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Social Democratic Capitalism
L A N E K E N W O RT H Y
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Lane Kenworthy 2020
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–0–19–006411–2
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.
—Martin Luther King Jr.
The legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people

whatever they need to have done but can not do at all, or can not do so
well, for themselves in their separate and individual capacities.
—Abraham Lincoln
If we keep track of how our laws and manners are doing, think up ways
to improve them, try them out, and keep the ones that make people
better off, we can gradually make the world a better place.
—Steven Pinker
CONTENTS
1. Sources of Successful Societies  1
PART 1 SOCIAL DEMOCR ATIC CAPITALISM
2. Social Democratic Capitalism and the Good Society  19

3. Is Its Success Generalizable?  72
4. Is There an Attractive Small-Government Alternative?  94
5. Why Not a Basic Income?  113
PART 2 SOCIAL DEMOCR ATIC AMERICA
6. America Is Underachieving  121
7. A Better America  160
8. How to Get There  202
Acknowledgments  235
Notes  237
References  255
Index  283
1
Sources of Successful Societies
For nations, as for individuals, it’s good to be rich. Affluent countries are more
likely to be democratic, more likely to have government programs that cushion
life’s bumps and boost the capabilities and well-being of the less fortunate, and
more likely to prioritize personal liberty. Their citizens tend to be more secure,
better educated, healthier, freer, and happier.
The world’s twenty or so rich democratic countries aren’t all alike, and they’ve
changed a good bit over the past century.1 Their experiences give us helpful
clues about what institutions and policies best promote human flourishing.
To this point in history, the most successful societies have been those that fea-
ture capitalism, a democratic political system, good elementary and secondary
(K–12) schooling, a big welfare state, employment-conducive public services,
and moderate regulation of product and labor markets.2 I call this set of policies
and institutions “social democratic capitalism.”
Social democratic capitalism improves living standards for the least well-off,
enhances economic security, and very likely boosts equality of opportunity. It
does so without sacrificing the many other things we want in a good society,
from liberty to economic growth and much more. Its chief practitioners have
been the Nordic nations: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Contrary to
what some presume, there is no good reason to think social democratic capi-
talism will work well only in these countries. Its success almost certainly is trans-
ferable to other affluent nations. Indeed, all of those nations already are partial
adopters of social democratic capitalism.
The United States, the largest of the world’s rich democracies, is one of those
partial adopters. If the United States were to expand some of its existing public
social programs and add some additional ones, many ordinary Americans would
have better lives. Despite formidable political obstacles, there is good reason to
think America will move in this direction in coming decades.
Those are my conclusions. This book provides the evidence and the reasoning.
1
2 So cial De mo cr atic Capitalism
Affluence and Its Consequences

Let’s begin with some context. The extent of human progress over the past two
centuries is astonishing. The starting point is improvement in economic well-
being. Economic historians have estimates of gross domestic product (GDP)
per person back to the year ad 1 for France and back a few centuries or more for
some other countries. For most of the past two thousand years—and by exten-
sion, for virtually all of human history—the quantity of goods and services we
produced barely budged.3 Then, around the middle of the 1800s, nations such
as the United States, Germany, France, and a handful of others stumbled upon
an institutional framework featuring markets, government provision of property
rights and public goods, and the scientific method. This configuration has proved
conducive to rapid and sustained economic advance, as we see in Figure 1.1.4
As societies get richer, they change in a variety of ways. Among these changes
are shifts in what people want and what they prioritize. Three are particularly
important.
First, people tend to dislike loss.5 The higher our income, the more insurance
we are willing to purchase in order to minimize potential loss. For some types
of insurance, such as insurance against low income in old age, government is
the most effective provider. Germany created a public old-age pension program
in the late 1800s, and other industrializing countries began to do so in the first
half of the twentieth century, with many introducing or expanding them during
the Great Depression in the 1930s. While many nations now have this type of
United States
$50k
Germany
France
0
1 1850
Year
Figure 1.1 GDP per capita. Adjusted for inflation and converted to 2011 US dollars using
purchasing power parities. “k” = thousand. The data begin in ad 1 for France, in 1500 for Germany,
and in 1650 for the United States. Data source: Maddison Project Database 2018, rug.nl/ggdc.
Source s o f Succe s s f ul Soc i e ti e s 3
100% Les
Kyr
Tim Guy
Uzb Mng
Bol
Nam Mus
MaldBot Rom
Bul
Lat
Sey
Lit
Rus
Svk Cze
Pol Est Svn
Kaz
TT Fr
Por NZ UK Fin
Ger
Ice
Swe
Can
Den
Nth Swi
Aus Nor
Ukr Blr
Old−age pension coverage

SAf Hun IreUS
Geo Tur
Swa Bra Bhs Cyp Asl
Bel
TjkArm AzeTha Ja It
AlbSVGUru Chl Kor Grc
China
Mol Isr HK
Tun Brb AB Sp
Nep MI Bez Alg
Ven Cro Mlt
CV Jam Irq
CR
Ecu
Mon
Mac
Sam Pala
Ser SKN Lib
STP Jor Bahr
BanMorDom Pan Gab
VietPer
EgyGren
PhiBHSL Irn
India
SenNic Mex Oma
ParCol
Cog
Tuv ES Mly
Moz Sri
CDR
SI Gua
Cmr
Dji Fji
Tgo
Gam
Afg DR
Ben
Eth
GinMrt
KenYem
Hon
CdI
Zam
Gha PalIdn
Uga
GuB
Zim
Ner
Mli
Camb
Rwa Lao
Sud
Mad
Mwi
Bdi
Van
Tza
BF Bhu
Pak
0 Cha
Hai
PNG
SL Ton Leb
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.2 Affluence and public old-age pension coverage. Old-age pension coverage: share
of statutory pension-age population. 2004–2013. Data source: United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), “Human Development Data,” using data from the International Labour Office (ILO),
World Social Protection Report. GDP per capita: converted to 2011 US dollars using purchasing power
parities. “k” = thousand. 2005. Data source: UNDP, “Human Development Data.” Three small, rich
city-states (Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore) are omitted. The line is a loess curve, calculated with
five oil-rich nations excluded.
public program, richer countries tend to have more expansive ones, as Figure
1.2 shows.
Government also plays an important role in the provision of health insurance.
As we see in Figure 1.3, public spending on healthcare tends to rise as nations
get richer. The same is true for education, as Figure 1.4 shows. (The association
in this figure would be even stronger but for the fact that virtually all countries
have universal government-funded K–12 schooling, which requires significant
expenditure regardless of national wealth.)
Much of what modern governments spend money on is public insurance.
Some programs protect against loss of income due to old age, unemployment,
illness, disability, family needs, discrimination, and other conditions and
circumstances. Other programs ensure widespread availability of schooling,
healthcare, housing, job training and placement, transportation, and other
services and goods. As a country gets more affluent, the welfare state tends
to grow.6
A second change in people’s desires as they get richer is to want more fair-
ness in their society.7 Drawing on several decades of public opinion survey data
from multiple countries, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have found
that once people can be confident of survival and of a decent standard of living,
they tend to shift away from a worldview that emphasizes traditional sources
of authority, religious dictates, traditional social roles, and the well-being of
10% Swe
Nth
NZFr Den
Public health expenditures

Ja Ger
Aus
Kir
Les Bel US Nor
UK Can Swi
FinIce
Dji SwaBH CR SvnSp
It
Sam Ser Pala Cro Cze Asl
Mwi Uru Por
Pan Svk
Nam Tha
Col
Mol
Nic JorAlg Ire
Gam Grc
HunEst Isr
SIHon
Van Bol
Ton Par
ES Ecu Brb
SVG Bul
Rom PolLit
Cog
Bdi Viet SAf
Mac Tur
Tun Bra AB Kor
Moz Bez
Dom LibBlr Chl
LatRus
STP
KyrCV
PNG
Ken UkrSL Mon Bhs SAr
Ner
Lbr UzbGuy PerIrq
Mex
Bot
China SeyCyp
TT Oma Bahr
Rwa
Afg
Eth
ZamBhu Fji
Alb
Jam Leb
DR Sur
Gren Irn EG
Gin
BF
Tza
Zim Mng UAEBru
Kuw
Sen Gua
Ben
Nep
Com Egy Mus Gab KazMly
CAR
TgoGha
Cha
Tjk
SL ArmSri
MrtMor SKN
UgaSud
CdI
Hai
CDRMli Phi
Geo Ven
Mad India
Camb
Tim Tkm
SS
GuB Aze
Cmr Nga Idn
Pak
Lao
Ban
0
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.3 Affluence and public health expenditures. Public health expenditures: share of
GDP. 2014. Data source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Human Development
Data.” GDP per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2014. Three small, rich city-states (Andorra, Luxembourg,
Singapore) and four small island nations that have very high health expenditures are omitted. The line
is a loess curve, calculated with eight oil-rich nations excluded.
9%
Swa
Public education expenditures
Den
Nam
Tim Swe
Mol Nor
Bol Fin
Mwi CR Ice
Ner
Kyr Ukr Brb Mlt
Moz Cyp
Viet NZ Bel
Cog
Bez Tun
Gha
Hon JamSAf
Bhu Bra
Mly
Isr
Svn UK Aus Ire
Sen
Ken Fr Nth
Bdi Asl
Can
Com MaldMex
SVG Por US
Rwa
Van Par
CV BlrLat
Mus Ger Oma Swi
Afg
Tgo SL
CdI MngCol
Nep Pol
Lit
Est
BF
Eth
Dji
Nic ChlHun Kor
Ben
Mli Ser Uru Cze Sp
Lao Ecu CroRus
Tjk Fji Tha
STP
Svk It
India Per Ja Bru
Gin
TzaPhiES Alb Bul Sey HK
MrtGuy Idn Pan
Cmr Tkm Rom
Cha Irn
SL Gua
Lbr
Gam
Pak Leb
Aze Bahr
GuB
CDR
Uga Arm
Mad
Camb
BanGeo
Zim
Sri
CAR
1 SS
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.4 Affluence and public education expenditures. Public education

expenditures: share of GDP. 2010–2014. Data source: United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), “Human Development Data.” GDP per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2010. Three small, rich city-
states (Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore) and two small island nations that have very high education
expenditures are omitted. The line is a loess curve, calculated with four oil-rich nations excluded.
the group or community rather than that of the individual. A “postmaterialist”

or “emancipative” worldview replaces a scarcity orientation.8 One element of
postmaterialism is a desire for basic political rights. Another element is univer-
salistic humanism, which deems all persons, including members of outgroups,
9.3 Swe Swi Nor

Viet
Eth Cyp
Importance of democracy
Uru Can
Egy Ger
Uzb Asl Nth
Zim
Zam ItFin
Geo Pol Hun NZ
UK
Arm Mly TT Sp
Kaz
Tur
Rom
Ecu
Idn Mex
Chl Fr
MorTun
Yem
GhaChina
PerTha US
Jor EstKor Ja
ColAlg Lib
Svn
AzeBra
BFPhi Leb Bul
Irq
Kyr
Mol
Nga
PakUkr Irn
Pal
India HK
Rwa
Mli
SAf
Ser
Blr
7.4 Rus
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.5 Affluence and desire for fairness in politics. Importance of democracy: average
response to the question “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed
democratically?,” with 1 indicating “not at all important” and 10 indicating “absolutely important.”
2005–2014. Data source: World Values Survey. GDP per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2005. Three small, rich
city-states (Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore) and Haiti are omitted. The line is a linear regression
line, calculated with two oil-rich nations excluded.
as equally worthy of rights, opportunities, and respect. In the world’s rich na-
tions, the shift from a traditional orientation to a postmaterialist one emerged in
the generation that grew up after the Great Depression and World War II.9 As the
rest of the world gets richer, we’re beginning to observe it there too.10
We can see the growing embrace of fairness when we compare nations that
have varying levels of economic affluence. The richer the nation, the more im-
portant people tend to say it is “to live in a country that is governed democrat-
ically,” as Figure 1.5 shows. Similarly, a much larger portion of the populace in
higher-income nations disagrees that “when jobs are scarce, men should have
more right to a job than women,” as we see in Figure 1.6.11 And Figure 1.7 shows
a similar pattern when respondents are asked whether “when jobs are scarce,
employers should give priority to [native-born] people over immigrants.”
A third shift that comes with affluence is a growing emphasis on personal
liberty. Most of us want the freedom to choose what to believe, how to behave,
with whom to live, and so on. As material well-being increases, this desire for
freedom comes to the fore.12
Here too we can observe the progress by looking across countries. Figure 1.8
shows that in richer nations more people consider religion, which tends to re-
strict our beliefs and behaviors, to be not very important in their life.13 More
people say divorce is justifiable, as Figure 1.9 shows. And more people view ho-
mosexuality as justifiable, as we see in Figure 1.10.
94% Swe
Women have equal right to a job

