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The Bounds of
Transcendental
Logic
Dennis Schulting
The Bounds of Transcendental Logic
Dennis Schulting
The Bounds
of Transcendental
Logic
Dennis Schulting
Bavaria, Germany
ISBN 978-3-030-71283-9 ISBN 978-3-030-71284-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71284-6
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
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illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
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For Cristiana
Acknowledgements
Permission to use previously published material in the present volume is

hereby acknowledged for (sections from) the following journal articles,
which appear here in substantially revised form: Kant’s Idealism: The
Current Debate. In Kant’s Idealism. New Interpretations of a Controversial
Doctrine, ed. D. Schulting and J. Verburgt, 1–25. Dordrecht: Springer,
2011; Kant’s Idealism and Phenomenalism. A Critical Notice of Lucy
Allais’s Manifest Reality. Kant’s Idealism and His Realism. Studi kantiani
XXX (2017): 191–202; and Gaps, Chasms and Things in Themselves: A
Reply to My Critics. Kantian Review 23(1) (2018): 131–143. Chap. 2
was published in Dutch in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 80(2)(2018): 337–346.
A section in Chap. 5 has been translated and revised from the Dutch
original that was published, as part of a larger article, in Tijdschrift voor
Filosofie 80(2) (2018): 363–378. I again thank Christian Onof for kindly
agreeing to read and comment on the penultimate draft. I also thank
Henny Blomme, Anil Gomes, Alexandra Newton, and Robert Watt for
their thoughtful critiques of a range of themes from my Kant’s Radical
Subjectivism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), which were published as part of
book symposia in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, Kantian Review and Critique
respectively, and which solicited the replies that can be found across some
of the chapters in this volume.
vii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Notes 7
References 8
Part I The Metaphysics of Transcendental Idealism and

Conceivability 9
2 Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism 11

Notes 22
References 23
3 Transcendental Idealism and the Metaphysical Two-

Aspect Interpretation 25
3.1 Introduction 25
3.2 Metaphysical Two-Aspect Readings and Allais’s Middle
Course 31
3.3 Two-Aspect Readings and Cross-Boundary Identity 36
Notes 40
References 43
ix
x Contents
4 Transcendental Idealism and Phenomenalism 47

4.1 Phenomenalism Revisited 47
4.2 Kant’s Elephant in the Room: Problems with Allais’s
Refutation of Phenomenalism 53
4.3 The Extreme Phenomenalistic Interpretation 63
4.3.1 Phenomena as Sense Impressions and the
Supersensible 65
4.3.2 The Distinction Between the Phenomenal and
Noumenal Worlds 71
Notes 74
References 75
5 Phenomenalism, Conceivability, and Epistemic Humility 77

5.1 Strawson on the Self-Reflexiveness of Experience 77
5.2 Strawson on Phenomenalism 80
5.3 Radical Subjectivism, Conceivability, and Epistemic
Humility 83
5.4 Epistemic Humility and the Existence of Things in
Themselves 87
5.5 Conclusion 93
Notes 94
References 95
Part II The Intimacy Between the Logic of Thought and the

Thought of an Object 97
6 The Unity of Cognition, or, How to Read the Leitfaden

(A79) 99
6.1 Introduction 99
6.2 The ‘Additive’/‘Disjunctivist’ Theory of Cognition and
Kant’s Deduction 101
6.3 The Three ‘Puzzles’ in Relation to the Transcendental
Deduction106
Contents xi
6.4 The Relation Between Sensibility and the

Understanding107
6.5 Ways of Reading the Goal of the B-Deduction 111
6.5.1 A Restrictive or Non-Restrictive View of
Subjectivity112
6.5.2 Two-Stage or Anti-Two-Stage 113
6.5.3 The Sense(s) of ‘Anschauung’ 116
6.5.4 One or Two Kinds of Unity? 120
6.6 Two Kinds of Synthesis? On How to Read the
‘Leitfaden’ Passage (A79) 128
6.7 Concluding Remarks 134
Notes135
References138
7 Transcendental Logic and the Logic of Thought141

7.1 The Highest Point of ‘Even the Whole of Logic’ and
Contradictory Thoughts 142
7.2 Contradictory Thoughts and the Unity of
Consciousness152
Notes157
References158
8 Once More Unto the Breach: The Derivation of the

Categories From a Principle159
Notes170
References170
9 Categorial Necessity and Categorial Illusion171

9.1 Introduction 172
9.2 Categorial Necessity and Bridging the Gap of the
B-Deduction172
9.3 Necessary Instantiation and Categorial Illusion 175
9.4 Categorial Misapplication in Metaphysical Statements 180
Notes183
References184
xii Contents
10 A Last Remark on Objective Validity185

10.1 Introduction 185
10.2 Intuition and Object-Reference 186
10.3 General and Objective Validity 190
Notes195
References196
Index199
Key to Abbreviations of Kant’s Works
Throughout this book the abbreviations listed below are used for refer-
ence to Kant’s works. The abbreviations are followed by the volume and
page numbers (and sometimes line numbers) of the respective volume in
the Akademie edition (AA) of Kant’s work (Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften.
Berlin: De Gruyter, 1900–) in which the cited work appears. However,
for the Critique of Pure Reason the standard way of citation by means of
reference to the pagination of the A- and B-edition is adhered to.
All English language quotations from Kant’s works in this book are
from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. P. Guyer
and A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–), except
for the Prolegomena, which is sometimes used in the Ellington/Carus edi-
tion (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977). Where I used a different translation
from the Cambridge, I have indicated so. Where a translation was not
available, I provided my own.
AA Kants Gesammelte Schriften, ed. königlich preußische

(deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin, 1900–
A/B Critique of Pure Reason, first (1781) and second
(1787) edition
Anth Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (AA 7)
Corr Correspondence (AA 10–13)
xiv Key to Abbreviations of Kant’s Works
FM What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany

Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? (Prize
Essay) (AA 20)
KpV Critique of Practical Reason (AA 5)
Log Jäsche Logik (AA 9)
MAdN Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (AA 4)
PND Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicæ nova
dilucidatio (AA 1)
Prol Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (AA 4)
Refl Reflexionen (AA 14–19)
UD Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of
Natural Theology and Morality (AA 2)
ÜE On a Discovery Whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason
is to be Made Superfluous by an Older One (AA 8)
V-Met/Volckmann Volckmann Metaphysics Lectures (AA 28)
1
Introduction
Abstract In Chap. 1, I introduce the theme of the book and delineate

the content of the following chapters. One of the central themes of this
book is the idea that transcendental logic and transcendental idealism go
together, and that the logic of thought that is the ground of possible
knowledge of objects entails epistemic humility about how the world is
in itself. The humility is not a detachable add-on to the logic of possible
knowledge, but follows directly from the conceivability thesis, namely
the Strawsonian core idea that the self of experience and the object of
experience are reciprocal elements of the same ‘limiting framework of all
our thought about the world and experience of the world’, which dictates
what we can conceivably know about objective reality. This shows what it
means to be able to think about objects if we are able to think at all.
Transcendental idealism is the framework from within which objects can
be seen as in principle intelligible. It constitutes the bounds of transcen-
dental logic.
The majority of the essays in this volume pivot around themes that are
central to the thrust of my interpretation of Kant’s Deduction including
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

D. Schulting, The Bounds of Transcendental Logic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71284-6_1
2 D. Schulting
the so-called ‘metaphysical deduction’—which I expounded in my earlier

books Kant’s Deduction From Apperception (Schulting 2012, Schulting
2018 [rev. edition]) and Kant’s Radical Subjectivism (Schulting 2017)—
except for the Chaps 3–5, which focus on the topic of idealism. Those
two groups of themes, Kant’s Deduction and idealism, are nonetheless
inextricably related. Unlike many commentators, I believe Kant’s tran-
scendental idealism is not severable from his transcendental logic, which
however does not imply that the logic entails his theory of space, often
seen as intrinsically related to his idealism. (Of course, the theory of space
is an additional necessary condition of empirical knowledge of objects.)
One of the central themes of this book is the idea that transcendental
logic and transcendental idealism go together, and that the logic of
thought that is the ground of possible knowledge of objects entails epis-
temic humility about how the world is in itself. The humility is not a
detachable add-on to the logic of possible knowledge, but follows directly
from the conceivability thesis, namely the Strawsonian core idea that the
self of experience and the object of experience are reciprocal elements of
the same ‘limiting framework of all our thought about the world and
experience of the world’ (Strawson 1968:15), which dictates what we can
conceivably know about objective reality. This is not tantamount to epis-
temological relativism. Rather, it shows what it means to be able to think
about objects if we are able to think at all. Transcendental idealism is the
framework from within which objects can be seen as in principle intelli-
gible. It constitutes the bounds of transcendental logic.
Chap. 2 can be seen as a capsule account of my interpretation of Kant’s
argument in the Deduction and its relation to idealism, and thus serves
as a good introduction to my general interpretative approach to that
notorious difficult chapter of the Critique. As such, it forms a succinct
preview of the more detailed arguments of the remainder of the book. In
this chapter, I explain why for Kant self-consciousness is intimately
related to objectivity, how this intimacy translates to real objects, what it
means to make judgements about objects, and, importantly, what ideal-
ism has got to do with all of this. It thus shows why transcendental logic
and transcendental idealism are really two sides of the same transcenden-
tal coin. This problematic forms the transition to the remainder of Part I,
in which I address various topical issues surrounding Kant’s much
1 Introduction 3
misunderstood doctrine of idealism, especially problems concerning the

current metaphysical two-aspect interpretation (Chap. 3) and the persist-
ing spectre of phenomenalism (Chaps 4–5). As to the latter issue, I delve
into one older (P.F. Strawson 1968) and two more recent (Lucy Allais
2015, Emanuel Rutten 2020) readings of Kant as a phenomenalist. I
believe Kant is indeed a phenomenalist, as Strawson and Rutten do, but
unlike them, I do not think his phenomenalism is a straightforward one,
that is, amounting to the theory according to which objects are con-
structed out of sense data, a reading that goes back to H.A. Prichard
(1909). Allais dismisses phenomenalist readings of Kant’s idealism in all
their varieties, but in Chap. 4 I provide several reasons for why we should
not throw the baby out with the bathwater. I also show how an extreme
phenomenalist interpretation of Kant, such as Rutten’s, fails to acknowl-
edge Kant’s fundamental empirical realism about objects.
In Chap. 5, I discuss grounds for seeing Strawson’s conceivability argu-
ment as compatible with a benign form of phenomenalism that shows
our epistemic humility with respect to knowledge of things in them-
selves. I also address the often held, but mistaken belief that on Kant’s
view things in themselves cannot be said to exist independently of our
categorial determination. Such a belief betrays a misunderstanding of the
function of the category of existence as a modal category which relates
the subject of judgement to the thing that is judged about, as well as a
conflation between the de re and de dicto senses of ‘existence’. It once
again shows that transcendental logic and transcendental idealism hang
together, in intricate ways that are not always appreciated by commenta-
tors: whilst knowledge of things is constrained by our capacity for deter-
mining things as objects for our thought, implying idealism, the existence
as such of things is not dependent on our categorial determination.
Things are ideal only to the extent that they are knowable. This idealism
is not ontological, but formal or transcendental.
Part II tackles central topics from the Transcendental and Metaphysical
Deductions in the Critique of Pure Reason, the sections in the
Transcendental Analytic where Kant expounds the heart of transcenden-
tal logic.
In Chaps 6, 7, and 8, respectively, I examine three main elements of
transcendental logic: (i) the idea that there is a unity of cognition that
4 D. Schulting
reveals an intimate bond between thought and experience, between

