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The European Rescue of the

Franco Regime, 1950–1975
The European Rescue

of the Franco Regime,
1950–1975
F E R NA N D O G U I R AO
1
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
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It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
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© Fernando Guirao 2021
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First Edition published in 2021
Impression: 1
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address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
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contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
Preface
Writing books is a lonely business. Books are written in solitude, during sleepless
nights and short weekends, at dawn during holidays and workdays alike. During
work hours, scholars prepare and deliver courses and conferences, deal with stu-
dents and colleagues, compile applications to finance travelling and printing, and
satisfy a myriad of administrative enquiries. Rigorous, methodical, time-consuming
high-quality research no longer fits into scholarly life and instead consumes the
authors’ leisure time: luncheons, parties, family trips, and friendly gatherings not
attended; visits and travels postponed sine die; holidays shortened or cancelled.
This book will not serve as compensation for my family and friends but at least
provides them with an explanation. This book is my tribute to them all, notably to
the most patient one.
This book would not have been possible without the professional assistance
received from the personnel at the archives referred to in the Archivalia section,
and the various libraries and documentation centres visited or consulted. Special
gratitude goes to (alphabetically) Isabel Barbeito, Reinier van den Berg, Rosario
Calleja, Pilar Casado, Joceline Collonval, Christine Delley, Carlos García, Virginia
García de Paredes, Cristina González, Teófilo Izquierdo, Maryannick Kervily,
Kathleen Anne Layle, María José Lozano, José Luis Marugán, Pandelis Nastos,
Maria Pont, Imma Riera, Violette Ruppanner, Fernando Sánchez, Elisa Carolina
de Santos, Mª Ángeles Santoyo, Elena Serrano, Elin Sissener, Nino Tieri, and
Teresa Tortella. Guadalupe Moreno and Pilar García de Yébenes provided vital
research assistance at the Historical Archive of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Happy memories are associated with my hosts while doing archival
research: Marco Fossati in Florence; Paloma Hernando, Chema Llorente, and
Nuria Negrete in Madrid; Michel Catala, the personnel of the Centre de recherches
en histoire internationale et atlantique—Alliance Europe, and the Maison des cher-
cheurs étrangers in Nantes; the Collège d’Espagne in Paris; Roberto Santianello in
Rome; and Joslyn Read and Michel Bonard in Washington. In Barcelona, the
Molina-Soler family provided me with optimal conditions to finalize the manu-
script of this book.
Marta Alorda, Albert Carreras, Víctor Gavín, Giuliana Laschi, Frances Lynch,
Mar Rubio, and Xavier Tafunell were generous in conversations over specific
aspects of this research. Tafunell deserves special recognition for assistance in
processing some of the statistical sources used in this book and for providing
feedback on first drafts of various chapters. I thank Lorenzo Bandini, David
Ellwood, Josep Maria Fradera, Carles Gasòliba, Mario Vignale, and Peter Wardley
vi Preface
for friendly encouragement, and Lluís Castañeda, Oriol Garcés, María Gundín,
José Ramón Losa, Nacho Spínola, Frederic Udina, and Luis Urteaga for their
unremitting support. Scott Arthurson, Michael Ferlazzo, Clarice Woitrin, and
Tobias Willett added intellectual talent in their linguistic corrections. Benito
Arruñada is responsible for pushing me to contact OUP. At OUP, Stephanie
Ireland processed the initial proposal, Elizabeth Casey took care of contract
details, and Katie Bishop received the final manuscript. Three anonymous readers
provided useful comments and guidance on the original proposal. ‘Reader A’
deserves specific appreciation for a controversial though challenging peer-review.
At the production stage, Deva Thomas M. from SPi Global and Monica Matthews,
as copyeditor, meticulously improved the manuscript with great expertise. Aitor
Canal, Maria Rosa Laorden, and Ramon Vendrell provided diligent support in
their respective areas of responsibility at Pompeu Fabra University.
No research project can be accomplished without the necessary financial sup-
port. I would thus like to acknowledge the support received from the European
Union Life-long Learning (Erasmus+) programme through the concession of
an ad personam Jean Monnet Chair in History after September 2013 (ref.
542523-LLP-1-2013-1-ES-AJM-CL) and a Centre of Excellence (the Barcelona
Centre of European Studies) in September 2019 (ref. 611941-EPP-1-2019-1-
ESEPPJMO-CoE); the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sport, through
the scholar mobility programme of the 2013–16 National Plan for Scientific and
Technical Research and Innovation, during 2016 (ref. PR2015-00517); and the
2017 SGR1512 research group in Applied Economics and Economic History,
financed by the Generalitat de Catalunya, through the Agència per a la Gestió
d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca, since 2017.
This book was meant to be read by one person, whose opinion I valued highly
and to whom the book is dedicated.
Fernando Guirao, Barcelona

Table of Contents
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms xv
Archivalia xvii
Introduction1
The European-Rescue Concept 1
The Argument 3
Comparable Research 22
Three Closing Remarks 24
PA RT I SE C T O R A L I N T E G R AT IO N I N
WESTERN EUROPE, 1950–1955
1. Schumania and Spain’s Heavy-Industry Supply 31

The Spanish Reception of the Schuman Proposals 32
The Spanish Steel Industry and Its Supply Requirements 35
Did the ECSC Represent a Threat? 39
The Limits to Supranational Authority 43
Concluding Remarks 47
2. Franco Spain at the Origins of the European Agricultural Community 52
The Green Pool: A Discriminatory Threat 53
Transport Co-operation as a Bargaining Tool 62
A Last-Minute Sprint 69
Defining the National Interest 72
The Strategic Question of Increasing Wheat Imports 79
The Institutional Paradox 84
PA RT I I T H E E E C : C HA L L E N G E A N D
R E SP O N SE , 1 9 5 5 – 1 9 7 0
3. Opposing Fascism or Accommodating Its Last Remnant? 103

The Rationale for a Spanish Wait-And-See Policy 104
First the EFTA 112
The Last Resort: A Solitary Approach to the EEC 118
Public Declarations versus Effective Governance 136
viii table of contents
The Six’s Lowest Common Denominator 153

4. The Decision to Grant the Preference (1964–1967) 170
Introductory Remarks 170
The Exact Profile of the Spanish Question 172
Not Quite Association 181
The Commission’s Acuerdo a la Española of November 1966 189
Lack of Commercial Discrimination: The Case of Oranges 196
Ready to Negotiate With Spain, but about What? 200
Determining the Content of the Preference 205
Issuing the Negotiating Mandate 215
Where did the Accusations of Fascism Go? 219
5. Negotiating the Preference (1967–1970) 235
Negotiations under a Proper Mandate: First Round, 1967 235
Negotiations under a Proper Mandate: Second Round, 1968 245
1969: Onward against All Odds 259
An Amazing End to Bilateral Negotiations, 1969–1970 274
The Arresting Story of Article 1 278
6. Marketing the 1970 Agreement 301
The Basic Features of the 1970 Agreement 302
The Need for a Marketing Campaign 305
Selling the Preferential Treatment 307
The Debate at the Cortes 312
PA RT I I I F R A N C O SPA I N I N T H E E U R O P E A N
SYS T E M O F T R A D E P R E F E R E N C E , 1 9 7 0 – 1 9 7 5
7. The Spanish Attempt to Expand Unilateral Preferences 321

The Generalized System of Preferences 321
The Opportunity of the EEC’s First Enlargement 326
The European Commission’s Proposals for a New Agreement 341
Tariff Standstill after January 1973 351
Association with the EFTA and Trade with the Soviets 354
8. The European Attempt to Topple Spain’s Industrial Protection 369
The European System of Trade Preferences 369
The Community’s First Attempt to Access the Spanish Market 372
The Spanish Sistema de Esclusas 378
table of contents ix
A Comparative Perspective from Western Europe’s Periphery 390

The Prolonged Impasse after 1974 401
From Privilege to a Primus Inter Pariahs Status 414
Finale: The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 433
References 441
Index 453
List of Figures
1. Spain’s trade with the Six and the rest of the world, 1965–77
(1963 pesetas) (1965 = 100) 17
2. Spain’s per capita income as percentage of that of the Six, 1950–77
(Geary-Khamis 1990 US$) 19
3. Geographical distribution of Spain’s export trade, 1956 and 1960 120
4. Spanish orange exports to the Six and the United Kingdom,
in value (above) and volume (below), 1968–72 (1968 = 100) 272
5. Real economic convergence, 1950–73 (per capita GDP as percentage of
that of the Community à Huit, Geary-Khamis 1990 US$) 391
6. Openness rate index for selected European economies, 1950–73
(Exports + Imports)/GDP in nominal values (1960 = 100) 392
7. Degree of openness of selected European economies, 1950–73
(Exports + Imports)/GDP in nominal values 392
8. Investment and openness rates for Portugal, 1953–73 (1953 = 100) 393
9. Investment and openness rates for Ireland, 1950–73 (1950 = 100) 394
10. Investment and openness rates for Greece, 1950–73 (1950 = 100) 394
11. Investment and openness rates for Spain, 1950–73 (1950 = 100) 395
12. Degree of Spanish trade openness by export and import trade,
1950–73 (1960 = 100) 395
13. Degree of Spanish trade openness by import trade with the Nine and
the rest of the world, 1950–73 (1965 = 100) 396
14. Current values of Spanish exports to the Six and the rest of the world,
1950–73 (1965 = 100) 396
15. Current values of Spanish industrial exports to the Six and the rest
of the world, 1965–73 (1965 = 100) 397
16. ROE rate for Spain’s non-financial corporations, 1960–80 399
17. ROE rate for Spain’s leading industrial sectors, 1960–80 399
18. Investment and openness indexes for the European Union,
1950–90 (1950 = 100) 437
List of Tables
1.1 Spain’s iron and steel production and raw materials, 1929–50 (tonnes) 37
1.2 Spanish trade in ECSC products in 1950 40
2.1 Value of Spain’s sixty main products exported in 1952
(percentages over total exports) 74
2.2 Imports of citrus fruits into selected European countries with
the origin area (million US$ at 1952 cif prices, annual averages) 75
2.3 Spain’s production and export of oranges, 1931–53 (tonnes) 76
3.1 Spain’s West-European trade, 1954–6 (thousand gold pesetas) 105
3.2 Spain’s orange exports to the EEC, 1956–62 (tonnes) 122
3.3 Spain’s trade balance, 1960–2 (million US$ and percentages) 123
3.4 Spain’s foreign trade distribution, 1960–3 (percentages) 158
4.1 Spain’s trade with the EEC, 1962–6 (million pesetas) 176
4.2 Spain’s tariff levels for imports from GATT countries in 1966 (% ad valorem)194
4.3 EEC imports from Spain, 1962–4 average 202
5.1 Spain’s trade deficit with the EEC, 1963–6 (million US$) 236
5.2 Assessment of the July 1967 EEC Council mandate (on 1965 trade values) 238
5.3 Coverage of Spanish tariff concessions offered in 1968 according to
their typology (1966 import-trade values, million US$) 249
5.4 Spain’s export trade by main product categories, 1965–8
(thousand 1963 pesetas) 261
5.5 Tariff-removal proposals offered to Spain (accumulated totals) 267
6.1 Reciprocal tariff concessions granted by the 1970 Agreement (1968 trade
figures, million US$) 303
7.1 Imports by the EEC à Six and à Dix from Spain not benefiting
from tariff preference (1969 values in thousand US$) 328
7.2 Tariff duties on Spain’s main export commodities to the United Kingdom 330
7.3 Applicable tariff levels for Spanish agricultural exports to the countries
of the enlarged Community (1969 data) 334
7.4 The enlarged Community’s world exports in 1970 (million US$) 339
7.5 Commodity lists for tariff-removal purposes: relative shares over Spain’s
imports from the Nine in 1971 345
7.6 Spain’s imports from the EFTA countries, 1970–2 (cif values in US$) 360
7.7 Spain’s exports to the EFTA countries, 1970–2 (fob values in US$) 361
xiv List of Tables
7.8 Index numbers of Spain–EFTA trade, 1970–2 362

8.1 Commodities offered tariff concessions subject to seasonal restrictions
by the Council mandate of July 1973 374
8.2 Comparison of the EEC and Spanish negotiation proposals 381
8.3 Preferential trade coverage of the various proposals for EEC–Spain
bilateral trade relations (percentage) 388
8.4 Degree of self-sufficiency in the EEC of Nine for agricultural products
of interest to Spain 404
8.5 Percentage of Spanish agricultural exports benefitting from tariff
concessions405
8.6 Tariff reduction schedule 406
8.7 Spanish export commodities subject to special protection devices 407
8.8 Spain’s tariff-removal schedule for industrial imports from
the Community after 1976 exhausting all possible delays, whether
unilateral or by joint decision 417
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
ABC —Spanish newspaper (Madrid edition)

