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The Belt and Road
Initiative in South–
South Cooperation
The Impact on World Trade

and Geopolitics
l i sh e ng
dm i t r i f e l i x d o n a sc i m e n t o
The Belt and Road Initiative in South–South
Cooperation
Li Sheng · Dmitri Felix do Nascimento
The Belt and Road

Initiative
in South–South
Cooperation
The Impact on World Trade and Geopolitics
Li Sheng Dmitri Felix do Nascimento
Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Macau University of Macau
Macao, China Macao, China
ISBN 978-981-16-6356-7 ISBN 978-981-16-6357-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6357-4
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
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189721, Singapore
Preface
On a visit to the Macao Museum, we would be surprised by the exhibi-

tion “Reminiscences of the Silk Road—Exhibition of Cultural Relics of
the Western Xia Dynasty,” which features artifacts from the Western Xia
Dynasty founded in 1038. The exhibition “deepens our understanding
of the historical background of the Belt and Road Initiative, which also
brings us to explore its important significance to modern and contempo-
rary development.”1 This reference is just one of the historical references
dating back to the Silk Road, the land route across the Eurasian conti-
nent, which was embryonically outlined before China’s Han Dynasty (206
BC–220 AD).
The period (2013–2021) in which we worked on the development of
the Belt and Road Initiative represents a contemporary historical experi-
ence that encompasses the areas of International Political Economy and
international relations. The structuring of the BRI during these years, as
an instrument of the People’s Republic of China, presented challenges,
changes, and potential within the concept of South-South Cooperation.
From a global perspective, considering a panorama of intense instability in
the global order (mainly on the issue of security) and the economic crises
in developed countries in the context of globalization, most developing
1 Macao Museum, 2021, “Reminiscences of the Silk Road—Exhibition of Cultural

Relics of the Western Xia Dynasty.” https://www.macaumuseum.gov.mo/en/exhibitions/
85027.
v
vi PREFACE
countries continued to have fragile economies aggravated by increased

technological competition and the financialization of central economies.2
These developments added to the already weakening traditional coop-
eration instruments of multilateral entities that intended to reduce the
distance and inequalities between the Global South and North.3
The purpose of this work is to seek visions, explanations, and anal-
yses that demonstrate, in the development process of the Belt and Road
Initiative, the formation of an architecture of integration and cooperation
aimed at economic and technological development, which has also had
an impact on geopolitics. We will try to demonstrate that, in addition
to being a proposal for financing infrastructure projects, the structuring
of the BRI and the economic corridors became an interface in the rela-
tionship dynamics among China and developing countries. Thus, from
conception to realization, the South-South Cooperation encountered
(and still encounters) geopolitical obstacles in the insertion of devel-
oping countries, especially due to the rise in the Chinese economy in
relation to developed countries. Regarding the impacts of investments
and partnerships in the areas of commerce and finance, the BRI follows
the dynamics of expansion of the Chinese economy and its geopolitical
pretensions, with the objective of creating power networks at different
levels of cooperation based on the shared hegemony of its decisions.
In the first chapter, The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): South-South
Cooperation (SSC) with Chinese Characteristics, we seek to demonstrate
the historical relationships between China and the Global South and show
how the BRI represents SSC with Chinese characteristics, as a theo-
retical framework for international relations and international political
economics. We will relate it to the process of erosion of neoliberalism in
the face of cooperation for development. As an alternative, China and its
developmental pathway are alternatives for countries in the Global South.
Our work also tries to answer questions that are pertinent to contempo-
raneity. Does South-SSC remain a horizon for the economic development
of countries on the periphery of the Global South? Why did the multilat-
eral instruments created in the post-Bretton Woods world fail to integrate
2 Sheng, L. (2012) Dealing with Financial Risks of International Capital Flows: A

Theoretical Framework. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25(3), 463–474.
3 Gu, X., & Sheng, L. (2010) A Sensible Policy Tool for Pareto Improvement: Capital
Controls. Journal of World Trade, 44(3), 567–590.
PREFACE vii
the global economy? Why did the investment model of western devel-
opment cooperation organizations fail to achieve their goals? Why does
the BRI try to provide different answers than those of the Washington
Consensus? Will we see a reemergence of SSC after the creation of the
BRI? By presenting these questions, we will try to bring out the specifici-
ties of the meanings that the BRI has exercised in the multilateralism of
political relations and in the interrelations of the interests of the countries
that comprise it.
In chapter 2, The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s New Role in
Geopolitics and Security, we will elaborate on what conceptions were put
forward to characterize the BRI as a security and geopolitical risk and
what changes in liberal hegemony are implied by the expansion of the
BRI. We will address the security consideration of the BRI for China and
analyze the related perceptions and responses of China’s rivals, the United
States and NATO, whose understanding of the BRI will greatly influence
its development. We will describe the interpretation that US political and
military agents have formulated of the BRI and how Americans see the
BRI as a threat and not an instrument of cooperation. The dilemma of
the security issue in BRI countries with internal conflicts, the potential
risks in the geographical environment of China, and the BRI prospects in
the post-COVID-19 world are also discussed.
In chapter 3, BRI and the Economic Corridors: Opportunities for Devel-
opment, we describe an overview of the development of the BRI and
the six economic corridors it comprises: the China–Mongolia–Russia
Economic Corridor (CMREC), the New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB),
the China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC), the
China–Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CIPEC), the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the Bangladesh–Chinese–
India–Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC). Different perceptions
of the BRI are analyzed at length, such as from Russia in relation to the
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the European Union (EU). Specif-
ically, we examine the fragmentation of northern and southern Europe
with the countries that are part of the BRI in the mechanism of Central
and Eastern European countries (16 + 1), as examples.
In chapter 4, Technological and Financial Integration in the BRI , we
will address the problem of the gaps of development in technology and
finance for developing countries. The role of New Development Banks
(NDBs) and Asia Infrastructure and Investment Banks (AIIB) in the
financial architecture of investments for the development of the BRICS
viii PREFACE
and BRI countries and their characterization as Multilateral Development

Banks (MDBs) are explored at length. The Digital Silk Road integration
proposal based on China’s digital ecosystem has also proved significant.
To conclude, we will seek to analyze the impacts of the US–China
trade war initiated by the Trump administration (2016–2021) on the
BRI, the perspective of US–China relations during the Biden administra-
tion (2021), and the disputes that COVID-19 have caused in the Covax
scheme, accelerating global political polarization. However, our task in
bringing the role of the BRI into the South-SSC panorama is a chal-
lenge for a historical process that seems to us to be unfinished. Despite
the recent historical experience of an unequal and excluding globalization
and that the BRI does not directly defy the West-led model, western hege-
mony (US–EU) presents a set of unilateral practices in the international
politics of its main agents, closing in on “ultranationalist” discourses and
practices to protect themselves from the “unknown other.” The rise of
China, the cooperation instruments built over the years and the expansion
of the BRI are part of this context in the search for greater decision-
making space and the right to development that the countries of the
Global South have not yet achieved.
Macao, China Li Sheng

Dmitri Felix do Nascimento
Contents
1 The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The South-South

Cooperation (SSC) with Chinese Characteristics 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 The Development of SSC: Still a Long Way to Go 6
1.3 The BRI: A Chance for SSC Resurgence? 19
1.4 The Theoretical Framework to Interpret the Relations
Between the BRI and SSC 30
References 39
2 The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s New Role
in Geopolitics and Security Issue 45
2.1 The Relationship Between the BRI and China’s
Geopolitical Security 45
2.2 The Security Dilemma of China 49
2.3 BRI Under the Security Challenge 51
2.4 The Perspective of the United States 58
2.5 NATO’s Vision of the BRI 68
2.6 The Future of the BRI: When Will Go
in the Post-Pandemic Era? 75
References 77
ix
x CONTENTS
3 The BRI and Its Economic Corridors: Opportunities

for Development 83
3.1 Introduction: What BRI Can Bring to Developing
Countries 84
3.2 Case Studies: The Main Economic Corridors
and Related Countries 87
3.3 The Comparison Between China’s BRI and Russia’s
EEU: Competitor or Complementary? 121
3.4 The BRI in Europe: Divisions of the North and South 130
References 143
4 Technological and Financial Integration in the BRI 151
4.1 Introduction: The Gaps of Development in Technology
and Finance 151
4.2 Financial Integration: The New Development Bank
(NDB) and the AIIB 154
4.3 The Digital Silk Road: The BRI’s Solution to Bridge
the Technology Gap 179
References 198
5 Conclusion 205
5.1 Factor I. The Impact of the Sino–US Trade War
on the BRI: From Donald Trump to Joe Bidden 207
5.2 Factor II. The BRI Amid the Covid-19
Pandemic: US–China Rivalry, the Covax Scheme,
and Accelerating Global Polarization in Politics 219
References 229
Index 233
List of Charts
Chart 1.1 China’s Foreign Aid in three categories, 2013–2018

(Source http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/
202101/10/content_WS5ffa6bbbc6d0f72576943922.
html) 26
Chart 1.2 China’s Foreign Aid recipients by income group,
2013–2018 (Source http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/
whitepaper/202101/10/content_WS5ffa6bbbc6d0f7
2576943922.html) 27
Chart 1.3 Distribution of China’s Foreign Aid by region,
2013–2018 (Source http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/
whitepaper/202101/10/content_WS5ffa6bbbc6d0f7
2576943922.html) 27
xi
CHAPTER 1
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The

South-South Cooperation (SSC)
with Chinese Characteristics
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and South-South Cooperation (SSC)
mirror each other in the current international environment and develop-
ment cooperation system. On the one hand, China’s foreign policies are
deeply shaped by the Third World’s historical experience of being invaded
and dominated by western powers, which can still be observed today in
China’s relations with countries in the Global South. This point of view
is key for comprehending China. Moreover, as neoliberalism has declined
in the last decade, China and its developmental pathways are regarded as
alternatives by an increasing number of countries in the Global South.
In this context, the BRI has become a vital topic for understanding the
future of the Global South and SSC. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze
the relationship between China’s BRI and SSC. This chapter will explain
their interconnections and try to show that the BRI is an example of SSC
with Chinese characteristics by introducing the evolution of SSC and the
BRI in the context of the theoretical frameworks of international relations
and International Political Economy.
1.1 Introduction
Throughout history, the journey to national development and prosperity
has not been an easy one, especially for countries in the Global South
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
L. Sheng and D. F. do Nascimento, The Belt and Road
Initiative in South–South Cooperation,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6357-4_1
2 L. SHENG AND D. F. DO NASCIMENTO
that have suffered colonial exploitation for centuries. The South here is
not an exclusively geographical term. In the discourse of international
geopolitics, the countries in the world tend to be categorized into “the
West” and “the Non-West” and “the South” and “the North” to indicate
their degree of development and geographic power relations from a global
perspective. The North refers to those nations with developed economies
and industrial bases, but they are not necessarily located in the geographic
north. In contrast, as a binary opposition to the North, the South
broadly refers to nations in the regions of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin
America that are confronting a series of shared problems such as undevel-
oped economics and marginalized politics in the international community.
Those problems are deeply rooted in their historical experience, including
colonialism. This colonial background not only identifies those coun-
tries as “the South” or “the Global South” but also “the Third World,”
“Developing Countries” and even countries that are “underdeveloped,”
“premodern” and “backward.” According to the South Commission, the
majority of the planet’s countries are in the South, with populations that
take up four-fifths of the world and that are endowed with rich natural
resources and large territory; nevertheless, existing on the periphery of the
developed countries of the North, the benefits of prosperity and progress
have largely bypassed them.1
For centuries, the Global South has suffered from underdevelopment.
During the hundred years before the middle of the twentieth century,
most of the countries in the South were under the yoke of western colo-
nialism. They have continued to be in an unfavorable position, constantly
haunted by colonial legacies, even though colonialism was largely aban-
doned with the ending of imperial games following WWII. After the
colonial era, the countries of the South are commonly deficient in financial
support, technological capabilities, and discourse power in the interna-
tional system. Driven by historical experience and common problems,
countries in the South are striving for paths to national development
and prosperity. On the one hand, with the bitter historical memories of
1 For more details about the definitions of “the countries in the South,” please refer to
Burnell, P. (2017). Politics in the developing world. Oxford University Press; Dados, N., &
Connell, R. (2012). The global south. Contexts, 11(1), 12–13; Modi, R. (Ed.). (2011).
South-South Cooperation (pp. 1–26). Palgrave Macmillan; Slater, D. (2008). Geopolitics
and the postcolonial: Rethinking North–South relations . Wiley; The South Centre. (1990).
The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission. Oxford University Press.
1 THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI) … 3
being invaded and exploited, they have been aware of the deficiencies of
colonialism and war as approaches to wealth accumulation. On the other
hand, being disadvantaged, the countries of the South want to join forces
in a united front to pursue their common interest. In such circumstances,
South-South Cooperation emerged.
South-SSC is an international regime originally designed for inter-
state cooperation among countries in the Global South. It is still the
core of the various definitions of SSC. According to the United Nations
Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), SSC is a “broad frame-
work of collaboration among countries of the South in the political,
economic, social, cultural, environmental, and technical domains.”2 The
basis of the framework is diverse, from bilateral, regional, intraregional
to interregional, under which “developing countries share knowledge,
skills, expertise, and resources to meet their development goals through
concerted efforts.” The form of SSC includes “increased volume of
South-South trade, South-South flows of foreign direct investment,
movements toward regional integration, technology transfers, sharing of
solutions and experts, and other forms of exchanges.”3 The Department
of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations (UNDESA) gives
a different explanation:
South-South Cooperation refers to technical cooperation among devel-

oping countries in the Global South. It is a tool used by the states,
international organizations, academics, civil society and the private sector to
collaborate and share knowledge, skills and successful initiatives in specific
areas such as agricultural development, human rights, urbanization, health,
climate change, etc.4
Based on the mentioned definitions given by different branches of

the United Nations, it can be seen that SSC is a multilevel regime for
cooperation among countries in the South in various fields, such as poli-
tics, economics, technology, and human rights. In these contexts, SSC is
perceived as a broad concept that has recently emerged as an important
poverty reduction strategy, sometimes supplanting prescriptive market-
driven orthodoxies by neoliberalism, which might further suggest a retreat
2 UNOSSC. About South-South and Triangular Cooperation.