Nor
Eth
Sp Fin
Svn NZ UKCan
Gua Bra FrAsl Nth
Mex US
Uru
Per
Col HunTT
Ser Swi
Ger
It
Chl Est
Zim Ecu Pol
Zam Bul Cyp
Blr
UkrSAf
GhaGeo
China Rus HK
VietIdn Tha
Mol
Hai Leb
Rom
Rwa
BF Arm
Mor
Uzb Kaz
India
Kyr
MliPal AlgTur Kor
Pak
Phi
Nga
Irq Irn Mly Lib
Tun
Yem Jor Ja
Egy
9 Aze
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.6 Affluence and desire for fairness for women. Women have equal right to a
job: share not disagreeing that “when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than
women.” Other response options: agree, neither agree nor disagree. 2005–2014. Data source: World
Values Survey. GDP per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2005. Three small, rich city-states (Andorra,
Luxembourg, Singapore) are omitted. The line is a linear regression line, calculated with two oil-rich
nations excluded.
Immigrants have equal right to a job
74% Swe
Nor
Fr Can
Nth
UK
Ger Swi
Uzb Sp
Eth Ser NZ Fin
Asl
UruMex
Tur US
Rwa SAf
Tha
BFPak It
Zim Ukr Bra Chl Svn
China Bul
Blr Pol
Kyr
Gha
Zam Per
Ecu
Col Rom Mly
Mor
Nga
Viet Rus
Gua
India
Arm
Mol
Phi Est TT Cyp
MliGeo Kaz
Yem
Hai Idn Irn HunKor
Lib
Ja HK
2 Jor
Egy
Aze
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.7 Affluence and desire for fairness for immigrants. Immigrants have equal right to
a job: share disagreeing that “when jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [native-born]
people over immigrants.” Other response options: agree, neither agree nor disagree. 2005–2014.
Data source: World Values Survey. GDP per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2005. Three small, rich city-states
(Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore) are omitted. The line is a linear regression line, calculated with two
oil-rich nations excluded.
97% China
Ja
Est Swe
Svn SpFr Nth Nor
Rus Ger
Asl
Blr Hun Fin Swi
Bul
UruKaz NZ UK
Chl Kor
UkrSer
Not very religious

Mol Can
Uzb Aze It
Kyr
Rwa Bahr US
India Pol
Per Bra
Rom Cyp
Leb
SAf
ThaMex
ArmCol
Ecu Tur
Zam Irn TT
Eth
Zim Gua Irq Mly
BFGeo
Phi
Mor
Pak
Nga
Mli
Gha JorAlg
Yem Egy
Tun
Idn Lib
1
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.8 Affluence and desire for freedom in personal beliefs. Not very religious: share
of the population responding other than “very important” to the question “For each of the following,
indicate how important it is in your life: religion.” Other response options: rather important, not very
important, not at all important. 2005–2014. Data source: World Values Survey. GDP per capita: see
Figure 1.2. 2005. Three small, rich city-states (Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore) are omitted. The line
is a loess curve, calculated with three oil-rich nations excluded.
Swe
8
Uru Svn Sp
Nth Nor
Chl Asl
Divorce is justifiable
Fr Swi
NZ Fin
Bul
Bra CypUK
Ger US
RusEst Ja
Hun Can
UkrBlr
EgySer Pol It
Mli Per Mex
Gua Kaz
Mol SAf
Hai
Zam Kor
MorColAlg
Phi IrqLeb
Rom TT
GeoEcu
Yem
BFChinaTun
Tha Lib
Zim Aze Tur
Irn
Uzb
Kyr
Eth IdnJor
Arm Mly
RwaNga
Gha
Pak
2 India
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.9 Affluence and desire for freedom in personal behavior: divorce. Divorce is
justifiable: average response to the question “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether
you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: divorce,” where 1
indicates “never justified” and 10 indicates “always justified.” 2005–2014. Data source: World Values
Survey. GDP per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2005. Three small, rich city-states (Andorra, Luxembourg,
Singapore) are omitted. The line is a loess curve, calculated with two oil-rich nations excluded.
Swe
8 Nth Nor
Homosexuality is justifiable
Swi
Sp
Asl
Fr
Uru
Fin
NZ Ger
Chl UKCan
Svn US
Ja
Ser
Phi Bra
SAf Mex Hun
Bul HK
Cyp
Per
Hai Col Pol It
Gua Leb EstKor
Mli Ecu Tha
Zam Ukr Rus
Mol BlrRomMly
China Alg Kaz
Kyr
BFNga Irq
Viet
Zim Lib
TT
Uzb
India
Eth
RwaPak
Pal
Yem Tur
Irn
Gha Idn
Mor
Geo
Arm Aze
Tun
1
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.10 Affluence and desire for freedom in personal behavior: homosexuality.
Homosexuality is justifiable: average response to the question “Please tell me for each of the
following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in
between: homosexuality,” where 1 indicates “never justified” and 10 indicates “always justified.” 2005–
2014. Data source: World Values Survey. GDP per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2005. Three small, rich city-
states (Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore) are omitted. The line is a loess curve.
These advances in freedom aren’t without cost. As people come to value

freedom more heavily, more choose to divorce or not to marry, so fewer children
grow up with two parents.14 And as religion fades, a key source of community
weakens.15 But these developments do enhance individual liberty.
People’s value orientations tend to be established in their teen and early
adult years and then persist through the rest of their lives, so at the societal level
changes in attitudes often happen slowly, via new cohorts replacing older ones.
Even so, the attitude shifts are clearly visible in the cross-country patterns in
Figures 1.2 through 1.10. Researchers also find them when comparing across
cohorts within countries and when examining changes over time in the few na-
tions for which attitudinal data are available over a lengthy period of time.16
When a country’s economic performance weakens, such as during recessions,
the rise in support for public insurance, fairness, and personal freedom some-
times stalls or even reverses. However, such backsliding tends to be temporary.17
Together, affluence, its causes (markets, stable and supportive government,
and science), and its consequences (desire for more insurance, fairness, and per-
sonal freedom) have produced societies that are not only richer but also more
secure, better educated, healthier, fairer, and freer. Let’s take a look at some of the
evidence that makes this clear.18
A common way to measure the extent of poverty or material deprivation in
different countries is to pick a minimally-acceptable income level and calculate
99% Bdi
Mad
Mwi
Tim
Ner
Lbr
SL
Cog
Moz
Tza
Mli
Gin
GuB
BF
CAR
STP
Rwa Nga
Tgo
Ben
Les
Uga
Zam
EthIndia
Sen
Ban
PNG
SILao
Ken
Cha
CDR
NepSS
Pak
CdI Swa
YemIdn
Hai
Gam
Cmr
Zim
Sud
Van
Dji Egy
Kir
Kyr Nam
Gha
Phi
Tjk
Com Mrt
Mic Irq
Geo SAf
Poverty Arm
Viet
Hon
CV
Bhu
Bot
Mald Gab
Sri
Fji
China
Mor
Tuv Gua
Nic
ESAlb Mex
Sam Col Ven
Tun
Bol Ecu
Ton Per
Mng
Mol JamDR
Mac
Alg Rom
Par Bra
Jor Pan
Mus Kaz
Tha
CR TurChl Mly
SerBulIrn
Ukr Mon Uru
AzeLatSey
Blr Lit
Cro
Pol
Rus Grc Isr
BH Leb Hun EstSvkPor
KorSp ItFrIce
0 Cze
Mlt
Svn Ja
UK
Cyp Can
FinSwe
Aus
Asl
Den
Bel
Ger NthUS Swi
Ire Nor
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.11 Affluence and a decent income floor. Poverty: share of persons living in a
household with an income less than $5.50 per day. Incomes adjusted for inflation and converted to
2011 US dollars using purchasing power parities. Average over 2004–2015. Data source: World Bank.
GDP per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2010. Three small, rich city-states (Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore)
are omitted. The line is a loess curve.
the share of the population that lives in households with an income below that
level. Figure 1.11 shows that if we use $5.50 per day as the threshold, many low-
income nations have very high poverty rates, while high-income nations have
virtually no poverty. Figure 1.12 shows that school completion tends to be
greater in higher-income countries. In Figures 1.13 and 1.14, we see a similarly
strong relationship for life expectancy and for homicides.19
Fairness outcomes also improve. Richer nations tend to be more dem-
ocratic, as Figure 1.15 shows. Women in more affluent countries tend to be
better off on measures of inclusion, justice, and security, as we see in Figure
1.16. Figure 1.17 shows that immigrants are much happier with their lives in
richer countries.
Finally, not only do people want more freedom as their societies become
wealthier; they often get it. Researchers at a libertarian think tank, the Cato
Institute, have compiled data on an assortment of freedoms, including the rule
of law, security and safety, freedom of movement, religious freedom, freedom
of association, freedom of expression and information, and freedom of identity
and relationships. Figure 1.18 shows that a composite index reflecting these per-
sonal freedoms tends to rise with countries’ GDP per capita.
The formula for progress, then, is straightforward: Put in place the
prerequisites for sustained economic growth. Get richer. This brings pressure
(from individuals and from organizations representing them, such as labor
unions) for government services and supports, for fairness, and for personal
14
UK Can
Ger
Asl USSwi
Lit Isr Den Nor
Pala EstCze NZ Ja Swe Ire
Geo Svk Kor Ice
Uzb
Mol Blr
LatPol Svn
Rus
Hun
Kaz Cyp Nth
Fr Bel HK
Arm Mon
Ukr AzeCro Fin Aus
Kyr Sri
Ser Bul Bhs
Rom TT It
Fji
Bez
TjkSam SAf Brb Grc
Jor Tkm Pan ChlMly
Mng Sp
Jam Alb
Phi SL Mac Ven Sey Bahr SAr UAE
Education Pal BH PerBotMusAB Por
Gren
SVGLebCR
Mex Uru
Bru
GuyEcu Sur SKN
Bol
Par
Viet Dom
IdnDR Gab
ThaTur Oma
Kir
Zim Bra
Alg
China
Col
GhaSwa
Zam TunLib
Egy Kuw
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ES
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Hon
Cmr
Mad GuaMald
India
TzaNga
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SI EG
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SLSudBhu
Moz
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Sen
Eth
Gin
Cha
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BF
1
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.12 Affluence and education. Education: average years of schooling completed. 2015.
Data source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Human Development Data.” GDP
per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2015. Three small, rich city-states (Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore) are
omitted. The line is a loess curve, calculated with eight oil-rich nations excluded.
84 Sp
IsrIt Ja Ice
Asl
HK
Swi
Chl NZFr Can
Kor Swe
AusNth Ire Nor
Por
Grc Svn UKBel
Fin Ger
Cyp Den
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Mon Est
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Nic JamEcu
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Hun
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MorJor Ser
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Bul LatMly SAr Kuw
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Life expectancy
Sam
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Pal ES
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48
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.13 Affluence and life expectancy. Life expectancy: years at birth. 2015. Data
source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Human Development Data.” GDP per
capita: see Figure 1.2. 2015. Three small, rich city-states (Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore) are
omitted. The line is a loess curve, calculated with eight oil-rich nations excluded.
freedoms. Together, changes in material well-being and in popular attitudes im-

prove the likelihood of good outcomes.
Achieving sustained economic growth has proved difficult for many of the
world’s poorer nations. A key challenge for social scientists is to improve our un-
derstanding of how to kick-start and sustain economic growth.20 In the past several
38 Les
Jam
Bez SKN
SAf
Gua
Bhs
Col
SVG TT
Bra
Homicides Guy
Tuv
SL
Swa
Nam DR Pan
Mex
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CAR SS
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0 Mad Pal Idn Grc Cyp Bahr
Aus
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.14 Affluence and safety. Homicides: per 100,000 population. 2010–2014. Data
source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Human Development Data.” GDP per
capita: see Figure 1.2. 2010. Three small, rich city-states (Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore) and three
very-high-homicide countries (El Salvador, Honduras, Venezuela) are omitted. The line is a loess
curve, calculated with eight oil-rich nations excluded.
10 CV MngCRMus Uru
Chl Lit
Hun
Grc
Pol
Por
Svk
SvnTTSp
Cyp ItNZ
JaFin Ger
UK CanNth IreSwi
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Den
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Mol
India
Jam
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BulPan EstCze
Cro Fr
Gha
SI
Tim Gua
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ES Ser Mex Lat
Bra
Bot Kor Bel US
Kyr
SL
Sen
BenHon
Pak
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Guy
Geo
Bol Tun
Col
DR
Mwi
Mad
Lbr
GuB
Nep
BF
CAR Nic Nam
Zam Leb
Sri Irq Isr
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CDRMli Bhu
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CdI Ukr
Zim Ven Rus
Democracy
Tza Gab
Camb Fji Alg
Ban
0 SS Lib
Bdi
Uga
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Tgo
Cha
Eth
Rwa
Tjk Jor Tha
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Cmr Mor
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KazEG
Lao
Viet China
Blr
Aze Kuw
Tkm Oma UAE
Uzb
Swa
−10 Bahr SAr
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.15 Affluence and democracy. Democracy: higher values indicate more democratic.
Scale is −10 to +10. 2016. Data source: HumanProgress, “Democracy versus Autocracy Over Time,”
using data from Polity IV Annual Time-Series. GDP per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2015. Three small, rich
seven oil-rich nations excluded.
decades there has been considerable progress: for the first time, poorer countries
containing a large portion of the world’s population—particularly China and India
but some others as well—have been growing rapidly. During this period more
people have escaped poverty than ever before in human history.21
Women, peace, and security index
.89 Ice
Swi Nor
Svn Sp Fin Can Nth
Swe
UKBelDen
Ger
Aus
Por NZFr Asl Ire
Ser EstCypKor
Cro Pol US
Lat LitCze It Ja
MacMonBlr Svk
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Hun UAE
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SL CogEgy
Cha
Cmr Leb
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Sud
Mli Irq
CDR
CAR
Pak
.38 Afg
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.16 Affluence and women’s well-being. Women, peace, and security index: a
composite measure of inclusion (economic, social, political), justice (formal laws and informal
discrimination), and security (family, community, societal) via 11 indicators. Scale is 0 to 1. Data
source: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security and Peace Research Institute of Oslo,
Women, Peace, and Security Index 2017–18. GDP per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2015. Three small, rich
five oil-rich nations excluded.
7.7 Fin
Den
Ice Nor
Immigrants’ life satisfaction
NZ Asl
CanSwe Swi
Mex NthUS
Isr AusIre
Oma
CR UK Bel UAE
Chl Mlt Ja
Ecu PanUru Cyp Fr Ger
BahrSAr
Ven Sp
Par Cze It
Bez Blr PolSvkPor
Svn
Uzb Tkm Rus
Tur Mly
Zam BH Jor Cro
Kaz
Mol Egy DR Hun Grc
Lib
Cmr Mon Leb Lit
Nga Ser Irq
TjkPak Mac Est HK
Kyr
Nep
Mrt SAfAze Lat
CDR Pal
SLYemUkr BotGab
India
Sen
Lbr
Mli
Zim Cog
Cha
Mwi
Sud
Uga
Ken
BF
Dji Arm
Afg
Ner
Ben
Gin
Com SSGeo
CdI
Rwa
3.5 Tgo
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.17 Affluence and immigrants’ well-being. Immigrant life satisfaction: average
response to the question “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10
at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder
represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally
feel you stand at this time?” 2005–2017. Data source: Gallup World Poll, via the World Happiness
Report 2018, online appendix. GDP per capita: see Figure 1.2. 2015. Three small, rich city-states
(Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore) are omitted. The line is a loess curve, calculated with six oil-rich
nations excluded.
9.5 Fin Den