judgement and intuition, a unity that refers back to the very capacity of
thought and its various functions; (ii) the primordiality of transcendental
logic in relation to what Kant calls general logic, which indicates that
transcendental logic is a metaphysical logic that concerns the very condi-
tions of the capacity for thinking; and (iii) the closeness of the forms or
functions of thought and the categories of experience, which points to
the logical or a priori derivability of the categories from the capacity of
thought or the understanding itself. These three elements show transcen-
dental logic to be a metaphysical logic.
In Chap. 6, in the context of a critique of James Conant’s (2016)
important new reading of the main argument of the Deduction, I present
my current, most detailed interpretation of the well-known Leitfaden
passage at A79, which in my view has been misinterpreted by a host of
prominent readers. The Leitfaden passage is crucial to understanding the
argument of, not just the so-called Metaphysical Deduction, but also the
Transcendental Deduction. This new account expands and improves
upon the account of the Leitfaden I gave in Chap. 5 of Kant’s Deduction
From Apperception. While I agree with the core of Conant’s critique of
what he calls the ‘layer-cake’ reading of the Deduction argument, in this
new account I make clearer my position on why the unity of judgement,
in which concepts and intuitions are a priori synthetically unified, is
wholly determined in virtue of the unity of apperception as the unitary
function of the understanding, without this leading to a strong form of
conceptualism such as that of Conant and others.
In Chap. 7, I reflect on the idea, hinted at by Kant in a footnote to §16
of the B-Deduction that is not often discussed (B134n.), that transcen-
dental logic is the ground of logic as a whole. This has important reper-
cussions for the way we should see the role of transcendental logic with
respect to the question of truth as well as the nature and scope of tran-
scendental logic in relation to cognition, and in relation to general or
formal logic as such. To illustrate one of the ways in which transcendental
logic is fundamental to our way of thinking, I address an issue that is
brought up by Kant’s counterfactual claim at B132 that if a representa-
tion is not accompanied by an ‘I’ thought, it is ‘either impossible’ or at
least ‘nothing for me’, suggesting to some recent commentators that by
1 Introduction 5
the former Kant means the impossibility of thinking contradictory

thoughts. Unlike these commentators, I do not think Kant is saying here
that we cannot think contradictory thoughts. To believe he is betrays a
misunderstanding of the metaphysical nature of transcendental logic, or
so I shall argue. It is because transcendental logic is a metaphysical logic
that Kant can claim that transcendental logic grounds even the whole of
logic, including the possibility of thinking contradictory thoughts.
In Chap. 8, I once again revisit issues that have to do with Kant’s con-
troversial claim that the table of categories is derived from a principle,
which formed the basis for the account in my first book Kant’s Deduction
From Apperception (Schulting 2012, 2018 [rev. ed.]) in which I made the
case for the thesis that all of the twelve categories are derived from apper-
ception, and can be shown to be so derived by closely looking at the argu-
ments of §§16 and 17 of the B-Deduction. This can be done by means of
patiently teasing out all of the analytical implications of the first Grundsatz
of thought, namely the proposition that the ‘I think’ must be able to
accompany all my representations. It is clear from the critics’ reactions to
my interpretation that not many readers are convinced that this is what
happens, or indeed should be seen as happening, in the Deduction.1 But
this won’t blunt my own conviction, following in the footsteps of Klaus
Reich (1986, 1992), that this type of prima philosophia is exactly what
goes on in the Deduction.2 Here, in Chap. 8 in this volume, I rehearse
several arguments that I presented in my earlier books and I provide addi-
tional textual evidence for why I think my approach, despite it being the
minority reading, is the most straightforward one, and in fact the only
one which can make sense of Kant’s central claims about the role of
apperception in the deduction argument.
Chaps 9 and 10 reflect on interpretative issues that are the corollaries
of the three main elements of transcendental logic discussed in the pre-
ceding three chapters. These issues reinforce the central idea of an inextri-
cable connection between transcendental logic and transcendental
idealism. In particular, many commentators believe that the constraints
of transcendental logic, i.e. the categories, merely concern the experience
of, or judgement about, objects and that transcendental logic is not con-
stitutive of the objects themselves. Categorial determination is presumed
to hold merely for our experience of the objective world, while it cannot
6 D. Schulting
account for the constitution of the world of objects itself. In other words,
the categories do not reach the real world of objects, and Kant is said to
have failed to provide a convincing argument for the claim that they do.
In Chap. 9, I consider a particular formulation of this criticism, namely
the criticism that the fact that the categories must be applied to our expe-
rience of objects does not imply that the categories are instantiated in the
objects of our experience. In other words, it is argued that the objective
reality of the categories is not eo ipso proven in determining their neces-
sary applicability in our experience or judgements. I believe this charge of
an invalid inference or a ‘slide’ on Kant’s part rests on a misunderstanding
of the argument in the Transcendental Deduction and a failure to under-
stand the implication of transcendental idealism in that argument, that
is, a failure to understand the conceptual intimacy between thought and
the thought of an object in terms of objective reference (Chap. 6). This
misunderstanding is also reflected in the way that the notion of objective
validity is consistently misinterpreted as having to do with the truth value
of a judgement, rather than with the truth of our cognitive claims, again
suggesting that the categories, which determine objective validity, do not
concern the objects, but merely our representation, experience, or judge-
ment of them. I reconsider this aspect in Chap. 10.
More in particular, in Chap. 9, I discuss two ostensibly related issues
concerning the argument of the B-Deduction, one of which touches on
the problem of the famous so-called ‘two-steps-in-one-proof ’ reconstruc-
tion of Kant’s reasoning and the aforementioned argumentative slide
from the necessary application of the categories to our experience to the
necessary instantiation of them in the objects of our experience. In his
reply to my critique of his interpretation of categorial necessity, Anil
Gomes (2018) has rejoined that there may be more agreement between
our positions than I made it out to be, and importantly, in his view there
is still an argumentative gap in the argument that needs to be bridged,
which is where the ‘second step’ comes in. This discussion goes to the
heart of the problem of how one should evaluate the argumentative pro-
cedure in the Deduction. In response to Gomes, I elucidate further my
position on the two-step proof, and specifically what, in my view, it
1 Introduction 7
means for Kant to say that categories are necessarily instantiated in all of
our determinative judgements solely in virtue of the act of transcendental
apperception. In this context, I also address a related issue that Gomes
brings up, namely, whether there can be cases of categorial illusion, cases
for which it seems that the categories are instantiated in our judgements
but where in fact categories turn out not to be instantiated. I argue that
the idea of categorial illusion is based on a conflation of the necessary
categorial application in Kant’s (transcendental) sense and cases of empir-
ical illusion. It is therefore not something we should worry about. The
exemplification of the categories in a determinative judgement about an
object necessarily entails the exemplification of the categories in the
object of judgement.
In Chap. 10, I rehearse my thesis, argued in Schulting (2017), that
Kant’s notion of objective validity should not be confused with the truth
value of a judgement or, as I argue against suggestions made by Robert
Watt (2017) in a critique of my position, with Kant’s notion of
Allgemeingültigkeit. I provide additional textual evidence for reading
objective validity in the way I have proposed, namely as having chiefly to
do with reference to objects of experience or as Kant himself calls it,
objective reality. This once again shows that Kant’s transcendental logic is
not concerned with merely the logical rules for valid thinking but rather
with the conditions for the possibility of true reference to objects. It con-
cerns a metaphysical logic about objective thought and experience.
Notes
1. See Dyck (2014), Howell (2018), Land (2018), Stephenson (2014), and
Watt (2017); see my reaction to Dyck and Stephenson in Schulting
(2014, 2017, Chap. 2).
2. Quarfood (2014) is more positive than my other critics; see also
Blomme (2018).
8 D. Schulting
References
Allais, L. (2015). Manifest Reality. Kant’s Idealism and His Realism. Oxford
University Press.
Blomme, H. (2018). Over de radicaliteit van Kants theoretische filosofie. Enkele
aanmerkingen bij Dennis Schultings Kant’s Radical Subjectivism. Tijdschrift
voor Filosofie, 80(2), 341–353.
Conant, J. (2016). Why Kant Is Not a Kantian. Philosophical Topics,
44(1), 75–125.
Dyck, C. (2014). The Function of Derivation and the Derivation of Functions:
A Review of Schulting’s Kant’s Deduction and Apperception. Studi kantiani
XXVII, 69–75.
Gomes, A. (2018). Minding the Gap: Subjectivism and the Deduction. Kantian
Review, 23(1), 99–109.
Howell, R. (2018). Deduction Difficulties. Kantian Review, 23(1), 111–121.
Land, T. (2018). Review of D. Schulting, Kant’s Deduction and Apperception.
Explaining the Categories. Kantian Review, 23(1), 145–151.
Prichard, H. A. (1909). Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. Clarendon Press.
Quarfood, M. (2014). A Note on Schulting’s Derivation of Contingency. Studi
kantiani, XXVII, 87–93.
Reich, K. (1986). Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel (3rd ed.). Meiner.
Reich, K. (1992). The Completeness of Kant’s Table of Judgments, trans. J. Kneller
& M. Losonsky. Stanford University Press.
Rutten, E. (2020). Contra Kant. Herwonnen ruimte voor transcendentie.
Kok Kampen.
Schulting, D. (2012). Kant’s Deduction and Apperception. Explaining the
Categories. Palgrave Macmillan.
Schulting, D. (2014). Kant’s Deduction From Apperception. A Reply to My
Critics. Studi kantiani, XXVII, 95–118.
Schulting, D. (2017). Kant’s Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental
Deduction. Palgrave Macmillan.
Schulting, D. (2018). Kant’s Deduction From Apperception. An Essay on the
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories (rev. ed.). De Gruyter.
Stephenson, A. (2014). A Deduction from Apperception? Studi kantiani,
XXVII, 77–85.
Strawson, P. F. (1968). The Bounds of Sense, 2nd printing. Methuen.
Watt, R. (2017). Robert Watt on Dennis Schulting’s Kant’s Radical Subjectivism.
Critique (November issue). https://virtualcritique.wordpress.com/2017/11/07/
robert-watt-on-dennis-schultings-kants-radical-subjectivism/
Part I
The Metaphysics of Transcendental
Idealism and Conceivability
2
Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism
Abstract Chap. 2 can be seen as a capsule account of my interpretation

of Kant’s argument in the Deduction and its relation to idealism, and
thus serves as a good introduction to my general interpretative approach
to that notorious difficult chapter of the Critique. As such, it forms a suc-
cinct preview of the more detailed arguments of the remainder of the
book. In this chapter, I explain why for Kant self-consciousness is inti-
mately related to objectivity, how this intimacy translates to real objects,
what it means to make judgements about objects, and, importantly, what
idealism has got to do with all of this. It thus shows why transcendental
logic and transcendental idealism are really two sides of the same tran-
scendental coin.
In a key passage in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the

