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Society in the Self
Society in the Self
A Theory of Identity in Democracy
H U B E RT J. M . H E R M A N S
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

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© Oxford University Press 2018
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

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above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Hermans, H. J. M., author.
Title: Society in the self : a theory of identity in democracy / Hubert J. M. Hermans.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2018. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identiiers: LCCN 2017038163 | ISBN 9780190687793 (hardcover : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Self—Social aspects. | Group identity. | Identity (Psychology) | Democracy.
Classiication: LCC BF697.5.S65 H47 2018 | DDC 302.5/4—dc23
LC record available at htps://lccn.loc.gov/2017038163
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
To my parents
who, although they passed away a long time ago,
are still living and guiding me in the intimate regions of my self
and
To my peers at primary school
who, by their bullying behavior,
unwitingly stimulated me to explore alternative routes in my life
Learning in a democracy is a continuing dialogue, both
between people and within the self, and a dialogue
assumes diferent and even contrasting positions.
– he author
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction: he Democratic Organization of Self and Identity 1
1. he Dynamics of Society-in-the-Self 17
2. Positioning and Democracy in the Self 45
3. Positioning and Democracy in Teams and Organizations 105
4. he Positioning Brain 141
5. Social and Societal Over-Positioning: he Emergence

of I-Prisons 203
6. Heterogenizing and Enriching the Self 255
7. Dialogue as Generative Form of Positioning 299
8. Dialogical Democracy in a Boundary-Crossing World:

Practical Implications 353
Glossary 399
References 401
Index 417
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
“Isn’t it time to stop this continuous writing of yours?” is a question oten asked
me as an emeritus professor ater 40 years of working as a psychologist and social
scientist at the Radboud University of Nijmegen. In my answer, I used to quote
the Belgian novelist Hugo Claus who, in a television interview at the occasion
of his 70th birthday, was confronted with the same question. He briely replied,
“You can also ask me to stop breathing.” When I refer to this anecdote, people
usually respond with a smile of understanding.
I want to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to a special circle of
friends and colleagues who have greatly inspired me to develop the positioning
theory outlined in this book or have given their valuable contributions during
the process of writing.
I have been blessed to work with three commenters, Agnieszka Konopka,
Annerieke Oosterwegel, and Peter Zomer, who have read all chapters in detail
and given their extremely useful critical remarks. Moreover, ater each chapter
they profoundly discussed with me the shortcomings of the initial texts and
enriched me with numerous suggestions for improvement. Peter was very keen
on conceptual clarity and consistency of the argument through all sections and
chapters of the book. Annerieke had a sharp eye for the luency and “rhythm” of
the text and helped me to link the present theory with other streams of thought.
Agnieszka stimulated me to strive for a balance between reason and emotion and
between verbal and nonverbal aspects of the theory. Usually, writing a lengthy
book is the job of a hermit. However, thanks to the intense interest and unusual
devotion of these dear colleagues, I had the feeling that they co-traveled with me
through the emerging space of the book. heir (critical) way of understanding
my texts deepened also my understanding of myself.
I also feel indebted to neuropsychologists Marc Lewis and Herman Kolk,
two internationally recognized colleagues from the Radboud University, who
were willing to check chapter 4 in which I have made an atempt to explore
ix
x Acknowledgments
what positioning theory can learn from recent developments in neuroscientiic

research. heir comments have stimulated me to sharpen and reine some of the
neurological concepts relevant to the exposition of the theory.
Apart from the commenters who have directly contributed to this book, I feel
the need to express my gratitude to several colleagues and friends who have
inspired me during the years preceding the writing of this book. Although the
list could be long, I limit myself to a selected group of persons:
My late friend and colleague Harry Kempen, a cultural psychologist, with
whom I published the irst article (American Psychologist, 1992) and book
(Academic Press, 1993) on dialogical self theory, always impressed me with his
unique capacity to think across the boundaries of (sub)disciplines, a git that
helped me to ind unexpected linkages between previously unrelated phenom-
ena. hroughout the years of our cooperation, we felt located in a ield of tension
between two streams of thought: one European and philosophical and the other
American and empirical. his area of ambiguity greatly motivated us to explore
linkages between divergent or contradicting approaches.
During 25 years I cooperated, as a co-therapist, with Els Hermans-Jansen,
with whom I developed the self-confrontation method, published in our book
Self-Narratives (1995). Applying the method in her independent practice
gave me the opportunity to witness the oten dramatic changes in the self-
organization of clients at turning points in their lives. Each client opened for me
a new universe of meaning and, at the same time, each new client was a threat
to my theory! Els also gave me the opportunity to apply a new method in her
practice, the Personal Position Repertoire (PPR) method, which stimulated the
further development of dialogical self theory, from which the present position-
ing theory is an ofspring.
Jaan Valsiner coined the term “promoter sign” in 2004, which led me to intro-
duce the notion of “promoter position” as one of the central concepts in the
present theory. Moreover, Jaan stimulated me to launch the International Journal
for Dialogical Science, to which he was willing to contribute as associate editor. In
this context, I am also very grateful to Vincent Hevern, another co-editor who
did the painstaking job of managing the journal.
he contribution of Agnieszka Konopka was already mentioned. I feel the
need to further express my gratitude for our stimulating cooperation in prepar-
ing and writing our book Dialogical Self heory (2010) and in giving many con-
ference presentations and workshops together. She advised me to include the
very useful spatial concept of I-prison in the theory. As a Buddhist, she taught
me how to develop a “beginner’s mind,” a precious git that helps me to look
at familiar people, objects, and even texts as if I see them for the irst time and
retain an open perspective.
Acknowledgments xi
here are four Japanese colleagues who provided the opportunity to spread
the work of my colleagues and me in their country: Masayoshi Morioka and
Tatsuya Sato from Ritsumeikan University, Shinichi Mizokami from Kyoto
University, and Reiko Nakama from Fukushima University. Masayoshi, Shinichi,
and Reiko translated the irst book on the dialogical self (1993) in Japanese.
Presently, Tatsuya and Masayoshi are inishing the Japanese translation of our
2010 book on the same subject.
I am very indebted to three editors of international journals who gave me,
together with changing teams of researchers, space to publish a series of spe-
cial issues on the dialogical self: Robert Neimeyer, editor of the Journal of
Constructivist Psychology; Henk Stam, editor of heory & Psychology; and Jaan
Valsiner, editor of Culture & Psychology. hey provided my collaborators and me
with an ideal forum to spread our ideas.
here were several colleagues with whom I had the privilege to cooperate in
organizing the biennial international conferences on the dialogical self: Michael
Katzko in Nijmegen, he Netherlands (2000); Leni Verhofstadt in Ghent,
Belgium (2002); (late) Katarzina Stemplewska and Piotr Oles in Warsaw,
Poland (2004); Miguel Goncalves and Joao Salgado in Braga, Portugal (2006
and 2018); Alex Gillespie in Cambridge, UK (2008); Stavros Charalambides,
Athens, Greece (2010); Bob Fecho, Athens, Georgia (2012); Frans Meijers,
he Hague, he Netherlands (2014); Piotr Oles, Lublin, Poland (2016); and
again Miguel Goncalves, Braga, Portugal (scheduled in 2018). I remember these
inspiring events with the greatest pleasure and gratitude.
I also like to express great respect and gratitude to Dan McAdams who was
willing to give several keynotes at our conferences and who made me aware not
only of the close connection between narrative and dialogue but also of their dif-
ferences. Ken Gergen, who also gave several keynotes at our conferences, shines
for me as an inspiring and deep thinker on the meaning of “relational being” in
our present society. he diferent views of Dan as a “unity thinker” and Ken as
a “diversity thinker” created a fertile ield of tension that was highly valuable in
developing the present theory.
I also want to thank Roos van Riet, an experienced drawer, who succeeded
in translating particular social relationships and emotions into facial expres-
sions and body postures as presented in one of the igures in chapter 2; Gerhard
Frensel, who designed the circle igure that appears in diferent chapters as a
pictorial representation of the essence of the theory; and Leiba Stuart for her
inal check on the English language.
I want to express my great appreciation for three anonymous reviewers invited
by Oxford University Press who have motivated me to revise parts of the book
and add new ones. I am also impressed by the luent and stimulating cooperation
xii Acknowledgments
with the staf members of the Press who were my very helpful guides in the inal
stage of the book.
Finally, I would like to thank my partner Josée Jeunhomme. Although hers
is a very diferent ield, her interest and dedication made her a true companion
during the writing of this book and the inevitable ups and downs that are part of
such a process.
Introduction
he Democratic Organization of Self and Identity
he most violent element in society is ignorance.

—Emma Goldman
Rather than considering society as an external cause or context, this book deals
with society as working in the internal domains of the self. In a similar vein,
democracy is not only treated as an organizing principle of a modern society
but also, and even primarily, as having its fertile source in the deeper layers of
self and identity.
In addressing self and society in all their complexity and diversity, scientists
have typically studied self as an entity or process in itself (e.g., self-consistency,
self-enhancement, self-eicacy), with society considered as the external envi-
ronment. hey do so on the (implicit) assumption that, although the self is
continuously inluenced by society from the outside, it can be studied as a sepa-
rate entity in itself. he problem of this self–society dualism is that it does not
suiciently take into account the functioning of society within the self and the
way the self acts upon this society from its own self-organization, as exempli-
ied by phenomena, recently popping up in the social-scientiic literature, like
self-sabotage, self-radicalization, self-cure, self-government, self-nationalization,
and self-internationalization. As these phenomena suggest, the self contributes
to and even shapes the society at large in and from its own internal workings.
he book takes maters even one step further. It not only deals with the societal
organization of the self but also poses the question whether the self is democrati-
cally organized. To what extent do the diferent self-parts (e.g., roles, emotions,
imagined others) receive freedom of expression? To what extent are they treated
as equal or equivalent components of the self? In analogy to the tension between
freedom and equality in a democratic society, the question is posed how the self,
in its organizing capacity, responds to the apparent tension between freedom
and equality of the components of the self. A signiicant implication of this view
1
2 Society in the Self
is that diferences, oppositions, coalitions, conlicts, clashes, and power games

exist not only between positions of participants of the society at large but also
between the I-positions of the individual self.
I will show that the intimate self–society connection has far-reaching con-
sequences for such divergent topics as self-leadership, cultural diversity in the
self, the relationship between reason and emotion, self-empathy, cooperation
and competition between self-parts, and the role of the self in prejudice, enemy
image construction, and scapegoating. I complete the book with an extensive
discussion of the necessity and potentials of generative internal and external dia-
logue in our boundary-crossing world and with practical guidelines for the self-
governing individual living in a democratic society in which the tension between
social power and dialogue is more intense than ever before.
he purpose of the book is to present an original theory on the “democra-
tization of the self,” based on theoretical investigations, social-scientiic litera-
ture, neuroscience, and analysis of everyday life situations. he central thesis is
that a democratic society is fostered by, and even in need of, a democratically
organized self.
What Led to Writing his Book?

During my search for the dialogical potentials of the self, I came across an article
that was somewhat disturbing to me and continued to function as an insoluble
contradiction in my thinking for several decades. It was Anthony Greenwald’s
(1980) landmark publication he Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of
Personal History. Its centerpiece was the striking analogy between the organiza-
tion of knowledge in the self and totalitarian information-control strategies as
exposed in George Orwell’s (1949) 1984. In his portrayal of the self, Greenwald
elaborated on three cognitive biases found in atribution research: egocentricity
(perceiving one’s self as more central to events than it actually is), “benefectance”
(perception of responsibility for desired, but not undesired, outcomes), and
cognitive conservatism (the disposition to preserve existing knowledge structures
together with a resistance to cognitive change). Orwell’s characterizations of
thought control at the level of a totalitarian society could stand as a summary of
cognitive biases at the level of an individual self.
Although I found that the analogy between the egocentric nature of the self
and the highly centralized totalitarian state was convincingly argued, I was con-
fused by the contradiction between the self-centered nature of the individual
person as depicted by Greenwald and the highly valued ideal of democracy that
is seen by many as one of the most cherished acquisitions of human civilization.
How can self-centered citizens it with a democratic society that requires them
The Democratic O rgani z ation o f S el f and Id e nti t y 3
to decenter themselves as part of a larger community? Are self-centered indi-

viduals able to function in a democracy that invites them to be other-centered
too? Are they able and willing to take responsibility not only for desired but
also undesired outcomes? Are they able and willing to change their cognitive
structures when confronted with nonconirming evidence or when they com-
municate with others who have diferent or contrasting views of life?
hese questions allowed me to consider the cultural limitations to which
the self is exposed. he Western self is not only centralized and individualized
to a strong degree but also bounded. his was eloquently expressed by cultural
anthropologist Cliford Geertz (1979) who deined the Western conception
of the self as “a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and
cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and
action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against
other such wholes and against a social and natural background” (p. 59). he
distinctive wholeness of the self was also discussed by Sampson (1985) who,
from a social-constructionist point of view, depicts the Western ideal image
of the self as an entity with razor-sharp boundaries between self and non-self,
with the exclusion of the other as an intrinsic part of the self and as persist-
ently involved in a pursuit of having the environment under perfect control. In
a philosophical analysis, Dunne (1996) deines the modern sense of self as a
“sovereign self ” that is above all “its own ground” (p. 137) and traces it back to
Descartes’ rational knower whose I or ego has “no acknowledged complicity in
language, culture, or community” (p. 138) (see also Gergen’s [2009] criticism
of the “bounded self ” as a product of the Enlightenment; for elaboration see
chapter 1 of this book).
We are faced with a problematic contradiction in the heritage of the
Enlightenment. Driven by its ideals of freedom and equality, it has stimulated
the process of emancipation by opening the closed boundaries between higher
and lower social classes, by stimulating women to broaden their role repertoire
beyond traditional constraints, and by extending sexual freedom and variation
beyond masculine ideals and patriarchal social structures. he opening of the
boundaries between classes, sexual identities, gender roles, age groups, and cul-
tural identities has led to an amazing expansion of the possibilities for the devel-
opment of the self. At the same time, however, the Enlightenment has had the
efect of fostering the ideal of a self-contained individualism that has constrained
the self to its own individualized autonomy and has put the heavy load of self-
esteem, self-realization, and self-development on the shoulders of its own sov-
ereignty. he Enlightenment has provided us with an increasing multiplicity of
identity and associated possibilities for psychological growth and development,
but, at the same time, this multiplicity has to be realized within the “golden bars”
of a self that is imprisoned in its own egocentricity.
he Core Idea of Positioning heory: Self as a

