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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
SERIES EDITOR: GIANLUCA PASSARELLI
The Informal Powers

of Western European
Presidents
A Way out of Weakness
Selena Grimaldi
Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics
Series Editor
Gianluca Passarelli, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics publishes books on all aspects
of presidential politics. We welcome proposals for monographs, edited
volumes and Pivots on topics such as:
● Contemporary presidencies and presidential powers

● Presidential elections and presidential party politics
● Presidential relations with the legislature
● The media and presidential communication
● The administrative presidency and presidential advisers
● The history of presidential offices and presidential biographies
The series focuses on presidents throughout the world, including both

directly elected and indirectly elected presidents, both single-country and
comparative studies of presidential politics. It also includes volumes on
conceptual or theoretical aspects, such as how to measure presidential
power. Moreover, the series considers book projects on the reform of
presidential politics, e.g. the reform of presidential elections.
For further information on the series and to submit a proposal for
consideration, please get in touch with:
● Commissioning Editor Ambra Finotello ambra.finotello@palgrave.

com
● Series Editor Gianluca Passarelli gianluca.passarelli@uniroma1.it
Selena Grimaldi
The Informal Powers

of Western European
Presidents
A Way out of Weakness
Selena Grimaldi
University of Macerata
Macerata, Italy
Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics

ISBN 978-3-031-33329-3 ISBN 978-3-031-33330-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33330-9
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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To my little Elettra who might consider becoming a President
rather than a Princess
With love Mum
Acknowledgements
My sincerest gratitude goes to colleagues that helped me in searching

data and that discussed with me the interpretation on certain episodes
of presidential intervention and especially Rui Feijo, Vasco Franco, Lauri
Karvonen, Maarika Kujanen and Tapio Raunio.
I’m also grateful to Dr. Anna Katharina von Oettingen of the German
Federal Presidential Office (Bundespräsidialamt) for providing me with
useful information related to the pocket vetos of German Presidents and
to Elisabeth Schuck of the Austrian Federal Presidential Office (Präsi-
dentschaftskanzlei) for providing the speeches of Austrian presidents that
I could not retrieve from the website. Similarly, I am also grateful to Chris
Duffin of the Office of the Secretary General to the President of Ireland
for providing me with the available Christmas speeches of Mary Robinson
and Mary McAleese. I would also like to thank Kimmo Hanhimäki, Senior
Officer of the Information service of the Office of the President of the
Republic of Finland, who provided me information about the vetoes of
Finnish Presidents.
Furthermore, I would like to thank certain colleagues who have
discussed with me certain theoretical aspects related to the develop-
ment of my reasoning on informal presidential powers during several
years or during certain conferences such as Silvia Bolgherini, Giuseppe
Ieraci, Luca Lanzalaco, Patrizia Messina, Gianfranco Pasquino and Gianni
Riccamboni.
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I’m also grateful to colleagues and friends who gave valuable remarks
and comments on certain parts of the book previously proposed as
conference papers especially in ECPR General Conferences in 2020
and 2021 and in the international workshop organized in Tampere
in 2022 and therefore to Raluca Farcas, Philip Köker, Vesa Koskimaa,
Mažvydas Jastramskis, Sophia Moestrup, Mara Morini, Octavio Amorin
Neto, Gianluca Passarelli, Lukas Pukelis and Thomas Sedelius.
I would also thank Matteo Boldrini and Aldo Paparo for the helpful
discussions on certain methodological strategies and my friends Laura and
Giulia Doriguzzi Bozzo for their helpful comments as outsider readers.
Finally, I am grateful to my parents and my partner Pierluigi Corri-
dolo for all the support and help in making worked the difficult balance
between private and working life in a period of great changes and stressful
situations.
Last but not least, thanks to Hemapriya Eswanth and Ambra Finotelli
of Palgrave McMillan for their patience and kindness and for never giving
up with the project of this book.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 What Are Weak Presidents? 5
1.2 Why Study Weak Presidents? 11
1.3 Aim, Research Questions and Theoretical Framework 16
1.4 Research Design, Methods and Data 22
References 29
2 Weak Presidents’ Characteristics and Pathways to Power 37
2.1 A Gap to Be Filled: How to Tackle with Presidents’
Background and Career 37
2.2 Presidents’ Socio-demographic Background 43
2.3 Presidents’ Political Career Paths 54
2.4 Career Duration, Diversification and Types of Presidents 69
2.5 Conclusions 79
References 81
3 Election and Term of Weak Presidents 91
3.1 Presidential Electoral Rules and Presidential Terms 91
3.2 Direct Elections and Second Order Theory 100
3.3 Indirect Elections and Party Politics 122
3.4 Duration in Office and Early Resignations 145
3.5 Conclusion 152
References 156
ix
x CONTENTS
4 Constitutional Strength and the Use of Formal Powers 161

4.1 Presidents’ Formal Powers: An Introduction 161
4.2 Formal Powers in Government Formation
and Parliament Dissolution 173
4.2.1 Austria 177
4.2.2 Finland 181
4.2.3 Germany 183
4.2.4 Ireland 184
4.2.5 Italy 187
4.2.6 Portugal 196
4.3 Formal Powers in Policy-Making: Vetoes and Messages
to the Parliament 205
4.3.1 Ireland 214
4.3.2 Italy 217
4.3.3 Portugal 222
4.4 Conclusion 228
References 231
5 Presidential Informal Powers and Their Use 237
5.1 Presidents’ Informal Powers: A Definition 237
5.2 Presidents’ Informal Powers: A Typology 245
5.3 Methodological Aspects and Research Design 250
5.4 Mapping Informal Powers in Government Formation 257
5.4.1 Pushing for Specific Governing Formulas 258
5.4.2 Vetoes on Ministers 262
5.4.3 The Appointment of a Minister 266
5.5 Mapping Informal Powers in the Policy-Making:
Pocket Vetoes and Line-Item Vetoes 270
5.5.1 Pocket Vetoes 270
5.5.2 Line-Item Veto or Moral Suasion 272
5.6 Explaining the Positive Outcome of President’s
Informal Powers 285
5.7 Conclusion 290
References 294
6 Informal Activism in Practice: The Individual
Presidents’ Experiences 301
6.1 Informal Activism in Austria 301
6.2 Informal Activism in Germany 316
6.3 Informal Activism in Ireland 339
CONTENTS xi
6.4 Informal Activism in Italy 348

