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MIGRATION,
DIASPORAS AND
CITIZENSHIP
Tahriib – Journeys
into the Unknown
An Ethnography of
Uncertainty in Migration
Anja Simonsen
Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship
Series Editors
Olga Jubany
Department of Social Anthropology
Universitat de Barcelona
Barcelona, Spain
Saskia Sassen
Department of Sociology and Committee on Global Thought
Columbia University
New York, NY, USA
For over twenty years, the Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship series
has contributed to cross-disciplinary empirical and theoretical debates on
migration processes, serving as a critical forum for and problematising
the main issues around the global movement and circulation of people.
Grounded in both local and global accounts, the Series firstly focuses on
the conceptualisation and dynamics of complex contemporary national
and transnational drivers behind movements and forced displacements.
Secondly, it explores the nexus of migration, diversity and identity,
incorporating considerations of intersectionality, super-diversity, social
polarization and identification processes to examine migration through
the various intersections of racialized identities, ethnicity, class, gender,
age, disability and other oppressions. Thirdly, the Series critically engages
the emerging challenges presented by reconfigured borders and
boundaries: state politicization of migration, sovereignty, security,
transborder regulations, human trade and ecology, and other imperatives
that transgress geopolitical territorial borders to raise dilemmas about
contemporary movements and social drivers.
Editorial Board
Brenda Yeoh Saw Ai (National University of Singapore, Singapore)
Fabio Perocco (Università Ca’Foscari Venezia, Italy)
Rita Segato (Universidade de Brasília, Brazil)
Carlos Vargas (University of Oxford, UK)
Ajmal Hussain (University of Warwick, UK).
Anja Simonsen
Tahriib – Journeys
into the Unknown
An Ethnography of Uncertainty
in Migration
Anja Simonsen
Department of Anthropology
University of Copenhagen
Copenhagen, Denmark
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar
or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
This book is dedicated to all the women, children and men
who venture out on hazardous journeys every single day, risking
their lives while encountering increased border control
and ever stricter rules for obtaining asylum.
Preface
While the majority of places in the book are real, all the names of people
presented in the book are pseudonyms. All the included pictures have
been taken by me during my fieldwork, except for two that have been
sent to me by people I encountered en route.
For city names and Somali given names, I use the standard English
spelling such as Hargeisa, Burao and Abdirahman (rather than Hargeysa,
Burco and Cabdiraxmaan). When I make use of Somali words, I spell
them in Somali such as hooyo [mother], aabo [father], xog (information),
etc. Here, ‘x’ is equivalent to the Arabic letter حand ‘c’ is equivalent to ع.
ix
Acknowledgements
Gratitude! This is what I feel towards all the people who have worked
with me through the process of conducting fieldwork, collecting and ana-
lysing data, and writing this book. The final result is a product of short-
and longer-term collaborations, different academic project constellations,
(inter)national colleagues and friendships. Without any one of you, this
book would never have seen the light of day. Thank you! I also want to
extend my gratitude to Det Frie Forskningsråd (FKK), the Velux
Foundation and the Carlsberg Foundation for funding past and present
projects.
To all the young Somali women and men that I have met during my
time in Ethiopia, Somaliland, Turkey, Greece, Italy and beyond: We have
laughed and cried together, seen and done things we never thought we
would; we have lost people that we knew and cared about along the way.
It has been a tough and painful journey, but it has also been a rewarding
one. I will be forever grateful for your warmth, hospitality and kindness.
