The EU, Irish Defence Forces and

Contemporary Security Jonathan

Carroll
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-eu-irish-defence-forces-and-contemporary-securit
y-jonathan-carroll/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed

Forces Hugo Meijer

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-handbook-of-european-defence-
policies-and-armed-forces-hugo-meijer/

Masculinities and Manhood in Contemporary Irish Drama:

Acting the Man Cormac O'Brien

https://ebookmass.com/product/masculinities-and-manhood-in-
contemporary-irish-drama-acting-the-man-cormac-obrien/

The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Contemporary British

and Irish Literature Richard Bradford (Editor)

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-wiley-blackwell-companion-to-
contemporary-british-and-irish-literature-richard-bradford-
editor/

Contemporary Irish Popular Culture: Transnationalism,

Regionality, and Diaspora Anthony P. Mcintyre

https://ebookmass.com/product/contemporary-irish-popular-culture-
transnationalism-regionality-and-diaspora-anthony-p-mcintyre/
A Companion to Contemporary British and Irish Poetry,
1960–2015 Wolfgang Görtschacher

https://ebookmass.com/product/a-companion-to-contemporary-
british-and-irish-poetry-1960-2015-wolfgang-gortschacher/

Limits and Languages in Contemporary Irish Women's

Poetry 1st ed. Edition Daniela Theinová

https://ebookmass.com/product/limits-and-languages-in-
contemporary-irish-womens-poetry-1st-ed-edition-daniela-theinova/

Principles of Computer Security: CompTIA Security+ and

Beyond Lab Manual (Exam SY0-601) Jonathan S. Weissman

https://ebookmass.com/product/principles-of-computer-security-
comptia-security-and-beyond-lab-manual-exam-sy0-601-jonathan-s-
weissman/

The Carroll Farm Fight Hunt Greg

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-carroll-farm-fight-hunt-greg/

Shadow (Special Forces: Operation Alpha) (Salinger

Security Book 4) Naomi Mckay & Operation Alpha

https://ebookmass.com/product/shadow-special-forces-operation-
alpha-salinger-security-book-4-naomi-mckay-operation-alpha/
 The EU,
Irish Defence Forces and
Contemporary Security
Edited by
Jonathan Carroll
Matthew G. O’Neill
Mark Williams
 The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary
Security

“This book is a critical and insightful contribution to the debate on Irish defence
and the role of the Defence Forces. Uniquely, it brings together the voices
of both scholars and practitioners to assess where Ireland stands in the face of
contemporary threats but also its potential across multiple defence domains. Irish
defence policy is in urgent need of serious and sustained attention. The authors
of this important text fulfil that mission perfectly.”
—Ben Tonra, Professor, MRIA, The School of Politics and International
Relations (SPIRe), University College Dublin, Ireland

“By mainly examining Ireland’s defence policy and the Irish Armed Forces, this
edited volume provides valuable knowledge to both practitioners and scholars.
The book is structured around five highly relevant themes, each contributing to
the debate on the contemporary challenges of security policy and military trans-
formation. Undoubtedly, any reader interested in international relations and/or
security studies, and especially those focusing on small states studies and/or
comparative strategy, will gain new insights by exploring this book.”
—Håkan Edström, Associate Professor in Political Science, Swedish Defence
University, Sweden
Jonathan Carroll · Matthew G. O’Neill ·
Mark Williams
Editors

The EU, Irish

Defence Forces
and Contemporary
Security
Editors
Jonathan Carroll Matthew G. O’Neill
Texas A&M University The Senator George J. Mitchell
College Station, TX, USA Institute for Global Peace,
Security and Justice
Mark Williams Queen’s University Belfast
The Senator George J. Mitchell Belfast, UK
Institute for Global Peace,
Security and Justice
Queen’s University Belfast
Belfast, UK

ISBN 978-3-031-07811-8 ISBN 978-3-031-07812-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Foreword

I welcome this publication, which shines a light on all things defence both
in Ireland and beyond. The publication entitled “The EU, Ireland, and
Contemporary Security” provides a critique of, but also valuable inputs
on the changing strategic environment and future challenges and poten-
tial future orientations for defence in Ireland. We should never be afraid of
objective criticism and evidence-based assertions, but rather, reflect posi-
tively on them and consider how we can enhance the understanding and
appreciation of defence in Ireland, particularly among civil society.
I would like to thank all the contributors who have contributed to
this publication. They come from a wide range of backgrounds and
perspectives, from academia to practitioners and geographically from
Ireland and, also, significant international contributions. I would like
to congratulate the editors, Jon Carroll from Texas A&M University,
and Matthew O’Neill and Mark Williams both from Queen’s University,
Belfast. I would also like to thank the publishers at Palgrave Macmillan
for their support and without whom we would not have this important
publication.
From a situation of negligible discussion on defence, this year we
have had an abundance of riches with a number of key publications. In
February 2022, we had the Report of the Commission on the Defence
Forces, probably the most far-reaching and detailed review of the Defence
Forces in the history of the State. And now, we have this international

v
vi FOREWORD

publication which examines and explores a wide range of issues from land
and naval operations to cyber, peacekeeping, and military strategy.
These publications will hopefully lift the discourse on defence in
Ireland to a new level, reflecting the realities of the changing strategic
environment, the return of power politics, and the implications of this for
Ireland. They are a wake-up call to the new realities.
Again, I would like to thank the editors and publisher for this
contribution to the debate and wish you every success in this publication.

Dublin 2, Ireland Mr. Simon Coveney, T.D.

Ireland’s Minister for Defence
and Minister for Foreign Affairs
 Acknowledgements

The genesis of this volume was a chance meeting by the Editors at the
Defence Forces Review annual conference at University College Dublin in
December 2019. At that conference, collegial and at times heated debate
occurred throughout the day between Defence Forces personnel, the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, defence and security academics,
and a multitude of other stakeholders about the future direction of Irish
defence. While intriguing, constructive, and indeed valuable, the Editors
were struck by the fact that this debate was largely happening behind
closed doors, leaving the wider political and public debates on defence
shaped by journalists and social media. The expertise on Irish defence
needed to be brought out into the open to ensure a more robust,
accessible, and informed debate, and thus, this project began.
With a collaborative project such as this volume, credit and thanks are
owed to many far and wide for their contributions and support. The
Editors would first like to thank the Politics and Development Studies
Editorial team at Palgrave Macmillan, especially Alina Yurova and Geetha
Chockalingam for bringing this publication to fruition with sage advice,
support, and enthusiasm.
We wish to extend our thanks to the Defence Force community with
particular thanks to the Lieutenant General Sean Clancy, Chief of Staff
of the Irish Defence Forces and Jacqui McCrum, Secretary-General at
the Department of Defence and their staff for their valued support and
cooperation. We also express our gratitude to Minister for Defence and

vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney, T.D., and his staff. The
contributions of Defence Forces and Department of Defence personnel
made this volume possible.
The Editors would also like to acknowledge the support from our
many colleagues at Texas A&M University, and The Senator George J.
Mitchell Institute for Security Peace and Justice at the Queen’s Univer-
sity of Belfast. Furthermore, we would like to thank School of History,
Anthropology, Philosophy, and Politics at Queen’s University, Belfast for
providing funding for the volume indexing of the book through the
Postgraduate-Led Initiative Funding.
Finally, we would like to thank our contributors to this edited volume,
who are some of the leading experts, both academic and practitioner,
on Irish and wider European defence and security. The contributions of
these experts are an invaluable first step towards wider discussion and
understanding of defence and security issues within Ireland.
We very much hope their voices will one day be joined by the many
security and defence experts, both in the military and academia, who for
various reasons could not ultimately participate in this project.
 Introduction

Defence is a contentious issue in Ireland, both politically and publicly.

In recent years, the utility, capabilities, and indeed the necessity of
having the Defence Forces has been the focus of public, political, and
academic discourse due to several events: increased tensions in Northern
Ireland due to Brexit, Ireland’s accession to the UN Security Council,
repeated incursions by Russian aircraft into Irish airspace, the COVID-19
Pandemic, Russian naval exercises off Ireland’s coast, and most recently,
the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Despite the litany of security issues, the
question has still been repeatedly asked by politicians and the public alike,
why does Ireland need a military? Even more provocatively, some ask
why a supposedly “neutral” country should invest in defence, instead
of housing, social welfare, or healthcare. Heated political and public
debates have questioned, and continue to question, the contribution of
the Defence Forces to Irish life, society, and national security. For those
advocates of Irish defence, the question is not whether Ireland needs a
military, but whether the Defence Forces are fit for the security chal-
lenges the country currently faces, or for those ahead. These are all
valid questions, and this volume aims to provide some answers, but also
thought-provoking discussion on the future direction of Irish defence in
a world of emerging and hybrid threats.
The timing of this volume is significant. The Irish State as we know
it today was established after the War of Independence and the Anglo-
Irish Treaty of 1921. The Irish Free State was formally recognised in

ix
x INTRODUCTION

December 1922. At the time of writing, Ireland as a nation has just

marked its centenary. In February 2022, the much-anticipated Report of
the Commission on the Defence Forces was published, the most in-depth
evaluation of Ireland’s security environment and defence capabilities in
the history of the State, with recommendations to fundamentally reform
the Irish defence framework to face current and future threats. The
Report’s recommendations were not binding. There will, undoubtedly
be renewed debate about the direction, shape, and even the nature of
Irish defence going forward. Accordingly, one hundred years on from the
foundation of the Irish State, and indeed from the establishment of the
Defence Forces in 1923, it is only prudent to take stock of Irish defence,
especially against the backdrop of an unprecedented and deteriorating
security environment and an increasingly globalised Ireland. It is partic-
ularly appropriate to evaluate how well-prepared Ireland is, as an island
state, for the evolving security environment, to ask tough questions, and
to face uncomfortable, even stark, realities.
Small nations often rely on military policies that aim to mitigate the
underappreciation of threats, or lack of investment, with innovation, flex-
ibility, and force multipliers through technology, the strategic use of
reserve forces, and cooperative defence agreements with regional neigh-
bours. Like many small nations in a world of emerging conventional
and hybrid threats, Ireland is facing these same challenges, these same
strategic choices. However, in some areas, there is a disconnect between
the ways and means of Irish defence policy, and indeed, the ends. Solving
this disconnect requires the evaluation of the threat environment facing
Ireland and the Defence Forces, and an appraisal of where Irish defence is
currently, and where it should go. Critically, what are the contemporary
and future threats, and how should the Defence Forces adapt to meet
them?
The EU, Irish Defence Forces, and Contemporary Security provides
a detailed exploration of Irish defence and the Defence Forces at the
strategic, operational, and historical levels across six central themes. The
six themes are Defence Forces capabilities and the threat environment, the
Reserve Defence Forces, peacekeeping operations, cyber security in the
digital age, Defence Forces institutional innovation and civil–military rela-
tions, and finally, the debates surrounding the principle of Irish neutrality.
Within these six themes, this volume has gathered military practitioners,
policymakers, and scholars from Ireland and the European Union in
the first in-depth conversation and analysis on modern Irish defence to
 INTRODUCTION xi

discuss, and in turn promote discussion, on where Irish defence is, and
where it should go in the future, especially in terms of implementing the
recommendations of the seminal Report of the Commission on the Defence
Forces.

Part I: Defence Forces Capabilities

and The Threat Environment
The first and largest theme within The EU, Irish Defence Forces, and
Contemporary Security explores Defence Forces capabilities, highlights
key strategic issues, and most importantly, provides an evaluation of the
threat environment Ireland faces now, and going forward. This theme
provides the “ends” with which defence “ways and means” must be
aligned to adequately counter existing threats. Opening this discussion
is former Defence Forces Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Mark Mellett,
providing the foundational context to this volume’s analysis by discussing
Ireland’s defence obligations, his appraisal of the security challenges that
lie ahead, and the Defence Forces’ ability to meet those challenges.
Brigadier General Brian Cleary of the Irish Army joins this discussion with
a personal exploration of how Ireland’s perception of security has transi-
tioned over the course of his career, from an inward-looking focus on
internal security during the Troubles to Ireland’s outward-looking heavy
involvement in multilateralism through peacekeeping operations in the
post-Cold War era. Cleary highlights that over the course of forty years,
Ireland’s Defence Forces have only diminished, while emerging threats
and operational commitments have only increased, and that doing more
with less has consequences for Irish security. Defence correspondent and
former army officer, Tom Clonan, highlights attitudes towards commu-
nication and intellectual discourse within the Defence Forces that have
led to a suboptimal articulation of threats to policymakers and even more
so, to the Irish public. Consequently, Clonan argues that this culture has
caused an underappreciation in public and political spheres as to why a
neutral country such as Ireland, needs a military, and even more, why
defence requires significant ongoing investment. Concluding this theme,
discussion then turns to the Irish Naval Service, with a focus on maritime
capabilities and innovation. Captain Brian Fitzgerald, former Chief of
Naval Operations for the Irish Naval Serviceexamines the current and
future challenges of protecting one of the largest maritime zones within
the European Union and defending the western frontier of the European
xii INTRODUCTION

continent. Fitzgerald is joined in this examination of the Naval Service by

Deborah Sanders of King’s College, London, with an explanation of the
broader challenges and threats small navies face, and recommendations on
how they are best mitigated to influence the future development of the
Naval Service. Finally, Niall Buckley and Raymond Martin examine the
Irish Air Crops (IAC) and how key technological and conceptual changes
will likely impact on how the IAC address the problems and challenges
that its second century of operations will bring. One hundred years ago,
Ireland was at the forefront of aviation advances and the new State rapidly
adopted the latest aviation developments.