3 Ibid.
4 UN. (2019, March 20). What is ‘South-South Cooperation’ and why does it matter?
by the state.5 Kevin Gray and Barry K. Gills also hold a similar idea
regarding SSC as an organizing concept, combining a set of practices in
pursuit of these historical changes through a vision of mutual benefit and
solidarity among the disadvantaged of the world system. It is worth high-
lighting in their explanation that SSC conveys the hope that development
may be achieved by the poor themselves through their mutual assis-
tance to one another, and the whole world order transformed to reflect
their mutual interests vis-à-vis the dominant Global North. Significantly,
SSC is endowed with a dual economic and political nature, considering
the historical experiences of the Third World.6 As Gosovic emphasizes,
SSC is also “a political project of emancipation, liberation, political, and
economic independence, of transcending the unidirectional links with the
North and vestiges of the colonial era, and of gaining influence and voice
in world affairs by pooling forces and acting collectively.”7
Admittedly, SSC reflected the common interests of countries in the
South, especially in the first two decades after WWII. With the support of
the United Nations, SSC has been expanded in more fields. However, it is
also an uneasy journey to have more development for SSC, especially after
the new millennium. On the one hand, the emergence of untraditional
security after the end of the Cold War has shaken global stability and
triggered a series of conflicts, both domestically and regionally. On the
other hand, rapid globalization has further enlarged the gap between the
North and the South, creating more obstacles to poverty eradication. As
a result, both countries in the South and SSC are currently confronting
severe challenges.
As a member of the Third World as well as a victim of colonialism and
imperialism, China deeply understands the eagerness for national devel-
opment of the countries in the South. Since 1949, China has attached
high importance to relations with countries of the South and SSC. For a
long time, China has defined itself as “a staunch supporter, active partic-
ipant and key contributor of South-South Cooperation” and committed
to “further expand South-South Cooperation, to promote joint efforts
5 Chaturvedi, S., Fues, T., & Sidiropoulos, E. (2012). Development cooperation and
emerging powers: New partners or old patterns? Zed Books.
6 Gray, K., & Gills, B. K. (2016). South–South cooperation and the rise of the Global
South. Third World Quarterly, 37 (4), 557–574.
7 Gosovic, B. (2016). The resurgence of South–South cooperation. Third World
Quarterly, 37 (4), 733–743.
for common development.” Lately, at the beginning of 2021, amid the

global crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic, China reaffirmed its commit-
ment to international development cooperation in which SSC was placed
in the focal position and the Belt and Road Initiative served as a major
platform.8
The BRI, also known as One Belt One Road or the New Silk Road,
is an ambitious infrastructure project launched in 2013 by China’s presi-
dent Xi Jinping. Strictly speaking, the project consists of two subprojects,
the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Twenty-First-Century Maritime
Silk Road. From China’s standpoint, the BRI is a significant public good
for the whole world in various fields, such as peace, economic growth,
opening up, innovation, green development, and cultural exchanges.
More specifically, the BRI consists of five pillars: infrastructure connec-
tions, financial integration, policy coordination, unimpeded trade, and
people-to-people exchanges. Unlike how the BRI is depicted in western
discourse, it is an inclusive cooperative project rather than a scheme of
formal alliances with China. In fact, China has always emphasized prin-
ciples such as national sovereignty, non-interference in other countries’
domestic affairs and mutual development evolving from its own histor-
ical experiences. As Tom Fowdy points out, more countries in Africa and
Latin America have grown to see China as an alternative pathway to their
national development, with Beijing’s traditional policies allowing these
countries to find empathy in the form of a common history, worldview
and legacy. To some extent, SSC is a channel for the world to understand
the BRI and even the foreign policy of China.9
The authors believe that the BRI and SSC mirror each other and that
the BRI is a form of SSC with Chinese characteristics. On the one hand,
China’s foreign policies are deeply shaped by historical experiences of
being invaded and dominated by western powers, which can be observed
in China’s relations with countries in the South today. It is a key point
of view for increasing comprehension of China. On the other hand, as
neoliberalism has declined in recent decades, China is regarded as an
8 For more details about China’s latest foreign policies on the international development
cooperation, please refer to: The State Council of PRC. (2021). China’s International
Development Cooperation in the New Era.
9 Fowdy, T. (2020). South-South Cooperation is how we should understand China’s BRI
diplomacy. CGTN.
alternative path to develop by more countries in the Global South.10

In this context, the BRI has become a vital topic in discussions of the
future of the Global South and SSC. Therefore, it is necessary to deter-
mine the relationship between China’s BRI and SSC, which is the goal
of this chapter. In the first section of this chapter, the focus is on SSC
from the perspective of its evolution, relations with China, and obsta-
cles under the international system dominated by the Global North. In
the second section, attention will be given to the BRI. At the beginning
of this section, the history of the Silk Road and the background of the
BRI are introduced. It then proceeds with a review of relations among
the BRI, China’s development pathways and Chinese history. Further-
more, it will analyze the cooperation between the BRI and SSC and the
achievements they have made. Additionally, it will briefly introduce their
latest cooperation in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the third
section, the analytical framework of the theories will be presented for the
analysis of the BRI and SSC.
1.2 The Development of SSC:

Still a Long Way to Go
1.2.1 SSC Evolvement: An Uneasy Journey
SSC is the result of the decline in the western empires after WWII and
the failures of the post-war arrangements. During the decades of the post-
war era, SSC ebbed and flowed. To date, there are various approaches to
chronicle the development of SSC. The authors would like to argue that
the evolution of SSC can be chronicled in four phases since the 1940s.
The first phase is between the 1940s and the 1950s, when many coun-
tries in the South gained independence and SSC began to emerge as
the western powers declined in the Global South. The second phase is
between the 1960s and the 1970s, when SSC experienced a boom via the
establishment of the Non-alignment Movement (NAM) and Group 77
(G77). The third phase is between the 1980s and 1990s, when SSC went
through difficult times due to a series of geopolitical events and crises
worldwide. Luckily, SSC was revived after the new millennium.
10 Sheng, L. (2014a). Capital controls and international development: A theoretical

reconsideration. Global Policy, 5(1), 114–120.
(1) The Emergence: 1945–1950s
After WWII, the decline in the western empires triggered the broad
liberalization movement in the Third Word, including Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. As a result, a number of new countries emerged in the
former colonial regions and began to act as independent actors in the
arena of international politics. However, these countries of the South
were still highly constrained in their journey to national development and
prosperity. On the one hand, they had been deeply exploited by colo-
nialism, which trapped them in a situation of poverty, premodernization
and preindustrialization. On the other hand, the post-war arrangements
failed to break the old economic order completely. The former colonies
were still deeply dependent on the north and stuck in an unfavorable posi-
tion. With the common predicament of underdevelopment and the goal
of national development, the countries in the South realized that only by
joining with other countries in the Global South could they truly become
independent actors in the global arena and achieve meaningful change
in international political and economic inequalities. In such a context,
countries in the South began to collaborate and establish mechanisms and
organizations for development cooperation.
The Bandung Conference is a vital milestone of SSC. However, the
date that marks the true beginning of SSC may be earlier. The starting
point of SSC could be 1945, the year WWII ended, because of two
historical events. One event is the establishment of the Arab League that
same year, which accelerated the independence of Middle East countries.
The other event is the Colombo Plan of 1950, a regional organization
established by the UK under the British Commonwealth to maintain its
relevance in the Asia–Pacific. However, it also promoted development
cooperation among the countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia.11
In 1955, the first Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung,
Indonesia, which was also named the Bandung Conference. It was the first
conference in history completely held and delegated by countries in the
South, assembling leaders from 29 countries whose combined population
made up approximately two-thirds of the world. The People’s Republic of
China was one of the participants. With the common hope of accelerating
11 Cabana, S. L. (2014). Chronology and history of South-South Cooperation. coopera-

cionsursur.
cooperation among the nations of the Third World and reducing their
dependence on western countries, the delegates signed a communique
that set a series of concrete goals, including the promotion of economic
and cultural cooperation, protection of human rights and the principle
of self-determination, a call for an end to racial discrimination wherever it
occurred, and a reiteration of the importance of peaceful coexistence. The
Bandung Conference is a milestone of SSC, laying the political, economic,
cultural, and legal foundations for the so-called Spirit of Bandung and
what became the Third World project.
(2) The Boom: 1970s–1980s
The Bandung Conference and the Bandung Spirit laid the foundation for
further collaboration and cooperation in politics and economics among
the countries of the South. Against the background of the Cold War,
to promote global peace and not be forced to take sides in the contest
between the two superpowers, the NAM was organized in 1961 dedi-
cated to the independence and security of the Third World. The NAM
continued the Spirit of Bandung, as captured by Yugoslav President Tito:
“Every country, regardless of their socioeconomic system, must daily
increase and broaden its economic cooperation.” Additionally, principles
such as “abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to
serve the particular interests of any of the big powers” were highly stressed
during the summit. In 1964, the G77, an intergovernmental organization
under the United Nations System, was established, which included most
developing counties in the world at that time. The G77 is named after
the number of countries present at the founding of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It called for the
establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and was
designed to serve the common economic interests of developing coun-
tries and improve the negotiating capacity of the countries in the South
and promote SSC as a means for development.12
The 1970s was a great optimistic period for SSC. On the one hand, as
the prices of raw materials continued to increase, the revenue of the coun-
tries of the South improved accordingly.13 With the economic resurgence,
12 The Group of 77, About the Group of 77. https://www.g77.org/doc/.