Benelux —The customs union formed by Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg
BLEU —Belgian and Luxembourg Economic Union
BOCE —Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Españolas, the official gazette of the
Spanish parliament
BOE —Boletín Oficial del Estado, official Spanish gazette
CAP —Common Agricultural Policy
CECA —ECSC in French and Spanish
CEE —EEC in French and Spanish
CET —Common External Tariff
CICE (Spain) —Comisión interministerial para el estudio de los problemas que pueden
plantear en la Península el Mercado Común Europeo como una posible
Zona de Libre Comercio
CIQCEE —Comité Interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique
européenne
CNE —Consejo Nacional de Empresarios
Comecon —Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
Coopeco —Coopération économique
Coreper —Committee of Permanent Representatives to the European
Communities
DGER —Directorate-General for External Relations of the EEC Commission
DGIER —Directorate-General for International Economic Relations at MAE-S
DGOI —Directorate-General of International Organizations at MAE-S
EAEC —European Atomic Energy Community
ECMT —European Conference of Ministers of Transport
ECOAM —European Conference on the Organization of Agricultural Markets
ECSC —European Coal and Steel Community
EEC —European Economic Community
EFTA —European Free Trade Association, Geneva
ENSIDESA —Empresa Nacional Siderúrgica S.A.
EPU —European Payments Union
EU —European Union
EUI —European University Institute, Florence
Eximbank —Export–Import Bank of the United States
FEOGA —Fonds européen d’Orientation et de Garantie agricole, the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
FNSEA —Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles
FO —Foreign Office of the United Kingdom
xvi List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
FOA —Foreign Operations Administration

FORPPA —Fondo de Ordenación y Regulación de Productos y Precios Agrarios
FTA —Free-Trade Area
GATT —General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP —Gross Domestic Product
GFCF —Gross Fixed Capital Formation
GNP —Gross National Product
GSP —Generalized System of Preferences
IBRD —International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICE —Información Comercial Española
ICFTU —International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICGI —Impuesto de Compensación de Gravámenes Interiores
IEME —Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera
ILO —International Labour Organization
IMF —International Monetary Fund
IUR —International Union of Railways
IWA —International Wheat Agreement
JEIH —Journal of European Integration History
JOCE —Journal officiel des Communautés Européennes, series Communication
and Information (C), and Legislation (L)
MEP —Member of the European Assembly/Parliament
MFN —Most Favoured Nation
OECD —Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC —Organization for European Economic Co-operation
OID —Oficina de Información Diplomática, Spanish Diplomatic
Information Bureau
OJEC —Official Journal of the European Communities, series (C) and (L)
Pta —peseta, Spain’s currency
Renfe —Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles
SCE —Service de coopération économique at the MAE-F
SECAM —Séquentiel couleur à mémoire (‘Sequential colour with memory’)
SGCI —Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel pour les questions de
coopération économique européenne
SNCF —Société nationale des chemins de fer français
SPD —Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
UK —United Kingdom
UN —United Nations
UNCTAD —UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNGG —Uranium Naturel Graphite Gaz, French nuclear reactor
U.S. —United States
Archivalia
AC Archives contemporaines, Fontainebleau

MTP Ministère des Travaux Publics
ACB Archive of the Council of the European Communities, Brussels
AI Archive intermédiaire (records under cataloguing process at time of
consultation)
ACMP Archivo Central del Ministerio de la Presidencia, Madrid
ACS Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome
UCD Ufficio del consigliere diplomatico
AEC Archives of the European Commission, Brussels
MCF Mansholt Cabinet Files (Bordereau de Transmission d’Archives
38/1984)
AGA Archivo General de la Administración del Estado, Alcalá de Henares
MA Ministerio de Agricultura
MAE Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores
MC Ministerio de Comercio
AHBE Archivo Histórico del Banco de España, Madrid. All records refer to
the Foreign Department section.
IEME Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera. All records refer to the
Secretaría General (SG) section. C/A stands for Consejo de
Administración.
AN Archives Nationales, Paris
AJ Commissariat général du Plan de Modernisation et de l’équipement
F10 Ministère de l’Agriculture
ANL Archives Nationales de Luxembourg
AE Records of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
APG Archivo de la Presidencia del Gobierno, Madrid
JE Jefatura del Estado
SCM Secretaría del Consejo de Ministros
CADN Centre des archives contemporaines, Nantes
25POI/1 Records from the French permanent representation to the European
Communities in Brussels, 1958–83
105PO/1 Records from the French embassy in Bonn, 1949–90
105PO/1999038 Records from the French embassy in Bonn, 1955–89
396POF Records from the French embassy in Spain, 1943–78
COCINB Cambra oficial de Comerç, Indústria i Navegació de Barcelona
5N Relacions comercials (Cámara de Comercio)
COM The Commission’s recommendations to the Council are available
online at Historical Archives, European Commission, COM files
(https://ec.europa.eu/historical_archives/archisplus/arcp_central.
cfm?page=com_recherche&reset=true)
xviii Archivalia
EFTA European Free Trade Association, Geneva

CSR Collection of Summary Records
HOD Meetings of Heads of Delegation
SRCM Summary Records of Council Meetings
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
HAEU Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence
BAC EEC and EAEC Commissions
CEAB European Commission
CM1 Special Council of Ministers of the ECSC
CM2 Council of Ministers of the EEC and Euratom
GSPE European Parliament Socialist Group
ME Mouvement européen
MAE-F Ministère des Affaires Extérieures, Paris
DE-CE Direction économique et de coopération européenne
Pool Vert Files containing the French diplomatic records on the Green Pool
Z-EE Series ‘Europe 1949–1955, Espagne’
MAE-I Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome
DGAP Direzzione Generale d’Affari Politici
MAE-S Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid. All records refer to the
Archivo Renovado. The first number corresponds to legajo (file), the
second to expediente (dossier), and the third (if necessary) to carpeta
(folder). The ‘nota(s) para el Sr. Ministro’ are addressed to the
minister of foreign affairs unless otherwise indicated.
MNE Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisbon
SE Secretaria de Estado
DGNEC Direção-Geral dos Negócios Econômicos e Consulares
EOI Organizações Econômicas Internacionais
RQE Repartição das Questões Econômicas
TNA The National Archives at Kew, London
CAB Cabinet papers
ER European Economic Co-operation Committee
MAC Mutual Aid Committee
FO Foreign Office
MAF Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
Introduction
The title of this book—The European Rescue of the Franco Regime—is not worded
to flirt with provocation. It is intended to draw the reader’s attention away from
traditional narratives. The thesis widely sustained by scholars and reflected in
public opinion is that the institutionalized pattern of European integration con-
tributed to isolate and weaken the political regime that generalissimo Francisco
Franco established after his victory in the Spanish civil war (1936–9) and headed
until his death in November 1975. In Spain, during the struggle for democracy
under and immediately following Franco’s dictatorship, full membership in the
European Communities became emblematic of a collective desire for democratic
consolidation and social modernization, as well as the fastest route to elevate the
Spanish standard of living in line with Europe’s most advanced societies. This
notion of the Europeanization of Spain has made it difficult to conceive the
Spanish policy of the European Communities during the Franco era as anything
other than a significant element in the combat against Francoism.* It is indisputable
that the Axis stigma prevented Francoist Spain’s membership to the European
Communities.1 Yet the absence of membership constitutes neither the beginning
nor the end, nor even the most important component of the story. From exclu-
sion, a multiplicity of possibilities sprouted—including active support.
The European-Rescue Concept
This book borrows its central notion from Alan Milward’s The European Rescue
of the Nation-State (1992). Milward’s European-rescue thesis is that after World
War II, certain nation-states that had failed to protect their populations in the
1930s and during the war pooled parcels of their national sovereignty in ways that
allowed them to assist crucial electoral constituencies more than they could have
done individually and so reinforced popular allegiance to the new democracies
under construction. The post-1945 consolidation of socially inclusive democratic
regimes in Western Europe was made possible because the various forms of
* The European Communities were three: the ECSC, established in July 1952 after the Treaty of
Paris of April 1951, and the EEC and the EAEC, established in January 1958 after the Treaties of Rome
of March 1957. Only when referring to the three, the term European Communities is used. After the
April 1965 Treaty of Brussels merged the three Communities, which commenced in July 1967, the
European Community emerged.
The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975. Fernando Guirao, Oxford University Press (2021).
© Fernando Guirao. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198861232.003.0001
2 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975
shared sovereignty sustained the post-war boom throughout the 1950s and into
the 1960s.* Known as the Golden Age of West-European capitalism, the period
this book covers was characterized by unprecedented levels of economic growth,
social cohesion, and political stability. Full employment and emerging welfare
states forged cohesion, while governments’ will and capacity to satisfy the most
pressing and widespread demands of their populations ensured stability.
Common policies in the coal and steel industries, agriculture, and trade, and,
most notably, the EEC customs union aided the governments of the six founding
members of the European Communities to protect critical production sectors.
This defence, intended against the worldwide liberal order dominated by the
United States, was considered indispensable to guarantee domestic employment
and national welfare. Without the EEC and its policies, which facilitated trade
expansion via the intra-EEC preference and a common tariff, the members of the
European Communities could not have offered their citizens the same measure of
security and prosperity that they provided. Enhancing the local virtues of national
reconstruction models through multilateral schemes of co-operation and integra-
tion favoured the maintenance of the post-war economic boom that, in turn,
provided long-term stability to the new democracies emerging from the war.2
The essence of the Milwardian concept is that the pooling of sovereignty
allowed certain nation-states to render their post-war reconstruction models eco-
nomically, politically, and socially viable. Consolidated democracies, like the
United Kingdom and the Scandinavian states, and the authoritarian regimes of
the Iberian Peninsula had other means to identify and assure their primary sup-
porters. In either case, the United Kingdom or Spain, Denmark or Portugal, at
some point, devising the right relationship with the European Communities
became part of each state’s strategy to satisfy large constituencies of their popula-
tion. In this sense, although the rescue concept emerged from the analysis of a
limited number of countries—mainly Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (the Six)—it could be extended
to other countries, including Franco’s Spain.
Whereas Milward identified a rescue of weak European democracies, the
rescue operation detailed in this book concerns an authoritarian regime that
was moulded by fascism in the 1930s. In both cases, the governments in
power—whether by force or through the force of votes—partially surrendered
national sovereignty in search of the affluence that they were otherwise unable to
provide and perceived as vital for the enduring allegiance of their populations.
Economic growth and long-term socio-political stability determined where
the frontier of national sovereignty should be drawn.3 European integration
* Throughout the book ‘Western Europe’ refers to the set of countries that participated in the
attern of institutionalized economic interdependence after 1947, while ‘western Europe’ includes
p
Spain and refers to all those European countries that did not become part of the Communist bloc.
Introduction 3
assisted all nation-states involved, including Spain, in the task of defining a