Part II: The Reserve Defence Forces

On the topic of Ireland’s Reserve Defence Forces, the second theme of
this volume, three contributors discuss the future of the Army Reserve
and the Naval Service Reserve in terms of operationalising the recommen-
dations of the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces. Jonathan
Carroll of Texas A&M University, a former Army Reserve officer who
has published extensively on the topic, argues for a fundamental revi-
talisation of the Army Reserve, no longer based on the existing Single
Force Concept, but on a Total Force Policy instead. Carroll details what
such an Army Reserve could and should look like, where dependence
on the Army Reserve promotes positive reforms and operational utilisa-
tion, to fundamentally benefit the Defence Forces as a whole. Joining
Carroll in providing recommendations for the future Army Reserve is
Neil Richardson, a serving reserve officer, and current Secretary-General
of the Reserve Defence Forces Representative Association. Like Carroll,
Richardson proposes a reformed Army Reserve based on three distinct
cohorts to argue how reforms can transform the Reserve into a force
multiplier for the Irish Army. Concluding the evaluation of the Reserve
Defence Forces are David Rodgers and Gavin Murphy with an analysis of
the Irish Naval Service Reserve’s capabilities and role, and a discussion of
what the future should look like for Ireland’s reserve maritime component
to adequately support Naval Service operations.
 INTRODUCTION xiii

Part III: Peacekeeping Operations

Ireland has the longest unbroken record of contributing to UN peace-
keeping and stabilisation operations in history. As such, the third theme
within this volume explores this critical contribution to international
peace and security with three excellent chapters on Peacekeeping Oper-
ations. Natalia Hapek, of the University of Warsaw, explores the legacy
of Irish overseas participation in the United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Hapek details the history of UNIFIL and
how Ireland’s largest and longest overseas commitment has shaped the
Defence Forces. For Hapek, UNIFIL provided the foundational expe-
riences in operational peacekeeping abroad for the Defence Forces.
Lebanon was also an environment that matured Irish troops militarily
and culturally, acclimating them for future, and more robust, peace-
keeping and peace enforcement operations in Liberia, Chad, and Kosovo.
Taking a different approach to Irish peacekeeping is Neil Dee, from the
Azure Forum for Contemporary Security Strategy. Dee evaluates the
impact of Irish history on Ireland’s approach to peacekeeping. Consid-
ering Ireland’s joining of the United Nations Security Council, Dee
explores how decolonisation, conflict, and independence, three elements
often highlighted as integral to Irish history, have interacted to shape
Ireland’s peacekeeping policy and operations. Concluding the discussion
on Ireland and peacekeeping, Dr. Annika Hansen explores the threats and
capability requirements for peacekeeping in the digital age, specifically
how information operations can be a force multiplier and misinforma-
tion mitigator at the operational level during peacekeeping missions in
the twenty-first century.

Part IV: Cyber Security in the Digital Age

The fourth theme of The EU, Irish Defence Forces, and Contemporary
Security deals with Cyber Security in the Digital Age and examines the
critical issue of developing adequate cyber defence in the Irish context to
confront the most potent hybrid threats that often can bypass conven-
tional defence capabilities. In this regard, the discussion is opened by
Mark Williams and Matthew O’Neill of Queen’s University, Belfast, with
their analysis of the strategic and operational consequences of new tech-
nologies’ role in a changing conflict environment. Arguing that the
evolving role of technology in conflict settings, as well as emerging hybrid
xiv INTRODUCTION

threats encountered in peace operations, necessitates adaptation of the

Defence Forces’ approaches, tools, and capabilities, while also noting the
opportunity this presents for the Defence Forces to be at the forefront of
the development and deployment of new capabilities needed to support
modern peace operations, and to champion a normative framework for
the deployment of these capabilities. Lieutenant General Michael Vetter,
Director-General of Cyber and Information technology at the German
Ministry of Defence, then provides an overview of the cyber security
threat environment from the perspective of EU cyber defence to argue
the critical need for “cyber resilience” in European militaries. In a detailed
discussion on current and future drone capabilities, Andy Scollick, argues
for greater investment by the Irish Defence Forces in drone technology.
By providing a comparative analysis of other small nations entering the
“Drone Age,” Scollick lays out the potential for drone technology as both
an emerging threat to, and a key force multiplier for, the Defence Forces.

Part V: Defence Forces Institutional

Innovation and Civil–Military Relations
The penultimate theme within The EU, Irish Defence Forces, and Contem-
porary Security is an exploration of the Defence Forces’ institutional
innovation and civil–military relations, a key requirement for small
nation militaries in a modern threat environment. Commandant Sharon
McManus of the Defence Forces, and Sharon Breen from the Department
of Defence, discuss the newly established joint Defence Forces/DOD
Research, Technology, and Innovation (RTI) unit, formed to consider
the significant potential of Ireland’s wider technology and research eco-
system to contribute towards the Irish defence framework, and especially
the development of technology with defence applications. Discussing
the potential pitfalls for RTI, Michael Mulqueen from the University
of Central Lancashire, explores how different institutional understand-
ings and perceptions of market norms created tensions between the
Defence Forces, the Departments of Defence, Finance, and Transport
when considering options for providing Ireland with Search and Rescue
aviation services. Mulqueen’s analysis highlights the significant civil–mili-
tary challenges in Ireland when the Defence Forces and government
departments have differing conceptions of how to conduct and provision
national defence, and how these challenges can impact defence innova-
tion in the future. In terms of civil–military relations, Senior Chief Petty
 INTRODUCTION xv

Officer Ruari DeBarra, illustrates that historically, defence reforms, when

they come, are usually at the behest of the various Defence Forces’ repre-
sentative associations. Yet these reforms and the practice of representative
association lobbying, DeBarra argues, are neither the most productive,
nor efficient means of obtaining beneficial reforms due to the adversarial
climate created by such civil–military relations, especially when different
associations diverge or disagree about what reforms should take priority.

Part VI: The Principle of Irish Neutrality

The final theme within this volume surrounds the often-contested topic
of Irish neutrality. Quite often, small nations seek to mitigate domestic
defence shortfalls by joining military alliances or cooperative security
arrangements. In the Irish context, as a perceived neutral country, there is
significant public and political resistance to Ireland increasing its involve-
ment with NATO beyond membership in the NATO affiliated Partnership
for Peace (PfP). There is similar resistance to suggestions of Irish partic-
ipation within an “EU Army.” Tackling this very issue of political and
public opposition is Eoin McNamara from the Finnish Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Helsinki, and the Johan Skytte Institute of Political
Studies at the University of Tartu in Estonia. McNamara argues that
Ireland is currently in a defence “no-man’s land” due to the return of
geopolitics to Europe and the resurgence of tensions between NATO
and the Russian Federation. This “no-man’s land,” McNamara explains,
originates from the European desire for greater defence integration and
capabilities development through NATO or EU CSDP which is politi-
cally infeasible in Ireland’s case, and the resultant need for independent
Irish defence investment and innovation which is similarly inhibited by
domestic political and public attitudes towards the Defence Forces and
Irish neutrality. McNamara presents a solution to escaping this no-man’s
land through a compromise, where Ireland moves to an arrangement
lying somewhere in between current PfP membership and full NATO
membership, to alleviate, at the very least, the significant pressure on
the Defence Forces in the areas of cyber defence, and maritime and air
policing operations.
While McNamara discusses Ireland and NATO, Commandant Dan
Ayiotis of the Military Archives explores the historical origins of Irish
neutrality and compares these origins to modern social and political
discourse in Ireland on maintaining neutrality. Ayiotis highlights that,
xvi INTRODUCTION

historically, and in the present, Ireland has never been truly neutral, but
instead has adopted a preferential pseudo-neutrality where tacit support
for other nations’ military operations has been provided based on the
Irish political and social perception of who is a friend and who is a
foe. Ayiotis identifies three periods in Irish history, which he terms as
neutrality as necessity, neutrality as expedience, and neutrality as conve-
nience. Thus, since the creation of the State, Ireland may have claimed a
status of neutrality, but has practised a policy of preferential favouritism
during ongoing conflicts. Finally, like McNamara’s treatment of Ireland
and NATO, and Ayiotis’s exploration of Irish neutrality historically, John
Mulqueen explores the historical Cold War political and public debates on
Irish neutrality, membership of NATO, and participation in an EU Army,
and how these debates colour current and future discussions on Ireland’s
attitudes towards increased EU military integration.
Modern defence policy entails making difficult decisions, taking risks
based on informed calculations as to where finite financial, personnel, and
materiel resources are or should be allocated. These challenging deci-
sions are even more acute for small nations like Ireland. With limited
budgets and competing social and political priorities, Ireland has long
faced the dichotomy of proximate conventional and hybrid threats that
remains underappreciated either by policymakers or by the electorate.
The following chapters aim to end this dichotomous approach to defence
policy, to promote meaningful discussion, even debate, on providing for
Ireland’s national defence now, and into the future.

Jonathan Carroll
Matthew G. O’Neill
Mark Williams
 Contents

Defence Forces Capabilities & The Threat Environment

Ensuring the Jungle Doesn’t Grow Back: The Obligations
Inherent to Irish Defence Policy 3
Mark Mellett
A Brigade Commander’s Perspective: “Oglaigh na
hEireann Has Been the People, Is the People, and Will Be
the People” 29
Brian Cleary
Disconnect and Mismatch: The Intellectual Formation
of Irish Defence Policy and Practice 47
Tom Clonan
The Irish Naval Service: The Burden of the Minimalist
Approach 67
Brian FitzGerald
Small Navies: Lessons for the Irish Naval Service 87
Deborah Sanders
Irish Air Corps: Towards 2052 107
Niall Buckley and Raymond Martin

xvii
xviii CONTENTS

The Reserve Defence Forces

Revitalizing the Irish Army Reserve Post-Commission
on the Defence Forces: Moving from the Single Force
Concept to a Total Force Policy 123
Jonathan Carroll
The Army Reserve: The Force-Multiplier for Irish Defence 153
Neil Richardson
Ireland’s Naval Service Reserve: An Analysis of Current
Capabilities and Role for the Future 173
David Rodgers and Gavin Murphy

Peacekeeping Operations
Decolonisation, Conflict and Independence: The Impact
of History on Ireland’s Approach to Peacekeeping 195
Neil Dee
Ireland’s Largest Peacekeeping Mission—The Irish Defence
Forces in UNIFIL 211
Natalia Agnieszka Hapek
Peacekeeping in the Digital Age: Future Threats
and Capability Requirements 229
Annika S. Hansen

Cyber Security in the Digital Age

The Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping
and the Role of the Irish Defence Forces 253
Mark Williams and Matthew G. O’Neill
Cyber Resilience for Europe’s Armed Forces
in the Twenty-First Century: A German Perspective 273
Michael Vetter
The Irish Defence Forces in the Drone Age 295
Andy Scollick
 CONTENTS xix

Defence Forces Institutional Innovation and Civil-Military

Relations
A Research, Technology and Innovation Capability
for the Defence Organisation 317
Sharon McManus and Sharon Breen
Shared Norms but Policy Incoherence: Analysing the Irish
Defence Forces’ Marketplace Aspirations 333
Michael Mulqueen
Ireland and the Citizens in Uniform 353
Ruairí de Barra

The Principle of Irish Neutrality

Ireland, NATO and “the Return of Geopolitics” in Europe 373
Eoin Micheál McNamara
Irish Military Neutrality: A Historical Perspective
for Modern Consideration 393
Daniel Ayiotis
Generating More Heat Than Light? The Debate Over
Ireland’s Neutrality and the “European Army” 411
John Mulqueen

Conclusion 429
Index 433
 List of Contributors

Daniel Ayiotis Irish Defence Forces, Dublin, Ireland

Sharon Breen Department of Defence, County Kildare, Ireland
Niall Buckley Irish Air Corps, Air Corps HQ, Casement Aerodrome,
Baldonnel, Dublin, Ireland
Jonathan Carroll Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
Brian Cleary Irish Defence Forces, Dublin, Ireland
Tom Clonan Senator & Security Analyst, Irish Senate, Dublin, Ireland
Ruairí de Barra Irish Naval Service, and Permanent Defence Force
Other Ranks Representative Association (PDFORRA), Cork, Ireland
Neil Dee The Azure Forum for Contemporary Security Strategy,
Dublin, Ireland
Brian FitzGerald Irish Naval Service, Haulbowline, Ireland
Annika S. Hansen Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF),
Berlin, Germany
Natalia Agnieszka Hapek University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Raymond Martin Irish Air Corps, Air Corps HQ, Casement Aero-
drome, Baldonnel, Dublin, Ireland

xxi
xxii LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Sharon McManus Irish Defence Forces, Dublin, Ireland

Eoin Micheál McNamara Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies,
University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
Mark Mellett University College Cork, Cork, Ireland;
Irish Defence Forces, DFHQ Newbridge, Ireland
John Mulqueen Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Michael Mulqueen School of Justice, University of Central Lancashire,
Lancashire, UK
Gavin Murphy Irish Naval Service Reserve, Carrigaline, Cork, Ireland
Matthew G. O’Neill The Senator George J Mitchell Institute for Global
Peace, Security and Justice, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK
Neil Richardson Irish Army Reserve and Reserve Defence Forces
Representative Association, Co. Roscommon, Ireland
David Rodgers Irish Naval Service Reserve, Douglas, Cork, Ireland
Deborah Sanders Defence Studies Department, King’s College
London, London, UK
Andy Scollick Independent Consultant, County Cork, Ireland
Michael Vetter German Ministry of Defence, Berlin, Germany
Mark Williams The Senator George J Mitchell Institute for Global
Peace, Security and Justice, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK
 List of Figures

The Irish Naval Service: The Burden of the Minimalist

Approach
Fig. 1 The real map of Ireland 68
Fig. 2 Commissioning ceremony of L.E. JAMES JOYCE—Dublin
2015 69
Fig. 3 L.E. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS (Offshore Patrol Vessel) 72
Fig. 4 Motor Torpedo Boats of the Marine and Coast-Watching
Service 1939–1946 73

Revitalizing the Irish Army Reserve Post-Commission

on the Defence Forces: Moving from the Single Force
Concept to a Total Force Policy
Fig. 1 Pie chart of the Army Reserve Force Structure: Single Force
Concept 2013–Present 130
Fig. 2 Pie chart on the Reimagined Army Reserve Force Structure 138

A Research, Technology and Innovation Capability for the

Defence Organisation
Fig. 1 The building blocks of the proposed RTI Capability Model 326

xxiii
 List of Tables

Ensuring the Jungle Doesn’t Grow Back: The Obligations

Inherent to Irish Defence Policy
Table 1 An analysis of gapping in capabilities currently
across the Joint Functions from the perspective of State
defence 24

Revitalizing the Irish Army Reserve Post-Commission

on the Defence Forces: Moving from the Single Force
Concept to a Total Force Policy
Table 1 Historical Reserve Force Structures 129
Table 2 The Army Reserve “Surge” Brigade 132
Table 3 The Army Reserve Combat Support Brigade 133
Table 4 The Army Reserve Combat Service Support Brigade 134
Table 5 The Integrated Army Reserve 136
Table 6 Army Reserve Unit Tiering System 137

xxv
Defence Forces Capabilities & The Threat
Environment
 Ensuring the Jungle Doesn’t Grow Back:
The Obligations Inherent to Irish Defence
Policy

Mark Mellett

Introduction
Every Nation has an Army. If not its own then someone else’s.1 So it
was in Ireland over a hundred years ago with British forces underwriting
the sovereignty of Great Britain and Ireland, shaping the character of
Irish society. The right to live in a civil society is a human right of every
man, woman, and child. It is where people are free, the institutions of
state function and where the vulnerable are protected. In the lead up to
the Irish War of Independence, the vulnerable were not protected and
Irish people were not free, nor was the Irish State sovereign. A state’s
sovereignty is inalienable, it being a paradox for the sovereignty and

1 In a letter to the Minister for Defence on 18 Apr 1948, Lt Gen Dan McKenna
observed “if we are not prepared to garrison and defend our country someone else will
come and do it for us,” in Michael Kennedy and Victor Laing (eds), The Irish Defence
Forces 1940–1949: The Chief of Staff’s Reports (Dublin, 2014), 440.