13 New World Economics. (2007). Commodities in the 1970s.
the trade volume among the countries of the South increased, making up
half of the world’s total trade volume.14 As a result of economic growth,
SSC was further developed in politics and cultures. On the other hand,
the increased activism of the G-77 and NAM during this period led to the
adoption of the UN General Assembly of Resolutions on the New Inter-
national Economic Order (NIEO) and new forms for technology transfer
between countries.
At the same time, a series of UN branches were established to promote
SSC, such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and the UN Fund for Science and Technology in Devel-
opment (UNFSTD). The authors believe that in this period, the three
pillars of SSC were constructed, and they remain significant today. The
first is the non-aligned movement continuing the Spirit of Bandung with
the principles of non-interference, self-determination, etc. It reflects the
political demands of the Third Word. In contrast, the other two pillars are
more focused on the economic interests of the Global South: the G77 and
UNCTAD. Each contributed to the conceptions, principles, and norms
that we can find today in the BRI.
(3) Stagnation: 1980s–1990s
The 1980s was a dark period for developing countries. As the prices of
primary commodities dropped, the revenue of the Global South widely
suffered heavy losses. At the same time, as the result of nation-building,
many developing countries, Africa and Latin America in particular, were
trapped in heavy debt and negative growth. To seek financial assistance,
many countries in the South had no choice but to turn to the West and
commit to shifting their development paradigm to that of the Bretton
Woods system, which wrecked their national stability.15 Moreover, under
the transition from the bipolar contest to US hegemony, a series of mili-
tary conflicts and wars broke out in the Middle East. Later, Southeast
Asia was severely affected by the 1997 financial crisis following the period
of economic prosperity. Worse still, developed countries’ gain from free
14 Sheng, L., & do Nascimento, D. F. (2021). A brief history of trade wars. In Love
and trade war (pp. 1–46). Palgrave Macmillan.
15 Sheng, L. (2012). Dealing with financial risks of international capital flows: A
theoretical framework. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25(3), 463–474.
capital mobility likely comes at the expense of risk and loss for developing
countries due to the latter’s financial vulnerability.16 In this circumstance,
SSC was laid to one side.
(4) Resurgence: After the 2000s
In the first decade of the new millennium, international politics was rela-
tively stable compared with the previous decade, and the global economy
continued to grow until 2008. With economic prosperity at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, SSC experienced a resurgence. In April 2000,
the G77 South Summit in Havana, Cuba, was another key milestone for
SSC. As the coachievement of the G77 and China at the summit, the
Declaration of Havana reaffirmed the group’s position on the key issues
of current international affairs and their resolution to be the negotiator
with the North under multilateral regimes such as the United Nations.17
The Declaration also portrays the inequality between the North and the
South: “in this context, and noting the interdependence of nations and
the varying levels of human development worldwide, we stress the need
for a new global human order aimed at reversing the growing dispari-
ties between rich and poor,” and “the countries of the South have not
been able to share in the benefits of globalization on an equal footing
with the developed countries and have been excluded from the benefits of
this process. Asymmetries and imbalances have intensified in international
economic relations, particularly with regard to international cooperation,
even further widening the gap between the developing countries and the
industrialized countries.”18
Moreover, as a result of the UN Poverty Eradication initiative since
1997, the Global South and SSC have gained more attention. Addition-
ally, the development of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, and China; it
was originally acronymized as “BRIC” in 2001, and when South Africa
was added, it became known as “BRICS”) played a significant role in
promoting SSC in three ways. First, it changed the position between
16 Sheng, L. (2011). Theorising free capital mobility: The perspective of developing

countries. Review of International Studies, 37 (5), 2519–2534.
17 Khor, M. (2014). G77 summit declaration a worthy marking of 50th anniversary.
18 Group of 77 South Summit Havana, Cuba, 10–14 April 2000, Declaration of the
South Summit.
donors and recipients. Second, it offered new modes of development

cooperation. Third, it indicates transformations of institutional architec-
ture and governance mechanisms.19 At the same time, the tendency of
multipolarity was another decisive factor, especially after the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, which further shifted the development pattern as has been
described by Emma Mawdsley; the old donor and recipient logic changed
its meaning in a new context. With this, the context for a rapidly changing
landscape of aid and development was a seismic shift that took place in
the geographies of power and wealth. The world became increasingly
multipolar in terms of the distribution of economic growth and in the
balance of political power within and across state, regional, and global
institutions.20
Looking back to the development of SSC, two trends can be identified.
First, with the ebb of the national liberation movements in the twentieth
century and the power transition of the global economy in the twenty-
first century, the focus of SSC has generally shifted from economic and
political independence to substantial development, such as poverty erad-
ication and environmental cooperation. Second, the UN’s role in SSC is
increasingly significant. From the perspective of Bruno Aylon, the UN has
contributed to the theoretical contribution and practice of SSC. First, the
UN enriches the nature and modalities of SSC conceptually and method-
ologically. Second, the capacities of consultation and cooperation among
developing countries are promoted under the UN framework. Third, the
UN facilitates the coordination of the Global South. Fourth, the UN
serves as the monitor of SSC development. Fifth, it acts as an interme-
diator in the progress of SSC negotiation. Sixth, it has constructed a
platform for SSC.21 However, Gosovic sharply points out that SSC has
been an orphan in the international development agenda under the UN
framework, in the shadow of North–South cooperation.22
19 Zoccal Gomes, G., & Esteves, P. (2018). The BRICS effect: Impacts of South–South
Cooperation in the social field of international development cooperation. IDS Bulletin,
49(3), 130–144.
20 Mawdsley, D. E. (2012). From recipients to donors: Emerging powers and the changing
development landscape. Zed Books Ltd.
21 Pino, B. A. (2014). Evolução histórica da cooperação sul-sul (css). Repensando
Cooperação Internacional, 57 .
Quarterly, 37 (4), 733–743.
1.2.2 China’s Role in SSC

Currently, China is the second-largest economy and the largest devel-
oping country in the world. China insists that its development coopera-
tion is “a form of mutual assistance between developing countries falling
into the category of South-SSC” and “therefore, it is essentially different
from North-SSC.” In the past seven decades, China has played a proactive
role in SSC.
Since its establishment in 1949, China has attached great importance
to relations and cooperation with developing countries. China’s foreign
aid started in 1950 and provided material assistance to its two neigh-
bors, the DPRK and Vietnam. After the Bandung Conference in 1955,
China enlarged its assistance scope from socialist countries to common
developing countries, even though China also lacked funds and mate-
rial resources. China’s assistance modalities included loans, infrastructure
construction, medical help, and so on, with no political conditions
attached. Between 1956 and 1962, China offered assistance to developing
countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Indonesia in various forms.
In 1964, during the diplomatic visit to Ghana, China’s premier, Zhou
Enlai, announced “the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical
Assistance to Other Countries”:
1. The Chinese government always bases itself on the principle of equality

and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards
such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual. 2. In
providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly respects
the sovereignty of recipient countries and never attaches any conditions
or asks for any privileges. 3. China provides economic aid in the form
of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for repay-
ment when necessary to lighten the burden on recipient countries as far as
possible. 4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese
government is not to make recipient countries dependent on China but to
help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and indepen-
dent economic development. 5. The Chinese government does its best to
help recipient countries complete projects which require less investment
but yield quicker results, so that the latter may increase their income and
accumulate capital. 6. The Chinese government provides the best-quality
equipment and materials manufactured by China at international market
prices. If the equipment and materials provided by the Chinese government
are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese govern-
ment undertakes to replace them or refund the payment. 7. In giving any
particular technical assistance, the Chinese government will see to it that

the personnel of the recipient country fully master the technology. 8. The
experts dispatched by China to help in construction in recipient countries
will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country.
Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any
special amenities.23
These principles are still fundamental in China’s relation with coun-

tries in the South and SSC. Among the eight principles, “no political
conditions attached” is particularly controversial. The arguments mostly
focus on whether it is in conflict with the strong conditions of the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which aim
to promote governance and macroeconomic reform in developing coun-
tries.24 However, the authors believe that the reality is more complex
than what those arguments suggest. Conflicting interests still exist in
the BRI, especially in construction assistance, involving various interest
groups in the economic, diplomatic and even security fields. Sometimes,
those conflicts are a part of diplomatic games due to the magnitude of
the project.
In 1965, after being turned down by several western countries,
Tanzania and Zambia turned to China for assistance with railway
construction. In 1967, Tanzania, Zambia, and China signed an agree-
ment on the construction of the Tanzania–Zambia Railway. According
to Gosovic’s analysis, construction began in 1970 supported by China’s
funds, equipment, and technical assistance and was completed in 1976.25
This was an early illustration of the hegemonic, neocolonial power poli-
tics by the North and of the potential of SSC to loosen and transcend the
stranglehold of the colonial-era economic and political geography.26
In 1971, China was voted back into the UN with the support of
most developing countries as the result of their commitment to the
23 People’s Republic of China. (2011). China’s foreign aid. State Council.

24 For more details, please see Vadell, J., Brutto, G. L., & Leite, A. C. C. (2020).
The Chinese South-South development cooperation: An assessment of its structural trans-
formation. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 63(2); Jiang, S. (2011). China’s
principles in foreign aid. China. org. cn, 2011–11.
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. China’s Assistance in
the Construction of the Tanzania–Zambia Railway.
Quarterly, 37 (4), 733–743.
Third World independence movement. Since that moment, the UN and

its agencies became another platform for China to develop SSC. After
China’s reform and opening up in 1978, the modalities of China’s devel-
opment cooperation with developing countries have been enriched and
extended from simple economic aid to multiform and mutually beneficial
assistance. At the same time, China began to pay more attention to long-
term aid projects via various approaches. In the 1990s, China reformed its
foreign aid mechanism, focusing on diversifying the sources and means of
funding. In 1993, China’s government found the Foreign Aid Fund for
Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects with parts of the interest-free
loans repaid to China by developing countries to support Chinese small-
and medium-sized enterprises to build joint ventures or conduct coopera-
tion with the recipient countries in the production and operation spheres.
In 1995, China began to provide medium- and long-term low-interest
loans to other developing countries via the Export–Import Bank of China,
which effectively expands funding sources of its foreign aid. Moreover, the
capacity building of recipient countries began to receive attention, under
which the scale of technical training has been enlarged. Officials from
recipient countries receiving training in China became an important part
of the cooperation of human resource development between China and
those countries.
After the millennium, SSC gradually evolved from the goals of national
liberation and independence to those of shared and sustainable develop-
ment with the power transition in the global economy. In this context,
China deepened cooperation with the UN to promote SSC. In 2000, the
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established to serve
as a bridge for friendly dialog between China and African countries. In
the following years, China established a series of mechanisms to facilitate
its cooperation with the UN in SSC, such as the International Poverty
Reduction Center China (IPRCC) in 2004 and the Information Platform
of Population and Development in South-South Cooperation (SSCPOP)
in 2009. In addition, China’s assistance modality was further diversified at
the international and regional levels, such as through the UN High-Level
Meeting on Financing for Development, the UN High-Level Meeting
on the Millennium Development Goals, the Forum on China–Africa
Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the China-ASEAN
Leaders Meeting, the China–Caribbean Economic & Trade Cooperation
Forum, the China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development &
Cooperation Forum, and the Forum on Economic and Trade Coopera-

tion between China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries. Between 2004
and 2009, China’s financial resources for foreign aid increased rapidly,
averaging 29.4%.27
1.2.3 The Challenges of SSC

Looking back to history via the previous section, we can easily find that
it is a rocky path for SSC and national development for developing coun-
tries. As the global economy is undergoing a power transition with the
rise of emerging economies and the relative decline in the West, SSC is
confronting more dual challenges internally and externally. On the one
hand, SSC is still trapped by the intrinsic dilemmas of countries in the
South. On the other hand, it is also constrained by Global North and
North–South relations.
(1) The Internal Challenges
After advances in recent decades, both the countries in the South and
SSC have made a series of remarkable achievements and accumulated
certain experiences for further development. However, new problems also
come along with progress. First, the structure of SSC should be improved
institutionally and theoretically. From the perspective of SSC institutions,
information asymmetry should be eliminated to promote transparency
and coordination, considering that many SSC projects are interstate and
interregional in nature, and information asymmetry should be elimi-
nated to promote transparency and coordination. From the perspective
of discourse power, it is necessary to construct a sharable SSC knowledge
system to reduce its vulnerability, especially under the predominance of
the western media.28
Second, the rise of emerging economies such as the BRICS actu-
ally exposes the economic divisions among the countries of the South.
In fact, the countries of the Global South today can be divided into
27 People’s Republic of China. (2011). China’s foreign aid. State Council.

28 Taidong, Z., & Haibing, Z. (2018). China’s Belt and Road Initiative: An opportu-
nity to re-energize South-South Cooperation. China Quarterly of International Strategic
Studies, 4(04), 559–576.
three groups according to their economic performance in the last decade.