Democracy
he problematic contradiction between the egocentricity of a bounded self and
the ideals and requirements of a democratically organized society instigated me
to look for ways to overcome the separation between self and society, that is, the
self considered as a purely inner reality with an essence in itself and a democratic
society viewed as a surrounding structure in which diferent (bounded) selves
are supposed to be capable and willing to cooperate and fulill their desires to
their mutual beneit. My answer to this contradiction led to some questions that
I posed to myself and served as searchlights during the years preceding the writ-
ing of this book: What would the self look like, when it would be considered as
a democracy itself? How would the self function if considered as a micro-society
in which its diferent parts would be organized in a democratic way? Would
democracy be a viable metaphor for exploring the ways in which the self is posi-
tioning itself toward others and toward itself? Could this metaphor be proit-
able not only for the self but also for the society at large? Would the metaphor
help to ind ways of overcoming the much-criticized self–society dichotomy and
allow the construction of communication channels between self and society that
would lead to their mutual beneit? In my search for answers to these questions,
I developed a theoretical framework in which the self is proposed as an organized
society of I-positions (e.g., I as professional, I as an immigrant, I as politically
engaged), as intimately linked with the identity positions of individuals, groups,
and cultures in the society at large. his “self-society” is organized in such a way
that positions are allowed to communicate with each other, to express them-
selves from their own experiences and speciic point of view, and to contribute
to the development of other positions in the self and to the positions of other
people in the society at large. As I argue in this book, a democratic organization
of the self adds value to both self and society in their interconnection.1
he Analogy Between Democracy in Society

and in the Self
At the end of the previous century, Amartya Sen (1999), Nobel prize win-
ner in economic sciences, was asked by a leading Japanese newspaper what
1
he positioning theory proposed in this book is a step beyond dialogical self theory (Hermans
& Hermans-Konopka, 2010). he present conceptual framework is formulated and developed as a
theory on the democratic functioning of the self.
he considered the most important thing that had happened in the twentieth
century. Pondering this thought-provoking question, he realized that many
things of gravity had happened during that century. he European empires,
mainly the British and French ones that had dominated so many parts of the
world for a long time, came to an end. here were two world wars that led to
the untimely death of many millions. here was the rise and fall of fascism and
Nazism. Moreover, the century witnessed the rise and fall of communism (as in
the former Soviet Union) or its radical transformation (as in China). here was
also a shit from the economic dominance of the West to a new economic bal-
ance with countries of East and Southeast Asia playing increasingly inluential
roles. Sen realized that the past hundred years were not lacking in important
events. Nevertheless, relecting on the many developments that had occurred
in that century, he did not, ultimately, experience any doubt in choosing one as
the preeminent development of that period: the rise of democracy. He would
expect that, in the distant future, when people look back at that century, they will
accord primacy to the emergence of democracy as the most acceptable form of
governance (Sen, 1999).
In his further relections, Sen (1999) observes that throughout the nine-
teenth century, theorists of democracy found it natural to discuss whether or not
a country was “it for democracy.” In the twentieth century, however, theorists
started to recognize that the question itself was wrong: “A country does not have
to be deemed it for democracy; rather, it has to become it through democracy”
(p. 4, emphasis added). he author views this “becoming” as a momentous
change, as the potential reach of democracy is extended to billions of people,
with their very diferent histories and cultures and disparate levels of aluence.
I ind this dynamic view of democracy particularly germane for the central thesis
as proposed in the present book. Democracy in the self is not to be conceived
as a personality trait with individuals rated as below or above an average, and
they are not to be judged as iting to a democratic society or not. It is rather a
process that becomes true in its active realization. As I try to demonstrate with
the dynamic positioning model, democracy is actually a desirable process of
self-democratization.
However, Sen (1999) is wondering: What exactly is democracy? It would
be a mistake to identify democracy with majority rule. Certainly, democracy
includes voting and respect for election results and legal entitlements, he con-
tinues, but it also needs the protection of liberties and freedoms, the guarantee-
ing of free discussion, and the uncensored distribution of news and comments.
He considers political and civil rights, especially those guaranteeing open dis-
cussion, debate, criticism, and dissent, as central to the process of generating
informed and considered choices. Along these lines, he perceives democracy as a
practice which “enriches the lives of the citizens” (p. 10, emphasis added). In line
with this view, I make a strong case for the enrichment of the self as expressed by
the emphasis on a broad bandwidth of open I-positions as a basis for dialogue,
on balancing positive and negative emotions and feelings, on the importance of
emodiversity (the health-promoting diferentiation within the domains of both
positive emotions and negative emotions), and on the awareness and construc-
tive use of shadow positions (chapters 6 and 8).
Sen (1999) distinguishes three diferent ways in which democracy enriches
the lives of the citizens. First, “political reedom is a part of human freedom in
general, and exercising civil and political rights is a crucial part of good lives
of individuals as social beings. Political and social participation has intrinsic
value for human life and well-being” (p. 10, emphasis added). he positioning
theory proposed in this book also emphasizes the freedom of any I-position to
tell its own story and express itself from its own speciic point of view without
being suppressed by any other position in the self. Democracy in the self resists
a strongly hierarchical and rigid organization in which one or a few “dictatorial”
I-positions reign the total space of the self, determining the values, purposes,
and desires of the other positions from above. I-positions can be addressed by
any other position and have the freedom to open or close themselves depending
on their own intentions and the demands of the situation (chapter 2).
Second, Sen (1999) proposes that democracy has “an important instrumen-
tal value in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting
their claims to political atention (including claims of economic needs)” (p. 10,
emphasis added). In terms of the present theory, democracy in the self implies
that social, political, economic, and spiritual I-positions receive atention from
meta-positions that, as “leaders” in the self, have the task to take these claims
into account in order to arrive at well-balanced decisions. he relation between
meta-position and speciic I-positions in the self runs parallel with the same rela-
tion in teams and organizations in which leaders listen carefully to the speciic
ideas, purposes, and stories of the members from the perspective of overarching
and long-term meta-positions (chapter 3).
hird, in Sen’s (1999) view the practice of democracy “gives citizens an
opportunity to learn rom one another, and helps society to form its values and
priorities” (p. 10, emphasis added). Likewise, in a democratically organized self
I-positions have the opportunity to learn from each other in a generative dialogue
that allows new and shared meanings to emerge on the interface of self and soci-
ety (chapter 7). Moreover, the theory has made a strong case for positions in the
self as adding value to each other as a result of this dialogue. In the macro-society
diferent spheres of public life (e.g., education, science, health care) transport
meaning to each other without any sphere (e.g., the economic one) becoming
overly dominant (chapter 5). Similarly, in the micro-society of the self, diferent
I-positions (e.g., I as a student, I as a scientist, I as a patient) are enriching each
other without allowing any position (e.g., I as consumer) to overpower the other
ones. Although Sen, in his elaboration of the relationship between democracy
and richness, does not explicitly refer to the connection between learning and
dialogue, he is very explicit about the importance of dialogue for democracy in
general: “In fact, the reach and efectiveness of open dialogue are oten underes-
timated in assessing social and political problems” (p. 10).
Positioning heory as Spatial and Relational

he positioning theory presented in this book is “spatial-relational” with change
in the form of “repositioning” as its temporal dimension. When there is a posi-
tion, there are always one or more other positions to which it is oriented. A crucial
implication of this view is that between I-positions ields of tension are stretched
that may function either as fertile soils for the emergence of new positions or,
alternatively, as swamps in which one may get lost as a consequence of identity
confusion or fragmentation. In the context of generative dialogue (chapter 7), I
elaborate on the ield of tension as allowing space for the construction of “third
positions” as bridging or reconciling two diferent or conlicting I-positions.
he relevance of this ield is also illustrated by the concept of “atmosphere” and,
more speciically, by an “atmosphere of trust” as a precondition to generative dia-
logue. Moreover, the ield provides a basis for the construction of a diversity of
intercultural, transgender, transsexual, and interracial identities, which have the
“civil right” in the self to inhabit and develop their own spaces, enabling them to
escape the I-prisons of mutually exclusive options (e.g., belonging to one’s origi-
nal or host culture, being man or woman, belonging to one or another sex, being
black or white) (chapter 2; see also Hermans, Konopka, Oosterwegel, & Zomer,
2017). Even in those parts of the world where mixed identities are oicially and
legally accepted, it is not evident that they have, as I-positions, suicient space
in the self where they can feel accepted as equals. Even in tolerant societies such
I-positions may be located in the danger zone of the self as caused by overt or
hidden stereotyping, prejudices, and stigmatization (chapter 4). I propose that,
in order to develop one’s I-positions and identities in the contemporary, increas-
ingly interdependent world, one needs tolerance of uncertainty and the courage
to enter one’s challenge zone (chapters 6 and 8).
I-positioning is a form of placing oneself vis-à-vis someone or something else
who is addressed as “another I” in the metaphorical space of the extended self
(Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). herefore, I understand the demo-
cratic self as a dynamic multiplicity and diversity of I-positions (e.g., I as a pro-
fessional, I as a father, I as supporting a political party) in the landscape of the
mind. his mind is intrinsically connected with the minds of other people (e.g.,
my colleagues, my children, my opponent) who function as other I-positions in

the extended domain of the self. Between these I-positions are ields of tension
where processes of positioning, counter-positioning, and repositioning occur in
the form of sign-mediated interchange, cooperation, and learning. In agreement
with Mead (1934), the person knows oneself via “taking the role” of the other or,
in our terms, via taking the position of the other as another I.
Self as Bureaucratic or Democratic Society?

I am certainly not the irst one to propose considering the self as a society. In his
groundbreaking work he Society of Mind (1985), computer scientist Marvin
Minsky did a bold atempt to explain how the mind works as a society of agentic
parts. In the 1970s, computer scientists were far enough to devise robot pro-
grams that could see and move well enough to arrange children’s building blocks
into simple towers and playhouses. To address the complicated management
problems required by these tasks, Minsky (1986) developed a model in which
the mind is considered to function as a hierarchically organized network of inter-
connected parts that together function as a “society.” he mind of the child play-
ing with blocks was imagined to contain a host of smaller minds, called “agents.”
At a high level of organization, an agent called Builder is in control of the situa-
tion. he specialty of Builder is making towers from blocks. However, building
a tower is too complicated a job for any single, simple agent. herefore, Builder
asks for help from several other agents that work at the next lower level of organ-
ization. Each of these agents, in turn, asks lower level agents for help. As agents
in a bureaucratic organization, the diferent parts of the mind work together to
make it function as an organized whole.
In Minsky’s (1986) model, only agents at the higher levels of the mind are
able to become involved in dialogical relationships. In contrast, agents at the
lower levels, although they are parts of a functioning whole, are oten not able to
comprehend one another. Most pairs of agents cannot communicate with each
other at all. With their own programs, they are simply doing their job without
knowing anything about the performance of the other agents. hey can sim-
ply be put “on” and “of ” in the service of the higher agents in the organization.
Only at these higher levels, agents may be involved in direct communication.
Elaborating on his block building example, Minsky describes that a conlict may
arise between Builder and another agent such as Wrecker who is working at the
same level and is only interested in breaking down what Builder has achieved.
At this higher level, agents may agree or disagree as a result of their communi-
cation. he agencies responsible for Building and Wrecking may negotiate by
ofering support for one another’s goals: “Please, Wrecker, wait a moment more
till Builder adds just one more block: it’s worth it for a louder crash!” (Minsky,
1986, p. 33).
here are, however, critical diferences between Minsky’s society of mind and
the self as society as proposed in this book. First, in the present theory, the basic
concept is not an “agent” but a “position.” Between two or more positions in
communication a “space” is stretched that functions as a fertile soil for the pro-
duction of new positions that are qualitatively diferent from the original ones.
Second, while the mind in Minsky’s model is supposed to function as a strongly
hierarchical bureaucracy, the self in the present theory is conceived of as a less
hierarchical, more decentralized democratic organization. hird, inspired by
James’s (1890) notion of the “extended self,” the other in the present theory is
not simply outside the self but functions as the other-in-the-self in its extended
domain. Finally, while in Minsky’s model society is taken as a metaphor for the
inner functioning of the mind, the main concepts of the present theory contrib-
ute not only to understanding the internal operations of the self (chapter 2) but
are also applicable to democratically functioning dyads, teams, and organiza-
tions (chapter 3) and to a democracy as a macro-process (chapter 8).
Toward a Bridging heory: At the Interface

of Disciplines
he present theory has its historical roots in the American pragmatism in the
line of William James and George Herbert Mead and in the Russian dialogical
school in the tradition of Mikhail Bakhtin. he fertility and applicability of the
theory are demonstrated by its links with recent developments in the literature
from a diversity of (sub)disciplines. Among them are developmental psychol-
ogy, social psychology, personality psychology, cultural psychology, sociology,
cultural anthropology, social constructionism, neuroscience, political science,
philosophy, literary science, and history. he theory can be labeled as a “bridg-
ing theory.” What kind of theory is that? As we have explained earlier (Hermans
& Gieser, 2012), a bridging theory is neither a grand theory pretending to ofer
a comprehensive explanation of human behavior nor a mini-theory focused on
a narrow segment of human functioning. It is also not a conceptual system that
atempts to integrate two or more existing mini-theories in a synthesizing way.
Rather, it is a theory in which a larger diversity of theories, research traditions,
and practices meet, or will meet, in order to create new and unexpected link-
ages. he label “bridging theory” does not mean that there are bridges only, con-
necting existing insights or practices without providing an original perspective.
Instead, it is a theoretical framework in itself with an own identity and speciic
conceptual framework. However, this framework is open and lexible enough
to create a platform where diferent, separated and even contradictory concep-

tual systems research traditions and practices can get connected so that their
views are broadened and linked with other approaches in service of their further
development.
A bridging theory can be placed in the tradition of the New Science as repre-
sented by the Italian philosopher and historian Giambatista Vico (1744/1968).
In vehement opposition to the thinking and ahistorical mind of his contempo-
rary Descartes, he put a premium on the constructive role of imagination used by
humans to make their history. For him imagination, not to be equaled with unre-
alistic fantasy, was not only a way of interpreting incomprehensible phenomena
but also a force in shaping the physical and social environment. He realized that,
since ancient times, progress has been the result of inventions. herefore, he
assumed the existence of a creative force, which he labeled as ingenium. Using
this force, humans are able to alter their world and make history. Endowed
with ingenium, they have the capacity to move things into “new relationships”
(Hora, 1966, p. 241). his is precisely what the purpose of a bridging theory is: it
wants to cross the boundaries of (sub)disciplines and look for new relationships
between existing theories, empirical indings, and practices and use these rela-
tionship in the service of “making” self and society. As Vico says, “verare et facere
idem esse” (knowing and doing are the same) (Hora, 1966, p. 237). Positioning
is not only a way of knowing self and other but also of shaping them.
In the course of this book, a diversity of theoretical approaches and a vast
amount of empirical indings from very diferent disciplines and subdisciplines
are presented. hese theories and indings are not to be understood as “proving”
the existence of a democratic self. he presented theory is not to be seen as a rep-
resentation of an existing reality. Rather, the theory serves as a construction that
ofers a perspective on the relation between self and society from which existing
reality is interpreted in a new and unusual way. In the context of this theory,
trends in the literature, including a great deal of empirical work, are presented
as arguments demonstrating that the democratization of the self is not only
desirable but also realistic. he purpose is to create linkages between diferent
research traditions in order to achieve a comprehensive theoretical construction
with a broad picture view. At the same time, the theory aims to create bridges
between theory and practice and to stimulate research. (For an overview of the
main concepts of the theory, see the Glossary at the end of the book.)
Chapters of the Book