6.5 Informal Activism in Portugal 380
6.6 Conclusion 396
References 400
7 When Presidents Go Public: An Analysis of Presidential
Major Speeches 409
7.1 Going Public in Europe: Values, Polity and Policy Issues 409
7.2 Presidential Speeches and Methodological Aspects 414
7.3 A Descriptive Exploration of Presidential Speeches
Among Macro Themes 423
7.3.1 The Policy Dimension 423
7.3.2 The Polity Dimension 435
7.3.3 The Politics Dimension 444
7.4 What Kind of Values and Policy Issues? Presidents
Facing External Shocks 448
7.4.1 Global Terrorism 448
7.4.2 The Global Financial Crisis and European
Debt Crisis 454
7.4.3 The Covid Pandemic 458
7.5 How Presidents Deal with the Politics of the Past
and Their Vision of the Homeland 464
7.5.1 Country-Specific Events 465
7.5.2 Vision of the Homeland 471
7.6 Conclusion 477
References 480
8 A Comprehensive Picture of Western European Presidents 483
8.1 Who Are Weak Presidents. Similarities and Differences
Between Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Western
European Democracies 485
8.2 What Weak President Do. Activism Between Formal
and Informal Powers 487
8.3 What Trigger the Positive Outcome of Presidential
Informal Activism 492
8.4 Other Informal Interventions and Future Research
Avenues 496
References 500
Annex: List of the Political Parties Quoted in the Book 503

Index 509
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Presidents’ level of education per country (percentage

values) 48
Fig. 2.2 Presidents’ type of tertiary education per country
(percentage values) (Note Totals in absolute numbers
differ from the number of presidents since in some
cases presidents have two degrees and in some other
cases presidents have no degree. Thus, the total is 12
for Italy; 10 for Germany; 7 for Austria; 8 for Ireland;
5 for Finland and 5 for Portugal) 50
Fig. 2.3 Presidents’ profession per time period (pre- and post-
the ‘90s) (percentage values) 53
Fig. 2.4 Presidents per party family (percentage values) 55
Fig. 2.5 Presidents previously party leaders per party family
(percentage values) 57
Fig. 2.6 Level of professionalization among presidents per country
Fig. 2.7 Level of professionalization among presidents per party
family (percentage values) 60
Fig. 2.8 Level of professionalization of presidents per time period
(pre- and post-1990) (percentage values) 60
Fig. 2.9 Presidents’ previous experience in national/federal
institutions per party family (percentage values) 64
Fig. 2.10 High and low prestige cabinet portfolios previously
covered by presidents per country (percentage values) 65
xiii
xiv LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 2.11 High and low prestige cabinet portfolios previously

covered by presidents per party family (percentage values) 66
Fig. 2.12 Extra-political positions held by presidents before entering
office per country (percentage values) (Note Total
is not 100 when the same president held more
positions. Other offices are related to higher positions
in Churches [i.e. President of the Evangelic Church];
in State Commissions [such as the Commission
for STASI records] or in high advisory state bodies such
as the Portuguese Council of State) 68
Fig. 2.13 Average duration of presidents’ career per country
(in years) 71
Fig. 2.14 Average duration of presidents’ career per party family
(in years) 73
Fig. 2.15 Types of presidents according to their pre-careers 75
Fig. 3.1 Turnout of presidential and legislative elections in Austria
(percentage values) (Note Presidential elections were held
in 1951; 1957; 1963; 1965; 1971; 1974; 1980; 1986;
1992; 1998; 2004; 2010 and 2016. The most proximate
legislative elections considered were the following: 1949;
1956; 1962; 1970; 1971; 1979; 1983; 1990; 1995;
2002; 2008 and 2013. Source Austria: Interior Ministry) 112
Fig. 3.2 Turnout of presidential and legislative elections in Ireland
(percentage values) (Note Presidential elections were
held in 1945; 1959; 1966; 1973; 1990; 1997; 2011
and 2018. The most proximate legislative elections
considered were the following: 1944; 1957; 1965; 1969;
1989; 1992; 2007 and 2016. Source Ireland: the website
Election in ireland by Christopher Took & Seán Donnelly) 113
Fig. 3.3 Turnout of presidential and legislative elections
in Portugal (percentage values) (Note Presidential
elections were held in 1979; 1980; 1986; 1991; 1996;
2001; 2006; 2011; 2016 and 2021. The most proximate
legislative elections considered are the following: 1976;
1980; 1985; 1987; 1995; 1999; 2005; 2009; 2015
and 2019 Source Portugal: Electoral Commission) 114
Fig. 3.4 Turnout of presidential and legislative elections in Finland
(percentage values) (Note Presidential elections were
held in 1988; 1994; 2000; 2006; 2012 and 2018. The
most proximate legislative elections considered were
the following: 1987; 1991; 1999; 2003; 2011 and 2015
Source Finland: Ministry of Justice) 115
LIST OF FIGURES xv
Fig. 3.5 Type of presidential majority compared to parliamentary

majority by country (absolute values) 125
Fig. 3.6 Duration in office (in years) per president by party family
and country (mean values) 147
Fig. 3.7 Percentage of the term completed by resigning presidents
Fig. 6.1 Informal interventions in government formation
and policy-making by Austrian presidents (absolute
numbers) 302
Fig. 6.2 Type of informal powers and their outcomes by Austrian
presidents (absolute numbers) 302
and policy-making by German presidents (absolute
numbers) 316
Fig. 6.4 Type of informal powers and their outcomes by German
Fig. 6.5 Informal interventions in government formation by Irish
and policy-making by Italian presidents (absolute numbers) 348
Fig. 6.7 Informal interventions per type of power and outcome
by Italian presidents (absolute numbers) 349
and policy-making by Portuguese presidents (absolute
numbers) 380
Fig. 6.9 Informal interventions per type of power and outcome
by Portuguese presidents (absolute numbers) 381
Fig. 7.1 The coding scheme (by number of coding references) 417
Fig. 7.2 Policy, Polity and Politics dimensions per number
of coding references per country (absolute values) 424
Fig. 7.3 Domestic issues, European issues and Foreign Policy
issues in the NY-CH speeches of Western European
presidents by total of coding references per country
Fig. 7.4 Distribution of Domestic, European and Foreign policy
issues within the same country (percentage values) 426
Fig. 7.5 Distribution of domestic, European and Foreign policy
issues per president (percentage values) 427
Fig. 7.6 The most frequent domestic issues per country by total
of coding references (percentage values) 429
Fig. 7.7 Distribution of specific domestic issues within the same
country (percentage values) 431
xvi LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 7.8 Distribution of specific domestic issues per presidents’