The first league is obviously the emerging economies represented by the
BRICS, which have integrated themselves into global supply chains with
certain technological and financial resources. The second is characterized
as “moderately developing economies” that are specialized or advanta-
geous in some fields. The last group consists of the “least-developed
economies” whose people are still struggling for the basic opportunities
for developing and even surviving. The imbalanced development among
the countries in the South could further cause divergences in politics
and economies in the Third World and undermine the internal solidarity
found in SSC.29
Third, the roles of emerging economies in SSC are still vague, which
may undermine the mutual understanding of the Global South. Early in
the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping, the former leader of the largest developing
country, established a diplomatic principle that China would not be the
leader of the Third World and this precept is still respected by China’s
leaders. Moreover, the Gini coefficients in recent years have revealed a
common problem of emerging economies: social inequality, which may be
intensified by approaching the technological revolution and destabilizing
internal societies.30 In this circumstance, can these emerging economies
balance their domestic problems and take their trust in SSC into the
future? It is a question that merits thinking about and observing.
(2) The External Challenges: Under the Shadow of the Global

North
In 1985, China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, pointed out that the world
was confronting two main issues. The first issue related to global peace
involving “East–West” relations, mainly between the United States and
the Soviet Union. The second issue was the development of the global
economy, involving “North–South” relations, in other words, the rela-
tions between developed countries and developing countries. He stressed
that the second issue caused by North–South relations was more severe
than the first. Although East–West conflicts have largely disappeared
29 Ibid.
30 Sheng, L. (2015). Theorizing income inequality in the face of financial globalization.
The Social Science Journal, 52(3), 415–424.
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, its legacies still haunt SSC today.
Moreover, North–South relations tend to overshadow the Global South.
According to historical views of western geopolitics, international
development cooperation was sustained by a well-orchestrated anti-
communist policy articulated with business segments, the armed forces
and even the middle classes under the backdrop of the Cold War. This
is because international development emerged as a result of two main
political processes in the shadow of the Cold War.31 Europe’s reconstruc-
tion and the final disintegration of colonial empires, during which the
Marshall Plan set a precedent for interstate assistance for development
and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was
later organized in 1948. The implementation of the Marshal Plan (1947)
and the creation of the OECD (1948), responsible for the reconstruction
of Europe (European Recovery Program), generated a strong influence
on economists of the time, as W. W. Rostow rightly put it. Of the total
US$13 billion package, more than 5% of the United States’ GDP in
1948 was defined and implemented between 1947 and the mid-1950s,
and approximately 25% consisted of food aid, sending seeds and fertil-
izers.32 Later, the routine practice of North-SSC (NSC) was formalized
as Official Development Assistance (ODA).33 At the same time, with the
dismantling of Europe, foreign assistance was broadly used as a tool for
the reconstruction of the spheres of influence by the two superpowers. In
this circumstance, the international system was re-hierarchized, leading to
cleavages between the developed and the underdeveloped spheres.34
In the 1970s, international organizations institutionally improved as
cooperation instruments. Between the 1980s and the 1990s, against
31 Hao, Y., Sheng, L., & Pan, G. (2017) Political Economy of Macao since 1999:
Dilemma of its success. Palgrave Macmillan.
32 Rostow, W. W. (1984). Development: The political economy of the Marshallian long
period. Pioneers in Development, 229–261.
33 Official development assistance (ODA) is defined by the OECD Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) as government aid that promotes and specifically targets the
economic development and welfare of developing countries. The DAC adopted ODA as
the “gold standard” of foreign aid in 1969 and it remains the main source of financing
for development aid. For more details, see Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, “Official development assistance—definition and coverage.”
34 Esteves, P., & Assunção, M. (2014). South–South cooperation and the international
development battlefield: Between the OECD and the UN. Third World Quarterly, 35(10),
1775–1790.
the background of privatized public services, developed countries’ atti-

tudes substantially changed toward the Global South and development
programs. It was pointed out that only by privatization could the debt
crisis in the South be solved. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
Global North’s view on international development and the global envi-
ronment evolved. According to Rostow, the East and West had distinct
understandings of development, but there was still no clarity on the
differences in the direction of development between the North and the
Global South. Based on the historical context of North–South relations,
Chatuverdi further points out that the philosophy behind North–South
and South-South development cooperation emerges from the notions of
philanthropy and mutual growth, respectively.35
As the product of the post-war order, the United Nations plays a
dual role in issues of the Global South, including SSC. As mentioned
in the previous section, the UN is significant in the growth of SSC.
However, from the most idealistic perspective, development cooperation
can be perceived as a set of international interventions aimed at the
exchange of experiences and resources between the North and the South
to achieve common goals based on criteria of solidarity, equity, effective-
ness, mutual interest, sustainability, and coresponsibility. At the same time,
to promote poverty eradiation and reduce social exclusion, it is necessary
to seek the path of increasing the level of development in the politics,
economics, and culture of the Global South. All these ideals can be found
in the documents of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(UNESCO).
For the United States, the superpower throughout the Cold War,
development cooperation has played a significant role in its foreign poli-
cies to serve its national interests and global hegemony as a tool of indirect
intervention in the Third World. Under such a context, the United
States has built a complete institutional structure of international assis-
tant programs. As mentioned in the previous sections, the Marshall Plan
was a milestone for the United States to play the tool of development
cooperation under the Iron Curtain. As the situation developed, more
assistant programs came out. In 1954, Congress passed the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act; in 1961, the Foreign Assistance
Act replaced the previous legal framework, the Mutual Security Act. In
35 Chaturvedi, S., Fues, T., & Sidiropoulos, E. (2012). Development cooperation and
emerging powers: New partners or old patterns? ZedBooks.
the following years, “assistance” and “development” were shown to be

key discourses in governmental speeches and documents of the United
States.
Even though these discourses have been ongoing, development coop-
eration now encompasses a set of actions by public and private actors
between countries of different income levels and stages of industrializa-
tion, with the purpose of promoting the economic, social, and sustainable
progress of countries of the South to be more balanced in relation to the
North. The issue of economic balance was emphasized to demonstrate
that the donor and recipient logic would not necessarily need to prevail
in the relations of states and international institutions. After September
11 in 2001, the United States and its agencies (as well as their political
influence on international entities) began to prioritize security strategies
and focused on battles against terrorism. In this circumstance, multilat-
eralism was undermined, and development cooperation was laid aside by
the Bush administration.
1.3 The BRI: A Chance for SSC Resurgence?

1.3.1 The Silk Road: History and Today
Throughout its thousand years of history, China has explored the pathway
to prosperity, and the Silk Road is one of its successful attempts. The
“Silk Road” was first proposed by German geographer Richthofen in
the nineteenth century to refer to the commercial routes that had
existed for several millennia. The Silk Road was originally a land route
across the Eurasian continent, which was embryonically outlined before
China’s Han Dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) and generally developed in
the following centuries. Around the Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD), the
Maritime Silk Road became prevalent, but the main commodities were
porcelain rather than silk textile. The Maritime Silk Road attracted more
merchants from India, Persia, and Arabia, and they cooperated in the
form of long-distance trade that eventually ended up in East Africa and
the Eastern Mediterranean region. Chan believes the Silk Road facilitated
the exchange between the east and the west in the ancient age: “The
traders had not restricted themselves to overland trade or maritime trade,
but rather their business spirits obliged them to use whatever transport
means and trade routes as convenient and engage in whatever product
trade as the market demanded.” According to the analysis by Chan, China
was the core of the globalized network along the Silk Road, providing
numerous commodities that were popular around the world. The Silk
Road, both the land and the maritime, connected the market and the
production places in a thriving global trade before the era of globalization.
However, as imperialism intruded, the Silk Roads weakened over the last
two centuries. The Great Game between Great Britain and Russia inter-
rupted the interaction between the overland and maritime Silk Roads.36
With the decline in the Silk Road, China, the core of the Silk Road
network, also became trapped in the darkest time in its history.
Learning from the hardship and ignominies of past centuries, the
Chinese people now are clear about one truth: that opening is the key to
prosperity and national rejuvenation. In fact, the commitment to reviving
the Silk Road has never diminished, especially after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. To bridge the economic and political gap left by the
Cold War, a series of projects were proposed, such as the Asian Devel-
opment Bank’s Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program,
the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia funded by the EU and
the continuous efforts of UNESCAP to upgrade the Asian Highway and
Trans-Asia Railway.37 However, this ancient Silk Road, as a commercial
route, did not gain too much attention from the world until the Belt and
Road Initiative was proposed in 2013.
After the twenty-first century, China’s social economy has been rapidly
developing. However, it is still confronting a series of challenges and even
obstacles to further challenges. Against such a background, China’s poli-
cymakers insist that to have more space for growth in the international
system, it is necessary to maintain multilateralism and multipolarity in the
international community and align with developing countries. Consid-
ering that soft power, including values and culture, is as important as
elements of hard power such as the economy and military force, J. Cheng
believes these are the reasons why China has to develop new thinking in
strategy and update its ideological interpretation as a backup for China’s
emergence.38 To some extent, the BRI reflects China’s endeavors both
in hard power and soft power as a comprehensive cooperation program
36 Chan, M. H. T. (2018). The Belt and Road Initiative—The new silk road: A research
agenda. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 7 (2), 104–123.
37 Ibid.
38 Cheng, J. Y. (2010). China’s foreign policy after the seventeenth party congress.
Dancing with the Dragon: China’s emergence in the developing world, 23–52.
involving infrastructure, finance, trade, policy coordination, and people-

to-people exchanges. Obviously, through a succession of programs, such
as the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the
construction of transnational railways in the Eurasian continent and the
strengthening of the “go-out policy” for China’s enterprises, it is not
difficult to find examples of China’s ambition to upgrade its hard power.
Moreover, it is also worth studying China’s soft power building and how
the BRI is shaping its national image.
By quoting the slogan of Yo-Yo Ma’s orchestral Silk Road Project, “a
modern metaphor for sharing and learning across cultures, art forms,
and disciplines,” T. Chin believes that the Silk Road offers a kind of
geopolitical chronotype39 where a geopolitical thought and action, as
well as a background context, are combined together. She even argues
that Chinese discourse is trying to construct an image of an “open
empire” instead of an “isolated civilization” via the Silk Road.40 However,
China’s image is still highly varied, controversial or even divided under
the dominating western discourse. In Vadell’s opinion, China’s profile
can be observed in various types based on different countries. From the
perspective of developed countries, China is regarded as an important
global player possessing key positions in the game of global politics and
economics; for underdeveloped countries, China is their supporter in the
international community by providing all sorts of aid and cooperation;
for emerging economies, China stands for the possibility that they will
be able to have a greater voice in global decision-making.41 More impor-
tantly, against the background of the BRI, China’s development model is
being debated once again, revolving around the topic of whether China’s
pathway is feasible for emerging countries. Wang42 stresses that, with a
39 A term employed by the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) to

refer to the coordinates of time and space invoked by a given narrative; in other words
to the “setting,” considered as a spatiotemporal whole.
40 Chin, T. (2013). The invention of the Silk Road, 1877. Critical Inquiry, 40(1),
194–219.
41 Vadell, J., Brutto, G. L., & Leite, A. C. C. (2020). The Chinese South-South
development cooperation: An assessment of its structural transformation. Revista Brasileira
de Política Internacional, 63.
42 Wang, H. (2010). Zhongguo jueqi de jingyan jiqi mianlin de tiaozhan [The
experiences and challenges of China Rise]. Wenhua Zhonghen [Cultural Review], 24–28.
strong state independent of international capital and political manipu-

lation, the heritage of the planning economy enables China to develop
a comprehensive strategy for development and negotiate with western
powers,43 which could serve as an example for the Third World.
1.3.2 Cooperation Between the BRI and SSC: Development

and Achievements
The BRI and SSC mirror each other as two of the most influential coop-
eration mechanisms in the world. Their cooperation will be constructive
for collecting resources for the Global South and addressing the uneven
development inside the Third World. The BRI and China’s SSC focus
coincide in many regions worldwide. In the framework of SSC, China’s
attention is given to the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the
Caribbean, while the BRI mainly covers Asia and part of Africa, but it also
leaves a door open for Latin American countries that have a tradition in
economic and political relations with China. It is an inspiring achievement
for the cooperation between the BRI and SSC according to the state of
South-South Cooperation by the UN the Secretary General:
The Belt and Road Initiative championed by China, with over 100 coun-
tries expressing interest in partnership, will provide new opportunities
and impetus for international collaboration, including South-SSC. The
initiative focuses on promoting policy coordination, connectivity of infras-
tructure and facilities, unimpeded trade, financial integration and closer
people-to-people ties.44
The BRI is regarded as an opportunity for SSC to revive in the

following aspects from the perspective of Zhou and Zhang. First, after
rapid development in recent decades, China has experienced infrastruc-
ture construction. Therefore, the BRI will facilitate the infrastructure of
the countries in the South, which is urgently needed. On the one hand,
infrastructure construction will significantly stimulate trade and attract
investment. On the other hand, it is also helpful to reduce economic
43 Wang, H. The Economy of Rising China.

