Public International Law

Finals Coverage
1. Right of Legation
a. Diplomats
b. Consuls

2. Treaty
a) Pacta Sunt Servanda
OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES Article 26. "PACTA SUNT SERVANDA" Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith. A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46

b) Treaties vs. Executive Agreements

Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two
thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive
action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.

An executive agreement as used in Philippine law is definitely Han international

agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
International Law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation

The confusion that the seemingly differing treatment of executive agreement

brings, however, is more apparent than real when it is considered that both
instruments - a treaty and an executive agreement - both have constitutional
recognition that can be reconciled: an executive agreement is an exception to the
Senate concurrence requirement of Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution; it is an international agreement that does not need Senate
concurrence to be valid and effective in the Philippines, Its exceptional character
arises from the reality that the Executive possesses the power and duty to execute
and implement laws which, when considered together with the President's foreign
affairs powers, authorizes the President to agree to international obligations that
he can already implement as Chief Executive of the Philippine government. In
other words, the President can ratify as executive agreements those obligations
that he can already execute and implement because they already carry prior
legislative authorization, or have already gone through the treaty-making process
under Article VII, Section 21 ofthe 1987 Constitution. (G.R. No, 204605 -
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, v. HON. PAQUITO OCHOA)

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 b. The Distinction Between Executive Agreements and Treaties The cases above
state that an executive agreement does not require Senate concurrence. This
position implies that an executive agreement is not a treaty under Philippine law
because a treaty requires Senate concurrence to be valid under the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 459 (“EO 459”) defines executive agreements as “similar to
treaties except that they do not require legislative concurrence.” Interestingly, EO
459 defines an executive agreement based on the consequence of its nature (i.e.,
non-necessity of Senate concurrence) rather than what qualifies as an instrument
as an executive agreement.78 Under EO 459, treaties and executive agreements
are two types of international agreements. It defines an international agreement
as: a contract or understanding regardless of nomenclature, entered into between
the Philippines and another government in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments.79 On the other hand, EO 459 defines treaties as
“international agreements entered into by the Philippines which require
legislative concurrence after executive ratification.”80 The Court, citing foreign
secondary sources, has explained that: a treaty has greater "dignity" than an
executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty
having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a
ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior
statutory enactment.81

c) Effects of signing a treaty to the sovereignty of a state

Types of Signature.

Simple. Where the instrument was signed initially but the

State is not completely bound unless the signature is later ratified.

Definitive. When the State is bound as soon as the instrument is signed,

regardless off whether it later ratifies the instrument or not.

Consequence of Signature Subject to Ratification.

Where an instrument is signed but not yet ratified, and such ratification is
material to bind the State fully, Article 18 of the VCLT provides that the signing
State must nevertheless refrain from acts. which would defeat the object and
purpose of the instrument (until it is ratified or the State clearly expresses its
intention to not become a party to the instrument. [Note: Under Art. 18(b) of the
VCLT, this same rule applies where the State has signed and ratified the same
but the instrument has not yet entered into force, provided the entry into force is
not unduly delayed.]

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 Ratification. The act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed
and approved by a State, and by which the State expresses its willingness to be
bound by the treaty.

d) Rebus sic stantibus

Clausula rebus sic stantibus is the legal doctrine allowing for a contract or a treaty
to become inapplicable because of a fundamental change of circumstances. In
public international law the doctrine essentially serves an "escape clause" to the
general rule of pacta sunt servanda.

e) Withdrawal from a treaty

A state may decide to withdraw from a treaty unilaterally. This is also referred to
as ‘denunciation’. Treaties usually stipulate the requirements to be fulfilled when
withdrawing from a treaty. It may for instance be necessary for the withdrawing
state to notify the other parties within a particular time limit.
f) Pangilinan vs. Cayetano (GR no. 238875)

Facts:
The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty that established the International Criminal
Court, where the gravest crimes under international law are prosecuted. Since 1996,
under President Ramos' presidency, the Philippines has participated in the court's
establishment, taking an active role in the deliberations as a member of the Drafting
Committee. On December 28, 2000, the Philippines, through then President Estrada,
signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. President Estrada's act
of signing the Rome Statute signified the Philippines' intent to be bound by the
provisions of the treaty, subject to the domestic requirements for its validity and
enforceability.
On December 11, 2009, with Senate concurrence to the Rome Statute still pending, then
President Arroyo signed into law Republic Act No. 9851, otherwise known as the
Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitanan Law, Genocide, and
Other Crimes Against Humanity. Republic Act No. 9851 replicated many of the Rome
Statute's provisions. Senate concurrence to the Rome Statute was obtained following
President Aquino election. On August 23, 2011, the Senate, with a vote of 17-1, passed
Resolution No. 546 enabling the Philippines' consummate accession to the Rome
Statute.
On August 30, 2011, the Philippines deposited the instrument of ratification of the
Rome Statute. On November 1, 2011, the Rome Statute entered into force in the
Philippines. The country was the 16th state party to belong to the Group of Asia-Pacific
State Parties in the International Criminal Court.

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On June 30, 2016, President Aquino's term ended and President Duterte took his oath
as chief executive.