As I demonstrate in chapter 1, the self is not only social but also societal. It is social
in the sense that many one-to-one relationships between persons in the real world
have their analogue in the relationship of the self with itself (e.g., self-protection,
self-abuse, self-praise, self-disgust, self-admiration). However, there is another
set of more recent developments that shows up in the literature in the social sci-
ences and beyond, suggesting that also societal forms of positioning have their
analogue in the organization of the self (e.g., self-sabotage, self-radicalization,
self-cure, self-government, self-nationalization, self-internationalization). As a
result, the contemporary self is loaded with a decentralized density and hetero-
geneity of oten contradicting I-positions, which broaden the range of possibili-
ties for the developing self and, at the same time, challenge the self ’s capacity to
realize an adaptive organization of these positions. Building on these observa-
tions, I introduce the concept of self-societalization, implying that the society at
large personiies and individualizes itself via the self of the individual and, in
turn, the self expresses itself as a highly dynamic and potentially creative micro-
society that contributes to and transforms the society at large.
In chapter 2 the theory’s central concept, I-position, including its exten-
sion “we-position,” is described as a spatial-relational act of an embodied self.
It exists only in the context of other positions (e.g., I position myself as com-
petitive toward a rival and as tender-hearted toward the person I love). he act
of I-positioning is placing oneself vis-à-vis someone else. As a spatial-relational
process it is taking a stance toward someone, either physically or virtually, and
it is a way of addressing the other via verbal or nonverbal communications. he
advantage of the spatial concept of positioning is that it allows the existence of a
highly dynamic ield of tension between positions as an area for the experience of
ambiguity and contradiction. Between otherwise dichotomous categorizations
(like “man” vs. “woman” or “black” vs. “white”), mixed and ambiguous positions
may ind their place (like transgender or biracial identities). Each position has
the possibility to speak with its own voice, to tell its own story, and to express
meanings from its own speciic point of view.
However, when the self is populated by an increasing amount of diverse posi-
tions, as it is in a boundary-crossing and globalizing world, the self is at risk of
becoming fragmented or ending up in a cacophony. herefore, some higher-
order positions are needed to bring the necessary order in the self. Two posi-
tions are particularly signiicant as playing the role of “leaders in the self ”: (a)
a meta-position that provides a helicopter view and fulills, in close cooperation
with more speciic lower-order positions and constantly fed by them, an execu-
tive function in the decision-making process and (b) a promoter position that has
a considerable openness toward the future, provides a sense of direction, and
has the potential to produce a diverse range of more specialized positions that
are relevant to the further development of the self. hree additional concepts,
indispensable to the theory, are discussed: power distance, emotional distance,
and communication channels between positions.
he purpose of chapter 3 is to demonstrate that the central theoretical con-

cepts presented in the previous chapter on the level of the self can also be usefully
applied on the level of teams and organizations. In this way, the conceptual struc-
ture provides a basis for facilitating an open communication between the levels
of self, team, and organization and contributes to overcoming the self-society
dichotomy. At the team level, I present the example of democratic leadership in a
successful soccer team. At the organizational level, I discuss the leadership prob-
lems of two merging organizations and in that context dwell on Isaacs’ (1999)
dialogical model, which deals with the communication between diferent mem-
ber positions that are opposites of each other and mutually complementing at
the same time. Dialogical relationships between these positions are considered
to facilitate the functioning of the team as a whole.
Inspired by the opening words of the Charter of the United Nations “We the
Peoples” and its pretension to develop a “we-position,” I discuss some conspicu-
ous aspects of the United Nations from the perspective of the present theory.
Being aware of the astonishing complexity of this worldwide forum, I analyze
some of its successes and failures. As it is well known, a democratically organ-
ized system has its apparent downsides. When participants are allowed to join a
decision process and to talk from their own point of view, at least two problems
should be taken into account: democracy is generally slow, and it is oten limited
by a lack of knowledge of the participants involved. I propose the terms “lexible
democracy” and “lexible democratic leadership” referring to moving up and
down the power dimension as required in a rapidly changing and crisis-laden
globalizing society.
Chapter 4 starts with the consideration that the self can only function in par-
ticipative and cooperative ways if the workings of the brain are supportive to such
a democratic organization of self and society. Building on recent literature on the
hemispheric specialization of the brain (e.g., McGilchrist, 2009; Schore, 2012),
I argue for considering the other not just as purely external reality but as “another
I-position” in the extended self. Elaborating on brain research and social psycho-
logical literature (and warning against the risk of false dichotomies), I discuss
the relationship between emotion and reason leading to the distinction between
emotional and reasoning forms of positioning. Furthermore, conscious and
nonconscious layers of the self are distinguished, allowing the diferentiation of
conscious and nonconscious positioning. Finally, these inclusive opposites—
self-with-other, reason-with-emotion, and conscious-with-nonconscious—are
combined in an elaborated position model that addresses both the power dis-
tance and the emotional distance between basic I-positions.
he purpose of chapter 5 is to introduce the concept of “over-positioning,”
which is not very diferent from the classic Greek notion hubris and derives from
the assumption that any position runs the risk of arriving in an overdrive if it is
not balanced by efective counter-positions. In order to deepen the potentials of

this concept, the main part of the chapter is devoted to a comparison of the func-
tioning of the self in two societal systems, Soviet communism and present-day
neo-liberal capitalism. he central thesis is that Soviet communist system placed
the other (the community) above the self (the individual), whereas the capi-
talist society in its neo-liberal manifestation places the self above the other. As
examples of communist over-positioning, I dwell on its typical housing policy
with its restrictions on personal space and private initiative and on its totalitarian
policy that had the efect of transforming critical positions into anti-positions in
the case of the so-called “dissidents.” More extensively, I elaborate on the impli-
cations of an over-positioning economy and the phenomenon of consumerism
that may inally lead to a point that the self is locked up in an I-prison. Finally,
I examine the potentials of the self to respond to forms of over-positioning.
Actually, I see the contemporary self as located in a very dynamic ield of
tension between homogenizing and heterogenizing trends that pull the self
into opposite directions and challenge its organizing capacities to the utmost.
Whereas homogeneity as resulting from over-positioning is the cornerstone
of chapter 5, heterogeneity, as relecting the diversity and decentralized rich-
ness of the democratic self, is the main theme of chapter 6. I refer to literatures
that show that happiness is not a simple dichotomy or scale between “happy”
and “unhappy” but that there are qualitatively diferent forms of happiness
and unhappiness suggesting that one may be happy in one position but not in
another one. Of special importance to the afective richness of the self is the
phenomenon of “emodiversity” as referring to the health-promoting diferen-
tiation within the domains of both positive emotions and negative emotions.
In addition, I emphasize the intrinsic value of negative emotions in response
to traditions in psychology that propose the replacement of negative by posi-
tive emotions. Furthermore, I argue that the richness of the self is promoted
by taking one’s shadow positions into account (e.g., acknowledging one’s role
in scapegoating and enemy image construction) that are generally perceived as
unacceptable and disowned parts of the self. Finally, I present some case studies
demonstrating that shadows are not necessarily a disadvantage to self and other
in all circumstances and that they can be combined with other, more acceptable,
positions through the formation of constructive coalitions.
Chapter 7 is based on the assumption that generative dialogue is the highest
form of communication and indispensable both for a democratic society and
for a democratically organized self. he spatial and positional basis of dialogue
is deepened by an extensive comparison of the views of two theorists who have
given indelible contributions to the ield: Mikhail Bakhtin and David Bohm.
I show that there are fundamental diferences in their conceptions with Bakhtin
proposing a broad view implying that dialogue, including learning, is everywhere
and from birth onward, while Bohm is ofering a more restricted vision pro-
claiming that (generative) dialogue is the result of learning. Building on these
theorists I propose a dialogical continuum in which generative dialogue is at
the upper end of a continuum that also includes other forms of dialogue (e.g.,
debate, negotiation, persuasion). Depending on the demands of the situation,
one may lexibly shit from one to another form of dialogue.
I demonstrate how generative dialogue has the potential of creating “third
positions” that are able to reconcile the conlict between two original positions
and how they may function as starting points for the development of promoter
positions. Building on the emotion-with-reason model and the conscious-
with-nonconscious model as explained in chapter 4, the workings of generative
emotion-reason and conscious-nonconscious dialogue are discussed. hese
forms of dialogue are presented as alternatives for those conceptions that see
dialogue as guided by reason or by conscious considerations alone. Finally, I dis-
cuss some factors that facilitate dialogue (e.g., tolerance of contradictions and
uncertainty) and some factors that can be seen as debilitating dialogical relation-
ships (e.g., stereotyping and narcissism).
Chapter 8 is writen as an integrative chapter and brings together the main
concepts of the theory in such a way that they allow some practical applica-
tions of the democratic self as a learning process. Building on elements of self–
categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), an
integrative model is presented in which three levels of inclusiveness and their cor-
responding positions in the self are distinguished: personal (I as an individual),
social (I as member of a group), and global (I as a human person). A democratic
self requires the lexibility of moving up and down across these levels of inclu-
siveness and has to ind its way in ields of tension between dialogue and social
power. On the level of society, the model receives inputs from three forms of
democracy—cosmopolitan, deliberative, and agonistic democracy—with the last
one focusing on the role of social power and emotions. he recognition of social
power gives rise to the distinction between consonant and dissonant forms of
dialogue, the later of which deals with diferences and conlicts in a world that
is crossing social, national, and cultural boundaries. hree main requirements
for a democratic self are outlined: (a) fostering a dialogical relationship between
reason and emotion with emotion not as subordinated to reason but as support-
ing it, (b) stimulating tolerance of uncertainty in a globalizing and boundary-
crossing world, and (c) integrating shadow positions in the organization of a
democratic self in order to avoid the destructive potentials of any good versus
bad dichotomy.
Message of the Book

What then is the message of this book? It is the thesis that democracy as a
botom-up process is ultimately rooted in a dialogical self. It is not the product
of a top-down political organization of society, but it is in the hearts and minds
of individual selves who, together with friends, allies, and opponents, are intrin-
sically motivated to give form to their society and add value to it. Ingenium and
ethos are close allies in this theory. My message is an expression of trust in the
self-governing potentials of the self and in readers who not only relect on the
democracy in their own selves but also make it true.
I have experienced the writing of this book as an adventurous travel that
enabled me to entertain internal and external dialogues with colleagues work-
ing in a variety of research domains. his travel had its highs and lows, ofered
fascinating panoramas, and sometimes gave me the feeling that I was at the edge
of a frightening abyss. During this journey, my eyes were oten caught by the
stimulating quotations of great thinkers who know the art of compressing a
profound insight in the box of a few shining words. I limit myself to three that
I ind particularly revealing as they highlight the relevance of learning, as empha-
sized in the inal chapters (7 and 8) of this book. One is atributed to Franklin
D. Roosevelt: “Democracy cannot succeed unless they who express their choice
are prepared to choose wisely. he real safeguard of democracy, therefore, is
education.” In close proximity to this view, Nelson Mandela proclaimed: “An
educated, enlightened and informed population is one of the surest ways of pro-
moting the health of democracy.” he one that touches the heart of the present
book most directly comes from the mouth of Mahatma Gandhi: “Be the change
you want to see in the world.” he message of the book is actually quite sim-
ple: Do you want a more democratic society? Start with yourself.
1
he Dynamics of Society-in-the-Self
Not being able to govern events, I govern myself.
—Michel de Montaigne
As many social scientists and philosophers have noticed, our self-ideal, most
typical of Western cultures, is strongly inluenced by the Enlightenment view
of individualized autonomy as based on a self-society dichotomy. As Sampson
(1985) argues, the Western ideal image of the self is one with razor-sharp
boundaries between self and non-self, with the exclusion of the other as an
intrinsic part of the self and as persistently involved in a pursuit of having the
environment under perfect control. Recently, this modern image of the self has
been eloquently summarized by Richardson and Woolfolk (2013), who, build-
ing on the philosophy of Charles Taylor, conclude: “there is a deep metaphysical
gulf between self and world, between the subjective and objective realms. Both
the self and its inner-worldly experiences tend to be portrayed as self-contained
‘objects’ that have no deining relations or meaningful ties to anything outside
their realm” (p. 18).
Elaborating on this observation, Richardson and Woolfolk (2013) refer
to the work of Dunne (1996) who deines the modern sense of self as a “sov-
ereign self ” that is above all “its own ground” (p. 137). Dunne traces the
sovereign self back to Descartes’ rational knower whose I or ego is “imme-
diately, transparently, and irrefutably present to itself as a pure extension-
less consciousness, already established in being, without a body, and with
no acknowledged complicity in language, culture, or community” (p. 138).
As separated from its social environment, the self has no extensions in space
and, as an ahistorical being, it is loosened from being embedded in time. It
has the laborious task of realizing itself as a highly individualized project (see
also Gergen, 2009, who criticizes the “bounded self ” as emanating from the
Enlightenment).
17
From the Other-in-the-Self to Society-in-the-Self