A-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant poses the following
question:
What does one mean […] if one speaks of an object corresponding to and
therefore also distinct from the cognition? (A104)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71284-6_2
12 D. Schulting
One would think that it is obvious to suppose that the object of which
we claim knowledge, which corresponds to it, exists independently and
regardless of that claim. The being of the object does not depend on our
knowledge and must therefore be strictly distinguished from it. But
Kant’s question goes beyond distinguishing between the necessary condi-
tions under which we can claim knowledge of an object and the ostensi-
bly quite separate question concerning the constitutive or ontological
conditions for the independent existence of the object. This distinction
reflects the traditional distinction between an epistemological question,
which concerns knowledge, and a metaphysical question, which is about
the being or existence of things. Kant asks a more fundamental question:
What do we actually mean by ‘object’? This question goes beyond both a
purely metaphysical and a purely epistemological question because it is
precisely about determining what we mean by the notion ‘object’ before
we can even formulate any specific knowledge claims about any arbitrary
given object and assess their truth conditions.
In his analysis in the Deduction, Kant wants to make visible some-
thing more formal that would remain implicit if we were to take the
object too concretely, as merely an empirically given thing that presents
itself to us. If we were to consider the object merely as an empirically
given thing, we would never be able to gather more than random infor-
mation about it. This formal aspect concerns the way in which we relate
to an object at all. To make this element visible, we must take a certain
reflective distance from the concrete object we experience. The concept of
‘object’ itself already expresses a certain reflexiveness, as Kant suggests (cf.
A103–104). In his analysis in the Deduction Kant highlights this reflex-
ive element in order to be able to elucidate what it actually means to talk
about an object and, in a more concrete sense, in fact first to be able to
have experience of it and make judgements about it.
What is revealed in such a formal analysis is what Kant understands by
the so-called transcendental conditions of possibility for both the experi-
ence of an object and the object of experience, namely the conditions that
govern the domain of possible experience. He links this to the possibility
of synthetic a priori judgements, judgements that are neither purely ana-
lytical—that is, judgements whose truth can be deduced from the analy-
sis of the concepts contained therein—nor a posteriori empirical
judgements. These synthetic a priori judgements are not concrete judge-

ments in the usual sense of the word but express the fundamental prin-
ciples that make it possible to speak of an object of experience in the first
place, to judge about it. They are principles that play in the background
of our ordinary judgements of experience. These synthetic a priori judge-
ments declare that under certain rules that Kant names categories objects
can first be known as objects, and at the same time these categories are
constitutive of the object itself, qua object. Kant writes at the beginning
of the Analytic of Principles:
In this way synthetic a priori judgments are possible, if we relate the formal
conditions of a priori intuition, the synthesis of imagination, and its neces-
sary unity in a transcendental apperception to a possible cognition of expe-
rience in general, and say: The conditions of the possibility of experience in
general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of
experience, and on this account have objective validity in a synthetic judg-
ment a priori. (B197/A158)
To return to the above-cited passage from the A-Deduction, Kant answers

the question as follows:
It is easy to see that this object must be thought of only as something in

general = X, since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could
set over against this cognition as corresponding to it. (A104)
Kant denies here that the object of which we claim knowledge is given
outside of our cognition. Instead, the object of knowledge is only ‘some-
thing in general = X’. In a sense, the object of knowledge is internalised
in thought, that is, it is a function of thought. In the following passage,
Kant indeed repeats that we are dealing only with our representations and
that the ‘X which corresponds to them (the object)—because it [i.e. the
object] is something that should be distinct from our representations—is
nothing for us [and] the unity that the object makes necessary can be
nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis
of the manifold of the representations’ (A105, translation emended). He
continues: ‘Hence we say that we cognize the object if we have effected
14 D. Schulting
synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition.’ The questions that arise are:
What is correspondence? How is distinction taken account of? To what
extent does a correspondence theory of truth still play a role in Kant? I
cannot deal with these questions in any detail here, but it seems clear that
for Kant correspondence between representation and object should not
be understood as a relation of some sort between, on the one hand, an
absolutely inner self and, on the other, an absolutely externally
given object.
The claim that an object is when we have effected a unity among our
representations does not mean to say, however, that the thing that we
know something objective about is also ‘generated’ by our thinking, by
the unity of consciousness, in terms of its existence. The thing that, inso-
far as it is an object of experience, is as an object for the knower and is
‘something in general = X’, is itself, qua existing in itself, of course not
internalised. As is well-known, Kant makes a distinction between the
appearance of a thing and the thing in itself. It is the appearance of a thing
that Kant identifies with the object of knowledge. We can know only the
appearance of a thing, and not the thing in itself, which remains indepen-
dent of the knowing subject (I come back to this distinction in detail in
the course of Part I). Objects are therefore in some very specific sense
distinct—at least conceptually, if not numerically—from things in them-
selves. By contrast, the traditional conception of true knowledge is that
our true judgements about things actually correspond to the things that
are independent of our judgements and therefore have an in-itself-nature
independently and regardless of our judgements (which is expressed in
the correspondence theory of truth). How else could our judgements be
true of things if they did not correspond to the things as they are in
themselves?
Importantly, Kant is not so much interested in the question of truth
per se, that is to say, the standard question of the logical conditions under
which a certain judgement a is F is true or false, or what the truth value
of our judgements is, nor in the question about which other necessary
but non-logical conditions must be met so that a certain judgement is
true. He is rather interested in a deeper aspect of the relation between
judgement and the object of judgement, whereby judgement should be
interpreted here as a synthetic judgement.1 Kant therefore speaks of the
question of transcendental truth. What makes it possible for me to attri-

bute, truly or falsely, a predicate a to an underlying object, the ‘X’ that
Kant speaks of in the above-quoted passage in A104 (and by means of a
also another predicate F, G, etc.)? What is at issue here is the primordial
relation to the object as such in any arbitrary judgement about an arbi-
trary given object or objective event, namely the original orientation to
the object or object-directedness—regardless of the question whether
attributing any arbitrary predicates a and F to any object leads to a true
or false judgement about same object. This deeper relation to the object,
which is indicated by the adjective ‘transcendental’, expresses the objective
validity of an arbitrary empirical judgement about a given object.
Objective validity is the fundamental ground that enables us first to make
a (true or false) judgement about a given object at all. For Kant, therefore,
objective validity is the characteristic of judgement as such.2
But what exactly is it that determines objective validity? How does
objective validity come about if it does not lie in the correspondence per
se between, on the one hand, judgement or our understanding, and, on
the other hand, the thing that is to be distinguished from it and that has
an independent existence in itself, let alone that the object or thing itself
is the so-called truthmaker? And does the uncoupling of objective valid-
ity as the fundamental orientation to the object from the traditionally
conceived correspondence relation between intellect and thing not pre-
cisely lead to a gap between our conceptuality and reality? Does Kant’s
approach to the question of truth as representation-internal not run the
risk of a hopeless idealism, whereby we are forever locked into our own
ideas and our own mental ‘reality’? In other words, is there not the risk of
an epistemological relativism according to which only our own ideas and
judgements are objective and the ‘really real’ cannot be reached?
In Schulting (2017), against the background of current discussions in
contemporary analytical Kant research, I argued that Kant is a radical
subjectivist in the sense that the objective application rules for our con-
cepts are purely a function of the capacity to judge, given the fact that we
are sensory beings who receive impressions from the outside, from the
things themselves. Our sensibility is of course a necessary condition of
possible empirical knowledge of objects, but sensibility is not determina-
tive in the sense Kant means; only our capacity to judge determines what
16 D. Schulting
knowledge and an object of knowledge is. The radical-subjective element

lies, more specifically, in the fact that our capacity to judge is defined by
what Kant calls transcendental apperception. Apperception is the prin-
ciple of self-awareness and makes it possible for me to be aware of myself
as the person who has certain representations. But apperception is not
merely the principle of self-awareness, as if this should be seen in contrast
to the consciousness of objects.
The radical claim that Kant makes—and which I explained in detail in
my previous monographs (Schulting 2017, 2018, 2021)—is the claim
that the act of transcendental apperception, which is an act of the synthe-
sis of all my representations, does not concern the apprehension of a
random series of representations that I happen to have (more accurately,
which are occurrent in the mind); rather, transcendental apperception
establishes the objective unity among those representations that I regard
as mine. The rules for a priori synthesis that enable such an objective
unity among my representations are the categories. The categories are the
various, very general modes—twelve to be exact—in which that unity
among my representations obtains, in such a way that these representa-
tions are identical to each other insofar as they count as all my representa-
tions qua combined, namely, those representations that I apprehend as
mine. Kant calls this unity the original synthetic unity of apperception,
which is the unity of the thinking subject that takes a series of representa-
tions together as his own. Kant speaks of this act of apperception as an act
of accompanying by the ‘I think’. The unity of the act of apperception is
the original ground of unity among representations that are accompanied
by this ‘I think’.
The identity of this thinking subject, the ‘I’ of the ‘I think’ that unites
its representations, is at the same time the identity of the whole of unified
representations accompanied by the same subject, that is, the same ‘I’.
This unified whole of representations forms a something, an object in gen-
eral, for that subject. What is termed ‘object’ thus lies in the way in which
the thinking subject takes his representations as an identical whole that is
as an object for that same subject. That is why Kant calls the transcenden-
tal unity of apperception an objective unity of apperception, and why he
defines object as ‘that in the concept of which the manifold of a given
intuition is united’ (B137): the unity of apperception maps exactly onto
the unity of the manifold in the intuition. There is an element of neces-

sity or invariance in the act of apperception that is not already contained
in the flow of the separate representations as such (cf. A107). This ele-
ment ensures that the representations are not merely subjectively valid
representations of an arbitrary representer, arranged in a haphazard way.
Because it is a necessary connection between representations, the objec-
tive unity of apperception, which expresses the unity of the twelve cate-
gories of experience, is always the unity of a thinking subject’s judgement,
which has the basic character of a is F—in contrast to a contingent
sequence of variant, separate representations that any representer might
have. For Kant, the thinking subject is always the judging, cognising,
self-conscious subject. The objective unity of apperception is therefore
the definition of judgement in terms of a cognitive unity of representa-
tions and expresses the unity of the predicates a and F in relation to the
underlying object that the judgement a is F is about. In short, the objec-
tive unity of apperception in a judgement in fact defines what an object
is, qua that in which predicates a and F are necessarily united insofar as
they are attributes of some thing x. This expresses the fundamental, inti-
mate identity relation between thought and object, between judgement
and object, without there having to be an inexplicable relation that is
external to an object outside of its representation.
But how can an identity relation between thought and object in a
judgement establish the relation to a real empirical object? Kant makes a
fundamental distinction between the intuition of an object, which
expresses the immediate relationship to the given object, and the concept
which relates to the object only by means of such an intuition. But as we
have seen, in Kant’s view the relation to the object is representation-
internal; the object is nothing outside of our knowledge to which that
knowledge should correspond. Yet the objective unity of apperception is
the condition of possibility only for the object qua object, that is, it con-
stitutes its objectivity. It does not constitute the object with respect to its
existence (cf. A92/B125). That would in fact be impossible because it
would mean that thinking would generate the reality of an object in an
existential or factual sense. The condition of real possibility for knowl-
edge, that which makes knowledge true empirical knowledge, experience
18 D. Schulting
(B147), lies in sensibility because only empirical intuition provides a

