The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited Was the War Inevitable? + Erik Melander a escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1988-1992 from a non-violent political struggle to a full-scale ethnic war was a momen- tous development in the final phase of the Cold War. Some analysts have sug- gested that this local conflict gravely weakened che Soviet Union and thus di- rectly contributed to the end of the Cold War. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has also been depicted as part of a general wave of ethnic violence that arose once the Cold War was largely over. Previous scholarly work has tended to por- tray the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as the result of a surge of nationalist sentiment unleashed under the more relaxed regime of Mikhail Gorbachev. According co this interpretation, the path to war was largely un- avoidable after deadly ethnic riots occurred in Sumgait in February 1988." ‘A closer examination of new primary evidence, including interviews with key participants, does not bear out these earlier views. Crucial developments in the summer of 1991 indicate that there was a possibility to avert the war at that time, more than three years after the events in Sumgait. In 1991 the po- litical leadership of the Armenian separatist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh offered the Azerbaijani authorities a virtual capitulation in exchange for a sation of hostilities. The war broke out because an alternative, more radical Armenian leadership gained the upper hand in Nagorno-Karabakh during the abortive August 1991 coup in Moscow, when the central authorities were temporarily disengaged. 1. See for example Ronald Grigor Suny, “Nationalism and Democracy in Gorbachev's Soviet Union: The Case of Karabagh,” in Rachel Denber, ed., The Sovies Nasionality Reader: The Disintegration in Context (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 493; Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nasions: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder (London: Zed Books, 1994}, p. 162; Svante Cornell, “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflice Reconsidered,” Journal of Soush Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1997), p. 6; and Svante Cornell, Smatl Nations and Great Powers (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999). Journal of Cold War Soudies Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 2001, pp. 48-75 © 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusects Institute of TechnologyThe Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited This interpretation of events bears directly on our theoretical under- standing of the causes of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. The two most theoreti- cally elaborated studies of the subject claim that the war erupted because of the willingness and opportunity (sometimes termed preferences and capabili- ties or interest and power) of the parties to fight over the disputed region. Stu- art Kaufman focuses on willingness and opportunity ofa particular kind; Eth- nic prejudices and fears among the masses give rise to a willingness to provide for their security by violent means if necessary, and the relaxation of state re- pression affords them the opportunity to take such military action. The result is a security dilemma in which each side is driven to enhance its security in ways that threaten the other. Preemptive ethnic warfare is the outcome.” Svante Cornell looks at willingness and opportunity in somewhat broader terms, arguing that che Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh possessed the will- ingness as well as the opportunity to go beyond preemptive self-defense (as Kaufman portrays it) and to rebel against Azerbaijani rule.? Kaufman and Cornell seem to argue that the conflict was inevitable and that a negotiated outcome was an impossibility. But demonstrating that actors are willing and able to do something is not the same as showing that this thing must happen. Decision makers base their actions on uncertain and conflicting expectations about the consequences of alternative courses of action! Kaufman's and Cornell’s arguments are a useful starting point, but they take us only part way toward an explanation. The general theoretical puzzle with wars is that they are costly to all sides and that a range of mutually preferable alternatives therefore ought to exist. A key question for conflict theorists is what will prevent the parties to a dispute from reaching a negotiated agreement. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could 2. Stuart J. Kaufman, “Ethnic Feats and Ethnic War in Karabagh,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, MN, March 1998. 3, Svante Comnell, “Autonomy in the South Caucasus: A Catalyst of Conflice” Paper presented at the fifeh annual convention of the Association for the Seudy of Nationalities, New York, NY, April 2000. 4, Erik Gartzke, “War Is in the Ervor Term,” International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Summer 1999), p. 569. This body of arguments is also developed in James D. Fearon, “Threats to Use Force Costly Signals and Bargaining in International Crises” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1992); James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, Vol. 49, No.3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414; James D. Fearon, “Coramitmene Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in David A. Lake and Donald S. Rothchild, eds., The International Spread of Fhnic Conflice: Fear, Diffusion, and Eicatation (Princeton, N}: Princeton Universicy Press, 1998), pp.s Robert H. Bates, Rui J. P Figueiredo, and Barry R. Weingast, “The Policics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition,” Politics & Socien Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1998), pp. 603-642; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Management of Transnational Ethnic Conflict,” in Lake and Rothchild, eds., Spread of Ethnic Conflict, pp. 203-226; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement,” in Lake and Rothchild, eds., Spread of Ethnic Conflict, pp. 339-350. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., “Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflics,” in Lake and Rothchild, eds., Spread of Ethnic Conflict, pp. 3-32. and David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Serategie Choice and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 49Melander have been resolved with much less bloodshed if the actors had been able to see through the strategic uncertainties of the situation. Incomplete information about capabilities and resolve are therefore an indispensable part of the expla- nation for why this war began. Mote specifically, if the successive regimes in Azerbaijan had been able to foresee the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union and the catastrophic con- sequences of Russia's disengagement and its subsequent reorientation in favor of Armenia, they would reasonably have preferred to cut their losses rather than use force to resist Armenian separatism and irredentism. On the other hand, if the political leadership of the Armenian separatist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh had expected the kind of brutal response by the Soviet Army that took place under “Operation Ring” in the spring of 1991, these leaders would have had a strong incentive to retract their demands. Had they done this, they would have spared themselves the pains of launching a failed initiative in the summer of 1991 that cost chem their leadership positions and was the likely reason for the assassination of Valerii Grigoriyan by Armenian hard-liners. If the abortive coup in Moscow in August 1991 bad not diverted the attention of the Soviet leadership at this critical juncture, the Armenian initiative might ultimately have succeeded in averting a full-scale war. This ar- ticle shows that Kaufman's assessment of the escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh as “mass-led” rather than “elite-led” must be qualified; the struggle for pri- macy between competing elites played a decisive role. The first section of this article provides background information on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the main actors involved. The second section discusses previous theoretical analyses of the causes of the war and proposes a complementary perspective that focuses on strategic uncertainty as the obsta- cle to negotiated outcomes. The third and fourth sections describe how the conflict escalated. The fourth section pays particular attention to the Arme- nian capitulatory initiative in the summer of 1991. The account here is based largely on new primary evidence in the form of interviews with participants, as well as published sources in Russian that have been previously overlooked. The conclusion lays out the theoretical findings of the article. Background and Main Actors* In 1987 Armenians made up 74 percent of the population of Nagorno- Karabakh, an autonomous province (oblast) within the Soviet republic of 5. Kaufman, “Ethnic Fears,” p. 25. 6. For more comprehensive history and further sources on the conflict, see Cornell, Smail Nations; 50The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited Azerbaijan.’ The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was physically separated from the Soviet republic of Armenia by a strip of land be- longing to Azerbaijan. The narrowest part of this strip is often referred to as the “Lachin corridor.” It was almost exclusively inhabited by Azeris and Kurds, and the NKAO can thus be characterized as an Armenian exclave. Within the NKAO there was also a substantial Azeri community, though it was considerably smaller than the Armenian population. This meant that the Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh were a local minority despite being part of the larger Azeri majority in the Azerbaijan republic as a whole, By the mid-to-late 1980s the Armenian population of Nagorno-Kara- bakh was increasingly resentful that the province was part of Azerbaijan rather than Armenia. The Armenians complained that the leaders of Azer- baijan systematically neglected the province and that the Armenians who lived there faced discrimination. The standard of living in the NKAO was relatively high in comparison to other undeveloped mountainous regions in the Soviet Un- ion and even in comparison to the Azerbaijan republic as a whole; but the NKAO was still poor, and the standard of living was lower than in Armenia. ‘Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh also complained that the province was be- ing drained of its resources by Baku and that it received few investments.’ It is difficult to know whether these perceived injustices were caused by discrimination against the province or by the incompetence, inefficiency, and corruption that were endemic in the Soviet Union at the time, particularly in the Transcaucasus republics. The difficulty of evaluating the claims of injus- tice is compounded by the Soviet regime’ lack of transparency and the dearth of reliable information. The actors in the conflict themselves faced a good deal of uncertainty about these matters. Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflicr: Causes and Implications (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998); and Kaufman, “Ethnic Fears.” 7. The percentages are found in A. N. Yamskoy, “Ethnic Conflict in the Transcaucasus: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh,” Theory and Socien Vol. 20, No. 5 (October 1991), pp. 631-660, esp. p. 645. ‘The background information provided here is based on the following works: Cornell, Sinail Nations; Croissant, Armenia-Azerbajan Conflict; Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations; Kaufman, “Ethnic Feats”; Mark Malkasian, “Gha-Ra-Bagh!” The Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996); V. G. Mityayey, “Karabaldhskii konflike v kontekste mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii,” in E. M, Kozhokina, ed., Armeniya: Problemy nezavisimogo racvitiya (Moscow: Rossiiskii Institut Strategicheskikh Issledovanii, 1998), pp. 487-354; and Alexei Zverey, “Ethnic Conflics in the Caucasus 1988-1994,” in Bruno Coppicters, ed., Contested Borders in the ‘Caucasus (Brussels: VUBPRESS, 1996}. As far as possible, controversial information has been checked against several different sources. See Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S, Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitae sive Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 373; and Robert K. Yin, Case Study Re- search: Design and Mevhods, Vol. 5 of Applied Social Rescarch Methods Series (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989) 8. Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations, p. 161; Mityayew, “Karabakhskii konfiikt’; Yamskow, “Ethnic Conflict in the Transcaucasus”s Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts in che Caucasus”; and Kaufman “Ethnic Fears,” p. 15E. $IMelander The dissatisfied Armenians in the NKAO were represented by two main factions, The traditional Communist nomenklatura played a leading role in the nationalist movement in the province, which might seem some- what surprising given the official internationalism supposedly adhered to by Communists.’ This faction initially operated through its representatives in the official Soviet structures of local authority, and it also founded the independent pressure group “Krunk.” A younger, more radical group emerged during the open phase of the conflict and gained increasing influence as the crisis progressed. The group's power base was built mostly in the Dashnak party, an illegal Armenian nationalist parcy secretly operating in the Soviet Union after 1988."