Social Justification and Political Legitimacy: How Voters Rationalize Direct Democratic Economic Policy in America Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger

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Social Justification
and Political Legitimacy
How Voters Rationalize
Direct Democratic Economic
Policy in America
Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger
Social Justification and Political Legitimacy
Social Justification
and Political
Legitimacy
How Voters Rationalize Direct Democratic
Economic Policy in America
UCLouvain
Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
ISBN 978-3-030-51715-1 ISBN 978-3-030-51716-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
Portions of this book have been reproduced from my dissertation, as well as Vila-
Henninger 2017, 2018, 2019a, and 2019b.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
I would like to dedicate this book to those who supported and encouraged
me throughout this entire process. To name a few: Loretta Vila-Henninger,
Luis R. Vila-Henninger, Miguel Vila-Henninger, Rosario Rizzo Lara,
Terrence Hill, Harvey, Nazir Harb, Maitham Naeemi, Omar Harb,
Patrick Gahr, Chris Miller, Shanda Romans, Justin Knoll, the Qualidem
team, UCLouvain ISPOLE, the University of Arizona Graduate and
Professional Student Council, and the University of Arizona School of
Sociology—especially Heather Bremenstuhl, Jessie K. Finch, Kate Gunby,
and Sosuke Okada.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Jeff Sallaz, Jane Zavisca, Albert Bergesen,

Lane Kenworthy, Terrence Hill, Henry Walker, Jurgita Abromaviciute,
Corey Abramson, Jodi O’Brien, Mark Cohan, Louise Roth, Taylor
Danielson, Rosario Rizzo Lara, and anonymous reviewers for their feed-
back throughout the development of my dissertation and/or this book.
I would also like to thank all of my respondents, Gina Walsh, Eleanor
Stilson, Colleen Pignato, Rochelle Cox, Sherry Bao, Christine Scolinos,
Adrian Barbachan, The Arizona Department of Economic Security, and
B. Torres-Traylor for their contributions. Finally, I thank Virginie Van
Ingelgom, Claire Dupuy, Margherita Bussi, Cal Le Gall, Mauro Caprioli,
Damien Pennetreau, and Ferdinand Teuber for all of their support and
feedback—as well as for helping me to refine my qualitative research
skillset through our collaboration on qualitative secondary analysis with
Qualidem. This research was made possible in part by a grant from the
University of Arizona Graduate and Professional Student Council. Award
Reference Number RSRCH-505FY’15.
vii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Part I
2 Theory 27
3 Analytical Approach and Broader American Political

and Economic Discourses 65
4 Data and Methods 85
Part II
5 Proposition 201 (2008) 105
6 Proposition 202 (2008) 151
7 Proposition 204 (2012) 205
8 Moral Economies 251
ix
x CONTENTS
9 Conclusion and Theory Building 285
Index 327
List of Tables
Table 2.1 The functions of legitimation from contemporary

sociological literature 29
Table 4.1 Quasi-independent variable operational definitions 93
Table 4.2 Initial comparison groups with projected number of
respondents 97
Table 4.3 Achieved case set for the analysis in this book 97
Table 4.4 Unusable cases from project case set for analysis in this
book 98
Table 5.1 Proposition 201 (2008): expected Proposition 201
position by economic position/partisan affiliation
comparison group and percentage Proposition 201
support 115
Table 5.2 Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 201
(2008) 126
Table 5.3 Legitimations distinctive of partisan affiliation and DDEP
position alignment and opposition for Proposition 201
(2008) 128
Table 5.4 Legitimations exclusive to economic position and DDEP
(2008) 130
Table 5.5 Expected: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP
position for partisan affiliation and economic position for
Proposition 201 (2008) 132
xi
xii LIST OF TABLES
Table 5.6 Unexpected: legitimations exclusive to the unexpected

DDEP position for economic position and partisan
affiliation for Proposition 201 (2008) 134
Table 5.7 Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the
expected DDEP position for economic position and
unexpected DDEP position for partisan affiliation for
expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and
unexpected DDEP position for economic position for
Table 6.1 Expected Proposition 202 (2008) position by economic
position/partisan affiliation comparison groups and
percentage Proposition 202 support 164
(2008) 177
(2008) 179
(2008) 183
Table 7.1 Proposition 204 (2012): expected Proposition 204
position by economic position/partisan affiliation
comparison groups and percentage Proposition 204
support 216
(2012) 227
LIST OF TABLES xiii

(2012) 229
(2012) 232
(2008) 257
Table 8.2 Legitimations distinctive of DDEP position for
(2008) 262
(2012) 275
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Empirical Issue: Direct Democratic

Economic Policy (DDEP) Legitimation
The narrative around American politics in popular culture is that citizens
have rejected economic voting and are instead engaged in a culture war
(e.g., Frank 2004; Kirk 2020). In social scientific terms, the picture is
much more complex but in some ways analogous: rather than responding
out of self-interest to economic policy incentives (Downs 1957), Amer-
icans’ voting decisions are largely driven by group allegiances—such as
partisanship (for summaries see Young 2013; Achen and Bartels 2016;
Bailey 2019).
However, historically, the American voter has tended to vote for the
political party that passed economic policy that benefited those in his/her
economic position—thus making it appear as if voters were acting out of
self-interest in response to economic policy incentives (Stonecash 2000;
Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Bartels 2006; McCarty et al. 2006; Volscho
and Kelly 2012; Franko et al. 2013; Widestrom et al. 2018). In other
words, for decades, self-interest and partisanship have appeared to align to
predict—on average—Americans’ vote choices for presidential candidates
(for summaries see Bartels 2006; Gelman 2008). These findings have then
been confirmed by recent work (Geus 2019; Ladewig 2020).
Thus, the empirical findings suggest an interaction between the
economic model of voter self-interested response to economic policy
incentives (Downs 1957) and the model of voter partisan bias (Achen
© The Author(s) 2020 1

L. A. Vila-Henninger, Social Justification and Political Legitimacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8_1
2 L. A. VILA-HENNINGER
and Bartels 2016). This is supported by work in direct democracy, which

demonstrates that policy positions and partisanship can align (Colombo
and Kriesi 2017) and that conservative political identification often aligns
with pragmatic justifications (Colombo 2019). However, this flies in this
face of theory from neuroscience in which scholars posit that self-interest
and partisanship compete (Jenke and Huettel 2016).
This interaction seems not to apply to voting in the 2016 American
presidential election, which raises the question of if partisan bias and self-
interest indeed interact to affect voter reasoning. While scholars study this
question in terms of vote choice (Sears and Funk 1991; Bartels 2005;
Franko et al. 2013; Hersh and Nall 2016; Widestrom et al. 2018) and
political attitudes (Weeden and Grusky 2012; Dodson 2017), they have
yet to study if or how self-interest and partisanship interact to structure
voters’ political rationalizations.
Such rationalizations are important to understand because they are
a form of political legitimation—which is theorized to affect actors’
compliance or cooperation with political power and personal belief in
the legitimacy of policy and the American political system more broadly
(Weber 1978 [1922]: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963,
1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis
see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). However, despite being recognized as a
key element of the political legitimacy in liberal democracies (Lipset 1994:
10), voter legitimation has largely been overlooked.
In order to help tease out the role of economic incentives and self-
interest in voter legitimation, I use data from semi-structured interviews
with American voters about their positions on different economic policies
that contain both economic policy incentives and indicators of partisan
affiliation. To collect data on voter legitimations of their stances on
real economic policy for which they could have voted, I interviewed
respondents about actual economic referenda—which I refer to as direct
democratic economic policy (DDEP).
Direct democracy was first implemented in Switzerland in 1844 and
first adopted in America in 1898 as part of the Populist political agenda.
South Dakota, the first state to implement direct democracy, did so in
response to growing frustration over the control of key parts of the
economy by monopolies and the failure of the Republican controlled state
legislature to respond to the needs of farmers. While the first initiatives
passed in South Dakota dealt with a variety of issues, the most prominent
1 INTRODUCTION 3
concerned political reform and economic policy—including the regula-

tion of cars, banks, and alcohol (Piott 2003). Thus, since its inception
in American politics, DDEPs has been a key political tool for bypassing
the control of political and market elites in order to give citizens the
opportunity to shape important elements of state economic policy.
Over the past 40 years, voter say in the economy via DDEPs has had
serious consequences. In 1978, California residents voted for Proposition
13—which severely limited the ability of the state to collect real estate
taxes. This vote subsequently underfunded key municipalities, increased
tuition in Californian schools, and spurred the contemporary tax revolt in
American politics (Martin 2008).
Furthermore, as states wrestle with budget deficits, they give citizens
the choice to enact political reform via economic policy. For example, in
2012 Colorado residents voted for Amendment 64, legalizing recreational
sales of marijuana in the state and increasing funding for public educa-
tion. Finally, the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership
referendum—or “Brexit”—forever changed European Union and British
politics.
Empirical Puzzles
Investigating voters’ legitimations of their positions on DDEPs allows
us to investigate two important corresponding empirical puzzles. First,
while voter reasoning and rationalization are seen as primarily driven by
partisanship (e.g., Achen and Bartles 2016), American citizens appear
to vote for parties that they are economically incentivized to support
(e.g., McCarty et al. 2006). This raises the question: How do partisan-
ship and self -interest interact to shape partisan voters’ rationalizations of
their position on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP)?
Second, the voter reasoning literature sees actors’ rationalization of
their policy positions as based on discourses supplied by political parties
(for a summary see Achen and Bartels 2016). Such a perspective overlooks
the role that non-partisan discourses play (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2019), as
well as how party-transmitted discourses extend beyond any given party
(Vila-Henninger 2019b). This raises a subsequent question: What are
the discourses that voters draw upon to rationalize their direct democratic
economic policy (DDEP) positions?
Empirical Agenda
Thus, this book empirically addresses two research questions. First, I
investigate how partisanship and self-interest interact to shape partisan
voters’ legitimations of their position on DDEPs. Answering this question
is important because it helps us to understand political legitimation. Polit-
ical legitimation is theorized to affect actors’ compliance or cooperation
with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of policy and
the American political system more broadly (Weber 1978 [1922]: 212–6
(esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham
and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6).
The first question then investigates the motives that affect how people
(de)legitimate DDEPs.
Second, I investigate the widely accepted political and economic
beliefs, norms, and values that voters draw upon to rationalize their
DDEP positions. The second question helps us to understand the norma-
tive basis of the political legitimacy of DDEPs. In particular, I investigate
the values (Lipset 1963), standards of governance (Beetham 1991;
Beetham and Lord 1998), and normative ends (Spillman 2012; Spillman
and Strand 2013) that actors use to (de)legitimate DDEPs.
These values, ends, and standards of governance are thus part of the
normative basis upon which respondents socially accept (legitimate) or
reject (delegitimate) of the political power of DDEPs. Subsequently, these
values, normative ends, and standards are then theorized to constitute
part of the basis of actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power
and personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political
system more broadly (Weber 1978 [1922]: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5;
Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for
qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6).
Research Question 1: How Do Partisanship and Self-interest Interact

