the year, and a farmer or breeder had to have a way of
reckoning the approach of new life. His calendar may well have been
the first mathematical device sophisticated enough to be called a
computer.
It was natural that numbers be associated with sex. The calendar
was related to the seasons and the bearing of young. The number
three, for example, took on mystic and potent connotation,
representing as it did man’s genitals. Indeed, numbers themselves
came quaintly to have sex. One, three, and the other odd numbers
were male; the symmetrical, even numbers logically were female.
The notion that man used the decimal system because of his ten
fingers and toes is general, but it was some time before this
refinement took place. Some early peoples clung to a simpler system
with a base of only two; and interestingly a tribe of Australian
aborigines counts today thus: enea (1), petchaval (2), enea
petchaval (3), petchaval petchaval (4). Before we look down our
noses at this naïve system, let us consider that high-speed electronic
computers use only two values, 1 and 0.
But slowly symbols evolved for more and more numbers, numbers
that at first were fingers, and then perhaps knots tied in a strip of
hide. This crude counting aid persists today, and cowboys
sometimes keep rough tallies of a herd by knotting a string for every
five that pass. Somehow numbers took on other meanings, like
those that figure in courtship in certain Nigerian tribes. In their
language, the number six also means “I love you.” If the African belle
is of a mind when her boyfriend tenderly murmurs the magic number,
she replies in like tone, “Eight!”, which means “I feel the same way!”
From the dawn of history there have apparently been two classes
of us human beings, the “haves” and the “have nots.” Nowadays we
get bills or statements from our creditors; in early days, when a slate
or clay tablet was the document, a forerunner of the carbon copy or
duplicate paper developed. Tallies were marked for the amount of
the debt, the clay tablet was broken across the marks, and creditor
and debtor each took half. No chance for cheating, since a broken
half would fit only the proper mate!
Numbers at first applied only to discrete, or distinctly separate,
things. The scratches on a calendar, the tallies signifying the count of
a flock; these were more easily reckoned. The idea of another kind
of number inspired the first clocks. Here was a monumental
breakthrough in mathematics. Nature provided the sunrise that
clearly marked the beginning of each day; man himself thought to
break the day into “hours,” or parts of the whole. Such a division led
eventually to measurement of size and weight. Now early man knew
not only how many goats he had, but how many “hands” high they
were, and how many “stones” they weighed. This further division
ordained another kind of mechanical computer man must someday
contrive—the analog.
The first counting machines used were pebbles or sea shells. For
the Stone Age businessman to carry around a handful of rocks for all
his transactions was at times awkward, and big deals may well have
gone unconsummated for want of a stone. Then some genius hit on
the idea of stringing shells on a bit of reed or hide; or more probably
the necklace came first as adornment and the utilitarian spotted it
after this style note had been added. At any rate, the portable adding
machine became available and our early day accountant grew adroit
at sliding the beads back and forth on the string. From here it was
only a small step, taken perhaps as early as 3000 B.C., to the rigid
counter known as the abacus.
The word “counter” is one we use in everyday conversation. We
buy stock over the counter; some deals are under the counter. We all
know what the counter itself is—that wide board that holds the cash
register and separates us from the shopkeeper. At one time the cash
register was the counter; actually the counting board had rods of
beads like the abacus, or at least grooves in which beads could be
moved. The totting up of a transaction was done on the “counter”; it
is still there although we have forgotten whence came its name.
The most successful computer used for the next 5,000 years, the
portable counter, or the abacus, is a masterpiece of simplicity and
effectiveness. Though only a frame with several rows of beads, it is
sophisticated enough that as late as 1947 Kiyoshi Matsuzake of the
Japanese Ministry of Communications, armed with the Japanese
version—a soroban, bested Private Tom Wood of the U. S. Army of
Occupation punching the keys of an up-to-the-minute electric
calculating machine in four of five problem categories! Only recently
have Japanese banks gone over to modern calculators, and
shopkeepers there and in other lands still conduct business by this
rule of thumb and forefinger.
The abacus, ancient mechanical computer, is still in use in many parts of the
world. Here is the Japanese version, the soroban, with problem being set up.
The name abacus comes to us by way of the Greek abax,