On April 24, 2017, Atty. Jude Sabio filed a complaint before the International Criminal
Court pertaining to alleged summary killings when President Duterte was the mayor
of Davao City. On June 6, 2017, Senator Trillanes and Representative Alejano filed a
"supplemental communication" before the International Criminal Court with regard to
President Duterte's drug
war.

On February 8, 2018, the Office of ICTC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda commenced the
preliminary examination of the atrocities allegedly committed in the Philippines
pursuant to the Duterte administration's "war on drugs."

On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced that it was withdrawing from the
International Criminal Court. President Duterte claimed that the country never
became a state party to the Rome Statute since the treaty was not published in the
Official Gazette.

On March 16, 2018, the Philippines formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal from
the International Criminal Court to the United Nations. Enrique Manalo, the
Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations in
New York, deposited the Note Verbale to Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Chef de Cabinet
of the United Nations' SecretaryGeneral Antonio Guterres.

On March 17, 2018, the Secretary-General of the United Nations received the
notification from the Philippine government.
Herein petitioners assail the validity of the Philippines' withdrawal from the ICJ.

Issues:
1 Whether or not petitioners have sufficiently discharged their burden of showing
that this case is justiciable?
2 Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a
Note Verbale delivered to the Secretary-General of the United Nations is valid, binding,
and effectual?
3 Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute places the
Philippines in breach of its obligations under international law?
4 Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome statute will
diminish the Filipino people's protection under international law; and even if it does,
whether or not this is a justiciable question?

Ruling:
I. No. Petitioners insist that the protection of human rights will be weakened, yet their
contentions are mere surmises. Ample protection for human rights within the domestic
sphere remain formally in place. It is a canon of adjudication that "the court should not

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form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which
it is applied." Contrary to petitioners' claim, these cases do not deal with the results of
the ongoing preliminary examination by Prosecutor Bensouda. Article 127 of the Rome
Statute covers that. Neither at issue here is whether a future president may decide to
re-enter the Rome Statute and secure the requisite Senate concurrence. It is possible
that whatever the results in these cases are, a future administration under a new
president can make that decision.

The Petitions are moot. They fail to present a persisting case or controversy that impels
this Court's review. In resolving constitutional issues, there must be an "existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory." On March 19, 2019, the International Criminal Court itself, through Mr.
O-Gon Kwon, the president of the Assembly of States Parties, announced the
Philippines' departure from the Rome Statute effective March 17, 2019. Any discussion
on the Philippines' withdrawal is, at this juncture, merely a matter of theory.

II.
Yes. Article 127 of the Rome Statute provides mechanisms on how a state party may
withdraw from it:
• A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect
one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a
later date.
• A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the
obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any
financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any
cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings
in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were
commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it
prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was already
under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became
eftective.
The President's withdrawal from the Rome Statute was in accordance with the
mechanism provided in the treaty. The Rome Statute itself contemplated and enabled
a State Party's withdrawal. A state party and its agents cannot be faulted for merely
acting within what the Rome Statute expressly allows.

Treaty-making is a function lodged in the executive branch, which is headed by the

president. Nevertheless, a treaty's effectivity depends on the Senate's concurrence, in
accordance with the Constitution's system of checks and balances.
While Senate concurrence is expressly required to make treaties valid and effective, no
similar express mechanism concerning withdrawal from treaties or international
agreements is provided in the Constitution or any statute. Similarly, no constitutional
or statutory provision grants the president the unilateral power to terminate treaties.

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This vacuum engenders the controversy around which the present consolidated
Petitions revolve.

Having laid out the parameters and underlying principles of relevant foreign concepts,
and considering our own historical experience and prevailing legal system, this Court
adopts the following guidelines as the modality for evaluating cases concerning the
president's withdrawal from international agreements.

First, the president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or
she determines to be contrary to the Constitution or statutes. Thus, a valid treaty or
international agreement may be effective just as a statute is effective. It has the force
and effect of law. Still, statutes enjoy preeminence over international agreements. In
case of conflict between a law and a treaty, it is the statute that must prevail.
Second, the president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were
entered into pursuant to congressional imprimatur. Third, the President cannot
unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate concurred and
expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurtence.

At no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority
to withdraw from treaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be
anchored on a determination that they run afoul of the Constitution or a statute. Any
such determination must have clear and definite basis; any wanton, arbitrary,
whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is correctible by judicial review. Moreover, specific
circumstances attending Congress's injunction on the executive to proceed in treaty
negotiation, or the Senate's specification of the need for its concurrence to be obtained
in a withdrawal, binds the president and may prevent him or her from proceeding with
withdrawal.
No. The Philippines aspired to the establishment of an international criminal court that
would dispense justice efficiently and effectively; an institution that was ineffective in
addressing the problem of impunity of the perpetrators of the most heinous violations
of the laws of humanity would not serve justice or help to maintain international peace
and security. The position of the Philippines, consistent with its constitutional and legal
traditions, was based on those considerations and on its desire to uphold the current
evolution of international law.