M. Mellett (B)
University College Cork, Cork, Ireland
e-mail: mark@markmellett.ie
Irish Defence Forces, DFHQ Newbridge, Ireland

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

Switzerland AG 2023
J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary
Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_1
4 M. MELLETT

sovereign rights of a state to be upheld by another’s military. Ireland’s

sovereignty and sovereign rights, just like the freedom of her people were
more imaginary than real, and so they remained until the Irish Free State
and the Defence Forces were established. For almost 100 years Óglaigh
na hÉireann has been the bedrock of Irish sovereignty, underpinning the
framework for the institutions of Ireland’s civil society.
Today our national, regional, and global security landscape has
changed dramatically. One hundred years after the foundation of the
Irish State it is only right to take stock against the backdrop of a dete-
riorating security environment, to see how well-prepared Ireland is for
the evolving security environment as an island state in an interconnected
world, and to comment on our future. It is impossible to cover all aspects
of Ireland’s defence considerations in one chapter, accordingly by neces-
sity some themes will be dealt with in a cursory manner. But, in examining
Ireland’s approach to Defence this chapter will draw on several threads.

(a) Examine Ireland’s geographical location and jurisdiction, where

the State exercises sovereignty, has sovereign rights, duties, and
obligations.
(b) Analyse the current security environment from national, regional,
and global perspectives.
(c) Comment on the multilateral framework within which National
Interests are exercised with a particular focus on the implications
for the Defence Forces.
(d) Assess, from the standpoint of Ireland’s Defence Policy, the
prospects of a policy-strategy match in the context of capabilities,
resourcing, and risk.

Ireland’s Geographical Location and Jurisdiction:

Where the State Exercises Sovereignty, Has
Sovereign Rights, Duties, and Obligations
On foundation of the State, Óglaigh na hÉireann, had a responsibility to
defend approximately 70,000 square kilometres on the island of Ireland,
given that defence from the sea was to be undertaken by His Majesty’s
Imperial Force.2 Today the Defence Forces have responsibility for a

2 Article 6 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921.

 ENSURING THE JUNGLE DOESN’T GROW BACK: THE … 5

growing jurisdiction where the State has expanding sovereign rights over
an area ten times as large, with one of the largest maritime to land ratios
in Europe, and a growing de facto multilateral responsibility and obliga-
tions encompassing the western approaches to the EU.3 In addition to
more traditional interpretations, defence is increasingly considered from
the perspective of multi domain integration across land, air, maritime,
cyber, and space.4 The five military operational domains are not equal:
space is global and encompasses the air, land, and maritime domains while
the cyber and electromagnetic domain permeates and pervades all the
others. Indeed, for clarity it is necessary to consider subdivisions when
assessing roles and responsibilities with, for example, the maritime domain
having air, surface, sub-surface, seabed, and sub-seabed domains.
From a sovereignty and sovereign rights perspective Ireland’s current
and future jurisdiction is significant with a potential to encompass up to
one million square kilometres with one of the richest food producing
ecosystems and renewable energy environments on the planet. By neces-
sity therefore this chapter will look in greater detail at our maritime, air,
and evolving domains, not necessarily well covered in the past, thereby
providing a greater sense of Irish State responsibilities, obligations, and
the required direction of defence for Ireland.
It is widely acknowledged that the process of globalisation transforms
both the concept and practice of state sovereignty.5 It is also argued that
the idea that state sovereignty can be defined territorially or that the
concept of state sovereignty denotes an autonomous international actor
are no longer valid descriptions. Accordingly, while sovereignty is a rele-
vant concept in the context of jurisdiction, defence and security there
are also wider considerations in political, diplomatic, economic, societal,
technological, legislative, and cultural terms. In terms of sovereign juris-
diction the Irish State exercises sovereignty over the land domain of the

3 Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government, Project Ireland 2040:

National Planning Framework (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2018), 98.
4 British Ministry of Defence, Joint Concept Note 1/20: Multi-Domain Integration
(London: Ministry of Defence, 2020).
5 Suzanne E. Gordon, “Changing Concepts of Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in the
Global Economy: Is There a Territorial Connection?,” available at http://ccges.apps01.
yorku.ca/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/gordon-changing-concepts-of-sovereignty-
and-jurisdiction-in-the-global-economy-is-there-a-territorial-connection.pdf.
6 M. MELLETT

26 counties and the sea area out to the limit of the Territorial Seas at 12
nautical miles beyond which it exercises sovereign rights.

Maritime Jurisdiction and Responsibilities

By the late 1900s in the words of the Chairman of the United Nations
Law of the Sea drafting committee, Alan Beesley, “the law of the sea was
in state of disorder bordering on chaos.”6 It is only in recent decades
that coastal state sovereign rights have been codified. The introduction
of new technology, evolutions in science, changes in market conditions,
and the rate of resource usage have inter alia combined to necessitate
more sophisticated ocean governance regimes. All of these add to the
sophistication of the security arrangements such as those required to
suppress unlawful acts in the case of maritime navigation and on fixed
platforms which under the 2004 Maritime Security Act, ironically, are the
primary responsibility of An Garda Síochána, not the Defence Forces.7
Concurrently, Ireland is obliged under international treaty to protect and
preserve the marine environment. Furthermore, Ireland is signatory to
the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response
and Co-operation (OPRC), obliging it to have a National Contingency
Plan (NCP) for oil pollution in place applicable throughout the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ).
Marine-based critical national infrastructure is set to increase exponen-
tially in the coming decades in the renewable energy sector. With offshore
gas production declining, gas field infrastructure presents opportunities
for the production and storage of “green hydrogen.”8 The growth in
fibre optic subsea cables provides for trans-Atlantic and regional inter-
connectivity, conveying trillions of euros per day, adding to the state’s
critical national infrastructure and vulnerabilities. Electrical interconnec-
tors, current and planned, link with the United Kingdom and EU, adding
to the sea-based critical national infrastructure. In the Climate Action

6 Alan Beesley, “The Negotiating Strategy of UNCLOS III: Developing and Developed
Countries as Partners—A Pattern for Future Multilateral International Conferences?” Law
and Contemporary Problems 46, no. 2 (1983), 183–194.
7 Irish Statute Book, “Maritime Security Act 2004,” available at https://www.irishstat
utebook.ie/eli/2004/act/29/enacted/en/print#sec1.
8 ESB, “ESB and dCarbonX launch Kinsale Head Hydrogen Storage project,” Press
Release 12 August 2021.
 ENSURING THE JUNGLE DOESN’T GROW BACK: THE … 7

Plan, the Government has committed to the installation of 7 GW of

offshore renewable energy (ORE) by 2030 with a further commitment of
more than 30 GW beyond that serving as a key enabler for EU Strategic
Autonomy, helping to attain energy security.9 For Ireland, this requires
the installation of significant fixed and floating offshore renewable energy
infrastructure with an estimated value exceeding e60 billion.10 The
designation of a network of Marine Protected Areas will help meet
Ireland’s international obligations, contributing to a wider ecosystem-
based management framework with the ultimate aim of achieving Good
Environmental Status in the coming years. The Maritime Area Planning
Act 2021 provides for the biggest transformation in marine governance
since the foundation of the State establishing the Maritime Area Regu-
latory Authority (MARA).11 Finally, Ireland’s Search and Rescue (SAR)
system conforms with several international conventions ensuring adequate
provision of SAR services.12

Air Domain Jurisdiction and Responsibilities

In the context of the Air Domain, Ireland has air traffic management
responsibilities within the area encompassing the Irish Flight Information
Regions (FIR(s)) of Shannon FIR, the Shannon Oceanic Transition Area
(SOTA) and Northern Oceanic Transition Area (NOTA). Through the
Irish Aviation Authority (IAA), Ireland provides air traffic management
services for 451,000 square kilometres of airspace.13 Though a crucial
gateway for 90 per cent of air traffic between Europe and North America,

9 Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, Climate Action Plan

2021: Securing Our Future (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2021); Jennifer Bray,
“Taoiseach Tells French Summit That Ireland Aims to Become Exporter of Energy,” The
Irish Times, February 11, 2022.
10 UK prices for 30 GW of ORE were in the order of £48 Billon in 2018. Renew-
able UK, “A Sea of Opportunity,” available at https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.renewableuk.
com/resource/resmgr/publications/offshore_wind_industry_counc.pdf.
11 Houses of the Oireachtais, “Maritime Area Planning Act 2021,” available at https://
www.oireachtas.ie/en/bills/bill/2021/104/.
12 Such as the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974: Chapter V
“Search and Rescue.” Department of Transport, Tourism, and Sport, National Search
and Rescue Plan (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2019).
13 Irish Aviation Authority, “En Route Services,” available at https://www.iaa.ie/air-
traffic-management/en-route-services.
8 M. MELLETT

Ireland does not have primary radar coverage over its FIRs which can and
has given rise to security concerns such as the risk of potential disruption
of civilian airspace by Russian Federation military aircraft and a reported
agreement for UK military overflights.14

Space Domain
Three fundamental principles guide the conduct of space activities, firstly
the notion of space as the province of all humankind, secondly the
freedom of exploration and use of outer space by all states without
discrimination, and thirdly the principle of non-appropriation of outer
space. These principles are codified in the five treaties and agreements of
international space law. In the context of responsibilities from the Irish
State perspective is the fact that each state is responsible for all space-
related activities arising within its jurisdiction. This includes those relating
to non-state actors or commercial interests. This places a particular
responsibility for Ireland to have appropriate intelligence and governance
structures to ensure space-related infrastructure in Irish jurisdiction is
not used, especially by foreign states, for activities that are contrary
to international law or to undermine State sovereignty. In recent years
there have been growing concerns regarding inappropriate access to space
infrastructure by foreign militaries.15

Cyber Domain
Ireland ranks among the leading EU Member States in terms of the
uptake and use of digital technologies which play a central role in
supporting and facilitating economic and social life. Ireland’s economic
growth is very much linked with the development of a global data
ecosystem, our geographic position, open economy, and EU member-
ship. As a result, Ireland has become host to a significant amount of
data and economic activity. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
works collaboratively with the Defence Forces, An Garda Síochána and

14 Edward Burke, “What Are Russian Bombers Doing in Irish Airspace?” The Irish
Times, March 10, 2020; George Allison, “Why Do British Jets ‘Protect’ Irish Airspace?”
UK Defence Journal, March 10, 2020.
15 Jonathan Barrett and Johan Ahlander, “Swedish Space Company Halts New Business
Helping China Operate Satellites,” Reuters, September 21, 2020.
 ENSURING THE JUNGLE DOESN’T GROW BACK: THE … 9

the National Security Analysis Centre (NSAC) in the Department of the

Taoiseach. It also works closely with the Office of Emergency Planning
(OEP) in the Department of Defence and leads, with respect to a Threat
Sharing Group comprising senior private sector cyber security special-
ists, critical infrastructure operators, the Defence Forces, and An Garda
Síochána.

Irelands Multilateral Responsibilities

Beyond the state’s sovereign jurisdiction Ireland’s international obliga-
tions and commitments have been inextricably linked to Ireland’s values
for a fairer world; a just world; a secure world, and a sustainable world.
Ireland’s foreign policy is deeply anchored in the values set out in
the Irish Constitution. These are also reflected in the Charter of the
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
principles which underpin the European Union. This explains Ireland’s
sustained strong commitment to multilateralism, a commitment that
underpins Ireland’s approach to membership of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council for the period 2021/2022. Key to Ireland’s successful bid
was the credibility Ireland leveraged from the longest unbroken record
of UN peacekeeping with an estimated 70,000 individual tours of duty
by Irish soldiers, sailors, and aircrew in the world’s most challenging
theatres. Ireland’s approach in aiding victims of armed conflicts and other
emergencies is to stress the importance of coherent, complimentary, and
coordinated actions within a multilateral framework. Ireland emphasises
the importance of systematically integrating protection of civilians and
gender-based violence initiatives into policy and practice to protect the
most vulnerable.

The Current Security Environment

from National, Regional, and Global Perspectives
While the preceding sections have outlined Ireland’s responsibilities across
the various security domains, state security is inextricably linked with
international and regional security. A safe and secure environment stim-
ulates economic growth and foreign direct investment, which in turn
enables improved public services and enhanced national infrastructure.
Notwithstanding the Balkan Wars and the more recent war in Ukraine,
for over 75 years there has been an extraordinary period of peace and
10 M. MELLETT

security in Europe, further reinforcing the links between economics and

security. This security has in no small way been the result of the multilat-
eral manner the values and principles of the European Union have been
institutionalised, building on the Philosophy of Robert Schuman. But it is
also important to note that the EU institutions were facilitated by initia-
tives such as the U.S. Marshall Plan in the aftermath of the Second World
War providing over $15 Billion to support European recovery that formed
part of the foundations of the EU we know today. EU recovery was
supported by U.S. interest in Europe, which today finds itself squeezed
between the United States, China, and an aggressively resurgent Russian
Federation that attempts to become stronger by making Europe look
weaker.
While traditionally state security arrangements are sovereign matters,
in a multilateral framework of common interests, they are also a matter
of reputation. Countries that do not provide adequately for their own
security arrangements may be seen as “free riding” on the investment in
defence and security made by neighbours. They may also unknowingly
facilitate espionage, cyber, or hybrid targeting activities by foreign states
against neighbours—a matter brought into even sharper focus following
the invasion of Ukraine.16 The historical security challenges of dissident
Republicanism notwithstanding, until very recently Ireland had enjoyed a
relatively safe and secure environment, a privileged position that is taken
for granted, especially when looking at regional and global challenges.
The decision by the Russian Federation to communicate an intention to
de facto annex approximately 5000 square kilometres of Ireland’s exclu-
sive economic zone (equivalent to the combined area of Dublin, Wicklow,
and Wexford), using naval artillery and launching rockets for five days was
unprecedented. It signalled contempt for the Irish people, an affront for
Irish sovereign rights, the rights of fishermen, and our duties to protect
the environment. In the space of a few days, the holes in Ireland’s defence
architecture were laid bare for the world to see. Unfortunately, this disre-
gard for the norms and principles of good order pales in significance when
considered in the context of the Russian Federation’s full scale invasion
of Ukraine.
Unlike many other states, Ireland does not have a National Secu-
rity Strategy, nor does it formally publish updated threat levels. While