party family (percentage values) 432
Fig. 7.9 The most frequent EU issues per country by total
of coding references (percentage values) 433
Fig. 7.10 Distribution of specific EU issues within the same
Fig. 7.11 The most frequent Foreign policy issues per country
by total of coding references (percentage values) 435
Fig. 7.12 Distribution of specific Foreign policy issues
within the same country (percentage values) 436
Fig. 7.13 Values, disvalues and state/nation building process
in the NY-CH speeches of Western European presidents
by total of coding references per country (percentage
values) 437
Fig. 7.14 Values, disvalues and state/nation building process
in the NY-CH speeches of Western European Presidents
by total of coding references per president (percentage
values) 438
Fig. 7.15 The most frequent values in NY-CH presidential speeches
by total coding references in each category (percentage
values) 439
Fig. 7.16 The most frequent political values by total of coding
references per country (percentage values) 440
Fig. 7.17 The most frequent social values by total of coding
Fig. 7.18 The most frequent moral values by total of coding
Fig. 7.19 The most frequent elements of State or Nation building
process by total of coding references per country
Fig. 7.20 Distribution of the most frequent elements related
to the State/Nation building process within the same
Fig. 7.21 The most frequent disvalues by total of coding references
per country (percentage values) 444
Fig. 7.22 Distribution of the most frequent disvalues
within the same country (percentage values) 445
Fig. 7.23 Distribution of Inter-executive relations, Appeals
to political leaders and Role of the presidents
in presidential NY-CH speeches (percentage values) 446
Fig. 7.24 Values and policy issues connected with Global Terrorism
in presidential speeches 450
LIST OF FIGURES xvii
Fig. 7.25 Intersection between global terrorism references and issue

and value references. (Absolute values) 453
Fig. 7.26 Values and policy issues connected with Global financial
crisis in presidential speeches 456
Fig. 7.27 Intersection between global financial crisis references
and issue and value references. (Absolute values) 459
Fig. 7.28 Values and policy issues connected with Covid Pandemic
in presidential speeches 460
Fig. 7.29 Intersection between Covid pandemic references and issue
and value references. (Absolute values) 464
Fig. 7.30 Values and policy issues connected with Country-specific
events in presidential speeches 466
Fig. 7.31 Intersection between Country-specific event references
Fig. 7.32 Values and policy issues connected with Vision
of the Homeland in presidential speeches 472
Fig. 7.33 Intersection between Vision of the Homeland references
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Presidential powers, type of presidential election, type

of constitutional design in Europe 9
Table 1.2 The main characteristics for the selection of the country
cases 24
Table 1.3 Presidents and presidential terms per country. (Absolute
and percentage values) 25
Table 1.4 Time frame per country and according to presidents’
term 27
Table 2.1 Presidents in office before and after 1990 (absolute
Table 2.2 Presidents per gender (absolute and percentage values) 45
Table 2.3 Presidential mean age at appointment and minimum
and maximum age at appointment per country 46
Table 2.4 Presidential Mean Age when entering and exiting office
per country and time period (pre-and-post the 90s)
Table 2.5 Presidents’ level of education per country and time
period (pre-and-post 90s) (percentage values) 49
Table 2.6 Presidents’ type of tertiary education per country
and time period (pre-and post the 90s) (percentage
values) 50
Table 2.7 Presidents’ profession per country (percentage values) 52
Table 2.8 Presidents per party family and country (percentage
values) 56
xix
xx LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.9 Presidents who performed as party leader per country

(absolute and percentage values) 56
Table 2.10 Presidents’ previous experience at municipal
and regional or state level per country (absolute
Table 2.11 Presidents’ previous experience at national/federal level
per country (absolute and percentage values) 63
Table 2.12 Average duration of presidents’ career per gender
(in years) 72
Table 2.13 Average number of different institutional offices held
before presidency per country and period 74
Table 2.14 Average number of different institutional political
offices held before presidency per party family and period 74
Table 3.1 Electoral rules and terms of weak presidents 101
Table 3.2 Comparison of Turnout between elections
with the incumbent or no incumbent per country
(Mean values) 106
Table 3.3 Turnout and presidential power per country (mean
values) 106
Table 3.4 Number of presidential elections per type
of competitiveness and turnout (absolute
Table 3.5 Candidacy fragmentation mean per country 108
Table 3.6 Number of presidential elections per fragmentation
of candidacies and turnout 109
Table 3.7 Turnout in presidential and legislative elections
per country (Mean values) 110
Table 3.8 Mean difference between turnout in presidential
and legislative elections per country 111
Table 3.9 Turnout in legislative elections in countries with direct
or indirect presidential elections (mean values) 116
Table 3.10 Percentage of votes for the winning candidate
at the final round per country (percentage values) 117
Table 3.11 Percentage of votes of the winning candidate per party
family at first and second elections (mean values) 118
Table 3.12 Type of presidential majority in comparison
to the legislative majority per average votes of winners
and round mean 133
Table 3.13 Fragmentation of candidacies and average number
of rounds in first and second elections (mean values) 134
Table 3.14 Number of female candidates per countries in all rounds
of voting per countries (absolute numbers) 139
LIST OF TABLES xxi
Table 3.15 Vote share in the final round and number of rounds
of voting per president by country (percentage
and absolute values) 142
Table 3.16 Votes of the winning candidates and the mean number
of rounds of voting per party family (mean values) 145
Table 3.17 Average duration in office during 1st and 2nd term
of directly and indirectly elected presidents and amount
of term completed 148
Table 4.1 Measures of president’s formal powers 170
Table 4.2 Presidential formal powers in government formation
and parliament dissolution in Western Europe 178
Table 4.3 Presidential formal powers in policy-making 206
Table 4.4 Referrals to the supreme court by Irish presidents
(1937–2021) 215
Table 4.5 Suspensive Vetoes of Italian presidents (1948–2021) 219
Table 4.6 Vetoes of Portuguese presidents 223
Table 5.1 Differences between formal and informal presidential
powers 241
Table 5.2 A typology of informal powers 248
Table 5.3 Mapping the proposals of governing formula
as substitutive or subverting informal powers and their
outcomes 259
Table 5.4 Mapping presidential vetoes of ministers as substitutive
or subverting informal powers and their outcomes 264
Table 5.5 Mapping the appointment of a minister as a substitutive
or subverting informal powers 268
Table 5.6 Informal powers in government formation per type,
outcome and country 269
Table 5.7 Mapping pocket vetos as substitutive or subverting
informal powers 273
Table 5.8 Mapping line-item vetoes as substitutive or subverting
informal powers 277
Table 5.9 Mapping line-item vetoes as parallel and risk-taking
informal powers per year 279
Table 5.10 Mapping line-item vetoes per type of informal power
and per country 284
Table 5.11 Determinants of the positive outcomes of presidential
informal activism 286
Table 6.1 Contextual factors and Personal features related
to presidential interventions 303
to presidential interventions in Germany 318
xxii LIST OF TABLES