direct sensory relation to the really existing object.
On the other hand, the intuition itself is also only a representation, or
a bundle of representations (sensory impressions), which, although hav-
ing a direct relation to the real thing of which we have a representation
(the x of a judgement), are not identical to that thing. We must differenti-
ate between, on the one hand, the distinction between representation and
represented and, on the other hand, the distinction between representa-
tion/represented and the thing in itself, namely the thing with all its pos-
sible predicates. In a judgement we can attribute only a limited number
of predicates to the thing judged about, and so any representation of a
thing is only a limitation of all of its possible predicates. Kant’s Copernican
turn—which states that in order to be able to analyse the possibility of
knowledge we no longer take the correspondence relation to be directed
from mind to thing, but instead must take things as they conform to us,
to our forms of knowledge—applies both to intuition, the form of our
sensibility, and to the concept, the form with which our mind works.
Although the intuition thus establishes the immediate, as yet indetermi-
nate relation to the real existing thing, the determined relation remains
representation-internal.
Here it is important to see that transcendental apperception works
both ways: it establishes unity among concepts, on the one hand, and
among representations in sensible intuition, on the other, and this hap-
pens simultaneously in judgement in virtue of one and the same deter-
mining act of synthesis (the act of apperception) that is performed by the
judging agent. Take for example the judgement This armchair is Prussian-
blue-coloured. The predicates <this armchair> and <Prussian-blue-coloured>
are connected in this judgement by the ‘copula’ (Verhältniswörtchen) ‘is’.
But the copula ‘is’ says more than just stating that predicates are linked to
each other. For a judgement always also has a modal element; it is not just
a proposition. The copula says something about the existence of the
object about which a judgement is made. The predicates <this armchair>
and <Prussian-blue-coloured> are also connected with an intuition of a
particular existing thing that falls under the subject concept which, just
in case the judgement is true, has the characteristics of being an armchair
and being Prussian-blue-coloured. In the judgement I thus perceive the
existing thing as the object with the objective properties that I attribute
to it in the judgement. That object is, of course, from a purely empirical
point of view the thing that exists independently and regardless of the
judgement. But the object qua object, or qua the determined thing with
such and such properties, is purely a function of judgement.
As we have seen, what is characteristic of Kant’s position is that our
knowledge does not consist in a direct correspondence relation between
concepts/intuition and thing. Whereas it is true to say that in Kant’s view
empirically speaking a thing existing independently of the perceiving
subject is presupposed as given for any true judgement—contrary to
what many commentators think, Kant is not concerned with proving
that such things or objects exist de re; he just takes their de re existence
for granted3—from a transcendental point of view there is nothing
beyond the judgement, that is to say, beyond the relation between con-
cepts and the underlying intuition to which the judgement corresponds
that determines the truth of my cognition. The objective validity of a
judgement about a given object o is established only in virtue of the
objective unity of apperception that connects concepts and intuition in
the judgement about o; as Kant says, ‘we say that we cognize the object if
we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition’ (A105),
confirming that the unity of apperception defines the object in the way
that we know it. This is the thesis that I have called Kant’s radical subjec-
tivism, referring to what Kant himself says, in the A-Deduction, where he
speaks about nature as a ‘whole of appearances’ (Inbegriff von
Erscheinungen), namely all possible objects of experience that can be
found only ‘in the radical faculty [dem Radikalvermögen] of all our cogni-
tion, namely, transcendental apperception’, in ‘that unity on account of
which alone it can be called object of all possible experience, i.e., nature’
(A114).4
The objective validity of an arbitrary judgement about a given empiri-
cal object is wholly constituted by the determining power of the judging,
apperceiving subject that apprehends and synthesises his representations.
This applies not only to the concepts in the judgement but also to the
sensory representations in the underlying intuition. The same subject
that combines the predicates <this armchair> and <Prussian-blue-coloured>
in the judgement This armchair is Prussian-blue-coloured at the same time
20 D. Schulting
combines the sensory perceptions of a particular given thing, the arm-

chair, to which these predicates are attributed in the judgement. Kant
expresses this in such a way that the synthesis of the intuition must be
seen as ‘the transcendental synthesis of the imagination’, whose faculty ‘is
an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application […]
to objects of the intuition that is possible for us’ (B152). So the under-
standing itself, that is to say, the thinking subject that apperceives his
representations, has, ‘under the designation [unter der Benennung] of a
transcendental synthesis of the imagination’ (B153), an effect on sensibility,
and thus it acts as a synthesis of the apprehension of representations in
sensible intuition itself. In this way the identity relation between thought
and object manifests itself as a relation that refers to an empirically per-
ceived object without it having to go beyond our representations.
It should be emphasised that what is, as it were, generated here by the
judging subject is only the necessary form of the empirical judgement,
namely the synthetic unity that combines both the concepts and the
empirical intuitions. The content of the judgement, namely, the predi-
cates themselves (in this case <this armchair> and <Prussian-blue-
coloured>) and the sensory material as such that underlies the judgement
and provides it real possibility, are wholly contingent and dependent on
all sorts of non-transcendental conditions.5 The form of judgement—the
objective unity of apperception—is necessary in the sense that it is the
necessary transcendental condition for the essential nature of a judge-
ment as an objectively valid statement about an object or objective event.
But it is also the sufficient condition for objective validity because the
object is, in terms of its objectivity, a function of that form; or more pre-
cisely, the form, namely the objective unity of apperception, defines the
object. Transcendental-logically speaking, the object does not exist out-
side the judgement, outside apperception. This is what is radically subjec-
tive about Kant’s position.
However, that does not mean, again, that the object depends on the
judgement for its actual existence, nor for its empirical characteristics, for
that matter. As I indicated earlier, Kant makes a distinction between
appearances and things in themselves. Appearances are things insofar as
we can know them as an object of our knowledge, of our judgements. An
appearance is, as Kant says (A20/B34), the indeterminate object of a
sensible intuition (the ‘x’ which I mentioned earlier) and is identical to

the object as a function of judgement insofar as that appearance is deter-
mined by the categories. ‘Existence’ is of course a category, too, but here
a distinction must be made between the fact that something exists and
establishing in virtue of applying the category ‘existence’ in a judgement
the fact that something exists (see further Chap. 5).
Kant’s radical subjectivism thus implies an idealism with respect to the
object as being in some sense dependent on our judging, but this is not
the idealism of Berkeley, say, which denies the mind-independent exis-
tence of things in themselves. Kant’s radical subjectivism ensures that we
can explain the intimate correspondence between knowledge and object
as a function of our own capacity to judge, namely the objective unity of
apperception, and that at the same time things insofar as their existence
is concerned are not reduced to being a function of our representations.
Whereas Kant’s subjectivism is thus characterised by both a metaphysical
and epistemological component—metaphysical because not only the
knowledge or experience of an object but also the knowable object itself
is a function of transcendental apperception—the thing in itself retains
its existential independence.
This in no way implies that our knowledge of objective reality is only
relative because supposedly it would not reach the things in themselves—
an oft-heard criticism, especially from Hegelians reading Kant.6 Such a
conclusion ignores the fact that the object determined by the judging
subject is the appearance of the thing itself, for that judging subject.
Although the judging subject does not know the thing as such, namely
independently of judgement, i.e. in itself, he does know the thing in the
way in which it appears to him as an object. The fact that he does not
know the thing as a thing in itself follows logically from the fact that
knowledge of something is not possible apart from the necessary condi-
tions under which such knowledge is first possible: For how can I judge
of something that it is so and so independently of judgement? Things are
therefore knowable if and only if they are subject to the necessary condi-
tions for knowledge, and they are subject to those conditions only if and
when they appear to us qua objects, not as things in themselves.
Knowledge of objects is thus possible only if the necessary a priori
conditions for knowledge of objects are met; outside of those necessary a
22 D. Schulting
priori conditions knowledge is ex hypothesi not possible, nor are objects

of knowledge, that is, objects for us, possible outside of those conditions.
This means that things in themselves, that is, things as they are indepen-
dently of the conditions under which alone they (as objects) can be
known, cannot be known as such (as things in themselves) under the
conditions under which alone objects can be known.7 Or, as Kant says in
the foreword to the B-edition of the Critique, ‘we can cognize of things a
priori only what we ourselves have put into them’ (Bxviii). This Copernican
principle ensures that things in themselves retain their absolute indepen-
dence. Does this mean that Kant’s theory of knowledge is relativist? Not
at all. Such a question betrays a misunderstanding with regard to the
transcendental question of how knowledge of an object is possible at all,
how ‘object’ is defined, and what it means to make a judgement about
an object.
Notes
1. With analytic judgements the relation to an object, an underlying x, is
otiose because irrelevant for assessing whether the judgement is true
or false.
2. Kant provides the definition for judgement in the Critique of Pure
Reason at B142; there he explicitly connects objective validity with
the nature of judgement. But it should be noted that this concerns
determinative judgements, not non-determinative, merely-reflective
judgements, such as aesthetic judgements, of which Kant speaks in
the Third Critique, nor analytic judgements, for which reference to an
underlying object is irrelevant to the understanding of their truth.
3. On the de re and de dicto senses of the category of ‘existence’, see Chap.
5, this volume.
4. For an account of this passage, see Schulting (2017:10–17, 328).
5. This should not be misunderstood as suggesting that the sensible mate-
rial is not also transcendentally determined in terms of its intensive mag-
nitude, by the understanding, in judgement. But this still concerns the
form of matter, i.e. matter qua matter, which is being determined as
a necessary element of all objective knowledge, not the factuality or the
empirical characteristics of this or that particular sense impression, or
this or that particular conceptual trait.
6. Schulting (2021, Chap. 9).

7. Of course, I can form a notion of the necessary characteristics of a thing
in itself and make claims about it—e.g. that a thing in itself cannot be
spatiotemporal. Such a judgement, however, does not relate to an actual
particular object, that is, the x of an empirical intuition that underlies
the subject-concept of a synthetic a posteriori judgement. It does not
yield empirical knowledge (empirische Erkenntnis, B147) in the sense of
the claims made in the Deduction. Further, such a judgement would still
be bound by the constraints of transcendental apperception, under
which an object in general can be thought, and so does not reach things
in themselves as such (but just explains the concept of them). See
Schulting (2017, Chap. 9).
References
Schulting, D. (2017). Kant’s Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental
Deduction. Palgrave Macmillan.
Schulting, D. (2018). Kant’s Deduction From Apperception. An Essay on the
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories (rev. ed.). De Gruyter.
Schulting, D. (2021). Apperception and Self-Consciousness in Kant and German
Idealism. Bloomsbury.
3
Transcendental Idealism
and the Metaphysical Two-Aspect
Interpretation
Abstract In Chap. 3 I address various topical issues surrounding Kant’s

much misunderstood doctrine of idealism, especially problems concern-
ing the current metaphysical two-aspect interpretation, in particular
interpretations from Lucy Allais and Cord Friebe. Topics that are dis-
cussed are the methodological reading, the nature of appearance, its rela-
tion to things in themselves and cross-boundary identity.
3.1 Introduction
In the last century much has been written about Kant’s controversial doc-
trine of idealism and the problems surrounding the distinction between
appearance and thing in itself. Notably, the great Kant scholar Erich
Adickes dedicated a whole book to the topic, entitled Kant und das Ding
an sich, published in 1924 (Adickes 1924), in which all the relevant pas-
sages in Kant’s entire work were canvassed that dealt, implicitly or explic-
itly, with idealism or the transcendental distinction between appearance
and thing in itself. For Adickes, it was in any case beyond doubt that the
notion of things in themselves referred to Kant’s commitment to a

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71284-6_3
26 D. Schulting
thoroughgoing realism and the mind-independence of the things that we

cognise.1 Fifty years on, in 1974, came the seminal work by Gerold
Prauss, Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich (Prauss 1974), whose
specifically non-metaphysical reading of the distinction between appear-
ances and things in themselves, and the apparent solving of a few riddles
that such a reading yields (e.g. the problem of noumenal causality), has
found, in the Anglophone world, an ally of sorts in Henry Allison, who
with his already classic Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation
and Defense (Allison 1983, 2004) defended the idea, against the predomi-
nant view that existed previously in English language Kant scholarship,
that the nature of Kant’s idealism should be seen in the light of his
epistemology.
According to Allison, drawing on Prauss’s work, Kant’s idealism does
not commit Kant to any speculative metaphysics or ontology that lies
beyond the limits of knowledge. This view of Kant’s idealism has since
come to be known as the epistemological or methodological reading,2
which foregrounds the perspectival change brought about by the tran-
scendental turn and thus the way that issues of realism, and a fortiori the
status of things an sich, should henceforth be regarded. Allison empha-
sises the thought that to regard objects from the perspective of their nec-
essary conceptual or, as he initially put it, epistemic conditions is precisely
not to regard them from the perspective of their being qua things in them-
selves, from which the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction must be
understood to derive. Allison has been accused of presenting an anodyne
interpretation of the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction (Langton
1998:9), as it ostensibly yields a mere tautology that cannot be what Kant
had intended by making the distinction.3 But, although the way Allison
presented his views in the first edition of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism
could be seen as vulnerable to this criticism, he later clarified his position
as having to do with Kant’s discursivity thesis, which includes the dual
theory of the necessary constraints of sensibility and thought, not any
mere notion of an epistemic condition (see Allison 1996:4–8; 2006:10ff.).
This might still strike one as too thin a characterisation of Kant’s ideal-
ism—for such a reading remains distinctively non-ontological, but it at
least shows that the distinction itself is not to be taken as a mere concep-
tual one.
3 Transcendental Idealism and the Metaphysical Two-Aspect… 27
On Allison’s view, the distinction that idealism draws between appear-