IV. No. This fear of imagined diminution of legal remedies must be assuaged. The
Constitution, which embodies our fundamental rights, was in no way abrogated by the
withdrawal. A litany of statutes that protect our rights remain in place and enforceable.
Republic Act No. 9851, or the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity, echoes the
substantive provisions of the Rome Statute. It was signed into law on December 11,
2009, two years before the Senate concurred with the Rome Statute. Republic Act No.
9851 covers rights similarly protected under the Rome Statute. Consequently, no new
obligations arose from our membership in the International Criminal Court. Given the
variances between the Rome Statute and Republic Act No. 9851, it may even be said

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that the Rome Statute amended Republic Act No. 9851. It has been opined that the
principles of law in the Rome Statute are generally accepted principles of international
law. Assuming that this is true and considering the incorporation clause, the
Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute would be a superfluity thus, ultimately
ineffectual. The Philippines would remain bound by obligations expressed in the Rome
Statute.
Treaties may become the basis of customary international law. While States which are
not parties to treaties or international agreements are not bound thereby, such
agreements, if widely accepted for years by many States, may transform into customary
international laws, in which case, they bind even non-signatory States.

Thus, petitioners' concern that the country's withdrawal from the Rome Statute abjectly
and reversibly subverts our basic human rights appears to be baseless and purely
speculative. All told, the consolidated Petitions are dismissed for failing to demonstrate
justiciability.

The unfolding of events, including the International Criminal Court's acknowledgment

of withdrawal even before the lapse of one year from initial notice, rendered the
Petitions moot, removing any potential relief from this Court's sphere.

Mechanisms that safeguard human rights and protect against the grave offenses sought
to be addressed by the Rome Statute remain formally in place in this jurisdiction.
Further, the International Criminal Court retains jurisdiction, over any and all acts
committed by government actors until March 17, 2019. Hence, withdrawal from the
Rome Statute does not affect the liabilities of individuals charged before the
International Criminal Court for acts committed up to this date.

As guide for future cases, this Court recognizes that, as primary architect of foreign
policy, the President enjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw from treaties which are
bona fide deemed contrary to the Constitution or our laws, and to withdraw in keeping
with the national policy adopted pursuant to the Constitution and our laws.
However, the President's discretion to withdraw is qualified by the extent of legislative
involvement on the manner by which a treaty was entered into or came into effect. The
President cannot unilaterally withdraw from treaties that were entered into pursuant
to the legislative intent manifested in prior laws, or subsequently affirmed by
succeeding laws.

g) International Economic Law (Tanada vs. Angara)

Petitioners: Wigberto Tanada, et
Respondents: Edgardo Angara, et al.

Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the

World Trade Organization for being violative of provisions which are supposed to give
preference to Filipino workers and economy and on the ground that it infringes

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legislative and judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on "most favored nation"
and national treatment, require that nationals and other member countries are placed
in the same footing in terms of products and services. However, the Court brushed off
these contentions and ruled that the WTO is constitutional. Sections 10 and 12 of
Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) should be read in relation to Sections 1
and 13 (promoting the general welfare). Also, Section 10 is selfexecuting only to "rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" but not every
aspect of trade and commerce. There are balancing provisions in the Constitution
allowing the Senate to ratify the WTO agreement. Also, the Constitution doesn't rule
out foreign competition. States waive certain amount of sovereignty when entering into
treaties.

Facts: This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the
World Trade Organization,
particularly when President ridel Ramos signed the Instrument of Ratitication and the
Senate concurring in the said treaty Following World War 2, global financial leaders
held a conference in Bretton Woods to discuss global economy. This led to the
establishment of three great institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), International Monetary Fund and International Trade
Organization.
However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the General Agreement on
Trades and Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round of the GATT that the WTO was then
established.

The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the reduction of
tariff and barriers. Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating
the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified
Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods." It is petitioners' position that the "national treatment" and
"parity provisions of the WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products." in contravention of the
"Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the
phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Issue 1: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES!

In seeking to nullify the Senates act as being unconstitutional, the petition no doubt
raises a justiciale controversy. It becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute
Issue 2: Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Section 19, Article II and
Section 10 & 12, Artilce XII of the 1987 Constitution? NO!

Petitioners' Contentions:

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 • Petitioners argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution
mandating economic nationalism are violated by the so-called "parity provisions"
and "national treatment" clauses scattered in parts of WTO Agreement.
o This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MN) of the TRIMS (trade-
related investment measures), TRIPS (Trade Related aspects of intellectual
property rights), Trade in Services, and par. 4 of Article III of GATT 1994.
o "shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
products of national origin"

Sec. 19. Art I:The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
• Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

• Sec. 12, Art XII: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make
them competitive."

Ruling:
These provisions are not self-executing Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review
and in making laws Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in
relation to the other sections in said article. especially Sec. 1 and 13:
A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services An expanding productivity as
the key to raising the quality of life

• The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or
not. Rather, the Issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in
the constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO
Agreement. And we hold that there are.

WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies

Unlike in the U where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the
Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality,
with each member's vote equal in weight.

Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries

Tariff reduction - developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6 years, developing
24% in 10 years
Domestic subsidy - developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6) years. developing
countries at 13% in 10 vears
Export subsidy - developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing countries, 3/4ths of
36% in 10 years

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 Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets
The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization
as an economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining
whether the Senate committed grave abuse or discretion
Issue 3: Does the text of the WTO and its Annexes limit, restrict or impair the exercise
of legislative power by Congress? NO!
• A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.
• While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing
on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations
voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of
the family of nations.
• The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered
absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: limitations imposed by the
nature of membership in the family of nations & limitations imposed by treaty
stipulations.

3. Nationality and Statelessness

a) Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
B) ARTICLE IVCITIZENSHIP

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;

[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided

by law.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their
citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to
have renounced it.

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 Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law.

c) Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.[9] For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes
of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:[1

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 I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a
dual allegiance - and I reiterate a dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening
than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps,
never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of
birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance

of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket,
as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for
overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and
Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because
of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in
that Overseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of

allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday,
including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of
guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion
who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.

Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese ¾ it is
of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we
have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest. (ERNESTO S. MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENTS. 1999)

d) Repatriation Law
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171

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 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS

Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by

marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic
necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the
manner provided in Sec. 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended:
provided, that the applicant is not a:

(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any

association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing
organized government;

(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,

personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;

(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.

Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper
civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration
shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue
the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.

e) Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003

Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO

ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine

Congress Assembled:

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Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State

that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the

contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic:

"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate,

illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of
the Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;

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 (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which
they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the

armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION

OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS

Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage
to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship,
including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in
Sec. 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: provided, that the applicant is
not a:

(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or

group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;

(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal

assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;

(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.

Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and
in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel

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 the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.

f) Statelessness

In international law, a stateless person is someone who is "not considered as a

national by any state under the operation of its law". Some stateless people are also
refugees. However, not all refugees are stateless, and many people who are stateless
have never crossed an international border

4. State Responsibility
a) Human Rights (Falcis vs. Civil Registrar, Imbong vs. Ochoa, Ang ladlad vs.
COMELEC, Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, )
JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, III, petitioner,
-versus-
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL, respondent.
G.R. No. 217910 September 3, 2019
J. Leonen

Facts:

Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure dated
May 18, 2015. He raised the issue on declaring article 1 and 2 of the Family Code
as unconstitutional, hence Articles 46 (4) and 55(6) of the Family Code null.
He had identified himself as a member of the LGBTQI+ community hence he
claimed that the Family Code has a "normative impact" on the status of same-sex
relationships in the country. He was also allegedly injured by the supposed
"prohibition against the right to marry the same-sex which prevents his plans to
settle down in the Philippines.

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 He also acclaimed that the case is of transcendental importance and that the mere
passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima facie case of grave
abuse of discretion. Thus, procedural niceties must be set aside.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the self-idenfication of petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III as a
member of the LGBTQI+ community gives him the standing to challenge the Family
Code;
2. Whether or not the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance is
warranted; and
3. Whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry are
cognates of the right to life and liberty.

Ruling:
1. No. Petitioner’s supposed “personal stake in the outcome of this case” is not the
direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as that which would endow him with
standing. Mere assertions of a “law’s normative impact”; “impairment” of his
“ability to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships”; as
well as injury to his “plans to settle down and have a companion for life in his
beloved country”; or influence over his “decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT
friendly country” cannot be recognized by this as sufficient interest. Petitioner’s
desire “to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships” and
“to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country” does not
constitute legally demandable rights that require judicial enforcement. This Court
will not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family Code for his admitted
inability to find a partner.
Petitioner presents no proof at all of the immediate, inextricable danger that the
Family Code poses to him. His assertions of injury cannot, without sufficient proof,
be directly linked to the imputed cause, the existence of the Family Code. His
fixation on how the Family Code is the definitive cause of his inability to find a
partner is plainly non sequitur.

2. No. In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear threats to

constitutional rights warrant a direct resort to this Court. We explained that the
decisive factor in whether this court should permit the invocation of transcendental
importance is not merely the presence of “special and important reasons” but the
nature of the question presented by the parties. This Court declared that there must
be no disputed facts, and the issue raised should only be questions of law.
3. Yes. Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations
will earn state recognition is better left to Congress in order that it may thresh out
the many issues that may arise.

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Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and
enforceable according to legal rules. Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent
“legalness” of marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot be secured simply
by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the law. Rather, the
law itself must create the “thing” to which one has a right. As a result, the right to
marry necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this
legal framework.
To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the
complementarity of the sexes is to perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples,
whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into that mold.

It renders invisible the lived realities of families headed by single parents, families
formed by sterile couples, families formed by couples who preferred not to have
children, among many other family organizations. Furthermore, it reinforces
certain gender stereotypes within the family.