to presidential interventions in Ireland 341
to presidential interventions in Italy 350
to presidential interventions in Portugal 382
Table 6.6 Number of informal interventions by Country and Party
Family (absolute numbers) 397
Table 7.1 Corpus of NY-CH speeches held by Western European
presidents 416
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Presidents’ role and powers have been studied in relation to the type
of regimes they operate. In fact, the discussion about what kind of
regime type is preferable is inherently related to what kind of equilib-
rium of powers emerges between the legislative and the executive. As a
consequence, the discussion about presidential strengths or weaknesses
originates from this specific debate, of which I hereby recall the most
important steps.
Political science debate on regime types is one of the most traditional
of the entire discipline and it stems from the classic distinction between
legislative, executive and judiciary provided in Montesquieu’s theory of
the separation of powers.
However, the contemporary debate on regime types actually starts with
the article of Juan Linz (1990) related to the perils of presidentialism. In
such an article and in the following book written with Linz & Valenzuela
(1994), Linz highlights the problematic role of presidents holding many
strong powers and the consequently populist drifts. Moreover, he claims
that certain institutional features—such as the double democratic legit-
imacy and the fixed term of presidents, are likely to push presidents to
oppose congresses, especially in instances of divided government, and to
make such conflict hard to overcome.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
S. Grimaldi, The Informal Powers of Western European Presidents,
Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33330-9_1
2 S. GRIMALDI
Linz’s thesis is that parliamentarism is better and less rigid than pres-
identialism and therefore preferable especially in transitional regimes or
in fragile new-born democracies. In fact, parliamentarism is supposed to
fit in divided societies (Lijphart, 1992), as the legislative-executive conflict
can be solved with the removal of cabinet and populist drifts are less likely,
since prime ministers (PMs) are not directly elected.
Subsequently, other authors partly contested Linz and Valenzuela’s
interpretation by pointing out that presidential systems even present some
benefits (Cheibub, 2007; Morgestern et al., 2020; Shugart & Carey,
1992; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). For instance, presidential fixed
terms enhance government stability and continuity in public polices; and
separation of powers provides more robust checks and balances; and
ensures effective accountability as decision-makers are clearly identifi-
able. Finally, presidents are more likely to embody nationwide interests
in comparison to PMs, who are more linked to their constituencies and
parties.
When this debate, originating in the Americas where presidentialism is
the most frequent type of regime, reached Europe, where there are almost
no examples of presidential systems (with the only exception of Cyprus),
the semi-presidential regime type was put at the centre of this assessment.
In fact, semi-presidentialism is a “European institutional by-product”. On
the one hand, historical examples of semi-presidentialism can be found
in Europe since the Weimar Republic in 1919 and the Austrian First
Republic (1929). Nevertheless, examples of semi-presidential systems
were present in Europe well before the most famous prototype of the
Fifth French Republic.1 One only needs to consider cases such as the
Irish Republic (1937), the Icelandic Republic (1944) and the Finnish
Republic2 (1944). On the other hand, with the third wave of democ-
ratization (Huntington, 1991), semi-presidentialism has widely spread,
thus becoming one of the most emblematic types of regime in Europe
(i.e. Portugal since 1976 and most of Central-Eastern countries after the
collapse of the Soviet Union).
The word semi-presidentialism was first coined by Duverger (1980)
and was conceived as a sort of hybrid between parliamentarism and pres-
identialism. From the ‘90s onwards, the European debate has revolved
1 Even though presidents have been directly elected only since 1964.
2 In Finland presidents have been directly elected since 2000.
1 INTRODUCTION 3
around two main issues: (1) the problematic definition of this “new”
regime type and (2) its assessment in relation to parliamentarism and pres-
identialism. As far as the first point is concerned, Elgie (1999) pointed
out that even though many different definitions were available, they
only increased confusion rather than clarity, especially when they tried
to encompass presidential actual powers or behaviour in such classifi-
cations. As a consequence, Elgie (2011) proposed a formal definition
of semi-presidentialism which is widely accepted in literature. Elgie’s
definition include two variants of semi-presidentialism, with a clear refer-
ence to Shugart and Carey’s work (1992): premier-presidentialism and
president-parliamentarism.
The other strand of the academic debate revolves around the pros
and cons of semi-presidentialism. On the one hand, Linz and Valen-
zuela expressed for semi-presidentialism similar concerns to those related
to presidentialism (such as double democratic legitimacy, presidential
fixed terms and populist drifts) and they even added that fused power
systems increase the likelihood of executive-legislative conflicts, especially
in case of cohabitation and divided executive. On the other hand, others
(Pasquino, 1997; Sartori, 1996) sustained that semi-presidentialism is
more likely to combine the advantages of both parliamentarism and pres-
identialism and, therefore, positive elements outweigh potential pitfalls,
especially for countries in transition towards democracy. Among these
pros one can find government stability, continuity in public policy and
the possibility to replace the PM and their cabinet when the conflict
between executive and legislative arises. More recently, scholars empha-
sized that not all types of semi-presidentialism are dangerous, but only
those which establish presidents with many and strong powers, namely
president-parliamentarism cases (Elgie, 2011; Elgie & Moestrup, 2016;
Sedelius & Linde, 2018).
The short outline provided above demonstrates that presidential role
and powers have been investigated and evaluated, especially when presi-
dents operate in presidential or semi-presidential regimes. However, there
is almost no debate in political science literature about presidents in parlia-
mentary systems (see Tavits, 2009 as exception). On the one hand, this
outcome is due to the idea that presidents in parliamentary systems are
only figureheads with exclusively ceremonial roles. Consequently, it comes
with no surprise that, in parliamentary democracies, most political science
research favours investigations on PMs and their cabinets (i.e. Baylis,
1996; Helms, 2005; Jones, 1991; Rhodes & Dunleavy, 1995; Rose,
4 S. GRIMALDI
1991; Weller, 1985), since the executive power is robustly in their hands.
Even in certain types of semi-presidentialism, when presidents are gener-
ally far from day-to-day politics, political scientists’ interest in presidents’
role is somewhat limited.
In Europe, the most influential debate—partially connected with pres-
idential powers—revolves around the so-called presidentialization thesis
(Poguntke & Webb, 2005) according to which even parliamentary and
semi-presidential regimes are becoming more presidential in their actual
practice without changing their formal structure. The logic of presiden-
tialization implies the growing power and autonomy of political leaders
within political executives and political parties, and in the emergence
of increasingly leadership-centred electoral processes. To use Passarel-
li’s words (2015: 6) “the presidentialization concept combines different
empirical trends into a unique theoretical understanding of ongoing
power shifts (also) within parliamentary regimes”. The presidentializa-
tion assumption has been criticized both because of the weaknesses of its
empirical findings (Dowding, 2013; Heffernan, 2005, 2013; Karvonen,
2010) and because it underestimates how institutions clearly shape polit-
ical behaviour (Samuels & Shugart 2010). Recently, the work by Passarelli
(2015) on the presidentialization of parties confirms that the institutional
logic supported by Samuels and Shugart (2010) holds strong however,
certain political contextual dynamics, such as the parties’ genetic features,
have leverage in explaining presidentialization. On one side, this litera-
ture has been useful in pointing out that presidentialization of politics
revolves around the empowerment of the Head of Government who
can be the President or the PM especially when he/she is also the
leader of nationalized and centralized parties. On the other side, it seems
this thesis leaves little space for the Head of State with no or limited
executive role. In this respect, Passarelli’s useful distinction of presiden-
tialization, personalization and centralization of party politics helps in
understanding that presidentialization occurs in semi-presidential systems
where presidential powers are strong and significant, whereas in other
cases of semi-presidentialism or parliamentarism there is personalization
without presidentialization. Following this line of reasoning, we can argue
that the empowerment of weak Presidents (in parliamentarism and semi-
presidentialism) is always contingent and unstable since it is grounded
on personalization of politics which refers to personal capital in terms
of skills, characteristic, attitudes and reputation and not on presidential-
ization which refers to specific institutional and party resources. Finally,
1 INTRODUCTION 5
these reflections have been also relevant because they emphasized the link
between personalization and informal politics. In fact, they argue that
the empowerment of PM in parliamentary contexts “stems more from
informal practices and the circumvention of formal rules rather than from
any significant changes to the constitutional structure or to the parties
themselves” (Gauja, 2015; Passarelli, 2015: 251).
The party decay age (Mair, 2013; Manin, 1997; Tormey, 2015), which
involves most consolidated democracies, has opened new windows of
opportunity for relatively weak presidents. In fact, cases of presidents who
intervene informally in fundamental spheres of power such as government
formation and policy-making are more and more frequent in parliamen-
tary and semi-presidential systems in Western Europe and cannot be
considered odd exceptions any longer, but need to be seriously taken into
account by political scientists.
All in all, this book is an attempt to fill a gap in political science
literature by investigating the role of formally constrained presidents.
1.1 What Are Weak Presidents?