shared sovereignty able to enhance each state’s national sovereignty. If most of
the West European governments involved in integration wished to consolidate
their new cohesive post-war democratic systems, the purpose of the Spanish
governments’ strategy with the European Communities was to generate the
framework in which the country could prosper and increase the overall stand-
ard of living without questioning their ruling political system. The objective of
the Franco regime in the 1950s–1970s differed little from the rest of Western
Europe economically, although prosperity served as a tool to maintain the dic-
tatorship’s firm grip on the country, not to advance the arrival of democracy.
The Argument
The core argument of this book is that the governments of the Six, collectively via
the European Communities, facilitated the subsistence of the Franco regime.
Trade with the Six improved Spain’s overall economic performance, which
secured Franco’s rule. As it happened with the Six in the 1950s, long-term stabil-
ity was protected by policies implemented to satisfy the constituencies supporting
the existing socio-political model in Spain in the 1960s and early 1970s. The Six
provided Francoist Spain’s economy with a stable supply of essential raw materials
and capital goods and with outlet markets for the country’s main export com-
modities. Through both mechanisms, which did not occur naturally, but as the
result of specific policy decisions, the members of the European Communities
assisted Spanish economic development and supported the stabilization of the
non-democratic political regime ruling Spain.
From 1950 to the mid-1960s, the Six avoided every sign of discrimination
against Spain. By the mid-1960s, in addition to this concession, the Six became
conscious of the need to promote Spanish exports. The expansion of their exports
on the Spanish market was in danger because of mounting trade and payments
imbalances. Import-trade liberalization, first undertaken by Madrid after 1955
and accelerated after Spain’s accession to the OEEC in 1959, could be maintained
only if Spanish exports found the necessary markets. In this regard, the Spanish
government desired an institutional arrangement with the EEC that, free of any
political conditionality, provided ample access to the markets of the Six while
keeping the domestic market essentially closed. Madrid conceived formal rela-
tions with the EEC to protect the interests of Spanish export sectors (i.e. fruit and
vegetable producers and emerging industrial sectors) that were to provide the
necessary resources to finance Spanish development, but in a way that would
avoid endangering other less-competitive economic sectors (i.e. cereals, dairy, the
coal and steel industry and their associated activities, and a wide range of other
industrial activities). What appears as the most telling feature of the story
unfolding in this book is that those negotiating on behalf of the Franco regime
did obtain such an arrangement.
In the second half of the 1960s, the Six negotiated an arrangement to assure the
Franco regime of Spain’s firm European anchorage. Such anchorage came with
the implicit understanding that the Franco regime would guarantee a Western
market economy in the short term, opening it progressively to competition in the
intermediary, and, in the long run, the transition to a West-European political
system. After 1972, despite the evidence that the last two conditions had not over-
come the stage of vague promises, the Nine negotiated the integration of the
Spanish market into the industrial pan-European FTA to pivot around the
European Community after July 1977, in exchange for the Nine gaining free
access to the Spanish market. It was the Spanish cabinet, at the last minute, for
internal reasons of economic protection, that derailed the European Community’s
offer of Europeanization.
The Franco regime was never threatened by any of these arrangements because
the Six (the Nine from 1973) masterfully isolated bilateral negotiations from
mounting political disturbance. The latter derived from the increasing repercus-
sion that political repression in Spain had on European public opinion. Without
unremitting material assistance from Western Europe, it would have been consid-
erably more challenging for the Franco regime to attain the stability that enabled
the dictator to maintain his rule until he died peacefully at 82 years old.
The European Communities’ official policy towards Spain from 1950 to 1975
proceeded from Western Europe’s general attitude towards the Franco regime after
1945. In Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe (Guirao 1998), I show
that the Franco regime suffered no specific discrimination during the immediate
post-war period. This absence of discrimination persisted despite loud anti-Franco
rhetoric. Iron ore and orange exports were Spain’s efficient tools in building a net-
work of bilateral trade agreements with Western Europe that implied, necessarily,
a de facto recognition of the Franco regime. When Spain was excluded from the
European Recovery Program (popularly known as the Marshall Plan) and the co-
operation schemes under the aegis of the OEEC and the EPU, West-European
governments made considerable efforts to diminish the material impact of such
exclusion. These efforts included extending OEEC-sponsored trade-liberalization
measures to Spain on a non-reciprocal and unilateral basis and the granting of
bilateral credit lines to compensate for the lack of EPU credits. The West-European
governments realized that, once the U.S.-sponsored recovery program had been
approved and Spain irreversibly excluded, maintaining and increasing trade with
Spain was necessary to avert a severe setback to the Spanish economy.
Political verbosity chastising Franco contented public opinion in West-
European democracies and fulfilled the political objective of keeping Francoist
Spain at arm’s length. But other means, hidden from public scrutiny, were used to
forestall the collapse of the Spanish economy. The maintenance of active trade
relations with Western Europe constituted not only the main instrument of
Introduction 5
economic and political stability for Spain and its political regime from 1945 but a
determining factor in the Spanish economy’s cumulative productivity improve-
ment, essential to its growth rate under Francoism.4 In the 1950s, initiatives based
on supranational institutions—the Schuman Plan, the Green Pool, and the EEC
Treaty—represented potential threats to Spain’s trading performance in Western
Europe that did not materialize.
Building upon its predecessor’s achievements in time and form, this book is a
first attempt to measure how much European integration damaged the Franco
regime. It starts by measuring the effects of Spain’s non-participation in the
Schuman Plan and the ECSC. Chapter 1—‘Schumania and Spain’s Heavy-Industry
Supply’ concludes that the Franco regime did not need to react to the Schuman
Plan, nor did the ECSC isolate Spain further. So far, however, research on this
historical episode has been conditioned by the assumption that Spain’s non-
democratic political regime rendered it impossible for the country to participate.
For the proponents of the ECSC, that Spain was not a democracy was less rele-
vant than the scant interest offered by the inward-looking Spanish sector. Madrid,
in turn, carried out a simple cost/benefit exercise and concluded that they had
nothing to gain from the initiative. The establishment of the ECSC negatively
affected neither the supply needs nor the main outlet markets of the Spanish
industry. This does not imply that Spain did not have supply problems after 1950;
it means that the establishment of the ECSC did not make matters worse. That the
United Kingdom did not participate excluded Spain’s largest supplier and the
largest outlet market for Spanish iron ores. Moreover, the ECSC Treaty excluded
pyrites altogether, Spain’s largest export item in the field.
Furthermore, the High Authority, the supranational agency expected to have
full executive powers, was first challenged by member-state governments in the
foreign trade sector. The ECSC failed to establish a common commercial policy,
and thus the Six continued to deal bilaterally with the rest of the world. Distortion
of the limited but essential trade between Spain and each of the Six was averted.
There was no reason for Spain to join the Schuman Plan experiment when they
could protect their perceived interests without surrendering a shred of their sov-
ereignty. Only six countries established the European Communities, and most of
the European democracies remained aloof: this historical fact alone should lead
us to ask not why Spain was excluded but why Spain reacted in line with the most
advanced West European democracies. The ‘absent at the creation’ syndrome is an
intellectual construct with little historical grounding, expedient to a particular
interpretation of European integration (Lord 1996).
Political hostility conditioned the terrain Franco’s regime navigated to form
productive relationships with European institutions. The limitations Madrid
faced on their options were real, and the anti-Franco stances went beyond postur-
ing. There is also little doubt that some aspects of European integration placed
pressure on Francoist politics. However, scholars, busy as they are tracking down
distasteful political declarations, have shown little desire to measure the effects of
political hostility towards the Franco regime, which has led them to underrate the
value of the arrangements reached between the European Communities and
Spain. They tend to compare them with ‘the best option’, notionally membership,
which was never discussed. The proper comparison should be with the options at
hand, particularly those that would have clearly discriminated against the polit
ical regime ruling in Spain. In other words, exclusion from the European
Communities was never the worst-case scenario; discrimination was.
The ECSC showed no particular animosity towards Spain. The absence of
democracy in Franco’s Spain did not lead the High Authority of the ECSC to treat
Spain worse than other countries (many West European democracies) outside the
common market of coal, iron ore, scrap, and steel. If anything, by the early 1960s,
the president of the High Authority, Pietro Malvestiti, and other ECSC officials
showed a more favourable attitude to discussing association with Spain than offi-
cial Spanish representatives.5 Yet the High Authority’s conciliatory attitude
offered the Spanish government inadequate political gain to compensate for the
detrimental effects of subjecting domestic production to ECSC regulation.
Madrid did not hesitate to exclude ECSC produce from its trade arrangement
with the Six, negotiated after 1964 and initialled in June 1970, to firmly protect
Spanish coal and steel interests. It was not until after 1974 that the Spanish steel
industry regretted Spain’s lack of ECSC membership: the fall in steel consumption
stemming from economic stagnation led some ECSC governments to impose
anti-dumping measures against state-assisted Spanish steel exports in a way that
would have been impossible had Spain been a member of the ECSC. In sum, the
official Spanish policy towards the ECSC cannot be explained by Spain’s undemo-
cratic politics, political incompetence, or apathy, but rather to the fact that the
Spanish government saw no specific interests at risk. Such an evaluation of the
effects of Schuman’s initiative on official Spanish programmes for the expansion
of steel production helps elucidate the rationale behind policy choices better than
any ideological apriorism. The value of measurement does not lie in the results
(no matter how surprising they turn out to be), but in the fact that the results
establish an objective foundation for future discussion.
The ECSC episode of this book concludes that integration was a revolutionary
method to solve post-war disputes about access conditions to resources between
France and the newly born Federal Republic, but it directly affected six countries.
The main questions for Spain, as much as for any of the eleven members of the
OEEC that did not attend the Schuman Plan negotiations, were how to guarantee
that the new cartel did not impact the Six’s trade relations with the outside world
and how to prevent future contagion to fields more relevant than coal and steel.
The first part of the task was easy to accomplish because Spain and the non-ECSC
OEEC members could count on the governments of the Six for assistance, in con-
frontation with the High Authority. The second was not. This book deals with the
consequences of the contagion.
Introduction 7
Madrid faced serious risks when integration threatened agriculture, as the

Green Pool episode narrates in Chapter 2—‘Franco Spain at the Origins of the
European Agricultural Community’. If the coal and steel sector was inward-
looking, the most dynamic quarters of Spain’s agriculture were outward-looking.
The initiatives advancing integration contemplated, at first, wheat and a few other
commodities, but threatened to modify the production and trade conditions for a
wider range of food products. In the early 1950s, foodstuffs dominated Spain’s
trade, particularly with Western Europe. The percentage of agricultural produce
in total Spanish exports to the Six in 1948–53 was 56%, which reached 61%
when accounting for all of Western Europe. The exportation of foodstuffs was
Spain’s primary mechanism for obtaining the financial means to pay for imports.
Agricultural exports generated around 40% of foreign currency receipts in 1950
(24% if considering exports to Western Europe), the reduction of which would
have a broad detrimental impact. The Spanish authorities paid careful attention
to the Green Pool because a West-European agricultural trade bloc represented a
threat to the entire Spanish economy and consequently, the ruling regime.
At the beginning of 1952, Spain was the only country in western Europe still
rationing bread. In the 1950/1 campaign, bread rations in Spain were still below
their 1935 level despite devoting a substantial part of the country’s foreign-
exchange resources to the purchase of wheat—46% of the agricultural import bill.
The British embassy in Madrid considered the shortfall in wheat supply as ‘the
only factor which in present conditions could precipitate political change.’6 Any
imported wheat was payable in dollars, the currency then in shortest supply, but
imports from the dollar zone would not solve the Spanish supply problem:
U.S. wheat was, on average, 25% more expensive than that of the IWA, and the
official Spanish IWA quota did not cover Spain’s needs.
Fortunately for Spain, during the Green Pool negotiations, the discussion
moved from production to commodity trade arrangements. France and the
Netherlands offered other West-European countries the surpluses they had gen-
erated after 1947 for dollar-savings reasons. Spain concluded a long-term purchasing
contract with France, at a ‘European price’ (about 10% above world-market price)
but not payable in dollars. The prospects of French wheat, plus that from the IWA
and the United States, allowed the Spanish government to avoid bread rationing
after the spring of 1952. Thus, the proposed European Agricultural Community
provided the Franco regime with the opportunity to improve food consumption
and overcome a critical threat to its survival.
Concerning exports, Spain’s access to the Green Pool conference took place,
precisely, when Spanish production and export of oranges, the single most
important staple in Spain’s export trade, had recovered pre-civil-war levels.
Recovery happened because Spain had been able to regain its share of the West
German market, displacing Italian and Moroccan oranges, due to the removal of
quantitative restrictions on citrus fruits in the 1952 bilateral agreement between
the Federal Republic and Spain. By the end of the Green Pool episode, Spain had
been granted de facto OEEC treatment in agricultural trade. Such treatment did
not imply the end to all restrictions, but it did give Spanish exporters equal access
conditions to the OEEC members. It had become evident that for major importing
countries, chief among them the United Kingdom and West Germany, Spanish
exports represented a supply guarantee for a wide range of fruits and vegetables at
competitive prices. During the entire period covered by this book, West Germany
and Britain favoured Spanish exports, most notably in the face of Italian pressure
to set common prices for fruits and vegetables at high levels.
The attempt to set up a European Agricultural Community on the heels of the
Schuman Plan did not adversely impact the Spanish economy, quite the contrary.
The same applies politically. The governments promoting agricultural integration
soon deserted supranational features and moved into trade talks, the traditional
business familiar to the Spanish administration.* West-European ministers of
agriculture witnessed the first attendance of a Franco minister to a ministerial
meeting convened under the pro-European-Unity aura. More importantly, par-
ticipation in the conference led Spain into the OEEC, as an associate member. In
sum, the Green Pool episode reinforced, rather than weakened, the Franco
regime. Naturally, the first statement of the Spanish minister at the agricultural
conference was to declare that European integration could not progress without
‘due respect’ to each country’s political and social institutions.7
By the mid-1950s, the Spanish administration had successfully side-stepped
the negative implications of sectoral integration in Western Europe, as shown in
Part I of this book. For them, any threat to Spain’s trade that might derive from
increasing institutionalized interdependence in Western Europe was surmount
able. The problem appeared when the comfortable status quo that Madrid had
gradually attained within the West-European multilateral system collapsed: the
Six agreed to the establishment of the EEC in 1957 and the seven OEEC countries
outside of the EEC to the creation of the EFTA in 1960. Both initiatives repre-
sented, as Part II of this book phrases it, a challenge requiring a response.
The stabilization of foreign trade, particularly Spanish imports from and
exports to the EEC, was paramount to remove the checks that impeded sustained
growth. The first steps to opening the domestic economy depended on outlet-
market guarantees for products (mainly foodstuffs) that could earn the foreign
currency that Spanish industrialization increasingly required. Import-trade liber-
alization permitted domestic industry to improve its output capacity and overall
productivity. Furthermore, Spain found large and stable outlet markets in Western
Europe for its developing industrial products. In this respect, the EEC’s import
ance to Spanish foreign trade rapidly increased, particularly because of trade with
* The term ‘Spanish administration’ encompasses the Spanish government (both cabinet and the
civil servants serving the different ministerial departments) and other public bodies.
Introduction 9
West Germany—as an outlet market, foreign-exchange provider, and source of