to Shape Partisan Voters’ Rationalizations of Their Position on Direct
Democratic Economic Policy (DDEP)?
This question bridges the gap between rational choice perspectives on
legitimacy (Rogowski 2016) and behavioral economics on the one hand
and legitimation on the other. Quantitative research in political sociology,
political science, and political psychology has provided many important
insights into the factors that affect voter decision-making, as well as
1 INTRODUCTION 5
how voters make decisions about voting for partisan candidates. This
scholarship utilizes recent iterations of rational choice models to focus
on bounded rationality (Simon 1997) and the biases (Kahneman and
Tversky 1972) and heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) that shape
information processing in political reasoning. Voter decision-making and
public opinion is then either enhanced (in the case of heuristics) or
hampered (in the case of biases) by political norms and partisan identity
(e.g., Gigerenzer and Todd 1999; Bartels 2002; Lau and Redlawsk 2006;
Westen et al. 2006; Martin and Desmond 2010; Baldassarri 2012; Brooks
and Manza 2013; Lodge and Taber 2013; Baldassarri and Goldberg
2014; Achen and Bartels 2006, 2016; Baldassarri and Park 2020).
In the process of transforming the rational choice model, research on
political reasoning has transformed our outlook on voter motives. Instead
of assuming a materialist approach to politics, in which voters often seek
to maximize utility through voting (e.g., Downs 1957), scholars have
demonstrated that voters only pursue self-interest in circumstances where
the stakes are high and the issues are clear (Sears and Funk 1991; Bartels
2005). Scholars have also argued that policy preferences (e.g., Brooks and
Brady 1999; Ansolabehere et al. 2006; McCarty et al. 2006) shape voter
decision-making.
Furthermore, American citizens have historically tended to vote for
parties that they are economically incentivized to support (e.g., McCarty
et al. 2006; Widestrom et al. 2018). Researchers have found that measures
of household income distribution correspond with actors’ political views
and policy positions (Weeden and Grusky 2012; Dodson 2017).
This extends to the literature on American presidential voting, which
suggests that a citizen will tend to vote for the candidate from the party
that supports policy that shifts household income distribution in favor of
the voter (Stonecash 2000; Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Bartels 2006;
McCarty et al. 2006; Volscho and Kelly 2012; Franko et al. 2013; Wide-
strom et al. 2018). By some estimates, this trend extended from 1976
through 2004 for presidential voting among white Americans (Bartels
2006).
The trend in American presidential voting was that as a citizen’s house-
hold income increased, so did the probability that (s)he would vote for a
Republican presidential candidate (Gelman 2008; Baldassarri and Gelman
2008). This relationship held even after controlling for variables such as
sex, age, education, and gender (Gelman 2008). Moreover, scholars have
found a persistent relationship between American partisan control at the
federal level and “share of income gains” for the top 1% of income earners
(Volscho and Kelly 2012; Widestrom et al. 2018: 6). Taken together, this
literature suggests a potential alignment between American voter parti-
sanship and economic incentives stemming from federal economic and
tax policies that influence household income distribution.
This then raises the question of if and how self-interest and partisan-
ship interact to affect voter reasoning and demonstrates the potential to
expand theories in which self-interest and partisanship compete (Jenke
and Huettel 2016). While quantitative work has investigated this process
as it is associated with voter decision-making, scholars have yet to
investigate the role it plays in structuring voter political rationalization.
Furthermore, the broader literature on political rationalization over-
looks the role of self-interest in shaping rationalization. This litera-
ture has established that actors rationalize for a variety of reasons: to
comply with social pressure (e.g., Haidt 2001; Vaisey 2009), in response
to group loyalties—including partisan allegiances—to reaffirm “prior
beliefs” (e.g., Achen and Bartles 2006, 2016), to perform information
transfer (Cushman 2019), to respond to moral intuitions (e.g., Haidt
2012), for consonance of behaviors and attitudes (Heider 1958), to
“sound rational” and avoid cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger 1962),
and/or to avoid social or existential threat—thereby defending the status
quo (e.g., Jost et al. 2009). However, while some have begun to theorize
the role of self-interest in rationalization (Jost et al. 2017), the literature is
in its infancy and has yet to investigate how partisanship and self-interest
interact to structure political rationalization.
A further gap is that these perspectives do not recognize political ratio-
nalizations as legitimations. Lipset (1994: 10) highlights the importance
of the electorate in understanding the legitimation of democratic govern-
ments. However, in the sociological literature on legitimation, there is
a gap concerning motives. For example, Weber (1978 [1922]) theorizes
the factors that shape how actors ascribe legitimacy, as well as compli-
ance with legitimate power, but does not theorize the factors that affect
legitimation itself.
Thus, in this analysis I address these gaps by responding empirically the
first research question. Furthermore, research demonstrates that the bases
for legitimacy and illegitimacy are asymmetrical (Schoon 2014). Thus, I
investigate the motives as legitimation and delegitimation as potentially
separate.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
Research Question 2: What Are the Discourses That Voters

Draw Upon to Rationalize Their Direct Democratic
Economic Policy (DDEP) Position?
The second question helps us to understand the normative basis of the
political legitimacy—or lack thereof—of DDEPs. In particular, I investi-
gate the values (Lipset 1963), standards of governance (Beetham 1991;
Beetham and Lord 1998), and normative ends (Spillman 2012; Spillman
and Strand 2013) that actors use to (de)legitimate DDEPs.
These values, norms, and standards of governance are thus part of
the normative basis upon which respondents publicly accept (legitimate)
or reject (delegitimate) of the political power of DDEPs. Subsequently,
these values, norms, and standards are then theorized to constitute part
of the basis of actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and
personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political
system more broadly (Weber 1978 [1922]: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5;
Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for
qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6).
This perspective begins with John Locke’s (Locke and Thomas 1952
[1689]) theorization of the normative ends of government being the
provision of basic rights. From here, contemporary sociologists and polit-
ical scientists have theorized the bases of legitimacy in terms of normative
ends and standards of governance (e.g., Beetham 1991; Beetham and
Lord 1998).
An analogous line of literature arose in response to Marx and Engels’
(1845–7 [1976]) materialism and Max Weber’s historical sociology.
Seymour Lipset (e.g., 1963, 1990) pioneered this approach and argued
that values and efficacy in achieving popular ends were bases for political
legitimacy in democracies (e.g., Lipset 1963: 245).
Supplementing this perspective is classic work on the role of self-
interest as an end key end for governments trying to establish or maintain
legitimacy. Classic political theory (Smith 1776; Kant 1785 [1969]) and
contemporary perspectives in social psychology (e.g., Zelditch and Walker
2003) have argued that a legitimation that appeals to self-interest can only
help to legitimate political power if the conditions for competition are fair.
Contemporary qualitative work (Vila-Henninger 2017) has buttressed
this argument by demonstrating that self-interest and fairness converge
in voters’ legitimations of DDEPs.
Here, I refer to “legitimacy” using Max Weber and Seymour Lipset’s

definitions definition of legitimacy as “a ‘believed-in title to rule’” (Lipset
1963: 290, also 17). More generally, for power to be “legitimate,” it must
be acknowledged, accepted, or affirmed by those upon which it is exer-
cised as normative (Weber 1978 [1922]; Lipset 1959, 1963; Dornbusch
and Scott 1977; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; Zelditch 2001,
2006; Johnson et al. 2006; Van Ingelgom 2014; Walker 2014; Gordon
2020).
Subsequently, a political legitimation in this context is an actor’s ratio-
nalization (or justification or validation or consecration or defense) of a
political system or element of a political system on normative grounds—
usually by reference to widely accepted beliefs and values (for summaries
see Weber (1922: 954; Lipset 1959: 86–7; Beetham 1991; Zelditch 2001,
2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Johnson et al. 2006; Van
Ingelgom 2014; for morally-specific legitimation see Abulof 2016).
Furthermore, in the Weberian tradition, legitimation is a mechanism
that transforms power into authority. This is because authority is power
that is accepted as obligatory or normative by those upon which it is
exercised. Legitimation is then a mechanism that then facilitates such
acceptance—and thus acquiescence to the demands of power without
enforcement (Zelditch 2006). Rationalization, which in this context is
legitimation, spreads legitimacy or re-establishes the legitimacy of social
systems whose legitimacy is directly contested (for a summery see Zelditch
and Walker 2003, Zelditch 2006; Walker 2014).
However, the justification of power is crucial even when the legiti-
macy of a social system is not directly contested or even if justifications do
not make explicit claims about legitimacy. For example, Max Weber theo-
rizes that continuation of organizational authority relies upon ongoing
processes of self-justification in terms of the basis of said authority (Weber
1978 [1922]: 953–5). From this perspective, the justification of power
facilitates continual compliance with authority (ibid.: 953).
David Beetham expands this theorization to the legitimacy of polit-
ical authority. For political authority to achieve or maintain legitimacy, its
rules must be justifiable in terms of widely held beliefs about a political
authority’s source—as well as beliefs about the appropriate standards and
ends of governance. This form of justification is referred to as “norma-
tive justifiability” (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998). Beetham’s
concept of normative justifiability is central for qualitative work in soci-
ology and political science on political legitimacy (Duchesne et al. 2013;
Van Ingelgom 2014).
1 INTRODUCTION 9
Beetham’s perspective overlaps with classic theory from American

political sociology. For example, Seymour Lipset’s (1959, 1963) appli-
cation of Weber (1978 [1922]) also argues that legitimacy stems from
widely shared beliefs. In particular, Lipset theorized that a political system
was legitimate in the eyes of citizens to the extent that the values upon
which the political system is based match with the group’s values or how
well the government meets popularly demanded ends (Lipset 1963). I
refer to these popular demanded “ends” as “normative ends” because
they are social norms about the ends that actors or society should pursue.
Thus, analyzing direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) position
rationalizations allows me to investigate the widely accepted beliefs—
available in public discourse—in terms of which voters justify their DDEP
positions. Building on the qualitative literature on political legitimacy,
as well as theory from political sociology, I will analyze the popular
beliefs in terms of which voters justify their position on a given DDEP.
Following Weber (1978 [1922]), Beetham (1991), Beetham and Lord
(1998) and Lipset (1959, 1963, 1990), I focus on the shared standards
(e.g., fairness), values, and normative ends upon which voters base their
legitimations.
These values, normative ends, and standards of governance are thus
part of the normative basis upon which respondents publicly accept
(legitimate) or reject (delegitimate) of the political power of DDEPs.
Subsequently, the values, normative ends, and standards are then theo-
rized to constitute part of the basis of actors’ compliance or cooperation
with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and
the American political system more broadly (Weber 1978 [1922]: 212–6
(esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham
and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6).
Furthermore, research demonstrates that the bases for legitimacy and ille-
gitimacy are asymmetrical (Schoon 2014). Thus, I investigate the values
and standards of governance on which legitimations and delegitimations
are based separately.
This research is important because there is a gap in the literature
concerning the actual values, normative ends, and standards of gover-
nance that actors use in their legitimations and upon which political
legitimacy is based. Recent quantitative work has been done on values
(Ciuk 2017). Qualitative work has also been done on the role of non-
political values in economic situations (Livne 2019; Altomonte 2020).
Furthermore, much work has also been done on public forms of culture
(Swidler 1986, 2001; Lamont 1992, 2000; Eliasoph and Lichterman