16 Conor Gallagher, “Ireland and Finland: Similar Countries with Vastly Different
Security Approaches,” The Irish Times, February 26, 2022.
 ENSURING THE JUNGLE DOESN’T GROW BACK: THE … 11

the current threat level regarding terrorism in Ireland is “moderate,”

in Northern Ireland it is “severe,” meaning an attack is highly likely.17
Following the “Wizard Spider” criminal ransomware cyber-attack on
Ireland’s Health Service Executive, it is reasonable to assume another
criminal cyber-attack of similar scope and scale is highly likely suggesting a
threat assessment of severe, if not critical. It also shows the critical infras-
tructure vulnerability to state actors’ nefarious disruptive activity, should
they so desire.
Over the past 15 years, the Global Peace Index has provided a rich
source of data allowing for year-on-year analysis relating to up to 99.7
per cent of the global population.18 The Index shows that since 2010 the
number of conflicts, globally, has risen by 88 per cent. There are currently
three wars on Europe’s borders. The invasion of Ukraine by Russian
Federation forces has already resulted in many deaths adding to the death
toll linked to the hybrid war in Ukraine following the 2014 annexation
of Crimea.19 In Syria, multiple proxy wars continue, which have caused
over 500,000 deaths and displaced over 6 million people.20 In Libya, the
civil war has reached somewhat of a stalemate. These and other conflicts
contribute to a plethora of second order activities including irregular
migration, people, and weapons trafficking, as well as a rise in piracy.
Of the eighty-four crises in the world monitored by the International
Crisis Group, eighteen are in countries that are negotiating accession to
the EU or have a European outlook. While deaths from terrorism fell for
the fifth consecutive year in 2019 in most regions, it has become more
widespread in others. There is evidence that remnants of ISIS have linked
up with disparate violent extremist groups, influencing across the Sahel.
The Gulf of Guinea persists as a maritime security hotspot, with the illegal

17 Department of Defence, “Speech by the Minister with Responsibility for Defence

Paul Kehoe T.D.,” February 25, 2020, available at https://www.gov.ie/en/speech/365
5ff-speech-by-the-minister-with-responsibility-for-defence-paul-kehoe-td/.
18 Institute for Economics and Peace, “Global Peace Index 2021,” available at https://
www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GPI-2021-web-1.pdf.
19 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Conflict-Related
Casualties in Ukraine,” available at https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/
Conflict-related%20civilian%20casualties%20as%20of%2030%20September%202021%20%
28rev%208%20Oct%202021%29%20EN.pdf.
20 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Update on the Extent
of Conflict-Related Deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic,” available at https://www.ohchr.
org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27531&LangID=E.
12 M. MELLETT

arms trade and people trafficking mixing with South American trafficked
narcotics, thus fuelling criminality which spills into Europe and beyond,
forcing instability and irregular migration.21 While states must treat the
symptoms in places like the Mediterranean, the only hope for a cure is to
treat the root causes. Prior to the Ukraine invasion, 85 per cent of the
worldwide displaced were from developing countries: 57 per cent come
from Syria, South Sudan, and Afghanistan alone.22
Other vectors driving instability in and between states include state
sponsored cyber, hybrid, and espionage operations below the threshold
of formally declared waefare, undermining the authority of legitimate
institutions, perversely shaping the outcomes from democratic processes,
and threatening critical national infrastructure such as electrical grids and
trans-ocean fibre optic telecommunications.23 Estimates suggest that the
annual cost of cybercrime damages is in the region of $6 trillion, and
the rise of right-wing political ideologies is driving more nationalistic
tendencies, often triggered by irregular migration.
Increasingly impacting on security is the influence of climate break-
down and biodiversity loss affecting every aspect of life, damaging food
systems, displacing millions, and shaping the future of conflict. With the
average global temperature now 1.2 degrees higher than pre-industrial
levels and the UN predicting this to rise to 2.4 degrees there are growing
threats from weather-related disasters including rising water scarcity and
sea level rises. The effects of population increase further add to insecurity
with a tenfold increase in global population noted over the last 250 years.
The UN estimate world population will pass 10 billion by 2050. The
Global Hunger Index points to alarming levels of hunger in 11 coun-
tries, with serious levels in 40 more, which causes greater insecurity, and
undermines peace. The relationship between climate change and deadly

21 ICC International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Report for the Period 1 January–31 March 2021,” available at https://www.skuld.com/
contentassets/a58fecffc88b4418959a19e6d2e07778/2021-q1-imb-piracy-report.pdf.
22 Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria, Handbook on CSDP (Vienna:
Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence, 2021). https://www.
bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/handbook_on_csdp4.pdf.
23 John Mooney, “Navy Called in as Russians Suspected of Targeting Undersea Internet
Cable,” The Sunday Times, August 15, 2021.
 ENSURING THE JUNGLE DOESN’T GROW BACK: THE … 13

conflict is complex and context specific, while the impact of COVID-

19 has signalled a clear link between intensifying pathogen emergence,
climate breakdown, and biodiversity loss.

Multilateral Framework, National Interests,

and Implications for the Defence Forces
The Ireland of today is changed remarkably from that of 100 years ago.
For one, the jurisdiction where the state has sovereignty or sovereign
rights has increased significantly in the air and maritime domains, compli-
cated by space and cyber. The bilateral relationship with the United
Kingdom is dominated by the de jure multilateral codified relation-
ship with our 26 EU partners. In many ways, Ireland has never been
more interconnected with international, regional, governmental, non-
governmental, and market and civil society institutions and yet it sits as
the lone EU sentinel in the Atlantic post Brexit. It is bound by a complex
web of obligations and duties which crisscross the political, economic,
societal, technological, environmental, and legislative pillars. But should
there be surprise?
400 years ago, the English Poet John Donne in For Whom the Bell
Tolls wrote, “No man is an island, entire of itself. Each is a piece of
the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea,
Europe is the less.” Many interpret Donne’s message as a metaphor of
interdependence suggesting that it is within a framework of multilater-
alism not unilateralism that this interdependency will best thrive. Today,
in a world of breakneck speed in terms of change and knowledge genera-
tion, humans are physically experiencing the effects of climate breakdown
and biodiversity loss, they are seeing a general decline in peace and secu-
rity, and states have never been more interdependent. In the era of the
Anthropocene, it is human activity that is the dominant influence on
climate, the environment and peace and security. So as a species it is
the principle of multilateralism that defines human security and how
the institutions of civil society should flourish. Against the backdrop of
such an assessment, at every level within Defence, across all govern-
mental levels, national and international, it is vital that cross cutting,
integrated approaches are pursued. This all points to the requirement for
a “whole of society approach” to defence and security such as practised in
Finland, among other countries. Greater cohesion between the Defence
14 M. MELLETT

Forces and the Department of Defence with a discerning National Secu-

rity Committee, an operational National Security Analysis Centre and a
codified and actioned National Security Strategy have never been more
important. Such fundamentals are vital for a broader EU defence and
security architecture, shaped to underpin EU “Strategic Autonomy.”

Ireland the EU and Strategic Autonomy

The pessimistic security environment assessment leaves no other choice
but to view Ireland’s defence and security through the prism of the multi-
lateral framework of the EU, UN and its relationship with NATO and
neighbours. Accepting that the European Union has brought unprece-
dented peace, prosperity, and democracy, outcomes such as Brexit point
to a questioning of the strategic direction Europe must follow. This has
profound implications for Ireland. It also has profound implications for
Ireland’s reputation and interpretation of the principle of solidarity.24
For decades the “Brussels effect,” and the ability to spread rules and
standards across the globe, has earned admiration worldwide; Europe
became a world power without realising it. But things are changing, and
the shared interests and principles of the European Union, including
the promotion of peace and guarantee of security for its citizens and
territory, are under threat. Internal and external security of the Union
and its states are ever more intertwined, with peace at home depending
on peace beyond EU borders. According to the EU Global Strategy,
the EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism
as its key principle and the United Nations at its core.25 This points
towards a credible, responsive, and joined-up EU. Credibility hinges
on European unity, the effectiveness of its policies and adherence to
its values with a growing acceptance of an integrated and comprehen-
sive approach to human security. Militaries should act in consort with
politicians, diplomats, NGOs, lawyers, investors in an appropriate insti-
tutional framework, often involving the EU and ideally underwritten by
the UN acknowledging that dysfunctionality at UN level can sometimes
exacerbate insecurity.

24 See Sophie Pornschlegel, Solidarity in the EU: More Hype Than Substance? (Brussels:
European Policy Centre, 2021).
25 European External Action Service, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe
(Brussels: EEAS, 2020).
 ENSURING THE JUNGLE DOESN’T GROW BACK: THE … 15

Nested within the EU Global Strategy, the EU Strategic Compass is

seen as one of the most resolute plans to close the gap between ambi-
tion and reality when it comes to external action, achieving unity in the
EU’s response to defence and security.26 Ultimately the compass has in its
sights the opportunity to leverage dormant or under developed provisions
of the EU Treaties, such as Article 42(7) of the Treaty of the Euro-
pean Union.27 In essence, the “Strategic Guidance” strategy does this by
formulating a common threat analysis of the EU, agreeing on strategic
objectives to strengthen the EU as an actor in security and defence and
offering political guidance for future military planning processes. Taken
together they point to a more geopolitical EU that, in the words of
the HRVP, must “learn to use the language of power” (Borell, 2019)
developing capacity in crisis management, enhancing capability develop-
ment, improving resilience, and maximising partnerships. The Strategic
Compass also acts as a platform for the deepening of EU relations with
NATO and partners like the United Kingdom and Norway.
The November 2016 EU Council conclusions refer to Strategic
Autonomy as the “capacity to act autonomously when and where neces-
sary and with partners wherever possible.” Many argue that the EU
has neither the strategic culture nor the required capabilities to support
strategic autonomy. But the requirement to acquire such autonomy is
being influenced on many fronts. Firstly, thirty years ago, the EU repre-
sented a quarter of the world’s wealth. In 20 years, it will represent about
11 per cent of world GDP, less than half that of China, which PwC
predict will be the world’s strongest economy followed by India and then
America. Secondly, a new language of unilateralism has entered centre
stage, with a decline of American soft power and a reawakening of isola-
tionist tendencies. This brings into question the degree of certainty with
which the EU can call on its old ally. Thirdly, and on the flip side, the
United States is understandably frustrated with a sense that the EU in
general and many of its Member States in particular, and this must include
Ireland, have been happy to free ride, enjoying the security dividend that
the United States and others provide. Fourthly is a growing desire within

26 FINABEL, European Army Interoperability Centre, “EU’s Strategic Compass for

Security and Defence: A New Approach in 2021,” available at https://finabel.org/eus-str
ategic-compass-for-security-and-defence-a-new-approach-in-2021/.
27 European Parliamentary Research Service, Unlocking the Potential of the EU Treaties
(Brussels: EPRS, 2020).
16 M. MELLETT

the EU for greater congruence between Member States in their approach

to defence. Hence, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), Euro-
pean Defence Fund (EDF), Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
(CARD), and so on, each of which has implications for Ireland with
resistance in some sectors to greater EU defence co-operation by Ireland.
Fifth, the EU’s dependency on Russian energy supplies is a cause of weak-
ness as evidenced in the recent difficulties in reaching consensus on the
nature of sanctions against Russia. European strategic autonomy through
energy security offers an extraordinary opportunity to Ireland in terms
of ORE. Finally, the policy of unilateralism is starkly evidenced by the
decision of the United Kingdom to exit the European Union prioritising
national sovereignty over EU multilateralism.
The concept of strategic autonomy was born in the field of the
defence industry with the most ambitious of three visions being common
defence and security, common financing, and procurement of capabilities,
sharing of expensive military assets and technological innovation aimed
at reducing defence costs. The concept now expands beyond the defence
sector into other domains, including technological, energy, competition,
climate, trade, and economic policies.

Ireland and Neutrality

The ambitions and direction of the EU bear heavily on the future of Irish
neutrality and while a deeper analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter,
the historical narrative has consistently been misrepresented and misun-
derstood. Within this volume, Daniel Ayiotis and John Mulqueen provide
particularly valuable insights, with Ayiotis eloquently identifying three
themes that capture the happenstance nature of Irish policy on neutrality,
namely neutrality as necessity, neutrality as expedience, and neutrality as
convenience. European Security and Defence Policy presents challenges
for how Ireland advances. The reality however is that there is nothing
new about this, and if anything, it is a matter that is likely to come more
to the fore in the aftermath of Brexit with greater demands being placed
on Ireland in the context of investment in defence as identified by the
Commission on the Defence Forces.
 ENSURING THE JUNGLE DOESN’T GROW BACK: THE … 17

Prospects of a Policy-Strategy Match

Drawing this chapter together it is clear that there are several macro
considerations that bear on the future of the Irish Defence Forces. These
relate to sovereignty, the security environment, multilateral obligations,
and the peculiarities relating to our interpretation of neutrality. All influ-
ence the nature of Ireland’s defence policy. Accordingly, it is worth
positioning these in the broader national landscape of what is increasingly
known as the whole of government approach to defence and security, to
assess the implications for neutrality and the capability realities of a fit
for purpose Defence Forces for 2030 and beyond. Before concluding, it
is valuable to look at Ireland’s national security arrangements from the
perspectives of:

(a) Defence policy.

(b) Defence expenditure and resourcing.
(c) Governance.
(d) Capabilities.
(e) Risk.

Defence Policy
Policy is the set of goals or political objectives that a nation adopts
to achieve a vital national interest. On matters so fundamental to the
integrity of a state and its sovereignty or decisions which ultimately
involve members of its military going into harm’s way it is reasonable to
expect that policy should be rational. That is, that there should be a clear
understanding of National Interests, with clear objectives agreed upon,
multiple options known and examined, and choices weighted. It requires
a decision-making process to set these goals or political objectives. Clause-
witz wrote that politics provides the logic setting clear objectives and
should not extend its influence to operational detail, while Sun Tzu
argues that Generals who “are not interfered with by the sovereign will
be victorious.”28

28 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Peter Paret and Michael Howard, eds. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1976), 87; Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Translated by Thomas
Cleary (Boston: Shambhala Dragon Editions, 1988).
18 M. MELLETT

After almost eight decades without a codified Defence Policy, the

first Irish Defence White Paper was published in February 2000, with
the second in 2015, and updated in 2019.29 The White Paper sets
out Government’s long-term policy. The roles and tasks assigned to the
Defence Forces drive the capabilities required across the five military
domains to meet the priorities of Government with the Reserve Defence
Forces required to augment the Permanent Defence Forces in times of
crisis. Central to the roles and core to the purpose of every military force
is the requirement to provide for the military defence of the State from
armed aggression. The development of a strategy for this policy imple-
mentation ultimately is a task for the Department of Defence and the
Defence Forces under the Minister for Defence. Two keys to a policy-
strategy match are first, appropriate objectives, and second, resourcing
required capabilities. As a fundamental, defence capability is not some-
thing that can be turned on and off like a tap; once lost it takes decades
to regenerate.
Since the foundation of the Irish State resourcing has been a point of
tension. Of course, over the decades other factors are points of friction,
especially regarding civil–military relations which have policy formulation
and implementation dimensions and consequences. Over the years, many
reports have referenced these tensions. Eunan O’Halpin set out six histor-
ical factors underpinning the structural tension between the Department
of Defence and the Defence Forces.30

(a) The shock of financing the National Army during and in the
period after the Civil War together with haphazard and unplanned
expansion.
(b) The long-standing fear of an over-mighty military arising largely
from the mutiny of 1924 and reinforced by the military involve-
ment in the 1969 Arms Crisis.