meaning “dust.” Scholars infer that early sums were done schoolboy
fashion in Greece with a stylus on a dusty slate, and that the word
was carried over to the mechanical counter. The design has changed
but little over the years and all abacuses bear a resemblance. The
major difference is the number of beads on each row, determined by
the mathematical base used in the particular country. Some in India,
for example, were set up to handle pounds and shillings for use in
shops. Others have a base of twelve. The majority, however, use the
decimal system. Each row has seven beads, with a runner
separating one or two beads from the others. Some systems use two
beads on the narrow side, some only one; this is a mathematical
consideration with political implications, incidentally: The Japanese
soroban has the single-bead design; Korea’s son pan uses two.
When Japan took over Korea the two-bead models were tabu, and
went out of use until the Koreans were later able to win their
independence again.
About the only thing added to the ancient abacus in recent years is
a movable arrow for marking the decimal point. W. D. Loy patented
such a gadget in the United States. Today the abacus remains a
useful device, not only for business, but also for the teaching of
mathematics to youngsters, who can literally “grasp their numbers.”
For that reason it ought also to be helpful to the blind, and as a
therapeutic aid for manual dexterity. Apparently caught up in the
trend toward smaller computers, the abacus has been miniaturized
to the extent that it can be worn as earrings or on a key chain.
Even with mechanical counters, early mathematicians needed
written numbers. The caveman’s straight-line scratches gave way to
hieroglyphics, to the Sumerian cuneiform “wedges,” to Roman
numerals, and finally to Hindu and Arabic. Until the numbers, 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and that most wonderful of all, 0 or zero,
computations of any but the simplest type were apt to be laborious
and time-consuming. Even though the Romans and Greeks had
evolved a decimal system, their numbering was complex. To count to
999 in Greek required not ten numbers but twenty-seven. The
Roman number for 888 was DCCCLXXXVIII. Multiplying CCXVII
times XXIX yielded an answer of MMMMMMCCXCIII, to be sure, but
not without some difficulty. It required an abacus to do any kind of
multiplication or division.
Indeed, it was perhaps from the abacus that the clue to Arabic
simplicity came. The Babylonians, antedating the Greeks, had
nevertheless gone them one better in arithmetic by using a “place”
system. In other words, the position of a number denoted its value.
The Babylonians simply left an empty space between cuneiform
number symbols to show an empty space in this positional system.
Sometime prior to 300 B.C. a clever mathematician tired of losing
track and punched a dot in his clay tablet to fill the empty space and
avoid possible error.
The abacus shows these empty spaces on its rows of beads, too,
and finally the Hindus combined their nine numerals with a “dot with
a hole in it” and gave the mathematical world the zero. In Hindu it
was sifr, corrupted to zephirium in Latin, and gives us today both
cipher and zero. This enigma of nothingness would one day be used
by Leibnitz to prove that God made the world; it would later become
half the input of the electronic computer! Meantime, it was developed
independently in various other parts of the world; the ancient Mayans
being one example.
Impressed as we may be by an electronic computer, it may take
some charity to recognize its forebears in the scratchings on a rock.
To call the calendar a computer, we must in honesty add a qualifying
term like “passive.” The same applies to the abacus despite its
movable counters. But time, which produced the simple calendar,
also furnished the incentive for the first “active” computers too. The
hourglass is a primitive example, as is the sundial. Both had an
input, a power source, and a readout. The clock interestingly ended
up with not a decimal scheme, but one with a base of twelve. Early
astronomers began conventionally bunching days into groups of ten,
and located different stars on the horizon to mark the passage of the
ten days. It was but a step from here to use these “decans,” as they
were called, to further divide each night itself into segments. It turned
out that 12 decans did the trick, and since symmetry was a virtue the
daylight was similarly divided by twelve, giving us a day of 24 hours
rather than 10 or 20.
From the simple hourglass and the more complex water clocks,
the Greeks progressed to some truly remarkable celestial motion
computers. One of these, built almost a hundred years before the
birth of Christ, was recently found on the sea bottom off the Greek
island of Antikythera. It had been aboard a ship which sank, and its
discovery came as a surprise to scholars since history recorded no
such complex devices for that era. The salvaged Greek computer
was designed for astronomical work, showing locations of stars,
predicting eclipses, and describing various cycles of heavenly
bodies. Composed of dozens of gears, shafts, slip rings, and
accurately inscribed plates, it was a computer in the best sense of
the word and was not exceeded technically for many centuries.
The Greek engineer Vitruvius made an interesting observation
when he said, “All machinery is generated by Nature and the
revolution of the universe guides and controls. Our fathers took
precedents from Nature—developed the comforts of life by their
inventions. They rendered some things more convenient by
machines and their revolutions.” Hindsight and language being what
they are, today we can make a nice play on the word “revolution” as
applied to the machine. The Antikythera computer was a prime
example of what Vitruvius was talking about. Astronomy was such a
complicated business that it was far simpler to make a model of the
many motions rather than diagram them or try to retain them in his
mind.
There were, of course, some die-hard classicists who decried the
use of machines to do the work of pure reasoning. Archytas, who
probably invented the screw—or at least discovered its mechanical
principle—attempted to apply such mechanical devices to the solving
of geometrical problems. For this he was taken to task by purist
Plato who sought to preserve the distinct division between “mind”
and “machine.”
Yet the syllogistic philosophers themselves, with their major
premise, minor premise, and conclusion, were unwittingly setting the
stage for a different kind of computer—the logic machine. Plato
would be horrified today to see crude decks of cards, or simple
electromechanical contrivances, solving problems of “reason” far
faster than he could; in fact, as fast as the conditions could be set
into them!