Imbong vs Ochoa

A. On the constitutionality of RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law

1. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the right to life:
NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual
Members could express their own views on this matter.
Ponente’s view (Justice Mendoza): Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution
states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the
traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the
ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view
that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the
moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and

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female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn
child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The
Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and
actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient
(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined
the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as
abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the
way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR
(Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the right to health
NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because
it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular
purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of
the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral
contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather,
they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws
prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a
duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in
place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under
Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the
contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or

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pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered
“mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated
and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are
“safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

3. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the freedom of religion and right to free speech

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or

participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the
Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates
the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious
beliefs of e.g. the petitioners

NO. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling
medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of
penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious
objections
YES. Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under
the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to

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Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose
basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do
so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information
and perform RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While
penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-
protected right must prevail over the effective implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec.
5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible
distinction between public health officers and their private counterparts. In
addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection
of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to
limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to
the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted
provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means
to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other
secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA
6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of
Women).

c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring
would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend
a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition

NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a

seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police
power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar
are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

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4. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
YES. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with
only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal
content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution.
Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to
defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of
families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this
mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the
family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure
is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-
family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case
of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in
elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority
in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over
their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept
or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.

5. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the freedom of expression and academic freedom
NO. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH
Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to
their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.

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Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of
Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of
parents in the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”.
The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the

IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the
moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and
other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well
be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the due process clause
NO. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The
“private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care service provider.”
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from
giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to
Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice
and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.

7. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause

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NO. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law
does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH
education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education.

8. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the prohibition against involuntary servitude
NO. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine
is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of
the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH
service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation,
no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b
of this digest.)
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
to determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs
List is valid
NO. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or
not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as
the FDA not only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the
FDA Act of 2009).

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C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments
and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
NO. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments.
Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local
government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it
has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of
these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an
undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by
LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM
merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government.
These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare.

CONSTI

Ang LADLAD Vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 190582, April 08, 2010

Topic: Congress| Composition, Qualifications, Term of Office| Party-list

representatives
Petitioner: ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS
CHAIR, DANTON REMOTO
Respondent: COMELEC

Facts
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party filed against the COMELEC resolutions that refuse to
accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization. In 2006, the application was
denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base.
In 2009, it was denied again but on moral grounds – it collided with statues that
adhere to morality and decency NCC 695, 1306, RPC 201. The party lied when it
said that "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or
failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." They
were also not given reconsideration – “Until the time comes when Ladlad is able
to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is
beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list

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system will remain just that.” And “homosexuality is not a constitutionally
protected fundamental right.” Hence, this petition.
Petitioner’s arguments - freedom of religion, privacy, freedom, speech and
assembly, international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation
OSG - no basis for COMELEC's allegations of immorality, there had been no
restrictions on rights of freedom of speech, expression, and assembly
COMELEC – no concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the
nation, LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and
RA 7941, made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC's field personnel.

Issue
Whether Ang Ladlad party-list should be given accreditation

Application
- we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections,[20] "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive"
- ground of making untruthful statements - this is irregular procedure; at
worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent's theory, and a serious
violation of petitioner's right to procedural due process.
- SC finds no misrepresentation – Ang ladlad never claimed to exist in each
province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community
in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had
16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its
electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national
LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of
the following LGBT networks:"
- Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC's moral objection
and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-
list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in
Ang Bagong Bayani.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for
Registration
- our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious
matters." government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

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Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration
– even though society disapproves of homosexuality, it has not been criminalized
- the resolutions have not specific any overt immoral acts by ang ladlad. Comelec
did not say what societal ills are sought to be prevented, why special protection is
needed for the youth, or how admission into the party-list system would be
harmful to society
- we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of
intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without
bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation.
- references to NCC and RPC - mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and
a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil
or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

Equal protection - Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither

burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.
- The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient
reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize
homosexual behavior
- The COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad
cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation,
furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a
disfavored group. From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated.
- Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis
as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an
unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances
of the case."

Freedom of Expression and Association - Under our system of laws, every

group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the
validity of its position through normal democratic means.
- It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions
should be distilled and deliberated upon.
- Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or
this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC
is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting
an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
- These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may
nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court's analysis. Foreign

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 authorities – US - ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian
rights to expressive conduct
- European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political
party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a
state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are
consistent with democratic principles.
- the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC's action, from publicly
expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that
there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law – ICCPR and UNDHR - the

principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating
to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
- petitioner's invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of
International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity),[51] which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of
international law. - At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these
Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines.
- so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law"
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which
amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State
practice or opinio juris.

- This Court's role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it
is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public
opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to
withstand vigorous debate.

Conclusion
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP
No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed
to GRANT petitioner's application for party-list accreditation.

Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC et al

G.R. NO. 221697

ISSUES AND RATIO:

1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to disqualify POE

The procedure and the conclusions from which the Resolutions of the COMELEC
emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

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 The issue before the COMELEC is whether the COC should be denied due course
‘on the exclusive ground’ that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. COMELEC should restrain itself from going into the issue of
qualifications of the candidate. It cannot, in the same cancellation case, decide
the qualification or lack thereof of a candidate. Not one of the enumerated powers
of the COMELEC as stated in Article IX C, Sec. 2 of the Constitution grants the
commission the power to determine the qualifications of a candidate. Such
powers are granted to the Electoral Tribunal as stated in Article VI Section 17
and the Supreme Court under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution.