° This radical group came to control the para- military forces in Nagorno-Karabakh that were organized with support from ‘Armenia, ‘The unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia was an important goal of the population of the Armenian Soviet Republic. A large nationalist movement emerged in Armenia and gradually assumed political power. The leaders of this movement, the so-called “Karabakh Committee,” did not come from the traditional nomenklatuna; instead, they were opposed to the Arme- nian Communist regime. Because the Armenian nationalist movement was widely popular, and pethaps because the Communists felt some genuine sym- pathy with Armenian nationalist aims, the Armenian Communist leadership mostly kept a low profile or adapted its position to fit the policies advocated by the Karabakh Committee." The Karabakh Committee institutionalized its activities in the Armenian National Movement (ANM), which successfully contested the 1989 clections to the Armenian Supreme Soviet. In August 1990 the ANM became the government of Soviet Armenia. Azerbaijan, for its part, was unwilling to relinquish Nagorno-Karabakh. The government in Baku expected Soviet leaders to prevent any terricorial changes so long as the Azerbaijani republic remained loyal to Moscow. This expectation was probably based on the assumption that Azerbaijan was more important than Armenia to the Soviet Union because of its oil. The national- ist movement in Azerbaijan did not become organized until rather late in. the conflict with the Armenians—partly because of government suppression, but also because Azeri leaders supported popular opinion on the question of Nagorno-Karabakh. Later on, frustration with the perceived weakness and passivity of the Azerbaijani government spurred the formation of a strong na- 9. Kaufman, “Ethnic Fears”; and Malkasian, “Gha-Ra-Bagh!” 10. Goldenberg, Pride of Simall Nations, p. 144. 11. Peter Rudland, “Democracy and Nationalism in Armenia,” Furope-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 5 uly 1994), p. 845. 52The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited tionalist opposition, which became a serious threat to the Communist re- gime’s control over the republic, In addition to the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, there was a third actor in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Soviet leadership in Moscow, headed by Gorbachev. Soviet leaders opposed Armenian designs in Nagorno-Karabakh because of the risk that similar demands could be made by various regions in the Soviet Union, thus destabilizing the whole state.'® Moscow naturally sided with the Azerbaijani regime in Baku." Gorbachev, however, was worried that the large-scale use of force would jeopardize his reform program. He sus- pected tha his conservative opponents in the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) would seize upon any outbreak of serious civil unrest to argue that the reforms were a threat to Soviet security. Gorbachev even feared that hard- liners would provoke such disturbances to discredit him and the whole reform program.'* The relationship among the three major actors in the conflict had a few significant characteristics that should be noted. First, Erevan, Baku, and Mos- cow formed a triangular relationship as the three strongest powers in the conflict. The Armenian separatist movement centered in Stepanakert was a fourth power, but it was clearly dependent on outside support. Nevertheless, the separatist movement could decisively influence the conflict through its ac- tions, and it could be confident that Armenia would send help if necessary. Second, each power had to contend with an alternative faction within its own ranks. The ruling elites in Erevan, Baku, and Moscow had to worry not only about one another but also about competition closer to home. To use the metaphor coined by Robert D. Putnam, the actors had to play a two-level game, which meant that shifting alliances and disunity within the camps were a distinct possibility." Theoretical Perspectives Conflict theory and theories of ethnic violence provide the best tools for un- derstanding the warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh. Most theories of violent 12. Malkasian, “Gha-Ra-Bagh!” p. 120f; and Zverey, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus,” 13. Cornell, Small Nations, p. 3531; Malkasian, “Gha-Ra-Bagh!” p. L16fF Rutland, “Democracy and Nationalism”; and Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus,” 14, Malkasian, "Gha-Re-Bagh!” p. 191; Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Tiena svobody: Reformatsiya Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika (Moscow: Zews, 1993), ch. 125 and Mikhail Gorbachev, Mem- airs (New York: Doubleday, 1995), ch. 15. 15, Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” Interna sional Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460. 53Melander conflict fall into three categories: those that look at the actors’ willingness to resort to violence; those that focus on opportunities to pursue a strategy of vi- olence; and those that look at a combination of willingness and opportunity. In addition, a new approach to conflict theory argues that the willingness- opportunity paradigm does not sufficiently explain costly wars. This new ap- proach, sometimes referred to as “strategic choice,” emphasizes the impact of uncertainty and incomplete information on decision making." Both Donald Horowitz and Walker Connor contend that willingness is the most important factor in instigating ethnic conflict. Horowitz looks at the effects of ethnic anxiety and ethnic entitlement on increasing tensions, and Connor stresses the importance of the family bonds associated with ethnic identity in arousing ethnic passions. In contrast, Charles Tilly focuses on the role of shared and collectively controlled opportunities in the competition for social niches.” Most theorists of ethnic conflict, especially those affiliated with the Majority at Risk project—perhaps the best-known body of system- atic research on the causes of ethnic conflict—refer to both willingness and opportunity."© In a thorough study of the origins of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Stuart Kaufman looks at willingness and opportunity of a particular kind. He argues that willingness to fight is generated by ethnic prejudice that gives rise to fears of extinction among an ethnic group. If members of the group perceive such a threat, they will take the opportunity to mobilize militarily if they believe they are in no danger of central state coercion, The result, according to Kaufman, is an ethnic security dilemma. Both sides in the ethnic conflict are driven by their perceived security needs to take measures that threaten their opponents. Unless a strong state resorts to severe repression against one or both sides (what Kaufman refers to as the Stalinist model), or undertakes a more modest form of repression (what Kaufman refers to as the Northern Ireland model), the ethnic security dilemma will result in ethnic war.” 16, Lake and Powell, Strategie Choice. 