2003; Patterson 2014; Lizardo 2017). However, this work largely focuses
on schemas, frames, and narratives and ignores values, normative ends,
and standards of governance (for a review see Wood et al. 2018; also see
Tavory and Swidler 2009; Vaisey 2009; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010; Avent-
Holt 2012; Ghaziani and Baldassarri 2011; Frye 2017; Hull and Edgell
2020). Finally, qualitative work has focused on legitimacy and the use of
state force (Gordon 2020; Rios et al. 2020) or meso-level processes (Luft
2020), but not on political legitimacy or the values, normative ends, and
standards of governance that actors use to (de)legitimate.
We see this gap when we turn to the qualitative work in sociology
and political science. For example, Perrin (2005) and Stoker et al. (2016)
use focus group data to analyze citizens’ democratic deliberation. Lane
(1967), Prasad et al. (2009, 2016), Eliasoph (2010) Kidder and Martin
(2012), Cramer (2016), Hochschild (2016), Kidder (2016), Pacewicz
(2016), Skocpol and Williamson (2016), Williamson (2017), Andreouli
and Nicholson (2018), Duina (2018), Wuthnow (2018), Silva (2019),
Curtis (2020), Hull and Edgell (2020), and Leeds (2020) all use ethnog-
raphy and/or semi-structured interviews to understand issues such as
identity and citizens perspectives on politics. However, this work has
largely overlooked both legitimation as well as the values, normative ends,
and standards of governance upon which legitimation draws.
We know that these values, normative ends, and standards of gover-
nance are of importance because of the work being done on the role of
partisan morality. For example, Jung (2020) demonstrates that partisan
moral rhetoric mobilizes voters by activating emotions related to partisan
preference. Furthermore, Luttrell et al. (2019) provide evidence of the
effectiveness of political moral appeals. Finally, Vössing (2020) shows the
importance of partisan justifications for public opinion.
Theory Building Agenda and Generalizability

More broadly, this book builds on the qualitative tradition of investigating
how citizens’ positions on economic and political issues are embedded in
rationalization processes that people use in their daily lives (Lamont 1992,
2000; Swidler 2001; Díez Medrano 2003; Lamont and Swidler 2014; Van
Ingelgom 2014). By addressing the two aforementioned puzzles empir-
ically, I aim to extend classic theories of legitimacy (e.g., Weber 1978
[1922]; Lipset 1959, 1963; Dornbusch and Scott 1977; Beetham 1991;
1 INTRODUCTION 11
Beetham and Lord 1998; Zelditch 2001, 2006). I also seek to extend
theories of voter rationalization (Achen and Bartels 2006, 2016) and
justification (Mills 1940; Scott and Lyman 1968; Boltanski and Thévenot
2006: 131; Barnard 2016; Hansen 2019). Specifically, I use my findings
to bridge the justification, rationalization, and legitimacy literatures in
order to develop a theory of voter DDEP position rationalization.
My analytical approach employs Michael Burawoy’s “Extended Case
Method” (ECM) (Burawoy 1998, 2009; Sallaz 2009) to interpret my
findings and engage in theory building (Vila-Henninger 2017, 2018,
2019a, 2019b). Specifically, I use Burawoy’s principle of “reconstruc-
tion” in the coding and analysis of my data. Reconstruction uses a core
theory to identify anomalous cases in the data in order to build theory.
In particular, my analysis consists of identifying policy-specific iterations,
or “rationales,” of widely accepted beliefs that are available in public
discourse. The process that results from this strategy of “reconstruction”
is a mode of analysis that is similar to abduction in its theory-building
logic based on identifying anomalous cases (Timmermans and Tavory
2012: 171; Tavory and Timmermans 2014), but is distinct to the extent
that it starts with two core theories in order to identify theoretically
anomalous cases.
The important point of distinction here is that I seek to contribute
by expanding extant theory rather than generalizing to a population. By
elaborating extant theory, this book can help facilitate future scholarship
by contributing to the analytical framework that researchers can use in
their research design and analysis—as well as in formulating hypotheses
(Shadish et al. 2001). In this sense, my findings will be generalizable to
the extent that any theory is generalizable.
Case Selection
In studying voter DDEP position rationalizations, I wanted to select
ballot measures that were not simply a result of partisan politics but rather
incorporated economic policy incentives and cues about partisan affilia-
tion. In contrast to ballot measures written by state legislatures, Citizen
Initiated State Statutes (CISS) are written by citizens and appear on the
ballot because the proponents of the measure succeeded in collecting
a state-determined number of signatures. This type of process requires
some financing and organization, but produces statutes that are more
organic to the state’s population.
Availability of CISSes that were economic policy limited states where

I could recruit respondents. In terms of selecting a timeframe, I wanted
to select ballot measures about topics that were politically salient. For this
reason, I selected ballot measures that occurred within the two presiden-
tial elections (2008–2012) before I began recruitment in 2013. 2008 was
an especially relevant and polarizing political year because not only did the
nation see its first African American president elected, but it also marked
the beginning of a major recession.
With these parameters in mind, I was left with CISSes in Arizona,
Colorado, and California.1 Given that political culture and salience of
household income varies according to average state household income
(e.g., Gelman 2008), it was important to choose a state where house-
hold income would be the most salient. Only Arizona was in the bottom
half of average state household income distribution, meaning that house-
hold income should be a more salient political factor than in California or
Colorado—which were both in the upper half of average state house-
hold income distribution (Gelman 2008). Thus, I chose to recruit
respondents in Arizona.
I chose the second congressional district in Tucson as my place of
recruitment for several reasons. First, research shows that a polarized
political environment helps political beliefs become more salient for
voters (e.g., Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). With this in mind, I sought an
area that was extremely polarized within a congressional district, and had
a marked household income disparity in the population, so that economic
position and partisan affiliation would both be salient for my respondents.
The second congressional district in Tucson met all of these require-
ments. Tucson is split between the second and third congressional
districts. The third district is consistently Democratic, while the second
congressional district is extremely polarized. In 2012, the Democratic
congressional candidate won by around 0.1%, while Romney carried the
district by 1.5%. In 2014, the Republican candidate won the district by
less than 1000 votes. Such polarization is to be expected in this district—
which has a history of polarization dating to before the tenure of Gabrielle
Giffords.
In order to employ my analytical approach to build theory in response
to the book’s two research questions, I use data from respondents who
were recruited based on two factors that I used to operationalize voter
partisanship and self-interest: partisan vote choice and economic posi-
tion—respectively. These two indicators are used in the empirical research
1 INTRODUCTION 13
on trends in American presidential voting that is in line with or in

opposition to voters’ economic policy incentives (e.g., Bartels 2006;
McCarty et al. 2006; Gelman 2008; Gelman et al. 2010; Widestrom et al.
2018). These indicators are also often used in investigations into associ-
ations between economic incentives and political attitudes (e.g., Brooks
and Brady 1999; Manza and Brooks 1999; Ansolabehere et al. 2008;
Weeden and Grusky 2012; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Boutyline
and Vaisey 2017). Thus, these indicators are appropriate for my investiga-
tion into how the alignment or opposition of self-interest and partisanship
influenced voters’ rationalizations of real DDEPs.
Research Design
In order to employ my analytical approach to build theory in response to
the book’s two research questions, I use data from respondents who were
recruited based on two quasi-independent variables that correspond to
voter partisanship and self-interest: partisan affiliation and economic posi-
tion—respectively. It is crucial to note that in my research design, instead
of standard quantitative “variables,” partisan affiliation and economic
position are each instances of a “quasi-independent variable.” As defined
by the American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology, a
quasi-independent variable is “in experimental design, any of the personal
attributes, traits, or behaviors that are inseparable from an individual
and cannot reasonably be manipulated. These include gender, age, and
ethnicity. Such attributes may be modeled and treated as statistically inde-
pendent but are not subject to random assignment, as are independent
variables.”2
I operationalized each quasi-independent variable—partisan affiliation
and economic position—as dichotomous: Democrat vs. Republican and
High vs. Low-Income—respectively. Because I address the empirical
puzzle of how partisanship and self-interest interact to shape voter ratio-
nalization, each quasi-independent variable is categorical and cannot be
operationalized in terms of “treatment” versus “pre-treatment.” Thus,
rather than comparing a pre-treatment group to a treatment group, I
compared four different comparison groups that constituted the four
different possible combinations of each of my two dichotomous cate-
gorical quasi-independent variables (Shadish et al. 2001). This means
that I used a quasi-experimental design that implements a “Posttest-