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 of the

COMELEC rules do not allow, are not authorization and are not vestment of
jurisdiction for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The
facts of qualification must first be established in a prior proceeding before an
authority vested with jurisdiction. Prior determination of qualification may be by
statute, by an executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or
tribunal. Lacking this prior determination, the certificate of candidacy cannot be
cancelled or denied due course on ground of false representations regarding a
candidate’s qualifications except if there exists self-evident facts of unquestioned
or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. In this light the COMELEC
cannot cancel Poe’s certificate of candidacy lacking prior determination of her
qualifications by a competent body.

2) Whether it can be concluded that Poe’s parents are Filipinos.

Presumption regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unacceptable in
Philippine Law. There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino
parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Hence, the burden of proof was
on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.

Private respondents should show that Poe’s parents were aliens. Her admission
that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not
exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos. In fact, there is a high
probability that her parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered official
Statistics from the Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the total
number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born
in the country were more than 10 Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance
that the child born in the Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn, would
indicate more than ample probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe’s parents are the fact
that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo

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2. She has typical Filipino features

There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature. On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents
are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.

3) Whether as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Citizen

Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language that would exclude them
either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration, there is a need to
examine the intent of the framers.

The amendment to the Constitution proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to

include foundlings as natural born citizens was not carried out, not because there
was any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are not
citizens, but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention.
There was no intent or language that would permit discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to
equal protection of the laws. Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support the
principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption
confers citizenship upon the adoptee,

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 rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in the first place to be adopted. Recent
legislation all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as
among Filipino children who may be adopted.

The argument that the process to determine that the child is a foundling
leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship is without merit. Hence, the argument that as a
foundling, Poe underwent a process in order to acquire or perfect her Philippine
citizenship, is untenable.

“Having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done by the
citizen. In this case, the determination of foundling status was done by
authorities, not by Poe. Second, the object of the process is to determine the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child and lastly, the
process is not analogous to naturalization proceedings.

Under international law, foundlings are citizens. Generally accepted principles

of international law which include international customs form part of the laws
of the land. The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Convent on
Civil and Political Rights obligates the Philippines to grant nationality from
birth and to ensure that no child is stateless. The principles stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality
laws (that a foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the country of
birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed born of
citizens of the country where he is found)

bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these conventions.

Although we are not a signatory to the Hague Convention, we are a signatory

to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which affirms Article
14 of the Hague Convention. Likewise, the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness affirms Article 15 of the UDHR. By analogy, although the
Philippines has not signed the International Convention for the Protection of
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, we (the Supreme Court) ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearance was nonetheless binding as a
generally accepted principle of international law.

Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South
America and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its
citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that foundlings are recognized as

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 citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in which
it is found.

Hence, as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Filipino citizen.

4) Whether Poe’s repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship.

The COMELEC arrogantly disregarded jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation which states that repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine
nationality will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino after
repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc). In passing
R.A. 9225, Congress saw it fit to decree that natural born citizenship may be
reacquired even if it has been lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with
the Congress’ determination.

Neither is repatriation an act to ‘acquire or perfect’ one’s citizenship. In the

case of Bengson, the Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens
under the 1987 constitution: natural born and naturalized. There is no third
category for repatriated citizens. The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial
precedent. Hence, COMELEC’s decision is wrapped with grave abuse of
discretion.

5) Whether Poe is a resident of the Philippine for 10 years

Poe alleged that her residency should be counted from May 24, 2005 when she
returned for good from the US. There are three requisites to acquire a new
domicile 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality 2. Intention to remain
(animus manendi) and 3. Intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non-
revertendi). The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for
an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned
their US domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence
include former US passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her
return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email
correspondences with freight company to arrange for the shipment of
household items as well as with the pet Bureau; school records of her children
showing enrolment in the Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June
2005 etc.

COMELEC refused to consider the petitioner’s domicile has been timely

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 changed as of May 24, 2005 and maintained that although there is physical
presence and animus manendi, there is no animus revertendi. Respondents
contend that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she
obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquired Philippine citizenship since
she is still an American until July 7, 2006 on the basis of previous cases ruled
upon by the Supreme Court.

SC held that the other cases previously decided by the court wherein residence
was counted only from the acquisition of permanent residence were decided as
such because there is sparse evidence on establishment of residence. These
cases cannot be applied in the present case. In the case at bar, there is
overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to
permanently abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early
as May 24, 2005.
These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship is clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.

The stamp in her passport as a balikbayan does not make Poe an ordinary
transient.

Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2012 COC was only a mistake
in good faith. Such a mistake could be given in evidence against her but it was
by no means conclusive considering the overwhelming evidence submitted by
Poe. Considering that the COMELEC failed to take into consideration these
overwhelming evidence, its decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The decision of the COMELEC is hereby annulled and set aside. Poe is thus
declared qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local
Election on May 9, 2016.

b) International Humanitarian Law

c) Environmental Law

OPOSA VS FACTORAN, JR.

224 SCRA 792
Date of Promulgation: July 30, 1993
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.

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 Keywords: taxpayers’ class suit; intergenerational responsibility; right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; timber license agreements

QuickGuide: Petitioner’s personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding

generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful environment is concerned.

Facts:
- The controversy begun as Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before the RTC
of Makati City Branch 66.