NZ Bel
Aus
Nth
Swe Swi
Nor
Asl
Ger
Can Ire
Por
Cze JaUK Ice
Svn
Est
Pol
Svk
Lit Kor
Sp US
HK
RomLat Cyp It Fr
Cro
Uru
CV CRBul Hun
Mon Chl
Personal freedom
Grc
Sey
BHSerSur Isr
Gha GeoAlb
Fji Mus
Pan
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Ben Mng
EcuSAf Bhs
BF Per
Nep Nam
Camb Mac
Brb
SL
Mad
Hai Jam
Bol
GuB MolArm
CdI
ES
Par Col Mex
Bra
TT
Moz Bot
Sen
RwaCog Bhu
Guy IdnDR Tur
Tun
Tgo Ukr
Swa
Gua
Phi
India Kaz
Lbr Bez
Tza
Ken
Kyr MorJor Tha
Hon
Nic
Zam Bru
Uga Viet Leb
TjkLao Mly Bahr
Mli Aze
Ven
Ner
CAR
Tim China Rus Kuw
Ban
Cha Oma
Gin Nga
EthPak SriAlg
Zim Gab UAE
CDRCmr
Bdi SAr
3.8 EgyLib
0 $70k
GDP per capita
Figure 1.18 Affluence and personal freedom. Personal freedom: average score for rule of law,
security and safety, freedom of movement, religious freedom, freedom of association, freedom of
expression and information, and freedom of identity and relationships. Scale is 0 to 10. 2015. Data
source: Ian Vasquez and Tanja Porcnik, The Human Freedom Index, Cato Institute. GDP per capita: see
Figure 1.2. 2015. Three small, rich city-states (Andorra, Luxembourg, Singapore) are omitted. The line
is a loess curve, calculated with seven oil-rich nations excluded.
While affluence makes progress in other areas more likely, it isn’t a precondi-
tion. An equally important challenge for social scientists, therefore, is to figure
out ways to speed up the implementation of services, cushions, fairness, and
freedom even before nations become rich.22 How can we get more children in
good schools for longer? How can we improve health outcomes before a fully
modern healthcare system is in place? How can we reduce deep poverty in ad-
vance of full-scale national affluence?
Along with addressing climate change and other existential threats, these
tasks are the most important ones facing researchers and policy makers, because
they affect a large share of the world’s people, including its least well-off.
However, they aren’t our only challenge. For all of their achievements, the
world’s rich democratic countries have progressed unevenly toward the good
society. These twenty or so nations are similar to one another in some of their
institutions and policies, but they also vary quite a bit. And while it isn’t always
easy to spot in the charts we’ve looked at so far, they differ significantly on an
array of outcomes.
What, according to these countries’ experience, is the configuration of
institutions and policies most conducive to human flourishing? The histor-
ical and comparative evidence suggests that the answer is social democratic
capitalism.

Social democratic capitalism consists of democracy, capitalism, education, a big
welfare state, and high employment. All rich longstanding-democratic nations
have the first three of these—democratic political systems, capitalist economies,
and good-quality K–12 schooling. What sets social democratic capitalism apart
is the addition of expansive and generous public insurance programs along with
aggressive promotion of high employment via public services and modest rather
than stringent regulation of product and labor markets.
In Part 1 of this book, I examine social democratic capitalism and its per-
formance. What has it achieved? To what extent does it suffer from tradeoffs?
Up to now, social democratic capitalism’s chief practitioners have been the
Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Is its success gen-
eralizable beyond the Nordics? Are there alternatives that can do as well or
better?
Chapter 2 looks at the experience of the Nordics and other rich democratic
nations. Joining democracy, capitalism, and education together with a big wel-
fare state and high employment has brought the Nordic countries a better
standard of living for their least well-off members, greater income security, and
very likely more equality of opportunity. And they have gotten these results
without sacrificing economic growth, freedom, health, happiness, or any of a
large number of other outcomes we want in a good society.
Skeptics discount the Nordics’ success on the presumption that these nations
have some unique feature that allows them, and only them, to reap the benefits
of social democratic policies without suffering tradeoffs. Versions of this story
identify the Nordics’ secret weapon as an immutable work ethic, superior in-
telligence, trust, solidarity, small population size, ethnic homogeneity, institu-
tional coherence, effective government, corporatism, a willingness to be taxed,
tax compliance, strong labor unions, or low income inequality. I examine these
hypotheses in Chapter 3. None holds up to close inspection.
Is there a small-government set of institutions and policies that can match
the success of social democratic capitalism? Some believe there is. It consists
of low government spending and taxes, strong families and voluntary organiza-
tions, private rather than public services, and public transfer programs heavily
targeted to the least well-off. As I document in Chapter 4, the experience of the
affluent democratic nations over the past half century hasn’t been friendly to
this hypothesis. Countries with smaller government haven’t achieved faster eco-
nomic growth. Families and voluntary organizations are sometimes less effective
and efficient than government programs, they by nature aren’t comprehensive in
coverage, and they’ve been weakening over time. They also are nearly or equally
as prominent in nations with a big government as in those with a smaller one.
Private provision of services should be welcomed, even embraced, but it is most

effective as a complement to public provision rather than a substitute. Relying
on heavily targeted government transfers can work, but it may be politically sus-
tainable only in a country with a strong egalitarian ethos, such as Australia. Even
there, it hasn’t matched the success of social democratic capitalism.
Universal basic income has emerged as a prominent alternative to social dem-
ocratic capitalism, championed mainly by those on the political left but also by
some on the right. We have very little evidence to look to in evaluating the at-
tractiveness of this proposal. What, then, should we make of it? I consider this
question in Chapter 5.
Social Democratic America

Part 2 of the book focuses on the United States. The United States is by far the
largest of the affluent democratic nations, with about one-third of their total pop-
ulation.23 Despite being one of the richest in this group, it is among the countries
that are farthest from the good society. Too few ordinary Americans have ade-
quate economic security, too few who grow up in disadvantaged circumstances
are able to reach the middle class, and too few see their boat lifted when the ec-
onomic tide rises. I detail the nature and extent of these problems in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 7 I suggest remedies. The problems are big ones, but they are not
intractable. The key to a solution? Social democratic capitalism. While we have
gradually expanded the size and scope of our public insurance programs and
employment-enhancing services over the past century, we need to do more.
I offer recommendations to add or improve health insurance, paid parental
leave, a child allowance, unemployment insurance and wage insurance, sickness
insurance, disability assistance, social assistance, pensions, eldercare, housing
assistance, early education, apprenticeships, college, affirmative action, full em-
ployment, the minimum wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, profit sharing,
infrastructure and public spaces, and paid vacation days and holidays. After
outlining the details for each of these, I turn to how much it will cost and how
to pay for it.
Can it happen? I predict yes. In Chapter 8 I explain why. The notion that the
United States will further increase the size and scope of its welfare state may
seem blind to the reality of contemporary American politics, but a different pic-
ture emerges when we step back and consider the long run. The lesson of the
past one hundred years is that as the country gets richer, we are willing to spend
more in order to safeguard against loss and enhance fairness. Advances in social
policy come only intermittently, but they do come. And when they come, they
usually last. Building a social democratic America doesn’t require a radical break
from our historical path. It simply requires continuing along that path. In all like-
lihood, that is exactly what we will do.
America has come a long way on the road to the good society, but we have
many miles yet to travel. Happily, our history and the experiences of other rich
nations show us the way forward. The United States is a much better country
today than it was a century ago, and a key part of the reason is that government
does more to ensure economic security, opportunity, and shared prosperity now
than it did then. In the future it will do more still, and we’ll be the better for it.
PA RT 1
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
CAPITALISM
2
Social Democratic Capitalism and

the Good Society
Social democratic capitalism consists of political democracy plus capitalism plus

education plus a big welfare state plus high employment. The experience of the
world’s affluent nations suggests that this set of institutions and policies is the
most likely to yield a coupling of democracy and liberty with income security, a
good standard of living for the least well-off, and equality of opportunity.
What exactly is social democratic capitalism? Which nations have embraced
it? What is the evidence that it yields good outcomes? Does getting those
outcomes require sacrificing other features of a good society? If social dem-
ocratic capitalism has worked well up to now, will it continue to do so going
forward?

Social democratic capitalism has six core elements1:
1. Democracy in the political sphere

2. Capitalism: private ownership and markets
3. Basic education: good-quality K–12 schooling
4. Expansive, generous public insurance programs
5. Employment-oriented public services: early education, affordable college,
retraining, job placement assistance, individualized monitoring and support,
lifelong learning
6. Modest regulation of product and labor markets
The first, second, and third of these are common to all of the world’s rich
longstanding-democratic nations. Each has a democratic polity, a market-
oriented economy with extensive private ownership of firms, and good-quality
19
20 Part 1: So cial De mo cr atic Capitalism
universal primary and secondary schooling. When it comes to the fourth, fifth,
and sixth elements, there is greater variation. Every affluent democratic country
has a welfare state, but their expansiveness and generosity differ significantly.
Employment-oriented public services and modest product and labor market
regulations aim to boost employment, and these too vary widely across countries.
The leading practitioners of social democratic capitalism are the Nordic na-
tions. Denmark and Sweden have embraced this model since roughly the 1970s.
Norway has too, but its performance on many outcomes is advantaged by its
substantial oil wealth, so we should be cautious in drawing inferences from the
Norwegian experience. Finland is a relative latecomer in embracing the full
gamut of social democratic policies, so it too isn’t quite as useful as Denmark
and Sweden in assessing the model.
Social democratic political parties in the Nordic countries have been the
prime movers in the adoption of this set of institutions and policies, and it’s for
this reason that I use the term “social democratic capitalism.”2 Others might
prefer a different label, such as “social capitalism,” “social investment capitalism,”
or “flexicurity.”3
Figures 2.1 through 2.4 help us to see countries’ positioning on the fourth,
fifth, and sixth elements of social democratic capitalism. On the horizontal axis
of Figure 2.1 is a measure of the expansiveness and generosity of public insur-
ance programs: government social expenditures as a share of gross domestic
product (GDP). I make a small adjustment for the size of the nation’s elderly
population and its unemployment rate, because spending is affected not only
by the structure and reach of a country’s programs but also by the share of the
population that needs them.4 Countries on the right side of the chart tend to
have a more generous and/or expansive welfare state. These include the Nordic
nations plus the continental European countries Austria, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Germany. Norway’s position is somewhat misleading: its very
large GDP (the denominator in the measure) pushes it farther to the left than it
ought to be.
On the vertical axis of Figure 2.1 is a measure of countries’ use of employment-
promoting government services: spending on active labor market policies such
as retraining and job placement and on programs like early education and paid
parental leave that help parents balance family commitments with paid work.
These kinds of services encourage more people, particularly women and parents,
to enter employment, they help persons who lose a job to prepare for and find
another one, and they serve as a direct source of jobs for teachers, trainers,
caseworkers, and others. Here Denmark and Sweden stand out, followed by
Finland and Norway along with France, Belgium, Austria, Ireland, and the UK.5
Figure 2.2’s horizontal axis has the same measure of public insurance expan-
siveness and generosity as in Figure 2.1. On its vertical axis is a measure of the
Employment−oriented public services
5% *Den*
*Swe*
*Fin*
*Nor* BelFr
Ire Aus
UK
NZ Ger
Asl Nth
Swi
Por
SpCan It
Ja
US
Kor
0
11 26%
Public insurance
Figure 2.1 Expansive, generous public insurance and employment-oriented public

services. Public insurance: public social expenditures as a share of GDP, adjusted for the size of the
elderly population and the unemployment rate. The adjustment is as follows: adjusted public social
expenditures = public social expenditures + (0.5 × (21.6 –(elderly population share + unemployment
rate))). Each percentage point of the elderly share and/or unemployment costs about 0.5 percent of
GDP, and 21.6 is the average across all countries and years for the elderly share (14.2 percent) plus
the unemployment rate (7.4 percent). 1980–2015. Data source: OECD. Employment-oriented public
services: public expenditures on active labor market policy and family (early education, paid parental
leave, child allowances and tax credits) as a share of GDP. 1985–2015. Data source: OECD. The
asterisks highlight the Nordic countries. “Asl” is Australia; “Aus” is Austria.
8.2 US NZ
CanUK
Modest economic regulation
*Den*
Swi
Ire *Fin*
Asl
Nth
*Nor* *Swe*
Ja
Bel Aus
Ger
Fr
Sp
Kor It
6.2 Por
11 26%
Public insurance
Figure 2.2 Expansive, generous public insurance and modest product and labor market
regulations. Public insurance: see Figure 2.1. Modest economic regulation: average score for legal
system and property rights, credit market regulations, labor market regulations, business regulations,
and freedom to trade internationally. Higher scores indicate less regulation. 1980–2015. Data
source: Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom database. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries.
“Asl” is Australia; “Aus” is Austria.
8.2 US Can NZ
UK
Modest economic regulation