supply. Exports to the EEC were indispensable for the economic transformation
of Spain upon which the country’s future wealth was to be based, and with it,
future social support for Francoism.
The consolidation of the EEC coincided with burgeoning social challenges to
the dictatorship’s legitimacy. In the late 1950s, the exhaustion of the post-civil-
war model of introversion and the establishment of the EEC appeared as sources
of potential instability; external and internal menaces compounded each other.
The dictatorship’s use of external threats to reinforce internal cohesion, a constant
throughout the 1940s, had waned in efficacy by the time the EEC was established,
though it was never entirely abandoned. By then, Francoism had consumed the
reserves of legitimacy it had claimed on the grounds of military victory over the
Communist threat in the Spanish civil war and defence of the fatherland against
international antagonism after World War II. The Spanish regime became aware
that it could not base its rule entirely on pure repression of real or imagined men-
aces, but must also improve the living standards for a large portion of Spain’s
population. Long-term political stability in Spain could not be ensured exclu-
sively through the suppression of domestic opposition by army and police, the
division of political opposition abroad, nor strict censorship of the media. Madrid
would continue to do these things; likewise, to use international action against the
regime to fuel rallies in defence of national pride, to play on fears of renewed civil
strife, to thunder that the alternative to Franco’s power was Communist domin
ation. But future legitimacy also had to derive from generalized economic welfare.
The idea that Spain’s economic, social, and political modernization was
intimately linked to Europe was forged in 1955–9 at the time the leading West-
European governments were involved in promoting and financing the stabilization
of the Spanish economy. The pro-Europe group in the Spanish administration
conceived the idea that trade liberalization, economic stabilization, and European
integration combined constituted the formula to assure the long-term survival of
the Franco regime. The liberal ministers and officials in Madrid agreed that Spain’s
progressive Europeanization, economically and politically, was to take place a la
española; that is, it was to be implemented only if and when Madrid had obtained
the guarantee that it would imply progressiveness, assistance, and political neu-
trality. The issue was, as Chapter 3—‘Opposing Fascism or Accommodating Its
Last Remnant?’ shows, whether European policymakers would disassociate
Spain’s economic and political circumstances.
The growth/democracy binomial is a long-standing tradition in the West, though
not always implying the same policy choices. During the first post-war decade,
the prevailing conviction was that political authoritarianism and economic liber-
alism were natural foes. In the late 1940s, Spanish authorities assured the Western
powers that they were ready to implement a programme of economic and polit
ical liberalization in exchange for assistance. Nobody, least of all Washington,
showed interest in their proposal. This disregard was due not only to the suppli-
cant’s lack of credibility but also to the fact that no political reform of the Franco
regime, short of Franco leaving office, would appease Western desires for democ-
racy in Spain. This attitude changed when economic growth was prioritized over
democratic consolidation and wielded as a cold-war weapon (Rostow 1960). It
was then that the West deemed it appropriate to assist the Franco regime in
redressing the poor state of the Spanish economy by promoting market-oriented
reforms. In their view, economic development would create the conditions for
authoritarian rule to shift towards more representative forms of governance.
Washington liked to stress that change was to be progressive and always under
the direct control of the friendly authoritarian state, assisted if necessary by the
United States and other Western powers. Only under these circumstances would
political change guarantee that the U.S. strategic priorities in the given country
were preserved.8 The logic behind the theory of Spain’s modernization as a pre-
requisite to its future democratization was straightforward: economic growth
would enlarge the social class most interested in gradual change, which would, in
turn, increase the non-violent pressure on the existing authoritarian regime for
further liberal reforms: ‘Viable democracy in Spain’, assured the National Security
Council in 1961, ‘appears only through gradual evolution, accompanied by
improved living standards and a considerable growth of the middle class.’9
De-coupling growth from democratization favoured arguments that only after
years of sustained development could a proper democratization process be rea-
sonably requested. At the time of the stabilization programme, with $300 GNP
per head (nominal prices in 1958), Spanish technocrats established an annual per
capita income of $800 as the threshold for political change. Laureano López Rodó,
head of the economic and social planning commissariat from 1964 and minister
from 1965 to 1974, elevated the threshold to $2,000, which was only reached in
Spain in 1974 yet represented 38.2% of the GNP per head in France.10 Cold-war
warriors provided policymakers in authoritarian Spain and elsewhere with the
excuse to postpone political change indefinitely.
West-European governments favoured a subtler strategy: economic growth,
were it to enable the transition to democracy, should be socially inclusive, and
democratization claims promoted and enhanced with external influence. In west-
ern Europe, authoritarian regimes sprouted from the breakdown of democracies
that had failed to generate wealth and benefit large swaths of their constituencies
(Lipset 1959). Thus, for Spain, the counterpart to West-European support was not
limited to the progressive opening of the Spanish economy but to the Spanish
government providing a programme of political action towards less repressive
and more pluralistic forms of government.
In response, from the late 1950s, policymakers in Spain adopted a reformist,
proto-democratizing rhetoric, in which asociaciones—taken by the West-
European governments as political-party embryos—and the emergence of
Introduction 11
Spanish Europeanism played the role of symbolizing political evolution. This was
enough to establish an intimate conviction in most of the West-European capitals
by the mid-1960s that closer relations with the European Communities would
facilitate political evolution in Spain. West-European governments showed a
desire to strengthen those elements in Spain that, when the moment to confront
the traditional forms of rule that the Franco regime embodied arrived, would tilt
the balance in favour of a West-European democracy.11
The official request of February 1962 to open negotiations with the EEC for an
adequate mutual accommodation was expressive of Spain’s goal to obtain a cred
ible commitment from the Six in favour of the country’s economic development
and political evolution at the regime’s desired pace. Economically, the official
Spanish EEC policy from the late 1950s to the end of the Franco era targeted
obtaining robust access to the Common Market for Spanish agricultural and
industrial exports (with ample continuity assurances across time and varying
political circumstances) and the continuance of sturdy protection for a substan-
tial part of the domestic market. Both circumstances were intrinsically linked to
the maintenance, Franco regnante, of Spain’s political structures. The two impera-
tives could not be separated.
Excluding retrograde fascists and those industrialists captive to a closed
economy, nobody in Spain seemed to doubt that closer association with the
EEC was the way to invigorate the country’s productive capacity, guarantee a
market-economy orientation, improve the collective standard of living for the
majority of Spaniards, and satisfy their aspirations for more freedom. Improved
economic performance was to result in social peace, which was, in turn, to
reduce the pressure on the regime’s political and social control schemes, and
thus repression. The Spanish government’s response to the EEC brought the Six,
implicitly if not explicitly, to assume some degree of responsibility towards the
country’s future economic stability, which, in turn, meant the maintenance of the
régime. The Six took some time to accept this logic, eventually doing so in 1964.
The critical moment in the European rescue of the Franco regime took place
when the Six accepted that the Europeanization of Spain should not be limited to
solving bilateral disputes, but also involved addressing the issue of Spain’s place in
the future integration of Europe; in other words, when the Six accepted Spain’s
association in the general terms requested by Madrid. Immediately after the
Spanish government announced its official application for closer relations with
the EEC, an editorial note in Agence Europe, a Luxembourg news agency serving
as the unofficial speaker of the EEC Commission*, framed the Spanish question
in a way that shows that Madrid’s motivating interests did not differ substantially
* Throughout the book, ‘the Commission of the EEC’ or ‘the EEC Commission’ is used before
January 1967. ‘European Commission’ is reserved for when the executives of the three Communities
merged into a single Commission.
from the Six’s: ‘The problem, in short, is to find the best way to help Spain back
into the European family and not the best way to keep her out.’12 The reader will
decide whether the Six played an active role in rescuing Franco’s Spain, or if they
were merely acquiescent in allowing it to survive. The Spanish question is, in
essence, how the Six interpreted—what a French ambassador called—‘Europe’s
responsibility towards Spain’.13
For the Six, as shown in Chapter 4, the main question regarding Spain was
whether they would grant the preference rather than how it should be articulated.
Because granting the preference meant helping Spain both economically and
politically, this was the most relevant question for the Community’s officials and
governments concerning Franco Spain during the whole period covered in this
book. It was a decision not justified by the need to compensate Spain for any dis-
criminatory effects caused by the establishment of the EEC. Official records and
trade data show that the EEC did not discriminate against Spanish products. The
orange trade, Spain’s most important export staple, reveals that the various orange
wars that Spanish media aired were fabrications or precautionary measures
designed to either increase the Spanish negotiators’ bargaining power or hide
their weaknesses in EEC–Spanish relations.
The EEC’s policy on Franco Spain was forged around the ideological justifica-
tion that close relations between the dictatorships of less-developed countries and
the countries of Western Europe would serve to promote economic development
and social change in less-developed countries. These changes would naturally
lead to the progressive emergence of a collective desire for political change. The
leading members of the European Communities during the period this book
covers—France and West Germany—acted accordingly and exercised due influ-
ence on their peers. In the pursuit of their own interests, the European
Community and its member-states opted to induce progressive and comprehen-
sive reform towards West-European institutional standards—such is the
Community’s definition of ‘Europeanization’—over punishment or rupture, as
the best guarantee against any sudden economic, social, and political breakdown.
The political debate within the most influential West-European governments was
limited to the speed of such changes, not to the validity of the assumption. The
Europeanization/democratization duality implied that closer relations with the
EEC would promote development and convergence towards West-European
standards, from which democratization would spring; this, in turn, would permit
proper consideration for Spain’s membership to the European Communities.
In the meantime, however, the task was merely to find the most suitable
means of accommodating the Franco regime within Europe. This was the object
of the negotiations from September 1967 to June 1970, dealt with in
Chapter 5—‘Negotiating the Preference’. This piece of the story is fascinating
because the Spanish negotiators managed to obtain what they requested. The
Spanish government’s main goal was to convince the Six that only through
Introduction 13
economic development would the political regime that rose from the civil war
evolve towards governance comparable to the rest of Western Europe. Their
specific objectives were, first, that Spain’s main export commodities were not
discriminated, particularly due to the CAP; second, that once Spanish industry
could export, it would have generous access to the Common Market; third, that
both advantages would be conferred without any reciprocal requirement that
Spain open its domestic market to the Six beyond symbolic gestures; and finally,
that there would be no political conditionality attached.
In the 1960s, the Spanish authorities were well aware that stable supply sources
and outlet markets for some of the country’s export staples were essential to sus-
tain their chosen pattern of economic development. That without West-European
political support and material assistance, the Spanish economy would not suc-
cessfully transition away from introversion. For this reason, Madrid struggled to
secure the institutional linkage that guaranteed that the EEC would account for
Spanish interests whenever the Six further integrated. This institutional solution
materialized, early in the summer of 1970, through an agreement that granted
lucrative trade preferences to the Spanish economy and that implicitly committed
the Six to maintain political stability in Spain.
The basic feature of the June 1970 Agreement between Spain and the European
Economic Community, as explained in Chapter 6—‘Marketing the 1970 Agreement’,
was the negotiated asymmetry favouring Spain. Franco’s government succeeded
in securing irreversible access to the Common Market, with the most favourable
terms possible for a non-member of the EEC customs union and without reciprocal
access for EEC producers to the Spanish market. Additionally, the 1970 Agreement
was not a mere trade agreement, although it did not carry the ‘association’ rank of
Article 238 of the EEC Treaty. This was an extraordinary success, secured despite
increasing the political costs for the Six/Nine and without Madrid having to pay
the price of political evolution. Ministers and officials of the Spanish administra-
tion only accepted that the Franco regime should evolve—no further precision
was ever offered beyond vague statements that they had their particular under-
standing of democracy. The speed and the destination, the how and the when,
should be left entirely up to Spain. The 1970 Agreement represented—in the words
of a member of the Spanish Cortes (the Franco regime’s corporative assembly)—‘a
protective shield for non-aggression’ granted by the Six in favour of Franco’s Spain.14
This book offers a detailed account of negotiations with the European Community.
It shows how difficult it is for a third party to negotiate with a bloc of countries
that make unanimous decisions and negotiate through delegation. The Six and
the EEC Council and Commission dealt with a relatively weak partner. The latter
was ruled by a man who personified the last stronghold of European fascism,
against which a six-year war was fought and against which, in theory, the union of
European democrats emerged. Meanwhile, Spain faced a set of countries that
together formed an omnipotent trading bloc and embodied the highest Western
values. Despite the seemingly unbalanced point of departure and the unequal
negotiating capacity of the parties, Franco’s negotiators succeeded in imposing
the essential aspects of their objectives.
The 1970 Agreement did not entirely satisfy either party but determined the
Spanish question until accession was conceivable. Chapter 7—‘The Spanish
Attempt to Expand Unilateral Preferences’ shows that no alternatives to the
EEC existed for Spain. At the same time, Chapter 8—‘The European Attempt to
Topple Spain’s Industrial Protection’ shows that the Six/Nine were resolute in
associating Franco’s Spain with the EEC—in the form of an industrial FTA—to
gain access to the Spanish market, the only large western European market that
remained closed to their producers. Both parties were condemned to take each
other as they were.
Madrid wanted further preference in agricultural trade, to the point of reach-
ing a quasi-membership status in the CAP, without having to face the political
struggle of seeking EEC membership. The Six thought that any agreement with
Spain after The Hague summit of December 1969 would need to be adapted to
the first enlargement of the European Communities, as well as to the industrial
free-trade arrangements that the Six had decided to enter into with the rest of
Western Europe and some Mediterranean countries. If the Spaniards chose not to
follow the Six’s designs, the practical value of the 1970 preference would dimin-
ish. How long would the EEC take to grant better access terms to third countries
other than Spain? How long would Madrid resist opening Spain’s domestic mar-
ket in exchange for retaining generous access to the Common Market? The
Spanish government entrusted the Directorate-General for International
Economic Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid and the perman
ent Spanish representation to the European Communities in Brussels, under the
leadership of José Luis Cerón (future minister of commerce, 1975) and Alberto
Ullastres (former minister of commerce, 1957–65) respectively, with the task of
retaining the preference. They were to accomplish this feat either through the re-
negotiation of the original terms of the 1970 Agreement with the Six or the nego-
tiation of a new agreement with the Nine. The Spaniards succeeded, Part III
shows, even as they actively and consciously foiled both endeavours; the 1970
Agreement continued to operate to the full benefit of the Spanish economy and
political regime.
The Six (Nine after 1972) guaranteed that the main source of Community sup-
port for the Franco regime operated unconditionally. Historical documentation
in Brussels, Florence, Luxembourg, Madrid, Nantes, and Paris shows that no one
warned the Spanish government that the Nine might terminate the 1970
Agreement: not when the Spanish government scorned its legal obligations under
the letter of the agreement; nor when administrative manoeuvring impeded the
effective implementation of the agreement where it favoured the Nine; nor when
Madrid forced a year-long standstill after the deadline for the mandatory
Introduction 15
adaptation of the 1970 Agreement to conditions arising from the first enlarge-
ment of the European Community arrived on 31 December 1972; nor when the
new deadline passed and Spain managed to place itself sine die on a temporary
solution; nor when the cabinet in Madrid refused, at the last minute, to assent to
the outcome of the latest round of the negotiations to include Spain in the pan-
European industrial FTA to be established in July 1977; nor after any of the
regime’s copious political rights abuses against trade unionists, workers, and dis-
sidents of all kinds through court-martials during the progressive association of
Spain to the European Community. Spanish industrial and agricultural producers
found their access to the Common Market permanently unchallenged. Despite
blatant administrative irregularities and socio-political repression, the 1970
Agreement that the Six negotiated as an interim agreement to be immediately re-
negotiated and that was extremely favourable to the political interests of the
Franco regime persisted as the legal framework for the official relationship
between the EEC and Spain until the Kingdom of Spain became a full member of
the three Communities. This is perhaps the crudest episode of the European res-
cue of the Franco regime.
The idea that the 1970 Agreement was a tool for the progressive opening of the
Spanish market and political system was aired while the terms of the arrangement
were being discussed publicly. When confronting the European Parliament,
defenders of the agreement argued that negotiations were not about oranges and
tariffs, but a surreptitious strategy to advance political liberalization under the
Franco regime. The connection between Spain’s relationship with the EEC and
political liberalization became an indisputable article of faith among many state
and Community actors. The problem for the European Community was that the
Franco regime’s level of repression increased between 1970 and 1975, rather than
decreased and that it carried no toll in bilateral negotiations (Guirao 2007).
Whether West-European governments’ conviction that economic development
would lead to trauma-free political evolution was genuine is relevant, but not cen-
tral to this book’s argument. What matters most is that the action programme
rationalized by this conviction implied the stabilization of the political regime in
Spain without bringing the Spaniards closer to political or institutional democracy.
At this point, I must address a possible protest from the reader. Namely, that
Western Europe acting in favour of the stabilization of the Spanish economy may
have been beneficial for Franco’s regime in that it was beneficial for the Spanish
people. This could be followed up with the argument that, in the long term, the
economic-development thesis held true. Many suggest that the key to the success
of Spain’s democratic transition was the level of development reached by the end
of 1975. Furthermore, that the economic and social development was closely tied
to Spain’s place in Western Europe. Based on this, many would say that the West-
European strategy towards Franco’s Spain was successful because the economic
development that their policies aided ultimately facilitated the arrival of
democracy to Spain. I have already mentioned that this sort of association pre-
supposes a necessary sequence of events in which democratization comes last.
It might be true that the EEC’s motives for accommodating Franco’s Spain were
not entirely cynical, and there was a genuine belief that economic development
would lead Spain to more liberal forms of government. The question is how long
bien-pensant officials of the European Community and West-European govern-
ments were willing to believe that by forming ties with the regime they could
exert pressure to moderate the regime’s excesses before realizing that their
Europeanization/democracy binomial was inoperative. Still, one might protest:
what would have happened if Western Europe had allowed the Spanish economy
to collapse in the 1950s? What if political conditionality had blocked trade talks
with Spain in the 1960s? Would such dire outcomes have been preferable? The
short answer is no. But here we speak of extreme scenarios when, in reality, the
Spanish question played out in the vast morass between unyielding punishment
and open-armed acceptance of the Franco regime.
This book argues that the European Community could have promoted devel-
opment in Spain while, at the same time, inducing the Franco regime to move
towards less repression and more representation, but it did not. When abuses
with an international public dimension took place and European institutions
were called to exert their influence, division and self-interest prevailed, and the
EEC’s executive bodies chose the easy road of further accommodation. It is diffi-
cult not to conclude that the ideology of economic development conveniently
provided the West-European governments’ rationalization to pursue their eco-
nomic interests in Spain while protecting a regime that was in no rush to loosen
its reins on the country. But even if evidence of good intentions emerges, this
book highlights Western Europe’s total failure to exert any real pressure on the
Franco regime to curb its authoritarian practices.
The 1970 Agreement represented an episode of aborted political and commer-
cial liberalization; it exemplified Madrid’s desire to shelter the régime and the
domestic market from the Six’s liberal assault while obtaining generous access to
the Common Market. Although it took the Six eight years to accept the opening
of their markets to a mélange of Spanish agricultural and industrial products, the
1970 Agreement favoured a constant expansion of Spanish exports to the EEC
markets, but it did not serve to expand EEC exports to Spain (see Figure 1). The
Six liberalized industrial imports from Spain and guaranteed outlets for Spain’s
main export commodities while the Spanish government was successful in con-
taining imports from the Six.
In the period preceding the preference to Spain (partially effective from 1969),
exports to the Six as a whole were performing below the general trend. Under the
1970 Agreement, Spanish exports to the EEC countries grew faster (annual
growth rate 1969–77, 16.3%) than exports to the rest of the world (11.6%).
Spanish foodstuffs encountered access problems to the Common Market, but
Introduction 17
1.000
Log.
100
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Exports to the Six Exports to the rest of the world