The next step is trying to understand what weak presidents are. In order
to address this topic, it is worth to refer to that strand of literature which
has analysed and tried to evaluate presidential powers. The first criteria
scholars take into account for this purpose is the assessment of presidential
powers according to what Constitutions allow presidents to do or not to
do.
From this point of view, from the ‘90s onwards literature provides a
number of contributions based on the check list method (i.e. Frye, 1997;
Hellman, 1996; Metcalf, 2000; Siarof, 2003; Tavits, 2009) which consists
in listing (all or certain) presidential powers, attribute them a score
according to their presence or absence, and finally aggregate all scores in a
unique indicator. Most scholars who rely on a check lists to evaluate presi-
dential powers adopt binary indicators (1 = power exists; 0 = otherwise).
Conversely, Shugart and Carey (1992), who distinguishes between legisla-
tive powers (package veto; partial veto, decree, exclusive introduction;
budgetary power referenda, judicial review) and non-legislative powers
(cabinet formation; cabinet dismissal; censure ministers by the Assembly,
dissolution of Assembly), rely on ordinary indicators (with a range 0–4
points) with the benefit of capturing certain important nuances.
6 S. GRIMALDI
The problem with check lists is that all presidential powers have the
same weight, thus many nominee powers end up increasing the overall
score, as they are more in numbers, even though less important than
other powers (such as that of dissolving parliament). Even Shugart and
Carey’s method (1992) presents some pitfalls since it cannot evaluate
presidents’ powers irrespective of the regime type presidents operate in. In
other words, Shugart and Carey’s interest is concentrated on presidential
and semi-presidential regimes only, thus hindering their capacity to eval-
uate the powers of presidents in parliamentary systems. In fact, as Metcalf
(2000: 668) claims, they do not include presidential referral, typical
for presidents who operate in parliamentary systems, among legislative
powers, and therefore their method is not always applicable.
Other disagreements in such attempts to evaluate presidential powers
have arisen on the decision of whether to consider direct election as a
power within these check lists or not. This consideration stems from an
important debate that focuses on the correlation between direct elec-
tion and presidential activism. However, there is no clear-cut evidence to
sustain that direct election either increases (i.e. Köker, 2017; Schleiter &
Morgan-Jones, 2010) or decreases (i.e. Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006)
presidential activity.3 It is more likely that, as finally, Tavits (2009)
clarifies, presidential activism is connected to certain opportunity frame-
works (i.e. high volatility rates; parliamentary fragmentation; minority
governments, unstable coalition governments, etc.) rather than to direct
election.
Another important problem is that among presidential formal powers,
some check lists comprise certain aspects wanting to also capture the
real praxis of the presidency (Amorin Neto & Costa Lobo, 2009;
Cranenburgh, 2008; Siarof, 2003; Tavits, 2009). However, these studies
don’t actually depart from the traditional ones, but simply re-scale the
assessment of presidential powers according to the use of certain powers
or the abstention from acting on the part of presidents. The problem
with this assessment of presidential behaviour is that it is not clear if these
scores are capturing presidential powers per se or other factors which
may have an impact on the political system such as party competition
(Doyle & Elgie, 2016: 733).
3 Especially because direct election seems to increase presidential activism when only
one type of intervention is considered, such as vetoes (Köker, 2017) or discretionary
government replacement (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009).
1 INTRODUCTION 7
As a consequence, to distinguish between weak and strong presidents,