*Den*
Swi
*Fin*
Asl Ire
Nth
*Nor* *Swe*
Ja Aus
Bel
Ger
Fr
Sp
Kor It
6.2 Por
0 5%
Employment−oriented public services
Figure 2.3 Employment-oriented public services and modest product and labor market
regulations. Employment-oriented public services: see Figure 2.1. Modest economic regulation: see
Figure 2.2. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries. “Asl” is Australia; “Aus” is Austria.
modesty of product and labor market regulations. This measure is based on each
country’s average score for its legal system and property rights, credit market
regulations, labor market regulations, business regulations, and freedom to trade
internationally. The easier it is to start up, operate, and shut down a business,
and the more flexible firms can be in hiring and firing workers, the more private
firms are likely to be able and willing to boost employment. Denmark is among
the countries scoring highest on this measure, together with New Zealand, the
United States, Canada, and the UK. Finland, Sweden, and Norway aren’t far
behind.
Figure 2.3 shows the third combination of these three indicators. Commitment
to employment-promoting public services is on the horizontal axis, and mod-
esty of product and labor regulations is on the vertical. The Nordic countries
again appear in the upper-right section.
An emphasis on high employment hasn’t always been at the forefront for so-
cial democrats. (Sweden was committed to pursuit of “full employment” as early
as the 1950s, but that referred mainly to a low unemployment rate among men.)
As public social programs expanded in the decades after World War II, some
reached a level of generosity at which they clearly dampened work incentives,
and this wasn’t necessarily considered a vice. Here is one description of the situ-
ation as of the 1980s, by Gøsta Esping-Andersen:
Like pensions, sickness and related benefits were originally meant to

help only the truly incapacitated. The idea of paid absence from work
has undergone a decisive transformation in terms of both quality and
Social Democratic Capitalism and the G ood S oc i e t y 23
scope. In most European countries, sickness benefits today equal normal

earnings. In some countries, notably Scandinavia, legislation has delib-
erately sought to emancipate the individual from work-compulsion
by extending high benefits for a broad variety of contingencies, in-
cluding sickness, maternity, parenthood (for mother and father), ed-
ucation, trade union and related involvement, and vacation. Controls
and restrictions have been eliminated or liberalized; waiting days have
been abolished, a medical certificate of illness is required only after one
week, no previous work experience is required to qualify, and benefits
can be upheld for very long periods. . . . When, as in Sweden, on any
given day approximately 15 percent of workers are absent yet paid to
work . . . a very large share of what normally is regarded as labor time is
in fact ‘welfare time.’6
Since then, employment promotion has become increasingly central to the

social democratic model.7 Why the shift? After all, employment isn’t always
a good thing. The need for a paycheck can trap people in careers that divert
them from more productive or rewarding pursuits. Work can be physically or
emotionally taxing. It can be monotonous, boring, and alienating. Some jobs
require a degree of indifference, meanness, or dishonesty toward customers
or subordinates that eats away at one’s humanity. And work can interfere with
family life.
Yet employment has significant virtues.8 It imposes regularity and disci-
pline on people’s lives. It can be a source of mental stimulation. It helps to
fulfill the widespread desire to contribute to, and be integrated in, the larger
society. It shapes identity and can boost self-esteem. With neighborhood and
family ties weakening, the office or factory can be a key site of social interac-
tion. Lack of employment tends to be associated with feelings of social exclu-
sion, discouragement, boredom, and unhappiness. In addition, employment
may help to achieve desirable societal outcomes such as economic security
and opportunity.
So employment has benefits and drawbacks. Some believe policy should
therefore aim to enhance people’s freedom to opt in or out of paid work.9 What
tips the balance in favor of high employment for social democratic capitalism is
the fact that paying for a big welfare state requires a large amount of government
revenue. High tax rates are one way to get that revenue, but capital mobility has
made it more difficult for nations to keep tax rates high, or to increase them.
A larger share of the population in paid work means more taxable income, which
increases tax revenue without necessitating an increase in tax rates. High em-
ployment eases the fiscal crunch another way too, by reducing the number of
people fully or heavily reliant on public benefits.
87%
Nor Swe
Den
Employment Fin
51
9 28%
Public insurance
Figure 2.4 Expansive, generous public insurance and high employment. The data points
are years, from 1980 to 2015. Solid thick lines: Denmark and Sweden. Dashed thick lines: Finland and
Norway. The other countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Korea (South), Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
United States. Public insurance: see Figure 2.1. Employment rate: employed persons aged 25–64 as a
share of all persons aged 25–64. Data source: OECD. The lines are loess curves.
Have social democratic employment-promotion policies succeeded? Figure

2.4 once again has public insurance spending on the horizontal axis. The ver-
tical axis has the actual employment rate, rather than policies aimed at boosting
that rate.10 Instead of data for a single point in time, this chart has a line for each
country that shows movement over the period from 1980 to 2015. The Nordic
countries, highlighted in bold, again are in the upper-right corner. They have
been the most successful at achieving and maintaining a large welfare state to-
gether with high employment.
How to Identify Social Democratic

Capitalism’s Effects
How can we assess the hypothesis that social democratic capitalism is the set
of policies and institutions that gets us closest to the good society? We look at
countries. Examining persons or firms or cities or regions can help, but it won’t,
in many instances, give us the information we need, because processes at these
levels may or may not scale up to full nations.11
For countries, the best way to identify causality is via quasi-experimental (“dif-
ference in differences”) analysis.12 We measure countries on the hypothesized
cause and the outcome at a point in time. Then some countries change more
than others on the hypothesized cause; for instance, some countries expand
their public insurance programs more than others. Then we compare across the
countries to see whether changes in the outcome correlate with changes in the
hypothesized cause. This isn’t foolproof evidence, but it gets us as close as pos-
sible to an experimental design.
Unfortunately, much of the change in public insurance expansiveness and
generosity in the world’s rich nations occurred prior to the 1980s, and data for
many of the outcomes we want in a good society aren’t available that far back
in time. What we need for a difference-in-differences analysis is sustained, uni-
directional changes over time in social policy and differences across countries
in the magnitude of that change. It isn’t especially helpful to examine year-to-
year fluctuations in social program generosity because noteworthy effects on
outcomes such as poverty are likely to take a while to show up, and because
many things influence short-run changes in outcomes. Instead, we want changes
that are large, that are in a single direction (rather than back and forth), that
persist for some time, and that vary in size across nations.13 The 1930s and the
1960s and ’70s fit the bill when it comes to public insurance.14 But we don’t have
cross-nationally comparable data for those periods on the key outcomes.
The best available option in this circumstance is to turn to other analytical
strategies such as static comparison across countries and comparison over time
in individual nations.
A Big Welfare State and High Employment

Contribute to an “Expanded Rawlsian” Result
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argued that among the features we should want
in a good society, three stand out as especially important: basic liberties, equality
of opportunity, and the best possible living standards for the least well-off.15
I share this view, though I think it needs a clarification and an addition.
Begin with the clarification. For Rawls, basic liberties refer to both demo-
cratic political institutions and personal freedoms.16 All of the world’s rich dem-
ocratic nations have both democratic polities and extensive personal liberties.
Next, the addition. Given what social scientists have learned about loss aver-
sion since A Theory of Justice was published in the early 1970s, if Rawls were
writing today he likely would include income security as an additional core at-
tribute of a good society. Humans dislike loss, and we’re willing to pay substan-
tial sums to avoid it or limit it.17 As a person’s income or assets increase, she will
tend to buy more insurance. Similarly, as nations get richer, they tend to allocate
a larger portion of their income (GDP) to insurance. Richard Layard puts it as
follows: “Many studies have found that a loss hurts roughly twice as much as an
equal gain helps. That is why people are so keen to avoid loss, and so unwilling
to incur the risk of loss. . . . It is precisely because people hate loss that we have
a social safety net, a welfare state. People want the security that these entities
provide. . . . If security is what most of us desperately want, it should be a major
goal for society. The rich have quite a lot of it and the poor less. A happy society
requires a lot of it all round.”18
We can think of this set of features—a democratic political system, basic per-
sonal liberties, the best possible living standards for the least well-off, income
security, and equality of opportunity—as an “expanded Rawlsian” result. Social
democratic capitalism seems well designed to achieve these aims. Does it suc-
ceed in doing so?
Let’s begin with the living standards of the least well-off. Even in countries
that are quite rich, many people have limited earnings from work. Government
transfer programs that cover more risks and do so more generously are likely to
boost their income.
The vertical axis of Figure 2.5 has a widely used indicator of the living
standards of the least well-off: the relative poverty rate. This is calculated, for
each country, as the share of people living in households with an income below
60 percent of the country’s median income. On the horizontal axis is public
24% US
Sp
Ja
Asl
Relative poverty
Kor Can
It
NZ
Por
Bel
*Swe*
IreUK
Swi Ger
Fr Aus
*Fin*
*Nor*
*Den*
12 Nth
9 20%
Public insurance
Figure 2.5 Public insurance and relative poverty. Relative poverty: share of persons
in households with income below 60 percent of the country’s median. 2010–2016. Data
sources: Luxembourg Income Study; OECD. Public insurance: public social expenditures as a
share of GDP, adjusted for the elderly population share and the unemployment rate. I also subtract
spending on health and active labor market policy; because these are services rather than transfers,
they aren’t counted in household incomes and thus won’t affect the poverty rate. 1980–2015. Data
source: OECD. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries. “Asl” is Australia; “Aus” is Austria. The
line is a linear regression line. The correlation is –.74.
$32k *Nor*
Swi
P10 household income

*Den*
*Swe*Aus
Can Nth
*Fin*
Asl Ger Bel
Fr
Ire UK
US NZ
Kor
Ja It
Sp
11 Por
9 20%
Public insurance
Figure 2.6 Public insurance and 10th-percentile household income. 10th-percentile

household income: posttransfer-posttax income. 2010–2016. The incomes are adjusted for household
size and then rescaled to reflect a three-person household, adjusted for inflation, and converted to
US dollars using purchasing power parities. “k” = thousand. Public insurance: see Figure 2.5. Data
sources: Luxembourg Income Study; OECD. “Asl” is Australia; “Aus” is Austria. The correlation is +.59.
insurance expenditures as a share of GDP. (Here I subtract expenditures on