1.000
Log.
100
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Imports from the Six Imports from the rest of the world
Figure 1 Spain’s trade with the Six and the rest of the world, 1965–77 (1963 pesetas)
(1965 = 100)
Notes: The Spanish tariff territory encompasses the Peninsula, the Balearic and Canary islands, and
the Spanish provinces in North Africa, i.e. Ceuta and Melilla. Current values (fob for exports and cif
for imports) have been deflated by the price index specifically compiled for foreign trade by the
National Statistical Institute, based on 1963 (Presidencia del Gobierno 1976). Current values from
1976 and 1977 have been deflated by ‘Números índices de precios’, Anuario Estadístico de España
1983, pp. 221–22. The resulting series of imports and exports in pesetas of 1963 illustrate the real
increase—not that induced by inflation—of Spanish foreign trade.
Source: Official Spanish trade statistics produced by the Dirección General de Aduanas in its Estadística
del comercio exterior de España, annual volumes.
never more than any non-CAP country. In the industrial field, with the 1970
Agreement, the European Community renounced its protection vis-à-vis Spain:
import liberalization concerning Spanish industry involved the reduction of tariff
protection to irrelevant levels (a 3% ad valorem duty, on average after 1 January
1973) and the removal of quantitative restrictions (excluding refined petroleum
products and cotton tissues) and other non-tariff barriers to trade. This position
contrasted with the Spanish import trends. Between 1965 and 1967 Spanish
imports from the Six and the rest of the world maintained a similar trend, but
from then until 1977 imports from the rest of the world showed greater buoyancy
than imports from the Six, the only exception being 1973. The Six, due to their
overall level of economic and technological development, geographic proximity,
long-standing connections with diverse Spanish business interests, and most
importantly because Spain, with the 1970 Agreement, had theoretically embarked
on a progressive market opening and trade liberalization favouring these coun-
tries, should have been the main beneficiaries of the increase in Spanish pur-
chases. This is not what happened. The 1970 Agreement did not appear to favour
either the expansion of Spain’s EEC imports any more than those from other
markets, which supposedly had to confront discriminatory treatment in the
Spanish market compared to EEC exporters; nor did it grant them greater stabil-
ity. The impact of the 1970 Agreement on bilateral trade flows was far more
unbalanced than had been anticipated. The Italian Christian-Democrat MEP
Giovanni Boano verbalized the assumption that characterized the official EEC
view of the 1970 Agreement:
The trade agreement gives the impression, at first sight, that its terms are far
more favourable to Spain than to the Community. However, taking into account
the overall situation, we realize the advantages that, in the long run, will benefit
the trading partner whose economic structure is most advanced, by the mere
fact of the possibility which is offered for access to a market which otherwise
would remain closed. Indeed, experience has shown that the concession of even
limited preferences offers to the party which is economically the most developed
market access. We can therefore hold that the agreement with Spain opens up
interesting prospects for industrial exports from the EEC, thanks mainly to the
full liberalisation of the Spanish market over the next six years.15
When the Six made the decision, in December 1964, to open exploratory talks
with Spain for a special bilateral arrangement, the disparity in development levels
between the parties was perceived as nearly insurmountable. But from 1950 to
1975, the country grew at an accumulative annual rate of 6.6% (5.5% in per capita
terms), and from 1964 to 1975 Spain’s per capita GDP climbed from 66% of the
Six’s to 85% (see Figure 2). Spain was the second-fastest growing economy world-
wide in the 1960s and early 1970s, second only to Japan.
Introduction 19
85
75
65
%
55
45
35
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Figure 2 Spain’s per capita income as percentage of that of the Six, 1950–77
(Geary-Khamis 1990 US$)
Source: Appendix to Carreras and Tafunell (2004).
That the 1970 Agreement worked so favourably for Spain owed less to the parties’
relative levels of development than to the Spaniards’ capacity to both avoid imple-
menting the legal obligations deriving from the text of the agreement and invent
obstacles to the expansion of EEC exports on the Spanish market. The Six thought
they were granting gracious and temporary concessions to a developing country,
but the Spanish administration managed to transform them into wide apertures
for long-term Common-Market penetration for Spain’s most dynamic industrial
sectors. This was possible because the EEC had poorly negotiated. Madrid bene-
fitted from the natural disequilibrium of the original agreement, while also abus-
ing its many flaws and re-interpreting many ambiguous clauses. Ambiguity had
been vital to an agreement with the Six, but it only benefitted the Spanish dicta-
torship. The kind of import liberalization that the Six thought they would be able
to impose on the Spanish authorities through the 1970 Agreement was limited,
even if the Spanish government accepted the Commission’s interpretation of all
the liberalization clauses inked in the agreement. The Six had not sought to
impose any radical change to the Spanish trade policy related to import substitu-
tion. Limited though it may have been, the Six did intend to induce a restructur-
ing of the Spanish trade regime, of which the Six would benefit in preference,
though not exclusively. The problem was that the official device conceived by the
Six to enhance import-trade liberalization in Spain was ineffective when con-
fronting the complexity of state intervention in that country.
The Spanish government planned to take maximum advantage of concessions
for the promotion of Spanish exports on the Common Market, while simultan
eously avoiding the fulfilment of their legal obligations to remove tariff and
non-tariff barriers on importation from the European Community. The Spanish