17. Donald L. Horowite, Eehnie Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); ‘Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Chatles Tilly, “Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union,” Theory and Sociery, Vol. 20, No. 5 (October 1991), pp. 569-580. 18. Ted Robert Gurr and Will H. Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oc- tober 1997), pp. 1079-1103; and Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, DC: Unised States Institute of Peace Press, 2000). 19. Kaufman, “Ethnic Fears.” One potential problem with Kaufman's cheory is that prejudices “of a type sufficient to justify the emergence of ethnic fears’ (p. 7) could be difficule to identify empirically without reference to the outcome. Te would seem that prejudices are present in many ethnic confliets that nevertheless do not escalate to war, [Fonly the prejudices that ended up in a violent outcome were to countas “sufficient,” Kaufman's explanation would be circular. 54The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited With regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Kaufman maintains that there was widespread ethnic prejudice throughout the Soviet period and that the political space afforded by Gorbachev's reforms allowed the security di- lemma to arise. Armenians feared that Azctbaijanis were oppressing and per~ haps planning genocidal actions against them, and these presentiments fueled the demand for the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. The Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, long regarded the Armenians as “trouble- makers” and resented them for their economic success and social status. Kaufman also notes that the Azerbaijanis who fled Armenian arcas before the violence erupted “obviously had cause to fear [the Armenians] as well.” What is more, Kaufman holds that the Azerbaijani sense of nationhood was fragile and tightly linked to the defense of territorial integrity, thus making ‘Armenian separatism seem especially threatening. These popular fears soon triggered deadly ethnic riots in Askeran, Sumgait, and other locales. As Soviet forces gradually disengaged from the conflict, the fighting escalated from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare. Thus, in Kaufman’s account, the underlying willingness to fight was present at che outset of the conflict, and the escalation of the war was mostly due to the opportunities resulting from the easing of Soviet repression. Kaufman also maintains that escalation oc- curred because Armenian leaders came under pressure to adopt increasingly belligerent policies. Svante Cornell has employed a more general willingness-opportunity framework to explain why the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict led to war. Based on a comparative study of nine ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus, Cor- nell claims chat a number of factors, such as the intensity of past conflict and the myths surrounding it, contributed to the willingness of minority groups to rebel. He also suggests that a variety of factors, such as rough terrain, helped create the opportunity for rebellious action. The propensity of conflicts to erupt and escalate, he argues, can be explained largely by vatia- tions in these factors. Cornell characterizes two especially important phenom- ena as catalysts: a radical leadership and external support for the rebellious mi- nority.2! In the Nagorno-Karabakh case, Cornell maintains, deep cultural differ- ences in language and religion, a history of intense conflict with accompany- ing myths, and an exclusive ethnic conception of the nation combined to give rise to a strong willingness among Azeris and Armenians to contest the consti- tutional status of Nagorno-Karabakh by force if necessary. The opportunities for the Armenian minority were enhanced by the mountainous terrain suit- 20. Ibid, p. 26. 21. Cornell, “Auconomy.’ 55Melander able for guerrilla warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh, the relatively unproblematic access to arms, and the presence of ethnic kin in the neighboring Armenian Soviet Republic. Cornell also points to the importance of political institutions associated with the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh: Froma very early stage in the conflicr, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians—who already had a strong willingness to act given the salience of cultural differences and the remembrance of past conflict —were equipped with three crucial factors: the autonomous status of the province, which had been helpful in sustaining Ar- menian identity, but more importantly carried with it the political institutions to channel secessionist sentiments; secondly, external support from the republic of Armenia which effectively obliterated che problem of demographic weakness (no more than 150,000 Armenians lived in Nagorno-Karabakh) and any possi- ble problems of economic viability; and thirdly, radical leadership which en- tailed an uncompromising course of action. In fact, faced with a refusal from both the Azerbaijani SSR and che USSR leadership to acquiesce to its demands and later Soviet military intervention in 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh leader- ship continued its uncompromising course of action. These three factors seem to have had a decisive impact on the development of the conflict.” Cornell's assessment of the unwavering refusal by the Nagorno-Karabakh leadership to compromise must be qualified in light of the evidence presented below. At this poine, however; the main thing to note is that Cornell attributes the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the combined presence of factors related to willingness and opportunity, particularly to cultural differ- ences, the remembrance of past conflict, autonomous institutions, external support, and radical leadership. The explanations advanced by Kaufman and Cornell are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The willingness-opportunity framework can be integrated with the security dilemma, and it is possible to see the security dilemma as a special case of the willingness-opportunity framework. The main difference between these two interpretations lies in their characterizations of the Arme- ian separatists. Cornell implies that they were revisionists on the offensive, whereas Kaufman suggests that they were motivated primarily by defensive se- curity concerns. This difference aside, both authors believe that the willing- ness and the opportunity to fight over Nagorno-Karabakh were present by 1988. Neither of these theories, however, addresses the question of why the parties to the conflict did nor conclude an agreement that would have avoided mutually costly fighting. Why did they not