Only Design with Nonequivalent Groups” (Shadish et al. 2001: 115–7;
Privitera and Ahlgrim-Delzell 2019).
Furthermore, regardless of the mechanisms that produced each respon-
dent’s position on a measure, I treated respondent DDEP position as
a quasi-independent variable that shaped the participant’s legitimation.
Thus, for each ballot measure, I had eight comparison groups: low-
income Democrats who supported the measure, low-income Democrats
who opposed the measure, low-income Republicans who supported
the measure, low-income Republicans who opposed the measure, high-
income Democrats who supported the measure, high-income Democrats
who opposed the measure, high-income Republicans who supported the
measure, and high-income Republicans who opposed the measure. As
respondent DDEP position often varied from one ballot measure to the
next, so did their placement in a proposition-specific comparison group
for a given DDEP.
Thus, this analysis investigates how these three quasi-independent
variables—Economic Position, Partisan Affiliation, and DDEP Position—
interact to shape respondent legitimations.
Research Agenda for the Selection

of Each of the Three Ballot Measures
Given the first empirical puzzle, the most important selection criteria were
that each ballot measure has associated economic incentives and partisan
cues that could then shape how voters legitimated their positions. For this
reason, I selected three ballot measures for this book.
The first ballot measure was “The Arizona Homeowners Bill of Rights,
Proposition 201 (2008).”3 This ballot measure, which was overwhelm-
ingly financed and endorsed by a wide array of construction-related
unions, was put on the ballot in the midst of the bursting of the real
estate bubble in a state whose economy was heavily dependent on the
construction of new homes. It sought to create standards for quality in
home repair, give all new homebuyers a 10-year-warrantee, and to give
homeowners increased legal leverage over contractors who did fraudulent
work. This measure gave me an opportunity to understand how voters
legitimated a ballot measure that was pro-labor, pro-market regulation,
and concerned the status of land as a commodity.
1 INTRODUCTION 15
The second ballot measure, “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring, Proposition

202 (2008),” sought, in a variety of ways, to reregulate undocumented
immigrants’ access to the Arizona labor market. I chose this initiative
because I wanted to include a measure that proposed to regulate labor
as a commodity. It was overwhelmingly financed by business associations.
Third, I selected the “Quality Education and Jobs Act, Proposition
204 (2012),” which proposed to extend a one-cent sales tax primarily to
fund public education. Given the budgetary crisis in Arizona in 2012 due
in part to the collapse of the real estate market, the state legislature
proposed cuts to public education. This proposition was written and
organized by the Quality Education and Jobs Committee, which is a pro-
public education advocacy group. This ballot measure was clearly partisan
in terms of its endorsements, being officially endorsed by the mayor of
Phoenix and the major of Tucson, both Democrats, and officially opposed
by the Arizona state treasurer and Arizona Governor, both Republi-
cans. Selecting this ballot measure allowed me to analyze an extremely
partisan element of economic policy that could potentially pit short-term
self-interest against partisanship.
A quick note here is that although I interviewed respondents about the
“Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, Proposition 203 (2010),” I did not
include an analysis of these data in this book. This is because there was
no economic incentive for respondents for this measure. For analysis of
this measure, see Vila-Henninger (2018).
Chapter Overview
In order to conduct this analysis and theory building process, I proceed
in Chapter 2 by providing an overview of theory and empirical work rele-
vant for understanding this research puzzle and conducting an empirical
analysis of voter DDEP rationalizations. As previously mentioned, I then
outline my analytical approach and theory building strategy in Chapter 3.
Next, I provide an overview of my data and methods in Chapter 4.
Subsequently, I conduct empirical analysis for each of the afore-
mentioned DDEPs (Chapters 5–7). Each of the empirical chapters
about individual DDEPs analyzes legitimations according to the inter-
action of self-interest and partisan affiliation. In a final empirical chapter
(Chapter 8), and in order to extend theory, I investigate legitimations in
each of the three ballot measures that extend across partisan affiliation
and economic position. I then conclude with a chapter in which I use my
findings to build theory (Chapter 9).
Notes
1. Ballot measures available on NCLS.org.
2. https://dictionary.apa.org/quasi-independent-variable.
3. The text each measure is available in the corresponding empirical chapter
and at the Arizona Secretary of State’s website.
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Part I
CHAPTER 2
Theory
Introduction
This book empirically addresses two research questions. First, I investigate
how partisanship and self-interest interact to shape partisan voters’ legiti-
mations of their position on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP).
Answering this question is important because it helps us to understand
political legitimation. Subsequently, legitimation is theorized to affect
actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and personal belief
in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political system more
broadly (Weber [1922] 1978: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959,
1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative
analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). The first question then investi-
gates the motives that affect how people legitimate DDEPs. My empirical
response helps to fill a key gap in the literature concerning voter legitima-
tion—which has been recognized as an important element of the political
legitimacy of liberal democracies (Lipset 1994: 10).
Second, I investigate the widely accepted political and economic
beliefs, norms, and values that voters draw upon to rationalize their
DDEP positions. The second question helps us to understand the norma-
tive basis of the political legitimacy—or lack thereof—of DDEPs. In
particular, I investigate the values (Lipset 1963), standards of governance
(Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998), and normative ends (Spillman
2012; Spillman and Strand 2013) that actors use to (de)legitimate
DDEPs. These values, normative ends, and standards of governance are
© The Author(s) 2020 27

L. A. Vila-Henninger, Social Justification and Political Legitimacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8_2
thus part of the normative basis upon which respondents socially justify
supporting (legitimating) or opposing (delegitimating) the political power
of DDEPs.
Subsequently, these values, normative end, and standards are then
theorized to constitute part of the basis of actors’ compliance or cooper-
ation with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs
and the American political system more broadly (Weber [1922] 1978:
212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991;
Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014:
5–6). My analysis then synthesizes overlapping models of reasoning from
the voting literature and the morality literature—thereby addressing a gap
in the literature noted by political sociologists (Brooks and Manza 2013:
745).
Legitimacy and Legitimation

This book analyzes the legitimations of political power made by everyday
people. Here, I define an “everyday person” as someone who does not
occupy a position of political authority. The key component here is that a
“legitimation” is a rationalization (or justification or validation or conse-
cration or defense) of political power in normative terms—often by appeal
to widely accepted standards of governance (Beetham 1991; Beetham and
Lord 1998), values (Lipset 1963), or normative ends (Spillman 2012;
Spillman and Strand 2013).
Legitimation of power by everyday people, or “popular political legit-
imation,” stands in contrast to the legitimations of those in positions
of political (e.g., Stryker 1989) or organizational (e.g., Suchman 1995)
authority. Legitimation as discourse is also distinct from approaches
that analyze legitimation as behavioral compliance (e.g., Burawoy 1979;
Przeworski 1980; Willis 1981; Johnson et al. 2006; Sallaz 2009).
This book’s theoretical perspective on legitimacy and popular political
legitimation combines work that spans American and European sociology
and political science. I proceed by providing a review of these literatures
as they pertain to “popular political legitimation.”
From this review we will see ten distinct types of legitimation. Legit-
imation differs in terms of its broader justification of power or specific
claims about legitimacy. Legitimation then serves to maintain, undermine
(in the form of delegitimation), repair, spread, or establish legitimacy.
For an overview see Table 2.1. As we can see, the empirical analysis in
Table 2.1 The functions of legitimation from contemporary sociological literature
Maintain legitimacy Undermine Repair legitimacy Spread legitimacy Establish legitimacy

legitimacy
Claims to Legitimacy Theory Legitimacy Theory Legitimacy Theory Legitimacy Theory Legitimacy Theory
legitimacy (for summaries see (for summaries see (for summaries see (for summaries see (for summaries see
Zelditch 2001, Zelditch 2001, Zelditch 2001, Zelditch 2001, Zelditch 2001, 2006;
2006; Zelditch and 2006; Zelditch and 2006; Zelditch and 2006; Zelditch and Zelditch and Walker
Walker 2003; Walker 2003; Walker Walker 2003; Walker 2003; 2003; Walker 2014;
Walker 2014; 2014) Walker 2014; Walker 2014; Gordon 2020)
Gordon 2020) Gordon 2020) Gordon 2020)
Broader Weber [1922] This Book When applied to Lipset (1959, Weber ([1922]
justification 1978: 953–55); political 1963); This Book 1978); Lipset (1959,
Berger and justifications: 1963)
Luckmann (1966); Sociology of
Homans (1974); Accounts (Mills
Beetham (1991); 1940; Scott and
Beetham and Lord Lyman 1968;
(1998); Duchesne Polletta et al. 2011;
et al. (2013); Van Kiviat 2017)
Ingelgom (2014) French Sociology of
Justification
Tradition (Boltanski
2
and Thévenot 2006;

Barnard 2016;
Hansen 2019)
THEORY
29
this book focuses on how legitimations as broader justifications that are