ances and things in themselves rests on the difference between two types
of concept of an object rather than two kinds of object, one of which would
have greater ontological status. The one concept (the object as appear-
ance) includes a reference to the necessary conditions for the perception,
and cognition, of an object whilst the other (object as thing in itself )
includes no such reference, that is to say, it abstracts from the human
cognitive perspective.4 And so the distinction drawn between appearance
and thing in itself has no ontological import. As Allison says, the tran-
scendental distinction has been ‘deontologized’ (1996:18). It merely
indicates the importance of the transcendental turn regarding how to
consider things, and the way we cognise them, at all. Appearances are the
things as they appear to us, and things in themselves are the very same
things as they do not appear to us, i.e. as they would be in abstraction
from the way we experience them.
Allison’s reading has sometimes been characterised in terms of a ‘two-
aspect’ reading so as to differentiate it from the ontological ‘two-object’
or ‘two-world’ interpretation. However, as Allison has subsequently
pointed out (2004:16), this description is somewhat confusing since
aspect theories are usually associated with metaphysical conceptions of the
distinction. Two-aspect views can either be a form of ‘property dualism’,
or, as Allison sees it, a methodological view regarding a ‘contrast between
two ways in which […] objects can be considered in a philosophical
reflection on the conditions of their cognition’ (2006:1). But, as Lucy
Allais has pointed out—and we shall have cause to return to Allais’s own
reading later—this last characterisation can also again be seen in terms of
a metaphysical interpretation.
Against the backdrop of the major work carried out by Karl Ameriks
in the 1980s and 90s and afterwards—in which he showed, in sharp con-
trast to Allison, that Kant was far more metaphysically committed and
hence that his idealism must be seen as a thesis about the ontologically
non-ultimate nature of appearances—a return to a more metaphysical
approach to Kantian idealism can be discerned in the Kant scholarship of
the last twenty years. Prime examples of this approach are Rae Langton
(1998), James Van Cleve (1999) and Lucy Allais (2006, 2007, 2015).5
Notwithstanding the possibility that, as Marcel Quarfood has suggested,6
28 D. Schulting
the potential of methodological or epistemological readings has not been

fully realised, I shall focus here on these more metaphysically informed
readings. The sheer quality of a range of papers, and two monographs,
published in the last two decades indicates that the debate surrounding
Kant’s doctrine of idealism is very much alive, notwithstanding the last-
ing influence on Kant commentators in the English speaking world of
the early dismissive approach to idealism propagated by the likes of
P.F. Strawson and Jonathan Bennett (one detects this continuing influ-
ence in the work of Arthur Collins, Paul Guyer, Robert Hanna, Kenneth
Westphal and others).7
In this chapter, and in the following two chapters, I want to focus on
two elements that have recently been emphasised in the context of inter-
preting Kant’s idealism: (1) the metaphysical two-aspect interpretation
that reaffirms the Adickesian idea that Kant was committed to realism
about things in themselves, and (2) the universally maligned position
that Kant’s idealism is a phenomenalism. More specifically, with respect
to (2), I want to look at one older (Strawson 1968) and two more recent
(Allais 2015, Rutten 2020) readings of Kant as a phenomenalist. I believe
Kant is indeed a phenomenalist, as Strawson and Rutten do, but unlike
them, I do not think his phenomenalism is a straightforward one, that is,
the theory according to which objects are constructed out of sense data.
By contrast, Allais dismisses phenomenalist readings of Kant’s idealism in
all their varieties, but I provide several reasons, in Chap. 4, for why we
should not throw the baby out with the bathwater. I also show how an
extreme phenomenalist interpretation of Kant, such as Rutten’s, fails to
acknowledge Kant’s fundamental empirical realism about objects.
Furthermore, in Chap. 5, I discuss grounds for seeing Strawson’s conceiv-
ability argument as compatible with a benign form of phenomenalism
that shows our epistemic humility with respect to knowledge of things in
themselves.
But first, in this chapter, I take a closer look at element (1). Lately,
there has been a little boom in literature on Kant which focuses—often
with the not always so helpful help of current theorising—on Kant’s ide-
alism in terms of a two-aspect or dual-aspect view that is ontological or
metaphysical in outlook rather than methodological or epistemological
(in addition to the aforementioned Langton 1998 and Allais 2006, 2007,
2015, see also Westphal 2004, Langton 2006, Friebe 2007, Rosefeldt
2007, and more recently Marshall 2013, Oberst 2015 and Onof 2019).
Quarfood (2004) has helpfully characterised the difference between the
metaphysical and methodological or epistemological approaches in terms
of adopting a ‘transcendent’ and a ‘transcendental’ or ‘immanent’ point
of view respectively. The ‘transcendent’ point of view, which ‘takes a top-
down approach’ (2004:36), accepts the limits that Kant imposes on our
having cognitive access to things in themselves but nonetheless deems it
legitimate to inquire into the nature of things in themselves, or at least
into the relation between things in themselves and appearances. Quarfood
also points out that metaphysical two-aspect interpretations bear a deeper
family resemblance to the two-world view than admitted since both the
two-world view and the metaphysical two-aspect view think it possible to
establish, ‘by means of general metaphysical reasoning’, ‘the existence of
unknowable properties belonging to the thing in itself ’. That is to say,
‘both views take Kant’s distinction between appearance and thing in itself
to be primarily ontological rather than epistemological. […] What both
[the metaphysical two-aspect and the two-world view] have in common
is that Kant’s distinction is considered to involve the assumption of a
realm of entities of different ontological status than objects on the empir-
ical level have’ (Quarfood 2004:35).
As suggested earlier, it is perhaps more natural to regard aspect theories
as ontological rather than as having to do with epistemological readings
such as Allison’s. In the context of a strongly realist interpretation of
Kant’s transcendental philosophy, Kenneth Westphal (2004:56–61), for
example, espouses such a metaphysical ‘dual aspect’ reading of idealism,
referring to Kant’s talk of a double perspective in the Bxviii note in the
First Critique preface. Westphal writes:
[T]he double aspect view cannot simply be two ways of thinking about or
describing objects. Rather, those two ways of thinking about objects must
be based on, because they can only be justified by, the metaphysically dis-
tinct characteristics objects have as intuited by us and as not intu-
ited. (2004:57)
30 D. Schulting
The classic example of a metaphysical dual-aspect theory is Spinoza’s view

regarding mind and body, which as irreducible attributes both belong to,
or more precisely express, one identical and unique substance. Associating
Kant’s transcendental theory, as the extreme opposite of Spinoza’s natu-
ralism, with aspect theory would then seem not so befitting.
It appears that Westphal, and perhaps metaphysical two-aspecters
about Kant’s idealism in general, assumes the naturalist position that the
objects as things in themselves are given, with all their determinate char-
acteristics, to which we subsequently latch on by means of intuiting these
objects or aspects of these objects, or not as the case may be. This seems
hardly Kantian, not even in spirit. Kant’s distinction between things in
themselves and appearances appears to be relocated to the given object,
the thing in itself, which is characterisable by two distinct types of state,
so that the object itself has different states which are either intuitable or
not. This is what Westphal seems to be saying:
Kant holds that the distinction between phenomena and noumena is not
simply one of description, but concerns objects intuited by us and as not
intuited, or, more specifically, those states of an object that occur or are evi-
dent as we intuit them and the other, nonintuitable states of that object. On
Kant’s view, the former are all spatiotemporal, though none of the latter
are’. (2004:57, emphasis added)
Westphal thus believes that the ‘double aspect’ character is not a matter
of distinguishing between ‘two ways of describing’ these two kinds of
aspect, but rather of distinguishing between two kinds of properties that
the thing itself, presumably the same identical object (since he uses the
term ‘object’), has (2004:58). The contrast between two aspects has to do
with the kinds of properties a thing has, either as intuited or as unintu-
ited (or, intuitable or unintuitable), and presumably, the ideal aspect
would be that aspect of the object that is intuited or intuitable in virtue
of the forms of intuition. Strikingly, the metaphysical nature of this dis-
tinction that Westphal, who thinks Kant’s transcendental philosophy is a
realism sans phrase, ascribes to Kant’s assumption of the ideal nature of
the forms of intuition is described by him as a ‘metaphysical fact’
(2004:58), which is at least somewhat counterintuitive considering Kant’s
radical turn away from a metaphysics that purports to describe reality in

a de re fashion or in terms of metaphysical facts, or any facts for that matter.
Without further ado, I now want to look in particular at Allais’s meta-
physical two-aspect reading, which she presented in a series of articles in
the mid-noughties, and then in monograph form in Allais (2015). Her
book is undoubtedly one of the most illuminating, novel, and important
in scholarship on Kant’s idealism in recent years.
3.2 etaphysical Two-Aspect Readings

M
and Allais’s Middle Course
Allais aims to steer ‘a middle course’ (2007:460) between the two extremes
of phenomenalist and ‘methodological’ readings of the distinction
between appearances and things in themselves. Allais is particularly con-
cerned with refuting the phenomenalist reading of Kant’s idealism, which
holds that appearances are (merely) mental representations. She empha-
sises that phenomenalism conflicts with Kant’s metaphysics of experi-
ence, which takes empirical objects to be really existing things that exist
unperceived. On her account, Kant is not a constructionist, for whom
the necessary constraints of experience are ‘mere ways of organising sense-
data’ (2007:461).8 Allais notes:
Kant is not concerned merely with how we construct experience, but also
to argue that there must actually be substance that endures through time
and is not created or destroyed. (2007:461n.10)
In other words, there must be a way that appearances are seen, not as
mental representations, or as existing in the mind, or as sense data, but as
publicly perceivable objects that endure unperceived and form part of
causally determined empirical nature, but which also—and this marks
the distinctiveness of Allais’s interpretation—allows appearances to be
mind-dependent as opposed to things in themselves, which are mind-
independent. In order to prop up her reading of appearances as both
being of substantial existing things in themselves and mind-dependent,
she alludes to Kant’s secondary quality analogy in the Prolegomena (Prol,
32 D. Schulting
AA 4:288–290).9 She argues that once we have a proper account of Kant’s

theory of perception in place (namely in terms of a direct theory of per-
ception), and so do not take Kant as a representationalist, and ‘once we
have the appropriate account of secondary qualities’ (2007:460), this
analogy is very useful in understanding the in-between status of appear-
ances as of things in themselves and mind-dependent (see 2007:463ff.).
Allais also wants to chart a middle course between what she calls ‘the
extremes of seeing Kant as committed to the existence of supersensible,
non-spatiotemporal objects distinct from the things of which we have
experience (noumena in the positive sense), and denying that Kant has
any real metaphysical commitment to the existence of things in them-
selves’ (2007:462n.17). Allais wants to stress that Kant is committed to
the existence of really mind-independent things, which as mind-
independent exist independently from us, and so are not appearances,
but which have another side to them, for which they are dependent on us
to the extent in which they appear to us. She sees her view (and that of
Langton 1998) as a correction of methodological one-world views
(2006:146), but as stopping short of what she intimates is extreme nou-
menalism about supersensible entities (2006:148). It seems that for Allais
the only things that would have a distinct existence as supersensible enti-
ties, were they to exist, would be noumena in the positive sense, and
things in themselves are not these. But, against Allais, one could argue
that to say that things in themselves are not such positive distinct entities,
i.e. noumena, does not imply that there is no way in which an ontological
distinction can be upheld between things in themselves and appearances
as two kinds of object.
In general, Allais’s reading is an attractive one, as it enables us to make
sense of the very term that Kant adopts, Erscheinung, to denote the object
of experience. An appearance is not a mere mental item, but a genuine
way or mode in which a mind-independent thing or object exists for us,
apart from the way it exists in itself as mind-independent. On the other
hand, Kant repeatedly says that appearances are ‘mere’ representations. At
one point in the A-Deduction Kant writes that ‘appearances themselves
are nothing but sensible representations [sinnliche Vorstellungen]’, which
‘in themselves [an sich] […] must not be seen as objects (outside the
power of representation)’ (A104, trans. modified). At A127 Kant is even