I am especially grateful to Hooyo and Aabo, their children and grandchil-
dren. You opened your home and your family to me in Somaliland to an
extent that I will never forget: getting up early to eat before sunrise dur-
ing Ramadan, participating in family gatherings and everyday life, and
never being left to the loneliness that new and strange places may hold. It
all made a world of difference to me and provided me with an insight into
xi
xii Acknowledgements
MAHAD-NAQ: Waxa aan halkan uga mahad naqayaa guud ahaan sha-
cabka Somaliland, haday tahay rag, dumar iyo qaybaha kala duwan ee bul-
shada. Gaar ahaan dhalinyaradii aan waqtiga kula qaatay safaradaydii
Somaliland, Turkiga, Giriigga iyo meelo fara badan oo dunida dacaladeeda
ahba. Waxa aan marna ii suurto gasheen inaan la’aantiin dhamaystiro
buuggan. Waxaynu isla soo qaadanay waqtiyo farxad iyo murugo leh, wax-
aynu usoo wada joognay dhacdooyin lama filaan ah. Intii aan waday
qoraalka buuggan waxaynu wayney asxaab qaali ahayd oo aynu wada
jeclayn. Sidaas darteed waxaay ahayd waayo-aragnimo xanuun badan,
laakiin hadana waxay ii ahayd mid aan ka bartay wax badan. Waxaan abaal
aan go’ayn idiin ka hayn doonaa soo dhawayntii, kal-gacalkii iyo diira-
naantii aad ii muujiseen. Waxa aan si gaar ah ugu mahad naqayaa Hooyo,
Aabo, ubadkooda iyo ubadka ay dhaleenba. Waxa aan uga mahad ceelinaya
sidii quruxda badnayd ee ay iigu martiqaadeen gurigooda intii aan joogay
Somaliland. Waligay ma hilmaami doono sidii wanaagga iyo sharfta
badnayd ee aynu aqalkiina ugu wada afuri jirnay waqtigii ramadaanka.
Sidii aad qoys-ahaan ii soo dhowayseen iyo ka mid noqoshadii qoyskiina
waxay iga badbaadisay cidladii iyo kelinimadii, waxayna iigu fadhiday
waxtar wayn. Sidoo kale waxay ii ahayd fursad aan wax badan kaga bartay
hab-nololeedka shacabka Somaliland, run ahaantii arintani la’aantiin
marnaba iima suurtowdeen. Waxaan sidoo kale abaal iyo mahad-celin
wayn u hayaa Mohamed, Ahmed, Dahir, Jama, Abdikarim, Sahal, Zayid,
Acknowledgements xiii
3 ‘If
I Die, I have Already Died’: Entanglements of Social
Death 55
6 T
empo(S) of Time En Route139
7 B
iometric Ambiguities159
8 M
aking Home183
9 C
onclusion: Universal Uncertainties207
I ndex219
xv
List of Figures
xvii
xviii List of Figures
securitisation (Karyotis and Patrikios 2010, 43; Léonard 2011, 8). Such
studies often take as point of departure the top-down policies drawn up
by those in power within nation states. The other approach to security,
the PARIS approach, takes the existential condition of the individual as
its empirical vantage point. This approach, with roots in anthropology
and development studies, operates on the micro-scale and often focuses
on the people who experience the security practices and policies discussed
by the Copenhagen School.2
In this book, I show how the ‘security moment’, which has been traced
back to 9/11 and which has seen a revival during the so-called migrant
crisis, is best understood if we approach security as a sense of achieving a
set of normative goals (Sulovic 2010). The goal is always to eliminate
insecurity, whether represented by the physical presence of people with-
out regular travel documents in Europe or by the lack of food and
employment opportunities among families in Somaliland. These insecu-
rities and the strategies to eliminate them are created, utilised and socially
understood by people representing the state, as well as by ‘actors and
groups outside of the state and its official institutions’ (Goldstein 2010,
492–493).
Security can thus be seen not as a universal thing out there to achieve
but as an expression of the various local experiences and categorisations
that can be socially and politically manipulated. This turns the fight to
decide what is and should be defined as security into a fight for power. As
Buur et al. argue (2007, 12), ‘Security is about real questions of safety
and violence, but it is also a way of representing particular problems in a
manner that makes them exceptional and a question of survival’. Security,
in other words, is about a physical condition as well as a political con-
struction surrounded by struggles for its definition.
The encounters between the young Somalis and European law enforce-
ment at border sites, explored in this book, show how socio-culturally
and politically constructed perceptions of security can be experienced in
a very real and physical manner. They further show how such encounters
between different definitions of security result in new uncertainties, con-
taining existential conditions of both fear and hope.