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Russia's Public Diplomacy: Evolution

and Practice 1st ed. 2020 Edition Anna

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Canada's Public Diplomacy 1st ed. Edition Nicholas J.

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Diplomacy: Theory and Practice 6th Edition G. R.

Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations

Cover illustration: TTstudio / Alamy Stock Photo

It is refreshing, but amenable, to write the foreword to this book—the

There are numerous factors, such as scientific and people exchanges,

Chairman of the International Trends editorial Alexey Bogaturov

November 2018 Anna A. Velikaya (Moscow) and

“This book is of paramount importance in the prevailing international situation.”

2 Russian Public Diplomacy: Historical Aspects 27

3 Russian Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding 45

4 Development Diplomacy of the Russian Federation 61

5 Russia’s Policy and International Cooperation: The

6 Russian Digital Diplomacy: A Rising Cyber Soft Power?103

7 Russian Public Diplomacy Through Higher Education119

8 Russian Science Diplomacy133

9 The Role of Civil Society in Russian Public Diplomacy147

10 Multiple Facets of Russian Public Diplomacy in

11 Russian Business Diplomacy in Southeast Asia183

12 The Baltic Sea Region: Cooperation in Human

13 Strategic Communication of Russia in Latin America219

14 Russia’s Public Diplomacy in the Middle East233

Daria Akhutina is a Senior Advisor on economic issues and science, the

Natalia Bubnova, PhD, is the leading researcher at Primakov National

focus on the nexus between disarmament and development, youth educa-

and foreign scientific journals on international relations, Middle East and

marketing, crisis management communications, media and armed

of European Studies in 1994. In 2002–2007 Tkachenko was a Vice-­

Table 10.1 Member-countries representation and contribution in the UN

Anna A. Velikaya and Greg Simons

Motivation and the Idea Behind This Book

© The Author(s) 2020 1

The Current State of International Relations

national security and national interests were international terrorism

The global information environment is becoming less free and more

actions to fight this projected menace. In this increasing tense geopolitical

If there is one thing that the overwhelming majority of policymakers and

There are an increasing number of stories appearing in the media that

There are a number of critical and inherent problems concerning

Russia’s annexation of Crimea, invasion of Donbas, and continued threats

The logic used to reach such conclusions, by many concerned, is a path

Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

(2008) argues that there are five components to public diplomacy—listen-

­ ersuasion, or some other form of attraction” (2012, p. 278). It is also

Russian Communications as a Threat

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare,

c­ ommunications and public diplomacy. How does this apply to Russia? A

External Perceptions and Interpretations of Russian

One of the narratives19 of the information war is that Russia is a threat,

ambition “to correct” what are perceived as being distorted information

Brief Chapter Descriptions

Russia in a zero-sum global game of competitive reputation and brand,

Western commentators, the efforts of Russia’s digital diplomacy seem to

a positive international image of Russia. A number of differences can also

Evgeny N. Pashentsev tackles the increased global conflict and compe-

November 2018 Anna A. Velikaya (Moscow) and

2 Russian Public Diplomacy: Historical Aspects 27

3 Russian Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding 45

4 Development Diplomacy of the Russian Federation 61

5 Russia’s Policy and International Cooperation: The

6 Russian Digital Diplomacy: A Rising Cyber Soft Power?103

7 Russian Public Diplomacy Through Higher Education119

8 Russian Science Diplomacy133

9 The Role of Civil Society in Russian Public Diplomacy147

10 Multiple Facets of Russian Public Diplomacy in

11 Russian Business Diplomacy in Southeast Asia183

12 The Baltic Sea Region: Cooperation in Human

13 Strategic Communication of Russia in Latin America219

14 Russia’s Public Diplomacy in the Middle East233

of European Studies in 1994. In 2002–2007 Tkachenko was a Vice-

ersuasion, or some other form of attraction” (2012, p. 278). It is also

c ommunications and public diplomacy. How does this apply to Russia? A