- The principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.

- The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.

- The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical forests."
- The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about
the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the Court."

- The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn."

- It is prayed for that judgment be rendered

ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new TLAs. and

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 (3) granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.

- The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied,
rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found.

- These rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is

irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which
have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial.

- Scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful

ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-
four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses.

- The distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation

have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

- Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of

continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

- On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is
a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government.

- In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1)
the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is
dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.

- On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned

motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that
the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of

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 the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

- Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court and asked the Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

- Petitioners:
o Contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as
it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment,
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation.
o Rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
o It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more
areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
o Non-impairment clause does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts.
o Even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled
that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

- Respondents:
o Aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners
to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action.
o They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court,
but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging
totally.
o As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25)

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 years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated
the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Issue/s:
- Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued
rape of Mother Earth.
(YES.)

Ruling:
- The instant Petition is granted, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge
is set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

Ratio:
LOCUS STANDI:
- The said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is
of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines.

- Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if

not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The SC likewise
declares that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to
ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter
being but an incident to the former.

- This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. The SC
finds no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality
to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the "rhythm and harmony
of nature."

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- Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

- The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the

same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY:

- The complaint focuses on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which,
for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated
in the fundamental law (Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution).

- This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the Section 15
of the same article.

- While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter.

- Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns

nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.

- As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

- If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of

the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost

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 not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

- The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment.

- The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests.

- Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be

irreversiby disrupted.

- Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
the right to health, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June
1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper
use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and
grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of
all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos."

- This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the

Administrative Code of 1987. It stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks
of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact
of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.

- Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR.

- On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment
for succeeding generations." The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to
the said policy.

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- Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and
by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

- A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.

CAUSE OF ACTION:
- A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right.

- The question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint itself.

- Falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted.

- It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is

concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.

POLITICAL QUESTION:
- The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation.

- It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no

longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review.

NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS:
- The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the
non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution.

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- The court declared that to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber license agreements amount to impairment of contracts
abhorred by the fundamental law.

- The respondent Secretary did not even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity
to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound
the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest
and welfare.

- Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

- Tan vs. Director of Forestry: . . . A timber license is an instrument by which the

State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

- Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be
invoked.

- Even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause
cannot as yet be invoked.

- Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp.: The freedom of contract, under our system of
government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral,
safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power
of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

- In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.

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 SHELAN TEH

d) Treatment of Aliens
• GR: An injury to a citizen is an injury to the State. A state has the legal
responsibility to protect citizens of other States coming into their jurisdiction,
and a legal interest in ensuring that their own citizens are hot harmed by the
conduct of other States or of foreign nationals.
• Sovereign Power. Flowing from its right to existence and as an attribute of
sovereignty, no State is under obligation to admit aliens. The State can
determine in what cases and under what conditions it may admit aliens.
Þ The State has the power to regulate the entry and stay of aliens, right to
expel aliens from its territory through deportation or reconduction.
Þ Expulsion or deportation may be predicated on the ground that the stay
of the alien constitutes a menace to the security of the State that his entry
was illegal, or that permission to stay has expired.
Þ Reconduction is the forcible conveying of aliens back to their home State.
Þ The alien must accept the institutions of the State as he finds them.
Accordingly, the alien may be deprived of certain rights, eg, political
rights, acquisition of lands.
Þ International Minimum Standard
- This standard means that a State must treat foreign nationals within
their territory based on an international minimum standard as
agreed upon in treaties and other conventions.
- These include the right to life, liberty, protection of property, and free
access to the courts.
- This standard is preferred by developed countries.
Þ National Standard
- This standard means that a State is not in violation of international
law as long as it treats foreign nationals in the same way it treats its
own nationals.
- This standard is preferred by developing countries.
Þ Fundamental Human Rights
• State is under obligation to make reparation to another State for the failure
to fulfill its primary obligation to afford the proper protection due to the alien
national of the latter State. The State may be held liable for injuries and
damages sustained by the alien while in the territory of the State if:
a. The act or omission constitutes an international delinquency.
b. The act or omission is directly or indirectly imputable to the State.
NOTE:
- Acts of primary agents of the State, e.g., head of State are 'acts of State,
which will give rise to direct State responsibility.
- Acts of high administrative officials within the sense of their authority
are also acts of State which could give rise to liability.

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 - Where the officer acts beyond the scope of his authority, his act is likened
to an act of a private individual.
c. There is injury to the claimant State indirectly because of damage to its
national.

• Enforcement of Alien's Claim

1.Exhaustion of local remedies. An alien must first exhaust all available local
remedies for the protection or vindication of his rights.
- EXCP: if there are no remedies to exhaust (as where the laws are
intrinsically defective), or where the courts are corrupt, or where there
is no adequate machinery for the administration of justice, or where
the international delinquency results from an "act of State."
- Exhaustion is also proper because it avoids the multiplication of claims.
- The Calvo Clause. A stipulation by which an alien waives or restricts
his right to appeal to his own State in connection with any claim arising
from the contract and agrees to limit himself to the remedies available
under the laws of the local State.

2. After the alien has exhausted all available local remedies without success,
he must avail himself of the assistance of his State.