6 A. Simonsen
History/ies of Migration
Generations of Somalis have sought greener pastures, both literally and
figuratively, as nomads, students and businessmen have moved across
clan territories, state borders and continental divides. They have responded
not only to the insecurity of rainfall but to existential uncertainties simi-
lar to those described by the young generation of today: the hopes and
dreams of youth and the aspiration of spending one’s time wisely and
making the most of life. Tahriib, however, is not only a history of Somalis.
It is, as argued by a young Somali scholar,3 ‘a history of humankind’:
Tahriib starts with the history of humankind. Even the Europeans did tah-
riib. Columbus, he sailed away from Europe to America facing the danger-
ous sea looking for a good place. It is human beings’ nature to leave a place
without any life to a place where you can live.
a living for themselves (Besteman 1999, 12). The colonial border draw-
ing also had consequences on a larger scale. By one stroke, Somalis found
themselves living as minorities and outsiders in territories that their fami-
lies had occupied long before the colonial era. In Kenya’s Northern
Frontier District, for example, Somalis went from being majority inhab-
itants of a vast Somali territory to being seen as ‘quasi-foreign elements in
the colony, later as undesirable members of a postcolonial nation, and
more recently as national and international security threats’ (Weitzberg
2017, 177). The categorisation of Somalis as outsiders and potential
security threats has led to an increase in young Somali Kenyans consider-
ing tahriib as a solution.
Following independence, the colonial legacy continued to affect many
Somalis through experiences of insecurity and displacement, as discussed
above. Concomitantly, the early 1960s saw ‘a growing feeling of national-
ism inspired by nationalist movements in their struggle against colonial-
ism’ (Ismail 2016, 2). The Somali Republic was born, implementing a
parliamentary democracy with two major goals: ‘socio-political unifica-
tion of the Somalis in the Horn of Africa and socio-economic develop-
ment of the new nation’ (ibid., 1).
In 1969, the newborn state of Somalia saw a military coup led by
Mohamed Siyad Barre, whose initial aim was to fight poverty, disease and
ignorance (Lewis [1965]2002, 208). During his 30 years of rule in
Somalia, he attempted to implement ‘scientific socialism’, inspired by the
Soviet Union and referring to ‘wealth-sharing based on wisdom’, includ-
ing urban and rural mass literacy campaigns in Somalia in 1973 and
1975. According to Siyad Barre and his followers, the success of ‘scientific
socialism’ included dismantling clannism. The official state slogan at the
time argued that ‘tribalism divides, socialism unites’ (ibid, 209). This spe-
cific part of the national campaign was met with demonstrations and
later accusations against Siyad Barre himself of favourising his own clan.
In addition to the growing dissatisfaction in the population, the unsuc-
cessful war initiated by Siyad Barre against Ethiopia in 1977, which led
to the displacement of many Somalis, played an important role in the
eventual demise of the regime. In 1991, civil war broke out, the post-
colonial state collapsed, and Somalis started to flee across the borders in
very high numbers.8
1 Introduction: Uncertainties of Migration 11
The two major cities of Somaliland, Burao and Hargeisa, were bombed
in 1988 when Siyad Barre was still in power. The war between south and
north Somalia resulted in hundreds of thousands of people fleeing the
north, rendering the capital, Hargeisa, a ghost town (Hansen 2006, 20,
56). In south-central Somalia, ethnic cleansing, violent conflicts and
famine broke out (Lewis 2002, 262–265).9 The capital Mogadishu
became ‘the centre of waves of destruction and terror’ (ibid., 264). In the
years after 1991, when the rule of Siyad Barre came to an end, 250,000
Somalis died due to civil war and famine (Menkhaus 2007, 81).
The international community attempted to create stability in Somalia
through formal state-building and national reconciliation initiatives, like
the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) between 1993
and 1995. Most of these initiatives failed (ibid.). Local stakeholders like
businessmen, professionals and former military officers have also worked
through informal channels to secure rules and regulations in Somalia.
But the numerous competing internal and external interests have pro-
longed conflicts and undermined local processes of stabilisation, thus
contributing to militant Islamism and warlordism (Hagmann 2016).