29 https://ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/Eire_-_2000_-_White_Paper_on_Defence.pdf.
Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence (Dublin: Government Printing Office,
2000); Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence (Dublin: Government Printing
Office, 2015); Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence Update (Dublin:
Government Printing Office, 2019).
30 Eunan O’ Halpin, “Rethinking Irish Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century,”
Defence Forces Review 13 (2016), 217–224.
 ENSURING THE JUNGLE DOESN’T GROW BACK: THE … 19

(c) The absence of long-term policy on how Ireland should be

defended from external and internal threats.
(d) The administrative culture which practises a “dual-structure”
approach whereby technical expertise is second guessed by non-
specialist, cheese pairing administrators as identified by the Devlin
Group.31
(e) Defence has had to fight on two fronts: simultaneously micro-
managing the Defence Forces while protecting them from the
depredations of the Department of Finance.
(f) Political sensitivities over the very term “Defence Policy.”

As a collective, they provide an interconnected tapestry that helps our

understanding of defence policy, finance, governance, capabilities, and
ultimately our tolerance of risk. It is unfortunate that policy curtailed the
opportunity to address observations such as those of O’Halpin’s when
defining the terms of reference for the Commission on the Defence
Forces. As a result the Commission did not examine governance arrange-
ments between the Defence Forces and the Department of Defence.
Outside the Commission’s work other than a commitment to an ongoing
Operational Readiness Review (OCR), and the 1991 Efficiency Audit
Group Review there is little reference to any independent, externally led,
review of the Department of Defence.32 The most significant external
examination to date was the Devlin Report in 1969, over fifty years ago.
Whereas, in the same period the Defence Forces have been subject to
many externally led independent reviews.

Defence Expenditure and Resourcing

Relative to the EU mean of 1.2 per cent, in 2019 Ireland’s percentage
spend was six times smaller than its EU partners. Furthermore, there is a

31 Vincent Browne, “The Uncivil Civil Servants: The Obstruction of Reform,” avail-
able at https://magill.ie/archive/uncivil-civil-servants-obstruction-reform. The failure to
reform the public service since the Devlin Report was published over 13 years ago has
been a major contributor to the crisis in which we find ourselves. See Public Services
Organisation Review Group, “The Devlin Report Part 3,” available at https://www.lenus.
ie/bitstream/handle/10147/125894/DevlinReportPart3.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
32 The Civil Service Renewal Plan (2014) provides for an internally led Programme of
Organisational Capability Reviews with an external review panel that does not undertake
review work.
20 M. MELLETT

disconnect between the ambitions of the 2015 White Paper on Defence

and the budget provision, an issue starkly identified by the Commis-
sion on the Defence Forces. In short, this is causing a policy-strategy
mismatch, with many of the programmes identified in the 2015 White
Paper either not initiated or currently behind schedule. A second consid-
eration relating to Defence Expenditure is remuneration, in particular the
matter of pay and conditions for Defence Forces personnel. For the past
number of years discharges of personnel have outstripped recruitment
with an unsustainable “churn” rate which has resulted in around 1000
vacancies which is particularly acute in the Naval Service. Based on CSO
data over the ten years leading up to 2021, in the context of average
weekly earnings of Irish public sector bodies, the Defence Forces have
been at the lowest for three years and second lowest over seven years. It
is argued that the unique attributes of service in the military, being subject
to military law, never withholding labour and being subject to an unlim-
ited liability are sufficient criteria to merit a review of Defence Forces pay
structures outside the framework of the collective.
O’Halpin’s comments on the long-standing fear of an over-mighty
military stem particularly from the 1924 “crisis,” which itself was largely
a reaction to Government cutbacks which cut the Army from 52,000 in
1923 to 16,000 in 1924. According to Theo Farrell civilian control of the
military appears to have been primarily exercised through control of army
expenditure.33 As observed by Ronan Fanning, since the Department of
Finance was run by former British civil servants who did not share the
Army’s view of a military threat from Britain or Germany, it was content
to starve the army of resources.34 Arguably this helped institutionalise
a corporate culture in the Department of Finance in the context of its
dealings with the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces which
prevails to this date.
The evolution of the European Defence Fund (EDF) incentivising
and supporting collaborative, cross-border research, and development
in defence is bringing change. It is increasing the EU’s technolog-
ical edge and helping develop the capabilities that are key for the

33 Theo Farrell, “The Suicidal Army: Civil-Military Relations and Strategy in Indepen-
dent Ireland,” in Tom Garvin, Maurice Manning, and Richard Sinnott (eds) Dissecting
Irish Politics (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2004), 49.
34 Ronan Fanning, The Irish Department of Finance, 1922–58 (Dublin: Institute of
Public Administration, 1978), 36–42.
 ENSURING THE JUNGLE DOESN’T GROW BACK: THE … 21

strategic autonomy and resilience of the EU. Complementing and ampli-

fying Member States’ efforts, the EDF promotes cooperation among
companies and research actors within the EU serving as a stimulant
for defence-related economic activity as has recently been announced in
Ireland.35

Governance
Ireland’s national security arrangements were born out of the period
leading up to and after independence. It is argued that a deep-rooted
tension which may have its roots not just in the period following the Irish
Civil War but, in the years, leading up to independence. The disruption
throughout the War of Independence almost certainly spurned a level of
resentment within a community of civil servants, many of whom switched
loyalty from His Majesty to the new government. Fanning’s observations
above support this thesis of an institutionalised antipathy towards defence
in the Department of Finance, reinforced by events such as the 1969
Arms Crisis. The matter of trust in the Defence Forces while seldom a
point of overt discussion has certainly been a driver of tension impacting
on the cross-government governance arrangements.36
The nature of institutional constructs such as the National Security
Committee and the slow progress of initiatives such as the National
Security Analysis Centre together with the absence of a National Secu-
rity Strategy add to suboptimal governance arrangements for Defence
and Security. Paraphrasing Clausewitz, there can be no other way but
to subordinate the military to the political. That is a fundamental of
democracy but when the controls mitigating the risk of a fear of an
unpredictable military create another risk associated with a wet blanket
of bureaucracy with non-specialists second guessing technical expertise, a
new risk emerges which undermines optimal governance.
Irish Defence Forces command and control arrangements are unique
among western militaries with no formalised structures for joint forces

35 Leigh McGowran, “10 Teams Shortlisted for SFI Challenge to Develop Tech for
Defence Forces,” available at https://www.siliconrepublic.com/innovation/sfi-defence-for
ces-research-challenge-shortlist-funding-ireland.
36 Conor Gallagher, “The ‘Cold War’ Between the Irish Military and the Civilians in
Charge of Them,” The Irish Times, February 20, 2021.
22 M. MELLETT

command. Defence Forces Headquarters is a de facto Army Headquar-

ters primarily staffed by Army personnel augmented by Air and Naval
personnel that make up a small percentage of the staff. The Chief of
Staff does not command the Army, Naval Service, or the Air Corps.
Instead, command flows directly from the Minister for Defence to the
General Officers Commanding the Brigades, the Air Corps, and the Naval
Service. This arrangement effectively bypasses the Chief of Staff and the
General Staff who exercise influence with moral authority rather than
actual authority resulting in communications and instructions from the
Minister or his officials directly to subordinate commanders. The current
system weakens the power of the Chief of Staff and the military while
increasing the risk for the Minister and the State arising from a mishap or
shortcomings in the rapid application of joint defence capabilities.
The failure to exercise legislated institutional provisions such as the
Council of Defence has been commented on as far back as Devlin. It
is difficult to comprehend and adds to the sense that its non-use is
related to a desire of civil authorities to maximise their power over the
Defence Forces. The provisions of the Section in the Act relating to
the Council of Defence are self-explanatory, with the Act specifying—
there “shall stand established”—this is a mandatory provision. It is also
important to consider Section 11(4)—the Council shall meet whenever
summoned by the Minister. While this gives the Minister discretion for
when they summon the Council to meet, they are nonetheless obliged to
have the Council established. The Defence Act envisages a cohesive body
(3 military, 2 civil) to “aid and counsel the Minister on all matters in rela-
tion to the business of the DOD on which the Minister may consult the
Council.” It is remarkable that as an institution the Council receives no
mention in the Commission on the Defence Forces.

Capabilities
In specifying the roles assigned to the Defence Forces the White Paper
on Defence articulates the need for the forces to be able to undertake
a full spectrum of military tasks that range from support in peace-time
operations overseas to war-fighting in defence of the State, as well as a
broad range of support tasks and civil contingency tasks. Kent Andersson
makes the point that capability is central to assessments and decision-
making in the defence and security sector, but the understanding of the
term seems to differ a lot. When considering if state X has the requisite
 ENSURING THE JUNGLE DOESN’T GROW BACK: THE … 23

variety in military capability to engage in conflict Y, Andersson points to

the Joint Functions or Military Power concepts.37 Military capability is
defined as the ability to attain operational success for a given scenario
and achieving desired effects under specified standards and conditions
through combinations of ways and means. The maintenance and devel-
opment of military capability requires a broad range of actions within
the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces. It consists of a
conceptual component (the thought process), a moral component (the
ability to get people to conduct operations, originating from Defence
Forces values), and a physical component (the means of conducting oper-
ations). Even dissecting these elements reveals a fundamental weakness
in the Irish Defence capability architecture. Without appropriate Joint,
Land, Air, Maritime, and indeed Space, Cyber, and Reserve inputs to the
thought process the conceptual component is suboptimal. Trying to get
personnel to conduct operations without command vested in the Chief
of Staff or clarity in employment law relating to reservists and questions
regarding remuneration results in a suboptimal moral component. Finally,
inadequate resourcing will always result in gaping gaps in the means
to conduct operations and therefore a suboptimal physical component.
Thus, Ireland’s conceptual defence trinity is fundamentally weak. This
ultimately bears on the capabilities for which it will provide, and the gaps
that it will accept.

Capability Gap Matrix

The following table provides a non exhaustive, indicative analysis of gaps
in capabilities currently in existence across the Joint Functions from the
perspective of State defence (Table 1).

Risk
A fundamental of governance is to ensure that processes and procedures
help organisations achieve policy objectives while addressing uncertainty
and acting with integrity. In short, it must manage risk which from
a defence perspective is inextricably linked to threat. The provision,