theorized to spread or undermine political legitimacy.
Legitimacy
Much of the work in American and European sociology and political
science on political legitimacy is based on the theory of Max Weber. For
Weber, legitimate power establishes both obligations and standards for
desirable conduct (Weber [1922] 1978: 31). Action driven by legitimacy
is thus normative rather than the result of strategic calculation (Weber
[1922] 1978; for a summary see Dornbusch and Scott 1977; Walker
2014). According to Weber, authority then gained or maintained legit-
imacy by appeal to (1) tradition, (2) legality, and/or (3) charisma (Weber
[1922] 1978: 215–6, 952–5; Lipset 1963; Walker 2014).
From the Weberian tradition, understanding legitimacy begins with
power. Power is unstable if it must continually be enforced or relies upon
actors’ interests for compliance. Thus, for Weber, power is legitimate if
those subject to power accept and/or comply with the demands of power
upon normative grounds—meaning that power is seen as obligatory or
exemplary. The idea here is that power is much more stable if those who
are subject to power accept it as normative.
Most importantly from the Weberian perspective is the idea that legit-
imacy needed to be analyzed as actors’ “belief in legitimacy”—which
enabled sociologists to study legitimacy as a social phenomenon rather
than a philosophical issue (for empirical analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014).
Furthermore, power is legitimate to the degree that it is widely perceived
as legitimate (Weber [1922] 1978; Johnson et al. 2006; Van Ingelgom
2014). This means that individuals do not need to agree with the exercise
of power or the collective beliefs, norms, and values with which power is
aligned. Rather, individuals need to perceive both power and the collec-
tive elements it is justified in terms of as being widely accepted (Johnson
et al. 2006: 55–6; Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6).
This means that legitimacy exists regardless of individuals’ opinions of
power. Instead, the key is that power is accepted, acknowledged, and/or
complied with. An integral part of this process is then the perception
that others accept and comply with power—which reinforces the percep-
tion of power as legitimate. Action that is purely driven by legitimacy
is thus normative rather than the result of strategic calculation (Weber
[1922] 1978: 31–3, 212–5; Lipset 1959, 1963; Dornbusch and Scott
2 THEORY 31
1977; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; Zelditch 2001, 2006;
Zelditch and Walker 2003; Johnson et al. 2006; Van Ingelgom 2014;
Walker 2014; Gordon 2020).
Thus, in the Weberian tradition, political power is “legitimate” to the
extent that it is acknowledged (Walker 2014) as constituting an obligation
or an exemplary form of conduct. Power can be explicitly acknowledged
through discourse or acknowledgement can be shown through behavioral
compliance.
A major figure in this tradition is Seymour Lipset (1959, 1963, 1990).
Lipset defines legitimacy as a normative “title to rule” (1963: 17, 290).
Lipset builds on Weber’s characterization of political legitimacy as stem-
ming from tradition, legality, and charisma (1963). For Lipset, the central
element of legitimacy for legal systems was that they share the “values”
of the citizens. Thus, institutions were formed and legitimated based
on shared beliefs (e.g., Lipset 1963: 16) and values in particular (ibid.:
245, Lipset 1990). However, Lipset saw the role of values as a legiti-
mating force extending beyond legal systems to, for example, charismatic
authority. For Lipset, charismatic leaders could gain and legitimate their
authority by appealing to values shared by their audience (Lipset 1963:
18).
Besides values, the other key source of legitimacy for Lipset was a
government’s efficacy in achieving commonly held goals for governance
(Lipset 1963: 90). However, this source of legitimacy was ultimately
unstable. Thus, it was advantageous for governments to establish legit-
imacy by rooting themselves in widely held values—as values serve as a
normative rather than performative basis of legitimacy (ibid.: 245).
A key element of Lipset’s political analysis, then, was to understand
a country’s shared values (e.g., ibid. 1990). By analyzing these shared
values, scholars could then investigate the development of a nation’s insti-
tutions and their legitimacy (ibid. 1963: 2). Importantly, Lipset shared
the Weberian perspectives that values were historically determined (ibid.:
7).
Another strand of literature in American sociology comes from “Legit-
imacy Theory” (for summaries see Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and
Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Gordon 2020). This work in Legitimacy
Theory by social psychologists is based on Dornbusch and Scott’s (1977)
distinction between two types of legitimacy they claim Weber conflated:
“propriety” and “validity.” Propriety is an individual’s evaluation of a
social system, or element of a social system, as exemplary (Homans 1974;
Zelditch 2001, 2006; Walker 2014). On the other hand, power is “valid”
when compliance is widely accepted as obligatory (Zelditch 2001, 2006;
Walker 2014). Actors “acknowledge” validity through their compliance
(Walker 2014). Validity is then justified in terms of tradition, rational or
natural law, or charisma (Weber [1922] 1978: 215; Walker 2014), and
science (Stryker 1994).
Validity involves two self-reinforcing mechanisms: support by authority
figures (authorization) and popular support (endorsement) (Dornbusch
and Scott 1977; Zelditch 2001, 2006: 335; Walker 2014; Walker and
Willer 2014; Gordon 2020). An important nuance here is that endorse-
ment can then be understood as collective propriety (Walker 2014: 368).
Both of these mechanisms serve to reproduce the perception that valid
orders are widely accepted and thus reinforce the obligation for compli-
ance (for summaries see Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003;
Walker 2014).
European qualitative political science and political sociology have long
utilized political theorists such as David Easton and David Beetham. For
example, for Easton, legitimacy is the belief “[t]hat it is right and prop-
er…to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements
of the regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way [a
person] sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his
own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere” (Easton
1965: 278; 1975: 451). This seems to echo Weber’s argument that legit-
imacy is the sense that something is “obligatory” or “exemplary.” Easton
then decomposes legitimacy into different types that vary according to
“objects of legitimacy” (Regime vs Authorities) and “Sources of Legiti-
macy” (Ideology vs. Structure vs. Personal Qualities) (see Easton 1975:
452).
For Beetham (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998), political
power is legitimate if it satisfies three conditions. First, power must be
established and exercised within the bounds of widely accepted rules.
This principle is referred to as “legality.” Second, the rules by which
power is bounded must be justifiable according to broadly accepted beliefs
about the source of authority, as well as widely accepted beliefs about
the standards for, and ends of, governance. This principle is referred to
as “normative justifiability.” Third, positions of power must be expressly
affirmed by both subordinates as well as others in legitimate positions of
power. This principle is referred to by Beetham as “legitimation.” This
2 THEORY 33
conception of normative justifiability builds on the work of John Locke

(1952 [1689]) on basic rights as the normative ends of democracies.
Drawing on Max Weber ([1922] 1978: 215–6), recent qualitative work
in this tradition focuses on legitimacy as citizens’ acceptance of political
domination of normative grounds (Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). The goal
of this work is then to understand the normative grounds upon which
citizens support political power by drawing upon Beetham’s conception
of “normative justifiability.”
Legitimation
A political legitimation, then, is an actor’s rationalization (or justification
or validation) of a political system, or an element of a political system,
in terms of widely accepted beliefs, norms, or values (for summaries
see Weber [1922] 1978: 954; Lipset 1959: 86–7; Zelditch 2001, 2006;
Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Johnson et al. 2006).
Weber emphasizes that organizational power requires self-
justification—or “legitimation”—in order for such power to continue to
be exercised. In this sense, for Weber ([1922] 1978: 952–4) legitimation
is the justification of power. This was then appropriated by Seymour
Lipset. Along the lines of Weber’s conception of legitimation as the
justification of power, Lipset framed legitimation as “morally accepting”
(ibid. 1963: 232) a political system—or an element of a political system.
Legitimacy Theory restricts its definition of “legitimation” to justifica-
tions that explicitly address claims to legitimacy. We see this in Legitimacy
Theory’s work on “justification”—which builds on the conceptualiza-
tion of justification from the “Sociology of Accounts” (Mills 1940; Scott
and Lyman 1968; Polletta et al. 2011; Kiviat 2017) as an attempt to
legitimate unexpected or deviant acts (Mills 1940; Zelditch 2001: 7).
Legitimacy Theory is referred to by some as the “cognitive orientation”
approach to legitimacy (Stryker 1994) and complements similar work in
social psychology (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Cook 1975; Ridgeway
and Berger 1986).
Beetham’s definition of “legitimation” is analogous to Legitimacy
Theory’s concept of “propriety.” By contrast, this book uses “legit-
imation” to connote Beetham’s concept of “normative justifiability.”
Empirical work over the past decade (e.g., Duchesne et al. 2013; Van
Ingelgom 2014) in Europe investigates legitimation as normative justifia-
bility by building on Juan Díez Medrano’s (2003) analysis of “frames”
to investigate popular political justifications. The key here is that the

emphasis is on legitimation as a justificatory process through which
citizens rationalize political power by appealing to widely held beliefs.
Framework for Research Questions