In 2012, the Somali Republic went from a transitional to a federal
government, marking a more permanent and stabilised state and result-
ing in increased optimism after 22 years of civil war and 12 years of con-
stantly changing transitional governments (Ismail 2016, 2). Despite
positive developments, the country continues to experience major inter-
nal insecurities and ongoing conflicts between the government and the
militant group al-Shabaab [‘the Youth’].10 Insecurity and hardship con-
tinues to make everyday life difficult for the Somali population and leads
to ongoing displacement. Out of a population of approximately 16.8
million people in Somalia (United Nations Population Fund 2022),11
more than 2.6 million Somalis have become part of the mixed migration
flows within the Horn of Africa, living as internally displaced persons or
in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, Ethiopia and Kenya (Human
Rights Watch 2022). Another estimated two million people of Somali
descent have settled as refugees in Europe and North America as part of
the diaspora (Kleist and Abdi 2022).
Thus, decades of instability in Somalia have led to a continued existen-
tial insecurity for many young Somalis growing up in the country.
12 A. Simonsen
Ethnographic Footsteps
The first time I set foot in the Horn of Africa was in 2010 as an intern for
a Danish NGO as part of my master’s degree in anthropology. I spent 10
months in the Somali Regional State in Ethiopia making friends among
young Somalis born in refugee camps in the region. They taught me that
despite living in safety away from the ongoing conflicts in Somalia, being
labelled a refugee in the eyes of the law did not provide a life in which
they could fulfil their hopes and dreams. In fact, many of my interlocu-
tors attended interviews with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) in the hope of being resettled in countries like
the USA.
Three years later, in May 2013, I found myself in Somaliland living in
a household of three generations. This was made possible by connections
made through my friends in Ethiopia and my participation in the com-
parative research project, Invisible Lives.12 Here, in Hargeisa, the young
people I encountered expressed dreams of moving away from a secure but
difficult or hopeless situation. While my friends in the Ethiopian refugee
camps would leave through regular and legal means of travel, my new
friends in Somaliland did not have that opportunity. Instead, they risked
their lives on journeys into the unknown, as Gacal told us in the begin-
ning of this book.
What struck me about the young Somalis in Hargeisa was that so
many shared the dream of doing tahriib, across clan affiliations and eco-
nomic differences. Most of my new friends, who shared their thoughts
and dreams with me, belonged to the lower middle class and middle
class. The majority were in the middle of or had just finalised their
14 A. Simonsen
university education, which they were paying for. Some received the
tuition fees from their immediate family; others had collected the money
from family members living outside of Somalia, the diaspora. The young
Somalis all had very high aspirations in life. What continued to puzzle
me was that although these high aspirations did not allow them to com-
promise with their hopes for the future, so many of them made the big-
gest compromise of all as they chose to risk their lives to journey into the
unknown. This book is the result of ongoing reflections upon this puzzle.
As part of my PhD project, I conducted 11 months of fieldwork in
three different landscapes: Somaliland, Turkey and Greece. Originally,
the three geopolitical spaces were divided into three parts: Somaliland as
the country of origin, Turkey defined as a transit country and Greece as
the destination country. Departing on this journey myself, reality quickly
hit me. Although I travelled to these three countries and thus constructed
a linear journey, for most of my Somali friends, tahriib did not entail any
clear sense of direction. A destination country like Greece was never really
the destination, as the young Somalis tended to ‘live in mobility’ meaning
that ‘their experiences were marked by an ongoing mobility that con-
sisted of a multiplicity of potential routes’ and often changes in status
(Schrooten et al. 2016, 1199; see also Schuster 2005). Movement was
never linear or certain, neither for them nor for me. Instead, it was what
Vertovec has defined as ‘circular migration’ characterised by a continuous
and non-linear movement (2007).
I travelled along these paths and felt as a part of the network con-
structed from footsteps taken long before me, along with me and con-
tinuing after me. A central component of my methodology was making
friends, which allowed me to build long-lasting relations and actively
participate in the networks of travellers. My new friends would always
bring me along and introduce me to others, like when I landed in Hargeisa
and was introduced to Abdullahi through another international scholar
conducting research there. Abdullahi introduced me to a family member,
Taban, whose perspectives on life and migration are introduced in the
book. Through Taban I was introduced to Abdirahman, who was a friend
of Taban’s younger brother and considering tahriib at the time.