clearer: ‘[A]ppearances, as such, cannot occur outside us, but exist only in
our sensibility.’10 And to be sure, it is not just their formal possibility that
appearances receive from the understanding, it is also ‘as they lie in the
sensibility as mere intuitions’ (A127, emphasis added) that they depend
on the mind. By contrast, Allais’s account of appearances would seem to
affirm their being mind-external objects, against Kant’s claim here, not
mere representations or items in our sensibility. It seems to me that Allais’s
account cannot fully exorcise the phenomenalist spectre by way of
explaining the mentalist language that Kant clearly adopts. I discuss her
criticisms of phenomenalist readings of Kant’s idealism in more detail in
Chap. 4.
Furthermore, her view creates a problem if an appearance were always
a mind-dependent aspect of a thing that as it is in itself is mind-
independent, for the question then arises as to how there can be purely
subjective appearances, that is, appearances which are not objectively
determinable and so not aspects of real things—that is, aspects of pub-
licly perceivable objects such as bent sticks (see her account in Allais
2007:471ff.). Sometimes Kant seems to use the notion ‘appearance’ syn-
onymously with a mere mental representation, a Praussian empirical-
subjective object, say. In other words, an appearance is not eo ipso a
representation of an object.11 However, in Allais’s favour it could be
argued that to the extent that mental representations and hence illusions
etc. are also, as ‘inner appearances’ (A386), possible objects of experience,
they belong to the same realm of appearances as any other that are tran-
scendentally ideal, i.e. dependent on minds such as ours for being cog-
nised as genuine empirical objects of experience (albeit not as purely
subjective).
One of the biggest problems facing Allais’s interpretation, however, is
that on her one-world view it seems that only empirical objects exist,
which have both an in-itself nature and an appearance nature, and not
things in themselves which only have an in-itself nature and no appearance
aspect (e.g. God, the soul).12 Allais may rightly point out that Kant is not
committed to the (theoretically determinable) actual existence of God
and other such noumenal objects—although this is more difficult to
34 D. Schulting
maintain regarding Kant’s view on the soul, more specifically, the imma-
terial nature of the human mind. However, her position (at least in her
earlier work) goes further than that: it in fact seems to disallow even the
possibility of God’s existence, for on her one-world reading no room is
left for objects that are effectively numerically distinct from appearances,
and which have no phenomenal counterpart (or for noumenal objects
that would affect beings with a different intuitional capacity than ours).
This is a general problem for two-aspect readings of idealism: no sense
can be made of the different numerical identities of things in themselves
and appearances whose difference is not just the difference in the set of
properties of one and the same thing.
Allais is right to query two-world views if such views are to mean that
Kant’s pre-Critical stance, in the Inaugural Dissertation—namely that we
distinguish strictly between a mundus sensibilis and a mundus intelligibilis
as mapping two kinds of theoretically accessible objects or worlds of
objects—still somehow informs Kant’s position in the Critique (she
quotes B311, B274, and Prol, AA 4:293).13 However, Kant’s denial of
theoretical knowledge of positive noumena does not mean he denies their
existence tout court (nor of course can he affirm it). In fact, Kant is com-
mitted to finding a proper way of being able to claim something positive
about the noumenal, e.g. in the Groundwork (cf. Wagner 2008:76, 77),
where Kant proposes the idea of human beings being part of the intelli-
gible world as well as of the sensible world.14 Generally, we cannot justify
claims that things in themselves are noumena in a positive sense (theo-
retically or speculatively determinable), but some noumena are real things
in themselves and not mere thought entities (e.g. a soul-substance that
underlies the ‘I’) even if we cannot know anything determinate about
them. Also, all appearances have things in themselves underlying them,
but, as said earlier, some things in themselves have no appearances some-
how supervening upon them (e.g. God).
Lastly, and perhaps most distinctively of her reading, Allais proposes—
so as to show that she pursues a middle way between extreme noumenal-
ism and mere methodological readings as well as to indicate her differences
with Langton on intrinsicness—to see the distinction between things in
themselves and appearances in terms of ‘distinguish[ing] between two
ways of knowing things’. Allais writes:
We can know things in terms of the ways in which they affect other things,
and we can know things as they are apart from this. (2006:159)
Allais uses the terminology of specifying something opaquely and speci-

fying something transparently. Both ways of specifying refer to the same
thing; describing opaquely does not give us knowledge of the intrinsic
nature of the thing but gives us knowledge of it as appearance. Our way
of cognising things is by way of opaque specification, for we never know
what things are intrinsically. We can only know outer relations, as Kant
says (A277/B333). The distinction that Allais has in mind is not so much
a distinction between sets of properties of the one thing, but ‘between
two ways of knowing the same things—knowing things intrinsically, or
as they are apart from other things (including ourselves), and knowing
things in terms of other things’ (2006:160). Knowing things intrinsically
would be knowing them by transparent description, but we do not actu-
ally know things that way.
Although such a reading might strike one as epistemological, Allais
still means it to be nontrivial in that it says something of the thing in
itself that exists (2006:164). To make a complex interpretation even more
complex, Allais also says that
[o]ur representation of space and time is not an opaque presentation of

something which has a way it is in itself, but rather belongs only to appear-
ances. […] We cognise space and spatial relations, time and temporal rela-
tions, intrinsically and directly. (2006:165)
But, regarding this last remark—i.e. that space is represented directly and
not opaquely—if the purpose of the distinction of ways of describing the
same things, either transparently or opaquely, was to capture the tran-
scendental distinction between, respectively, things in themselves that
have an intrinsic nature and appearances that are merely relational, and
given that one of the fundamental features of appearances in contrast to
things in themselves is their spatiotemporality, then Allais’s proposal
turns out not to be very useful. It could be argued though on Allais’s
behalf that Kant does allow talk of knowing (directly) the inner nature of
things if by inner is meant comparatively inner determinations, which for
phenomena are nothing but relations.15
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The instructions for warding off submarine attack have more than
a passing interest. They signified a new chapter in the work of the
American Navy, with no doctrine as precedent—the task of
transporting an army across three thousand miles of ocean and
protecting it against an enemy which was supremely confident that
its undersea warfare could not be thwarted, which had boasted that it
could prevent the landing of an American army in France. In a way,
this was a momentous experiment. How thoroughly and intelligently
the Navy had studied the problem may be discerned in these
extracts from its confidential orders to the Corsair and the other
ships of the escort:
Reports of enemy submarine activity indicate that the
area of greatest activity is east of Longitude Twenty West,
and within a circle radius five hundred miles from Fayal,
Azores. Submarines may be operating on the Atlantic
coast of the United States and Canada. Every effort has
been made to hold secret the sailing of the convoy but it
may be assumed that the departure of convoy from the
United States and the hour of departure will be
communicated to the enemy. It is possible that particular
effort will be made by the enemy to accomplish the
destruction of the convoy, and no part of the water
traversed may be assumed to be free from submarines.
Ships will make every effort to maintain distance
accurately and will be careful not to drop astern,
particularly at night or in thick weather. Speed will be
assigned by signal. During daylight every effort will be
made to determine the revolutions necessary to make the
speed of the convoy in order that each ship may maintain
a more nearly constant speed during the darkness.
Convoy will be manœuvred as necessary by the Battle
Signal Book. Ships will manœuvre independently in
accordance with the Rules of the Road in all cases when
necessary to avoid collision. When convoy alters course
each ship of the convoy will turn in the wake of the next
ahead except in zigzagging when all turn together.
There will be two well-protected and arranged lookout
stations aloft; one on each side of the mast as high as
possible, capable of holding four lookouts each. There will
be four well-protected and arranged lookout stations on
each side of the ship, capable of holding two lookouts
each. During daylight there will be an officer in each top, in
addition to lookouts. At all times there will be an officer in
charge of lookouts on deck who will make periodic
inspections. The communication system from lookout
stations to bridge will be tested frequently.
Lookouts will be carefully selected for their fitness for
lookout duty—keen eyesight, intelligence, and freedom
from seasickness are essential qualities. A school for
lookouts will be held daily. They will be instructed to report
everything they see. In so far as practicable they will be
furnished with binoculars and each lookout will always use
the same glass. Each lookout will be assigned a definite
sector and will be required to maintain the closest possible
watch within that sector, no matter what may be
happening in other sectors.
Gun crews will be at all times in the immediate vicinity of
their guns. One man of each crew will be at all times on
watch. Daily pointing, loading, and fire control drills will be
held. When conditions permit and upon orders from the
Group Convoy Commander, target practice will be held in
accordance with the General Signal Book.
No radio message will be sent except in great
emergency involving the safety of the ship. A continuous
radio watch will be maintained. If it becomes necessary to
communicate by radio, the cipher contained in the
operation order will be used.
All vessels will be darkened so that no ray of light shall
show outboard between sunset and sunrise. A single
gleam of light may cause the loss of the ship. Sentries will
make constant rounds to insure the strict enforcement of
this order throughout the ship. Navigational lights will not
be shown except when specifically ordered by the convoy
commander or when immediately necessary to avoid
collision and then only long enough to meet the
emergency. Range lights will not be shown and all lights
will be dimmed to two miles visibility.
Smoke from the funnels must be reduced to a minimum
both by day and night. All vessels will keep fuel so
trimmed that maximum speed can be maintained toward
end of voyage. Neither the whistle or the siren shall be
used in submarine waters except in case of emergency.
Care will be exercised that the leads of the siren and
whistle cords are such that these cannot be accidentally
pulled or become jammed.
A station bill will be prepared showing the stations at fire
quarters and abandon ship. Daily drills at fire stations and
abandon ship will be held until all persons on board
become familiar with their duties.
Necessary instructions in regard to rendezvous and
courses will be found in the sealed instructions. These will
be opened only as directed on the outside of the
envelope. Before dark a rendezvous for 4 p.m. of the day
following will be signalled by the Escort Commander.
Nothing that floats will be thrown overboard. All waste
material that can be burned will be burned. Tin cans must
be well punctured before being thrown overboard.
Garbage that cannot be burned shall be accumulated in
suitable receptacles and thrown overboard from all ships
simultaneously one hour after sunset each night.
Submarine Attack
The following is generally accepted:
Submarines on surface are visible on the horizon.
Submarine awash is visible about five miles. Submarine
submerged, periscope showing, is not visible more than
two miles unless periscope appears against skyline.
Porpoising of submarine as it comes to the surface to
obtain sight through periscope creates a distinct wake
which is more clearly visible than the wake of periscope
when submarine is steadied.
Under poor conditions of atmosphere and sea the
probability of detecting a submarine decreases. It follows
that constant vigilance alone will insure the early detection
of a submarine. The wake of a torpedo is distinctive and
can easily be picked up in smooth water at a distance of
two thousand yards. In rough water it is difficult to observe
the wake.
NUMBER TWO GUN CREW ON WATCH