pursue a compromise that would have stopped short of violence? If both sides knew that they and their 22. Ibid. p. 41 56The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited adversary were willing and able to wage war over Nagorno-Karabakh, why did the conflict gradually escalate for almost four years before full-scale war- fare erupted? This latter question seems especially puzzling if we bear in mind the perceived advantages of striking first in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A deceptively simple answer to these questions is that the parties pos- sessed incomplete information about crucial aspects of che situation. For ex- ample, neither side knew whether its opponent would succeed in imposing its will through force. Neither side knew whether the Soviet authorities would come down on one side or the other, or whether the central government would merely withdraw from the conflict. In strategic choice theory these and similar uncertainties will determine whether the outcome of a conflict is a peaceful, negotiated settlement or war. To the extent that the parties hold conflicting beliefs about the balance of resolve and the balance of power, the search for a less costly negotiated solution may be impeded. For example, if both sides in a conflict believe they will prevail relatively easily on the bat- tlefield, perhaps because they both expect support from a third party, then neither will be willing to make any substantial concessions. If one side under- estimates the resolve of its opponent, it is likely to demand more than the op- ponent will concede. But if the parties overestimate each other's resolve or strength, they may be willing to seek a compromise.” This relationship between the perceived balance of resolve and power on the one hand, and the perceived range of acceptable divisions of the disputed stakes on the other, implies that the parties in conflict face incentives to exag- gerate their resolve and power. Through displays of force and other signals, cach side can try co intimidate the other into conceding more of the stakes. (Sometimes, however, the parties have incentives to downplay their resolve and power, perhaps to attract sympathy and support from third parties or to prepare the ground for a surprise attack.) Since each side knows that the other is inclined to conceal its true resolve, neither believes what the other says. This uncertainty is likely to affect each side’s decision about whether to escalate. 23. The length of the escalatory process could be attributed to the level of repression used by the cen- wal government, But a mote important factor was the uncertainty about how Moscow would respond 10a conflict. As will be shown in the empirical section, the uncertain and sometimes contradictory ex- pectations about the reaction of the central authorities to different actions affected the behavior of all parties involved. 24. Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47. 25. When all parties in a conflict correctly assess the balance of resolve and power, they should be able to predice the outcome of a violent confrontation. IF so, they should also be able to agree on conces- sions mutually preferable ro a costly and violent conflict. 57Melander When a party decides to escalate or offer concessions, it must convey its intention to the adversary. Signals that ate more costly to the sender are less likely to be dismissed as cheap talk and are therefore inherently more credible as tools of intimidation. The parties to a conflict can be expected to start out by using less costly means and will then gradually increase the belligerence of their acts. This may explain why so few conflicts escalate very quickly to all- out war even if first-strike advantages are present. During the early stages, the parties are uncertain about the outcome and are still hopeful that a favorable agreement can be reached through less costly means. The longer the exchange of intimidating signals lasts without an agreement, the greater the risk at any given moment that war will be initiated. The increasingly belligerent signals tend to strengthen perceptions that the stakes are highly valued by all parties and that the advantages of a first strike are growing. ‘When explaining a war, we must do more than simply show that the ac- tors were willing and able to fight. We must also determine whether the ac- tors’ manipulation of strategic uncertainty was successful. The Nagorno- Karabakh war, as this article will demonstrate, was not inevitable; it could have been avoided if the actors had seen through the uncertainties of the situ- ation and had better anticipated the consequences of their actions. Developments up to 1991 The status of Nagorno-Karabakh was in dispute both before and during the Soviet era. The most recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began shortly after Gorbachev announced his reform programs of perestroika and glasnost. In 1987 Armenians repeatedly petitioned the authorities in Moscow to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, Soviet leaders mostly ignored these appeals until the Armenian petitioners and demonstrators grew bolder. The demon- strations and strikes went beyond the level of behavior that was normally tol- erated, but they did not necessarily guarantee that violence would occur. Until the early 1990s most Armenians believed that a negotiated solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was still possible In late 1987 and early 1988, however, a series of tragic events drastically altered the situation. By the end of 1987 Azeri refugees began ¢o flee the NKAO.* On 22 February Azeri demonstrators marched on Stepanakert to protest a resolution adopted by the Nagorno-Karabakh provincial council ap- pealing a transfer of the NKAO to Armenia. Just inside the border of the 26. Audrey L. Altstads, "O Patria Mia: National Conflict in Mountainous Karabagh,” in W. Raymond Duncan and G. Paul Holman, eds., Ethnic Nationaliom and Regional Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994): Cornell, Smail Nations; and Kaufman, “Ethnic Fears,” p. 16. 