Despite the existence of a self-society split, there are traditions in psychology
and the social sciences that have demonstrated that the other is an intrinsic part
of the self. Diferent streams of thought have questioned the idea that self and
other are mutually exclusive, as if the other can be conceptualized as “purely
outside the self.” As opposed to this rather naive assumption, early Freudian
psychoanalysis has demonstrated that the other (in the form of parental norms)
is internalized into the self as a “superego.” Later psychoanalysts, known as
“object relation theorists,” have shown how our selves are shaped by early family
relationships and how these relationships orchestrate our interactions with oth-
ers later in life. Developmental psychologists, in the tradition of Lev Vygotsky,
have elaborated on the thesis that what takes place between caregiver and child
is later on “interiorized” as a process within the self. Atachment theorists, in
the line of John Bowlby, have suggested that signiicant others are organizing
the self in the form of “internal working models” referring to the mental acces-
sibility and responsiveness of the caregiver. Recent developments in social psy-
chology have proposed the existence of “other-in-the-self ” models proposing
that when being in a close relationship with another person, one includes in the
self the other person’s perspectives, resources, and identities (e.g., Aron et al,
2005). Symbolic interactionists, in the tradition of George Herbert Mead, have
argued that the (generalized) other is not purely outside the self but functions
as part of the “Me” and in this way organizes rule-guided behaviors in society.
hese developments have in common that they question one of the widely dis-
puted heritages of a modern Enlightenment view of the self as an autonomous,
individualized agency having its own exclusive ground and as having an exis-
tence “in itself.”
Building on these views, I have two aims in this chapter: (a) to demonstrate
that, in order to understand the workings of the self in the contemporary global-
izing society, there is a diference between the “other in the self ” and “society in
the self ” and (b) to argue that, as a self-relexive and self-organizing process, the
self is involved in the construction of a “society-in-the-self.”
What is the diference between the other in the self and society in the self
and what is the relevance of this diference? When talking about “the other,” one
may limit oneself to a description of another person, or a small group of people
(e.g. parents or a family), as part of a social self, without saying much about the
broader societal structures and paterns with their diversity of social expecta-
tions and institutions. he traditional theories of “internalization,” “introjec-
tion,” and “interiorization” usually describe processes that lead to the inclusion
of others in the self, based on an implicit or explicit assumption that the other-
in-the-self is originating from one person, from a small and homogeneous group
The D y namic s o f Societ y - in -the -S el f 19
or from a homogeneous society as Ritzer (1992) has observed in his critical dis-
cussion of Mead’s view. hese theories don’t say much about the way in which
the broader globalizing society1 is working in the self, in a way that reveals a mul-
tiplicity and diversity of social and societal positions and their conlicting and
contradictory nature. I want to show that the self is not only a meeting place of
social one-to-one relationships or one-to-few relationships but also a multiplic-
ity of positions relecting its participation in broader societal structures. So not
only the relationship with the other is in the self, but also society as a cultural
and institutional paterning of positions deines its nature.
My second purpose is to expose a view that is contrary to the traditional
idea that there exists a self that has an essence in itself, typically (but not
exclusively) studied by psychologists, surrounded by a wider society, typically
(but not exclusively) studied by sociologists, cultural anthropologists, and
other social sciences. In contrast to this artiicial division, I expose a series of
examples and developments in the social-scientiic literature that show that
society is not something with an essence diferent from the nature of the self
but as participating in its most intimate workings. It is my purpose to demon-
strate that society, rather than being an “external” causal factor, is manifest-
ing itself in the self and receiving there an answer from the same self. Self
meets society in itself and, in turn, society meets the self in itself. Along these
lines, I want to show that it is possible to bring self and society closer together
than possible in any container view of self and identity. In order to build up
the argument, I start with some familiar examples that represent the usual
social relationship of the self to itself (e.g., self-praise or self-destruction) and
then move gradually to less familiar trends of a more societal nature (e.g.,
self-government, self-nationalization, or self-internationalization) that refer
to the self as part of a globalizing world. Altogether, these societal examples
demonstrate that there are trends in the social-scientiic literature that tran-
scend any container view of the self as an individualized entity “in itself ”
and that demand a broader, more open, and more comprehensive view of
“self-societalization.”2
1
In a most general way, globalization refers to the process of international, interregional, and
intercultural contacts resulting from the interchange of products, people, ideas, and worldviews. Such
interchanges, including advances in transportations and telecommunications, are central aspects of
globalization. As Marsella (2012) concludes, virtually all the deinitions of globalization acknowl-
edge that “the process of globalization involves extensive and oten imposed contact among people
from diferent cultures, nations, and empires with subsequent social, cultural, economic, and political
interdependencies and consequences” (p. 456).
2
For the concept of ‘societalization’ see also sociologist Jefrey Alexander’s public lecture,
University at Bufalo, titled “Social Crisis and Societalization: A Cultural Sociological Approach to
the Financial Crisis, Church Pedophilia, and Media Phone Hacking” (November 17, 2014).
In contrast to the container view of the self that has emanated from the self-
other dichotomy and, even broader, from the self-society dichotomy of the
modern self, the process of “self-societalization” transcends this split by placing
society as an intrinsic part of the self. hat is, society at large personiies and
individualizes itself via the self of the individual, and, in turn, the self expresses
itself as a highly dynamic and potentially3 creative micro-society that contrib-
utes to and transforms the society at large. In other words, self, and society are
not mutually exclusive projects but mutually inclusive processes, constantly
involved in making up each other.
Diference Between the Other in the Self

and Society in the Self
Self-societalization as the central concept in this chapter is more than the equiv-
alent of a purely one-to-one social relationship. For example, self-consolation
is similar to consolation that one person gives to another person or similar to a
group of individuals involved in consoling each other ater an accident. here are
no explicit societal rules or institutions that regulate or dictate the way people
give consolation to each other, unless society ofers existing rule-guided prac-
tices that organize societal events, as it happens at funerals, organized national
mourning ceremonies ater a disaster, or an oicial praying to Holy Maria as con-
solatrix alictorum. Consolation as a social act is not identical to a societal event
organized as a regulated or prescribed convention. One is free to create one’s
own particular way of expressing concern to another person, by touching a hand,
giving a warm hug, sharing a past event, writing a compassionate text, or just
being present when words do not suice to express one’s feelings. A similar argu-
ment can be given when looking at other forms of social relationships that may
be interiorized into the self: (self-)protection, (self-)compassion, (self-)consul-
tation, (self-)honoring, (self-)negotiation, (self-)management, (self-)celebra-
tion, (self-)command, (self-)negotiation, (self-)redemption, and many others
All these relationships may vary on a continuum ranging from personal and inti-
mate to strictly organized, prescribed and institutionalized. Even an awkward-
looking behavior, like mutilation, may vary from an ultimate expression of
3
I use the term “potentially” because the self may relate to society also in damaging ways (see,
e.g., the phenomena of enemy image construction and scapegoating in the service of self-protection,
discussed in chapter 6). In turn, society may relate to the self in equally damaging ways (see, e.g.,
the imprisonment of the individual self in communism of the former Soviet Union and the wide-
spread problematic inluence of present-day neo-liberalism, both analyzed as forms of societal “over-
positioning’ [see chapter 5]).
Table 1.1. Examples of Social and Societal Relationships in the Self

Social Relations in the Self Societal Relations in the Self
Self-protection Self-sabotage
Self-compassion Self-radicalization
Self-demanding Self-cure
Self-consolation Self-marriage
Self-ridiculing Self-government
Self-criticism Self-nationalization
Self-judgment Self-internationalization
personal revenge by a betrayed husband or wife to an organized ritual of groups

of soldiers who become involved in degenerating acts of mutilations of killed
enemies. It can even be organized and institutionalized by governments.
he relationship of persons with themselves are like relationships they have
with other people. However, this thesis takes two steps, one more social and the
other more societal. he relationships with oneself, as similar to that with others,
can be social in the sense that it likens a relationship between one person and
another one, where both give form to their relationship according to their per-
sonal preferences. In this irst step, one relates as a socius to oneself. As I demon-
strate in this chapter, there is an additional step to make. he relationship with
oneself takes the form of a society-in-the-self and, as such, enters the sphere of
social expectations, social rules, and institutionalization. With this step I want
to establish a irst basis for the exploration of the democratization of the self, a
process which I discuss later in this book (particularly chapters 3–8).
Next we move to an example, self-sabotage, that illustrates how society
receives form in and by the self (for other examples, see Table 1.1).
Self-Sabotage: Ranking Yourself Lower than

You Deserve
here are concepts that may look a bit “strange” at irst sight, but they refer to
phenomena that are actually more widespread than one may expect without fur-
ther scrutiny. Bernice Buresh and Zuzanne Gordon (1996), co-directors of the
Women, Press & Politics Project, an independent research group in Cambridge,
Massachusets, specializing in nursing and media issues, depict subtle forms of
self-sabotage. hey portray the case of nurses who unwitingly interact with doc-
tors in underassertive ways at the expense of their professional prestige. Here is a
description of a form of self-sabotage on the side of the nurses of some hospitals

under investigation:
Nurses at a major teaching hospital on the East Coast point with pride
to their strong professional nursing department and collaborative phy-
sician relationships. At this hospital, nurses make rounds with physi-
cians each morning and reportedly communicate their concerns as
equal members of the health care team. Professionals from other facili-
ties frequently visit to examine this collaborative model in action.
In one of the units, though, the ostensible goals of this practice are
contradicted by the way the participants arrange themselves to com-
municate with each other during rounds. he interns perch on an air
conditioner ledge in front of the windows. he resident stands near a
side wall facing them. he nurses fan out behind the resident. With her
back to the nurses, the resident speaks to the interns, and they direct
their responses to her. When the nurses provide information about
patients, they tend to speak in deferential tones, and the resident barely
turns her head.
At another hospital that also boasts of its physician-nurse collabo-
ration, a nurse needs to talk with a physician about a patient. When
she inds the physician in the waiting room deeply engaged in a con-
versation with another physician, she stands quietly next to them. hey
continue to talk without acknowledging her presence. Eventually the
nurse shrugs and walks of, mutering that she’ll catch the physician
later. (p. 22)
As these instances suggest, self-sabotage is not a purely internal process in the self
and not a purely one-to-one person communication problem. Diferent organi-
zational models are at work, one explicit, the other implicit. Doctors and nurses
are working in a hospital that on the level of words and missions is progressive in
preaching a cooperative style of interaction. On the actual behavior level, how-
ever, the interactions relect the old conservative paterns typical of a traditional
hierarchically organized hospital with doctors above nurses. In this case, self-
sabotage implies a discrepancy between espoused ideals and actual practice: the
nurses do not take the opportunity ofered by the values of the hospital.
he institutional context as working in the self is also manifest in my own
experience.
I remember an instance of self-sabotage when I served as a soldier in

military service when I was 21 years old. I was summoned to come to
the room of the oicer in charge who would like to have me on the
carpet for “misbehavior.” he reason was quite “stupid”: he accused

me of having placed the key of my cupboard not in my pocket, where
it should belong, but on top of the cupboard itself (for me more easy
to ind). While he was siting behind his big desk as an unassailable
authority, I had to stand with my arms tight along my body. Although
I knew for myself, before and ater this moment, that I had placed the
key correctly in my pocket, the suggested power of his words, posture,
and authority was that strong that I did not protest against his reproach
and confessed silently. It didn’t occur to me to disagree! Apparently,
overconformity with his authority suppressed my knowledge about the
“truth.” I remember that moment vividly, because it strongly contrasted
with my cherished I-position as independent thinker.
What strikes me in this example is that I did not do something I rightly could have
done: protesting against an apparently unjustiied accusation. he authority of
the oicer was, at that moment, overwhelmingly present and it felt as if he took
a central place in my own self. I wanted to behave in agreement with his orders,
even when he said something that evoked disagreement within me. However,
that disagreement was not strong enough to be directly expressed. Relecting
on this event later in my life, I realized that this happened in an institutional
context where soldiers were systematically indoctrinated with the repeated mes-
sage: “You do not think; we do that for you!” Apparently this message was strong
enough to organize my own self in conformity with his position as authority and
to drive me into the corner of self-sabotage.
We now move to the analysis of a phenomenon, self-radicalization, in which
the power of the society-in-the-self and the active role of the self becomes even
more apparent.
Self-Radicalization: he Slippery Slope of Violence