Abdirahman’s social network and thoughts on migration, as he gathered
1 Introduction: Uncertainties of Migration 15
information and slowly changed his mind and decided to stay in Hargeisa,
have been an invaluable foundation for this book.
My methodological approach to studying circular migration depended
heavily on border-crossing social networks. Just like my new friends,
when they ventured on tahriib, I also ‘utilized, extended and established
social connections spanning places of origin and places abroad’ (Vertovec
2007, 2). The modern technological solutions and the reduced costs of
being online have intensified this and helped me and my friends obtain,
maintain and develop border-crossing social networks. Now, almost 10
years later, I still exchange online messages with the people I befriended
back in 2013, who are now scattered throughout the globe. The same
technology has allowed my friends to make online introductions to other
friends through social media. These introductions have helped me develop
my network in Italy in 2016, 2017 and 2018, where I conducted my
postdoctoral research in the collaborative project, The Biometric Border
World.13 Here, I set out to explore how young Somalis en route experi-
enced and negotiated the increased European border control, including
the implementation of biometric technologies.
I was initially surprised to see how some made use of biometric regis-
tration to negotiate family relations or socio-cultural positions at home
(Simonsen 2020b). At the same time, I found some of my earlier puzzles
re-emerging, as so many young Somalis chose to continue their journey
into the unknown despite being provided with temporary security in
Italy. This showed me that the young Somalis experienced life in Italy as
very similar to life at home—except now, many had no place to live and
lacked the stable food supply that most had enjoyed in Somaliland.
However, for Somalis in Italy, continuing into the unknown had become
more difficult, as the European authorities’ security measures against
irregular migration started to include biometric registration at bor-
der sites.
Throughout the various stages of fieldwork, I have made use of research
assistants to set up meetings, to entertain endless discussions on tahriib
and other themes and to translate interviews conducted in Somali. All
my research assistants were either considering tahriib, were in the process
of doing tahriib or were living among their peers doing so. This gave me
unique access to the community of young Somalis doing tahriib. This
16 A. Simonsen
Notes
1. My interlocutors originate in different parts of the Horn of Africa:
Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia, and the majority come from the self-
pronounced republic of Somaliland.
2. For an in-depth discussion of the two main approaches within security
studies—the Copenhagen School and the PARIS approach—see Bigo
and McCluskey 2018.
3. Semi-structured interview, 04.03.2015, with one of the authors of the
book Magafe: Tahriibka iyo Dhallinta Sibiq-dhaqaaqday.
4. Of course being aware of national, regional and local differences
(Pelican 2013).
5. https://www.joh.cam.ac.uk/library/library_exhibitions/schoolresources/
exploration/scramble_for_africa/
6. See the work of Touval (1963) for an in-depth exploration of the parti-
tion of the Horn.
7. The latest fights in Las Anod, the capital of the Sool region in Somaliland
bordering Puntland, which erupted in December 2022, also has its roots
in the colonial division of Somalia along with ‘the changing relationship
between clan and state in the context of a recent flurry of international
investment’ (Norman 9 March 2023). https://africanarguments.
org/2023/03/conflict-in-lasanod-and-crisis-in-somaliland-external-
investment-intensifying-internal-competition-and-the-struggle-for-
narrative/
20 A. Simonsen
8. With the Gulf War in the Middle East and the larger historical context
taken into consideration, one could argue that almost every Somali per-
son has been displaced in one way or the other (Hansen 2006, 58).
9. This is an updated version of the book, which was originally published
in 1965.
10. Al-Shabaab was created by former members of the Islamic Court Union
after its dissolution in 2006, which occurred after fights with Ethiopia
and the Somali government.
11. https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/SO
12. The project was funded by The FKK [Det Frie forskningsråd].
13. This project was funded by the Velux Foundation.
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Olwig, Karen Fog. 2018. Migration as adventure: Narrative self-representation
among Caribbean migrants in Denmark. Ethnos. Journal of Anthropology 83
(1): 156–171.