58The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited NKAO, near Askeran, Azeri demonstrators clashed with police and local Ar- menians, and two Azeris were killed. When these casualties were announced on Azerbaijani radio, violence against Armenians erupted in the town of Sumgait (near Baku) on 27 February. Some of the 2,000 Azeri refugees who had fled to Sumgaie were reported co have played a significant role in this eth- nic tiot, which killed 26 Armenians and 6 Azeris, according to official sources.” ‘The cause of the Sumgait riot continues to be a puzzle.” Ie is clear, how- ever, that the riot increased fears within the Armenian community.” Al- though these fears had an important long-term effect on the development of the conflict, most Armenians during the early phase of the struggle for the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia still believed in the potential of a nonviolent political campaign. They were convinced that Moscow, and Gorbachev personally, would be won over to their side. From early on, however, a few more militant Armenians began to prepare for an armed struggle in response to the events in Sumgait.” Among them were Igor Muradyan, one of the original members of the Karabakh Commit- tee in Armenia, who had been expelled from the Committee because of his 27. Armenian sources claim a much higher number of Armenian casualties. See Joseph R. Masih and Robert ©. Krikorian, Armenia: Ar she Crossroads (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), ps 28. Several alternative explanations can be proposed for the Sumgait events, One is that the deadly cthnic riot was a spontaneous or locally instigated outbreak of uncontrolled violence, which the re- publican and central authorities failed to prevent because of incompetence and inefficiency rather than malign intent. A variant of this explanation holds that local elements in the Azeri mafia wanted a cover under which Armenian competition could be climinated. Sce Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms 1985-1990 (Hempel Hempstead: Philip Allan, 1990), p. 244. See also Kaufman, “Ethnic Fears.” Another possible explanation is that the events were organized by the Azerbaijani republican authorities, possibly even in conspiracy with the central authorities in Moscow, as a warning to the se- cessionist Armenians in NKAO. Some claim that before the riots the authorities in Baku threatened the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh with violence unless the demands for unification with Armenia were withdrawn, See Vagan Bakhshiyevich Arutyunyan, Sobytiya v Nagornom Karabakhe. Kbronika. Chast’ 1. Fevral’ 1988 g.-Yanvar’ 1989 g. (Erevan: Izdatel’stwo AN Armyanskoi SSR, 1990). Yet an- other possibilty is chat anci-perestroika forces organized the deadly ethnic riot to discredit Gorbachev and his reforms. This was the explanation offered by Gorbachev himself, See Croissant, Armenia: Azerbaijan Conflict, p. 29. Ochers suggest that Moscow or the U.S. Cencral Intelligence Agency sought 10 destabilize the region for their own purposes, ot that the riot was instigated by Armenian ptovoca- teurs to justify Armenian nationalist policies. See Levon Chorbajian, Patrick Donabedian, and Claude Mutafian, The Caucasian Knot: The Hiscory and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh (London: Zed Books, 1994), p. 189. Finally, some Armenians believe there is a genetic predisposition among ethnic Turks to murder Armenians. ‘This view was encountered in several conversations during fieldwork; sec also Ida Babayan, Armenia and Mountainous Karabakh on the Political Scene of the World (Erevan: Aghvank, 1995) 29. Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations, p. 154; Edmund M. Herzig, “Armenia and the Armenians,” in Graham Smith, ed., The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States (London: Longman Group, 1996), p. 257; Malkasian, “Gha-Ra-Bagh!”: Masih and Krikorian, Armenia: As the Crosroads Mityayev, “Karabakhskii konflike,” p. 490; and Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus.” 30. Masih and Krikorian, Armenia: Ar the Crossroads, p. 206. 59Melander radicalism and had formed his own Miatsum (Unification) movement." Young Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh threatened to launch a guerrilla war if the demand for unification with Armenia was not met, and in May self- defense troops appeared on the streets of Stepanakert. These militants would later grow in strength and numbers, and eventually they dominated politics in the Armenian enclave. ‘Armenian hopes for an easy political victory were dashed in March 1988 when the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (the chief legislative organ in the Soviet Union, though one with very little real power) rejected the petition of the Nagorno-Karabakh council for unification with Armenia and denied the council’s right to appeal. During the spring and summer, sporadic clashes and local incidents involving the forced removal of minority popula- tions continued in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, Although Soviet leaders dis- patched Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) troops to Erevan, Armenian activ- ists continued to organize new meetings and demonstrations. On 13 June the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of Azerbaijan declared that the Nagorno-Karabakh council's petition of 20 February was unacceptable. Two days later the Armenian Supreme Soviet officially endorsed the request for unification, and on 17 June Azerbaijan rejected this request, spurring new complaines by the Nagorno-Karabakh council. On 28 June, at the Nineteenth Conference of the CPSU, Gorbachev ruled out any changes to republic bor- ders. This came as a great disappointment to the Armenian nationalists. That same month, at a meeting with the Communist Party first secretar- ies of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh, Egor Ligachey, a leading member of the CPSU Politburo, offered to upgrade the level of autonomy of the NKAO to the status of an autonomous republic. The Armenians rejected the plan, however, reportedly because it expanded the borders of Nagorno- Karabakh to include more areas populated mainly by Azeris.” ‘The continued large-scale demonstrations and insistent appeals for unification despite the rejections by Moscow and Baku, and the highly visible deployment of Soviet troops to Erevan, were risky. A concrete reminder of the dangets involved came on 5 July 1988, when a demonstration blocking the airport outside Erevan was brutally dispersed by Soviet MVD troops, killing one Armenian demonstrator. Expectations of an imminent military crack- down were widespread in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh after the airport incident. For a time the Armenian nationalist movement shifted to less pro- yocative and less risky tactics. The strikes were largely called off, and national- 31. Malkasian, “Gha-Ra-Bagh!”p. 91 32. Ibid, p. 102, 60The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited ist activists in Armenia began to emphasize democratization of the republic and decentralization of the broader union.