health and active labor market policy; these are services, which aren’t counted
as income and thus can’t affect the poverty rate.) There is a strong correlation;
countries with a bigger welfare state tend to have lower relative poverty rates.
Some think the living standards of the least well-off are best assessed via an
absolute measure, rather than a relative one.19 The vertical axis in the next chart,
Figure 2.6, shows the income of a household at the 10th percentile of the dis-
tribution (90 percent of households have larger incomes, and 10 percent have
smaller ones). The incomes are adjusted for cost-of-living differences across
countries. The incomes of low-end households tend to be higher in nations with
more expansive and generous social programs.
A more direct indicator of material well-being is people’s responses to
questions about their living conditions. Since 2007, the Gallup World Poll has
asked a representative sample of adults in each country whether there has been
a time in the past year when they didn’t have enough money to (a) buy food that
they or their family needed or (b) provide adequate shelter or housing. On the
vertical axis in Figure 2.7 is the average share of households responding “yes” to
these two questions. The share ranges from 5 percent in Denmark to 15 percent
in the United States and 20 percent in South Korea.20 Here too we see a ten-
dency for countries with a bigger welfare state to do better.21
So all three indicators of the living standards of the least well-off—the
relative poverty rate, 10th- percentile household incomes, and material
21% Kor
Material hardship US
Por It
Sp Fr
Bel
Can
IreUK NZ
Asl *Fin* Aus
JaSwi
GerNth
*Nor* *Swe*
*Den*
4
11 26%
Public insurance
Figure 2.7 Public insurance and material hardship. Material hardship: average share of adults
responding yes to the question “Have there been times in the past 12 months when you did not have
enough money to buy food that you or your family needed?” and the question “Have there been times
in the past 12 months when you did not have enough money to provide adequate shelter or housing
for you and your family?” 2007–2017. Data source: Gallup World Poll, via the Legatum Prosperity
Index. Public insurance: see Figure 2.1. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries. “Asl” is Australia;
“Aus” is Austria. The line is a linear regression line. The correlation is –.55.
deprivation—suggest that things are better where the welfare state is larger and
more generous. This correlation reflects a causal effect.22 One way we know this
is because of over-time patterns. In recent decades increases in income for the
least well-off in the rich democratic nations have tended to come mainly from
increases in government transfers, not from rising earnings.23
A common worry is that government transfer programs will discourage em-
ployment, reducing people’s market incomes, so that these programs end up re-
ducing poverty that they themselves caused.24 But while some transfer recipients
do work less than they otherwise might, this effect tends to be outweighed by
the income boost from the transfers, so the poorest are better off than they
would be in the absence of these programs. And countries with greater welfare
state expansiveness and generosity don’t tend to have lower employment rates.25
Another potential problem is that heavy public spending on services might
crowd out spending on transfers. Transfers are counted as income whereas serv-
ices aren’t, so crowding out would hinder the ability of a big welfare state to re-
duce poverty.26 That hasn’t happened, however. Many of the countries that are
the biggest spenders on public services have continued to have generous transfer
programs.27
So a big welfare state helps the least well-off. Does employment help too?
People at the low end don’t automatically benefit from a higher employment
24% US
Sp
Ja
Asl
Relative poverty
Kor Can
It NZ
Por
Bel
UK *Swe*
Ire
Ger Swi
FrAus
*Fin*
*Nor*
*Den*
12 Nth
63 82%
Employment
Figure 2.8 Employment and relative poverty. Relative poverty: see Figure 2.5. Employment
rate: employed persons aged 25–64 as a share of the population aged 25–64. 2000–2016. Data
source: OECD. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries. “Asl” is Australia; “Aus” is Austria. The
line is a linear regression line. The correlation is –.36.
rate.28 They could end up worse off in a relative sense if the additional jobs go
mainly to persons in households that already had middle or high incomes. Even
in an absolute sense there may be no gain if a person shifts from receipt of a gov-
ernment transfer to a job with low pay. In the United States, a steady rise in the
employment rate during the 1980s and 1990s produced very little increase in
the earnings of households in the bottom fifth of incomes.29 The same appears
to have been true for Germany in the 2000s and 2010s.30 On average, however,
employment does help the least well-off. In Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10, we see that
nations with higher employment rates tend to have lower relative poverty rates,
higher 10th-percentile household incomes, and less material hardship. Increases
in employment rates have played a key role in rising low-end incomes in Ireland,
the Netherlands, and Spain. And when employment has increased within coun-
tries over time, poverty rates have tended to fall.31
Next, let’s consider income security, which refers mainly to avoidance of large
income reductions. A helpful measure here is the average decrease in house-
hold income from one year to the next when an individual in the household
experiences a large earnings decline. Suppose a person suffers a large earnings
drop because she retires, loses her job, or takes time off to deal with a health
problem or to have a child. If she is the sole earner in the household and nothing
else changes, the household’s income will decline by the same amount as the
individual earnings decline. But if there is another earner in the household, the
fall in household income will be smaller (as a share of the previous year’s in-
come). And if the other earner increases his work hours or gets a pay raise, the
$32k *Nor*
Swi
P10 household income

*Den*
Aus *Swe*
Nth
*Fin*
Can
Ger
Bel Fr Asl
Ire USUK NZ
Kor
It Ja
Sp
11 Por
63 82%
Employment
Figure 2.9 Employment and 10th-percentile household income. 10th-percentile household

income: see Figure 2.6. Employment rate: see Figure 2.8. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries.
“Asl” is Australia; “Aus” is Austria. The line is a linear regression line. The correlation is +.67.
21% Kor
Material hardship
US
It Por
Sp Fr
Bel
Can
Ire Asl UK NZ
*Fin*
Aus Nth
Ja Swi
Ger *Den**Nor*
*Swe*
4
63 82%
Employment
Figure 2.10 Employment and material hardship. Material hardship: see Figure 2.7.
Employment rate: see Figure 2.8. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries. “Asl” is Australia; “Aus”
is Austria. The line is a linear regression line. The correlation is –.50.
household’s income might not decline at all. The same is true if the household
receives unemployment compensation, sickness or disability benefit, parental
leave payment, a pension, social assistance, or some other public insurance pro-
gram payment.
The vertical axis of Figure 2.11 shows the average decline in household in-
come when a member experiences an earnings decline of 20 percent or more
from one year to the next. Boosting economic security is a core objective of
welfare state programs, so it isn’t surprising to see that average income decline
tends to be smaller in nations with more expansive and generous public insur-
ance.32 Income decline also tends to be smaller in countries with a higher em-
ployment rate, as we see in Figure 2.12.
−8% *Nor*
*Swe*
Kor Fr
Income decline
Nth
*Fin*
*Den*
Ger Bel
Asl Aus
CanIre Swi
US
Por
UK It
−35 Sp
9 20%
Public insurance
Figure 2.11 Public insurance and income decline. Income decline: average year-to-year
household disposable income decline for households in which an individual experiences an earnings
decline of 20 percent or more. 2005–2010. Data source: Boris Cournède, Paula Garda, Peter Hoeller,
and Volker Ziemann, “Effects of Pro-Growth Policies on the Economic Stability of Firms, Workers
and Households,” OECD Economic Policy Papers 12, 2015, figure 18, using CNEF, ECHP, EU-SILC,
and OECD data. Public insurance: see Figure 2.5. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries. “Asl” is
Australia; “Aus” is Austria. The line is a linear regression line. The correlation is +.53.
−8% *Nor*
*Swe*
Kor
Fr
Income decline
Nth
*Fin* *Den*
Bel Ger
AusAsl
Ire Can Swi
US
Por
It UK
−35 Sp
62 81%
Employment
Figure 2.12 Employment and income decline. Income decline: see Figure 2.11. Employment
rate: see Figure 2.8. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries. “Asl” is Australia; “Aus” is Austria.
The line is a linear regression line. The correlation is +.44.
The story thus far: A big welfare state and high employment boost the living
standards of the poor and improve income security. The Nordic countries,
which have generous public insurance programs and high employment rates,
have tended to do especially well on these two outcomes.
Let’s now look at equality of opportunity. The feature of social democratic
capitalism that’s most likely to enhance equality of opportunity is provision of
accessible, affordable, high-quality early education (childcare and preschool). It
does so by improving the capabilities of children from less advantaged homes,
pulling those capabilities closer to those of children in the middle and at the top.33
Some children have parents who read to them, instill helpful traits such as
self-control and persistence, shield them from stress and physical harm, expose
them to new information and learning opportunities, assist them with school
work, utilize connections to help them get out of trouble or into a good job, re-
main in a stable relationship throughout the childhood years, and so on. Other
children are less fortunate.
Schools help to offset the differences in capabilities caused by families. We
know this from two pieces of evidence. First, at kindergarten entry children
from poor homes tend to have much lower measurable skills than children
from affluent homes. Given the huge variation in home and neighborhood
circumstances, we would expect that gap to continue to widen throughout
childhood. But it doesn’t; it’s about the same size at the end of high school as
at the start of kindergarten. This tells us that schools have an equalizing effect.34
Second, during summer vacations, when children are out of school, those from
lower-income families tend to fall farther behind compared to those from higher-
income families.35
Having children enter school earlier in life can reduce the disparity when
they arrive for kindergarten. Indeed, some analysts conclude that the impact of
schooling is larger before kindergarten than after.36
The effects of three high-quality early education programs in the United
States—the Perry Preschool Project in Michigan in the 1960s, the Abecedarian
Project in North Carolina in the 1970s, and the Child-Parent Center Education
Program in Chicago in the 1970s—have been tracked into early adulthood
or beyond. Each program appears to have had positive effects for low-income
children that persist throughout the life course. That’s also the case with Head
Start, with a large-scale though short-lived childcare program put in place in the
United States during World War II, and with early education in Denmark and
Norway.37
For the Perry and Chicago programs, gains in test scores faded away but
there were long-term gains in labor market success and other outcomes. The
same appears to be true for Head Start and for Norway’s universal early educa-
tion program. This suggests that the key improvement is in noncognitive skills
rather than in cognitive ability. On the other hand, the Abecedarian Project
yielded better long-term behavioral outcomes and sustained gains in test scores.
A natural experiment in Denmark also found lasting test-score gains. So early
education’s benefits for children from less advantaged homes may come via both
cognitive and noncognitive skills.
An especially informative test is one that looks at differences across coun-
tries in changes over time.38 If early education helps to equalize opportunity,
we would expect a greater equalization over time in countries that adopted uni-
versal early education, such as Sweden and Denmark, than in countries that
didn’t. Gøsta Esping-Andersen has examined the data. He concludes that this is
indeed what happened:
I use the IALS [International Adult Literacy Survey] data to compare

social origin effects on the probability of completing upper-level sec-
ondary education across birth cohorts. . . . The analyses follow three
cohorts, the oldest born in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the youngest
in the 1970s. And I compare “social inheritance” trends in the three
Nordic countries with Germany, the UK, and the US. The results are
very consistent with a “constant flux” scenario in Germany, the UK,
and the US. In these countries we see no decline whatsoever in the im-
pact of origins on educational attainment across the cohorts—which
is to say, over a half century. . . . In contrast, there is a very significant
decline in the association in all three Scandinavian countries, and the
drop occurs primarily in the youngest cohort—the first to enjoy near-
universal participation in childcare.39
There is no straightforward way to measure opportunity, so social scientists

tend to infer from outcomes, such as earnings or income. If we find that a partic-
ular group fares worse than others, we suspect a barrier to opportunity. It isn’t
ironclad proof, but it’s the best we can do. To assess equality of opportunity
among people from different family backgrounds, a common indicator is rela-
tive intergenerational mobility—a person’s position on the earnings ladder rela-
tive to her or his parents’ position.40 If most people end up in a position similar
to that of their parents, opportunity probably isn’t very equal.
The vertical axis in Figure 2.13 shows the correlation between the relative
position of fathers in the earnings distribution and the relative position of their
sons at a similar point in the life course. Smaller numbers, which are higher on
the axis, indicate a weaker correlation, or greater intergenerational mobility;
this suggests that children’s earnings aren’t determined by the earnings of their
parents, which implies greater equality of opportunity. The horizontal axis in
the figure shows public expenditures on early education. There is a positive
.1
*Den*
Intergenerational mobility
*Swe*
Asl Ger *Nor*
Can UK *Fin*
Fr
US It
.5
0 1.5%
Early education
Figure 2.13 Early education and intergenerational mobility. Intergenerational

mobility: correlation between the earnings of parents and those of their children, with axis values
reversed. Data source: John Ermisch et al., eds., From Parents to Children, Russell Sage Foundation,
2012, figure 2.1. Early education: expenditures as a share of GDP. 1980–1995. Data source: OECD,
Social Expenditures Database. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries. “Asl” is Australia. The line
is a linear regression line. The correlation is +.60.
association across the countries: those spending more on early education tend
to have greater intergenerational mobility.
We can think of opportunity as individuals’ capability to choose, act, and
accomplish—what Isaiah Berlin called “positive liberty” and Amartya Sen has
labeled “real freedom.”41 While critics of big government tend to assume that
public social programs reduce freedom, many of these programs are capability-
enhancing. They boost people’s cognitive and noncognitive skills, increase their
employment options, ensure that hard times do minimal damage, and reduce
dependence on family and friends. More than a century ago, John Stuart Mill
recognized that true freedom to lead the kind of life we want requires education,
health, and economic security.42 More recently, Anu Partanen has highlighted
this point in a comparison of her native Finland with her adopted country, the
United States. Observing that many Americans don’t have access to high quality,
affordable health insurance, childcare, housing in good school districts, college,
and eldercare, Partanen notes that this diminishes not only Americans’ eco-
nomic security but also their freedom:
Most people, including myself, assumed that part of what made the
United States a great country, and such an exceptional one, was that
you could live your life relatively unencumbered by the downside of
a traditional, old-fashioned society: dependency on the people you
happened to be stuck with. In America you had the liberty to express

your individuality and choose your own community. This would allow
you to interact with family, neighbors, and fellow citizens on the basis
of who you were, rather than on what you were obligated to do or ex-
pected to be according to old-fashioned thinking. The longer I lived in
America . . . the more puzzled I grew. For it was exactly those key benefits
of modernity—freedom, personal independence, and opportunity—
that seemed, from my outsider’s perspective, in a thousand small ways
to be surprisingly missing from American life today. . . . In order to
compete and to survive, the Americans I encountered and read about
were . . . beholden to their spouses, parents, children, colleagues, and
bosses in ways that constrained their own liberty.43
Here too we have no direct measure. A useful indirect measure comes from a
question asked by the Gallup World Poll: “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with
your freedom to choose what you do with your life?” We can treat the share
responding “satisfied” as an indicator of equality of opportunity, of the degree
to which capabilities extend widely across the population. This share is on the
vertical axis of Figure 2.14, with public insurance expenditures on the horizontal
axis. The pattern across countries is consistent with the hypothesis that an ex-
pansive and generous welfare state expands opportunity.
95% *Nor* *Den*