44 UN. International Day for South-South Cooperation, 12 September. https://www.un.
org/en/observances/south-south-cooperation-day.
inequalities within and among countries, creating positive economic exter-

nalities. Second, the BRI can provide a platform to integrate and exchange
advantageous techniques and industries among emerging countries to
promote industrial upgrading in developing countries. Third, the BRI
has attached great importance to international trade and is particularly
dedicated to unimpeded trade. By a mechanism such as the China Inter-
national Import Expo, the BRI is fostering more channels of growth in
trade for countries of the South by facilitating and expanding the scale
of trade, especially through burgeoning e-commerce transactions. Last
but not least, the BRI also pays attention to constructing its own knowl-
edge system and that of SSC by offering educational opportunities and
technical training based on the channel of people-to-people exchange.45
In the document, which evaluates China’s foreign assistance from 2010
to 201246 (2014), we observed a total increase by 89.34 billion yuan
(14.41 billion US dollars) for foreign assistance. In terms of territo-
rial coverage, China aided 121 countries, including 30 in Asia, 51 in
Africa, nine in Oceania, 19 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and
12 in Europe. In addition, China also provided assistance to regional
organizations such as the African Union (AU). It also engaged in the
following:
Supporting Development Assistance Programs of Multilateral Organiza-

tions. By 2012, China had donated a total of 1.3 billion US dollars to these
regional financial institutions. Apart from China’s investment of 20 million
US dollars to establish the Poverty Reduction and Regional Cooperation
Fund in the Asian Development Bank in 2005; in 2012, China donated
another 20 million US dollars to this fund to help with the poverty reduc-
tion and development of developing countries. By the end of 2012, China
had contributed 110 million US dollars to the Asian Development Fund of
the Asian Development Bank. Furthermore, China supported the capacity
building of these financial institutions through technical cooperation funds
set up in the African Development Bank, the West African Development
Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank.
45 Taidong, Z., & Haibing, Z. (2018). China’s Belt and Road Initiative: An opportu-
nity to re-energize South-South Cooperation. China Quarterly of International Strategic
Studies, 4( 04), 559–576.
46 The State Council of PRC. (2014). China’s foreign aid. http://english.www.gov.cn/
archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986592.htm.
In the Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative,47 we found that
the sense of connectivity and interconnectivity interact in an attempt to
place Asia, Europe, and Africa in a common set of development concepts
that can be shared:
The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the connectivity of Asian,
European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and
strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road,
set up all-dimensional, multitiered and composite connectivity networks,
and realize diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development
in these countries. The connectivity projects of the Initiative will help align
and coordinate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt
and Road, tap market potential in this region, promote investment and
consumption, create demands and job opportunities, enhance people-to-
people and cultural exchanges, and mutual learning among the peoples of
the relevant countries, and enable them to understand, trust and respect
each other and live in harmony, peace and prosperity.
The BRI structure presents the challenge of integrating Eurasia and

encompassing Africa. The BRI’s exceptionality lies in the fact that
the developed countries of Western Europe will participate in the
project, since one of the purposes is to add the production chains in
Eastern Europe. This concept places South-SSC on another theoret-
ical and methodological level. Additionally, the BRI would cover other
existing mechanisms, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), ASEAN Plus China (10 + 1), Asia–Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Asia Cooperation Dialog
(ACD), Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in
Asia (CICA), China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), China-
Gulf Cooperation Council Strategic Dialog, Greater Mekong Subregion
(GMS) Economic Cooperation, and Central Asia Regional Economic
Cooperation (CAREC), to strengthen communication with relevant
governments and attract more countries and regions to participate in the
47 The State Council of PRC. (2015). Action Plan on the Belt and Road
Initiative. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_2814
75080249035.htm.
Belt and Road Initiative. President Xi Jinping48 ’s speech at the 1 Forum

in Beijing (2017) summarizes the breadth of achievements of the first
4 years of the BRI:
Total trade between China and other Belt and Road countries in 2014-
2016 exceeded US$3 trillion, and China’s investment in these countries
has surpassed US$50 billion. Chinese companies have set up 56 economic
cooperation zones in over 20 countries, generating some US$1.1 billion
in tax revenue and 180,000 jobs for them (...) The Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank has provided US$1.7 billion of loans for 9 projects in
Belt and Road participating countries. The Silk Road Fund has made US$4
billion of investment, and the 16+1 financial holding company between
China and Central and Eastern European countries has been inaugurated.
According to a recent report, China’s International Development Coop-

eration in the New Era 49 by China’s State Council, five years after the BRI
was proposed (2013–2018), successive achievements have been made in
development cooperation:
China allocated a total of RMB270.2 billion for foreign assistance in three

categories – grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. Grants of
RMB127.8 billion, accounting for 47.3 percent of the total, mainly went
to help other developing countries build small and medium-sized social
welfare projects and to fund projects for cooperation in human resources
development, technical cooperation, material assistance, and emergency
humanitarian assistance, as well as projects under the South-SSC Assis-
tance Fund. Interest-free loans of RMB11.3 billion, constituting 4.18
percent of the total, were mainly allocated to help developing countries
construct public facilities and launch projects for improving local people’s
lives. Concessional loans of RMB131.1 billion, making up 48.52 percent
of the total, were provided to help developing countries undertake indus-
trial projects and large and medium-sized infrastructure projects that yield
economic and social benefits and for the supply of technical services,
48 Speech by H. E. Xi Jinping. Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt
and The Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road. http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/
english/n100/2018/0306/c25-1038.html.
49 The State Council of PRC. (2021). China’s International Development Cooperation
in the New Era. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202101/10/content_W
S5ffa6bbbc6d0f72576943922.html.
Chart 1.1 China’s Foreign Aid in three categories, 2013–2018 (Source

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202101/10/content_WS5ffa6
bbbc6d0f72576943922.html)
complete sets of equipment, mechanical and electrical products, and other

goods and materials (Charts 1.1 and 1.2).
China extended assistance to 20 regional and international multilateral

organizations and 122 countries across the world—30 in Asia, 53 in Africa,
9 in Oceania, 22 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 8 in Europe
(Chart 1.3).
According to Serafettin Yilmaz,50 from the standpoint of neo-

Gramscian critical theory, the rise of China as a real alternative to
the existing social, political, and economic structures signifies a poten-
tial historical formation that represents comprehensive systemic change,
even though it does not suggest that it is a radical overhauling of the
established order. Indicating the creation of a historical bloc (economic-
corporate, class consciousness, and hegemonic) or an incipient historical
50 Yilmaz, S. (2014). China, historical blocs and international relations. Issues and
Studies, 50(4), 191.
Chart 1.2 China’s Foreign Aid recipients by income group, 2013–

2018 (Source http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202101/10/con
tent_WS5ffa6bbbc6d0f72576943922.html)
Chart 1.3 Distribution of China’s Foreign Aid by region, 2013–2018 (Source

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202101/10/content_WS5ffa6
bbbc6d0f72576943922.html)
bloc is essentially economically driven (multimember trade blocs, de-

dollarization movement, regional development and assistance banks, and
other forms of economic-financial cooperation). A China-led historical
bloc is expected to be formed incrementally as it moves from structure
to superstructure by achieving legitimacy through material and ideational
strength, which altogether advises consent.
1.3.3 Chinese Characteristics in the BRI

As an international cooperation initiative proposed by China, the BRI
is naturally endowed with Chinese characteristics in many aspects. From
a worldwide perspective, the BRI reveals China’s view on international
relations, global governance and cooperation with its developing country
peers. China is attempting to increase its global influence via coopera-
tive instruments. Moreover, China’s shrinking domestic demand indicates
that its output growth must increasingly rely on expanded manufacturing
exports.51 Qin Yaqing believes that when pursuing its national inter-
ests by strengthening its hard power, China can also integrate itself into
the global economy by seeking cooperation. From his point of view,
reform and opening up are key to China’s development. It was feasible
for China to start the market economy with the previous framework of
the planning economy because the reform and opening up three decades
ago allowed China to re-estimate the overall political and socioeconomic
tendencies.52 In this circumstance, China was able to predict that peace
and development would be the two key issues in the world and design its
foreign policy to enlarge international cooperation.53 Likewise, returning
to the UN and its agencies is also important for China. After decades of
struggling over membership in the international community, China has
51 Sheng, L. (2016) Explaining US–China economic imbalances: A social perspective.

Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29(3), 1097–1111.
52 Yaqing, Q. (2009). Development of international relations theory in China.
International Studies, 46(1–2), 185–201.
53 On March 4, 1985, China’s leader Deng Xiaoping proposed that the world
was confronting two issues: first, peace, and second, economic development. The first
involves East–West relations, while the second involves North–South relations which was
the key issue. Please see China Daily. (2010). Peace and development are the two
outstanding issues in the world today. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcna
tionalcongress/2010-10/21/content_29714474.htm.
generally evolved in the last three decades from a revisionist to a detached

and then to a status quo power.54
From the perspective of political comparison, the BRI demonstrates
China’s refocus on its tradition, on the one hand, and indicates the
decline in western liberalism. Based on China’s traditional values, Yan
Xuetong points out that there are three key factors strengthening the
competitiveness of China’s foreign policy. First, although Marxism is the
official ideology of the Communist Party of China, it plays a limited
role in current foreign policy. Second, economic pragmatism has been
the ideology most popularly accepted by both the government and ordi-
nary people in China in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s political reforms
in 1978. Third, traditionalism is gaining momentum among everyday
Chinese people, as well as intellectuals and politicians, even though it is
not official ideology. In addition, traditionalism does not exclusively refer
to Confucianism but rather to a combination of all schools of ancient
Chinese thought. The author believes that the BRI reveals that China’s
attempt to return to its history and tradition after being “a student of the
West” in the past century. Moreover, China is dedicated to reviving its
heritage for the benefit of the world.
From an historical perspective, there are several points for finding
common ground between the BRI and the previous international coop-
eration of China. In his work, Zhou Hong55 analyzes the role of China’s
foreign aid and traditional donor-recipient relations, which may help us
to have a deeper comprehension of the spirit of China’s cooperative
diplomacy and its continuity in the BRI. Based on official documents,56
Zhou summarized the achievements that China made during the six
decades from 1950 to 2010. In these 60 years, “China has under-
taken about two thousand development aid projects in more than one
hundred countries and regions, among which more than two-thirds
are in the least-developed and other low-income countries. Africa took
54 Yaqing, Q. (2010). International society as a process: Institutions, identities, and

China’s peaceful rise. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(2), 129–153.
55 Please see Hong, Z. (2012). China’s evolving aid landscape: Crossing the river by
feeling the stones. Development cooperation and emerging powers: New partners or old
patterns, 134–168; Chaturvedi, S., Fues, T., & Sidiropoulos, E. (2012). Development
cooperation and emerging powers: New partners or old patterns? Zed Books.
56 People’s Republic of China. (2011). China’s foreign aid. State Council. http://eng
lish.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284620.htm.
45.7%, Asia 32.8%, and Latin America and the Caribbean 12.7%; these
projects included railways, highways, power plants, water conservation
schemes, farms, schools, hospitals, and sports venues, all of them aimed
at improving everyday life in recipient countries.”
Furthermore, Zhou introduces the dual status of China in foreign aid.
On the one hand, China acts as a developing country donor. On the other
hand, it is also a recipient of aid for its own development. According to
Zhou’s analysis, aid can be divided into two categories. In the context of
financial aid transferred from the developed to the underdeveloped world,
the donor country “assume[s] the responsibility of helping underdevel-
oped countries and the assistance should be provided selflessly, with no
conditions attached.” As a result, underdeveloped countries are supposed
to prioritize poverty eradication as a central task. Considering the advan-
tages of China’s Model, where the economic system is diversified by
the socialist market economy and business enterprises, Zhou argues that
financial organizations should play a key role in the market to attract
FDI and unburden the recipients. At the same time, enterprises should
be encouraged to enter recipient countries according to the experience
of China. Zhou believes it is “conducive to the combination of govern-
mental aid funds and funds of enterprises to expand the financial sources
and project scale, consolidating the achievements of aid projects and
raising their efficiency.”
Additionally, Zhou reports on the experience and cooperation mech-
anisms that China has been building with foreign aid, which, after
adjustments in policies, methods, systems, and organization, has become
more complex and diversified in both structure and participation. This
complexity of the cooperation mechanisms based on China’s experience
in Africa and Asia provides a history that has been incorporated into the
BRI. As the author reports, “many developing countries also welcome
China’s aid because they can learn from China’s experience in acquiring
funds, technology and expertise, and developing the markets they need
for their economic development.”
1.4 The Theoretical Framework to Interpret

the Relations Between the BRI and SSC
As mentioned in the previous section, SSC embodies a kind of hope
that development may be achieved by the poor themselves through their
mutual assistance to one another, transforming the whole world order to
reflect their mutual interests vis-à-vis the dominant Global North.57 Like-
wise, the BRI is a cooperative development initiative proposed by China,
the largest developing country in the world, with the hope of building
up a community of a shared future for all humankind and achieving
mutual development. However, the roots of those good hopes are the
bad legacies on the old pathways to the development and the failures of
the current international system. Before explaining why the BRI is signif-
icant for SSC, it is necessary to review the last five centuries and discuss
the pathways of development.
1.4.1 Review of the Development Pathway of the West and China