Pelican, Michaela. 2013. International migration: Virtue or vice? Perspectives
from Cameroon. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 39 (2): 237–258.
1 Introduction: Uncertainties of Migration 23
Somali proverb:
‘Calaf waa labo cagood’.
(Happiness is two feet)(Varming 2010)
The Somalis have a long history of various forms of regional and global
movement as nomads, labour migrants, students, seamen and business
entrepreneurs (Weitzberg 2017, 2). We know from the literature that
these proud traditions of movement are essential to the self-perception of
Somali society. We also know that thousands of Somalis have had to flee
their country since the outbreak of civil war in 1988 and, consequently,
have engaged in newer forms of migration practices. Within Western
social sciences, the long history of varied forms of mobility among
Somalis and other communities across the globe have been explored
through different analytical optics (Olwig and Sørensen 2002, 5). I begin
this book by introducing the major trends in migration- and refugee
studies within sociology and anthropology, and how these trends have
influenced the way migration practices are presented and analysed, focus-
sing on the three main classifications of ‘migrants’, ‘refugees’ and ‘inter-
nally displaced persons’ (IDPs). I view these categorisations as problematic
It was not until the 1980s and 1990s that the push-pull approach was
overshadowed by approaches favouring ‘movement and the formation
and sustaining of long-distance ties in human life and society’ (Olwig and
Sørensen 2002, 1). Key to this new trend within migration studies was
the transnational approach within sociology that focused on the ‘multiple
ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of
nation-states’ (Vertovec 1999, 447; see for instance: Schiller et al. 1995;
Portes 2001; Vertovec 2001; Wimmer and Schiller 2002; Levitt and
Schiller 2004). Transnational scholars, focusing mainly on migration
towards the USA, paved the way for migration researchers to focus on
social fields rather than geographical ones.
The discipline of anthropology opened up similar avenues of research
but focused primarily on movement towards the metropoles, especially in
Latin America and on the African continent. The increased interest in
migration issues in the 1950s and 1960s led to the establishment of
migration research as a central topic within the anthropological field
(Horevitz 2009). This led to the Manchester school of thought,1 which
framed migration studies by focusing on migrants themselves, move-
ment, processes, links, changes and simultaneous processes, approaching
spaces as social places. The world, in other words, was now understood to
be interconnected. Connectedness is a key word for ‘the mobility turn’,
which sharpened the focus on movement, exploring human and non-
human mobilities (Kleist 2019, 73; Hannam et al. 2006; Sheller and
Urry 2006) defined by ‘flows, fluids and deterritorialisations’
(Schapendonk 2011, 9). Olwig and Sørensen, for example, in the early
beginnings of the mobility turn, advocated for ‘shifting the analytical
focus from place to mobility, and from “place of origin” and “place of
destination” to the movements involved in sustaining a livelihood’ (2002,
2). Now, more than 20 years later, I use ‘livelihood’ as a conceptual
approach to carve out the connections between movement and social
obligations and explore the interesting tension between the negative sta-
tus assigned to international movement through irregular paths and the
positive associations that tahriib holds for the Somali youth and other
mobile populations (see Vigh 2017, 479). For the Somali youth, the
irregular modes and paths of movement represent a way to show care,
28 A. Simonsen
as reer guuraa [family of moving], through the story of Yusra and her fam-
ily. This nomadic heritage and the approach to life inherent in it are
generally seen as a central part of Somali identity.
[7] Ib. p. 672. Will. Malm. Gesta Reg., l. v. c. 392 (Hardy, pp.
616, 617).
[10] Will. Malm. Gesta Reg., l. iv. c. 310 (Hardy, pp. 491, 492).
[11] See Freeman, William Rufus, vol. i. pp. 293, 295, 305; vol.
ii. pp. 535, 536.