Can
Swi *Fin* *Swe*
Freedom to make life choices
Asl NZ
Ire Nth Aus
Bel
Ger
USUK Fr
Ja
Por
Sp
63 Kor It
11 26%
Public insurance
Figure 2.14 Public insurance and freedom to make life choices. Freedom to make life
choices: share responding “satisfied” to the question “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your
freedom to choose what you do with your life?” Average over 2005–2016. Data source: Gallup
World Poll, via the World Happiness Report 2017, online appendix. Public insurance: see Figure 2.1.
The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries. “Asl” is Australia; “Aus” is Austria. The line is a linear
regression line. The correlation is +.46.
Employment also should help to equalize opportunity. Where individuals

from poor backgrounds have a better chance to get a foothold in the labor
market, their disadvantage stemming from parents, school quality, connections,
and related factors matters less. Figures 2.15 and 2.16 show that employment
rates are correlated with greater intergenerational earnings mobility and with
more people feeling satisfied with their freedom to make life choices.
.1
*Den*
Intergenerational mobility
Ger *Swe*
*Nor*
Asl
*Fin*
Can
UK
Fr
It US
.5
62 81%
Employment
Figure 2.15 Employment and intergenerational mobility. Intergenerational mobility: see

Figure 2.13. Employment: see Figure 2.8. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries. “Asl” is
Australia. The line is a linear regression line. The correlation is +.68.
95%
*Fin* *Den**Nor*
Freedom to make life choices
AslCan NZ *Swe*
Swi
Aus Nth
Ire
Bel
GerUK
Fr US
Sp Por Ja
63 It Kor
63 82%
Employment
Figure 2.16 Employment and freedom to make life choices. Freedom to make life
choices: see Figure 2.14. Employment: see Figure 2.8. The asterisks highlight the Nordic countries.
“Asl” is Australia; “Aus” is Austria. The line is a linear regression line. The correlation is +.68.
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superiority in face and figure. The features of many might almost
have been called delicate and refined; and it was so, strange to say,
even when very perceptible traces of the African nose and lips
remained, and these still surmounted with the African wool. I
understood that this was also to a great extent the case where a
Spaniard was the father. The reason of this difference I believe to be
a very obvious one, that Frenchmen and Spaniards, having much
smaller bones than the Northern nations, are better able on that
account to correct, in their mixed descendants, the grossness of the
physiognomy and figure of the African. The German half-breeds are
still more unattractive than the Anglo-Saxon; the Scandinavian are
worse; but the worst of all are those whose long-headed and high
cheek-boned fathers come from the north of the Tweed.
No one without having seen the thing himself—
and the jolting will impress it on his memory—can The Best Road
form any proper conception of the holes, the mud, in the World.
and the pools of water which not unfrequently
constitute what is called in America a road. At Augusta I had seen
axles disappear in the main streets. But the most advanced
specimen of this kind of means of communication I ever passed
over, was in going to the station of the Mississippi and Tennessee
railway at New Orleans. I could not see or hear that any attempt had
ever been made to form a road. The traffic was great, and was of
course confined by the houses to a narrow street. It was a natural
swamp, and there had been lately a great deal of rain. My reflections
on coming at last to the station were, that American horses were
wonderful animals, and that in nothing did the Americans themselves
show their inventive powers so triumphantly as in constructing
carriages which could carry heavy loads day after day through such
difficulties;—I do not say through such roads, because there was
nothing but a collection of the hindrances to travelling which a road is
made to remedy.
This is a subject on which the Americans themselves are very
tolerant and easily satisfied. ‘Sir,’ said a gentleman to me, on the top
of Wells and Fargo’s coach, as we were passing over the Plains to
Denver, ‘Sir, this is the finest piece of road in the world.’ As nothing
had been said previously about roads, and as what we were passing
along was merely a freight-track on the dry prairie, four inches deep
in dust and sand and earth in fine weather, and as many or more
inches deep in mud in wet weather, I intimated that I believed I had
not heard rightly his remark. He then repeated his assertion even
more emphatically than at first, ‘that it was the best piece of road in
the world.’ I was beginning to explain to him, as courteously as I
could, why I should hardly have ventured to call it a road at all, when
he stopped me short with, ‘Sir, we have no faith in European
practices. I am a judge of roads. I have seen all kinds of roads; and I
have seen roads in all kinds of places; and this is just what I said it
was, the finest piece of road in the world.’ Over this model road,
sometimes with six good horses, never with less than four, we were
able to manage about six miles an hour.
The railroad from New Orleans, for the first mile or two, lies
through a most dreary dismal swamp. The water stands everywhere.
The palmetto and the swamp cedar grow out of the water. The trees
are completely shrouded with the grey Spanish moss. The trees and
the moss look as if they had long been dead. One who enters the
city by this approach (had ever any other great city such an
approach?) must carry with him some not very encouraging
thoughts. Whenever in the summer or autumn the wind blows from
this direction, I suppose it will remind him of the yellow fever, the
horrible scourge of the place.
The swamp I just mentioned is succeeded by
sugar plantations, the costly machinery of which A Prayer for a
had been destroyed during the war. They now Brother Minister.
appeared to be used as grazing farms for cattle
brought up from Texas. On one of these ruined plantations I saw
some hedges of the Cherokee rose. This is an evergreen, and
makes too wide a hedge, though its height may be an advantage in
that climate. It is a common opinion in New Orleans that all these
sugar plantations will eventually be re-established; but that this will
never be done by the present proprietors, who are all ruined, and
who will have to sell the land at a merely nominal price, which is all
that the land without the machinery is worth. Those who will buy the
land will be companies, or Northern men who will have capital
enough to purchase new machinery, and to pay the heavy costs of
carrying on the cultivation of the cane and manufacture of the sugar.
Americans are very careful not to give offence in what they say to
others. An American bishop remarked to me that the only exception
to this rule was to be found among ministers of religion, and among
them only in their prayers. He mentioned, as an instance, something
that had occurred at a public meeting at which he had himself been
present. A minister had opened the proceedings with prayer. He was
followed by a rival preacher. The latter, after dwelling for some time
on general topics, at last came up to his opponent in the following
way: he prayed that the gifts of the Spirit might be poured out on all
his brethren in the ministry abundantly, and then added, ‘and on
behalf of our brother whose words we have just heard, we offer this
special supplication, that his heart may become as soft as his head.’
CHAPTER X.
MY ONLY DELAY ON AN AMERICAN RAILWAY—NO CONCEALING
ONE’S NATIONALITY—RAILWAY COW-PLOUGH—PISTOLS—
MEMPHIS—EMIGRATION FROM THE SOUTH DEPRECATED—
TRUE METHOD OF RESUSCITATION—THE MINISTER’S STUDY—
CONVERSATION WITH TWO MINISTERS—INVITATION TO ‘GO TO
CHURCH’ 150 MILES OFF—LUXURY DOES NOT SAP THE
MILITARY SPIRIT—MRS. READ—ENTRY INTO EDEN—SHARE A
BED-ROOM WITH A CALIFORNIAN—HOW CALIFORNIA WAS
CIVILISED—HOW A SITE UPON THE SWAMP WAS CREATED FOR
CAIRO—DECLINE THE FOURTH PART OF A BED-ROOM AT ODIN
—‘BE GOOD TO YOURSELF.’
One hears a great deal of accidents on American railways, and they
certainly appear to be very frequent, and often to be most fearful. It
is not an uncommon consequence of a railway accident in winter that
a great part of the passengers are burnt to death. This arises from
the fact that an American railway car is a long box containing
between fifty and sixty people, generally with a red-hot stove in
winter at each end, and without any possible means of egress
except by the doors at each end. The natural issue of this is that
when an accident takes place, the carriages are forced close
together, the doors are thus shut, and the stoves being overturned,
or the crushed-in ends of the carriages brought in contact with them,
the train is in a few minutes in flames. But as the Americans have
more than thirty-eight thousand miles of railway at work, which is
more than three times as much as we have in the United Kingdom,
they are entitled to a good many accidents. My own experience, but
it is limited to eight thousand miles, is in favour of the safety of
American railway travelling. No train I was in ever met with an
accident. The only delay I ever had to submit to was caused by a
luggage train ahead having crushed a rail. And this delay of four
hours was not altogether wasted time, for besides giving one an
opportunity for taking a little walk in an American forest, it was the
cause of one’s hearing the following piece of wisdom: ‘There are two
things a man ought to bear well: what he can help, and what he
cannot help;’ and the following specimen of infantile Transatlantic
English: ‘Mother! Fix me good. Fix me good.’ The first came from a
gentleman ‘on board’ the train, whom his friends called General, and
was addressed to some impatient passengers. The latter came from
a little sobbing child of two or three years of age, who wanted to be
placed in an easier position.
In my tour throughout the greater part of the
Union I was never mistaken for a native. On some No Concealing
occasions, before I had spoken a word I was One’s
addressed as an Englishman. I could not imagine Nationality.
what it was that revealed my nationality. Was it my
dress? or the look of my luggage? or was it my manner? It once
happened—it was between Gordonsville and Richmond—that a
gentleman in the train even went still further, by divining at a glance
not only my nationality, but also that I was a clergyman; for he
began, ‘I suppose, sir, I am addressing an English clergyman.’ I was
puzzled, and could only be certain that it was not my dress that had
enabled him to make the discovery. The single point at which their
sagacity was ever at fault, appeared to be the motive which had
induced me to undertake so long a journey (of course I am only
speaking of the persons one casually meets in a railway car). In the
South, and up the Mississippi, I frequently heard the supposition that
I had come across the water to establish some kind of business. I
was supposed on the prairies to be speculating in land; in the Rocky
Mountains to have an eye to gold mining. But to go back to the
original point. I was once told what it was that had betrayed me on
that particular occasion, and to that particular gentleman. He had
taken his seat at the same breakfast table as myself, at the Gayoso
Hotel, at Memphis. We had not been talking together long, when he
announced to me that I was an Englishman, and how he had made
the discovery. ‘Sir,’ he said, ‘it is impossible for a foreigner to escape
detection in this country. His speech always betrays him. There is a
harshness and a coarseness in foreign tones which an American
instantly observes, because Americans themselves all speak with
soft and musical intonations; it is natural to them.’
The railway cow-catcher, of which we used to
see frequent mention in books of American travel, Memphis.
appears now to have been superseded by another
contrivance with a different form; for in the United States nothing
remains long in one form. The new form resembles that of the snow-
plough, and it must act by partially lifting what it comes in contact
with, and then throwing it off to the right or left, as it may happen.
This cow-plough, though evidently superior to any contrivance for
picking up or catching the cow, does not always do its work. Not far
from the town of Jackson, we came up with one of these poor
animals that happened to be lying on the rails. On this occasion the
plough went over it, and so did the first two or three carriages; till at
last the unhappy brute got fast fixed among the springs and wheels
of the car I was in. The train was stopped, and the cow taken out,
which, though horribly mangled, proved to be still alive. The
conductor called out for the loan of a pistol to enable him to put it out
of its misery. In an instant almost from every window on that side the
train a hand was extended offering the desired instrument. On my
making some observation on the number of pistols that were
forthcoming ready loaded, at a moment’s notice, the gentleman
seated next to me replied, ‘that it was quite possible that I was the
only man unarmed in the train. That formerly in that part of the
country many people carried revolvers, but that now, from
apprehension of the blacks, in consequence of the frequent
robberies committed by them, no one ever thought of moving without
his six-shooter.’
Memphis is on a bluff of the Mississippi. How strange does this
juxtaposition of the names of hoar antiquity and of yesterday sound
in the ears of a European! And it will also seem strange to many that
this city, whose name they had never heard mentioned, except as
being that of a great city of the Pharaohs, has already a population
of 84,000 inhabitants, and is so well situated that it is destined to
become, under the reign of freedom, one of the largest of the
second-class cities of the Union. A bluff is a river-cliff. It may be
either an old and abandoned one (many miles of such bluffs are to
be seen in the valley of the Platte, at considerable distances from the
existing channel of the river), or it may be one at the foot of which
the stream still runs. To the latter class belongs the bluff on which
Memphis is built. It is of a soft sand, and large spaces of it have
been escarped and graded between the city and the water’s edge, in
such a manner as to enable the traffic to be carried on easily. A great
many cotton bales were standing ready for shipment on the great
river steamers. As these bales were spread out over the quays,
occupying in this way much space, they suggested the idea of a
great deal of traffic. One might perhaps have counted a thousand of
them. But then I remembered that the whole of them would be but a
very sorry cargo for one of the enormous steamers, the General
Robert Lee, or the General Putman, on board of which I had lately
been, and which were the largest vessels, excepting the Great
Eastern, I had ever seen. They had stowage, I understood, for three
thousand bales, and yet as you looked through their gilded and
splendidly furnished saloons, 180 yards in length, and saw how great
was the number of sleeping berths they contained, you would have
supposed they were constructed for passengers only.
In this most modern city with most ancient name,
there were many fine shops and good buildings, Emigration
but little that was continuously good; unoccupied Deprecated.
spaces, or spaces occupied only with poor wooden
tenements, were everywhere interposed. The streets were generally
totally uncared for. This unsightliness and neglect are to be set down
to the past, and not to the present state of things. They are some of
the legacies of slavery.
I found that from Memphis, as from many other places in the
South, a considerable emigration was going on. While I was there
names of intending emigrants were being collected for a settlement
in British Honduras: this however, I believe, was abandoned on
account of the unsuitableness of the climate for white labour. As in
their own State of Tennessee there is so much good land, and so
delightful a climate, it could have been political reasons only that
prompted this thought of leaving their country. For such persons
Brazil appears just now one of the most favourable fields for
commencing life anew; as the government is there offering, at a
merely nominal price, in the hills in the neighbourhood of the capital,
land well suited for coffee plantations, and where the climate is such
as to admit of European labour. This has been done with the
especial view of attracting some part of the emigration from the
Southern States. No friend, however, of the unhappy people of the
South would advise them to accept any offers of the kind. How much
more manly would it be, and how much better would it be financially
for themselves, and morally for their children and descendants, if
they are prepared to labour with their own hands, to do so in their
own country, and remain a part of the great Anglo-Saxon race, with
all its rich inheritance of laws, literature, and traditions, than to cast in
their lot with mongrel Portuguese and Africans!
Among the letters of introduction I carried with me to Memphis was
one to the President of the Memphis and Ohio railway. He had just
returned from a short stay at the Hot Springs Mountain in Arkansas.
He is one of those gentlemen who are doing everything in their
power to resuscitate the South by persuading the people to turn their
attention to the varied and inexhaustible resources they possess
within their own territories. As instances of this he showed me two
specimens; one of a creamy white stone he had lately brought from
the Hot Springs Mountain in Arkansas, and which could cut steel as
readily as a file does soft iron. Of this stone he was having hones
and grindstones made, which would probably be the best things of
their kind anywhere to be had. The other specimen he showed me
was that of iron ore from the Iron Mountain in Alabama. It looked
almost like the metal itself. He said it contained sixty per cent. of
iron, and that the Confederates had made use of it in the late war.
This mountain is sixty miles north of Montgomery, and there is in its
neighbourhood plenty of limestone, and of coal. For this district he
expected (as who would not?) a great future; for not only is the
consumption of iron in agriculture every year increasing, in the form
of new machinery as well as tools, of which the South now stands
greatly in need, but the place itself, from its contiguity to several
large navigable streams, is admirably situated for a great
manufacturing centre.
It is the custom in the American Church for the clergyman of the
parish to spend a great part of every morning in a room annexed to
his church. I always found this room fitted up as his
library and study, with a fire in winter blazing on the A Conversation
hearth, and the minister himself seated at the table with Two
at work. This arrangement has great advantages Ministers.
both for the clergyman and for his parishioners. He
can study, and prepare for his pulpit, without any interruptions from
his children, or from the ever-recurring little incidents of domestic
affairs, to which, had he been in his own house, he would have been
expected to give some attention; and his parishioners are more likely
to call upon him in this room, knowing that he is there for the very
purpose of seeing them, and that they shall not be disturbing anyone
by their visit.
Having been requested to call on a clergyman of the place, I found
him in such a room as I have just been describing, in company with
another clergyman of the neighbourhood. Of course the conversation
turned on church affairs. They told me that there were five Episcopal
churches in the city; that the Episcopal church was not so active in
the States of Mississippi and Louisiana as elsewhere in the Union.
That the church of Rome was, in that part of the country, looking very
far ahead, and buying large tracts of land, and founding educational
establishments; that the Germans and Irish did not leave its
communion. That church partisanship was a strong feeling in
America; to take for instance our own church, there were everywhere
men who were not members, that is communicants, but yet
considered themselves as belonging to the Episcopal church, who
would fight for every stitch in the surplice, and every letter in the
Prayer-book. And that it was so in all the other churches. Much
interest, they said, was taken in the ritualistic question, because it
was becoming generally felt that our service is deficient in appeals to
the senses; and that it wants variety and animation. That in the
American church, though there is no canon forbidding ex tempore
preaching, there is one which imposes on the clergyman the
necessity of writing every sermon he preaches. The object of this
canon is to enable the bishop to judge of the orthodoxy of any
statements in the sermon with which the congregation may have
been dissatisfied. This was thought necessary in consequence of the
sensitiveness of some congregations, and the tendency in all
American churches to lapse into some ‘ism’ or ‘ology.’ They told me
that in some of the nascent States, as for instance in Idaho, the
church was stronger than any other religious body. In this territory (I
believe it is still in that embryonic condition), there is not a town or
village without an Episcopal church. This has been brought about by
sending out missionary bishops to plant the church in these new
territories. The missionary bishop of Idaho, Dr. Clarkson, is one of
the most active and successful of this new order. As this plan has
succeeded so well, it is much to be regretted that it was not
attempted long ago.
Americans are great travellers. It almost appears
as if there was something in the air of America Going to Church
which makes one think lightly of distances, 150 Miles off.
however great. I heard a lady at Washington
talking of starting in a few days for California—a journey of more
than five thousand miles—as if it involved no more than a journey
from London to Edinburgh. I met another lady at a dinner table at
New Orleans who had only that day arrived from New York, a
distance of nearly fifteen hundred miles; and I entered Denver with
two ladies who had been travelling continuously for about two
thousand miles each—one from some New England town, and the
other from New York. But I was never made so sensible of an
American’s disregard of distance, and of the slightness of the
provocation needed for inducing him to undertake a journey, as I was
by an invitation I received from a gentleman to accompany him one
hundred and fifty miles out, and of course as many back, merely to