The last 500 years have witnessed a series of fundamental changes in
human history. In other words, the world system today has been deeply
shaped by developments over the past five hundred years. R. Allen divides
the five hundred years into three periods. The first period is character-
ized as the “mercantilist era,” spanning from 1500 to 1800, beginning
with the age of discoveries and ending with the Industrial Revolution.
This period triggered global economic integration by colonialism and
promoted the development of manufacturing in Europe. The second is
the “catch-up” period in the nineteenth century, when economic devel-
opment was deemed a priority by Western Europe and North America.
With the four keys of a unified market, external tariffs, stable curren-
cies, and mass education, Western Europe and America joined the UK,
forming today’s club of rich nations. The third is the “big push” period
in the twentieth century, when countries closed the gap with the West
by planning their economies and coordinating investment to jump ahead.
Allen points out that the development of a nation is determined by its
industrialization.58
As the cradle of the Industrial Revolution, the interpretation of power
is still dominated by the West under the current liberal hegemony.
Slater59 notes that the West is a non-geographic reference to the First
57 Gray, K., & Gills, B. K. (2016). South–South cooperation and the rise of the Global
South. Third World Quarterly, 37 (4), 557–574.
58 Allen, R. C. (2011). Global economic history: A very short introduction (Vol. 282).
Oxford University Press.
59 Slater, D. (2008). Geopolitics and the postcolonial: Rethinking North–South relations .
Wiley.
World or the North, which is customarily associated with the countries

of Western Europe, North America and Australia and New Zealand, with
Japan being classified as both of the First World and the North. More-
over, it is constructed as a model to measure the social progress of the
whole world. This imagination is repeatedly stressed under the neolib-
eral discourse. As a result, the western pathways were regarded as the
surest approach to development for those “premodern” countries, espe-
cially under liberal hegemony, which has been the foundation of today’s
world order for centuries. According to Robert Cox, the construction
of liberal hegemony can be divided into three historical periods. The
first period is characterized as “the coming of the liberal international
economy,” spanning from 1789 to 1873, when Britain dominated. The
second period was “the era of rival imperialism” between 1873 and 1945,
when the United States and Germany were rising as the major competi-
tors for global hegemony. The third period is that of the neoliberal world
order, which began at the end of WWII. During the decades of the post-
war era, the US hegemony and multilateral entities have been deemed the
major components leading the world. In each period, numerous tears,
blood, and even bone were laid down to strengthen the foundation of
liberal hegemony as the result of capital exploitation, colonial expansion,
imperial rivalries, and military wars. Such trade competition led to war,
as was seen in the case of WWI that was triggered by the trade rivalry
between Germany and Britain. At the same time, the revolution also grew
under exploitation. Lenin argued that it was the contradictions in indus-
trial growth and the advent of imperialism that generated conflicts among
the main capitalist countries, including England, France, Germany, and
Italy, accelerating the revolutions in Russia, which was on the periphery
of western capitalism.60
As a result of the western pathway, the two world wars created “muta-
tions.” WWI created Soviet Russia, while WWII created the superpower
of the Soviet Union and shaped a bipolar world order. However, the two
heterogeneous systems, led separately by the United States and the Soviet
Union with contrasting ideologies and economic systems, paradoxically
merged, resulting in the assimilation of the socialist camp by the capi-
talist market and a loosening of state control. To some extent, the United
States became the major power shaping the new world after WWII. Based
60 Lenin, V. I. (1917). Imperialism the highest stage of capitalism. Aziloth Books. ed.
2018.
on Bretton Woods’ determinations, the United States created the basis for
the development of international institutions such as the WTO, WB, and
IMF. This institutional architecture, together with the United Nations
(UN), anticipated the Cold War conflicts between the United States and
the USSR. In the 1970s, the Bretton Woods system faced a crisis of
legitimacy. At the same time, the oil crisis in the 1970s and the debt
crisis in the 1980s eroded the belief that controlled markets produced
growth and stability, accelerating economic financialization and under-
mining the state’s role in economic planning.61 Therefore, the author is
trying to argue that the third stage of liberal hegemonic development can
be further divided into two stages: the third stage, which spanned from
1945 to 1980 when Keynesianism prevailed; and the fourth stage, which
began with the reforms of privatization and liberalization under Margaret
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, shifting Keynesian to neoliberalism. With
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the optimism for liberalism reached its
peak. Fukuyama was perhaps the most optimistic, claiming that it was “the
end of history for mankind’s ideology evolution; the universalization of
western liberal democracy will be the final form of human government.”62
However, the pathway to the industrialized boom of the West was a
blind alley of deindustrialized doom for the rest of the world, especially
for the ancient manufacturing economies of Asia. As R. Allen stresses,
“the underdevelopment is the product of the nineteenth-century global-
ization and western industrial development.”63 The situation in the Third
World has been in strong contrast to the West for ages. In the nineteenth
century, when rivalry among western imperialist powers reached its peak,
China’s fortune slumped to rock bottom. The hundred years between the
1840s and the 1940s is usually deemed the darkest age in the history of
China for most Chinese people. This ignominious history deeply shaped
the internal and external policies of China in the following decades as
the result of the strong forces of imperialism and revolution. On the one
hand, imperialism brought the most miserable and disgraceful memories
to Chinese people. According to China’s historical discourse, the first
61 Sheng, L. (2010) Growth-volatility tradeoff in the face of financial openness: A

perspective of developing economies. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 23(4),
609–622.
62 Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest (16), 3–18.
63 Allen, R. C. (2011). Global economic history: A very short introduction (Vol. 282).
Oxford University Press.
Opium War between China and Britain was regarded as a critical junc-
ture of China’s modern history; China became a semicolony and began
to suffer invasions from imperialist empires, including Britain, France,
Russia, and Japan. On the other hand, the Chinese people were inspired
by the revolution to fight against the invaders and explore pathways to
national rejuvenation. To some extent, the bitter historical memories
shaped China’s empathy for nations that had suffered the same history
and comprehension of the Third World’s desire for self-determination,
independence, equality, and development, which further influenced the
internal and external policies of China after 1949.
Regarding internal development, R. Allen believes that China is a great
example of a “big push” development model in the twentieth century;
thus, the key to China’s achievement cannot be simply summarized as
“free market reform.”64 The development of China can be divided into
two periods: the planning period, between 1950 and 1978, and the
reform period, which spanned from 1978 to the present. In 1949, when
the Communist Party of China (CPC) established the People’s Republic
of China, China confronted a dire economic situation, with a GDP
per capita of only $448. In response, China adopted the Soviet model,
including collective farms, state-owned industry and central planning,
and focused on heavy industry to promote an urbanized and industri-
alized society. At the same time, China attempted to “walk on two legs”
by combining capital-intensive technology and labor-intensive manufac-
turing. As a result, the GDP per capita had doubled from 1949 to 1978.
Although China was not distinguished from other poor countries at the
time, the period established the foundations of its industrialization and
modernized defense system, which has gained increasing attention in
recent years. In 1978, China’s reform began with the second-generation
leader Deng Xiaoping. The planning economy was shifted to a market
economy. With exchange rate stability and selected capital control, China
exhibited strong macroeconomic performance in the period.65 However,
R. Allen insists that the heritage of the planning economy cannot be
ignored in areas such as public health, literacy, education, and overall
industry.
64 Ibid.
65 Sheng, L. (2014b). Income inequality, financial systems, and global imbalances: A
theoretical consideration. Global Policy, 5(3), 311–320.
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BLACKWOOD'S EDINBURGH MAGAZINE, VOL. 75, NO. 460,
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BLACKWOOD’S
EDINBURGH MAGAZINE.
No. CCCCLX. FEBRUARY, 1854. Vol.
LXXV.
CONTENTS.
Abyssinian Aberrations, 129

The Quiet Heart.—Part III., 150
National Gallery, 167
A Glance at Turkish History, 184
Macaulay’s Speeches, 193
Fifty Years in both Hemispheres, 203
A Sporting Settler in Ceylon, 226
Gray’s Letters, 242
EDINBURGH:
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BLACKWOOD’S
EDINBURGH MAGAZINE.
No. CCCCLX. FEBRUARY, 1854. Vol.