administration made every possible recourse to contain imports from the Six:
high and arbitrary tariff protection, tax distortion, state trade, import quotas,
and all the administrative barriers that the imagination of the personnel in
charge of trade could think up for the protection of key economic sectors, with
an intense use for the automobile and chemical industries. Despite the various
trade-liberalization episodes recorded since the mid-1950s, which the members
of the European Community tried to reinforce through a reciprocal trade-
liberalization agreement, the Spanish trade policy at the end of the Franco
regime’s reign remained strongly intervened, with straight import prohibitions
whenever it was thought necessary to protect domestic production. The core
objective of the Spanish government’s commercial policy was, as the European
Commission experts put it, ‘to contain imports while developing exports’.16
The Six needed to reverse this by breaking the protection of the Spanish indus-
trial market. This is what led the Six/Nine to accelerate the transformation of the
1970 Agreement into an FTA to commence at the end of the transition period
of the first enlargement, i.e. July 1977. From 1972 onwards, the European
Community initiated a new negotiation process with the government of Spain
that implied, by all means, a more intimate relationship with Franco Spain, at the
moment in which repression coincided with the dictatorship’s decline. In the end,
it was the Spanish government, not the governments of the Nine, who did not
ratify the FTA agreement, concluded in spring 1975. Madrid wanted to avoid the
opening of the Spanish domestic market. But the institutions of the European
Community decided to present their decision to ‘suspend negotiations’ with
Spain as their own response to the Franco regime’s final human-rights abuse case.
West-European governments and the European Community built a public dis-
course that distracted public opinion away from what they were doing. The gov-
ernments of the Nine were willing to accommodate what many, including prime
ministers of these very same governments, considered a fascist government. The
discourse on values hid material interests. The ideological commitment of EEC
governments to Spain was predominantly a rationalization of material interests:
the Spanish market offered enormous business potential after two decades of
complete protection. The Six failed to tap the potential through the 1970
Agreement, but the Nine believed until the final hour of Francoism that they
would be able to gain access to Spain’s large domestic market through the trans
formation of the 1970 Agreement into an FTA. The material interest that they
held in the Spanish market made the EEC irrelevant in promoting political evolu-
tion under the Franco regime. Indeed, the EEC attitude and policy reinforced
rather than weakened the non-democratic profile of the Franco regime.
That Madrid managed to boycott the European Community’s efforts to gauge
Spain towards a pan-European industrial FTA by mid-1977 matters because in
1970–5 Spain was not seen only as a neighbouring country but as a future
Introduction 21
membership candidate to the European Communities. Spain’s candidacy would

have to wait until the country’s particular political circumstances ended but,
given the age and health of the man responsible for those circumstances, the offi-
cial application for membership was on the horizon. When it was issued, in July
1977, the European Commission regretted the official Spanish attitude after 1970.
Unlike in the case of Greece and Portugal, whose agreements with the EEC were
fully implemented in the tariff field, the 1970 Agreement did not imply the
‘decisive progress’ that should have been made ‘by the time of accession.’ The lack
of convergence in customs matters would necessarily add ‘major difficulties’ at
accession negotiations.17 In sum, the 1970 Agreement did not serve to push the
Spanish economy closer to the competitive circumstances of the Common Market.
The final section of this book, ‘Finale: The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy’,
concludes that Franco Spain’s success in promoting Spanish export trade while
retaining full control over the country’s import policy was detrimental for the
overall interests of all the parties involved, whether the Spanish population or
Western Europe. It invites economic historians to estimate the costs of the official
Spanish policy on the EEC concerning the inefficient allocation of resources,
weak technological transfer, lesser accompanying investment, and limitations to
total factor productivity increases. How much welfare were the Spaniards
deprived of because the Spanish government barely fulfilled its liberal obligations
regarding the EEC? Political historians, in turn, should elucidate what specific
interests explain, in each case, why, if official Spanish trade practices in export
promotion and import restriction gave the Six every incentive to denounce the
1970 Agreement, apart from obvious political reasons, they did not denounce it.
I have searched for documentary and statistical data to support or reject claims
about the relative success of the European Communities’ policy towards the
Franco regime. The results are surprising. In every important episode narrated in
this book, maximum care was taken, whether in Luxembourg or Brussels, to
reduce the detrimental effects of the Six/Nine’s decisions on Spain. Simply put, the
most damaging option for Spain was not considered by the ministerial Council of
the European Communities, the ECSC High Authority, or the EEC/European
Commission. Instead, they considered Spain’s interests and frequently adopted
policies that had a low cost for Spain. This conciliatory approach was constant,
from the ECSC in the early 1950s to the last decisions adopted by the Council
before the death of the dictator in 1975. The historical records show that the
European Communities sought to minimize the difficulties that their co-operative
arrangements caused for Spain. The members of the European Communities never
conceived any strategy, policy, or measure designed to penalize Spain for its
authoritarian practice. The story that emerges is revealing in regards to the politics
of the European Community as much as to Spain. It reveals that co-operation with
the Franco regime was an acceptable price to keep Spain within the Six’s area of
influence. Further research in Greece, Portugal, Israel, Turkey, and Yugoslavia will
tell whether relations between the European Community and Franco Spain repre-
sent the exception or the rule. So far, the research on other cases does not mitigate
the unflattering image that this book offers.
The consistency of the European Communities’ policy on Spain from 1950 to
1975 permits us to speak of a European-rescue operation in several respects. The
European Communities freed the Franco regime from suffering the material con-
sequences of the confinement in which they could have placed it due to its
authoritarianism. Through their actions, the members of the European
Communities granted the Franco regime the opportunity to obtain more signifi-
cant domestic support than it could have achieved on its own. Negotiations and
agreements with the EEC granted the régime the opportunity to present itself as
politically moderate and converging towards Western practices: a modernizer in
economic terms and the country’s best guarantee for a safe future. After 1959, the
various Spanish governments insisted that it was ‘Spain’—not Franco’s Spain—
that requested accommodation in European integration schemes.
The lack of a trenchant denunciation of authoritarian action by the EEC
Council and Commission led the Franco regime to construct a discourse of a pro-
gressive evolution towards Western standards celebrated and praised by numerous
European ministers visiting Spain in the late 1950s, the 1960s, and early 1970s. At
home, the regime also managed to present itself as the guarantee that any future
participation in integration affairs would be carried out under complete control
of the Spanish government and only once the domestic economy had successfully
gone through the necessary, but progressive, modernization process. Within
Spain, a wide coalition of forces came to believe that the exceptionally talented
officials that operated in commerce and diplomacy for the Franco regime would
be capable of assuring a long-term relationship with the EEC that economically
and politically anchored the country to the West. By the time of the Portuguese
revolution, in the spring of 1974, it had become clear to everyone that only a
democratic regime could enjoy the full benefits of Community membership, but
also that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy was not necessarily
uniform, that there was a specific Spanish route to ‘democracy and Europe’. But
this is a story for another book.
Comparable Research
Julio Crespo, Spain and the Process of European Integration (2000) is the primary
publication in English dealing with some of the contents of the book in your
hands. Crespo’s book represents the classic vision of European integration serving
to isolate the Franco regime. Crespo offers a collection of political declarations
against the Franco regime without ever considering if and how they managed to
condition the room for the economic and political manoeuvring of the Franco
regime. The European Rescue of the Franco Regime widens the temporary,
Introduction 23
thematic, source-based, and comparative scope of Crespo’s book for the Franco
era. It includes the ECSC years; covers the economic, as much as the political
dimensions of the relationship between the European Communities and the
Spanish dictatorship; widens the documentary base of analysis from, essentially,
Spanish diplomatic papers to archives in seven countries (Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom); and places Spain in a
comparative perspective with, among others, Greece, Israel, Portugal, and Turkey.
Matthieu Trouvé, L’Espagne et l’Europe (2008) is the French equivalent to Crespo
but with French sources. Thus, the differences mentioned above also apply here.
Notwithstanding this, Trouvé shows a more solid analysis than Crespo’s. The most
interesting aspect of the comparison between Trouvé’s book and The European
Rescue of the Franco Regime is that both arrive at opposite conclusions using simi-
lar French and Spanish sources.
In recent years, Jesús M. Zaratiegui has published a trilogy on the European
integration policy of the Franco regime. Zaratiegui needs three volumes to cover
half of Trouvé’s narrative period, making recourse to many private archives in
addition to the French and Spanish diplomatic records. Quite unfortunately,
Zaratiegui adds no more precision to the historical facts that sustain previous
accounts. Several additional Spanish publications deal with some of the issues
dealt with in this book. La Porte (1992), Moreno (1998), Senante (2006), and
Cavallaro (2009) do not question the traditional narrative that contemporaries
created to accommodate their own actions. This literature is based, mainly, on
Spanish diplomatic records, disregards the economic dimension in the
Communities–Spain relations, requires comparative perspective, and falls short
of measuring the effects of the alleged discrimination. Víctor Fernández Soriano
(2015) deals with the human-rights dimension of the Spanish question, together
with the Greek military regime and Portuguese authoritarianism. The main dif-
ference between Fernández’s book and The European Rescue of the Franco Regime
(when complemented with Guirao 2007) is that while the former compiles state-
ments and builds a narrative based on declarative principles, the latter measures
the impact of concrete policy action. I am not interested in window-dressing dec-
larations that had no actual effect, but in the policy decisions that had the poten-
tial to change the nasty reality of authoritarian regimes. Such opposing methods
lead necessarily to opposite conclusions.
The body of literature mentioned shares the interpretation method. These
authors mainly see a foreign-policy objective in the Spanish EEC policy and the
willingness to keep Franco’s Spain at arm’s length in the EEC policy on Spain. The
reality coming to light from the records I have consulted is more sophisticated on
both sides. The authors mentioned have assumed that the goal driving the actions
of the European Communities’ member governments, as well as the Communities’
institutions, whether the EEC Commission, the Council of Ministers of the
Communities, the European Council, or the European Parliament, was to
politically integrate the member-states. Within this purposive approach, the
non-democratic nature of the Spanish regime meant the natural exclusion of

Spain from European integration. The object of their research was to underline
this circumstance, neglecting other forms of closer relations between Franco’s
Spain and the European Communities and their effects on the economic and
political evolution of both parties. The historical records show that instead of a
clarion commitment to a universally accepted goal, the Six favoured different
forms of integration, the pace and scope of which was not pre-determined but
the result of hard bargaining between opposing interpretations, interests, aims,
and purposes.
Karamouzi (2014), Lopes (2014), Zaccaria (2016), and Heimann/Herman
(2019) constitute the sort of literature in English within which analysts might
place The European Rescue of the Franco Regime for a comparative purpose. The
combined recourse to the set of works listed will provide the interested reader
with a rich view of the institutional arrangements that the European peripherals,
i.e. Greece, Israel, Portugal, Spain, and Yugoslavia, reached with the European
Communities in the 1950s–70s.
Three Closing Remarks
Three additional clarifications will close this introduction. First, the research lead-
ing to this book has not been carried out in an intellectual void. Scholars have long
been revealing Spain’s increasing participation in West-European networks of
commerce, mobility by workers and tourists, science and technology, and mass
culture during the course of the Franco period. Valuable work is available also on
Spain’s bilateral relations with many European countries, as well as on the relation-
ships established between corporate groups acting under Francoism as well as
opponents (of all ideological tendencies) to Francoism and their counterparts in
Western Europe. These studies show that Spain and the Spaniards were not iso-
lated in European affairs and help to establish possible links between economic
and social development under and immediately following Francoism. The reader
will find references to relevant studies on the previous topics in the various chap-
ters of this book, when pertinent. This book, another piece in the giant puzzle of
Spain’s contemporary history, focuses on the institutionalized pattern of Spain’s
progressive association with the European Communities, rather than with the pro-
gressive Europeanization of Spain under Francoism. They are two different topics,
often confused, not clearly determined or delimited to each other. This work does
not aim to show the indisputable change of Spanish society (being influenced by
and adopting western models) that took place during the Franco era. This work
seeks to illustrate the difficulties that West-European democratic governments,
when acting together through the European Communities or the EFTA, encoun-
tered when dealing with the principal non-democratic regime in western Europe.
Introduction 25
This book focuses on the members of the European Communities collectively