hear a preacher he thought well of, and who he understood would be
only at that distance from Memphis on Sunday. Now this gentleman
was a lawyer who had come all the distance from Detroit to
Memphis, on the previous day, on some matter of business, and
would have to start on his return on Monday evening; and this was
the way in which he spent the Sunday that intervened between two
such long journeys, adding three hundred miles to what anyone but
an American would have thought was already a great deal too much
travelling.
It is a commonly received opinion, though perhaps more largely
entertained by authors than by their readers, that the ever-increasing
luxury of the present day has done much to weaken the warlike
virtues. This opinion, I believe, is exactly the opposite of the truth,
and is merely the echo of the opinion of those writers of ancient
Rome who made and bequeathed to us a thoroughly mistaken
diagnosis of the diseases and symptoms of the body politic of their
own decaying empire. Our own late wars, but above everything of
the kind in modern or ancient times, the late great American war,
show how entirely false is this opinion. Never was a war before
carried on upon so great a scale, in proportion to the population of
the communities engaged in it; never was a war more deadly; and
never before was a war so thoroughly voluntary in the cases of so
large a majority of the common rank and file of the combatants. The
history of the 7th New York Volunteers, a regiment of gentlemen who
went out, at the beginning of the war, of their own free will, and went
through the whole of it with all its hardships, sufferings, and
deadliness, would alone disprove this opinion. The hundreds of
thousands of men who in the North left their countinghouses, their
farms, and their drawing-rooms, to risk health, and limb, and life for
an idea, are just so many hundreds of thousands of arguments
against it. And in some respects the argument from the South is still
stronger, for there a still larger proportion of the people went to
greater hardships, more cruel wants and sufferings, and to a deadlier
warfare, inasmuch as the same regiments had more frequently to
meet the enemy. In every family I visited in the South I heard tales of
suffering and of heroism. I will only repeat one, because it shows
what a lady even can do and bear in these luxurious times. A Mrs.
Read, while assisting her husband at the siege of Vicksburg, had her
right arm so shattered by a shell that immediate amputation was
necessary. It was during the night, but she would not have anyone
called off from other work to do for her what she was still capable of
doing for herself; she therefore held with her left hand the lamp
which lighted the surgeon to amputate her shattered right arm.
I arrived at Cairo by steamer at three o’clock in
the morning. It was a dark and gusty winter night. Eden.
The rain was falling heavily. At the landing place
there was not a light, not a conveyance, not a porter, not a negro
even to direct us the way to the hotel. Self-help was the only kind of
help any of the passengers got that night. As I scrambled up the
slippery Levee, and then waded through the mud to the hotel distant
about a quarter of a mile, I congratulated myself on my having sent
on all my heavy luggage in advance, so that I had nothing with me
but a hat-box and a hand-bag. But these impediments were more
than enough for the occasion. As I struggled on I thought that if the
author of ‘Martin Chuzzlewit,’ who was then giving readings in
America, should revisit his Eden under such circumstances, he
would not feel dissatisfied with the kind of immortality he had
conferred upon it.
The stream of passengers at last reached the hotel. There was no
want of light here. This had been our beacon, and we felt that we
had made the harbour. It was a large red-brick building, with a large
hall, and a large stove, red-hot, in the midst of it. I went straight to
the clerk’s counter, and entered my name in the folio guests’-book. I
was among the first to do this, that I might secure a good room. No
sooner, however, had I gone through this preliminary than the
manager turned to me, and announced that the house could not
allow me a room to myself that night, but that I must take one jointly
with the gentleman who had registered his name before me. I hardly
took in the speaker’s meaning, for this was the first occasion of my
life when the idea of occupying a bed-room with another man had
been suggested to me. I suppose I was so taken by surprise that I
remained silent when I ought to have spoken, for I was next
addressed by the gentleman himself with whom it was proposed I
should share the bed-room. ‘Well, sir,’ he said, ‘what do you intend to
do? It is now past three; and if you don’t accept this gentleman’s
offer, you will have to go out again into the street.’ Having said this
he took the key from the clerk, and turning to an attendant, told him
to show the way to the room. I rather followed than accompanied
him, thinking over, as I went along, what I had read of Cairo when,
fifteen or twenty years ago, it was a nest of rowdies, robbers,
gamblers, and cut-throats, floating upon a fever-and-ague-haunted
swamp. I began to be somewhat reassured by the appearance and
bearing of my companion. He was a clean-limbed and remarkably
handsome man, apparently turned of forty. His moustache and beard
were trimmed in the French style, and his bearing was frank and
soldierly. On the other side, however, I observed that he had no
luggage whatever. At last the door was reached and opened. The
attendant entered to light the gas. While he was doing this my
companion crossed the room. In crossing it he took off his coat, and
kicked off his boots, and walked ‘slick’ into bed. This was done
quietly and deliberately, but in less time than it took to light the gas. I
felt that I was becoming uncertain as to the reality of things. Was I at
Drury Lane, looking on at the transformations of a pantomime? or
was I dreaming that I was at Cairo?
As the balance of probability did not appear to
be in favour of either of these suppositions, I took A Bed-room
off my boots, and placed them on the outside of Companion.
the door. As I closed the door a voice came to me
from the bed at the further side of the room. Its tone was manly and
friendly: ‘Sir,’ it said, ‘if that is the only pair of boots you have with
you’ (it was so; for I had sent my luggage on to St. Louis), ‘I would
advise you to keep them inside the room, and have them cleaned on
your feet in the morning. The last time I was here I put mine outside
the door, and never saw them again; and so I had to go barefooted
till I could get another pair.’ I thanked the speaker for his advice, and
acted upon it. My next care was to provide for the safety of my watch
and pocket-book, which contained three hundred dollars in
greenbacks. This I did by putting them into the pocket where I had
my handkerchief, which I then took out of my pocket, as if there was
nothing in it (but the watch and pocket-book were in it), and placed it
under my pillow. I have no doubt but that my companion saw through
what I was doing, for he now addressed me a second time. ‘Before
you go to sleep, I suppose you would like to know who is in the room
with you; and yet I hardly know how to describe myself. For the last
four or five years I have been on this side the mountains. For the
fifteen years before that I had been in California; and I began life in
the old States as a lawyer. In the early days of California, I went out
as one of a company for digging and mining. There were seven of
us, and five of the seven were lawyers. I came over the mountains to
help the North in putting down the rebellion. I made a great heap of
money in California, and I have lost a great heap in bad speculations
since I have been over here. But I have got a scheme on its legs by
which I hope to make again as much as I have lost. That, sir, is what
I am—and I wish you good night. My name is——’ I could not catch
the word, but I afterwards ascertained it, and found that my first bed-
room companion added modesty to his other merits, and had not told
me how great a man he was in his own State.
It happened the next day that no train started for the North till half-
past four in the afternoon; and as the rain of the previous night had
turned to heavy driving sleet, I congratulated myself on the accident,
although it appeared so disagreeable at the time, to which I was
indebted for the acquaintance of the Californian. He had known
California, he said, from the first influx of gold hunters. The rogues
and desperadoes of all that part of the world were collected there;
but there was some good stuff that came in at the same time.
Society would have been completely turned upside down, and no
decent man could have remained in the place, if it had not been for
Lynch law and the use of the pistol. These two things set everything
quite right in five years, in a way in which no other kind of law,
supported by all the churches and all the teachers in the world, could
have done it in fifty years. And now the State is as orderly a
community as there is on the face of the earth. After the roughness
of many years of Californian life, in the early days of the State, he
found the hardships of the late war mere bagatelles. The war
seemed to him only like an exciting pastime.
The capacity of Eden, for offering a field for such
talents as those of Mr. Mark Tapley, was very much How the Site of
diminished during the late war; for being at the Eden was
junction of the Ohio with the Mississippi (the Ohio Created.
itself, not far above this point, is joined by three
large streams), it became a very important military station. But it was
necessary to create a site for a town, for the locality itself supplied
nothing of the kind. This was done by raising a levee, forty feet high,
and then, behind this, making streets in the form of embankments at
right angles to the levee, these streets again being intersected by
other embankments parallel to the levee. The whole space that was
reclaimed was thus divided by these embankments into hollow
squares, each of which is intended for a block of buildings. At
present very few of these blocks have been raised, but the streets—
that is, the embankments, with in some instances planked trottoirs at
their sides—are finished. If the water should ever rise up through the
ground, or the storm-water flow into the cellars and underground
parts of the houses, it will be necessary to pump it out, for there can
be no drainage in such a place. So in America, where no difficulties
are recognised, are towns built in swamps.
One cannot help speculating on what will be the amount of
inducement required for getting people to try to live and carry on
business at this city in the swamp, for the fact that the traffic of the
valleys of the Ohio and Mississippi join and diverge here will ensure
its becoming rich and populous. And what will be the manners and
customs of the place? Will it be merely that people living here will
call for more whisky toddy and sherry cobblers, smoke more cigars,
and play more games of billiards than they would elsewhere? How
far will the beneficent railway go towards redressing the
wretchedness of the place by carrying off, for the night, for Sundays,
and for holidays, all who might wish to have their homes on terra
firma? Democracies are stingy and do not build beautiful cities in
these days; so, however rich it may become, it is not likely ever to
become a Venice.
The train in which I had left Cairo reached a place called Odin at
eleven o’clock at night. We had to wait here for a St. Louis train till
the next morning. This is an instance of what is called, in American
railway phraseology, ‘making bad connexions.’ The gentleman who
registered after me at the chief hotel at Odin happened to be my
Californian acquaintance. Having entered his name, he said to the
manager, pointing to me, ‘This gentleman and I will have the same
bed-room.’ This was meant as a compliment; and I did not now feel
as disinclined to the proposal, particularly as it came from him, as I
had been a few nights before. The clerk, however, told him that the
house was full, and that I was the last person he could
accommodate. I was, upon this, shown to my bed-room, which
turned out to be only the fourth part of a very small apartment
containing four beds, three of which were already tenanted. My
English inexperience and prejudices were still too strong for this, so I
sallied out in search of another hotel. While thus occupied I had time
to reflect, that there is not much more harm in spending the night in a
room with three others, than in spending the day in a railway car with
thirty or forty others. At last, chance conducted me to the same
house the Californian had already reached; and we sat by the stove
in the drawing-room, talking together till the small hours of the
morning. There is an unconventional kind of frankness and
manliness that is very pleasing in these Western men, who have
gone through a great deal of rough life and hardship, and have
never, for years together, been out of danger from Indians, or
desperate white men, as sanguinary as Indians, and as little troubled
with scruples.
For the words’ sake I ‘made a note’ of a parting
expression I heard used by a rough-looking and ill- Be Good to
clad ostler, who it appeared was not very Yourself.
comfortably assured of his friend’s motives for
leaving him to go to one of the most rowdy places in the Union. His
friend had taken his place on the roof of the coach, which was in the
act of starting, when he waved his hand to him, saying at the same
time with an enviable neatness, that conveyed both his kindly
feelings and his misgivings, ‘Tom, be good to yourself.’
CHAPTER XI
MISSISSIPPI FROZEN OVER AT ST. LOUIS—WHY THE BRIDGE AT
ST. LOUIS IS BUILT BY CHICAGO MEN—GENERAL SHERMAN—
IDEAS ABOUT EDUCATION AT ST. LOUIS—LIBERAL BEQUESTS
FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES—HOW NEW ENGLANDISM
LEAVENS THE WHOLE LUMP—THE GERMAN INVASION WILL
NOT GERMANISE AMERICA—ST. LOUIS—ITS RAPID GROWTH—
ITS CHURCH ARCHITECTURE—AN IDEA ON MENTAL CULTURE
FROM THE WEST BANK OF THE MISSISSIPPI—A THOUGHT
SUGGESTED BY HEARING THE SKATERS ON THE MISSISSIPPI
TALKING ENGLISH.
On leaving Odin I saw the prairie for the first time. It was a sea of
rich level land, and was here everywhere under cultivation. Since I
had left Washington, I had not till now seen cultivation and houses
everywhere around me, as far as the eye could reach. After some
hours we came to undulating land where coal-mining was being
carried on. There were several pits alongside of the rail. The seam of
coal, I was told, is seven feet thick. At ten o’clock we reached East
St. Louis. Only a few days ago I had been among the oranges,
bananas, and sugar-canes; and now I looked upon the mighty
Mississippi, solidly frozen from shore to shore, and saw multitudes of
persons crossing and recrossing on the ice. So great is the range of
climate in this vast country, and yet, by the aid of steam, so near to
each other are the two extremes!
At St. Louis, the Mississippi is crossed by very
powerful steam ferries, and a passage across the An Advantage
river has for this purpose to be kept open and free of Youth.
from ice. The Bluff has been escarped to enable
vehicles to get down to the water-side. The crush and crowd were
very great, and to increase the difficulty of getting down, the face of
the descent was at that time coated thickly with ice. I saw two loaded
waggons capsize, and the coach I was in at one time began to slip,
and we were only saved by the skill of the driver. The ferry boat took
over more than a dozen coaches and waggons each trip, many of
them having four horses. The city of St. Louis is on the further or
western bank, and all the traffic of the city and of the vast region
beyond it crosses at this ferry. It will not, however, be needed much
longer, for the foundations are now being laid for a bridge, which, like
that at Niagara, will carry foot-passengers and all kinds of horse-
drawn vehicles, as well as the railway trains. It is a strange thing that
this bridge is being built, not by the people of St. Louis itself, but by
capital advanced by Chicago men. The reason is not far to seek. St.
Louis, regarded as a considerable place, is ten or fifteen years older
than Chicago. The moneyed men therefore at St. Louis are getting
into years, and so have become cautious, and indisposed to try new
investments. The Chicago men are still young: the enterprise of
youth in them is not yet exhausted; and so they are ready to
entertain, and even to accept, new ideas; and a proposal, however
grand, or novel, or costly it may be, is not on these accounts
appalling to them. In America, where everything is ever moving and
changing, an elderly man is unfit for business.
At St. Louis I became acquainted with General Sherman. I
mention this because it may be interesting to hear what were one’s
impressions of the man who conceived and executed one of the
boldest and most arduous military achievements of modern times—
that of marching his army down through the heart of the Southern
States to Charleston and Savannah. He is tall and thin, without an
ounce of flesh to spare. He gives you the idea of a man who is ready
at any moment to tax his mental and bodily powers to any amount
possible for human nature, and that they would respond to the
demands made upon them without flagging, only that his frame
would become more and more fleshless and wiry. If you had not
known that he was General Sherman, still you would have thought
him one of the kindliest and friendliest men you had ever met. His
first questions were, whether there was anything he could do for me?
any letters he could write for me to persons in St. Louis or Missouri?
any information on any subject that it was in his power to give me?
The letters of introduction he supplied me with he wrote with his own
hand. He interested himself about my intended excursion to the
Plains and Rocky Mountains, going over the route with me, and
advising me what to see and what to do, and bid me not to hesitate
about applying to him for anything I wanted that he could do for me.
His physiognomy agrees with his military life in indicating that he is a
man of unflinching determination. His first thought on undertaking
anything appears to be, as it was with our Iron Duke, to master
thoroughly all the details of the subject, to ascertain what will be
wanted down to the minutest particular, and to provide for
everything.
As the superintendent of schools at St. Louis, to
whom I had a letter from Washington, was Educational
confined to his house by illness, I took a letter from Ideas at St.
General Sherman to the president of an institution Louis.
at St. Louis that goes by the name of the
‘Washington University.’ It is not a university in our sense of the
word, but an institution for working connectedly the different
educational resources of the place, beginning with the elementary
schools, and passing up through grammar and high schools to a kind
of polytechnic institution, in which arts rather than sciences are
taught, the arts in truth being little more than the principles and
practice of different trades and occupations. This seems to us a low
view to take of education and of a university. But it is what is first
wanted in a new country, where every man has to work for his bread,
and everything has to be done. Higher culture is not for the existing,
but for future generations. So think the people who manage this
institution. And so think the people for whose benefit the institution
has been established, except that they have little or no idea at all, as
yet, of the ‘higher culture.’ They are beginning to be intolerant even
of the time and money spent in teaching law and medicine, and of
the position assigned to lawyers and physicians. It was in this spirit
that a gentleman said to me, on the prairie between Chicago and
Omaha, ‘What we want, sir, in this great country, is fewer graduates
of law and medicine, and more graduates of the machine shop and
agricultural college.’
This Washington University has had 800,000 dollars presented
and bequeathed to it by citizens of St. Louis in the last eleven years;
and as the war, and the collapse that followed the war, cover more
than half of this period, the sum appears very considerable. This is in
the spirit, and it is a very common spirit in America, of the times
when our own colleges and schools were founded.
The president told me that he came from New England to settle at
St. Louis thirty years ago. He rode all the way. At that time the
country was so little settled that he would ride by compass a whole
day without seeing a log hut or a human being. He brought with him
to St. Louis the ideas and the traditions of New England. His son
had, following the example of his father, moved on westward. He had
crossed the mountains and settled in Oregon, on the Pacific coast.
His son had been brought up at St. Louis in the ideas and traditions
of New England, and had taken them with him. In this way it is that
the New England element, which is a distinct character, is kept up
and propagated throughout the whole West. Other emigrants bring
with them nothing of so tough and perdurable a nature; New
Englandism therefore must spread till it has leavened the whole
lump.
In the West one is frequently confronted by the
question, What will be the effect on the Americans America will not
of the future of the vast hordes of Germans which be Germanised.
yearly invade and settle in the country? Whole
districts are occupied by them, beginning in Pennsylvania, to the
exclusion of the English language. In the Western towns you will see
street after street in which half, or more than half, the names are
German. They have their own hotels, their own newspapers, their
own theatres. It seems a greater invasion than that of the Roman
Empire by their fathers. That overthrew the empire, and for a time
disorganised society; it, however, did not extend the language of the
Fatherland into Italy, Spain, or France. But here is a continuous
stream of between 200,000 and 300,000, every year coming, not
with sword and torch to slay and to burn, or to perish themselves, but
with the axe and the plough to clear away the forest, and to cultivate
the soil. Every one that comes is taken up into that entity which will
be the America of the future. What then will be the effect? Many
Americans fear that it will not be good. ‘Because,’ say they, ‘the
Germans are deficient in spirituality.’ That is the word they use. ‘They