LXXV.
ABYSSINIAN ABERRATIONS.[1]
Locomotion, profitless and often aimless, is, in the opinion of

Continentals, a condition of an Englishman’s existence. Provided
with a dressing-case that would contain a Frenchman’s entire
wardrobe, and with a hat-box full of pills “to be taken at bedtime,”
every son of Albion is supposed to perform, at some period of his life,
a distant journey, with the sole apparent object of acquiring a right to
say that he has been “there and back again.” An Englishman, in the
opinion of Europe, would be a miserable being, had he not
continually present to his mind the recollection or the anticipation of
a journey to the uttermost parts of the earth—to the North Pole or
the South Seas, to the feverish heart of Africa or the scarcely less
perilous wastes of Tartary. That opinion will be strongly confirmed
by the peregrinations of Mansfield Parkyns.
There can be no reasonable doubt that when the handsome
volumes, full of amusing letter-press and neat sketches, and
externally decorated with a chubby and Oriental St George spearing a
golden dragon, with bossy shields and carved scimitars, and lion’s
mane and tail, which Mr Murray has just published, shall have been
as generally read as they deserve to be, the tide of enterprising travel
will set strongly in the direction of Abyssinia. Everybody will take
wing for the land of the Shohos and Boghos; African outfits will be in
perpetual demand; sanguine railway projectors will discuss the
feasibility of a “Grand Cairo and Addy Abo Direct” line. Mr Parkyns
tells us, in his preliminary pages, that he shall estimate the success of
his book, not by his friends’ flatteries or his reviewers’ verdict, but by
its sale. Sale!—why, it will sell by thousands, in an abridged form,
with a red cover, as the “Handbook for Abyssinia.” Persons starting
for those parts will ask for Parkyns’ Handbook, just as tenderer
tourists, who content themselves with an amble through Andalusia,
inquire for Ford’s. That many such starts will be made, we cannot
doubt, after reading the book in which are so vividly described the
charms of the pleasant land of Tigrè, the delights of the journey
thither, and of the abode there. Never was anything so tempting. The
mere introduction makes us impatient to be off. Mr Parkyns is
resolved to lure his readers, in his very first chapter, not only to read
his book, but to roam in his footsteps. Werne’s Campaign in Taka
gave us some idea of the advantages enjoyed by those privileged
mortals to whom it is given to ramble between the Blue Nile and the
Red Sea; but the German’s narrative, which we thought striking and
startling enough when we read it, is thrown into the shade by the
vivid and lively delineations of the friend and comrade of Prince
Shetou. The sanitary, dietetic, and surgical instructions, with which,
for the benefit of future travellers in Abyssinia, he preludes his
subject, would alone suffice to inspire us with an ardent longing to
pass a season in the delightful regions where they are applicable. The
preservation of health, he justly observes, should be every traveller’s
chief care, since, without it, pleasure or profit from the journey is
alike impossible. Then he proceeds to point out the chief dangers to
health in Abyssinia, and the means of warding them off. The
highlands, he tells us, are highly salubrious, but unfortunately one
cannot always abide upon the hills; and down in the valleys malaria
prevails, engendering terrible inflammatory fevers, to which four
patients out of five succumb, the fifth having his constitution
impaired for life, or at least for many years. Parkyns points out a
preservative. Light two large fires and sleep between them. They
must be so close together that you are obliged to cover yourself with
a piece of hide to avoid ignition of your clothes. “Not very agreeable
till you are used to it,” says the cool Parkyns, “but a capital
preventive of disease. Another plan, always adopted by the natives, is
not, I think, a bad one:—Roll your head completely up in your cloth,
which then acts as a respirator. You may often see a nigger lying
asleep with the whole of his body uncovered, but his head and face
completely concealed in many folds”;—a sort of woodcocking which
may be pleasant, but can hardly be considered picturesque. Tobacco
is indispensable; in that country you must smoke abundantly. On the
White Nile no negro is ever without his pipe, which sometimes holds
a pound of tobacco. “The largest I now possess,” says Parkyns,
somewhat dolefully, “would not contain much more than a quarter of
that quantity.” The sun, generally considered formidable to travellers
in Africa, is disregarded by him to whom we now give ear. “I never
retired into the shade to avoid the noonday heat; and for four years I
never wore any covering to my head except the rather scanty
allowance of hair with which nature has supplied me, with the
addition occasionally of a little butter. During the whole of that time
I never had a headache”;—an immunity we are disposed to attribute
less to the sun’s forbearance than to some peculiar solidity in the
cranium of Parkyns. “In these climates,” he next informs us, “a man
cannot eat much, or, even if he could, he ought not.” This probably
applies exclusively to foreigners, for we are afterwards introduced to
native dinners, where the gormandising surpassed belief, and yet
none of the guests were a pin the worse. Indeed, in the course of the
book, the Abyssinians are invariably represented as enormous
feeders, capable of demolishing four or five pounds of meat, more or
less, raw, as one day’s ration, and without ill effects. As long as you
are moderate in quantity, the quality of what you eat is evidently
unimportant in a sanitary point of view. “A man who cares a straw
about what he eats should never attempt to travel in Africa. It is not
sufficient to say, ‘I can eat anything that is clean and wholesome.’
You will often have to eat things that are far from being either,
especially the former. I have eaten of almost every living thing that
walketh, flyeth, or creepeth—lion, leopard, wolf, cat, hawk, crocodile,
snake, lizard, locust, &c.; and I should be sorry to say what dirty
messes I have at times been obliged to put up with.” As general rules
for the preservation of health, we are instructed to avoid bad
localities—the valleys, especially after the rainy season, when the sun
pumps up malaria from stagnant pools and decayed vegetable matter
—to be abstemious in all respects, and to follow the native customs
with respect to food, injunctions which appear difficult to reconcile.
Should all precautions prove ineffectual, and fever or other ills assail
us, kind, considerate Parkyns, who himself, he tells us, has some
knowledge of the healing art, instructs us what to do. “Local
bleedings, such as the natives practise, are often highly
advantageous; and firing with a hot iron may also be adopted at their
recommendation. For severe inflammation of the bowels, when you
cannot bear to be touched on the part, some boiling water poured on
it will be a ready and effective blister,—a wet rag being wrapped
round in a ring to confine the water within the intended limits. For
bad snake-bites or scorpion stings, bind above the part as tightly as
possible, and cut away with a knife; then apply the end of an iron
ramrod, heated to white heat. This, of course, I mean supposing you
to be in the backwoods, out of the reach of medicines. Aquafortis is, I
have heard, better than the hot iron, as it eats farther in.” Actual
cautery, boiling-water blisters, and “cutting away” really compose a
very pretty basis for a surgical system. Professor Parkyns gives but
few prescriptions, supposing, he says, that few of his readers would
care to have more, or be likely to profit by them. Judging from the
above sample, we are inclined to coincide in his supposition.
Mr Mansfield Parkyns is an amateur barbarian. Leaving England
when a very young man, he plunged, after some previous rambling in
Europe and Asia Minor, into the heart of Abyssinia, and adopted
savage life with an earnestness and gusto sufficiently proved by his
book, and by the regret with which he still, after three years’ return
to what poor Ruxton called “civilised fixings,” speaks of his abode in
the wigwams of Ethiopia, and of his hankerings—not after the flesh-
pots of Egypt, but—after the ghee-pots and uncooked beef he so long
throve upon in the dominions of the great Oubi, Viceroy of Tigrè.
Fancy a civilised Englishman, gently nurtured and educated, pitching
his tent for three years amongst filthy savages, adopting their dress
and usages, rubbing his head with butter, sleeping with the but of his
rifle for a pillow—the grease from his plaited locks being “beneficially
employed in toughening the wood”—having himself partially
tattooed, eating raw beef, substituting raw sheep’s liver soused in
vinegar for oysters, discarding hats and shoes, and going bareheaded
and barefoot under the broiling sun and over the roadless wastes of
Abyssinia, burning and gashing his flesh in order to produce peculiar
scars and protuberances, deemed ornamental by the people amongst
whom he dwelt, and, upon his return home (to England, we mean to
say, for the home of his predilection is amongst the savoury savages
he so reluctantly left, and amongst whom he evidently considers
himself naturalised), coolly writing down and publishing his
confessions—in most amusing style, we freely admit, but not without
a slight dash of self-complacency, as if he would say, See what a fine
fellow I am to have thus converted myself into a greasy, shoeless,
raw-beef-eating savage for a term of years! We have nothing in the
world, however, to do with Mr Parkyns’ peculiar predilections. This
is a free country—as the Yankee observed when flogging his nigger—
whose natives have a perfect right to exhibit themselves in any
character they please, from an Objibbeway to an alabaster statue, so
long as they do not outrage decency, or otherwise transgress the law.
For our part, we should have been sincerely sorry if Mr Parkyns had
not en-cannibaled himself, and told us how he did it. We should have
been deprived of two of the most extraordinary, original, and
amusing volumes through which we ever passed our paper-knife. We
accept the book, and are grateful for it. With the author’s tastes,
depraved though we cannot but consider them, we purpose not to
meddle. Men of his stamp should be prized, like black diamonds, by
reason of their rarity. We are much mistaken, or Mr Parkyns will be
the cynosure of all eyes during the approaching spring—particularly
if he condescends occasionally to exhibit his tattooed arm, and to
bolt a raw beef-steak. Gordon Cumming, on his return from his
South-African slaughterings, was the lion of the London season;
Mansfield Parkyns will receive much less than his due if he be not
made its hippopotamus.
Mr Parkyns started from Smyrna for a tour of the Nile, in company
with the poetical member for Pontefract, Mr Monckton Milnes, then
pondering his “Palm Leaves.” Of the Nile tour, so repeatedly made
and so well described by others, he abstains from speaking, in order
the sooner to get to Abyssinia. After an agreeable boat voyage of two
months’ duration, he parted from his companion at Cairo. Mr Milnes
must surely have regretted quitting so lively and intrepid a fellow-
traveller, and Mr Parkyns, we cannot doubt, equally deplored their
separation. The cool of the evening would have been so pleasant in
the desert. But parliamentary duties summoned one of the travellers
northwards; the Wander-trieb, the vagabond instinct, impelled the
other southwards, and so they parted. A double-barrelled gun, a
single rifle, a brace of double pistols, and a bowie-knife, composed
Mr Parkyns’ travelling arsenal; he also took with him three pair of
common pistols, a dozen light cavalry sword-blades, some red cloth,
white muslin, and Turkey rugs, as presents for Abyssinian chiefs, and
in March 1843 he sailed from Suez for Jedda, on board a miserable
Arab boat, loaded with empty rice-bags and a hundred passengers.
The throng was too great to be agreeable, but Mr Parkyns, who has
evidently a happy temper and a knack at making himself popular
amongst all manner of queer people, was soon on most friendly
terms with the Turks, Bedouins, Egyptians, Negroes, and others who
composed the living freight of the clumsy lateen-rigged craft. The
voyage from Suez to Jedda varies from nine days to three months.
Mr Parkyns was so fortunate as to accomplish it in little more than
three weeks. We pass over its incidents, which amused us when we
first read them, but which have lost their piquancy now that we recur
to them with the highly-spiced flavour of the Abyssinian adventures
hot upon our palate, and we go on at once to Massawa Island, on the
Abyssinian coast, whose climate may be estimated from the remark
made by an officer of the Indian navy to Mr Parkyns, to the effect
that he thought Pondicherry the hottest place in India, but that
Pondicherry was nothing to Aden, and Aden a mere trifle to
Massawa. “Towards the latter end of May I have known the
thermometer rise to about 120° Fahrenheit in the shade, and in July
and August it ranges much higher.” Indoors, the natives, men and
women, wear nothing but striped cotton napkins round their loins.
Most Europeans suffer severely from the heat of the place. Mr
Parkyns, who is first cousin to a salamander, suffered not at all, but
ran about catching insects, or otherwise actively employing himself,
whilst his servants lay in the shade, the perspiration streaming off
them. He is clearly the very man for the tropics. After ten days at
Massawa, he started for the interior, previously getting rid of his
heavy baggage, to an extent we should really have thought rather
improvident, but which, if he had already made up his mind to
content himself with the comforts, and conform to the customs of the
people he was going amongst, was doubtless extremely wise. We
have enumerated his stock of arms, and his assortment of presents
for the natives. The list of his wardrobe, after he had given away his
European toggery—partly at Cairo, and partly to Angelo, a Massawa
Jew, who made himself useful and agreeable—is very soon made out.
When he landed on the mainland, opposite Massawa, it consisted of
“three Turkish shirts, three pair of drawers, one suit of Turkish
clothes for best occasions, a pair of sandals, and a red cap. From the
day I left Suez (25th March 1843), till about the same time in the year
1849, I never wore any article of European dress, nor indeed ever
slept in a bed of any sort—not even a mattress; the utmost extent of
luxury I enjoyed, even when all but dying of a pestilential fever, that
kept me five months on my beam-ends at Khartoum, was a coverlet
under a rug. The red cap I wore on leaving Massawa was soon
borrowed of me, and the sandals, after a month, were given up; and
so, as I have before said in the Introduction, for more than three
years (that is, till I reached Khartoum), I wore no covering to my
head, except a little butter, when I could get it, nor to my feet, except
the horny sole which a few months’ rough usage placed under them.”
The sole in question had scarce put its print upon Ethiopian soil
when it was near meeting with an accident that would have
necessitated the use of the sharp knife and white-hot ramrod. On his
way to the house of Hussein Effendi, a government scribe, at the sea-
coast village of Moncullou, Mr Parkyns put his bare foot near an
object that in the twilight had the appearance of a bit of stick or
stone. “I was startled by feeling something cold glide over it, and,
turning, saw a small snake wriggling off as quickly as possible. From
what little I could distinguish of its form and colour, it seemed to
answer the description I had heard of the cerastes, or horned viper,
which is about a foot and a half long, rather thick for its length, and
of a dirty, dusty colour, mottled. The horns are nearly over the eyes,
and about the eighth of an inch in length. This is considered one of
the most venomous of the snake tribe, and they are very numerous in
this neighbourhood. I tried to kill it, but without success.” He soon
came to think very little of such small deer as this. Snakes are as
common as rats in those torrid latitudes, and about as little heeded.
On his way to the hot springs of Ailat, a day’s journey from Massawa,
he killed another horned viper, as it was coolly wriggling across his
carpet, “spread in a natural bower formed by the boughs of a species
of mimosa, from whose yellow flowers, which emit a delicious
fragrance, the Egyptians distil a perfume they call ‘fitneh.’” After this
he makes no mention of adventures with snakes on account of their
frequency, until he gets to his chapter on the natural history of
Abyssinia, towards the close of the second volume, to which we shall
hereafter refer. We are at present anxious to get up the country, to
the court of King Oubi, whose capital, Adoua, was Mr Parkyns’
headquarters during his residence in Tigrè. There he had what he
calls his town-house, of which he presents us with a plan and
sketches. He remained for some weeks at Ailat, the Cheltenham of
Abyssinia, whose healing springs attract visitors from great
distances. There he lodged in the house of a sort of village chief,
called Fakak, and passed his time shooting. It was rather an amusing
residence, caravans of Bedouins and Shohos frequently passing
through on their way to and from Massawa, and he had excellent
sport. The evening before starting for Kiaguor, three days’ journey on
the road to Adoua,
“I went out to procure a supper for myself and numerous friends and attendants;
and, to tantalise my English sporting readers, I will tell them what bag I brought
home in little more than an hour. My first shot brought down four guinea-fowl; my
second, five ditto; third, a female of the little Ben Israel gazelle; fourth, her male
companion; and, fifth, a brace of grouse; so that in five shots I had as good a bag as
in England one would get in an average day’s shooting, and after expending half a
pound of powder, and a proportionate quantity of shot, caps, and wads. But I feel it
my duty to explain that I never shoot flying, considering that unsportsmanlike. A
true sportsman shows his skill by getting up to his game unperceived, when,
putting the muzzle of his gun as close to the tail-feathers as he possibly can, he
blazes away into the thick of the covey, always choosing the direction in which he
sees three or four heads picking in a row! At any rate, this is the only way you can
shoot in a country where, if you entirely expend your powder and shot, you must
starve, or else make more, as I have been obliged to do many a time. I cannot
understand how people in Europe can enjoy shooting, where one is dependent on a
crowd of keepers, beaters, dogs, sandwiches, grog, &c.... My sole companion on
ordinary occasions is a little boy, who carries my rifle, whilst I carry my gun, and
we do all the work ourselves. His sharp eyes, better accustomed to the glare than
my own, serve me in every point as well as a setter’s nose. The country (about
Ailat) is sandy and covered with large bushes. Most of the trees are thorny, being
chiefly of the mimosa tribe, and their thorns are of a very formidable description,
some of them being about two inches and a half in length, and as thick at the base
as a large nail; while another variety, called in Abyssinian the ‘Kantàff-tafa,’ have
thin short-curved thorns placed on the shoots two and two together. These catch
you like the claws of a hawk, and if they enter your clothes you had better cut off
the sprig at once, and carry it with you till you have leisure to liberate yourself,
otherwise you will never succeed; for as fast as you loosen one thorn another
catches hold.”
Some interesting sporting anecdotes follow (they abound in Mr