exercising their competencies in the Council of Ministers, and when they decided
not to, in determining their pattern of collective action. This book is not con-
cerned with the public position of any given government acting within the
domestic realm. There are countless occasions when a given government
addressed rhetoric to its national constituency in flat contradiction with what it
had agreed in the secrecy of EEC Council meetings. For the purposes of this
book, only the contexts, mechanisms, and effects of collective action merit atten-
tion when determining the historical role of the European Communities. It was
when acting collectively that the Six/Nine could condition the European
Community’s policy options regarding Franco’s Spain. Some representatives’ pro-
tests delayed specific measures, but none ever vetoed progressive Spanish associ
ation with the European Community. Austria and the United Kingdom, though,
did merit a veto that impeded, for years, the Six negotiating association and
membership, respectively.
Furthermore, I am interested in those who made decisions (in Spain and at the
Community level) affecting EEC–Spain relations, the decision-making process,
and the effects of these decisions in the short and long run. This book’s focus is
not on specific individuals adopting personal positions in favour or against the
Europeanization of Spain, nor on specific groups such as trade unions, political
parties, or employers’ organizations, except when there are visible traces of their
impact on Community policymaking. What this book is interested in are the facts
that fed the precise policymaking that affected the accommodation of Franco’s
Spain in the integration of Europe.
Second, the institutionalized pattern of European integration encompasses
also the EFTA. It is clear that the EEC was the most important element of integra-
tion after 1958, but the Geneva-based organization should not be neglected when
dealing with the European policy of the Franco regime. In this respect, this book
brings EFTA back to life concerning Spain before 1977. This book will also refer
to various integration attempts: coal and steel, agriculture, transport, and foreign
trade. Integration initiatives were not equally effective in all fields, nor was Spain
affected equally by all forms of integration. The book’s primary interest lies in
trade, where the most fruitful forms of integration took place.
The list of topics covered in this book could have been more exhaustive, to the
peril of challenging the patience of the readers. It could have involved the evalu
ation of the relative importance of economic and financial assistance received
from the United States since 1950, the pro-European Unity movement in Spain
and its connections with twin associations beyond the Pyrenees, the domestic
and international components of the stabilization programme of 1959, the pro-
cesses of import-trade liberalization under the aegis of the OEEC after 1955 and
of tariff reform for GATT membership in the early 1960s, Madrid’s relationship
with the EAEC and the launching of the Spanish nuclear programme, and, finally,
the degree of economic and political Europeanization that the 1970 Agreement
produced in Spain. Incorporating these topics into the story would have been
entirely pertinent to its central concept, but it would have involved further delay-
ing the publication of this volume. All these themes and topics will see the light of
day in subsequent publications.
The third and final observation concerns terminology. I would like to alert the
reader against the confusion of mistaking the part (the EEC) for the whole (the
European Community). But quite frequently, when European integration is
touched upon, the whole also is taken for its parts. Many say ‘Europe’ when refer-
ring to the European Community, and quite frequently present declarations or
actions of individuals, single national governments, or particular institutions as
representing ‘European’ action. The use and abuse of this synecdoche have con-
tributed to the European Community’s receipt of credit or censure for a more
extensive list of achievements and failures than historical facts allow; termino-
logical confusion leads directly to historical distortion.
The EEC represents a further source of confusion, given the complexity of its
institutional setting. An effort must always be made to identify who is talking ‘on
behalf of ’ the EEC. Many take resolutions adopted at the European Assembly
(European Parliament after 1979) to represent the official EEC position when this
is not the case. During the whole period covered by this book, any opinion
expressed at the European Assembly that ran contrary to a decision on Spain by
the EEC Council of Ministers never led to a change in policy, resulting at most in
minor adjustments. It is true, however, that the parliamentary assembly of the
European Communities served at times as the latter’s conscience on democracy
and human rights, occasionally confronting the approach adopted by govern-
ments through Council decisions and executed by the Commission. Others
assume that the Commission represented the EEC, but this was true only when
unanimously voted on by the member-state governments—either after the found-
ing treaties or for a particular purpose. Relations with third countries were always
a competence reserved for member-states. It was up to the national ministers to
establish the broad guidelines of the Community’s policy towards Spain and other
third countries, which the Commission was to translate into concrete proposals.
All Council decisions were based on consensus. In the absence of consensus, no
collective decision was made, and each of the member-state governments acted
according to its own political logic and material interests. Only the Council’s
decisions were entitled to alter the measures that EEC governments applied to
their commercial relations with Spain, the primary field affected by EEC policies.
In most respects, it was exclusively the Council of Ministers that defined the EEC
policy on Spain and other third countries.
The discussion on whether the EEC/European Commission is a technical or a
political body is as old as the institution itself. Its first president, Walter Hallstein,
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and he ran right home to take off the trousers and wait for Mr. Fox to
return.
“Oh, you might put on a kettle of water,” called Mr. Fox as Tim was
hurrying away, “and have it boiling; it must boil hard.”
Mr. Fox had a harder time than he expected getting the soap from
Mr. Man’s, for Mr. Dog had gone to sleep right in the doorway of the
barn, and that was where Mr. Fox wanted to go.
He had seen a piece of white soap on a box in the barn one day,
where Mr. Man had been washing his best harness, and he hoped
very much he would find it there now.
After a while Mr. Dog awoke and went away and Mr. Fox crept in.
He was lucky enough to find the soap, and off he ran for Tim Coon’s
house just as the sun was going down.
“I risked a good deal, Tim, to get this soap,” he said. “I do not like
to go over the hill in the daytime—too risky.
“Now we must put the trousers in a pail,” explained Mr. Fox, “and
then very slowly pour the water on them. Are you sure the water is
boiling hard?”
Tim said he was, and so Mr. Fox told him to bring it along, and as
Tim poured it in the pail Mr. Fox shaved up the soap and dropped it
in.
“Now get me a stick,” he said, “so I can stir it and make a good
suds, and now I will leave you, for I am sure you can do the rest, and
I must get home, as it is getting dark.
“All you have to do is to let them soak overnight and take them out
in the morning and hang them in the sun, and if that recipe for
washing woolen is good for anything your trousers will be as good as
new.”
Off ran Mr. Fox for home, chuckling to himself all the way. “Yes,
they will be as good as new,” he said, “but not for you to wear, my
friend Tim. They may fit a very young coon, but not a full-grown-up
coon like you. Oh no.”
Poor Tim Coon viewed his trousers as they hung on the line the
next day with a sinking heart, for the black stain of the paint was of
course still to be seen, but later when they were dry and he tried to
put them on it was not a feeling of sadness which came over him. It
was anger.
Tim looked at himself in the looking-glass and saw that his
handsome plaid trousers were no longer fit for him to wear. They
were well up to his knees, and so snugly did they fit him he could not
bend, let alone walk.
It took some time to get out of them, but when he did he took them
over to Mr. Fox’s house and showed him the remains of what had
once been his plaid trousers.
“It did not work right. That is all I can say,” said Mr. Fox, trying hard
to look sad. “You never can tell about those recipes you read in
papers and magazines until you have tried them.”
“I wish some one else had tried it first,” said Tim, with a sigh, as he
looked at his trousers.
“I might have worn a long-tailed coat and covered up the paint
spot, but there is nothing I can do with these short legs.”
“You could wear a skirt or put some lace on the bottom of the
legs,” suggested Mr. Fox.
“Are you sure the water had to boil?” asked Tim.
“Sure as I am that the sun will shine!” replied Mr. Fox. “Are you
sure, Tim, those trousers are all wool?”
“I thought they were,” said Tim.
“I know they are,” said Mr. Fox, looking after Tim down the path.
Of course the plaid trousers were of no use to any one, but Mr.
Fox was satisfied so long as he did not have to see Tim Coon
wearing them.
THE THREE RUNAWAYS
M
r. Dog sat in front of his house, looking very sad; Mr. Tom Cat
came along with his head hanging down, very sad, too.
“Hello, Tommie!” said Mr. Dog. “You look as sad as I feel. What is
the matter?”
“Matter enough, Mr. Dog,” said Mr. Tom Cat. “I have just been
driven out of the house with a broom by cook, who says I am of no
use; that I am too fat and too well fed to catch the mice.
“Mr. Dog, I have caught all the mice in that house for years, and
just because I slept one night—that was last night—that cook forgets
all about all the good work I have done in the past and puts me out,
and with a broom, too. Oh, it is too terrible, and I have not had my
breakfast, either.”
“Tommie, dear fellow,” said Mr. Dog, “you certainly have a hard
time of it, but let me tell you what has happened to me after all my
years of service to the master. Last night a fox got into the hen-
house, and just because I did not keep awake all night and catch him
the master took me up to the hen-house and put my nose right down
on the floor where that fox had walked, and then he boxed my ears.
Think of it, Thomas, he boxed my ears before all the hens and
chickens and said I was getting old and good for nothing, and I have
not had a bite to eat this morning. I wonder what this place is coming
to when such good fellows as we are get such treatment. That is
what I would like to know, Thomas Cat.”
Mr. Tom Cat licked his mouth and stretched himself before he
answered: “I think, Mr. Dog, we better give the master and cook a
chance to think over what they have done to us and perhaps they
may remember all the good things we have done all these years and
think that one little mistake was not so bad, after all. I am for running
away, I am. What do you say?”
“Now I never thought of that, Thomas,” said Mr. Dog, standing up
and looking very serious. “I believe that is a good plan, Thomas. I do,
indeed; but where shall we run?”
“Oh, we can walk; you know we don’t have to run at all, only they
call it running away if you go off where people can’t find you,” said
Mr. Tom Cat. “I know a place we can go. Come with me.”
“I’ll go with you,” said Mr. Dog. “Lead the way, Thomas.”
Just as they were passing the barn-yard they saw Mr. Rooster
scrooged under the fence.
“Hello, Mr. Rooster!” said Mr. Dog. “What has happened to you
that you look so unhappy this morning?”
“Why wouldn’t I look unhappy?” replied Mr. Rooster. “Here I have
been on this farm and looking after all those silly hens these long
years, and this morning the master said he wished the fox had got
me last night instead of the hen he carried off. I tell you it is hard
luck, after all I have done for the master.”
“Come with us,” said Mr. Tom Cat. “We are running away; the cook
chased me out this morning because I happened to sleep all night
and didn’t catch the mice, and Mr. Dog was blamed because the fox
got into your house last night. We are not appreciated around here,
that is plain. Will you come along?”
“I had never thought of running away,” said Mr. Rooster, getting
out from under the fence and flapping the dust from his wings, “but I
think I like the idea of running away. I will go along with you. Perhaps
the master and those foolish hens of mine will begin to think what a
fine fellow I am and wish I had not gone. Where are you going?”
“Oh, to a place I know where no one will find us,” said Mr. Tom
Cat, running ahead.
Mr. Dog and Mr. Rooster followed Mr. Tom Cat, and soon they
were in the woods where the bushes grew thick and the trees shut
out the sun.
“Here we are,” said Mr. Tom Cat; “now no one will find us and we
can rest in ease.”
“I have not had my breakfast,” said Mr. Rooster, scratching the
ground.
“Neither have we,” said Mr. Tom Cat, “but I have heard somewhere
that you should not think of your troubles and they will not bother
you, so suppose we each tell a story to take up the time and also
take our minds off the thought that we have not had our breakfast.
You begin, Mr. Dog, because you are such a good story-teller and
have had so many adventures.”
Mr. Dog looked very wise and scratched his head as if he was
thinking very hard.
“Did I ever tell you about how I treed a coon?” he asked.
Mr. Rooster and Mr. Tom Cat said they never had heard it, but they
should like to hear about it very much indeed.
MR. DOG’S STORY