The tie of nationality must exist from the time of the injury until the
-
time the international claim is finally settled.
e) Extradition
• The tie of nationality must exist from the time of the injury until the time the
international claim is finally settled.
• Basis of Extradition: a treaty. In the absence of a treaty, the local State may
grant asylum to the fugitive; or, if surrender is made, the same is merely a
gesture of comity.
• Distinguished from Deportation. Extradition is the surrender of a fugitive by
one State to another where he is wanted for prosecution or, if already
convicted, for punishment. The surrender is made at the request of the latter
State on the basis of an extradition treaty. Deportation is the expulsion of an
alien who is considered undesirable by the local State, usually but not
necessarily to his own State.
- Extradition Not Unilateral. While deportation is a unilateral act of the
local State pursuant to its own interests, extradition is not. This is
because extradition requires the transfer of an individual from the
sending State to the requesting State on the basis of a treaty obligation.
• Extradition proceedings are administrative. The only question is whether to
extradite or not. the head of the executive department is the ultimate decision
maker with regard to whether or not to extradite.
• Fundamental Principles:

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 a. principle of specialty, a fugitive who is go extradited may be tried only for
the crime specified in the request for extradition and included in the list of
offenses in the extradition treaty. The State of refuge has the right to object
to a violation of this principle.
b. Any person may be extradited, whether he is a national of the requesting
State, of the State of refuge or of another State.
c. Political and religious offenders are generally not was out subject to
extradition.
d. In the absence of special agreement, the offense must have been committed
within the territory or against the interests of the demanding State.
e. Double criminality - The act for which the extradition is sought must be
punishable in both the requesting and requested States. This is known as the
rule of double criminality,

• Procedure for Extradition

a. Request, accompanied by the necessary paper relative to the identity of the
wanted person and the crime alleged to have been committed or of which he
has already been convicted, made through diplomatic channels to the State of
refuge.

b. Upon receipt of the request, State of refuge will conduct a judicial

investigation to ascertain if the crime is covered by the extradition treaty and
if there is a prima face case against the fugitive according to its only laws. If
there is, a warrant of surrender will be drawn and fugitive delivered to the
State of refuge.
NOTE: Bail is allowed in extradition cases. the standard to be used in
granting bail in extradition cases should be "clear and convincing evidence"
• Asylum. The power of the State to allow an alien who has sr sought refuge
from prosecution or persecution to remain within the territory and under its
protection. This has never been recognized as a principle of international law.
• Principles on Asylum.
a. Territorial asylum. Exists only when stipulated in a treaty or justified by
established usage. May depend on the liberal attitude of the receiving State,
on grounds of "territorial supremacy."

b. Diplomatic asylum. Granted only if stipulated in a treaty, or where

established usage allows it, but within "narrowest limits" or when the life or
liberty of the person is threatened by imminent violence.
f) Refugees
- A refugee is any person who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he
has no nationality, the country of his former habitual residence, because he
has or had well-founded fear of prosecution by reason of his race, religion,
nationality or political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the government of the country

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 of his nationality, or if he has no nationality, to return to the country of his
former habitual residence.
- Essential elements: a) outside the country of his nationality, or if Stateless,
outside the country of his .habitual residence; b) lacks national protection;
and c) fears persecution.
5. UNCLOS
a) Discussion of Justice Carpio (Ret.)
Why is the South China Sea important?
1) South China Sea is one of the most important waterways in the world. About
5.3 trillion dollars in ship on goods traverse the South China Sea every year. 4
leading exporting countries use South China Sea for their maritime trade.
2) Also, 12% of annual global fish catch because of the spratlys.
3) Rich in Methane Hydrates

b) Philippines vs. China

c) Magallona vs. Ermita

Magalona vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, Aug. 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law
followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS 1), codifying, among others, the sovereign
right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of which, however,
was left undetermined.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute

now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046
compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among
others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of
baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for
the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with
these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough
Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.

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Issues:
1. WON RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory" because
it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the
Treaty of Paris and related treaties?

2. WON RA 9522's use of UNCLOS IIl's regime of islands framework to draw

the baselines, and to measure the breath for the applicable maritime zones of
the KIG,
"weakens our territorial claim" over that area?

3. WON RA 9522 failed to textualize the Philippines' claim over Sabah and
North Borneo?
4. WON RA 9522 unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into
archipelagic waters?

Held:
1. No. Dismiss
2. Yes.
3. No. Dismiss.
4. No. Dismiss.

Ratio:
UNCLOS IlI has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory.
Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the
rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the
Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because
this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The
baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the
rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent arcas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
maritime zones and continental shelf.
Wherein RA 9522 denotes safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.

According to Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open
the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah. The definition of the baselines of
the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea

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around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. Republic
Act No. 5446 correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the

Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1)), the
Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.

According to Paragraph 2, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution uses the

term archipelagic waters separately from territorial sea. Under UNCLOS Ill,
an archipelagic State may have internal waters such as those enclosed by
closing lines across bays and mouths of rivers (Article 50, UNCLOS III).
Moreover, Article 8 (2) of UNCLOS III provides:

Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method

set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which
had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as
provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters.

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