His precautions were soon justified. Robert had refused the thorny
crown of Jerusalem, but the crown of England had far other charms;
and his movements were quickened by Ralf Flambard, who early in
the spring made his escape to Normandy.[21] It was probably through
Ralf’s management that the duke won over some of the sailors who
guarded the English coast and thus got ashore unexpectedly at
Portsmouth while the king was keeping watch for him at the old
landing-place, Pevensey.[22] At the first tidings of the intended
invasion Henry, like Rufus in the same case thirteen years before,
had appealed to Witan and people, and by a renewal of his charter
gained a renewal of their fealty. No sooner, however, was Robert
actually in England than the great majority of the barons prepared to
go over to him in a body. But the king born on English soil, married to
a lady of the old kingly house, had a stronger hold than ever Rufus
could have had upon the English people; and they, headed by their
natural leader and representative, the restored archbishop of
Canterbury, clave to him with unswerving loyalty.[23] The two armies
met near Alton;[24] at the last moment, the wisdom either of Anselm,
of the few loyal barons, or of Henry himself, turned the meeting into
a peaceful one. The brothers came to terms: Robert renounced his
claim to the crown in consideration of a yearly pension from England;
Henry gave up all his Norman possessions except Domfront, whose
people he refused to forsake;[25] and, as in the treaty made at Caen
ten years before between Robert and William, it was arranged that
whichever brother lived longest should inherit the other’s dominions,
if the deceased left no lawful heirs.[26]
[21] Ord. Vit. (Duchesne, Hist. Norm. Scriptt.), pp. 786, 787.
The first line of the Norman or ducal host under William of Mortain
charged the English front under Ralf of Bayeux, and by the fury of
their onset compelled them to fall back, though without breaking their
ranks. The issue was still doubtful, when the only mounted division
of Henry’s troops, the Bretons and Cenomannians under Count
Elias, came up to the rescue, took the duke’s army in flank, and cut
down two hundred men in a single charge. Those Cenomannian
swords which William the Conqueror was so proud to have
overcome now carried the day for his youngest son. Robert of
Bellême, as soon as he saw how matters were going, fled with all his
followers, and the duke’s army at once dissolved.[41] In Henry’s own
words, “the Divine Mercy gave into my hands, without much
slaughter on our side, the duke of Normandy, the count of Mortain,
William Crispin, William Ferrers, Robert of Estouteville, some four
hundred knights, ten thousand foot—and the duchy of
Normandy.”[42]
Forty years before, on the very same day, William the Conqueror
had landed at Pevensey to bring the English kingdom under the
Norman yoke. The work of Michaelmas Eve, 1066, was reversed on
Michaelmas Eve, 1106; the victory of Tinchebray made Normandy a
dependency of England.[43] Such was the view taken by one of the
most clear-sighted and unprejudiced historians of the time, a man of
mingled Norman and English blood. Such was evidently the view
instinctively taken by all parties, and the instinct was a true one,
although at first glance it seems somewhat hard to account for. The
reign of Henry I., if judged merely by the facts which strike the eye in
the chronicles of the time, looks like one continued course of foreign
policy and foreign warfare pursued by the king for his own personal
ends at the expense of his English subjects. But the real meaning of
the facts lies deeper. The comment of the archbishop of Rouen upon
Henry’s death—“Peace be to his soul, for he ever loved peace”[44]—
was neither sarcasm nor flattery. Henry did love peace, so well that
he spent his life in fighting for it. His early Norman campaigns are
enough to prove that without being a master of the art of war like his
father, he was yet a brave soldier and a skilful commander; and the
complicated wars of his later years, when over and over again he
had to struggle almost single-handed against France, Flanders and
Anjou, amid the endless treasons of his own barons, show still more
clearly his superiority to nearly all the other generals of his time. But
his ambitions were not those of the warrior. Some gleam of the old
northman’s joy of battle may have flashed across the wandering
knight as he defied his besiegers from the summit of his rock “in Peril
of the Sea,” or swooped down upon the turbulent lords of the
Cenomannian border, like an eagle upon lesser birds of prey, from
his eyrie on the crest of Domfront; but the victor of Tinchebray looked
at his campaigns in another light. To him they were simply a part of
his general business as a king; they were means to an end, and that
end was not glory, nor even gain, but the establishment of peace and
order. In his thirteen years of wandering to and fro between England,
Normandy and France he had probably studied all the phases of
tyranny and anarchy which the three countries amply displayed, and
matured his own theory of government, which he practised steadily
to the end of his reign. That theory was not a very lofty or noble one;
the principle from which it started and the end at which it aimed was
the interest of the ruler rather than of the ruled; but the form in which
Henry conceived that end and the means whereby he sought to
compass it were at any rate more enlightened than those of his
predecessor. The Red King had reigned wholly by terror; Henry did
not aspire to rule by love; but he saw that, in a merely selfish point of
view, a sovereign gains nothing by making himself a terror to any
except evil-doers, that the surest basis for his authority is the
preservation of order, justice and peace, and that so far at least the
interests of king and people must be one. It is difficult to get rid of a
feeling that Henry enforced justice and order from motives of
expediency rather than of abstract righteousness. But, as a matter of
fact, he did enforce them all round, on earl and churl, clerk and
layman, Norman and Englishman, without distinction. And this
steady, equal government was rendered possible only by the
determined struggle which he waged with the Norman barons and
their French allies. His home policy and his foreign policy were
inseparably connected; and the lifelong battle which he fought with
his continental foes was really the battle of England’s freedom.