Mr. Dog cleared his throat and then he said: “I have always had
the reputation of being a good hunter, especially when coons were in
season, but this story which I am about to tell will show that I had the
hardest time a dog ever had getting a coon.
“One moonlight night the master came out of the house and
whistled to me; he had his gun over his shoulder and I knew pretty
well what was going to happen; we were going coon-hunting.
“So I wagged my tail and gave two or three sharp barks because I
knew I could not bark again until I had something to bark about.
“Oh, it was a beautiful night, and just as we got out in the road a
little way from the barn I saw something moving. I wasn’t sure at first
whether it was a fox or a coon, both of them being equally fond of
visiting the poultry-yard; but I kept very still and pretty soon I saw him
right in the full moonlight. It was as fat a coon as I ever saw, and he
didn’t see me and I made a run for him.
“Well, you may have seen a coon run, my friends, but believe me
when I tell you that you never saw one run as this one did. He gave
a bound and away he went, and I went after him, and Mr. Man
followed, for I was barking now, for there was reason for it.
“Well, that coon got to the tree first, and up he went, for I saw him,
and I can tell you I was some tickled, for I knew that the master
would be pleased enough when he saw the size of that coon.
“After he got into the tree I stood under it and looked up and
barked with all my might, and Mr. Man was coming a-running as fast
as he could in the distance.
“But while I saw that coon go up the tree as plainly as I ever saw
anything, I couldn’t see hide nor hair of him when I looked up.
“Mr. Man came up to me after a while and said, ‘Where is he,
Rover?’
“I kept looking up in the tree and barking to keep up my courage,
though I could see nothing but tree.
“‘You are fooled, old fellow,’ said the master; ‘he got away from
you. Go after him, old boy.’
“But I knew I wasn’t fooled, though for the life of me I could not see
that coon.
“I kept on barking and jumping about and the master took another
look, but he did not see that coon and pretty soon he got tired.
“‘You are a fake, Rover,’ he said to me. ‘I am going home. We will
try it another night and see if you can see straight.’ And off he went.
“But I didn’t leave that tree. I knew that coon couldn’t have jumped
out of the tree and I also knew he went up the tree, so I was sure he
was in the tree right then.
“I barked louder than ever, and though the master whistled and
called, I still barked and jumped about.
“Suddenly I thought if I kept very still a minute that coon might
show his head, so I stepped close to the tree and stood in the
shadow and kept quiet. It wasn’t more than a minute before, just as I
thought, out poked the head of that coon to see if I had gone.
“Well, I just barked some then and I danced, and pretty soon
master came running back and I jumped and barked right under the
place where I had seen the head of Mr. Coon.
“‘Ah, you are right, boy,’ I heard the master say, softly, and then
bang went his gun and Mr. Coon dropped to the ground.
“‘Good old boy, you can’t be fooled, can you, Rover?’ said master,
patting me on the head; ‘you can’t be beat for coon-hunting. Come
along home and show what we got.’
“The next night they had a great time at the master’s house. He
told them all how I treed that coon and how I stuck to it in spite of his
going away and calling to me to go along.
“I was patted on the head and made a great deal of, and every
time I see the master with that coon cap he wears I feel very happy.”
Mr. Dog stopped and looked sad again, and Mr. Tom Cat said:
“Oh, cheer up, Mr. Dog, the master will soon be wearing that cap
again, and he will remember how you caught the coon. That is a
good story to tell. Now we will listen to what Mr. Rooster has to tell
us.”
Mr. Rooster said he would tell them about the new rooster that
came to the barn-yard one day.
MR. ROOSTER’S STORY
Mr. Rooster straightened himself and said he was proud to say he
was raised on the master’s farm. He was proud, too, to say he had
succeeded the old rooster that had gone to a dinner one day and did
not return.
“I have always taken good care of my family, and, if I do say it,
there is not a better-looking family than mine around these parts,”
said Mr. Rooster.
“There have been many young roosters in the barn-yard, but they
have gone away to other farms to live, for the master has an eye for
beauty, and he has always decided that I was too—er—valuable to
lose.”
Mr. Dog and Mr. Tom Cat smiled a little on the side at this last
remark, for they well knew how vain Mr. Rooster was, and then he
really did have fine feathers and a beautiful comb.
“I have never had any trouble with my family until one morning
Madam Blackie came running to me,” continued Mr. Rooster, “to tell
me a new rooster had come in the barn-yard to live.”
“‘It is shameful the way all those silly hens are running around
him,’ she said. ‘He isn’t noticing them a little bit and they strut back
and forth, eying him as if they had never seen a handsome rooster
before.
“‘For my part, I think the old friends are the best, though of course
you are not old, my dear Mr. Rooster, only old in acquaintance I
mean.’
“I had always thought Madam Blackie an old busybody, but now, if
this was all true, I had found her my only friend.
“‘You are most kind, Madam Blackie,’ I said, ‘and I thank you, but I
feel sure that the master will not have a new rooster here. This new-
comer will probably leave in a few days.’
“I expected he would, too, for I had as fine a set of spurs as I had
ever seen, and I intended to show them to this new rooster.
“As soon as I could get away from Madam Blackie I took a stroll
around by the barn-yard, and sure enough there were all my family,
even the chickens, walking around and clucking and cackling as
hens will at a handsome red-and-black rooster that stood by the barn
door.
“I felt pretty queer for a minute, for that new rooster had a very
shiny-looking set of feathers, and I knew he would be very popular
for a while at least, and with the whole family against me, even my
spurs might not make me king.
“I held my head very high, and with my light step I walked past
them some distance from the barn, but still I knew they all saw me.
“There was a little flutter at first, and they ran toward me, but they
gave a look at the new rooster. I could see them out of the corner of
my eyes, and back the whole silly lot went and began their silly
cackling and clucking.
“I went behind a wall and watched them through a hole. First they
would scratch the ground near the new rooster and talk away to one
another, and then they would walk by him, but not once did he turn
his head.
“‘He isn’t going to let them think he sees them,’ I thought; but the
longer I watched the stranger it seemed to me that with all those
fine-looking hens and chickens cackling about him he should not
look once their way; and then a thought came to me which made me
jump up, so I crawled under the gate and walked into the barn-yard.
“I walked right up to that family of mine and looked at them, and
then I looked at the new rooster. I was right close to him then.
“Every hen opened her eyes and mouth, for they thought right then
and there was to be a settlement of rights, but one glance at the new
rooster told me what I had thought was true, and I just turned my
back on him and said: ‘When you silly hens and chickens get tired of
admiring the new weather-cock you better come over in the lot back
of the barn. There is some corn and grain on the ground. I am
surprised that my family cannot tell a tin weather-cock from a real
rooster,’ and away I walked with my head held higher than ever.
“After that I never had the least trouble with them, but of course I
found out that Madam Blackie had been the first one to see the tin
rooster and had gone right up to him and found it out, and then
waited to see if the others would be fooled. When she found they
were she ran away to tell me.
“Oh, it takes all kinds of hens to make a barn-yard family!” sighed
the rooster.
“I guess they will miss you,” said Mr. Dog, “and the master will,
too, for all the hens are likely to run away, with no one to keep them
at home.”
“Tommie Cat, we will hear what you have to tell. I bet it will be
about a mouse.”
“You win the bet,” said Mr. Tom Cat.
MR. TOM CAT’S STORY

“My story,” said Mr. Tom Cat, “is about a mouse, the only mouse
that ever got away from me—that is, the only one that I ever saw. Of
course, I did not see the ones that cook thought I should have
caught.
“I came to live at the master’s house when I was a very little kitten,
and right away I began to catch the mice.
“I have heard it said that my mother and father were the best
mousers anywhere around, and I expect I take after them. Anyway, I
could catch mice, so I became a great pet in the house.
“And while I always had plenty of milk—and sometimes cream—to
eat, I never failed to catch a mouse each night, and sometimes
more, for a cat had not lived in the house for years, and those mice
thought they owned it until I came.
“They ran about everywhere, on the pantry shelves and all over
the rooms at night, and they would even run over me sometimes
when I was taking forty winks; but I soon stopped that. I played I was
asleep when I wasn’t and caught those silly mice until the others
began to learn that I was a thing to be feared and not to be taken as
a joke.
“But there was one mouse I could not catch. He was larger than
the others and had a little piece taken out of one ear, so I always
knew him, and it gave me no end of worry to think he always
escaped me.
“The others called him Tip, because it was the tip of his ear that
was gone; and Tip was some runner, I can tell you. He could get
through the smallest hole in the wall and he could get away from you
when you had your paw right over him. I made up my mind to get Tip
if I had to let the other mice have the house, and so for a week I laid
for Tip.
“One night he came out of his hole and jumped right over my head
and I chased him around the kitchen, when all at once right before
my eyes he disappeared.
“I sniffed and hunted. I knew he was there, but I could not see him
or find him. All at once I saw a shoe of the master’s, that stood near
the stove, move, and as quick as a wink I flew at it and put in my
paw.
“Did I get Tip? No, sir; that slick little fellow crawled out of a hole in
the side of that shoe and ran for his hole in the wall, laughing and
giggling to think he had fooled me again.
“I did not sleep for two days after that, sitting by that hole in the
wall, and I was thinking how hungry Tip must be, having to stay in
there without any food and feeling sure he would have to come out
soon or starve, when I felt something touch my tail.
“I turned around and there was Tip. How he got out I never knew,
but I expect he gnawed a hole in another part of the wall. Anyway,
there he was sitting on his hind legs and making funny motions with
his front paws.
“I jumped, but he was ready for that, and away he scampered into
the pantry and I after him.
“Over the shelves he went, and I went, too. Back of the boxes, and
I went, too, tins and dishes falling with clatter and smash, but I did
not care. I was after that Tip mouse and I knew it was now or never.
“He knew it was a fight to the death, I think, by the mad dash he
made behind dishes and tins, but after a while he grew tired and
made for his hole in the wall. I knew that was my chance to get him
in the open, and I flew after him and reached him with the tip of my
paw, but it was only his tail I had. Tip was in the hole. I grabbed at
the tail with my teeth and off it came. I have that tail yet, for I never
got Tip, and I like to look at it sometimes just to get up my fighting
spirit.”
“Didn’t you ever see Tip again?” asked Mr. Rooster and Mr. Dog.
“Oh yes, I saw him once after that,” said Mr. Tom Cat, with a yawn.
“Why didn’t you catch him?” they asked, together.
“Oh, Tip was in a trap when I saw him,” said Mr. Tom Cat.
“Was it one of those traps that catch them by the head?” asked Mr.
Dog.
“No, it was a little wire affair,” said Mr. Tom Cat, “and I looked in
and saw him running about.”
“Why didn’t you catch him then when the master opened the trap?
Didn’t they give you a chance at him?”
“No, Mr. Dog,” said Mr. Tom Cat, looking very lofty. “I am a
sportsman and no true sportsman ever touches a caged mouse. Tip
was let out of the trap, and the master thought I would catch him, but
I didn’t even run after him, and for all I know Tip may be living yet. I
will do my own hunting and catching; none of those traps can ever
help me to get a mouse.”
“Some of his grandchildren might go back there to live, even if Tip
did not return to the hole in the wall,” said Mr. Dog.
“It might be that those very mice that were running about last night
were some of his relations.”
“I never thought of that,” said Mr. Tom Cat. “I will watch for them
to-night, and whether they are or not I will remember Tip and catch
them all.”
“I guess I will go along with you,” said Mr. Dog. “I am pretty hungry,
and it must be dinner-time.”
“If you all are going home, I guess I better get back in time for
dinner, too,” said Mr. Rooster; “my family will think I am lost.”
So all three started off for their home, forgetting all about their
grievances in listening to the story each had told, and if nothing has
happened to them I expect they are living there yet.
THE END
Transcriber’s Notes:
Minor errors and omissions in punctuation have been fixed
Page 55: Changed “but that it still” to “but that is still”
Page 124: Changed “Martha did not treat her” to “Martha treated her”
Page 155: Changed “‘Oh, don’t you know?’ said Jacko” to “‘Oh, don’t you know?’ said
Jocko”
Page 179: Changed “the master he wished” to “the master said he wished”
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The European Rescue of the Franco

Regime, 1950-1975 Fernando Guirao

The Op-Ed Novel: A Literary History of Post-Franco

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Wolf to the Rescue Terry Spear

Wolf to the Rescue Terry Spear

The European Rescue of the

The European Rescue

Fernando Guirao, Barcelona

1. Schumania and Spain’s Heavy-Industry Supply 31

3. Opposing Fascism or Accommodating Its Last Remnant? 103

viii table of contents

The Six’s Lowest Common Denominator 153

7. The Spanish Attempt to Expand Unilateral Preferences 321

A Comparative Perspective from Western Europe’s Periphery 390

xiv List of Tables

7.8 Index numbers of Spain–EFTA trade, 1970–2 362

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABC —Spanish newspaper (Madrid edition)

xvi List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

FOA —Foreign Operations Administration

AC Archives contemporaines, Fontainebleau

EFTA European Free Trade Association, Geneva

The European-Rescue Concept

2 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

assisted all nation-states involved, including Spain, in the task of defining a

4 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

6 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

Madrid faced serious risks when integration threatened agriculture, as the

8 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

West Germany—as an outlet market, foreign-exchange provider, and source of

10 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

12 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

14 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

16 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

Exports to the Six Exports to the rest of the world

18 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

20 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

non-tariff barriers on importation from the European Community. The Spanish

membership candidate to the European Communities. Spain’s candidacy would

22 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

24 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

non-democratic nature of the Spanish regime meant the natural exclusion of

Three Closing Remarks

This book focuses on the members of the European Communities collectively

26 The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–1975

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7.8 Index numbers of Spain–EFTA trade, 1970–2 362