Next, I will discuss legitimacy as it applies to each research question. In
particular, for the first question I provide background on legitimation,
as well as the influence on legitimation of self-interest and partisanship.
For the second question, I provide background on the widely held beliefs
upon which legitimacy is based. I then discuss the types of beliefs I inves-
tigate in this book: political values, norms of self-interest, and economic
fairness. In particular, I discuss how economic fairness is understood in
the moral economy literature, as well as neoliberalism.
Research Question 1: How do partisanship and self-interest interact to
shape partisan voters’ rationalizations of their position on direct demo-
cratic economic policy (DDEP)?
Answering this question is important because it helps us to under-
stand political legitimation. Subsequently, legitimation is theorized to
affect actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and personal
belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political system
more broadly (Weber [1922] 1978: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset
1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qual-
itative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). This question bridges the
gap between rational choice perspectives on legitimacy (Rogowski 2016),
behavioral economics, and legitimation.
We can understand this process of the justification—or rationaliza-
tion—of political power in terms of widely held beliefs, norms, and values
as “legitimation” (Lipset 1959: 86; Almond and Verba 1963; Easton
1975: 451–2; Della Fave 1986; Weil 1989; Tyler 1990; Suchman 1995;
Van Ingelgom 2014; for a summary see Stryker 1994). This approach
to legitimation is similar to the “normative approval” of power (Della
Fave 1986: 477; see also Habermas 1973; Collins 1975). Legitimation
is then a mechanism that facilitates the acceptance, acknowledgment, and
compliance with power on normative grounds.
Thus, for this analysis I define “legitimation” as an actor’s rational-
ization (or justification or validation or defense) of a political system
or element of a political system on normative grounds—and usually in
2 THEORY 35
terms of widely accepted beliefs and values” (for summaries see Weber
[1922] 1978: 954; Lipset 1959: 86–7; Beetham 1991; Zelditch 2001,
2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Johnson et al. 2006; Van
Ingelgom 2014; for morally specific legitimation see Abulof 2016).
Political legitimation then spreads, re-establishes, or maintains the
legitimacy of social systems whose legitimacy is directly contested (for
a summery see Zelditch and Walker 2003, Zelditch 2006; Walker 2014).
However, the justification of power is crucial even when the legitimacy
of a social system is not directly contested or even if justifications do not
make explicit claims about legitimacy. For example, Max Weber theorizes
that the continuation of organizational authority relies upon ongoing
processes of self-justification in terms of the basis of said authority (Weber
[1922] 1978: 953–5). From this perspective, the justification of power
facilitates continual compliance with authority (ibid.: 953).
Furthermore, for Weber ([1922] 1978), we can see an important
gap concerning the motives that drive legitimation. According to Weber,
compliance with legitimacy may be based on interest or maybe be subjec-
tive (ibid.: 33, 213). Individuals’ ascription of legitimacy as a “belief in
legitimacy” (ibid.: 213) is then based on normative factors (ibid.: 36).
Subsequently, there are then three ideal types of legitimacy beliefs that
have three corresponding normative bases: rational grounds with a corre-
sponding belief in legality of rule and right of authority figures to rule,
traditional beliefs and corresponding belief in sanctity of tradition and
legitimacy of traditional authority figures, and charismatic grounds and
corresponding devotion to a charismatic leader (ibid.: 215). Each of
these normative bases of legitimacy beliefs then constitutes a grounds for
legitimation (ibid.: 954).
However, for Weber ([1922] 1978), legitimation is broader than these
three ideal types and is fundamentally normative (ibid.: 31, 213, 764–5).
Thus, there are different normative grounds upon which authority may be
legitimated: natural law (ibid.: 867), utilitarian (ibid.: 870), status (ibid.:
766), and knowledge (ibid.: 766). For example, legal authority is estab-
lished through reference to legal norms, which are established through
reference to value rationality and expedience (ibid.: 217).
The gap in Weber’s work then concerns factors that motivate legitima-
tion. Turning to the rationalization literature, scholars have established
that actors rationalize for a variety of reasons: to comply with social pres-
sure (e.g., Haidt 2001; Vaisey 2009), group loyalties—including partisan
allegiances—to reaffirm “prior beliefs” (e.g., Achen and Bartles 2006,
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in cattle kept on distillery and brewery dregs. Lead taken in small
quantities in soft water that has run through lead pipes or stood in
leaden cisterns produces in cows and other animals chronic
affections of the kidney. Ellenberger and Hofmeister have produced
the disease experimentally with lead and copper respectively.
Microbian invasions of the kidney that advance slowly like
glanders and tubercle are further causes of chronic nephritis. Other
secondary microbian infections of the kidney are complications of
infectious diseases in other parts, including abscess, pyæmia,
septicæmia, ulcerative endocarditis of the left heart, bronchitis,
pneumonia (Fröhner), and of others less directly in the line of the
circulation, as omphalitis, uterine phlebitis (Lustig), abscess of the
nasal sinuses, bones, and fistulæ (Trasbot).
In other cases the nephritis is evidently a result of the irritation
caused by toxins in process of elimination by the kidneys, as there is
no evidence of a nephritic infection.
In some instances minute emboli originating in the lungs or heart,
become the starting point of the nephritis, which slowly extends by
reason of infection or low condition and special susceptibility.
Disease of the aorta or renal artery may lead to this condition as
noticed by Cadeac and Lustig. Cadeac has also noticed its association
with aneurism of the mesenteric arteries so that the strongylus
(sclerostoma) armatus may be considered as a factor. Again in old
horses and dogs it has been associated with atheroma of the aorta
and renal vessels (Trasbot).
Overfeeding is not without its influence, especially when on animal
food, which charges the kidneys with excreting an excess of the
irritating urea and uric acid, and this is one reason why it is far more
frequent in house dogs than in other domestic animals. When the
meat is already decomposing and putrid there is the added evil of a
quantity of toxins and even of microbes to be eliminated from the
system by the much abused kidneys. Add to these that the dog’s
urine is even in the normal condition more dense and contains more
irritating ingredients than that of herbivora, and that owing to the
slight activity of his perspiratory apparatus he can obtain less relief
from the skin, and we find a substantial ground for the prevalence of
chronic nephritis in this animal.
Disease of the valves of the right heart or dilatation with
insufficiency of the auriculo-ventricular valves is a potent cause of
nephritis, the reflux of blood into the veins and the increased venous
tension, speedily producing passive congestion and a slow type of
inflammation in the kidney. This factor is especially liable to operate
in dogs, which are particularly obnoxious to rheumatism and
valvular ulceration, and are very subject to nervous cardiac
disorders; in horses that have contracted heaves; and in beef breeds
of cattle which suffer from fatty degeneration of the heart with
dilatation.
The influence of calculi must not be overlooked, whether they are
lodged in the pelvis, the chalices, or the uriniferous tubules. Their
tendency is to induce local irritation and exudation, with fibroid
degeneration and thickening of the walls of the tubules or pelvis and
of the adjacent tissue.
When to one or more of the above conditions there are added
overfeeding or what is worse a low condition from starvation or
unwholesome food (permeated by bacteria or cryptogams or
containing vegetable acids), and when to crown all there are frequent
exposures to cold or wet, we have a vicious combination especially
conducive to kidney trouble.
Habitual retention of urine in mares in harness, in house dogs, or
in horses in railway cars, and violent exertion, or sprains of the back
are among the remaining accessory causes.
Symptoms. These are often slight or obscure, so that not only
owners and attendants but even veterinarians are liable to overlook
them. Loss of flesh, flabbiness of the muscles and a lack of spirit and
energy are among the first symptoms. The horse appears stiff,
especially in his loins and hind limbs, and fails to advance the hind
feet as far under the belly as formerly, and straddles more. When put
to work he is early fatigued and appears unfit for sustained exertion.
His movements are slow and if urged to a trot he may even groan
with every step and quickly settles back to his sluggish pace. If
turned sharply round on himself he does so with difficulty and often
groans. When he is mounted or when the loins are pinched he may
droop to excess. If you come on him lying down, and urge him to rise
he may rise on his fore limbs and sit on his haunches until urged
before he makes any attempt to raise himself on his hind. The dog
may spend most of his time in the kennel, and show little disposition
to run, play or hunt. On the contrary the owner may have to call him
several times before he will come out and then he moves listlessly,
wearily and even weakly.
In all animals the appetite is poor or capricious, and the patient
gradually loses condition, at first slowly and later, after a few weeks
or months, more rapidly. The advance of anæmia is also steadily
progressive.
Dropsical effusion is not uncommon. It is often prominent in the
horse as stocked limbs, but may be absent for a length of time. In
other animals it is more likely to appear later in the disease and
under the chest or abdomen or in one of the internal serous cavities.
Trasbot has found it absent for months in the nephritic dog.
The exploration of the kidney through the flaccid abdominal walls
in small animals, and through the rectum in small horses and cattle,
may reveal renal tenderness and even swelling. If there is a tendency
to frequent passage of urine in small quantities, or to straining
without micturition, the indication is of value.
There may be little or no fever, and, when left at rest, little
evidence of discomfort.
Any indication of urinary trouble, and especially with dropsy,
weakness, flabbiness and anæmia and a subnormal temperature,
should lead to examination of the urine, as a crucial test. A high
density is good ground for suspicion. But this is not constant. In
advanced cases (chronic interstitial nephritis, small white kidney,
atrophic nephritis) it may be 1015 to 1025, in exceptional advanced
cases with polyuria, it may be 1010, 1005, or even 1001. With such a
condition, however, there is great anæmia, pallor of the mucosæ, and
prostration. Tested with nitric acid and heat, the urine throws down
an abundant precipitate of albumen. Under the microscope it shows
a profusion of granular, degenerating epithelial cells, and casts of the
uriniferous tubes.
Progress. The course of the disease is usually slow, extending over
several months, but with a tendency to constant advance. The thirst
increases and the urine increases in amount, clearness and levity.
There may supervene extreme sluggishness, dropsies, anæmia, and
weakness, irritability of the heart, and palpitations on slight exertion.
So long as the heart’s action is strong, elimination may be
maintained and life prolonged for months (in cow, Dickinson), or
years (Friedberger and Fröhner). When the heart’s action becomes
weak, elimination is rendered imperfect and the animal shows
catarrh of the lungs or bowels (common in dogs), local inflammation
of the lungs, pleura or pericardium, or œdemas, or hæmorrhages.
The toxic effect on the nerve centres is shown by stupor or lethargy,
or vertigo. When an abscess forms it is associated with a temporary
rise of temperature (Trasbot). The patient may die in convulsions, in
a state of coma, or by gradually advancing debility and failure of the
heart.
Lesions. In cases of comparatively short standing the kidney is
usually of full size, or somewhat enlarged, with firmly adherent
capsule and rough or even nodular surface. The surface of the cortex
may be red or grayish or parti-colored, pink and gray. The cortical
portion is firm and it may even be attenuated somewhat, while the
medullary portion, naturally lighter, has often grayish streaks
converging toward the hilus. When the gray streaks are scraped with
the knife a serous fluid, mixed with fatty granules or globules, is
obtained. The glomeruli may be still about the normal size with some
increase of the epithelial tuft cells. The tubules contain casts (colloid,
hyaline, granular), and their epithelium normally columnar, are
flattened down to cubes and are swollen, granular or fatty.
In cases of older standing the connective tissue has usually
undergone a marked increase. The capsule is thick, dense and
adherent. The cortical substance is shrunken with a great increase of
the fibrous elements, and the same holds true of the medullary
portion. In consequence of this, even in the cortical substance the
white or gray color predominates. The parenchymatous tissue
(glomeruli, tubules) have greatly shrunken. In connection with the
contraction of the forming fibrous hyperplasia, there is a general
shrinkage of the kidney in size, it may be to one-half its original
volume. Trasbot reports a case of nephritis, of 8 months standing, in
the dog, with a kidney half the normal size. In the end the
parenchyma may have practically disappeared, and the kidney may
have shrunken to a small, firm, white, fibrous mass. Abscess of the
kidney is exceptionally met with (Laurent, Lafosse).
Lesions of distant organs are not uncommon. Bronchitis,
pneumonia, pleurisy, insufficiency of the tricuspid or mitral valves,
dilated heart, hypertrophied or fatty heart, congested or fibroid liver,
arteritis, and dropsies are among such morbid conditions.
Prognosis. This is almost always unfavorable. Death may be
delayed for months or years, and partial transient recoveries may
take place but a restoration to normal structure and function is not to
be looked for.
Treatment. This cannot be expected to be much more than
palliative. The avoidance of overwork, and of the exposure to cold
and wet, and the securing of a free action of the skin by warm
buildings and clothing, are essential. The diet should be easily
digested and non-stimulating, for herbivora green food, carrots,
roots, apples, silage, with a moderate allowance of oats to counteract
weakness and anæmia; and for carnivora, milk, buttermilk, mush
made of oat, wheat or barley meal, with, if necessary, a slight
allowance of tender raw meat. Tonics fill a similar need. Iron and
bitters may be combined. Or hydrochloric acid or nitromuriatic acid
with bitters (nux, calumba, salicin, quassia) may be tried. These
acids are especially valuable when the case has originated in or is
maintained by calculi, indigestion or hepatic disorder. When the
heart is defective in tone, it may be stimulated by small doses of
digitalis, strophanthus, sparteine, caffein, or nitro-glycerine, or to a
certain extent by strychnia or nux. These, however, must be used
with judgment, if it is found that they aggravate the case by
increasing the arterial tension. In those cases in which there is an
excessive secretion of watery urine, the possible source of this in
musty aliment should be avoided, and the flow checked by nux
vomica, in moderate doses, and bromide or iodide of potassium in
full doses. When, on the other hand, the urine becomes scanty and
dense, the great danger of a toxic action must be met by agents that
favor excretion. Pure water at will is perhaps the least objectionable
of such agents, but potassium or sodium acetate or citrate, or even
sodium chloride, in weak solution, may be given. In some cases
benefit will come from a moderate use of the balsam of copiaba, or
the leaves of buchu, which may improve the tone of the secretory
elements. The most promptly effective of these agents is pilocarpin
(Friedberger and Fröhner), but it has the serious drawback of
inducing profuse and dangerous depletion and debility. Yet in careful
hands, and with good cardiac tone, it may often be used to
advantage.
Fomentations over the loins, warm baths and mustard
embrocations, may at times be beneficial. Attempts have been made
to check the hyperplasia by the use of arsenic, mercury or the
compounds of iodine, but their use in such cases is based on theory
rather than accomplished results.
HYPERTROPHY OF THE KIDNEY.
Hypertrophy of both kidneys has not been recorded in domestic