* Nonetheless, a smaller, more radically minded part of the Armenian na- tionalist movement drew the opposite conclusion. The radicals sought to in- tensify the struggle for the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia and argued that Armenia should strive for outright independence from the Soviet Union. Most of the radical nationalists in Armenia were politically close to the Dashnaks in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian nationalists in Nagorno-Karabakh were less tolerant of the sta~ tus quo than were nationalists in Armenia. The Nagorno-Karabakh council was unwilling to back down on its earlier demands or to accept the current stalemate, Instead, on 12 July the council declared that Nagorno-Karabakh was seceding from Azerbaijan. The Azetbaijani Supreme Soviet immediately responded by declaring the move “null and void.” On 18 July the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet devoted an entire session to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and again ruled that border changes were out of the question. The Presidium also decided to send special represen- tatives to Nagorno-Karabakh to oversee a program for large-scale economic investment and cultural development, which had been initiated in March but had failed to placate the Armenian nationalists. In addition, a special commis- sion under the USSR Soviet of Nationalities (one of the two houses of the USSR Supreme Soviet) was to examine the situation in the NKAO in greater detail. The Armenians were increasingly disappointed with the decisions in Moscow, and they sensed that the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Ar- menia would be a more difficult task than initially expected.” Even the com- paratively radical Armenian leadership in Stepanakert temporarily moderated its position in response to the latest developments.” Moreover, strikes ended in Nagorno-Karabakh for the time being. Armenians in both Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia had assumed that Gorbachev would grant their request for unification. These expectations in- creased after Sumgait, since the violence in Sumgait seemed to make clear that the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh could no longer live under Azerbaijani rule. Many Armenians believed that Gorbachev was genuinely trying to cor- 33. Ibid, pp. 103-129. See also Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations, p. 142f; and Herzig, “Armenia and the Armenians,” p. 258f. 34. Christopher J. Walker, Armenia and Karabagh: The Seruggle for Unity (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1991), p. 126. i 35, See the statement by NKAO First Secretary Poghosyan, quoted in Malkasian, “Gha-Ra-Bagh!” p. 119. 61Melander rect some of the mistakes committed by earlier Soviet leaders, especially by Josif Stalin. They viewed the subordination of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan as an obvious case of a historical injustice in need of redress."* The authorities in Moscow, for their part, underestimated the intensity of the Armenians’ desire to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenia. Soviet lead- ers believed that proposals for major investment and cultural development in the NKAO, announced on 24 March 1988, would suffice to offset the Arme- nian dissatisfaction.” They also assumed that the dispatch of MVD troops to Nagorno-Karabakh in February had signaled resolve not to change the border. This, however, proved not to be the case. Initially, many Armenians viewed the troops sent to Stepanakert more as protectors than as a deterrent against further separatism.” The Azerbaijani government was staunchly opposed to the separatist movement. The authorities in Baku naturally could not foresee that the conflict would ultimately lead to a catastrophic military defeat several years down the road. For the time being, they trusted that Moscow would do what- ever was needed to uphold the status quo. Based on that assumption, Azerbaijani leaders repeatedly rejected the Armenian demands. The escalation of tensions continued in Nagorno-Karabakh. In the wake of Sumgait, fear had gradually increased in che province. Thefts of sheep, one of the mainstays of the local economy, were increasingly common, Rioting and small-scale ethnic cleansing took place during the spring in Stepanakere and neighboring Shusha, a settlemene with a predominancly ‘Azeti population, in the NKAO. The Azeri minority in Armenia and the Ar- menian minority in Azerbaijan outside the NKAO were also subjected to vari- ous forms of harassment, and numerous people were forced to flee from their homes. Most likely, the perpetrators of these deeds were loosely organized bands of militants who began to coalesce on both sides. Azeri refugees testify that Armenian hardcore nationalists, referred to as “the bearded ones” (borodachi), played a prominent role in the violence.” In Stepanakere Arme- nian refugees from Sumgait were already present when Azeri refugees from Armenia began to arrive in increasing numbers to Shusha. The appearance of terrified and mistreaved refugees served to heighten fear on both sides. Many 36. Rutland, “Democracy and Nationalism”; Herzig, “Armenia and the Armenians,” p. 256; Crois- sant, Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflic, p. 25f; Gerard J. Libaridian, The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking since Independence (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1999), p. 26; and Masih and Krikorian, Armenia: At the Crossroads, p. 7. 37. Malkasian, “Gha-Ra-Bagh!” p. 62. 38, Grisha Hairapetyan, Dashnak leader and paramilitary commander in Nagorno-Karabakh, inter- view, Stepanakert, June 1999. 39. See Rena Pashabekova, ed., Bezhentsy (Baku: Gzhadzhlik, 1992), p. 425. 62The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited Armenians suspected that Azeri refugees were being sent to Shusha by the Azerbaijani authorities in a conscious effort to alter the demographic balance in the province and thereby undermine the rationale for unification with Ar- menia. In protest, Armenians initiated strikes once again in Stepanakert in the middle of September.” One consequence of the intermingled ethnic settlement patterns in Nagorno-Karabakh was that there were islands of Azeri settlements, such as Shusha, within the predominantly Armenian-inhabited province. In some places there were even small Armenian settlements within these Azeri en- claves. The people living in the enclaves naturally began to worry about being cut off from outside support during a conflict. Throughout the summer transports through the Lachin corridor had been hampered by civil distur- bances, and the Armenian population in the NKAO began to feat an Azerbaijani siege of the whole region, which would have been especially men- acing given the harsh winters in the mountains." Similarly, a siege within a siege threatened to develop around the Azeri village of Khojaly, slightly co the north of Stepanakert. On 18 September 1988 a serious clash took place among members of both ethnic groups, as well as Soviet MVD forces. One Armenian was killed in a prolonged firefight. During the days that followed, the ethnic cleansing of Stepanakert and Shusha was more ot less completed.” ‘The clash in Khojaly was the most serious incident since the Sumgait ri- ots. For the first time, firearms were used on both sides. This meant that both sides in Nagorno-Karabakh had the capacity and willingness to engage in a semi-milicary confrontation. Moreover, the clash underscored the vulnerabil- ity of the Armenian majority and the Azeti minority in the NKAO, particulary to siege warfare. For the Armenians, Sumgait could no longer be interpreted as an atypical, unintended consequence of hooliganism. Instead, the Armenians concluded that the Azeris harbored hostility or even genocidal intentions toward them. With che possible exception of Sumgait, the sporadic and relatively lim- ited acts of violence described thus far did not necessarily indicate that any central organization was directing the actions. Most of the clashes arose spon- taneously and spread primarily because of the incompetence of local and cen- tral authorities. But che subsequent waves of ethnic cleansing in both Atme- nia and Azerbaijan would have been impossible without substantial planning and centrally organized efforts. The entire Azerbaijani minority in Armenia 40. Malkasian, “Gha-Ra-Bagh!” p. 143. See also Croissant, Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, p. 31 41. Malkasian, “Gha-Ra-Bagh!”p. 113. 