it seems convincing to first identify the powers they display according to
the constitution. To do this, I rely on the most recent and complete study
on presidential powers (Doyle & Elgie, 2016) which pools together 28
existing measures of presidential constitutional powers and also addresses
some of the major criticisms on check list methods (Fortin, 2013).
Without creating a new measure Doyle and Elgie (2016) proposed
a time-series, cross-sectional dataset of presidential power scores with
country years as the unit of observation, for a total of 116 countries
and 181 country time periods (since a country can be counted twice
or more when the Constitution is amended in a way that impact pres-
idential power). Prespow1 are computed in the following way: all the
scores are derived from different measures they decided to rely on and
are normalized. Then, the average of these normalized scores per country
is calculated and finally, country scores are normalized to generate a range
of 0–1 points to help comparisons among countries.
According to prespow1 scores, the distinction between regime types
and presidential powers are not always fitting. In fact, there are parlia-
mentary presidents more powerful than semi-presidential ones, such as
the Italian president (0.1) vs. the Irish one (0.062). There are presi-
dents operating in president-parliamentary systems who are weaker than
presidents in premier-presidential systems such as the Austrian president
(0.092) vs. the Lithuanian (0.282) or the French (0.131) ones. The
common belief sustaining that presidential systems are always those with
the strongest presidents is not always proven right. For instance, there
are semi-presidential systems with presidents who score higher than in
certain presidential systems (i.e. Icelandic presidents, 0.325 vs. US presi-
dents 0.289). Relevant differences emerge even when looking at the same
regime type, for instance by comparing the US president (0.289) with the
Mexican (0.343), the Argentinian (0.407) or the Brazilian (0.489) ones.
In order to assess presidential powers, it makes sense to consider
specific geographical areas. In fact, same areas are likely to feature similar
presidents, as it is more probable to have coherent government types,
similar political cultures and comparable historical legacies. By grouping
presidents per geographical regions it emerged that, in Europe, presidents
have lower powers in comparison to presidents in other regions. In fact,
on average, presidential power in Europe scores as 0.226, whereas in Asia
it scores 0.356, in Latin America 0.362 and in Africa as 0.441.
8 S. GRIMALDI
As the European context is the focus of this book I can say that,
according to formal powers, weak presidents are those who score below
the mean value of 0.226 when all regimes are considered and below 0.214
when one only considers existing regimes. Based on these criteria, all pres-
idents in the parliamentary system (as expected) and some presidents who
operate in semi-presidential systems are weak, namely their score is below
the mean value as reported in Table 1.1.
Building on the idea of consistent and inconsistent constitutional
designs provided by Fruhstorfer (2019), when dealing with presidential
institutions I assess as inconsistent designs those which combine directly
elected presidents with a low score of presidential powers (namely with
a score below the mean value) or indirectly elected presidents with high
scores (namely with a score above the mean value), whereas those which
combine directly elected presidents with high scores and indirectly elected
presidents with low scores of presidential powers are defined as consistent
designs.
This exercise allows us to understand that the majority of European
presidencies (17 out of 28) seem to rely on a consistent constitutional
design whereas an important minority (11 out of 28) rely on an incon-
sistent constitutional design. On the one hand, almost all presidential
institutions in parliamentary systems are consistent in terms of constitu-
tional design, since low scores of presidential powers are associated with
indirect election. However, relevant exceptions exist such as Hungary
and Czech Republic where there are indirectly elected presidents with
relatively strong powers. On the other hand, inconsistent constitutional
designs seem to affect more semi-presidential regimes than parliamen-
tary ones, especially in Western Europe, where directly elected presidents
enjoy low powers. Among these cases, one finds Austria, Finland, France,
Ireland and Portugal.
All in all, this discussion has been useful to understand that:
(1) Regime types are not always consistent with the strength of pres-
idents. As mentioned above, some presidents in semi-presidential
systems are stronger than presidents in presidential systems; and
some presidents who operate in parliamentary system are stronger
than certain presidents in semi-presidential systems. Thus, I agree
with the claim that the internal coherence of classic categorization
of parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism and presidentialism is not
1 INTRODUCTION 9
Table 1.1 Presidential

Presidential Direct/ Consistency/
powers, type of
score indirect inconsistency
presidential election, (prespow1) election
type of constitutional
design in Europe Albania 0.141 Indirect Consistent
1998–
Austria 1945– 0.092 Direct Inconsistent
Belarus 1997– 0.615 Direct Consistent
Bosnia and 0.284 Direct Consistent
H. 1996–
Bulgaria 0.183 Direct Inconsistent
1992–
Croatia 2001– 0.291 Direct Consistent
Cyprus 1960– 0.648 Direct Consistent
Czech 0.257 Indirect Inconsistent
Republic
2001–
Estonia 1992– 0.184 Indirect Consistent
Finland 0.05 Direct Inconsistent
2000–
France 1963– 0.131 Direct Inconsistent
Germany 0.029 Indirect Consistent
1949–
Greece 1986– 0.029 Indirect Consistent
Hungary 0.275 Indirect Inconsistent
1991–2011
Iceland 1944– 0.325 Direct Consistent
Ireland 1938– 0.062 Direct Inconsistent
Italy 1948– 0.1 Indirect Consistent
Latvia 1998– 0.01 Indirect Consistent
Lithuania 0.282 Direct Consistent
1993–
(North) 0.116 Direct Inconsistent
Macedonia
1992–
Malta 1965– 0.148 Indirect Consistent
Moldova 0.272 Direct Consistent
2001–
Poland 1997– 0.241 Direct Consistent
Portugal 0.197 Direct Inconsistent
1983–
Romania 0.25 Direct Consistent
1992
(continued)
10 S. GRIMALDI
Table 1.1 (continued)