In a profound analysis, psychologists Clark McCauley, co-director of the
Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conlict, and Sophia
Moskalenko, a research fellow at the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, consider the process of political radical-
ization as a continuum of increasing extremity of feelings, beliefs, and behaviors
that justify intergroup conlict and violence (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).
he authors pose the intriguing question of how individuals or groups get in
situations of increasing conlict and violence.
As the authors observe, terrorists and political extremists receive overwhelm-
ing public atention through frequent media exposure. However, they may be
the apex of a pyramid. At its base are those who sympathize with the goals of the
terrorists but are not actively involved in their actions. In the political conlict in
Northern Ireland, for example, the base of the pyramid was occupied by all those
who were in support for the IA and who agreed with “Brits out.”
Moving from the base to apex, one inds at higher levels of the pyramid
decreasing numbers but increasing radicalization of beliefs and behaviors.
Central to the analysis of radicalization is the gradient that distinguishes terror-
ists on top of the pyramid from their sympathizers at the base. herefore, the
researchers try to understand the movements of individuals from the base to the
more extreme levels of violence at the apex. At that point, they address the pro-
cess of self-radicalization, as observed in some social-psychological experiments.
One of the most impressive examples of the power of self-radicalization is
found in Milgram’s (1974) classic experiments on obedience. Normal individ-
uals were placed in the role of “teacher” and instructed by the experimenter
to give increasingly higher levels of shock to a protesting “victim.” his victim
assumed the role of “learner” in a simple memory task but was actually an
accomplice of the experimenter. Each time the “learner” made a mistake, the
teacher was instructed to administer a shock by pressing a buton. With suc-
cessive mistakes, the shocks increased by 15 volts, starting with a minimum of
15 volts and going up to a maximum of 450 volts. Complete obedience on the
part of the teacher was deined as going up to the maximum of 450 volts. he
appalling result of this experiment was that 60% of the teachers were found to
be completely obedient.4
Commentators of this type of experiments, with an experimenter requir-
ing obedience of the teacher, have oten suggested that it is the authority of
the leader that makes the teacher comply in an unfamiliar situation. herefore,
McCauley and Moskalenko (2010) also discuss a less well-known variation of
this type of experiment in which it is not the experimenter who gives instruc-
tions to increase the shocks but a “co-teacher” who comes up with the idea. In
this alternative procedure, the co-teacher, who actually is another accomplice of
the experimenter, asks the questions, while the naïve teacher gives the shocks. At
some point, the experimenter is summoned away for a “phone call” and, while
he is no longer in the room, the co-teacher proposes to raise the level of shocks
with each mistake. Despite the fact that the experimenter and his authority are
absent in this alternative experiment, 20% of teachers go up to administering the
maximum of 450 volts.
4
One of the factors inluencing obedience is the physical proximity of experimenter and learner.
When the experimenter and learner are in diferent rooms, with the experimenter giving his instruc-
tions by phone only 20.5% go to 450 volts (Reicher, Haslam, & Smith, 2012). Apparently, the direct
physical contact with the prestigious experimenter puts more pressure on the participants to con-
tinue delivering shocks of a higher level.
As the authors discuss, a most plausible explanation of the progress in admin-

istering shocks, in quite some cases to the maximum level, is that “each shock
becomes a reason to give the next shock. he closely graded shock levels rep-
resent a kind of slippery slope in which refusing to give the next shock requires
recognizing that there was something wrong with giving the last shock. If 300
volts was ok, how can 315 volts be wrong? But if 315 volts is wrong, how can
300 volts be right?” (p. 420). Apparently, the slippery slope creates a situation
in which there is no clear “stop sign,” so that self-radicalization represents a self-
justifying process on a sliding continuum.5
In a similar way, the authors analyze another famous experiment in which
self-radicalization was observed: the so-called prison experiment, performed in
the early 1970s by psychologist Philip Zimbardo and colleagues (Haney, Banks,
& Zimbardo, 1973). In this study, male students, who were considered to be
psychologically stable, were randomly assigned to take the role of either a guard
or a prisoner in a simulated prison situation. It appeared that within the time
course of just a few days, the guards’ behavior gradually escalated, in the form
of humiliation and punishment. he dehumanizing treatment of the prisoners
started from making them do push-ups and inally led to forcing them to act out
sexually suggestive plays. he planned two-week of research on social processes
in prison life had to be terminated ater only six days, because the guards became
more and more cruel and even sadistic while the prisoners became increasingly
depressed and exhibited signs of extreme stress.
In their comparison of the obedience and the prison experiments, McCauley
and Moskalenko (2010) conclude that in both experiments there is a patern of
slowly increasing radical behavior that is harmful to others. hese experiments
demonstrate the power of self-radicalization and self-persuasion in justifying one’s
own behavior, as expressed in postexperimental inquiries: “Self-radicalization
5
he slope, however, is not entirely continuous. In a reassessment of the Milgram experiments,
Reicher, Haslam, and Smith (2012) have studied the points at which participants decide to withdraw
from the task of administering shocks to the learner. he irst point at which this is likely to occur
is 150 volts (37% of participants halt at this point). At this point the learner complains about his
heart problem and asks to be let out of the study. A second key point is 315 volts (where 11% of
participants halt). At this point the learner says that he refuses to answer anymore and that he is no
longer part of the study. In agreement with Packer (2008), the researchers argue that a key reason
for withdrawal at these particular junctures is a change in their identity. At the start of the experi-
ment, they are atuned only to an identity that they share with the experimenter (as collaborators
in a legitimate scientiic enterprise). At the 150-volt point they become aware of a competing social
identity (as moral citizens in the world) where they feel responsible for the well-being of the learner.
Apparently, they arrive at a point where they feel torn between two competing voices that are mak-
ing contradictory demands upon them. Stopping or continuing at these junctures depends on the
predominance of one of these identiications. For a critical review of the Milgram experiments, see
Brannigan, Nicholson, and Cherry (2015).
is a slippery slope of increasingly extreme behaviors, with increasingly extreme

reasons and justiications icing the slope” (p. 421).6
For sure, it would be misleading to see self-radicalization as a purely inter-
nal process performed by an individual in social isolation. As Neumann (2013)
comments, notions as “self-radicalization” and “lone wolves” have received
widespread atention, particularly since the actions of wannabe terrorists and
the Tsarnaev brothers who carried out the Boston bombings. What was striking
in these cases is that they had no face-to-face contact with al Qaeda recruiters.
However, this does not mean that they were involved in these actions on their
own. Actually, in these cases and many others, the Internet provides plenty of
opportunities to participate in jihadist communities. In the era of social media,
potential terrorists may be physically on their own but actually far from lonely.
Online forums provide them with opportunities for social interaction and con-
nectivity that may be more accessible than with their physically close friends,
colleagues, and family. Mostly, self-radicalization is part of a broader social con-
text that, either physically or virtually, functions as a facilitating environment.
hey participate in vibrant (virtual) countercultures that tend to glorify terror-
ism and celebrate atacks against innocent civilians.
What I want to show is that self-radicalization, both in the discussed experi-
ments and in the societal context that facilitates it, is neither a purely individu-
alized process taking place within the “walls” of the self nor a purely social
process of indoctrination or determination by external social forces. here
is a deeper commonality between self and society: the very process taking
place in society, between people, can also, and at the same time, be observed
in the household of the self. Obedience to an authority or receiving the posi-
tion of guard in a prison may lead, under speciic circumstances and depend-
ing on individual diferences, to antisocial or illegal behavior. However, at
the same time there is something going on in the self that contributes to this
self-escalating process. his “something” is not simply the product of a causal
determination by an external force but it is something that the self is doing to
itself and that is facilitated by social or societal processes that are working in
the self.
6
Like Milgram’s obedience study, the Stanford Prison Experiment is far from undisputed. Since
its publication, a sizeable and critical literature has emerged, leading to its status as one of the most
discussed and researched studies in the history of psychology. As Bartels (2015) concludes, much
of this critical literature challenges the assertion that the study demonstrates the “power of the situa-
tion” and the “banality of evil.” In part, these challenges rest on various methodological problems of
the study including the authoritative inluence of the prison superintendent (Zimbardo), the lack of
realism of the artiicial prison, and the potential selectivity of the sample. Moreover, a strict situation-
ist interpretation of the study is hindered by the inconsistencies in guard behavior (there were not
only “bad guards” but also “good guards”) and by failures to replicate the indings.
From a positional point of view, the phenomenon of self-radicalization raises

an important question: What happens in someone’s position repertoire when
moving over the sliding slope of self-radicalization? When the participant in an
obedience experiment, in a prison situation or in a situation of gradually increas-
ing political extremism gradually moves further, then, apparently, the diference
between the previous step and the present one is not big enough to give a reason
convincing enough to stop the chain of behaviors. You just do not see that it
makes a diference. Suppose, you make a picture of yourself each day from your
20th to your 70th birthday. When you look each day at your picture of yesterday,
you do not see any diference in age. However, when you compare the photo of
your 20th with that of your 70th (or even much earlier) then you can be shocked
by the apparent age diferent: you were a young hero and now an old bag and the
two feel as qualitatively diferent.
Given the special conditions as exempliied in the discussed experiments, it
is possible that a person changes from the position of “teacher” to the position
of “killer” (remember the increasing volts in the obedience experiment) with-
out noticing at any moment a qualitative change. here is no point on the scale
where the participants realize that they have become a killer, which they were
not at the previous step. One could be able to see the change of position, if one
could look at oneself from a meta-position, broad and encompassing enough
to notice the qualitative diference between them, including their afective and
moral meanings. Such a meta-position can also be ofered by another whose per-
spective on your changes is broad and diferent enough to make one aware of the
qualitative change. Take this personal example.
As a boy of approximately eight years old, I started to become aware

of the important role of money and discovered what kind of delicious
things can be bought by its possession, like candy, ice cream, and chew-
ing gum. In my parents’ home, where both my father and mother were
involved in running a busy bakery, it was easy to ind money because
it was sometimes just available in an open cupboard. I started to take a
small nickel but, as my “crime” was never detected, I raised the amount
slightly till it became a litle over a Dutch guilder. As usual in Catholic
families, I went to church regularly to make my confession. One day,
I was siting in the dark confessional, waiting until the priest would
“open the gate” and give his blessings. Ater he had spoken his irst
ritual phrases, I said to him that I had taken away some money in my
parents’ house. With a stern facial expression, he asked: “How much
did you take?” I felt forced to mention an amount and answered with
the required guilty atitude: “Two guilders.” His posture became more
straight and his voice louder: “Two guilders?!” and he barked right
into my face: “When you go on in this way, you will become a thief!”
Abruptly, he gave me the standard blessings and let me in shock: I as
sweet-lover, in need of some pocket money, could I become a thief!?
his warning was strong enough for me to stop taking money, at least
keeping the amount at a “reasonable” level. From that moment on,
I was aware of the existence of a issure between “taking some money”
and becoming a thief.
Self-radicalization in combination with self-escalation is just one example of the

thesis that processes that take place in society can also be observed in the work-
ings of the self. here are other instances that reveal the societal nature of the
self. One of them is self-cure.
Self-Cure in Integrative Medicine: he Doctor

in the Patient
For more than 30 years medical scientist Volkel Diehl has been involved in basic
and clinical research to investigate and defeat the Hodgkin/Reed-Sternberg cells
in the laboratory. During his 30-year leadership of the Hodgkin Study Group, is
seeing himself as a bridging person between science and the clinic. However, he
realized quite late in his career that there is another bridge to cross for oncolo-
gists in order to connect two pillars: one consists of the principles of evidence-
based medicine; the other refers to the subjective, psychological reality of his
patients. “Integrative oncology” as he calls it, requires the doctor to see with two
eyes: one focused on the maximal kill of the tumor cells and the other atentive
to the sufering face of the patient and their need for empathy.
As Diehl (2009) outlines, integrative medicine aims to give incentives and
practical assistance to patients to detect and realize their own resources of
self-protection and resistance to the adverse consequences of anticancer ther-
apy. here is a growing movement among oncologists and cancer patients in
Germany and Switzerland who unite themselves under the banner “Patients”
Competence’ that aims to uncover the “doctor in the patient” (p. 321) as
Paracelsus deined it many centuries ago. his movement embraces the insight
that patients subjectively want to understand their illness and want to empower
their self-healing capacities—salutogenesis—as a meaningful response to their
disease.
Representatives of integrative medicine become more aware of the dichot-
omy between the perceptions of cancer patients who are confronted with an
existential experience and the focus of those research-oriented scientists who
view patients as subjects in a randomized clinical trial. In order to expand
traditional medical treatments, proponents of integrative medicine develop