animals. On the other hand the extraordinary development of one in
compensation for the loss or atrophy of the other is not uncommon.
In this the organ follows the general law of adaptation, seen in the
double symmetrical organs (testicle, etc.) and the more so that its
functional activity is indispensable to life. Among causes are:
blocking of an ureter by calculus, worms, neoplasm, nephritic
abscess, gangrene, etc. The enlargement of the remaining kidney is a
vicarious act and essentially a physiological one.
If compensation is perfect, it may be impossible to detect
symptoms apart from those of the primary disease.
Prognosis. Life is endangered in case of any subsequent kidney
disease.
ATROPHY OF THE KIDNEY.
Result of hyperplasia of connective tissues and compression and absorption of

parenchyma. Unilateral or partial. Causes: chronic productive inflammation,
calculus in tubes, ureter, or pelvis, tumor, retention cyst, embolism. Lesions:
sclerosis of kidney, firmness, pallor, anæmia, lack of glomeruli and tubules, cysts,
congenital, urinous retention, colloid. Symptoms: reduced secretion, palpation of
kidney. Treatment: Prevention: arrest conditions, abundance of water, succulent
food, parasiticides, operation on cysts, counteract nephritis.
Unlike hypertrophy, this is constantly the result of a pathological

process. So long as a normal functional activity of the secreting
elements is carried on, such parts must maintain their size and
healthy characters. But with the compression of such secreting
elements (glomeruli and convoluted tubes) by a hyperplasia of
connective tissue, by pressure from without or from the damming
back of the urine in the pelvis and tubes, the secretory elements are
absorbed and removed, and the final result is a general atrophy. If
such atrophy appears in both kidneys at once it can only be very
partial in extent, as extreme atrophy of both, with loss of their
secretory function, would entail poisoning and death from the
retained urinary products. The comparative frequency of the disease
may be inferred from the reports of the numbers of specimens found
by Barrier and Moussu in old horses in the dissecting rooms. The
latter observed a dozen cases in a single winter, other examples are
recorded by Cadeac (horse), Soula (swine) and Trasbot (in various
animals).
Causes. The most common source of the condition is the
occurrence of chronic productive inflammation. The new product in
such cases, if not pus, or a growth that rapidly passes into fatty or
granular degeneration, or into gangrene, tends to form tissue of a
low organization, especially fibrous. The resulting increase of the
fibrous trabeculæ, in undergoing subsequent contraction necessarily
compresses the secretory tissue and the final result is a visible and, it
may be, extreme wasting. Hence any slowly advancing productive
inflammation is liable to result in absorption and removal of the
kidney parenchyma, and distinct atrophy of the gland.
Again the obstruction of the ureter by a calculus in the pelvis
which falls into the infundibuliform entrance, or a stone arrested at
any part of the duct (or even of the urethra) or by worms, hydatids,
cysts or tumors, throws back on the kidney the secreted urine, which
distending the pelvis and uriniferous tubes leads to direct
compression and absorption of the secretory parenchyma. Direct
compression of the kidney by an adjacent tumor will act in a similar
manner. Retention cysts by their gradual increase and augmenting
pressure cause absorption of the gland tissue.
The blocking of individual uriniferous tubules by minute calculi,
which is so often seen in cattle, kept on dry feeding in winter, is a
cause of partial nephritis, and absorption, as noted by Röll.
A somewhat rare cause of atrophy is the diminution of the blood
supply by arteritis and embolism of the renal artery, or by pressure
of tumors on that vessel. Arteritis and blocking suggests at once the
possible agency of the strongylus (sclerostoma) armatus in the horse.
Trasbot records a striking instance of compression of the renal artery
and kidney by an enormous sublumbar melanoma. This occurred in
an aged horse and led to atrophy.
Lesions. In cases due to productive inflammation with sclerosis of
the kidney, the firmness, pallor and bloodlessness of the organ is a
marked feature. When incised it is found to be composed mainly of
fibrous tissue, while the glomeruli and tubuli have to a large extent
disappeared.
If there has been simple lack of circulation the kidney becomes
flaccid, pale and small in size. The secretory elements (glomeruli and
uriniferous tubes) are first absorbed, leaving the fibrous network,
which tends to shrink and form a hard resistent mass. In extreme
cases there may be absolutely no glandular tissue left, and the dense
shrunken mass represents only the hyperplasia of the original
fibrous network. In the different successive stages of this process the
glomeruli and tubules become flattened, the epithelial cells become
granular, or contain colloid casts and refrangent elements like oil
globules and finally they are represented by a small mass of fibrous
material.
Of all the atrophies caused by the pressure of tumors perhaps that
caused by cysts is the most characteristic. There may be a single cyst
or they may be multiple; they may range in size from a pea to the size
of the two fists the total size exceeding that of the normal kidney. In
all such cases the cysts project visibly from the surface of the organ.
They vary according to their origin and nature. Congenital cysts are
said to have resulted from distension by retained urine of the capsule
of the glomerulus. The arterial tuft is atrophied and flattened against
the wall. Serous cysts with clear contents are found in the old.
Urinous cysts again form by distension of the tubules that are
obstructed by cysts or minute calculi. Colloid cysts are found in
certain forms of nephritis formed by the dilatation of the capsule of
the glomerulus or of the uriniferous tubules. The liquid often
contains leucin, tyrosin and cholesterine. In all such cases the walls
of the cyst become thick, and the glandular parenchyma is
compressed leading to progressive degeneration and atrophy.
Symptoms of atrophy of the kidney are necessarily those of
suppression of urine, with, in certain cases, the passage of casts of
the uriniferous tubes and of crystals of salts. There are, however, no
absolutely pathognomonic symptoms. When the kidney can be
reached through the flaccid walls of a comparatively empty
abdomen, or through the rectum, its hard, shrunken condition may
assist in diagnosis.
Treatment is not successful in advanced cases. Prevention is to be
sought by obviating or treating the conditions on which the atrophy
depends. Nephritis must be treated on general principles. Calculi
must be avoided by a liberal supply of water, by soiling, or by
pasturage. Strongylus parasitism should be dealt with by destroying
the parent worms in the bowels, and by securing pure drinking water
free from their eggs and embryos. Cysts, and tumors are only
amenable to surgical measures and not often open even to these.
FATTY DEGENERATION OF THE KIDNEY:
STEATOSIS OF THE KIDNEY.
Causes: age, overfeeding, idleness, atony, retention of urine. Lesions: kidney

enlarged, pale yellow, capsule loose, cut surface glistening unctuous, oil globules in
scrapings, granules soluble in ether. Symptoms: in idle, overfed, obese, improved
meat producing breeds, closely confined, starchy or saccharine food, fatty granules
in urine, finally dropsies, anæmia, debility, sluggishness. Prognosis unfavorable in
advanced stage. Treatment: butcher, restricted regimen, open air exercise,
nitrogenous diet, crossing, diuretic food or drugs, oil of turpentine, balsam
copiaba. Palliation only.
Fatty degeneration of the kidneys is by no means unknown in the

domestic animals. It has been observed in dogs and cats (Rogers,
Goubaux, Vulpain, Trasbot). In dogs it has been erroneously set
down as a characteristic lesion of rabies. Like fatty degeneration of
other organs, it is also met with in old and overfed individuals of
meat producing breeds of animals, in which the tendency to early
maturity and rapid and excessive fattening has been fostered from
generation to generation. In man small, granular, fatty kidney is a
common result of chronic parenchymatous nephritis, and often
coincides with fatty liver. Chronic poisoning by arsenic or
phosphorus is another cause, as it is of fatty degeneration in other
organs.
Vulpain has attributed it to a lack of active exertion and of general
tone, associated with excessive amylaceous feeding, sluggish, shallow
breathing and tardy elimination. Goubaux and Trasbot attach great
importance to the compulsory retention of urine in house dogs, cats
and horses. The damming back of the urine in the convoluted tubes
and glomeruli, temporarily arrests secretion, and the inactive and
compressed cells tend at once to granular and fatty degeneration.
Lesions. The gland is sensibly increased in size, and pale, yellowish
or straw yellow. The capsule is easily detached from the cortical
substance, contrary to what is the case in chronic productive
inflammation. The cortical substance is increased in thickness, and
pale, the pallor being largely in ratio with the duration or extent of
the fatty degeneration. The cut surface may be glistening and
unctuous to the touch. It is softer than usual, rather friable, and if
scraped, furnishes a serous or grayish pulp in which oil globules are
prominent features, together with granular epithelium and free
granules that dissolve readily in ether. Tubules are varicose and
unequal at different parts. The medullary portion has undergone
little change. It may be paler at certain points, with some shrinking
of its substance and increase of firmness.
Symptoms. As a rule the disease occurs in pampered, overfed and
obese animals, and in those of the improved breeds which have great
power of digestion, assimilation and fattening. It is especially to be
looked for after close confinement on full, stimulating, amylaceous
diet. Symptoms are not usually recognized during life. There is,
however, a lessening of the urinary secretion, and, as the disease
advances, albuminuria. When examined microscopically this is
found to contain characteristic elements, such as granular epithelial
cells, the granules soluble in ether, oil globules, and at times crystals
of cholesterine (Beale). A diagnosis based on the mere presence of oil
globules may, however, be fallacious, as these may be present in
animals that have just been heavily fed on oleaginous food, and again
the oil used to smear the catheter may float in the urine and prove
misleading. Under such circumstances vaseline or glycerine may be
substituted on the catheter. Scriba induced fatty urine by injecting
fat or oil emulsion into the blood, and Chabrie by ligating the large
intestine. Trasbot says that cylindroid casts may be present. As in
other grave kidney affections, dropsies supervene as the disease
advances. These may show in the limbs, in the abdomen, or in other
serous cavities. A steadily advancing anæmia with pallor of the
mucosæ, listlessness, weakness, debility and sluggishness are to be
noted.
Prognosis. Since the disease is rarely diagnosed until it has
reached an advanced stage, it usually progresses steadily to a fatal
issue. If, however, it can be detected at an earlier stage, it may be
palliated, or held in abeyance, for a length of time varying with the
extent of the lesions. As it is very largely a disease of meat producing
animals and as the subject is at first in a condition of marked obesity,
it can usually be turned over to the butcher without material loss.
Treatment. If the disease has resulted from the inbred propensity
to fattening, the family that shows the disposition must be subjected
to a somewhat different regimen, open air exercise must take the
place of confinement in warm stables, a rather bare pasturage is
valuable for herbivora, and a restricted diet in which the oleaginous,
saccharine, and amylaceous constituents do not predominate, is
strongly indicated. Crossing with a strange male having many of the
desirable qualities of the herd, but which is more vigorous may be
resorted to. When the secretion of urine becomes scanty an
abundance of pure water, or a diet of succulent grass or roots or
ensilage or even small doses of alkaline diuretics may be resorted to.
Any source of arsenic or phosphorus poisoning should be cut off, and
as an antidote to phosphorus, oil of turpentine may be given in small
doses. This agent may, indeed, replace the alkalies as a diuretic,
bringing in an element of tone for the mucosa which is not to be
despised. Or balsam of copaiba or buchu leaves may be substituted.
When the small white kidney (granular, fatty) results from chronic
nephritis, the prevention and treatment would be as for that disease.
Little hope is to be entertained of entire restoration to health.
AMYLOID KIDNEY. LARDACEOUS OR WAXY
KIDNEY.
This condition of the kidney has been found in the ox (Gerlach)