37 Kent Andersson, “Notes on Military Capability Concepts and Their Relevance for
Analysis of System Characteristics,” available at https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/
diva2:1473159/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
corte, y dar noticia de un certamen que decían haber instituido en
Olimpia con la mayor equidad y discreción posible, persuadidos de que
los egipcios mismos, nación la más hábil y discreta del orbe, no
hubieran acertado a discurrir unos juegos mejor arreglados. El rey
después de haberle dado cuenta los eleos del motivo que los traía
formó una asamblea de las personas tenidas en el país por las más
sabias e inteligentes, quienes oyeron de boca de los eleos el orden y
prevenciones que debían observarse en su público certamen, y
escucharon la propuesta que les hicieron, declarando que el fin de su
embajada era conocer si los egipcios serían capaces de inventar y
discurrir algo que para el objeto fuera mejor y más adecuado. La
asamblea, después de tomar acuerdo, preguntó a los eleos si admitían
en los juegos a sus paisanos a la competencia y pretensión; y
habiéndosele respondido que todo griego, así eleo como forastero
podía salir a la palestra, replicó luego que esto solo echaba a tierra
toda equidad, pues no era absolutamente posible que los jueces eleos
hicieran justicia al forastero en competencia con un paisano; y que s
querían unos juegos públicos imparciales y con este fin venían a
consultar a los egipcios, les daban el consejo de excluir a todo eleo de
la contienda, y admitir tan solo al forastero.[223] Tal fue el aviso que
aquellos sabios dieron a los eleos.
CLXI. Seis años reinó Psamis solamente, en cuyo tiempo hizo una
expedición contra la Etiopía, y después de su pronta muerte le sucedió
en el trono su hijo Apríes,[224] el cual en su reinado de 25 años pudo
con razón ser tenido por el monarca más feliz de cuantos vio el Egipto
si se exceptúa a Psamético, su bisabuelo. Durante la prosperidad llevó
las armas contra Sidón, y dio a los tirios una batalla naval; pero su
destino era que toda su dicha se trocara por fin en desventura, que le
acometió con la ocasión siguiente, que me contentaré con apuntar po
ahora, reservándome el referirla circunstanciadamente al tratar de la
Libia. Habiendo enviado Apríes un ejército contra los de Cirene, quedó
gran parte de él perdido y exterminado. Los egipcios echaron al rey la
culpa de su desventura, y se levantaron contra él, sospechando que
los había expuesto a propósito a tan evidente peligro, y enviado sus
tropas a la matanza con la dañada política de poder mandar al resto de
sus vasallos más despótica y seguramente, una vez destruida la mayo
parte de la milicia.[225] Con tales sospechas y resentimiento, se le
rebelaron abiertamente, así los que habían vuelto a Egipto de aquella
infeliz expedición, como los amigos y deudos de los que habían
perecido en la jornada.
CLXII. Avisado Apríes de estos movimientos sediciosos, determinó
enviar a Amasis adonde estaban los malcontentos para que
aplacándolos con buenas palabras y razones, les hiciera desistir de la
sublevación. Llegado Amasis al campo de los soldados rebeldes, a
tiempo que les estaba amonestando que desistieran de lo empezado
uno de ellos, acercándosele por las espaldas, coloca un casco sobre
su cabeza, diciendo al mismo tiempo que con él le corona y le
proclama por rey de Egipto. No sentó mal a Amasis, al parecer, según
se vio por el resultado, aquel casco que le sirvió de corona, pues
apenas nombrado rey de Egipto por los sublevados, se preparó luego
para marchar contra Apríes. Informado el rey de lo sucedido, envió a
uno de los egipcios que a su lado tenía, por nombre Patarbemis
hombre de gran autoridad y reputación, con orden expresa de que le
trajera vivo a Amasis. Llegó el enviado a vista del rebelde, y declarole
el mandato que traía; pero Amasis hizo de él tal desprecio, que
hallándose entonces a caballo, levantó un poco el muslo y le saludó
grosera e indecorosamente, diciéndole al mismo tiempo que tal era e
acatamiento que hacía a Apríes, a quien debía referirlo. Instando, no
obstante, Patarbemis para que fuese a verse con el soberano, que le
llamaba, respondiole que iría, y que en efecto hacía tiempo que
disponía su viaje, y que a buen seguro no tendría por qué quejarse
Apríes, a quien pensaba visitar en persona y con mucha gente de
comitiva. Penetró bien Patarbemis el sentido de la respuesta, y viendo
al mismo tiempo los preparativos de Amasis para la guerra,[226] regresó
con diligencia, queriendo informar cuanto antes al rey de lo que
sucedía. Apenas Apríes le ve volver a su presencia sin traer consigo a
Amasis, montando en cólera y ciego de furor, sin darle lugar a habla
palabra y sin hablar ninguna, manda al instante que se le mutile
cortándole allí mismo las orejas y narices. Al ver los demás egipcios
que todavía reconocían por rey a Apríes la viva carnicería tan atroz y
horriblemente hecha en un personaje del más alto carácter y de la
mayor autoridad en el reino, pasaron sin aguardar más al partido de
los otros y se entregaron al gobierno y obediencia de Amasis.
CLXIII. Con la noticia de esta nueva sublevación, Apríes, que
tenía alrededor de su persona hasta 30.000 soldados mercenarios
parte carios y parte jonios, manda tomar las armas a sus cuerpos de
guardias, y al frente de ellos marcha contra los egipcios, saliendo de la
ciudad de Sais, donde tenía su palacio, dignísimo de verse por su
magnificencia. Al tiempo que los guardias de Apríes iban contra los
egipcios, las tropas de Amasis marchaban contra los guardias
extranjeros; y ambos ejércitos, resueltos a probar de cerca sus
corazas, hicieron alto en la ciudad de Momenfis.[227] En este lugar nos
parece prevenir que la nación egipcia está distribuida en siete clases
de personas; la de los sacerdotes, la de guerreros, la de boyeros, la de
porqueros, la de mercaderes, la de intérpretes, y la de marineros.
CLXIV. Estos son los gremios de los egipcios, que toman su
nombre del oficio que ejercen.[228] De los guerreros parte son llamados
calasiries, parte hermotibies, y como el Egipto esté divido en Nomos o
distritos, los guerreros están repartidos por ellos del modo siguiente:
CLXV. A los hermotibies pertenecen los distritos de Busiris, de
Sais, de Quemis, de Papremis, la isla que llaman Prosopitis y la mitad
de Nato. De estos distritos son naturales los hermotibies, quienes
cuando su número es mayor, componen 16 miríadas o 160.000
hombres, todos guerreros de profesión, sin que uno solo aprenda o
ejercite arte alguna mecánica.
CLXVI. Los distritos de los calasiries son el bubastista, el tebano
el aftita, el tanita, el mendesio, el sebenita, el atribita, el farbetita, e
tmuita, el onufita, el anitio, y el miecforita, que está en una isla frontera
a la ciudad de Bubastis. Estos distritos de los calasiries al llegar a lo
sumo su población, forman 25 miríadas o 250.000 hombres, a ninguno
de los cuales es permitido ejercitar otra profesión que la de las armas
en la que los hijos suceden a los padres.
CLXVII. No me atrevo en verdad a decir si los egipcios adoptaron
de los griegos el juicio que forman entre las artes y la milicia, pues veo
que tracios, escitas, persas, lidios, y, en una palabra, casi todos los
bárbaros, tienen en menor estima a los que profesan algún arte
mecánico y a sus hijos, que a los demás ciudadanos, y al contrario
reputan por nobles a los que no se ocupan en obras de mano, y
mayormente a los que se destinan a la milicia. Este mismo juicio han
adoptado todos los griegos, y muy particularmente los lacedemonios
si bien los corintios son los que menos desestiman y desdeñan a los
artesanos.
CLXVIII. Los guerreros únicamente, si se exceptúan los
[229]
sacerdotes, tenían entre los egipcios sus privilegios y gajes
particulares, por los cuales disfrutaba cada uno de doce aruras o
yugadas de tierra inmunes de todo pecho. La arura es una suerte de
campo que tiene por todos lados cien codos egipcios, equivalentes
puntualmente a los codos samios. Dichas propiedades, reservadas a
cuerpo de los guerrerros, pasan de unos a otros, sin que jamás disfrute
uno las mismas. Relevábanse cada año mil de los calasiries y mil de
los hermotibies, para servir de guardias de corps cerca del rey, en cuyo
tiempo de servicio, además de sus yugadas, se les daba su ración
diaria, consistente en cinco minas de pan cocido, que se daba po
peso a cada uno, en dos minas de carne de buey, y en cuatro sextarios
de vino.[230] Esta era siempre la ración dada al guardia; pero volvamos
al hilo de la narración.
CLXIX. Después que se encontraron en Momenfis, Apríes al frente
de los soldados mercenarios, y Amasis al de los guerreros egipcios
diose allí la batalla, en la cual, a pesar de los esfuerzos de valor que
hizo la tropa extranjera, su número mucho menor fue superado y
oprimido por la multitud de sus enemigos. Vivía Apríes, según dicen
completamente persuadido de que ningún hombre y nadie, aun de los
mismos dioses, era bastante a derribarle de su trono;[231] tan afianzado
y seguro se miraba en el imperio; pero el engañado príncipe, vencido
allí y hecho prisionero, fue conducido luego a Sais, al palacio antes
suyo, y entonces ya del rey Amasis. El vencedor trató por algún tiempo
al rey prisionero con tanta humanidad, que le suministraba los
alimentos en palacio con toda magnificencia; pero viendo que los
egipcios murmuraban por ello, diciendo que no era justo mantener a
mayor enemigo, así de ellos como del mismo Amasis, consintió este
por fin, en entregar la persona del depuesto soberano a merced de los
vasallos, quienes le estrangularon y enterraron su cuerpo en la
sepultura de sus antepasados, que se ve aún en el templo de Atenea
al entrar a mano izquierda, muy cerca de la misma nave del santuario
Dentro del mismo templo los vecinos de Sais dieron sepultura a todos
los reyes que fueron naturales de su distrito; y allí mismo en el atrio de
templo está el monumento de Amasis, algo más apartado de la nave
que el de Apríes y de sus progenitores, y que consiste en un vasto
aposento de mármol, adornado de columnas a modo de troncos de
palma, con otros suntuosos primores: en ella hay dos grandes
armarios con sus puertas, dentro de los cuales se encierra la urna.
 CLXX. En Sais, en el mismo templo de Atenea, a espaldas de su
capilla y pegado a su misma pared, se halla el sepulcro de cierto
personaje, cuyo nombre no me es permitido pronunciar en esta
historia. Dentro de aquel sagrado recinto hay también dos obeliscos de
mármol, y junto a ellos una laguna hermoseada alrededor con un preti
de piedra bien labrada, cuya extensión, a mi parecer, es igual a la que
tiene la laguna de Delos, que llaman redonda.
CLXXI. En aquella laguna hacen de noche los egipcios ciertas
representaciones, a las que llaman misterios de las tristes aventuras
de una persona que no quiero nombrar,[232] aunque estoy a fondo
enterado de cuanto a esto concierne; pero en punto de religión
silencio. Lo mismo digo respecto a la iniciación de Deméter o
Tesmoforia, según la llaman los griegos, pues en ella deben estar los
ojos abiertos y la boca cerrada, menos en lo que no exige secreto
religioso: tal es que las hijas de Dánao trajesen estos misterios de
Egipto,[233] y que de ellas los aprendieron las mujeres pelasgas; que e
uso de esta ceremonia se aboliese en el Peloponeso después de
arrojados sus antiguos moradores por los dorios, siendo los arcades
los únicos que quedaron de la primera raza, los únicos también que
conservaron aquella costumbre.
CLXXII. Amasis, de quien es preciso volver a hablar, reinó en
Egipto después de la muerte violenta de Apríes: era del distrito de Sais
y natural de una ciudad llamada Siuf. Los egipcios al principio no
hacían caso de su nuevo rey, vilipendiándole abiertamente como
hombre antes plebeyo y de familia humilde y oscura; mas él poco a
poco, sin usar de violencia con sus vasallos, supo ganarlos por fin con
arte y discreción. Entre muchas alhajas preciosas, tenía Amasis una
bacía de oro, en la que así él como todos sus convidados solían
lavarse los pies: mandola, pues, hacer pedazos y formar con ellos una
estatua de no sé qué dios, la que luego de consagrada colocó en e
sitio de la ciudad que le pareció más oportuno a su intento. A vista de
la nueva estatua, concurren los egipcios a adorarla con gran fervor
hasta que Amasis, enterado de lo que hacían con ella sus vasallos, los
manda llamar y les declara que el nuevo dios había salido de aque
vaso vil de oro en que ellos mismos solían antes vomitar, orinar y
lavarse los pies, y era grande sin embargo el respeto y veneración que
al presente les merecía una vez consagrado. «Pues bien, añade, lo
mismo que con este vaso ha pasado conmigo; antes fui un mero
particular y un plebeyo; ahora soy vuestro soberano, y como a tal me
debéis respeto y honor». Con tal amonestación y expediente logró de
los egipcios que estimasen su persona y considerasen como deber e
servirle.
CLXXIII. La conducta particular de este rey y su tenor de vida
ordinario era ocuparse con tesón desde muy temprano en el despacho
de los negocios de la corona hasta cerca de mediodía;[234] pero desde
aquella hora pasaba con su copa lo restante del día bebiendo
zumbando a sus convidados, y holgándose tanto con ellos, que tocaba
a veces en bufón, con algo de chocarrero. Mal habidos sus amigos con
la real truhanería, se resolvieron por fin a dirigirle una reconvención en
buenos términos: «Señor, le dicen, esa llaneza con que os mostráis
sobrado humilde y rastrero, no es la que pide el decoro de la majestad
pues lo que corresponde a un real personaje es ir despachando lo que
ocurra, sentado magníficamente en un trono majestuoso. Sí así lo
hicierais, se reconocieran gobernados los egipcios, con estima de su
soberano, por un hombre grande; y vos lograréis tener con ellos mayo
crédito y aplauso, pues lo que hacéis ahora desdice de la suprema
majestad». Pero el rey por su parte les replicó: «Observo que solo al i
a disparar el arco lo tiran y aprietan los ballesteros, y luego de
disparado lo aflojan y sueltan, pues a tenerlo siempre parado y tirante
a la mejor ocasión y en lo más apurado del lance se les rompiera y
haría inservible. Semejante es lo que sucede en el hombre que
entregado de continuo a más y más afanes, sin respirar ni holgar un
rato, en el día menos pensado se halla con la cabeza trastornada, o
paralítico por un ataque de apoplejía. Por estos principios, pues, me
gobierno, tomando con discreción la fatiga y el descanso». As
respondió y satisfizo a sus amigos.
CLXXIV. Es fama también que Amasis, siendo particular todavía
como joven amigo de diversiones y convites, y enemigo de toda
ocupación seria y provechosa, cuando por agotársele el oro no tenía
con qué entregarse a la crápula entre sus copas y camaradas, solía
rondando de noche acudir a la rapacidad y ligereza de sus manos.[235
Sucedía que negando firmemente los robos de que algunos le
acusaban, era citado y traído delante de sus oráculos, muchos de los
cuales le condenaron como ladrón, al paso que otros le dieron po
inocente. Y es notable la conducta que cuando rey observó con dichos
oráculos: ninguno de los dioses que le habían absuelto mereció jamás
que cuidase de sus templos, que los adornara con ofrenda alguna, n
que en ellos una sola vez sacrificase, pues por tener oráculos tan
falsos y mentirosos no se les debía respeto y atención; y por e
contrario se esmeró mucho con los oráculos que le habían declarado
por ladrón, mirándolos como santuarios de verdaderos dioses, pues
tan veraces eran en sus respuestas y declaraciones.
CLXXV. En honor de Atenea edificó Amasis en Sais unos
propileos tan admirables, que así en lo vasto y elevado de la fábrica
como en el tamaño de las piedras y calidad de los mármoles
sobrepujó a los demás reyes: además levantó allí mismo unas
estatuas agigantadas y unas descomunales androsfinges.[236] Para
reparar los demás edificios mandó traer otras piedras de extraordinaria
magnitud, acarreadas unas desde la cantera vecina a Menfis, y otras
de enorme mole traídas desde Elefantina, ciudad distante de Sais
veinte días de navegación. Otra cosa hizo también que no me causa
menos admiración, o por mejor decir, la aumenta considerablemente
Desde Elefantina hizo trasladar una casa entera de una sola pieza
tres años se necesitaron para traerla y dos mil conductores
encargados de la maniobra, todos pilotos de profesión. Esta casa
monolitha, es decir, de una piedra, tiene 21 codos de largo, 14 de
ancho y ocho de alto por la parte exterior, y por la interior su longitud
es de 18 codos y 20 dedos, su anchura de 12 codos y de cinco su
altura. Hállase esta pieza en la entrada misma del templo, pues, según
dicen, no acabaron de arrastrarla allá dentro, porque el arquitecto
oprimido de tanta fatiga y quebrantado con el largo tiempo empleado
en la maniobra prorrumpió allí en un gran gemido, como de quien
desfallece, lo cual advirtiendo Amasis no consintió la arrastraran más
allá del sitio en que se hallaba; aunque no falta quienes pretenden que
el motivo de no haber sido llevada hasta dentro del templo fue po
haber quedado oprimido bajo la piedra uno de los que la movían con
palancas.
CLXXVI. En todos los demás templos de consideración dedicó
también Amasis otros grandiosos monumentos dignos de ser vistos
Entre ellos colocó en Menfis, delante del templo de Hefesto, un coloso
recostado de 75 pies de largo, y en su misma base hizo erigir a cada
lado otros dos colosos de mármol etiópico[237] de 20 pies de altura. Otro
de mármol hay en Sais, igualmente grande y tendido boca arriba de
mismo modo que el coloso de Menfis mencionado. Amasis fue también
el que hizo en Menfis construir un templo a Isis, monumento realmente
magnífico y hermoso.
CLXXVII. Es fama que en el reinado de Amasis fue cuando e
Egipto, así por el beneficio que sus campos deben al río, como por la
abundancia que deben los hombres a sus campos, se vio en el estado
más opulento y floreciente en que jamás se hubiese hallado, llegando
sus ciudades al número de 20.000,[238]todas habitadas. Amasis es
mirado entre los egipcios como el autor de la ley que obligaba a cada
uno en particular a que en presencia de su respectivo nomarca, o
prefecto de provincia, declarase cada año su modo de vivir y oficio, so
pena de muerte al que no lo declaraba o no lo mostraba justo y
legítimo; ley que, adoptándola de los egipcios, impuso Solón Ateniense
a sus ciudadanos, y que siendo en sí muy loable y justificada es
mantenida por aquel pueblo en todo su vigor.
CLXXVIII. Como sincero amigo de los griegos, no se contentó
Amasis con hacer muchas mercedes a algunos individuos de esta
nación, sino que concedió a todos los que quisieran pasar al Egipto la
ciudad de Náucratis para que fijasen en ella su establecimiento, y a los
que rehusaran asentar allí su morada les señaló lugar donde
levantaran a sus dioses aras y templos, de los cuales el que llaman
Helénico es sin disputa el más famoso, grande y frecuentado. Las
ciudades que, cada cual por su parte, concurrieron a la fábrica de este
monumento fueron: entre las jonias, las de Quíos, la de Teos, la de
Focea y la de Clazómenas; entre las dóricas, las de Rodas, Cnido
Halicarnaso y Fasélide, y entre las eolias únicamente la de Mitilene
Estas ciudades, a las cuales pertenece el Helénico, son las que
nombran los presidentes de aquel emporio o directores de su
comercio,[239] pues las demás que pretenden tener parte en el templo
solicitan un derecho que de ningún modo les compete. Otras ciudades
erigieron allí mismo templos particulares, uno a Zeus los eginetas, otro
a Hera los samios, y los milesios uno a Apolo.
CLXXIX. La ciudad de Náucratis era la única antiguamente que
gozaba el privilegio de emporio,[240] careciendo todas las demás de
Egipto de tal derecho; y esto en tal grado, que al que aportase a
cualquiera de las embocaduras del Nilo que no fuera la Canóbica, se le
exigía el juramento de que no había sido su ánimo arribar allá, y se le
precisaba luego a pasar en su misma nave a la boca Canóbica; y si los
vientos contrarios le impedían navegar hacia ella, érale absolutamente
forzoso rodear el Delta con las barcas del río, trasladando en ellas la
carga hasta llegar a Náucratis: tan privilegiado era el emporio de esta
ciudad.
CLXXX. Habiendo abrasado un incendio casual el antiguo templo
en que Delfos existía, alquilaron los Anfictiones por 300 talentos a
algunos asentistas la fábrica del que allí se ve en la actualidad. Los
vecinos de Delfos, obligados a contribuir con la cuarta parte de la
suma fijada,[241] iban girando por varias ciudades a fin de recoge
limosna para la nueva fábrica; y no fue ciertamente del Egipto de
donde menos alcanzaron, habiéndoles dado Amasis 1000 talentos de
alumbre y 20 minas los griegos allí establecidos.
CLXXXI. Formó Amasis un tratado de amistad y alianza mutua
con los de Cirene, de entre los cuales no se desdeñó de tomar una
esposa, ya fuera por antojo o pasión de tener por mujer a una griega
ya por dar a estos una nueva prueba de su afecto y unión. La muje
con quien casó se llamaba Ládice, y era, según unos, hija de Batto
según otros, de Arcesilao, y según algunos, en fin, lo era de Critóbulo
hombre de gran autoridad y reputación en Cirene. Cuéntase que
Amasis, durmiendo con su griega, jamás podía llegar a conocerla
siendo por otra parte muy capaz de conocer a las otras mujeres. Y
viendo que siempre sucedía lo mismo, habló a su esposa de esta
suerte: «Mujer: ¿qué has hecho conmigo? ¿qué hechizos me has
dado? Perezca yo, si ninguno de tus artificios te libra del mayor castigo
que jamás se dio a mujer alguna». Negaba Ládice; mas por eso no se
aplacaba Amasis. Entonces ella va al templo de Afrodita, y hace allí un
voto prometiendo enviar a Cirene una estatua de la diosa, con tal que
Amasis la pudiera conocer aquella misma noche, único remedio de su
desventura. Hecho este voto, pudo conocerla el rey, y continuó lo
mismo en adelante, amándola desde entonces con particular cariño
Agradecida Ládice, envió a Cirene, en cumplimiento de su voto, la
estatua prometida, que se conserva allí todavía, vuelta la cara hacia
fuera de la ciudad. Cuando Cambises se apoderó después del Egipto
al oír de la misma Ládice quién era, la remitió a Cirene sin permitir se
la hiciera el menor agravio en su honor.
 CLXXXII. En la Grecia ofreció Amasis algunos donativos
religiosos; tal es la estatua dorada de Atenea que dedicó en Cirene
con un retrato suyo que al vivo le representa; tales son dos estatuas
de mármol de Atenea, ofrecidas en Lindos,[242] juntamente con una
coraza de lino, obra digna de verse; y tales son, en fin, dos estatuas
de madera de Hera que hasta mis días estaban en el gran templo de
Samos colocadas detrás de sus puertas. En cuanto a las ofrendas de
Samos, hízolas Amasis por la amistad y vínculo de hospedaje que
tenía con Polícrates, hijo de Eaces y señor de Samos. Por lo que toca
a los donativos de Lindos, no le indujo a hacerlos ningún motivo de
amistad, sino la fama solamente de que llegadas allí las hijas de
Dánao, al huir de los hijos de Egipto, fueron las fundadoras de aque
templo. Estos dones consagró, en suma, en Grecia Amasis, quien fue
el primero que, conquistada la isla de Chipre, la obligó a pagarle
tributo.[243]
 LIBRO TERCERO.