Presidential Direct/ Consistency/
score indirect inconsistency
(prespow1) election
Slovakia 0.189 Direct Inconsistent

2002–
Slovenia 0.118 Direct Inconsistent
1992–
Ukraine 2011 0.464 Direct Consistent
Average 0.214
(existing
regimes)
Average all 0.226
regimesa
Notes (1) Here are reported all scores per existing regimes (namely
28 country in Europe with a directly or indirectly elected presi-
dent). However, Doyle and Elgie (2016) took into account also
previous regimes (here intended as different constitutional frame-
works where presidential powers varies) such as Albania 1991–1998;
Croatia 1991–2000; Latvia 1992–1997 etc. Therefore, 0.226 is the
mean value of 49 country time periods whereas 0.214 is the mean
value for the actual 28 regimes
(2) Russia and Turkey are geographically placed between Europe
and Asia and therefore have been excluded from this table
Source Adaptation from Doyle and Elgie (2016) and from
Fruhstorfer (2019)
as strong as it is generally assumed (see Blondel, 2015; Cheibub

et al., 2014; Fruhstorfer, 2019).
(2) As expected, weak presidents are typically those who operate in
parliamentary systems. However, because of the number of semi-
presidentialism systems with inconsistent constitutional designs,
many weak presidents are present even within semi-presidentialism.
(3) The majority of European presidents are weak: out of 28 cases,
there are seven presidents in parliamentary systems presenting a
consistent constitutional design; and there are nine presidents in
semi-presidential systems with inconsistent constitutional design,
for a total of 16.
Even though formal criteria adopted in literature are not fully satisfying
(because there is no doubt that formal powers cannot capture the whole
scale of presidential activism) this definition of weak presidents is suffi-
ciently rigorous to allow comparative studies and to avoid common sense
1 INTRODUCTION 11
selection of the cases based exclusively on regime types or on certain

institutional features such as direct or indirect elections.
All that said, it is true that informal powers exist and are used by
presidents even though they are completely neglected by literature. This
problem has been brought up recently even by scholars of presidential
systems who were trying to figure out why US presidents are assessed
as relatively weak in comparison to most Latin American ones, even
though their actions lead to similar outcomes. They consequently have
claimed that “if the ability to implement policy is similar but formal/
constitutional powers are different, then scales of presidential powers
are lacking” (Morgenstern et al., 2013: 39). However, as Morgenstern
et al. (2013) suggested, it is likely that formal and informal powers are
substitutive or complementary rather than additive, and therefore weaker
presidents according to Constitutional formal scales are more likely to use
informal powers to achieve outcomes similar to stronger presidents’ ones.
1.2 Why Study Weak Presidents?

Weak presidents, namely those with limited and few formal powers, are
rarely considered by political scientists who have so far preferred to leave
the room to law scholars. However, certain weak presidents have recently
started to become more visible and active within their political systems,
so much so that we need to reconsider the idea that all weak presidents
are figureheads with no or limited political power.
As Tavits (2009) pointed out, certain opportunity frameworks are
likely to stimulate presidential intervention and, since party and govern-
ment stability are more and more challenged in recent times, it is likely
that presidents may intervene on certain occasions. In fact, as scholars
of political parties remarked, party systems are changing in almost all
Western democracies (Casal Bertoa & Enyedi, 2016; Lisi, 2018), electoral
volatility is increasing (Chiaramonte & Emanuel, 2017) and the frozen
party systems identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) are no longer able
to explain new dynamics. As a consequence, fragmentation, volatility and
polarization are common features of many party systems as well as the
decreasing electoral performance of traditional party families and the rise
(and success) of new parties.
If this holds true, it is likely that certain accountability actors such
as presidents without executive powers may intervene to support other
12 S. GRIMALDI
institutions within democratic systems, such as the work of government

and parliament.
Italian presidents are probably a case in point among parliamen-
tary democracies, since their role has been expanded when the party
system reshuffled, and major parties were replaced in the early ‘90s.
As a matter of fact, presidential role in the government- building and
policy-making spheres have been recognized by several political scien-
tists (i.e. Amoretti & Giannone, 2014; Grimaldi, 2015, 2017; Pasquino,
2003, 2012; Tebaldi, 2005) who also stressed their capacity to reconcile
different sections of society with opposing political cultures and values by
proposing the adoption of a sort of constitutional patriotism (Grimaldi &
Riccamboni, 2007; Nevola, 2003). The most evident consequences of
Italian presidents’ increasing interventions have been the discretional
appointment of outsider or technical PMs (i.e. Ciampi, Dini, Monti,
Draghi) who were supposed to cope with dramatic crisis or exogenous
challenges that political elite and political parties seemed unable to solve
(Marangoni & Verzichelli, 2015). In this respect, the power to dissolve
parliament—even though it has been invoked by certain political leaders
or by some PMs—has been parsimoniously used by presidents who have
often convinced parties to find alternative parliamentary majorities and
support such “presidential cabinets” with a vote of confidence.
What happens in Italy seems to be no exception, especially when
unexpected political conditions may reverse the constitutional praxis of
presidential inactivity and convince presidents to act. In this respect, both
the Austrian and Icelandic presidents (who are considered figureheads)
recently decided to behave in divergence with constitutional praxis or,
to put it in terms of neo-institutionalism, they behaved in divergence
with the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2006). For example,
in 2019 Austrian president Van der Bellen discretionarily intervened in
government formation by selecting the president of the Constitutional
Court, Brigitte Bierlein, as leader of a non-political caretaker govern-
ment after a no-confidence vote was cast for the first time in Austria.
The collapse of the first Kurz cabinet was due to a political scandal, the
so-called Ibiza-gate, which involved the junior party of the coalition, the
FPÖ, and its leader and vice chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache.
Similarly, in 2016 Icelandic president Grimson refused to authorize the
PM to dissolve parliament, disregarding government expectations. Also in
this case, a huge political scandal (the Panama Papers) involved the PM
and his family and led to his political isolation and the insurgence of mass
1 INTRODUCTION 13
protests. These examples clarify that, even though well-established consti-