programs that inform, educate, and support patients in coping with their dis-
ease and life both during treatment and aterwards. Available complementary
interventions include, among others, art-painting-sculpture therapy, gymnas-
tics, physical exercise, music therapy, voice training, dance therapy, and tai chi
(Diehl, 2009).
here is a further step to make. Under the supervision of medical scientist
Lucien Engelen a group of medical workers at the University of Nijmegen in
the Netherlands are united in an innovate project named “Health 2.0.” hey are
inspired by the idea that a new relationship is emerging between care provid-
ers and patients that lourishes under the name of “participatory health care.” In
this model, patients and physicians design treatment in cooperation. Doctors
ask their patients to tell them about their experiences and opinions, and closely
involve them in decision-making, from prevention to investigation, and from
treatment to recovery (Engelen, 2011). In this way, patients are empowered with
a voice of their own.
One of the participants in this project, Bas Bloem, a specialist in Parkinson
disease, pictures his approach this way: “Should I give the patient a medicine
that does not work, then it is my mistake. If I explain to the patient that I am
hesitating between two kinds of medication, and we decide together which we
are going to try, then we can jointly claim success if it works, and share in the
failure if it does not work” (Engelen, 2011, p. 12). In giving form to this alter-
native patient-doctor relationship, he has restructured the spatial design of his
room: “Now doctors are God. But they ought to become a guide, a coach, who
supports people in making decisions. hat is absolutely not threatening, it will
just make the work more enjoyable. I prefer a level playing ield, without hierar-
chy. In my oice there is a table with four chairs around it. I do not have my own
desk. People irst get confused: “Where should we sit down, doctor?” I’m not
above them, I just sit around the table with them” (p. 12).
One of the centerpieces of this approach is the use of technology, explicitly
not as an end in itself but as a means. Of course, many patients come in with a
considerable amount of knowledge about their disease, informed as they are by
the Internet and sometimes they know more than their physician. In this project
some doctors ofer Twiter consultation hours that can be easily combined with
Internet information.
However, the use of the Internet, Twiter, and webcams is just a beginning. In
a TV program7 about Project 2.0 more advanced technologies were discussed.
One of them is the use of a “healthPatch,” a biosensor worn on the patient’s chest
to measure caloric burn, heart rate, and other vital signs. Such a device would
7
Tegenlicht, April 27, 2014.
have a wireless connection with the doctor who could then provide remote
care. Another development is the so-called “ViSi-Mobile System,” a platform for
comprehensive monitoring of vital signs that is designed to keep clinicians con-
nected to their patients, whether in or out of bed, or while in transport. Also
in such long-distance contact, patients who are not in the immediate neighbor-
hood of the doctor are required to play an active role in the form of self-care.
One of the interviewed doctors is quite sure about the necessity of this form of
medical assistance: “he necessity is blatantly clear. Elderly people stay at home
longer, there are more and more chronically ill people. If you wish to help them
all, you will have to work diferently. Less direct contact does not mean that your
patient is less central” (Engelen, 2011, p. 15).
he participatory model brings both the patient and the doctor in a diferent
position: the doctor has to add the position of coach to his repertoire and the
patients have to develop the “doctor in themselves.” his requires both of them
to develop their dialogical capacities in order to be prepared to take the position
of each other. An essential feature of a dialogical relationship is the ability to
take multiple “levels of intention” into consideration. he doctor is supposed to
think in this way: “I’m aware [level 1] that it is your wish [level 2] that I take into
account . . . [level 3].” his is diferent from the traditional model where doctors
can permit themselves to reduce the levels of intentionality in their interactions
when they take decisions on the basis of objective medical information only: On
the basis of this evidence, I decide that it is best to give him this medication (only
one level of intentionality). Also from the part of the patient, this model needs
a more intentional complexity: “I know [level 1] that my doctor wants [level 2]
that I feel . . . [level 3].” his change of relationship requires a learning process
for medical staf who are trained in the traditional relationship where only one
person is supposed to be knowledgeable. In addition, this approach requires
from patients to be knowledgeable about their own wishes and needs and are
able to take the position of the physician and ask the appropriate questions. In
a participatory model, two people are cooperating each with their own speciic
expertise and capacity to take each other’s positions (Bohart & Tallmann, 1999;
Hermans, 1996; Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995). his model requires the
self to develop itself as part of changes in the broader societal context.
In summary, advances in medical treatment show how scientiic, techno-
logical, and societal development are intimately interconnected. A signiicant
implication of this interconnection is that the position repertoire of both patient
and doctor is becoming broader and more diferentiated. Patients are not only
patients in the traditional sense of the term but also the doctor of themselves.
Doctors, on their side, are no longer the only expert but have to take into
account, and even make active use of, the patients in themselves. As the tradi-
tional treatment model changes into the direction of a participatory model, the
dialogical capacities of both patient and doctor are challenged. his change does
not only take place in the “external society.” Rather, society and its developments
have deep implications for the self as a society of I-positions. As the changing
relationship between doctor and patient suggests, developments in the macro-
society are not only working in the self; they also require, at the same time, rom
the self an increased level of self-empowerment.
In order to elaborate on the interconnection of self and society, we next look
at a relatively new and controversial phenomenon, self-marriage, as an example
of what can be described as a form of “self-institutionalization.” As I will show,
this trend is not only an example of an increasing process of self-societalization
but at the same time an expression of an atempt to keep together the decentral-
izing I-positions in a rapidly changing social and societal environment.
Self-Marriage: An Institutionalized Form

of Self-Love
In the American Prospect, Samhita Mukhopadhyay (2012), discussed the case of
Nadine Schweigert who, in front of a room illed with family and friends, mar-
ried herself. his is only one example of an increasing number of people, mainly
women, who decide that they want to be a good and trustful partner to them-
selves and wish to celebrate and conirm this in the form of an oicial event. he
upcoming phenomenon of self-marriage, or sologamy as it is also called, coexists
with a decline of the number of conventional marriages over the past decades.
he article contains no statistics about self-marriage but it does mention the
decrease of conventional marriage. It refers to statistics of the Pew Institute,
which calculated that in 2011 barely 50% of Americans were oicially married,
a sharp decline from 1960 when over 72% of Americans over 18 had a married
status. he phenomenon of self-marriage seems to be at odds with the idea that
the ultimate ideal of many is to ind the “one great true love.” he same article
quotes Sasha Cagen who comments on the growing desire of women to marry
themselves: “he common theme in most of the stories that I hear is a commit-
ment to take care of oneself as one hopes or imagines that a lover would. Women
also frame self-matrimony as a unique solution to the problem of women sac-
riicing their own needs in a relationship. Marry yourself irst, they say, before
marrying anyone else.”
As one would expect, self-marrying is highly controversial. While opponents
complain that self-marriage relects American individualism gone awry, propo-
nents claim that marrying oneself is an empowering ceremony of self-love, and
they see the push to marry as an expression of the conventional pressure to keep
women in their traditional roles as wives, mothers, and caretakers. As a parallel,
they refer to anti-gay marriage advocates who used to argue that gay marriage
would ruin society. Similar arguments are now extended to women who marry
to themselves.
he 2014 Self-Marriage Ceremonies Newsleter8 provides this deinition: “Self-
Marriage is the commitment to live what we know to be true in our hearts.
It is the commitment to radically honor, value, and practice self-love and self-
compassion in order to live a beter life and help minimize the collective sufer-
ing of the world.” Four components of self-marriage are listed: (a) becoming
your own lover, best friend, and parent/child; (b) connecting with and com-
miting to your deeper purpose: (c) uniting all the contradictory and conlict-
ing aspects of yourself; and (d) harmonizing your external relationships and
circumstances.
In order to give a feel of what may motivate a person to marry herself, I select
some notes of Katalin Koda (2013) who shares her relections on the personal
meaning of her self-marriage:
In customary marriage, most people use traditional vows or write their