TA L Í A .

Expedición de Cambises al Egipto: derrota de los egipcios. Intenta Cambises conquistar la

Etiopía; relación de los descubridores enviados a este país y desgracias de los
expedicionarios. — Búrlase Cambises de los dioses egipcios: sus locuras y muerte de su
hermano y esposa. — Fortuna de Polícrates, el tirano de Samos, a quien atacan los
lacedemonios y corintios. — Álzase contra Cambises el mago Esmerdis y se apodera de
trono de Persia: muerte de Cambises. — Descúbrese la impostura del mago y muere a
manos de los siete conjurados. — Artificio de Darío para subir al Trono. — Contribuciones
del Imperio persa. — Descripción de la India, Arabia y sus producciones. — Oretes
gobernador de Sardes, mata a Polícrates: castigo de Oretes. — Artificio del médico
Democedes para regresar a Grecia. — Darío ayuda a Silosonte para recobrar a Samos. —
Rebelión de Babilonia, su asedio y reconquista.

I. Contra el rey Amasis, pues, dirigió Cambises, hijo y sucesor de

Ciro, una expedición en la cual llevaba consigo, entre otros vasallos
suyos, a los griegos de Jonia y Eolia; el motivo de ella fue el siguiente
Cambises, por medio de un embajador enviado al rey Amasis, le pidió
una hija por esposa, a cuya demanda le había inducido el consejo y
solicitación de cierto egipcio que, al lado del persa, urdía en esto una
trama, altamente resentido contra Amasis, porque tiempos atrás
cuando Ciro le pidió por medio de mensajeros que le enviara el mejo
oculista de Egipto, le había escogido entre todos los médicos del país
y enviado allá arrancándole del seno de su mujer y de la compañía de
sus hijos muy amados. Este egipcio, enojado contra Amasis, no
cesaba de exhortar a Cambises a que pidiera una hija al rey de Egipto
con la intención doble y maligna de dar a este que sentir si la
concedía, o de enemistarle cruelmente con Cambises si la negaba. E
gran poder del persa, a quien Amasis no odiaba menos que temía, no
le permitía rehusarle su hija, ni podía dársela por otra parte
comprendiendo que no la quería Cambises por esposa de prime
orden, sino por amiga y concubina: en tal apuro acudió a un
expediente. Vivía entonces en Egipto una princesa llamada Nitetis, de
gentil talle y de belleza y donaire singular, hija del último rey Apríes
que había quedado sola y huérfana en su palacio. Ataviada de galas y
adornada con joyas de oro, y haciéndola pasar por hija suya, enviola
Amasis a Persia por mujer de Cambises, el cual, saludándola algún
tiempo después con el nombre de hija de Amasis, la joven princesa le
respondió: «Señor, vos sin duda, burlado por Amasis, ignoráis quién
sea yo. Disfrazada con este aparato real me envió como si en m
persona os diera una hija, dándoos la que lo es del infeliz Apríes, a
quien dio muerte Amasis, hecho jefe de los egipcios rebeldes
ensangrentando sus manos en su propio monarca».
II. Con esta confesión de Nitetis y esta ocasión de disgusto
Cambises, hijo de Ciro, vino muy irritado sobre el Egipto. Así es como
lo refieren los persas;[244] aunque los egipcios, con la ambición de
apropiarse a Cambises, dicen que fue hijo de la princesa Nitetis, hija
de su rey Apríes, a quien antes la pidió Ciro, según ellos, negando la
embajada de Cambises a Amasis en demanda de una hija. Pero
yerran en esto, pues primeramente no pueden olvidar que en Persia
cuyas leyes y costumbres no hay quien las sepa quizá mejor que los
egipcios, no puede suceder a la corona un hijo natural existiendo otro
legítimo; y en segundo lugar, siendo sin duda Cambises hijo de
Casandane y nieto de Farnaspes, uno de los aqueménidas, no podía
ser hijo de una egipcia.[245] Sin duda los egipcios, para hacerse
parientes de la casa real de Ciro, pervierten y trastornan la narración
mas pasemos adelante.
III. Otra fábula, pues por tal la tengo, corre aún sobre esta materia
Entró, dicen, no sé qué mujer persa a visitar las esposas de Ciro, y
viendo alrededor de Casandane unos lindos niños de gentil talle y
gallardo continente, pasmada y llena de admiración empezó a
deshacerse en alabanza de los infantes. «Sí, señora mía, respondiole
entonces Casandane, la esposa de Ciro; sí, estos son mis hijos, mas
poco, sin embargo, cuenta Ciro con la madre que tan agraciados
príncipes le dio: no soy yo su querida esposa, lo es la extranjera que
hizo venir del Egipto». Así se explicaba, poseída de pasión y de celos
contra Nitetis: óyela Cambises, el mayor de sus hijos, y volviéndose
hacia ella: «Pues yo, madre mía, le dice, os empeño mi palabra de que
cuando mayor he de vengaros del Egipto, trastornándolo enteramente
y revolviéndolo todo de arriba abajo». Tales son las palabras que
pretenden dijo Cambises, niño a la sazón de unos diez años, de las
cuales se admiraron las mujeres; y que llegado después a la edad
varonil, y tomada posesión del imperio, acordándose de su promesa
quiso cumplirla, emprendiendo dicha jornada contra el Egipto.
IV. Más empero contribuiría a formarla el caso siguiente: servía en
la tropa extranjera de Amasis un ciudadano de Halicarnaso llamado
Fanes, hombre de talento, soldado bravo y capaz en el arte de la
guerra. Enojado y resentido contra Amasis, ignoro por qué motivo
escapose del Egipto en una nave con ánimo de pasarse a los persas y
de verse con Cambises. Siendo Fanes por una parte oficial de crédito
no pequeño entre los guerreros asalariados, y estando por otra muy
impuesto en las cosas del Egipto, Amasis, con gran ansia de cogerle
mandó desde luego que se le persiguiera. Envía en su seguimiento
una galera y en ella el eunuco de su mayor confianza;[246] pero este
aunque logró alcanzarle y cogerle en Licia, no tuvo la habilidad de
volverle a Egipto, pues Fanes supo burlarle con la astucia de
embriagar a sus guardias, y escapado de sus prisiones logró
presentarse a los persas. Llegado a la presencia de Cambises en la
coyuntura más oportuna, en que resuelta ya la expedición contra e
Egipto no veía el monarca medio de transitar con su tropa por un país
tan falto de agua, Fanes no solo le dio cuenta del estado actual de los
negocios de Amasis, sino que le descubrió al mismo tiempo un modo
fácil de hacer el viaje, exhortándole a que por medio de embajadores
pidiera al rey de los árabes paso libre y seguro por los desiertos de su
país.
V. Y, en efecto, solo por aquel paraje que Fanes indicaba se halla
entrada abierta para el Egipto. La región de los sirios que llamamos
palestinos se extiende desde la Fenicia hasta los confines de Caditis
desde esta ciudad, no mucho menor que la de Sardes, a mi entender
siguiendo las costas del mar, empiezan los emporios y llegan hasta
Yeniso, ciudad del árabe, cuyos son asimismo dichos emporios.[247] La
tierra que sigue después de Yeniso es otra vez del dominio de los
sirios hasta llegar a la laguna de Serbónida, por cuyas cercanías se
dilata hasta el mar el monte Casio, y, finalmente, desde esta laguna
donde dicen que Tifón se ocultó, empieza propiamente el territorio de
Egipto. Ahora bien; todo el distrito que media entre la ciudad de Yeniso
y el monte Casio y la laguna de Serbónida, distrito no tan corto que no
sea de tres días de camino, es un puro arenal sin una gota de agua.
VI. Quiero ahora indicar aquí de paso una noticia que pocos
sabrán, aun de aquellos que trafican por mar en Egipto. Aunque llegan
al país dos veces al año, parte de todos los puntos de la Grecia, parte
también de la Fenicia, un sinnúmero de tinajas llenas de vino, ni una
sola de ellas se deja ver, por decirlo así, en parte alguna del Egipto
¿Qué se hace, pues, preguntará alguno, de tanta tinaja transportada?
Voy a decirlo: es obligación precisa de todo demarco o alcalde, que
recoja estas tinajas en su respectiva ciudad y las mande pasar a
Menfis, a cargo de cuyos habitantes corre después conducirlas llenas
de agua a los desiertos áridos de la Siria;[248] de suerte que las tinajas
que van siempre llegando de nuevo, sacadas luego del Egipto, son
transportadas a la Siria, y allí juntadas a las viejas.
VII. Tal es la providencia que dieron los persas apoderados
apenas del Egipto, para facilitar el paso y entrada a su nueva provincia
acarreando el agua al desierto del modo referido. Mas como
Cambises, al emprender su conquista, no tuviese aún ese arbitrio de
aprontar el agua, enviados al árabe[249] sus mensajeros conforme a
aviso de su huésped halicarnasio, obtuvo el paso libre y seguro
mediante un tratado concluido bajo la fe pública de entrambos.
VIII. Entre los árabes, los más fieles y escrupulosos en guardar la
fe prometida en los pactos solemnes que contratan, úsase la siguiente
ceremonia. Entre las dos personas que quieren hacer un legítimo
convenio, sea de amistad o sea de alianza, preséntase un medianero
que con una piedra aguda y cortante hace una incisión en la palma de
la mano de los contrayentes, en la parte más vecina al dedo pulgar
toma luego unos pedacitos del vestido de entrambos, y con ellos
mojados en la sangre de las manos va untando siete piedras all
prevenidas, invocando al mismo tiempo a Dioniso y a Urania, o sea a
Baco y a Venus. Concluida por el medianero esta ceremonia, entonces
el que contrae el pacto de alianza o amistad presenta y recomienda a
sus amigos el extranjero, o el ciudadano, si con un ciudadano lo
contrae; y los amigos por su parte miran como un deber solemne
guardar religiosamente el pacto convenido. Los árabes, que no
conocen más Dios que a Dioniso y a Urania,[250] pretenden que su
modo de cortarse el pelo, que es a la redonda, rapándose a navaja las
guedejas de sus sienes, es el mismo puntualmente con que solía
cortárselo Dioniso. A este dan el nombre de Orotalt, y a Urania el de
Alilat.
IX. Volviendo al asunto, el árabe, concluido ya su tratado público
con los embajadores de Cambises, para servir a su aliado, tomó e
medio de llenar de agua unos odres hechos de pieles de camellos, y
cargando con ellos a cuantas bestias pudo encontrar, adelantose con
sus recuas y esperó a Cambises en lo mas árido de los desiertos. De
todas las relaciones es esta la más verosímil; pero como corre otra
aunque lo sea menos, preciso es referirla. En la Arabia hay un río
llamado Coris que desemboca en el mar conocido por Eritreo
Refiérese, pues, que el rey de los árabes, formando un acueducto
hecho de pieles crudas de bueyes y de otros animales, tan largo y
tendido, que desde el Coris llegase al arenal mencionado, por este
canal trajo el agua hasta unos grandes aljibes que para conservarla
había mandado abrir en aquellos páramos del desierto. Dicen que a
pesar de la distancia de doce jornadas que hay desde el río hasta e
erial, el árabe condujo el agua a tres parajes distintos por tres canales
separados.
X. En tanto que se hacían los preparativos, atrincherose
Psaménito, hijo de Amasis, cerca de la boca del Nilo que llaman
Pelusia, esperando allí a Cambises, pues este, al tiempo de invadi
con sus tropas el Egipto, no encontró ya vivo a Amasis, el cua
acababa de morir después de un reinado feliz de 44 años, en que
jamás le sucedió desventura alguna de gran monta. Su cadáve
embalsamado se depositó en la sepultura que él mismo se había
hecho fabricar en un templo durante su vida. Reinando ya su hijo
Psaménito en Egipto, sucedió un portento muy grande y extraordinario
para los egipcios, pues llovió en su ciudad de Tebas, donde antes
jamás había llovido, ni volvió a llover después hasta nuestros días
según los mismos tebanos aseguran.[251] Es cierto que no suele verse
caer una gota de agua en el alto Egipto, y sin embargo, caso extraño
viose entonces en Tebas caer el agua hilo a hilo de los cielos.
XI. Salidos los persas de los eriales del desierto, plantaron su
campo vecino al de los egipcios para venir con ellos a las manos.[252
Allí fue donde las tropas extranjeras al servicio del Egipto, en parte
griegas y en parte carias, llevadas de ira y encono contra Fanes po
haberse hecho adalid de un ejército enemigo de otra lengua y nación
maquinaron contra él una venganza bárbara e inhumana. Tenía Fanes
unos hijos que había dejado en Egipto, y haciéndolos venir al campo
los soldados mercenarios, los presentan en medio de entrambos
reales a la vista de su padre, colocan después junto a ellos una gran