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Social Democratic Capitalism Lane

Would Democratic Socialism Be Better? Lane Kenworthy

Interrupting Capitalism: Catholic Social Thought and

Reckoning: Black Lives Matter and the democratic

Public Opinion: Democratic Ideals, Democratic Practice

Western Lane Chetna Maroo

Austerity from the Left. Social Democratic Parties in

Savage Little Games Lane Hart

The Digital Street Jeffrey Lane

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Lane Kenworthy 2020

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

The legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people

1. Sources of Successful Societies 1

PART 1 SOCIAL DEMOCR ATIC CAPITALISM

2. Social Democratic Capitalism and the Good Society 19

PART 2 SOCIAL DEMOCR ATIC AMERICA

Sources of Successful Societies

Affluence and Its Consequences

Old−age pension coverage

Public health expenditures

Figure 1.4 Affluence and public education expenditures. Public education

the group or community rather than that of the individual. A “postmaterialist”

9.3 Swe Swi Nor

Women have equal right to a job

Not very religious

These advances in freedom aren’t without cost. As people come to value

freedoms. Together, changes in material well-​being and in popular attitudes im-

9.5 Fin Den

Social Democratic Capitalism

Private provision of services should be welcomed, even embraced, but it is most

Social Democratic America

Social Democratic Capitalism and

Social democratic capitalism consists of political democracy plus capitalism plus

Social Democratic Capitalism

1. Democracy in the political sphere

Figure 2.1 Expansive, generous public insurance and employment-​oriented public

Modest economic regulation

Like pensions, sickness and related benefits were originally meant to

scope. In most European countries, sickness benefits today equal normal

Since then, employment promotion has become increasingly central to the

Have social democratic employment-​promotion policies succeeded? Figure

How to Identify Social Democratic

A Big Welfare State and High Employment

P10 household income

Figure 2.6 Public insurance and 10th-​percentile household income. 10th-​percentile

insurance expenditures as a share of GDP. (Here I subtract expenditures on

P10 household income

Figure 2.9 Employment and 10th-​percentile household income. 10th-​percentile household

I use the IALS [International Adult Literacy Survey] data to compare

There is no straightforward way to measure opportunity, so social scientists

Figure 2.13 Early education and intergenerational mobility. Intergenerational

happened to be stuck with. In America you had the liberty to express

95% *Nor* *Den*

Employment also should help to equalize opportunity. Where individuals

Figure 2.15 Employment and intergenerational mobility. Intergenerational mobility: see

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1. Sources of Successful Societies  1

2. Social Democratic Capitalism and the Good Society  19

freedoms. Together, changes in material well-being and in popular attitudes im-

Figure 2.1 Expansive, generous public insurance and employment-oriented public

Have social democratic employment-promotion policies succeeded? Figure

Figure 2.6 Public insurance and 10th-percentile household income. 10th-percentile

Figure 2.9 Employment and 10th-percentile household income. 10th-percentile household

95% Nor Den