42, Ibid. p. 146f, and Mityayev, “Karabakhskij Konflike,” p. 490. 43, Rafael Kazaryan, member of the Karabakh Commietee, interview, Erevan, June 1999, 63Melander and most of the Armenian minority outside Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan were forced to leave their homes in November and December 1988. The cleansings were probably organized and executed by the various nationalist groups. For example, Rafael Kazaryan, a member of the Karabakh Committee claims that he helped organize the expulsion of the Azetis from Armenia." As a result of these incidents the Azerbaijani authorities lost de facto control over most of the NKAO by the end of 1988. Ic is unclear whether Soviet MVD troops took part in the cleansing or whether they mainly tried to curb the worst excesses and alleviate the suffer- ing of those displaced. It is clear, however, that the troops did not do every- thing they could have done to prevent the cleansing, since they were consider- ably better armed than the local nationalists and would have been able to stop much of the violence if they had made the effort. It is possible that Gorbachev was still hesitant to order the use of large-scale force. On 1 December he ac- cused Armenian and Azerbaijani officials of losing control, and he urged them to act decisively to stop the violence. The incident around Khojaly in September 1988 marked the beginning of a shift from low-cost, largely symbolic or declarative steps to more costly actions with enormous, highly visible consequences. The incidents of ethnic cleansing confirmed each side's feats about the other. The inability of the MVD forces to prevent the conflict increased the likelihood of a semi-military confrontation between Armenians and Azeris. The sieges within sieges chat developed made minorities acutely aware of their vulnerability. In ethnically mixed areas, communication routes between the settlements of one ethnic group often ran through the settlements of the other group. This feature, which is commonly found in ethnically mixed mountainous areas with cana- lizing terrain, had important political consequences in Nagorno-Karabakh. Whereas one group perceived the securing of communication routes as an in- dispensable precautionary measure in a situation of perceived threat, the other group was apt to see this as a direct attack on its community. This is the logic of the security dilemma. According to paramilitary commander Zhanna Galstyan, the first task of the local Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh was to secure the lines of communication within the enclave, a task that necessi- tated the capture of Azeri-inhabited villages.” ‘The massive ethnic cleansing that followed the Khojaly incident was spurred on by a number of other factors as well. The minority population 44, Ibid. 45. Croissant, Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, p. 34. 46. Masih and Krikorian, Armenia: At the Crossroads, p. 13. 47. Zhanna Galstyan, interview, Stepanakert, June 1999. 64The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited on both sides was increasingly perceived as a potential threat that could be neutralized only through expulsion. Morcover, the ethnic cleansing could send intimidating signals of resolve and overpowering strength, which could convince the enemy that any further resistance would be crushed, Ethnic cleansing also came to be favored by those who regarded ethnically pure territories as valuable in and of themselves. This sentiment, which spread as the scale and intensity of the conflict increased, was converted into a deadly ideology by fears of preemption and memories of past bloodshed. Those who favored an ethnically pure Greater Armenia were mindful of the ex- tremely difficult history of the Armenians, especially the enormous massacres committed by the Ottoman Turks during World War I. Memories of this tragic history, cultivated over the years, encouraged the Armenians to feel vul- nerable and to see the Azeris as related to the Turks who perpetrated the Armenian genocide. A similar form of extreme nationalist ideology moti- vated sizable numbers of Azerbaijani nationalists, who feared that the sep- aration of the NKAO would threaten the rather weak Azeri sense of nation- hood.* Officials in Moscow responded to these developments by ousting local officials in both Armenia and Azerbaijan who had either participated in the events or not done enough to prevent them. Leaders of nationalist organiza- tions were arrested. On 12 January 1989 the NKAO was placed under direct rule from Moscow, an attempt at compromise between Armenian demands for secession and Azerbaijani insistence that the status quo be preserved. But Moscow was only moderately successful in imposing order in the NKAO, and no real progress was made in bringing the parties closer to a mutually accept- able agreement. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenians protested against the dismissal of local leaders such as the Communist Party first secretary, H. A. Poghosyan. In Au- gust 1989 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh formed a “National Council,” which claimed to be the true representative of Armenians in the province un- til the former local government was restored. In open defiance of Moscow this council soon announced the secession of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan and the unification of the breakaway province with Armenia. Predictably, both Baku and Moscow immediately condemned the move. ‘Three months later, on 28 November 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR abruptly handed administration of the NKAO back to Baku. Although the Supreme Soviet also adopted several measures to bolster the autonomy of the province and to reestablish its provincial council, the abandonment of the province's special administrative status was widely seen as a victory for 48. Kaufman, “Ethnic Fears.” 65