own that are then spoken aloud in front of a witness to honor a com-
mitment to another person. However, in the case of self-marriage, we
write and say vows to ourselves. his, on its own, holds an immense
power. Vows are a responsibility; they are an act of holding ourselves
accountable. hey are a statement of clarity about our commitment to
self. [. . . ]
Although I wasn’t certain at the time I chose to marry myself how
this related, it became clear during the process. One of my vows stated
my wish to call back all parts to myself. And this is the core of self-
marriage, to reintegrate each and every part of our being—our self-love,
our inner wisdom.
To call back all the parts that have been celebrated, explored and
accessed as well as the parts that have been traumatized, oppressed and
pushed into submission. his is a reclaiming, one that allows for a more
multidimensional expression. [. . .]
Ater the ceremony, I felt a profound shit within. I felt, for the irst
time in my life, a complete alignment with my purpose on earth. here
was a feeling like I clicked into place. [. . .]
Far from narcissistic, I actually found the experience of self-marriage
to be one of the most humbling, loving and direct methods to surren-
der my smaller ego self to the larger self of my inner authentic being.
8
March 30–June 8, 2014
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
works of art and the opinions of men of learning of the day upon
them. Extracts from books which she had read are also omitted;
though in many cases the titles of the books she read and her critical
remarks upon the contents are retained. By these it is possible to
form some opinion of her special tastes in literature, and discover by
what stages she was able to prepare herself to become the leader of
Whig society.
LIST OF PLATES TO VOLUME I.
Elizabeth, third Lady Holland, 1793 Frontispiece
From a painting by Robert Fagan.
Richard Vassall, 1793 To face p. 132
From a painting by J. Hoppner.
Elizabeth, third Lady Holland, 1795 „ 212
From a painting by Louis Gauffier.
JOURNAL OF ELIZABETH LADY
HOLLAND
In June 1791 I left England and went to Paris. During my stay the
King and Royal family escaped to Varennes, but were brought back.
I attended the debates in the National Assembly; I heard
Robespierre and Maury[1] speak. The Jacobin Club was then in
embryo. I wanted to hear a speech, and the Vicomte de Noailles
during dinner promised that he would gratify me by making one. He
accordingly took me to the box, and went into the Tribune and began
an oration upon some subject trivial in itself, but made important by
the vehemence of his manner. The Wyndhams[2] joined me at Paris;
Mr. Pelham[3] was also there, and several other English.
Towards July I went by the way of Dijon through the Jura
Mountains to Lausanne. I lived for three months at Mon Repos, a
spot celebrated as having been the residence of Voltaire and the
scene of much theatrical festivity; it was there he composed and
represented many of his chefs d’œuvre, Zaïre, I believe, among the
number.[4] My society was composed of a mixture of French and
English to the utter exclusion of the Swiss.
Gibbon had for several years withdrawn himself from the
turbulence and neglect of his own capital to share the quiet and
enjoy the adulation of the inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud. He was
treated by them more as a prince than as an equal. Whenever he
honoured their goutées with his presence every person rose upon
his entrance, and none thought of resuming their chairs till he was
seated. His whim arranged and deranged all parties. All, in short,
were subservient to his wishes; those once known, everything was
adapted to them. The Sheffields,[5] Trevors, Mr. Pelham, Duc de
Guines,[6] Mde. de Juigné, and Castries. I knew Tissot.[7] Having my
residence at Lausanne I made frequent excursions. I went through
Geneva to the Valley of Chamouny, saw the glaciers; and at a small
village in the road stopped to look at General Phiffer’s model of Mt.
Blanc; it was curious but inferior to that at Lucerne. Our party to
Chamouny consisted of the Sheffields, Mr. Pelham, and some others
whose names I have forgotten.[8]
Soon after my return to Lausanne I made a tour
through Berne to Lucerne. I was too great a SWITZERLAND
coward to go upon the lake, therefore I only saw
the views from the bridge and the high ground near the town, as I
was too indolent to ascend Mount Pilate. The spot so celebrated by
the heroic and incredible exploits of Guillaume Tell I only knew by
drawings, as it is not to be seen but by going to the Lac des Quatre
Cantons. Phiffer’s model of the whole of Switzerland is wonderful; it
is an exact representation of every object, lakes, mts., rivers. Such
representation of countries would be useful for military posts. I
returned by Soleure, Neuchâtel, and Fribourg and Vevey to
Lausanne.
Towards the middle or end of September I began a journey to
Nice. I stopped at Geneva a day or two, and went with the Messrs.
Calandrin to see Ferney; it was in a desolate, ruined state, and
showed few marks of taste or comfort. We followed the Rhône to
L’Écluse, where soon after that it loses itself for some miles
underground. The road is beautiful. Annecy, where Rousseau lived, I
believe we passed. Lyons is a magnificent city, two fine rivers and
broad, well-built quays with sumptuous houses. The manufacturers
complained of the revolutionary spirit which deprived them of orders
and workmen.
From thence I followed the Rhône to the Pont St. Esprit. The
bridge is singular and ingenious. The rapidity of the river had thrown
down the preceding bridges owing to a strong current rushing with
violence against the piers: to obviate this the architect made the
bridge of this form. It has succeeded, and the building is permanent.
The Pont de Gard is a magnificent remnant of Roman grandeur; it
fulfilled the double purpose of bridge and aqueduct. Orange, on
account of massacres at Avignon, we could not see. There are fine
remains of triumphal arches and other military trophies, raised to the
honour of Marius, who there defeated the formidable host of
Northern barbarians, the Teutons and Cimbri, though upon
recollection I think he fought them in the present Venetian territory.
Upon the road there are vestiges of triumphal buildings, erected in
the Middle Ages, if one may judge by the clumsy taste. At Nismes,
the amphitheatre and Maison Carrée. The latter is beautiful, and
being the first specimen of Grecian architecture I had ever seen I
was delighted with the richness and proportion of the edifice. The
amphitheatre is small, and disfigured by the filth and closeness of
the adjacent houses. Like St. Paul’s in London, it is impossible to
judge of its magnitude or graceful structure, as no exterior view can
be obtained.
Marseilles is charmingly situated; fine town, a forest of shipping,
busy quays; and the liveliness of the pretty Bastides, all white upon
the surrounding hills, is delightful. This was the first view I had of the
Mediterranean. The deep blueness of its waters and the constant
fulness of its shores struck me with increasing admiration, as I
always thought the variation of the tide was a defect; for pleasing as
variety is, uniformity is preferable to such change as the tide
produces—mud and stench.
Aix is a pleasing town. Crossed the Esterelles,
a high ridge of granite mts.; the passage was NICE
infested by banditti, and we were obliged to take
some maréchaussées to protect us. We passed without alarm or
interruption. Fréjus, the See of Fénelon, well deserves all the
disapprobation he bestows on it. Antibes, a gay pretty town; crossed
at Gué the torrent Var, and 4 miles after reached Nice. Some
antiquaries have supposed that the Var was the celebrated Rubicon,
which once passed was so fatal to the liberties of Rome.
I was left alone[9] at twenty years old in a foreign country without
a relation or any real friend, yet some of the least miserable, I might
add the most happy hours, of my life were passed there. I lived with
great discretion, even to prudery. I never admitted any male visitors
(except to numerous dinners), either in the morning or evening, with
the exception only of two—Dr. Drew, and a grave married man, a Mr.
Cowper. Drew used to spend the whole eve. with me, and give me
lectures on chemistry, natural history, philosophy, etc., etc. I made
frequent excursions about the neighbourhood, to Monaco, Villa
Franca, Monte Cavo, La Grotte de Chateauville, the convent of St.
Pons, old Cemenelium, etc.
In Feb. 1792 the Duncannons,[10] Dowr. Lady Spencer, Dss. of
Devonshire, came to Nice: my friendship begun there. I saw a
Maltese galley with some wretched Turkish slaves at the oar. The
English society was too numerous to be pleasant. I lived with a few
only,—Dss. of Ancaster, Ly. Rivers, Messrs. Ellis, Wallace, Cowper,
etc. C. Ellis[11] was a very old friend of mine; we were brought up for
many years absolutely together. As I had experienced such very
cruel usage from the unequal and ofttimes frantic temper of the man
to whom I had the calamity to be united, it was the wish of my
mother, Lady Pelham, Ly. Shelburne, and those I most respected,
that I should never venture myself in a journey alone with him,
therefore as Mr. Ellis was going part of the journey we meant to
make, he joined our party. We also conveyed an emigrant of the
name of Beauval, an excellent, ingenious young man.
Sunday, May the 6th, 1792.—Left Nice for Turin. We took the
road across the Col de Tende. Just above the Convent of St. Pons,
we crossed the torrent Paglione, from whence I took a farewell look
at the lovely plain of Nice. We dined at L’Escaleine, a small village
prettily situated in the mts. We wound for many hours the
numberless traverses of a steep and lofty mt., and at night reached
Sospello, a tolerable gîte.
7th.—Still among mts. Dined at Grandolla. Wretched inn at Tende
—no accommodation; only one room for us all.
On ye 8th the carriages were dismounted and carried over the
Col de Tende upon mules: I went over in a chaise à porteurs, so did
my child.
Snow was melting very fast, and made the
footing for the mules and guides very insecure. We TURIN
stopped at a small house at Borgo Limone as one
of the carriages was broken in getting it off the mule’s back.
11th.—Arrived at Turin. Ly. Duncannon and Dss. were already
arrived. In the evening I went to Trevor’s:[12] he was the English
Minister. A celebrated performer on the violin attempted to render by
sound the story of Werter; the imagination must have supplied
greatly to assist the effect. All that I could understand was the scene
where he shoots himself; the twang of the catgut made a crash,
which made one start, so it had that effect in common with the report
of a pistol. During my stay at Turin I attended chemical lectures at
Bonvoisin’s; had I been able to apply more I might under his care
have advanced considerably in information. Cte. Masin gave me a
very fine dinner. Before dinner he sent for one of the Professors, who
exhibited the cruel experiment upon a frog to prove animal electricity.
I went one morning with Ly. D., Dss. Devonshire, etc., to La
Venesia to be presented to the Prince and Princesse de Piémont.[13]
She is in person like her brother the King of France. Since the
downfall of the clergy in France she has constantly worn the dress of
a Sœur grise. They are both bigoted and superstitious. I had many
pleasant parties to Montcalieri, La Superga, the Colline, etc. The
Vallentin is a singular old château on the banks of the Po. It was built
by Christina, Dsse. de Savoie, one of the daughters of Henry IV. of
France. I made acquaintance for the first time with Mde. de Balbi.[14]
Previous to my leaving Turin we were surprised by the arrival of Ly.
Malmesbury[15] and G. Ellis.[16]
We left Turin on ye 10th June, 1792; our route was to Verona,
and to see Lago Maggiore in our way. We went to Arona that we
might cross the Ticino at Sesto, as there was a flood at Buffalora, the
usual ferry. Slept first night at Vercelli. After wading through very
deep water for a mile or two, caused by the overflowing of the lake,
we reached, on ye 12th, Arona, a small town charmingly situated on
the lake. The next day I summoned up courage and went upon the
lake to see the Borromean Islands. Just above the town of Arona
stands the colossal statue of St. Charles Borromeo, executed in
1650 by his family; it exceeds 100 ft. in height, allowing 64 for the
figure and 46 for the pedestal. This lake is longer than that of
Geneva. The islands are beautiful. The Isola Bella is the enchanted
spot, on which the fairy palace and gardens stand. Since the days of
Circe and Armida nothing has equalled the magic land, and little
worthy of detention would be an Ulysses and Rinaldo who could
repine at seclusion in such a voluptuous abode. The Palace is on an
eminence, and pastures and terraces descend from it to the water.
Some of the apartments are made like grottoes and are brought to
the margin of the lake: without exaggeration it is a spot apparently
made by magic art. Prince Augustus[17] was seeing the Palace. I
there met with him for the first time. He is handsome and well-bred.
13th.—Left Arona; crossed the Ticino and
arrived very late at Milan. The heat in the plains of 1792 PAVIA
Lombardy in the summer is intense; the AND MANTUA
thermometer varied from 92 to 96 degrees
Fahrenheit. The Litta family live with princely splendour. The Csse.
Maxe, celebrated in the annals of European gallantry, was very civil,
and showed me all that was worthy of notice. Padre Pini, an old
Barnabite monk, gave me many good specimens, especially of his
Adularia, a species of felspar he has discovered. I went over to
Pavia to see the celebrated Spallanzani:[18] he is the great friend of
Bonnet of Geneva, and he is the man who has made some filthy
experiments upon digestion.
Pavia is a curious old town, formerly the capital of the Lombard
Kings, and in more modern times the scene of the disaster of the
French army, and the captivity of its monarch. Francis ye 1st here
became prisoner to the unfeeling, politic Charles V. The Cathedral is
a specimen of very early Gothic, misshapen and clumsy. The Po and
Ticino join near the city. Great preparations among the emigrants of
Coblentz for marching into France.
22nd June.—Left Milan for Dresden. We skirted Lodi, famous for
its cheeses and deep sands. A violent thunderstorm came on at
Pizzighettone, where I stopped; and notwithstanding abuse and
threats I was resolved to stay and not risk my life and my child’s with
hot horses near a deep river during a heavy storm.
23rd.—Got to Mantua. The waters of the Mincio being suffered to
stagnate, the wells about Mantua are unwholesome and bad. The
Palais du T. [sic] is a pretty villa belonging to the ancient Princes of
Gonzaga. The walls are painted in fresco by Giulio Romano, the best
of Raphael’s scholars: the subject represents the ‘Battle of the
Giants.’ I looked around in vain for a beech tree under whose wide
spreading branches a Tityrus was wont to recline and amuse his little
lambkins with the soft notes of his pipe in the days of the Mantuan
Bard. Tho’ Vergil was born, one might doubt much if he was bred,
here; he seems to have described the pastoral manners of some
happier soil of Italy.
The party reached Verona on the 24th. ‘The town is handsome; the
bridge over the Adige very fine. The Corso is very noble.’ They left
again two days later, and at Ala entered the Tyrol.
The entrance is through a narrow gorge, apparently opened by
an earthquake, and probably widened by the deep and rapid course
of the Adige. The mts. are not very high till Mt. Baldo, which does not
exceed a 1000 ft. Between Ala and Roveredo we passed among
rocks that have suffered some great convulsion; at a distance they
resemble the ruins of a demolished city. A calcareous mountain
stood where the road now passes; probably in one tremendous night
when all the elements were waging war, the loud rolling thunder and
the forked lightning darting upon this ill-fated spot, the earth trembled
with the shock and the side of the mountain was split and broken into
a thousand pieces. The falling of the mt., tho’ no history records the
event, does not appear to have happened at an early period. The
fragments are still sharp and angular. Owing to a fair at Trent we
were forced to remain at Roveredo. Since the league of Cambray
Roveredo is no longer in the possession of the Venetians.
27th.—The road from thence is through a
tolerably well cultivated country of vines and 1792
mulberries, thro’ which the Adige moves along INNSPRUCK
irregularly, sometimes slowly, at other times
rapidly. The road in many places is very narrow with a precipice to
the river undefended by a parapet. Monr. de Calonne was
overturned into the river, and but for the assistance of Messrs.
Wallace and Ellis, in the year ’91, must have been drowned.
After passing Neumarck, the travellers arrived at Brixen on the
28th.
Brixen is prettily situated in a very fertile vale; vines and corn
appear in abundance. The hills are cultivated and a more genial soil
is the consequence. The churches and castles built on the tops of
craggy rocks along this valley are singularly romantic. The valley is
extremely populous, and the younger part of the inhabitants have
extremely pretty faces.
At Innspruck we were compelled to remain two nights, as we had
not the plea of being Aulic Counsellors or Ambassadors. It is a paltry
restriction on travellers that they must consent, unless privileged, to
remain eight and forty hours in Austrian territory—a sort of tax that
one must spend money in their dominions. In the principal church
there is a magnificent tomb erected to the memory of the Emperor
Maximilian, grandfather to Charles V. He was a complying, weak
Prince, of whom Abbé Raynal says in his Mémoires Historiques ‘Il
n’inspirait point de reconnaissance, quoiqu’il accordat presque tout
qu’on lui demandait: on sentait qu’il ne cherchait pas à obliger, mais
qu’il ne savait pas refuser.’ Near the town is a castle, the residence
of the Archduchess, Governor of the Tyrol; the arsenal contains a
curious collection of different suits of armour, which belonged to
some of the most celebrated of warriors. I went to a German play,
the pantomime of which, tho’ a deep tragedy, diverted me much, tho’
I did not comprehend a word of the dialogue.
2nd July.—Took the road to Munich. Immediately on leaving the
town began ascending; slept at Wallensee, prettily situated among
the mts., near a small lake. The change of temperature was
sensible: thermometer in the morning at Innspruck was 75, at
Wallensee fell to 59.
3rd July.—Large clumps of the spruce fir dotted over rich plains
and fertile hills, with a noble view of the mts. we were quitting, made
a view not altogether insipid.
The approach to Munich is not imposing; it denotes little of the
magnificence of a capital. The town is large and irregular; the houses
are more substantial and imposing than magnificent; many are
thatched, and those that are not have high roofs, gable ends, and
garret windows. I was labouring under such low spirits, that the
prejudice I felt against Munich was owing to the unhappiness I
endured there.
Count Rumford,[19] an American of the name of Benjamin
Thompson, was the Prime Minister of Bavaria. He has made some
excellent reforms in the governt. of that country, and created many
beneficial institutions for the poor. He was very civil, and showed me
with a degree of minuteness, with which I could have dispensed, all
his hospitals, manufactures, etc. I was compelled to see what I did
not wish, his beloved, a Mde. Nogarolla.
Went from Munich to Ratisbon. Here I first hailed the Danube, a
mighty stream, the prince of rivers. I purchased a gun and pair of
pistols of the famous Kerkenrüyter to make a present to Mr. Pelham.
The maker told me he had sold to Col. Lennox the identical pair he
used against the Duke of York. It was scarcely fair to use such sure
weapons.
Reached Dresden in ye night of the 21st. We
found a numerous society of English, Lord H. LORD HENRY
Spencer,[20] Mr. Robt. Markham, Mr. Elliot,[21] SPENCER
English Minister, Ct. Stopford, and afterwards Lds.
Boringdon and Granville Leveson-Gower. Ld. Henry was there on his
way to Vienna, whither he was to carry the compliment upon the
accession of the Emperor. He was then Secretary at the Hague
under Ld. Auckland. His abilities were spoken highly of; at Eton he
was known as a poet in the Microcosm.[22] His shyness
embarrassed him, and rendered his manner awkward. He was very
witty, and possessed a superabundant stock of irony. In short, he
became ardently in love with me, and he was the first man who had
ever produced the slightest emotion in my heart.
I was received at Dresden with a degree of distinction that was
highly flattering. I would not go to Court; the Princesses sent a civil,
reproachful message, and begged me to see them en particulier at
one of their villas. I went, and an embarrassing circumstance
occurred. The Prince Antony, by some mistake, took me for Ld.
Henry’s wife, complimented him upon my beauty, agréments, etc.,
and concluded by saying, ‘I see by your admiration and love for her
you are worthy to possess her.’ This said before ten people was too
painful to bear. Had I been very accessible to vanity on the score of
person, I could not have resisted the flattery I everywhere met with:
dinners, fêtes, etc., given to me; invitations sent to people on
purpose to meet ‘La charmante Miladi’; my dress copied, my manner
studied.
The 2nd of August, 1792.—Very pleasant supper at the French
Minister’s, Baron de Montesquieu. The Duke of Brunswick’s
Manifesto filled everybody with astonishment and alarm for the lives
and liberties of the Royal family.[23] This rash and violent diatribe
against the Parisians was a precursor of an invasion of France.
Seventeen thousand of the Provincial troops were to be assembled
on ye 14th July at Paris, and it was said that if the Prussians, etc.,
advanced into the country, that the King would be conveyed to Blois;
then troops are supposed to be already destined to that service, and
the Parisians are already jealous of them.
In England, the Association of the Friends of the People alarm
the steady, and the example of France terrifies even the moderate
innovators.[24] The Association was formed without the participation
of Mr. Fox;[25] he never was consulted about it. On the contrary the
Association seemed determined against all advice, but most
particularly against his. Thinking people apprehend more from the
superabundant loyalty of the country than from its Democracy. There
are to be Addresses from all parts of the Kingdom, thanking the King
for his Proclamation and professing attachment to his Person and
Governt. Extremes are dangerous.
Left Dresden in September; went by Prague to
Vienna. I was much pleased with my residence THE FRIENDS
there; I was fêted enough to gratify the most OF THE
unbounded vanity. I went to Court; a separate PEOPLE
private introduction to the Emperor and Empress.
Sir Robert Keith was the English Minister. The Countess Thuron was
the lady who went about with me. Made an excursion to Presburg,
the capital of Hungary. Ld. Henry was there. We parted on
September the 25th or 26th, not later.
From Vienna we went to Venice by the road of Gratz, thro’ Styria
and Carinthia. On our arrival at Venice Mr. Ellis was dangerously ill
of a putrid fever. He recovered by the care of a Jew doctor. We
stayed a short time after his recovery; went by way of Mantua to
Parma. From thence to Bologna and Florence. Mr. Ellis left us at
Florence to return to England. We went on by the road of Radicofani
to Rome (where we staid only two nights), then to Naples, which we
reached about the 2nd week in October.
As soon as I was a little rested after my journey I began to see
the wonderful environs, both of natural and artificial curiosities. The
English society was composed of many of my friends; the
Palmerstons,[26] Miss Carter, Sr. Charles Blagden, Dss. of Ancaster,
Ly. Plymouth with whom I became intimate. Soon came the
Bessboroughs (the old Father died), Ly. Spencer, Dss. of
Devonshire, Ly. E. Foster, Mr. Pelham. In January the French fleet
came and menaced Naples with a bombardment.[27] They were
moored in front of my house on the Chiaia. I was brought to bed of
my son Henry, on ye 10th Feb., 1793. I made my grossesse a
pretext for staying at home in the evening. I went out every morning
to see the objects most worthy of notice, and the evening I always
passed with friends who came to see me, Drew, Mr. Pelham, and
Italinski,[28] a Russian who grew much attached to my society.
March 22nd.—We set off for Paestum. Our
party consisted of the Palmerstons, Miss Carter, a ROAD TO
Mr. Poor (a very eccentric man), and Mr. Pelham. PAESTUM
About two miles from Pompeia the country begins
to be pretty, and we got more amongst the Apennines. The road is
excellent, it being made by ye King to go to a chasse of his at Eboli.
La Cava and Vietri are charmingly situated in their different styles;
the first has all the beauties of social life, small neat cottages
interspersed amongst vineyards, olives, and myrtles, upon the side
of a hill inclining towards a small torrent. The whiteness of the
houses contrasted with the verdure of spring vegetation in the
foreground, and the boldness of the scraggy rocks behind make a
lovely picture and fill the mind with pleasing sensations at the sight of
comfort and tranquillity, a lot that rarely befalls the peasantry of
France and England. There is an aqueduct traditionally called
Abelard’s bridge; why, the learned must determine, for I never knew
that victim to love left his native France. Vietri is situated upon a rock
above the sea, into which it abruptly ends; it commands a noble view
of the bay of Salerno. With a glass from hence one may discern the
temples of Paestum on the opposite coast. Salerno is a pretty little
town upon the edge of the sea; the detail of the country is charming.
On the right side of the bay is Amalfi, remarkable for being the spot
where the Justinian Code was discovered. The Cathedral at Salerno
is curious; in it are many sarcophagi brought by Robert Guiscard
from Paestum, and various columns of fine marble and granite,
which are placed to form a corridor in the court of the Cathedral, but
being of different sizes the whole has an awkward appearance. From
Salerno ye country is less interesting; excepting a few Baronial
castles perched upon the tops of scraggy, isolated rocks there is little
worthy of notice.
At Eboli we were obliged to change our carriages for smaller
ones on account of the roads, which to Paestum were called
abominable. We crossed ye Sele in a ferry; it is a torrent frequently
impassable. Here the wretched inhabitants by their emaciated and
squalid looks indicated the beginning of the malaria. Their
habitations were such that one could easier imagine oneself in
Siberia than in delightful Italy! Delicious country! as their homes, if
they deserve such an epithet, were an exact counterpart of a Tartar
hut. Circular mud walls raised about three feet from the ground,
thatched with reeds forming a conical summit; the only aperture a
door, which answered ye double purpose of admitting the wretched
owners and letting out the smoke, which was very abundant from a
fire lighted in the centre of the hut. But even in this disconsolate
dwelling there was an attempt to drive away the melancholy which
disease and penury must naturally inspire, for on one of the poles
which supported the roof and came across the interior of the dwelling
there hung a guitar. I persuaded one of the peasants to strike it: I
immediately perceived an illumination of joy upon the haggard
countenances of his auditors. Happy instrument! to suspend for a
moment the sensation of misery, and banish by its tones the anguish
of want from the breasts of the forlorn inmates. As we approached
Paestum the dreariness of the country quite oppressive; plains filled
with buffaloes, the most hideous of animals, stagnant ditches, and
stinted myrtles, were all the objects that met the eye.
Paestum itself is situated in a plain about a mile
from the sea, dedicated to Neptune and built by ye PAESTUM
Phoenicians about 250 years after the foundation
of Rome; 500 years before Christ. Near the amphitheatre (which is
much ruined) is the remains of a building with fluted columns nearly
as large as those of the temples, more upright marks still existing of
their bases; the capitals much worked in extraordinary designs. Parts
of the frieze lying about; figures of men from 24 to 30 inches high
worked on the frieze between the triglyphs. The stone of this building
is more of the colour of grey limestone, and appears less porous
than that of which the temples are built, that is a stone formed by
incrustation of water. Paestum formerly was famous for roses, the
sweetness of which is celebrated by several of the Latin poets; now
alas! brambles and malaria have extinguished the fragrance of ye
rose.
Our accommodation was but indifferent: I slept upon a table, the
repelling points of which rather annoyed my limbs and would have
convinced Boscovitch,[29] had he been in my place, of the existence
of hard matter. However, I tried to sleep, tho’ its ancient inhabitants,
ye Sybarites, would not have rested, if the story is true that one of
them complained that a curled rose leaf destroyed their rest. The first
view I had of ye temples was in ye dusk of ye evening; their
appearance was majestic, but precisely what I had conceived them
to be from the drawings I had seen. They are the only remains in
Italy of early Grecian architecture. The Doric, to my taste, is too
uneven. The columns are squat and clumsy. The inhabitants are
savage and ignorant.
Fix’d like a plant on his peculiar spot,
To draw nutrition, propagate, and rot,
seems exactly their state. The cicerone assured us that in one of the
temples there was a prodigious treasure inaccessible to men, as the
Devil kept guard over it.
We saw the temples again in the morning, and then proceeded to
Salerno, where we slept. I walked upon the terrace before my
window and enjoyed the beauty of the night; the moon shone bright,
which added to the lulling sound of the waves filled me with every
pleasing and melancholy recollection. Tho’ separated by land and
sea from some objects too dearly cherished, yet I was tranquil.
Prudence satisfied me that all was for the best. I could not help
casting an anxious thought towards my dear father stretched upon a
bed of sickness, perhaps to rise no more, but the reflection of never
having done anything that could disturb his peace, or render his last
moments painful from my misconduct, was a relief that God grant my
children may feel when they think of me in a similar situation.
Delicious as Salerno is, yet like all the goods of this life it is
counterbalanced by a portion of evil, as half the year it is untenable
on account of the malaria. We dined in the Temple of Isis at
Pompeia, on which day I completed my 22nd year; so old and yet so
silly.
On ye 1st of April, 1793, we set off for Beneventum, Lady
Plymouth,[30] Italinski, Mr. Pelham, and Mr. Swinburne. Aversa is the
first town of any consequence. The polichinello of the Neapolitan
stage, which resembles the harlequin of the Italian, derives its origin
from this town, and the dialect of this place belongs to him, as the
Bergamesque does to the harlequin—which harlequin is, bye the
bye, a burlesque on Charles Quint. Arienzo is the next town, only
remarkable for the strange costume of the women, their dress being
only two aprons tied behind and before, which leaves a considerable
aperture on each side equally unpleasant and indecent. The country
is a dead flat to within three miles of Arpaia.
Between Arienzo and Arpaia is the valley which
is supposed to have been the scene of the AN ITALIAN
disgrace of the Romans, when they were MÉNAGE
compelled by the Samnites to pass under ye yoke.
The weather towards evening grew bad, and we could not get out
and examine the defiles with the attention and accuracy Italinski
required. The Marchese Pacca, to whom we were recommended,
received us with that hearty kind of hospitality, which unfortunately
for the good fellowship of society is totally banished from our would
be refined country. His time, himself, and all he possessed, were at
our disposal. The interior of an Italian ménage I only knew from buffa
opera; it is worth seeing. Himself, his old palace, his antiquated
volantes, his equipages, his stubborn mules, all were sights. The old
Marchesa was also delightful, not to the eye, for she was hideous,
nor to the ear, for she squalled, nor to the nose, for she was an
Italian; yet, from her unbounded desire of pleasing, the tout
ensemble created more agreeable sensations than many more
accomplished could have inspired, as there is something infinitely
gratifying to our predominant sentiment of self-love to see another
solicitous to please, even tho’ the attempt should prove
unsuccessful. Fruitless as it was, the goodwill supplied the failure.
In consequence of the birth of a son to the Empress there was a
brilliant appartamente at the Queen’s.[31] I went with joy.
1st May.—The whole proceeding was conducted with the utmost
magnificence.
The post of ye 2nd brought the melancholy news of the death of
one of my warmest friends, poor Ly. Sheffield! She loved me most
tenderly, nor did the great disparity of years prevent me from
returning with cordiality her affection.
On ye fourth of May I went to see the celebrated miracle of the
liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius.[32] The Duc de Sangro, in
whose house we saw the miracle, gave us afterward a ball. The
composition of the material puzzles the chemists. The miracle, such
as it is, requires the vigour and warmth of a young hand to reduce it
from its concrete state to fluidity.
Sunday, 5th May.—Prince Esterhazy, the Imperial Ambassador,
gave a splendid fête in honour of the young Archduke. The King,
Queen, and Prince Royal were present: the Queen came and sat by
me the greater part of the evening. She is lively and entertaining in
conversation. It was whispered about the room that the atrocious
Marseillais were marching upon Paris to destroy the Queen.
6th May.—Rode out as usual; a very pretty retired ride towards
the Camaldoli.
7th.—Infamously bad weather, which made us delay our project
of passing the day at Baia. We therefore confined ourselves within
hail (?) of land, and dined at Pollio’s villa upon Posilippo. We rowed
by the side of the charming Colline. The whole detail of the country is
delightful; the bright green of the vine contrasted with the brilliant
yellow of the tufa produces the most pleasing effect. Pollio’s villa is
on the East side of the Colline, from whence it commanded a fine
view of the chain of Apennines with the high point of St. Angelo
lowering above, the towns of Pompeia, Stabia, the promontory of
Minerva, and the whole of the bay including an oblique view of Capri.
We attempted to row round Nisida, but a threatening storm
prevented us. We rowed to the Porto Pavone, a lovely little harbour
formed like a peacock’s tail, which figure gave rise to the name. We
dined at Pollio’s villa during a violent thunderstorm. I conquered my
fears and behaved with great intrepidity.
The next day we embarked at Pozzuoli for
Baia. At Pozzuoli, a tolerable statue of Tiberius, BAIA
ornamented with bas-reliefs representing 14 cities
destroyed by an earthquake and restored by him; monster as he was
he could sometimes be betrayed into a good action. We passed
Mons Gaurus, on which grew the Falernian wine so much praised by
Horace, who either did not know what good wine was or the quality
of the grape has changed, as the wine it now yields has no claim to
encomium. The next summit is Monte Nuovo, raised by a terrible
earthquake and eruption out of the Lucrine Lake within the space of
24 hours; its elevation destroyed a small town situated on its banks.
The crater of Monte Nuovo gives one a very good notion of a
volcano: the hill composed of light volcanic ashes which will soon
become compact enough to be called tufa. We passed by Nero’s
baths and villa.
On landing at Baia, the first object is the Temple of Venus, an
octagon building; above it is a circular building dedicated to Mercury
and another to Diana, of which only half remains, like the section of a
building in architectural drawing. In the centre it had a cupola not
unlike the form of the Pantheon. The present castle of Baia is upon
the spot where Julius Caesar had a villa. Every atom of this once
favoured spot was either highly decorated with fine gardens,
fountains, porches, and terraces, or adorned with luxurious villas.
Marius was reproached in the Senate for living in a spot so much the
seat of pleasure. Sylla, Cicero, Lucullus, Pompey, Caesar,
Hortensius, all had villas. The baths of Nero are between Baia and
the Lucrine Lakes; the heat of the water is so great that an egg is
boiled in two minutes. The sand under the sea is so heated that one
could not with convenience hold it for any time. This all proves the
vicinity of that powerful agent so destructive to this beautiful country:
hourly may one expect some dreadful explosion that may perhaps
lay the very spot I am now on many hundreds of feet below its
present level, or raise it to the height of Vesuvius. The sea was
rough, and the periodical storm came on an hour later than the
preceding day. It is singular the degree of accuracy with which the
people foretell the approach of bad weather, and even the duration
of it. We returned by land. We passed the ruins of Cicero’s academic
villa. How grand it must have been in its days of splendour. Atticus
procured from Greece the pictures and statues; that they must have
been excellent one cannot doubt, both from his fine taste and the
facility with which he could obtain the finest subjects.
We went next day from Pozzuoli to Misenum: Lady Spencer
declined going from a reason which I did not know till afterwards, or
it doubtless would have operated in retaining me, viz., the length of
the sea excursion, and the probability of a storm. The sea was very
rough, and I, of course, was very nervous. We passed through
pieces of what are called Caligula’s Bridge, but more likely to have
been a mole beyond which he carried a bridge of boats over which
he rode to fulfil a prophecy, which was, “That it was as unlikely that
he should come to the Empire, as that he should ride across the Bay
of Baia on horseback.”