THEY ARE ALL SEA DOGS TOGETHER
Daylight attack by surface craft (enemy raider), will be

handled by signal from the Convoy Commander. Daylight
attack by submarines shall be handled as follows by each
vessel:
(a) Open fire instantly on any submarine sighted. Don’t
delay the first shot even if it is apt to go wild,—it will show
the direction of the submarine and will have a pronounced
moral effect.
(b) Continue to fire as rapidly as possible. Short shots
interfere with the ability of the submarine to see and aim.
(c) If submarine appears less than six points on bow
and not more than 2000 yards away, head for submarine
at best speed.
(d) If submarine appears more than six points on bow,
abeam, or on the quarter, head directly away from
submarine at best speed.
(e) If torpedo wake only is seen, fire gun immediately
and indicate direction to other ships and manœuvre to
avoid torpedo as in case of submarine, i.e.—turning
towards torpedo if less than six points.
(f) Other ships of convoy turn from direction of
submarine and scatter at best speed, maintaining keenest
lookout for torpedo wake and for a possible mate of the
attacking submarine.
(g) Resume course when it is deemed that your vessel
is outside the danger zone of attacking submarine.
Night Attack:—All vessels instantly change course
ninety degrees either to port or starboard. Course will be
resumed before any vessel has proceeded ten miles after
ninety degrees change. If any vessel is damaged by
torpedo, that vessel will act independently and all other
vessels of convoy escape at best speed. The damaged
vessel may send out radio distress signals provided for
merchant vessels.
Owing to the presence of escorting ships it is not
probable that submarines will be caught on the surface
and therefore will not attempt to use her guns. It is very
probable that the first indication of the presence of a
submarine will be the wake of her torpedo.
Mines, floating or submerged, may be encountered. All
floating objects, the character of which is uncertain, must
be carefully avoided. Floating mines have recently been
encountered under the following conditions:
(a) Two mines connected by lines.
(b) Secured to bottom of dummy periscopes which were
mounted in a box or other object.
(c) In waterlogged boats, used as decoys.
(d) Attached to wreckage of various kinds.
If submarine is sighted or if gunfire from any ship
indicates attack, destroyers and fast yachts of escort will
head at best speed in direction of submarine, force it to
submerge, and attack as conditions permit. They will
rejoin convoy at earliest possible moment. If any ship is
damaged by torpedo, two destroyers will stand by ship,
those nearest of escort, affecting such rescue as may be
necessary and possible.
CHAPTER II
“LAFAYETTE, WE ARE HERE!”
T HE Corsair stood out to sea with the transports and the escort in
the morning of June 14th after a thick fog had delayed the
departure for several hours. As finally selected, the ship’s company
consisted of 130 officers and enlisted men. The shifting fortunes of
war were to scatter most of them to other ships and stations during
the long exile overseas, and when the battered yacht came home,
only Commander Porter and Lieutenant McGuire and eighteen of the
crew of this first muster roll were left on board.
Changes were so frequent that from first to last almost three
hundred men served in the Corsair.[1] The ship proved to be a
training school for officers, and made an exceptional record in that
thirteen of her enlisted force and one warrant officer won
commissions during the war, some taking the examinations while on
foreign service and others being sent to Annapolis for the intensive
course of three months and receiving the rank of temporary ensigns
in the regular naval organization. On deck and below, men were
rated as petty officers as rapidly as they displayed aptitude, and few
of the crew failed to advance themselves. The spirit of the ship was
eager and ambitious from the start and drudgery could not dull it.
As a proper man-of-war the Corsair lived a complex and
disciplined programme of duty through the twenty-four hours of the
day. When she steamed past Sandy Hook, outward bound, the
complement included a chief boatswain’s mate, one boatswain’s
mate, six coxswains, seven gunner’s mates, four quartermasters,
nineteen seamen, nineteen ordinary seamen, three electricians, four
radio operators, a carpenter’s mate, two ship-fitters, a boiler maker, a
blacksmith, a chief machinist’s mate, one machinist’s mate, a chief
water tender, two water tenders, four oilers, twenty-one firemen and
coal passers, a chief yeoman, three yeomen, a hospital apprentice, a
bugler, a cabin steward, four ship’s cooks, and eight mess
attendants.
The complete roster of the ship on this famous day of June 14,
1917, was as follows:
Lieutenant Commander T. A. Kittinger, U.S.N. (Commanding)
Lieutenant Commander W. B. Porter, N.R.F. (Executive)
Lieutenant Robert E. Tod, N.R.F. (Navigator)
Lieutenant R. J. McGuire, (JG) N.R.F. (First Lieutenant)
Lieutenant J. K. Hutchison, (JG) N.R.F. (Engineer Officer)
Ensign A. K. Schanze, N.R.F. (Gunnery Officer)
Ensign J. F. W. Gray, N.R.F. (Communications Officer)
Assistant Surgeon E. V. Laub, N.R.F.
Assistant Paymaster J. J. Cunningham, N.R.F.
Machinist W. F. Hawthorn, N.R.F.
Machinist A. V. Mason, N.R.F.
Boatswain R. Budani, N.R.F.
Aguas, I C. F1c.
Ashby, C. N. Sea. 2c.
Balano, F. Sea.
Barko, A. W. G.M. 3c.
Barry, H. A. Sea.
Bayne, C. S. Sea.
Bedford, H. H. F1c.
[2]Benton, E. M. Sea.
Bischoff, H. J. F2c.
Bonsall, T. C. Cox.
Breckel, H. F. Elec. 1cR.
[2]Brillowski, A. J. F2c.
Byram, C. S. F2c.
Carey, N. J. Bugler
[2]Carroll, O. W.T.
Clinch, T., Jr. Elec. 2cG.

Coffey, A. H. Sea.
Connolly, C. Yeo. 3c.
Copeland, A. T. Sea.
Cure, H. S.C. 2c.
Curtin, J. J. F1c.
Davis, I. S. Elec. 2cR.
De Armosolo, V. M. Att. 3c.
Donaldson, S. J. Sea. 2c.
Duke, W. M., Jr. Sea.
Egan, L. C. G. M. 3c.
Emmons, L. C. Sea. 2c.
Evans, W. F. Sea.
Farr, F. S. Q.M. 2c.
Feeley, N. M.Att. 1c.
[2]Flynn, J. S. M.Att. 1c.
[2]French, L. A. Sea.
Fusco, N. S.C. 3c.

Ganz, C. A. M.M. 2c.
Gilhooley, J. P. G.M. 3c.
[2]Gillette, H. E. F2c.
Goring, H. D. H.A. 1c.

Graul, R. W. F1c.
Gray, A. O. Sea. 2c.
Griffin, L. H. F3c.
Haase, H. E. G.M.3c.
Haling, C. W.T.
Hamilton, C. Blacksmith
[2]Hanley, J. M.Att. 1c.
[2]Heise, W. F. F1c.
Herrman, H. Oiler
Hill, F. C. C.M. 3c.
Hiss, S. W. F1c.
Hollis, L. R. Sea. 2c.
Houtz, E. L. Sea.
Jetter, R. T. Sea.
Jones, R. D. Oiler
[2]Jones, T. W. F1c.
Kaetzel, H. D. Sea. 2c.

Keenan, A. E. B.M’ker.
Kerr, G. M. Sea.
[2]Kleine, J. F. Oiler
Leal, R. M.Att. 3C.

Lewis, F. W. Cox.
Lindeburg, F. R. Sea.
Loescher, H. A. Elec. 2cG.
Loftus, J. P. C.B.M.
Luke, E. E. C.M.M.
Marsden, C. Cox.
Marsh, A. J. Sea.
Martin, O. F. F1c.
Martinez, M. M.Att. 3c.
McClellan, R. B. B.M. 1c.
Miller, A. E. Yeo. 2c.
Montaux, R. C. Cox.
[2]Moore, J. E. Sea. 2c.
Moore, W. C. G.M. 2c.

Mulcahy, W. W. Cox.
Mullins, T. Q.M. 1c.
Murphy, W. F. Sea.
[2]Nardo, S. M.Att. 1c.
Nolan, F. M.Att. 2c.

Outwater, H. Sea.
Paulson, G. C. Yeoman
Pease, A. E. F1c.
Phillips, E. S.C. 2c.
[2]Plummer, J. A. Elec. 2cR.
Prindle, E. B. Q.M. 2c.

Rachor, J. Cox.
Rahill, W. J. Sea.
Regent, A. A. Sea. 2c.
Reynolds, F. J. Sea. 2c.
Robertson, C. Oiler
Rubein, S. F1c.
[2]Schlotfeldt, H. B. F2c.
Schmidt, H. L. S.F. 2c.

Seger, R. G. Sea.
Sellers, E. H. Sea. 2c.
[2]Sholander, E. Sea. 2c.
Simpson, J. F. G.M. 3c.

Skolmowski, S. J. Sea. 2c.
Smith, A. C., Jr. Q.M. 2c.
Smith, J. F1c.
Smock, T. F. Sea. 2c.
Stephenson, H. F1c.
Sullivan, V. J. F.2c.
Swan, M. H. Elec. 3cR.
Tepelman, L. W. F1c.
[2]Teuten, W. W. F1c.
Thysenius, E. Cabin St’rd

Tibbott, D. W. Sea.
Tucker, R. S.C. 3c.
Underbill, P. W. Sea. 2c.
Valyon, L. J. Sea. 2c.
[2]Van Camp, L. R. Sea.
Wallace, E. C.W.T.
Walters, F. Sea. 2c.
Washburn, C. F. Sea. 2c.
Waters, C. W. Yeo. 2c.
Walters, F. Sea 2c.
[2]Wheatcroft, W. A. S.F. 2c.
Wyllie, A. A. G.M. 1c.

Wysocki, P. P. Elec. 3c.
Many of these patriotic pilgrims were about to undertake their first
voyage on blue water, nor could they foresee how much piteous woe
can be caused by the uneasy motion of a ship. The Corsair was a
lively boat, as the saying is, for her hull was not moulded like a fat-
bellied merchantman, and she lifted to the seas with the graceful
stride of a Yankee clipper. And so when the transports plodded out
into the wide, wet Atlantic, not a few of the bold mariners of the
Corsair devoutly wished they had enlisted in the Army. They were
not disgraced, however, for many a hard-shell of the regular Navy
has confessed to the pangs of seasickness. The nervous thoughts of
submarines were forgotten in wrestling with the immediate
tribulation. The great adventure was not what it had been cracked up
to be.
Copyright by Kadel and Herbert, N.Y.
SOME OF THE OFFICERS AND CREW, BEFORE LEAVING
NEW YORK
Among the bluejackets was a Princeton undergraduate, Arthur