Parkyns’ book), told in off-hand characteristic style—encounters with
wild pigs, rather dangerous animals to deal with—and then we take
the road to Kiaguor. A night’s rest there, and we are off to Adoua.
Hereabouts Mr Parkyns gives a sketch of “Abyssinian Travelling.” We
presume that he himself, somewhat tanned by the climate, is the
gentleman mounted on a jackass, with bare head and legs, and a
parasol for protection from the sun. Suppress the donkey and supply
a parrot, and he might very well pass for the late Mr R. Crusoe.
Vague ideas of columns and obelisks, Moorish architecture and the
like, floated in Mr Parkyns’ fancy as he drew near to the capital city
of the kingdom of Tigrè, one of the most powerful of all Ethiopia. He
found a straggling village of huts, most of them built of rough stones,
and thatched with straw. The customhouse—they possess that
civilised nuisance even in Abyssinia—gave him trouble about his
baggage, which it found exorbitant in quantity, and suspected him of
smuggling in goods on account of merchants. He explained that he
had a supply of arms, powder, lead, &c., for two or three years’
consumption, besides presents for the prince, but the Tigrè
douaniers insisted on examining all his packages. He would not
submit, and set off to make an appeal to Oubi—nominally the
viceroy, but in reality the sovereign of the country—who was then at
a permanent camp, at a place entitled Howzayn. During this part of
his travels, Mr Parkyns was in company with Messrs Plowden and
Bell; and on reaching Howzayn, which they did in a heavy shower of
rain, they went at once to the habitation of Càfty, the steward of
Oubi’s household, who had been Mr Bell’s balderàbba on a former
visit. “It is customary for every person, whether native or foreigner,
after his first audience with the prince, to ask for a ‘balderàbba,’ and
one of his officers is usually named. He becomes a sort of agent, and
expects you to acknowledge, by presents, any service he may render
you—such as assisting you out of difficulties in which you may be
involved, or procuring for you admission to his master when you may
desire it. Càfty was absent on an expedition. His brother, Negousy,
was acting for him, and he volunteered to procure us an audience of
the prince without delay.” Meanwhile the travellers were not very
comfortable. Some poor fellows were turned out of their huts into the
rain to make room for them; but the huts let in water so freely, that
the new occupants were scarcely better off than those who had been
ejected. Only one hut, about 7 feet in diameter, and 5½ feet high,
had a water-tight roof. Imperfect shelter was but one of their
annoyances, and a minor one. It is a custom of that country for the
king to send food to travellers as soon as he hears of their arrival,
and our three Englishmen, aware of this, had brought no provisions.
This was unfortunate, for Oubi neglected to observe the hospitable
custom, and they were half starved. Instead of obtaining for them an
immediate interview with the prince, Negousy, who was fishing for
presents, put them off from day to day. They were obliged to send a
servant round the camp, crying out, “Who has got bread for money?”
and offering an exorbitant price; but even thus they could not obtain
a tithe of what they needed. To add to their vexations, Mr Parkyns’
servant, Barnabas, a negro whom he had engaged at Adoua, was
claimed as a slave by a man in authority, to whose uncle he had
formerly belonged. At last, on the fourth evening after their arrival,
Oubi sent them a supper. “It consisted of forty thin cakes, thirty
being of coarser quality for the servants, and ten of white ‘teff’ for our
own consumption. These were accompanied by two pots of a sort of
sauce, composed of common oil, dried pease, and red pepper, but, it
being fast time, there was neither meat nor butter. To wash all down
there was an enormous horn of honey beer.” On the morning of the
sixth day Oubi sent for them, and, escorted by Negousy, they
hastened to the Royal Hovel. They had to wait some time for
admission, amidst the comments of a crowd of soldiers—comments
then unintelligible to Mr Parkyns, but which he afterwards
ascertained to be far less complimentary to the personal appearance
of himself and companions than he at the time imagined—their eyes
being compared to those of cats, their hair to that of monkeys, and
their skin, to which the sun had given a bright capsicum hue, being
greatly coveted for red morocco sword-sheaths.
Oubi was reclining on a stretcher, in a circular earthen-floored hut,
thirty feet in diameter. Although it was the middle of August there
was a fire in the apartment, and Mr Parkyns was almost blinded by
the wood smoke. When he was able to see, he beheld “a rather good-
looking, slight-made man, of about forty-five years of age, with bushy
hair, which was fast turning grey. His physiognomy did not at all
prepossess me in his favour. It struck me as indicative of much
cunning, pride, and falsity; and I judged him to be a man of some
talent, but with more of the fox than the lion in his nature. Our
presents were brought in, covered with cloths, and carried by our
servants. They consisted of a Turkey rug, two European light-cavalry
swords, four pieces of muslin for turbans, and two or three yards of
red cloth for a cloak. He examined each article as it was presented to
him, making on almost every one some complimentary remark. After
having inspected them all, he said, ‘God return it to you,’ and ordered
his steward to give us a cow.” The cow proved to be what a Far West
trapper would call very “poor bull”—a mere bag of bones, which
would never have fetched two dollars in the market (the value of a fat
cow in Abyssinia varies from 8s. to 12s. 6d.); but, such as it was, the
taste of meat was welcome to the hungry travellers, who devoured
the beast the same day they received it, so that by nightfall not an
eatable morsel was left. Oubi made a better acknowledgment of their
gifts by settling their difficulty with the chief of the customhouse, and
not long after this Mr Parkyns parted from Messrs Bell and Plowden,
their routes no longer lying together. “I prepared for a journey into
Addy Abo, a province on the northern frontier of Tigrè, then so little
known as not to be placed on any map. My principal object in going
there was the chase, and if possible to learn something of the
neighbouring Barea or Shangalla—a race totally unknown, except by
the reputation they have gained in many throat-cutting visits paid to
the Abyssinians.” When recording his parting from his two friends,
both of whom he believes to be still in Abyssinia, he intimates his
intention of revisiting that country. “It is not improbable,” he says,
“that we three may meet again, and do what we have often done
before—eat a raw beef-steak, and enjoy it for the sake of good
company.”
The road to Addy Abo took Mr Parkyns through Axum, the capital
of that part of Abyssinia until supplanted by Adoua. Axum contains a
tolerably well-built church, probably of Portuguese construction, and
some neatly-built huts, whilst broken columns and pedestals tell of
the civilisation of former ages. It possesses, moreover, a beautiful
obelisk and a very remarkable sycamore tree, “both of great height,
the latter remarkable for the extraordinary circumference of its
trunk, and the great spread of its branches, which cast their dark
shade over a space of ground sufficient for the camp of the largest
caravan. The principal obelisk is carved on the south side, as if to
represent a door, windows, cornices, &c.; whilst, under the
protecting arms of the venerable tree, stand five or six smaller ones,
without ornament, most of which have considerably deviated from
the perpendicular. Altogether they form a very interesting family
party.” Judging from the present book, antiquarian researches have
not much interest for Mr Parkyns, whose sympathies are with the
living, his pleasures in the field and forest, and who seems more of a
sportsman than of a student. It would be unfair, however, not to
mention, that whilst enjoying himself in his own peculiar ways (and
some of his ways certainly were extremely peculiar), he kept less
selfish aims in view, and exerted himself to make collections of
objects of natural history, of costumes, arms, and other curiosities,
besides investigating the history and geography of the country. His
collections were on a very large scale: unfortunately some went
astray upon the road; others, left for years in warehouses, and ill
cared for by those to whom they were consigned, were plundered of
their most precious specimens. The latter was the case with his first
great shipment, of more than twelve hundred birds, sent to England
by way of Hamburg. Rats and moths destroyed the contents of
another case, left by mistake for four years at Aden; and another,
containing arms, silver-mounted ornaments, and zoological
specimens, its owner supposes to be either at Bombay, Calcutta, or in
some warehouse of the Transit Company in Egypt. These losses are
the more to be deplored, that they comprised that of many extremely
rare specimens of birds and monkeys, some of them from regions
into which it is probable that no European traveller ever before
penetrated. To make sure of not losing his collection made in Nubia
and on the White Nile, Mr Parkyns himself went out to fetch it, and
never lost sight of it till he had it safe at home. It consisted of six
hundred birds, and of about a ton weight of negro arms and
implements. He was still more unfortunate in geographical than in
zoological matters, having lost the whole of the observations, maps,
&c. made during his long residence in Tigrè.
The Great Gondar road, along which Mr Parkyns travelled for
some distance after quitting Axum, bears about the same
resemblance to a civilised European highway that Oubi’s smoky
cabin bears to the Louvre or the Escurial. High-roads in Abyssinia
are mere tracks worn by passage. “The utmost labour bestowed on
any road in that country is, when some traveller, vexed with a thorn
that may happen to scratch his face, draws his sword and cuts off the
spray. Even this is rarely done. An Abyssinian’s maxim is, ‘I may not
pass by this way for a year again; why should I give myself trouble for
other people’s convenience?’ The road, however, here as in many
parts of Tigrè, is abundantly watered by several tolerably copious
streams, which flow all the year round. These are most useful to the
numerous merchants who pass constantly between Gondar, Adoua,
and the Red Sea, with large caravans of laden animals, offering not
only ready means for watering their cattle, but often green food for
them near the banks, when all the rest of the country is parched up
and dry, and a cool grassy bed for their own weary limbs to repose
upon.” Hereupon Mr Parkyns breaks out into rapturous laudation of
life in the wilderness, and advises his readers to shoulder their rifles,
abandon civilised diggings, and take a few months’ roughing and
hardship in a hot climate. Only in such a life, he maintains, is real
happiness and enjoyment to be found. His arguments are as original
as his book. The principle that he goes upon is, that one enjoys
nothing thoroughly until one has suffered from privation of it. Shade,
a patch of grass, a stream of water, a cloud, are treasures in Africa,
whilst in England they are unheeded, because easily obtainable. A
draught of water in the desert, albeit dirty or tar-flavoured, is more
precious than the choicest Tokay in epicurean blasé Europe; a piece
of scorched gazelle and an ill-baked loaf, made by putting a red-hot
stone into the middle of a lump of dough, form a repast more
luxurious, when hunger and exercise supply the sauce, than ever was
placed before royal gourmet by the most renowned of France’s
cooks. There is not much fruit in Abyssinia—but, oh! for a good raw
onion for luncheon! Scenting some of those fragrant bulbs, greedy
Parkyns, during his residence in the “Happy Valley” of Rohabaita,
once ran two miles up a hill, in the heat of the day. How he enjoyed
himself in that pleasant province of Rohabaita, hard by the banks of
the Mareb, where he abode nine months, and to which he feels
disposed to devote many chapters! He had the good fortune, he says,

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The Belt and Road Initiative in

South–South Cooperation: The Impact

The impact of China&#x02019;s One Belt One Road

Love and Trade War: China and the U.S. in Historical

Rethinking the Silk Road: China’s Belt and Road

China’s Globalization and the Belt and Road Initiative

A Legal Analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative:

International Flows in the Belt and Road Initiative

A New Blue Ocean A New Blue Ocean Prospects For Latin

The Palgrave Handbook of Globalization with Chinese

The Impact on World Trade

The Belt and Road

ISBN 978-981-16-6356-7 ISBN 978-981-16-6357-4 (eBook)

On a visit to the Macao Museum, we would be surprised by the exhibi-

1 Macao Museum, 2021, “Reminiscences of the Silk Road—Exhibition of Cultural

countries continued to have fragile economies aggravated by increased

2 Sheng, L. (2012) Dealing with Financial Risks of International Capital Flows: A

and BRI countries and their characterization as Multilateral Development

Macao, China Li Sheng

1 The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The South-South

3 The BRI and Its Economic Corridors: Opportunities

Chart 1.1 China’s Foreign Aid in three categories, 2013–2018

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

South-South Cooperation refers to technical cooperation among devel-

Based on the mentioned definitions given by different branches of

2 UNOSSC. About South-South and Triangular Cooperation.

for common development.” Lately, at the beginning of 2021, amid the

alternative path to develop by more countries in the Global South.10

1.2 The Development of SSC:

10 Sheng, L. (2014a). Capital controls and international development: A theoretical

(1) The Emergence: 1945–1950s

11 Cabana, S. L. (2014). Chronology and history of South-South Cooperation. coopera-

(2) The Boom: 1970s–1980s

12 The Group of 77, About the Group of 77. https://www.g77.org/doc/.

(3) Stagnation: 1980s–1990s

(4) Resurgence: After the 2000s

16 Sheng, L. (2011). Theorising free capital mobility: The perspective of developing

donors and recipients. Second, it offered new modes of development

1.2.2 China’s Role in SSC

1. The Chinese government always bases itself on the principle of equality

particular technical assistance, the Chinese government will see to it that

These principles are still fundamental in China’s relation with coun-

23 People’s Republic of China. (2011). China’s foreign aid. State Council.

Third World independence movement. Since that moment, the UN and

Cooperation Forum, and the Forum on Economic and Trade Coopera-

1.2.3 The Challenges of SSC

(1) The Internal Challenges

27 People’s Republic of China. (2011). China’s foreign aid. State Council.

three groups according to their economic performance in the last decade.

(2) The External Challenges: Under the Shadow of the Global

the background of privatized public services, developed countries’ atti-

the following years, “assistance” and “development” were shown to be

1.3 The BRI: A Chance for SSC Resurgence?

involving infrastructure, finance, trade, policy coordination, and people-

39 A term employed by the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) to

strong state independent of international capital and political manipu-

1.3.2 Cooperation Between the BRI and SSC: Development

The BRI is regarded as an opportunity for SSC to revive in the

43 Wang, H. The Economy of Rising China.

inequalities within and among countries, creating positive economic exter-

Supporting Development Assistance Programs of Multilateral Organiza-

The BRI structure presents the challenge of integrating Eurasia and

The impact of China’s One Belt One Road