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Society in the Self: A Theory of Identity

in Democracy 1st Edition Hubert J. M.

Self and Identity Trenton Merricks

The Oxford Handbook of Self-Determination Theory

Democracy, Elections, and Constitutionalism in Africa

Security, Democracy, and Society in Bali: Trouble with

At Home with Democracy : A Theory of Indian Politics

Career Development and Counseling: Theory and Practice

Emotions as Original Existences: A Theory of Emotion,

Hume on the Self and Personal Identity Dan O'Brien

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2018

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Introduction: he Democratic Organization of Self and Identity 1

2. Positioning and Democracy in the Self 45

3. Positioning and Democracy in Teams and Organizations 105

4. he Positioning Brain 141

5. Social and Societal Over-Positioning: he Emergence

6. Heterogenizing and Enriching the Self 255

7. Dialogue as Generative Form of Positioning 299

8. Dialogical Democracy in a Boundary-Crossing World:

what positioning theory can learn from recent developments in neuroscientiic

he most violent element in society is ignorance.

is that diferences, oppositions, coalitions, conlicts, clashes, and power games

What Led to Writing his Book?

to decenter themselves as part of a larger community? Are self-centered indi-

he Core Idea of Positioning heory: Self as a

he Analogy Between Democracy in Society

Positioning heory as Spatial and Relational

my colleagues, my children, my opponent) who function as other I-positions in

Self as Bureaucratic or Democratic Society?

Toward a Bridging heory: At the Interface

to create a platform where diferent, separated and even contradictory concep-

Chapters of the Book

he purpose of chapter 3 is to demonstrate that the central theoretical con-

not balanced by efective counter-positions. In order to deepen the potentials of

Message of the Book

From the Other-in-the-Self to Society-in-the-Self

Diference Between the Other in the Self

Table 1.1. Examples of Social and Societal Relationships in the Self

personal revenge by a betrayed husband or wife to an organized ritual of groups

Self-Sabotage: Ranking Yourself Lower than

description of a form of self-sabotage on the side of the nurses of some hospitals

I remember an instance of self-sabotage when I served as a soldier in

carpet for “misbehavior.” he reason was quite “stupid”: he accused

Self-Radicalization: he Slippery Slope of Violence

As the authors discuss, a most plausible explanation of the progress in admin-

is a slippery slope of increasingly extreme behaviors, with increasingly extreme

From a positional point of view, the phenomenon of self-radicalization raises

As a boy of approximately eight years old, I started to become aware

Self-radicalization in combination with self-escalation is just one example of the

Self-Cure in Integrative Medicine: he Doctor

traditional medical treatments, proponents of integrative medicine develop

Self-Marriage: An Institutionalized Form

In customary marriage, most people use traditional vows or write their

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