Herbert Coffey, rating as a seaman, whose misfortune it was to
suffer serious trouble with his eyes, so that he was sent home shortly
after the Corsair reached France. Later he entered the aviation
service and died of influenza on December 31, 1918, greatly
mourned by his former shipmates. He wrote, at some length, his
impressions of the voyage and so entertainingly caught the spirit of it
that he must be permitted to tell you how they went rolling out to find
the “Bay of Biscay, O”:
I shall never forget the morning of June 14th as long as
I live. It was three a.m. and very foggy when our bos’n’s
mate roused us from our hammocks and told us to “rise
and shine” as we were going to shove off. I’ll admit that I
had many fears and misgivings at these harsh words,
“shove off.” I had never been out of sight of land before in
my life, and to cross the ocean on your first trip in a yacht
three hundred feet long seemed to me to be some
adventure, just then. Up to that time I hadn’t given it much
thought. In fact, I had been impatient for the event, like the
rest of the men, but as I was pulling on my socks that
morning (and three a.m. is a rotten time of day anyhow), I
began to reflect that perhaps I had been just a little bit
hasty in rushing into the war. And I couldn’t help thinking
how pleasant it would be to be snoring in a good, soft bed
at Princeton with nothing between me and complete
enjoyment of the day excepting a ten-thirty recitation hour.
Well, I got dressed anyway and turned to. We dropped
down the river slowly and anchored off the Battery, for the
fog was so thick that you could hardly see your hand
before your face. All about us there was the moaning of
fog-horns and I felt forlorn inside. But soon the fog lifted a
bit and that, together with Bill Rahill’s grin, made things
feel a little bit better. “Well, we are off for the big stunt,” I
said to myself. “I wonder when we’ll see this old town
again.”
I had the watch in the crow’s nest that afternoon, from
two to four, and enjoyed myself very much. It had turned
out to be a fine day, the sun was bright, and we had lots of
company, seven ships in all, four transports, a cruiser, and
two destroyers. After an hour in the crow’s nest I
happened to glance down at the deck and noticed some
very odd actions among the crew. Several of them were
leaning over the rail and appeared to be staring very
intently at something in the water. I watched them for a
while and then suddenly it occurred to me that they were
seasick.
I felt like a hardened old sailor, for here I was high up in
the crow’s nest, swaying from side to side, right over the
water, and in tip-top form with a husky appetite for the next
meal. I still felt fine when I climbed down to the deck, but
was too wise to kid anybody. And it was a good thing I
kept quiet, for an hour later I was as miserable as the rest
of them. We certainly had a seasick crew for a couple of
days. The green firemen were so sick that they were
unable to stoke properly and we failed to keep up with the
rest of our convoy.
We kept dropping farther and farther behind, the firemen
still shy their sea-legs and also some of the crew. Nobody
saw the doctor and the paymaster for four days.... Then
the doctor made a brief appearance in the sick-bay. He
looked at a cut in a man’s hand, clapped his own hand
over his mouth, and we didn’t see him again for two days
more. But he came around in fine shape after that, on the
job every minute, although he was not needed often, I am
glad to say.
To make a long story short, we abandoned all hope of
staying with the first division and ploughed along by
ourselves for a few days, then picking up the second
group consisting of four transports and the same type of
escort. Everything went along smoothly for four days and
then our destroyers came out to meet us from
Queenstown. There were five of them and a bully good
sight they were to us who were getting pretty close to the
danger zone with our precious transports. The destroyers
came zipping up like gray streaks and were on us almost
before we knew it. We stood on deck and cheered
ourselves hoarse. They were the boys who had gone over
early, the first of the Navy to see active service. They were
glad to see us, too, it appeared, and many messages
were wig-wagged back and forth. They fell into position
and all hands felt as safe as a church.
About two o’clock in the afternoon of the next day, I was
below getting a drink of water when suddenly there was a
loud explosion. I remember that at the time I thought
somebody had dropped a hatch cover directly over my
head. I realized in a moment that it was something else,
for I heard loud shouts and the tramp of feet on deck. I
was topside in no time and rushed for my gun as I was the
loader of Number Three gun.
The transports had all stopped. One of them, nearest to
us, was giving the submarine warning, a number of blasts
on her whistle which sounded uncanny to us because it
was the first time we had heard anything from the
transports since leaving New York. They had moved
across the ocean like so many ghosts. It was a beautiful,
clear day and the sea was as smooth as a carpet.
I took my position at the gun, broke open a box of
ammunition, and laid hands on a shell. The doctor came
rushing aft with a handful of cotton which he told us to stuff
in our ears. Then we were all set to be torpedoed. I wasn’t
scared—I was too busy, I guess—but I was a little bit
jumpy. I looked at my watch and it was just five minutes of
two. I wondered how long it would take our yacht to sink
after the torpedo hit us.
The transports, as I have said, were making no
headway and were all grouped together like a flock of
frightened sheep, while the destroyers were just getting
into motion. This was one of the prettiest sights I ever saw.
No sooner had the transports halted than the destroyers,
six in all, darted out in a fan-shaped formation and then
worked back and forth, looking for all the world like
greyhounds on a scent. And maybe they didn’t make
knots! We were moving at top speed ourselves, but those
destroyers gave us the impression that we were standing
still. Zoom, one would cut across our bow at about thirty
knots, then another would flash astern at the same rate.
For a time we could discover nothing else out of the
ordinary. Then suddenly the captain of Number Four gun
gave a yell and pointed astern. “There she goes!” he
shouted. “It’s a torpedo as sure as you live, or I never saw
one.” We all rubbered astern with our eyes sticking out like
onions, and there, sure enough, was a wake foaming
along at tremendous speed about fifty yards away, but it
was not heading in our direction, thank goodness. I don’t
know whether it was a torpedo or not. I have never seen
one, but our regular Navy men swore it was.
The paymaster was sure it was, although he had never
seen one either, and he dashed up and down the deck,
clapping his hands and loudly exclaiming, “Oh, it is a
torpedo! It is a torpedo!” This relieved the strain
considerably. We all laughed until we almost cried. The
officer upon the after deck-house suddenly cried out,
“Stand steady, boys. Don’t get excited. A school of
porpoises is coming toward us.” We saw them, and I
imagine there would have been a heavy mortality in that
bunch of porpoises if the keen-eyed officer had not
warned us in time.
That was about all I saw of the submarine attack, but I
heard other stories from the deck and bridge. The
explosion at the outset had been caused by the dropping
of a depth charge from a destroyer, quite close aboard the
Corsair. No wonder I thought somebody had banged a
hatch cover over my head! The firemen below thought we
had been torpedoed and were all for erupting on deck for
a breath of fresh air. That depth charge was powerful. Our
men said they saw the destroyer’s stern lift high in air
while a great spout of water leaped just astern. We saw oil
smeared over the water and I hope the destroyer was
given official credit for sinking a submarine.
One of our officers told me that more than one
submarine must have been in the attack, and that the
activity of the destroyer escort drove them off. There was
one incident which some of the men thought rather a joke,
but I felt sorry. In the morning an old British tramp picked
us up, and seeing all the destroyers, etc., concluded that
we were good company to travel in, so she stuck with us
all the forenoon, keeping a mile off to port. No sooner did
she hear the submarine warning than she lit out at full
speed, about ten knots, for safer waters. Two hours after
that, our radio men got an S.O.S. from her, that she had
been torpedoed and was sinking. It seemed too bad that
we couldn’t go and help her.
This submarine alarm was the famous episode which thrilled the
American public as elaborated by George Creel for the newspapers
of July 4, 1917. The Corsair witnessed only what occurred among
the second group of transports, and although some of her men
declared they saw the wake of a torpedo, Commander Kittinger
failed to confirm it in his official report of this busy afternoon. Rear
Admiral Gleaves carefully considered the statements of the officers
of ships in Group Two and drew the following conclusions, omitting
the names of the vessels engaged because of the naval censorship
in force at that time:
The H, leading the second group, encountered two
submarines, the first about 11.50 a.m., June 26th, about a
hundred miles off the coast of France, and the second
submarine two hours later. The I investigated the wake of
the first without further discovery. The J[3] sighted the bow
wave of the second at a distance of 1500 yards and
headed for it at a speed of twenty-five knots. The gun
pointers at the forward gun saw the periscope several
times for several seconds but it disappeared each time
before they could get on, due to the zigzagging of the
ship.
The J[3] passed about twenty-five yards ahead of a
mass of bubbles which were coming up from the wake
and let go a depth charge just ahead. Several pieces of
timber, quantities of oil, bubbles, and débris came to the
surface. Nothing more was seen of the submarine. The
attacks on the second group occurred about eight hundred
miles to the eastward of where the attacks had been made
on the first group.... It appears from reports of the French
Ministry of Marine and from the location of the attack that
enemy submarines had been notified of our approach and
were probably scouting across our route.
WITH AMERICA’S FIRST CONVOY. THE TROOP-SHIPS ARE THE

HENDERSON, ANTILLES, MOMUS, AND LENAPE
THE MINE FUNCTIONS AND A LURKING U-BOAT WOULD FIND
IT EXCESSIVELY UNHEALTHY
The story of Seaman Arthur Coffey is less exaggerated than might

have been expected in these wholly novel circumstances. It may
have been a torpedo or, perchance, it was a porpoise that was seen
from the Corsair. If it was the latter, no blame is to be laid to the
young sailors who were so tremendously excited. To their
unaccustomed eyes the ocean swarmed with periscopes and U-
boats. Many a seasoned skipper had blazed away at blackfish or
shivered in his shoes at a bit of floating spar. The destroyer
Cummings, at any rate, blew up something from the vasty deep with
the “ash can” that plopped from her fan-tail. As for the soldiers
packed in the transports, all girdled with life-belts and eyeing the
ocean with morbid suspicion, they would have told you that the
submarines were coming at them in droves. It was one of the
dauntless doughboys of this First Expeditionary Force who wrote
home to his trustful kindred:
Dear Mother and the Folks:

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The Bounds of Transcendental Logic

1st ed. 2022 Edition Dennis Schulting

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ISBN 978-3-030-71283-9 ISBN 978-3-030-71284-6 (eBook)

Permission to use previously published material in the present volume is

Part I The Metaphysics of Transcendental Idealism and

2 Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism 11

3 Transcendental Idealism and the Metaphysical Two-

4 Transcendental Idealism and Phenomenalism 47

5 Phenomenalism, Conceivability, and Epistemic Humility 77

Part II The Intimacy Between the Logic of Thought and the

6 The Unity of Cognition, or, How to Read the Leitfaden

6.4 The Relation Between Sensibility and the

7 Transcendental Logic and the Logic of Thought141

8 Once More Unto the Breach: The Derivation of the

9 Categorial Necessity and Categorial Illusion171

10 A Last Remark on Objective Validity185

AA Kants Gesammelte Schriften, ed. königlich preußische

FM What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany

Abstract In Chap. 1, I introduce the theme of the book and delineate

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

the so-called ‘metaphysical deduction’—which I expounded in my earlier

misunderstood doctrine of idealism, especially problems concerning the

reveals an intimate bond between thought and experience, between

the former Kant means the impossibility of thinking contradictory

Abstract Chap. 2 can be seen as a capsule account of my interpretation

In a key passage in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 11

judgements. These synthetic a priori judgements are not concrete judge-

To return to the above-cited passage from the A-Deduction, Kant answers

It is easy to see that this object must be thought of only as something in

question of transcendental truth. What makes it possible for me to attri-

knowledge and an object of knowledge is. The radical-subjective element

the unity of the manifold in the intuition. There is an element of neces-

(B147), lies in sensibility because only empirical intuition provides a

combines the sensory perceptions of a particular given thing, the arm-

sensible intuition (the ‘x’ which I mentioned earlier) and is identical to

priori conditions knowledge is ex hypothesi not possible, nor are objects

6. Schulting (2021, Chap. 9).

Abstract In Chap. 3 I address various topical issues surrounding Kant’s

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 25

thoroughgoing realism and the mind-independence of the things that we

On Allison’s view, the distinction that idealism draws between appear-

the potential of methodological or epistemological readings has not been

The classic example of a metaphysical dual-aspect theory is Spinoza’s view

radical turn away from a metaphysics that purports to describe reality in

3.2  etaphysical Two-Aspect Readings

AA 4:288–290).9 She argues that once we have a proper account of Kant’s

power of representation)’ (A104, trans. modified). At A127 Kant is even

Allais uses the terminology of specifying something opaquely and speci-

[o]ur representation of space and time is not an opaque presentation of

NUMBER TWO GUN CREW ON WATCH

Daylight attack by surface craft (enemy raider), will be

Clinch, T., Jr. Elec. 2cG.

Fusco, N. S.C. 3c.

Goring, H. D. H.A. 1c.

Part I The Metaphysics of Transcendental Idealism and

2 Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism 11

3 Transcendental Idealism and the Metaphysical Two-

4 Transcendental Idealism and Phenomenalism 47

5 Phenomenalism, Conceivability, and Epistemic Humility 77

Part II The Intimacy Between the Logic of Thought and the

6 The Unity of Cognition, or, How to Read the Leitfaden

6.4 The Relation Between Sensibility and the

7 Transcendental Logic and the Logic of Thought141

8 Once More Unto the Breach: The Derivation of the

9 Categorial Necessity and Categorial Illusion171

10 A Last Remark on Objective Validity185

3.2 etaphysical Two-Aspect Readings