From the year 1103 onward the battle was fought wholly on the
other side of the Channel. In England Henry, as his English subjects
joyfully told him, became a free king on the day when he drove out
Robert of Bellême.[45] One great hindrance indeed still remained,
hanging upon him like a dead weight throughout his early struggles
in Normandy; the controversy concerning ecclesiastical investitures,
with which the rest of Europe had been aflame for a quarter of a
century before it touched England at all. The decree of the Lateran
Council of 1075 forbidding lay sovereigns to grant the investiture of
any spiritual office with ring and staff was completely ignored in
practice by William the Conqueror and Lanfranc. Their position on
this and all other matters of Church policy was summed up in their
reply to Pope Gregory’s demand of fealty: William would do what the
English kings who went before him had done, neither more nor less.
[46] But the king and the primate were not without perceiving that, as
a necessary consequence of their own acts, the English Church had
entered upon a new and more complicated relation both to the state
and to the Apostolic see, and that the day must shortly come when
she would be dragged from her quiet anchorage into the whirlpool of
European controversies and strifes. Their forebodings found
expression in the three famous rules of ecclesiastical policy which
William laid down for the guidance of his successors rather than
himself:—that no Pope should be acknowledged in England and no
letter from him received there by any one without the king’s consent;
—that no Church council should put forth decrees without his
permission and approval;—and that no baron or servant of the crown
should be laid under ecclesiastical censure save at the king’s own
command.[47] These rules, famous in the two succeeding reigns
under the name of “paternal customs,” were never put to the test of
practice as long as William and Lanfranc lived. The Red King’s
abuse of the two first, by precipitating the crisis and driving S.
Anselm to throw himself into the arms of Rome, showed not so much
their inadequacy as the justice of the misgivings from which they had
sprung. Henry at his accession took his stand upon them in the true
spirit of their author; but the time was gone by; Anselm too had taken
his stand upon ground whence in honour and conscience he could
not recede, and the very first interview between king and primate
threw open the whole question of the investitures. But in England
and in the Empire the question wore two very different aspects. In
England it never became a matter of active interest or violent
partisanship in the Church and the nation at large. Only a few deep
thinkers on either side—men such as Count Robert of Meulan
among the advisers of the king, perhaps such as the devoted
English secretary Eadmer among the intimate associates of Anselm
—ever understood or considered the principles involved in the case,
or its bearing upon the general system of Church and state. Anselm
himself stood throughout not upon the abstract wrongfulness of lay
investiture, but upon his own duty of obedience to the decree of the
Lateran Council; he strove not for the privileges of his order, but for
the duties of his conscience. The bishops who refused investiture at
Henry’s hands clearly acted in the same spirit; what held them back
was not so much loyalty to the Pope as loyalty to their own
metropolitan. The great mass of both clergy and laity cared nothing
at all how the investitures were given, and very little for papal
decrees; all they cared about was that they should not be again
deprived of their archbishop, and left, as they had already been left
too long, like sheep without a shepherd. In their eyes the dispute
was a personal one between king and primate, stirred up by Satan to
keep the English Church in misery.