taza, y sobre ella los van degollando uno a uno, presenciando su
mismo padre el sacrificio. Acabada de ejecutar tal carnicería en
aquellas víctimas inocentes, mezclan vino y agua con la sangre
humana, y habiendo de ella bebido todas las guardias extranjeras
cierran con el enemigo. Empeñada y reñida fue la refriega, cayendo de
una y otra parte muchos combatientes, hasta que al fin cedieron e
campo los egipcios.
XII. Hallándome en el sitio donde se dio la batalla, me hicieron los
egipcios observar una cosa que me causó mucha novedad. Vi por e
suelo unos montones de huesos, separados unos de otros, que eran
los restos de los combatientes caídos en la acción; y dije separados
porque según el sitio que en sus filas habían ocupado las huestes
enemigas, estaban allí tendidos de una parte los huesos de los persas
y de otra los de los egipcios. Noté, pues, que los cráneos de los persas
eran tan frágiles y endebles que con la menor chinita que se los tire se
los pasará de parte a parte; y al contrario, tan sólidas y duras las
calaveras egipcias que con un guijarro que se les arroje apenas se
podrá romperlas. Dábanme de esto los egipcios una razón a la que yo
llanamente asentía, diciéndome que desde muy niño suelen raer a
navaja sus cabezas, con lo cual se curten sus cráneos y se endurecen
al calor del sol. Y este mismo es sin duda el motivo porque no
encalvecen, siendo averiguado que en ningún país se ven menos
calvos que en Egipto, y esta es la causa también de tener aquella
gente tan dura la cabeza. Y al revés, la tienen los persas tan débil y
quebradiza, porque desde muy tiernos la defienden del sol
cubriéndosela con sus tiaras hechas de fieltro a manera de
turbantes.[253] Esta es la particularidad que noté en dicho campo, e
idéntica es la que noté en los otros persas que, conducidos po
Aquemenes, hijo de Darío, quedaron juntamente con su jefe vencidos
y muertos por Inaro el libio, no lejos de Papremis.
XIII. Volvamos a los egipcios derrotados, que vueltas una vez las
espaldas al enemigo en la batalla, se entregaron a la fuga sin orden
alguno. Encerráronse después en la plaza de Menfis, adonde
Cambises les envió río arriba una nave de Mitilene, en que iba un
heraldo persa encargado de convidarlos a una capitulación. Apenas la
ven entrar en Menfis, cuando saliendo en tropel de la fortaleza y
arrojándose sobre ella, no solo la echan a pique, sino que despedazan
a los hombres de la tripulación, y cargando con sus miembros
destrozados, como si vinieran de la carnicería, entran con ellos en la
plaza. Sitiados después en ella, se entregaron al persa a discreción a
cabo de algún tiempo. Pero los libios que confinan con el Egipto
temerosos con lo que en él sucedía, sin pensar en resistir se
entregaron a los persas, imponiéndose por sí mismo cierto tributo y
enviando regalos a Cambises. Los colones griegos de Barca y de
Cirene, no menos amendrentados que los libios, les imitaron en
rendirse al vencedor. Diose Cambises por contento y satisfecho con
los dones que recibió de los libios; pero se mostró quejoso y aun
irritado por los presentes venidos de Cirene, por ser a lo que
imaginaba cortos y mezquinos. Y, en efecto, anduvieron con é
escasos los cireneos enviándole solamente 500 minas de plata, las
que fue cogiendo a puñados y derramando entre las tropas por su
misma mano.
XIV. Al décimo día después de rendida la plaza de Menfis, ordenó
Cambises que Psaménito, rey de Egipto, que solo seis meses había
reinado, en compañía de otros egipcios, fuera expuesto en público y
sentado en los arrabales de la ciudad, para probar del siguiente modo
el ánimo y carácter real de su prisionero. A una hija que Psaménito
tenía, mandola luego vestir de esclava enviándola con su cántaro po
agua; y en compañía de ella, por mayor escarnio, otras doncellas
escogidas entre las hijas de los señores principales vestidas con e
mismo traje que la hija del rey. Fueron pasando los jóvenes y damas
con grandes gritos y lloros por delante de sus padres, quienes no
pudieron menos de corresponderlas gritando y llorando también a
verlas tan maltratadas, abatidas y vilipendiadas; pero el rey Psaménito
al ver y conocer a la princesa su hija, no hizo más ademán de dolo
que bajar sus ojos y clavarlos en tierra. Apenas habían pasado las
damas con sus cántaros, cuando Cambises tenía ya prevenida otra
prueba mayor, haciendo que allí mismo, a vista de su infeliz padre
pareciese también el príncipe su hijo con otros 2000 egipcios, todos
mancebos principales, todos de la misma edad, todos con dogal a
cuello y con mordazas en la boca. Iban estas tiernas víctimas a
suplicio para vengar en ellas la muerte de los que en Menfis habían
perecido en la nave de Mitilene, pues tal había sido la sentencia de los
jueces regios, que murieran diez de los egipcios principales por cada
uno de los que, embarcados en dicha nave, habían cruelmente
fenecido. Psaménito, mirando los ilustres reos que pasaban, por más
que entre ellos divisó al príncipe, su hijo, llevado al cadalso, y a pesa
de los sollozos y alaridos que daban los egipcios sentados en torno de
él, no hizo más extremo que el que acababa de hacer al ver a su hija
Pasada ya aquella cadena de condenados al suplicio, casualmente
uno de los amigos de Psaménito, antes su frecuente convidado
hombre de avanzada edad, despojado al presente de todos sus bienes
y reducido al estado de pordiosero, venía por entre las tropas pidiendo
a todos suplicante una limosna a vista de Psaménito, el hijo de
Amasis, y de los egipcios, partícipes de su infamia y exposición en los
arrabales. No bien le ve Psaménito, cuando prorrumpe en gran llanto
y llamando por su propio nombre al amigo mendicante, empieza a
desgreñarse dándose con los puños en la frente y en la cabeza. De
cuanto hacía el prisionero en cada una de aquellas salidas o
espectáculos, las guardias persas que estaban por allí apostadas iban
dando cuenta a Cambises. Admirado este de lo que se le relataba po
medio de un mensajero, manda hacerle una pregunta: «Cambises
vuestro soberano, dícele el enviado, exige de vos, Psaménito, que le
digáis la causa por qué al ver a vuestra hija tan maltratada y el hijo
llevado al cadalso, ni gritasteis ni llorasteis, y acabando de ver a
mendigo, quien según se le ha informado en nada os atañe n
pertenece, ahora por fin lloráis y gemís». A esta pregunta que se le
hacía respondió Psaménito en estos términos: «Buen hijo de Ciro
tales son y tan extremados mis males domésticos que no hay lágrimas
bastantes con qué llorarlos; pero la miseria de este mi antiguo valido y
compañero es un espectáculo para mí bien lastimoso, viéndole ahora
al cabo de sus días y en el linde del sepulcro pobre pordiosero, de rico
y feliz que poco antes le veía». Esta respuesta, llevada por e
mensajero, pareció sabia y acertada a Cambises; y al oírla, dicen los
egipcios que lloró Creso, que había seguido a Cambises en aquella
jornada, y lloraron asimismo los persas que se hallaban presentes en
la corte de su soberano; y este mismo enterneciose por fin, de modo
que dio orden en aquel mismo punto para que sacasen al hijo del rey
de la cadena de los condenados a muerte, perdonándole la vida, y
desde los arrabales condujesen al padre a su presencia.
 XV. Los que fueron al cadalso con el perdón no hallaron ya vivo a
príncipe, que entonces mismo, por primera víctima, acababa de se
decapitado. A Psaménito se le alzó en efecto del vergonzoso poste y
fue en derechura presentado ante Cambises, en cuya corte, lejos de
hacerle violencia alguna, se le trató desde allí en adelante con
esplendor, corriendo sus alimentos a cuenta del soberano; y aun se le
hubiera dado en feudo la administración del Egipto, si no se le hubiera
probado que en él iba maquinando sediciones, siendo costumbre y
política de los persas el tener gran cuenta con los hijos de los reyes
soliendo reponerlos en la posesión de la corona aun cuando sus
padres hayan sido traidores a la Persia. Entre otras muchas pruebas
de esta costumbre, no es la menor haberlo practicado así con
diferentes príncipes, con Taniras, por ejemplo, hijo de Inaro el libio,[254
el cual recobró de ellos el dominio que había tenido su padre; y
también con Pausiris, que recibió de manos de los mismos el estado
de su padre Amirteo, y esto cuando quizá no ha habido hasta ahora
quien mayores males hayan causado a los persas que Inaro y Amirteo
Pero el daño estuvo en que no dejando Psaménito de conspirar contra
su soberano, le fue forzoso llevar por ello su castigo; pues habiendo
llegado a noticia de Cambises que había sido convencido de intentar la
sublevación de los egipcios, Psaménito se dio a sí mismo una muerte
repentina, bebiendo la sangre de un toro: tal fue el fin de este rey.
XVI. De Menfis partió Cambises para Sais con ánimo resuelto de
hacer lo siguiente: Apenas entró en el palacio del difunto Amasis
cuando sin más dilación mandó sacar su cadáver de la sepultura, y
obedecido con toda prontitud, ordena allí mismo que azoten al muerto
que le arranquen las barbas y cabellos, que le puncen con púas de
hierro, y que no le ahorren ningún género de suplicio. Cansados ya los
ejecutores de tanta y tan bárbara inhumanidad, a la que resistía y daba
lugar el cadáver embalsamado, sin que por esto se disolviera la
momia, y no satisfecho todavía Cambises, dio la orden impía y
sacrílega de que el muerto fuera entregado al fuego, elemento que
veneran los persas por dios.
En efecto, ninguna de las dos naciones persa y egipcia tienen la
costumbre de quemar a sus difuntos; la primera por la razón indicada
diciendo ellos que no es conforme a razón cebar a un dios con la carne
cadavérica de un hombre; la segunda por tener creído que el fuego es
un viviente animado y fiero, que traga cuanto se le pone delante, y
sofocado de tanto comer muere de hartura, juntamente con lo que
acaba de devorar.[255] Por lo mismo guárdanse bien los egipcios de
echar cadáver alguno a las fieras o a cualesquiera otros animales
antes bien los adoban y embalsaman a fin de impedir que, enterrados
los coman los gusanos. Se ve, pues, que lo que obró Cambises con
Amasis era contra el uso de entrambas naciones. Verdad es que s
hemos de creer a los egipcios, no fue Amasis quien tal padeció, sino
cierto egipcio de su misma edad, a quien atormentaron los persas
creyendo atormentar a aquel; lo que, según cuentan, sucedió en estos
términos: Viviendo aún Amasis, supo por aviso de un oráculo lo que le
esperaba después de su muerte; prevenido, pues, quiso abrigarse
antes de la tempestad, y para evitar la calamidad venidera, mandó que
aquel hombre muerto que después fue azotado por Cambises fuese
depositado en la misma entrada de su sepulcro, dando juntamente
orden a su hijo de que su propio cuerpo fuese retirado en un rincón e
más oculto del monumento. Pero a decir verdad, estos encargos de
Amasis y su oculta sepultura, y el otro cadáver puesto a la entrada, no
me parecen sino temerarias invenciones con que los vanos egipcios se
pavonean.
XVII. Vengado ya Cambises de su difunto enemigo, formó e
designio de emprender a un tiempo mismo tres expediciones militares
una contra los carquedonios o cartagineses, otra contra los amonios, y
la tercera contra los etíopes macrobios, pueblos que habitan en la Libia
sobre las costas del mar Meridional.[256] Tomado acuerdo, le pareció
enviar contra los carquedonios sus armadas navales, contra los
amonios parte de su tropa escogida, y contra los etíopes unos
exploradores que de antemano se informasen del estado de la Etiopía
y procurasen averiguar particularmente si era verdad que existiese all
la mesa del sol, de que se hablaba; y para que mejor pudiesen hacerlo
quiso que de su parte presentasen sus regalos al rey de los etíopes.
XVIII. Lo que se dice de la mesa del sol es que en los arrabales de
cierta ciudad de Etiopía hay un prado que se ve siempre lleno de carne
cocida de toda suerte de cuadrúpedos; y esto no es algún portento
pues todos los que se hallan en algún empleo público se esmeran
cada cual por su parte en colocar allí de noche aquellos manjares
Venido el día, va el que quiere de los vecinos de la ciudad a
aprovecharse de la mesa pública del prado, divulgando aquella buena