and dog (Rabe, etc.). There are usually similar degenerative lesions
in the liver, pancreas, intestines and other organs. It is usually a
concomitant of some chronic wasting disease (chronic nephritis,
tuberculosis, etc.).
Morbid Anatomy. The kidney is usually enlarged, pale and on
section waxy or glistening. Soaked in dilute compound tincture of
iodine it shows spots of a walnut or mahogany brown color. The
glomeruli are well marked and show the earlier changes, later the
tubes do so excepting the epithelium. The latter is swollen, granular,
fatty.
Symptoms. There may have been those of chronic nephritis. Rabe
has noticed in dogs dropsy of the limbs, ascites, emaciation,
anorexia, followed by uræmia, coma, weakness, vomiting, and if the
kidney alone was affected great lowering of temperature (35.9°C).
With hepatic complication there was greater weakness, giddiness,
and higher temperature (39.6°C). Urine is usually increased (in man
albuminous) and the casts have shown the anyloid reaction. They
tend to be fatty or finely granular. Casts may, however, show anyloid
reaction when the kidney, post mortem, does not (Jaksch).
Diagnosis from Bright’s disease is often impossible.
Treatment is essentially the same as in chronic nephritis, and is
not hopeful.
Trasbot recommends KI 3 to 7 grs., or tinct of iodine 3 drops for
shepherd dog. Ol. terebinth and alkaline diuretics are also
commended.
RENAL CALCULUS.
This is much more common than is supposed. Small calculi formed

in the tubuli uriniferi of cattle on dry winter feeding often pass
without recognition, and habitually disappear on rich spring and
summer grass.
If retained in the pelvis until increasing size forbids their passage
through the ureter they form pelvic calculi.
If retained in the bladder so that they cannot enter the urethra
they form cystic calculi.
Pelvic calculi or concretions are often (in cattle and swine) mere
scales lying in chalices. They may fill the whole pelvis and send
branching processes into chalices.
Causes. They are attributed to phosphaturia, lithæmia or uric acid
diathesis, oxaluria, etc. In cattle they are associated with dry feeding
and are common on all magnesian limestone soils. There are usually
catarrh of the kidney and the presence of bacterial ferments and
colloids (pus, albumen, etc.). (Sharing and Ord.) Calculi or gravel is
preceded by renal catarrh, but this is aggravated by the crystalline
deposit. Bacteria act also in producing NH3O, which instantly
precipitates ammonio-magnesian phosphate. Retention of urine
greatly favors the precipitation.
Symptoms. A white or brownish yellow deposit in the last urine
discharged collects on the floor. Cloudy urine. Passage of crystals—
round—or angular. Colic. Lameness in one or both hind limbs.
Arched back. Sensitive loins. Pain paroxysmal. Attempts to urinate.
Little passed but often with drops of blood. Sudden relief when the
calculus enters the bladder.
Retained in the kidney it may cause no suffering in meat
producing animals, but in horses it usually causes stiffness or
lameness especially under violent effort. Also hematuria; blood
globules are found in the deposit when placed under the microscope.
There may be sepsis and specially cloudy offensive urine.
Diagnosis: May be confounded with renal tuberculosis, or sarcoma
or oxaluria. Examine for bacillus, small cells, or oxalate of lime or
oxalic acid.
Prophylaxis. In the early stages give succulent, watery food,
ensilage, roots, potatoes, spring grass, and water ad libitum.
Treatment. Salt may tempt the patient to drink. Nitro-muriatic
acid is a solvent and antiseptic. Or alkalies with salicylate of soda.
Also tonics. Quiet pain by morphia and other anodynes. Use
piperazine.
These failing, an operation on the kidney may be considered.
HYDRO-NEPHROSIS.
A common result of calculus or other obstruction, causing
increasing pressure of urine in the pelvis and absorption of the
parenchyma, and finally leaving a mere urinous sac.
RENAL TUMORS.
1. Non-malignant: Fibroma.
Lipoma.
Angioma.
Adenoma.
Papilloma.
2. Malignant: Sarcoma.
Carcinoma.
RENAL PARASITES.
Echinococcus: Herbivora, Omnivora.
Bilharzia Crassa: Egyptian cattle.
Strongylus Gigas: Horse, ox, dog, man.
(Cysticercus Tenuicollis: Ruminants: Pig).
Tænia serrata: Dog. Pelvis.
Sclerostoma equinum: (renal arteries, kidney pelvis), soliped.
Stephanurus dentatus: Pig, (pus cavities).
Trichosoma plicata: (Urinary bladder), dog.
T. felis: (Cat), bladder.
Indetermined embryos: Kidneys, dog; small tumors.
Cytodites nudus: Kidneys; hens.
Œstrus, (Gast. Hemorrhoidalis): Bladder walls: horse.
Mucorimyces: Kidneys; dog.
Coccidia: Kidney, Horse, dog, goose.
INJURIES OF THE URETERS.
Lesions by bullets, arrows, stabs, bruises and lacerations in parturition, treads,

wheels, tumors, ulcers, calculi, tubercles, parasites. Course. Pathology: transverse
division may cause hydronephrosis, or septic peritonitis. Symptoms: uncertain,
traumatism, bloody urine, arched, stiff, tender loins, straining, recumbency,
groaning in turning or rising, rectal palpation of distended ureter, of ascitic fluid,
pitting on pressure of loin, flank or groin, liquid drawn through a cannula is
urinous, urine still discharged by normal channel. Crystals in urine, worm ova.
Treatment: compresses, fomentations, sinapisms, anodynes, balsams,
antispasmodics, extraction of calculus, lateral implantation of urethra.
From their deep and protected position it might be plausibly

concluded that the ureters were secure against every kind of
traumatism. This however, is not the case, since in both man and
animals they have been known to have been injured by bullet
wounds, arrow wounds, and stab wounds of various kinds. In
dystokia with laceration of the womb, vagina or bladder the ureter is
liable to be injured. By blows and kicks it may even be ruptured or
torn across, and also by sudden and severe mechanical compression
of the abdomen as when run over by a wagon or trodden on by a
horse, ox, or other large animal. Tumors of various kinds may grow
in, or press upon the ureter, ulcers with thick indurated margins or
base may obstruct the passage, or calculi, or worms may block and
give rise to overdistension and even rupture. Kopp describes
obstruction by multiple calculi with saccular dilation in front, close
to the kidney in a cow. Cadiot records cases of thickening of the
mucosa by numerous cysts as small as hempseed. Intra-abdominal
tumors of the spermatic cord have been known to block the passage.
Again tubercles have formed on the urethra, and polypi on the
trigonum vesicæ have blocked the ureter and produced all the evil
consequences of calculus, parasites, etc.

Social Justification and Political Legitimacy: How Voters Rationalize Direct Democratic Economic Policy in America Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger

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Social Justification and Political Legitimacy: How Voters Rationalize Direct Democratic Economic Policy in America Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger

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Social Justification and Political

Legitimacy: How Voters Rationalize

Communicative Legitimacy: Habermas and Democratic

Pathologies of Democratic Frustration. Voters and

The Handbook of Political, Social, and Economic

Globalisation and Energy Transition in Latin America

Direct Social Work Practice: Theory and Skills eBook

The Arab Uprisings in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia:

Social Democratic Capitalism Lane Kenworthy

Epistemic Democracy and Political Legitimacy 1st ed.

ISBN 978-3-030-51715-1 ISBN 978-3-030-51716-8 (eBook)

I would like to thank Jeff Sallaz, Jane Zavisca, Albert Bergesen,

3 Analytical Approach and Broader American Political

4 Data and Methods 85

5 Proposition 201 (2008) 105

6 Proposition 202 (2008) 151

7 Proposition 204 (2012) 205

8 Moral Economies 251

9 Conclusion and Theory Building 285

Table 2.1 The functions of legitimation from contemporary

Table 5.6 Unexpected: legitimations exclusive to the unexpected

Table 7.3 Legitimations distinctive of partisan affiliation and DDEP

Empirical Issue: Direct Democratic

© The Author(s) 2020 1

and Bartels 2016). This is supported by work in direct democracy, which

concerned political reform and economic policy—including the regula-

Research Question 1: How Do Partisanship and Self-interest Interact

Research Question 2: What Are the Discourses That Voters

Here, I refer to “legitimacy” using Max Weber and Seymour Lipset’s

Beetham’s perspective overlaps with classic theory from American

(Swidler 1986, 2001; Lamont 1992, 2000; Eliasoph and Lichterman

Theory Building Agenda and Generalizability

Availability of CISSes that were economic policy limited states where

on trends in American presidential voting that is in line with or in

that I used a quasi-experimental design that implements a “Posttest-

Research Agenda for the Selection

The second ballot measure, “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring, Proposition

Baldassarri, Delia, and Andrew Gelman. 2008. “Partisans Without Constraint:

Jung, Jae-Hee. 2020. “The Mobilizing Effect of Parties’ Moral Rhetoric.”

Lizardo, Omar. 2017. “Improving Cultural Analysis: Considering Personal

© The Author(s) 2020 27

Legitimacy and Legitimation

Maintain legitimacy Undermine Repair legitimacy Spread legitimacy Establish legitimacy

and Thévenot 2006;

this book focuses on how legitimations as broader justifications that are

conception of normative justifiability builds on the work of John Locke

to investigate popular political justifications. The key here is that the

Framework for Research Questions

Hypertrophy of both kidneys has not been recorded in domestic

Result of hyperplasia of connective tissues and compression and absorption of

Unlike hypertrophy, this is constantly the result of a pathological

Causes: age, overfeeding, idleness, atony, retention of urine. Lesions: kidney

Fatty degeneration of the kidneys is by no means unknown in the

This condition of the kidney has been found in the ox (Gerlach)

This is much more common than is supposed. Small calculi formed

Lesions by bullets, arrows, stabs, bruises and lacerations in parturition, treads,

From their deep and protected position it might be plausibly

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