tutional praxes exist, formal powers granted to the presidents allow them
to change such regularities and overturn institutional actors’ and citi-
zens’ shared expectations. These changes in presidential behaviour should
convince political scientists to reconsider the idea that presidents in these
semi-presidential regimes are necessarily figureheads (Samuels & Shugart,
2010; Sartori, 1996).
From the above considerations, it is clear that the first reason to study
weak presidents is that, in such changing times and different political
conditions, the presidential role may become important in certain demo-
cratic systems and especially when parties and party elites seem to pull
back and leave a void (Mair, 2013). In fact, since mainstream parties
have suffered heavy defeats in many countries in the last decade, govern-
ment formation has become less predictable and easy than it used to be in
the past. So much so that reading the electoral results and subsequently
appointing a PM has involved presidential discretional intervention and
institutional deadlocks have been solved by weak presidents in many
Western European countries (i.e. the 2017 Great Coalition in Germany
beyond the Italian and Austrian cases above mentioned). Such presidential
intervention may become a new permanent feature of Western European
democracies.
Another reason to study weak presidents is related to the opportunity
to better understand informality and how informal powers work.
On the one hand, in European presidential studies, there are only a
few attempts to recognize the existence of informal powers (Feijo, 2021;
Grimaldi, 2021; Raunio & Sedelius, 2020). This marginality is coherent
with the difficulty to emerge worldwide experienced by the strand of
literature related to informal institutions, considering that classic insti-
tutional analysis has the tendency to neglect or “push the informal to the
margins since the informal sphere has the aura of the irrational and irreg-
ular rarely able to be grasped in elegant formal models” (Brie & Stoelting,
2012: 19). However, recent researches confirm that informal institutions
arrangements are necessary for the functioning of formal institutions, and
therefore they should be systematically included in any policy research
which aims to achieve realistic results (Azari & Smith, 2012; Brie &
Stoelting, 2012; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).
On the other hand, in another context the importance of the use
of informal powers by presidents has never been questioned. Many
scholars have emphasized US presidents’ “power of persuasion” as a
14 S. GRIMALDI
function of reputation and prestige (Neustadt, 1990) and their ability

to appeal to the public to place pressure on Congress (Canes-Wrone,
2005; Kernell, 1997; Lowi, 1985; Neustadt, 1990; Rudalevige, 2005;
Schlesinger, 1974). Moreover, among studies on presidents who operate
in presidential systems, it has been suggested that when formal powers
are few, reinforced or informal powers prove important (…), while exten-
sive formal powers limit the necessity for and the utility for associated
(informal) powers (Morgenstern et al., 2013: 48). If this idea holds true,
it is likely that, by focusing on formally weak presidents, new forms of
power may be detected and analysed.
In other words, weak presidents are the best candidates if one wants
to investigate informal politics. Exactly because weak presidents have so
many constitutional and formal constrains it is more likely that they will
try to play a role in politics through informal powers. This does not
mean that weak presidents are the only ones to use informal powers. Even
strong presidents do it, on certain occasions. However, coherently with
certain US literature on the theme (Morgenstern et al., 2013), I argue
that informal powers are more likely to be used by more constrained pres-
idents in comparison to strong ones who can choose among a wide range
of formal powers to see satisfied their requests or preferences.
The connection between weak presidents and informal powers is worth
to be investigated and it is precisely addressed in this book. However,
a couple of examples can clarify that this idea seems to capture certain
presidential intervention which cannot be explained by referring to the
formal rules or Constitution only.
Informal powers are often used by presidents to intervene in the
government formation process by proposing specific party coalitions, by
opposing the nominee of a specific minister or by suggesting the appoint-
ment of another one in contexts where the president clearly doesn’t
have formal powers in these matters. Europe presents several examples,
even though not always successful, i.e. in Austria presidents often pushed
for Great coalition formulas; in Germany president Steinmeier has been
considered the architect of the Great Coalition which is in power since
the 2017 elections. In Italy, often presidents had a say on the appoint-
ment of certain ministers (especially for Foreign Affairs and Economics
and Finance).
Informal powers are quite frequently used by presidents to intervene in
the policy-making sphere too. For example, in both Austria and Germany,
presidents don’t have any formal role in the legislative process, namely the
1 INTRODUCTION 15
possibility to send bills back to parliament is not foreseen in both constitu-

tions. Nevertheless, in both countries Constitutional scholars have argued
that presidents may still refuse their signature under certain conditions,
and it can be argued that they possess a form of pocket veto (Köker,
2014). German presidents have used such pocket vetoes on certain occa-
sions, whereas in Austria President Fisher only recently refused to sign
a bill. Moreover, certain presidents have frequently tried to informally
step in the policy-making by giving advice, writing notes, calling private
talks or exchanging phone-calls with PMs and cabinet members or MPs
in different countries, and therefore to issue a sort of informal line-
item vetoes. In Italy, the phenomenon is so well known and basically
accepted that the term “moral suasion” was coined by making refer-
ence to the role of the British monarch described by Bagehot (1867)
(Amoretti & Giannone, 2014; Grimaldi, 2015). Other ways presidents
use to intervene in policy-making are through a lot of “going public”
tactics such as messages, speeches and interviews with policy content
as well as participation in specific events and visits within the country.
In particular, presidents frequently use their inaugural speeches or the
opening of Parliament speeches to underline most important challenges,
problems, and situations that need to be addressed by government and
parliament. In addition, specific tools have been created to foster pres-
idential intervention in policy-making. This is the case of the Berliner
Rede (Berlin Speeches) in Germany which specifically deal with a policy
issue or the presidências abertas (Open presidencies) in Portugal (Amorin
Neto & Costa Lobo, 2009). All these informal powers have not so far
been investigated by political scientists, thus hindering the capacity to
fully understand presidential activism and showing only one side of the
coin in presidents’ hands.
All that being said, weak presidents definitely are worth the effort of
this research as they are relevant political actors who deal with important
issues related to the functioning of contemporary democracies, especially
when party systems are facing a crisis or cannot function as they would
normally do.
16 S. GRIMALDI
1.3 Aim, Research Questions

and Theoretical Framework
The aim of this book is to address the need to understand presidential
activism by widening our knowledge on weak presidents, irrespective of
the regime type they operate and on the basis of a Small-N comparative
design which adopts an interactionist approach where personal, institu-
tional and contextual factors are integrated (Elgie, 2015). As mentioned,
weak presidents have been the most marginalized group in political
science. However, their impact can be more relevant than what it is
usually supposed, especially when traditional and mainstream parties lose
their electoral weight or when party system instability emerges. More-
over, the presidential capacity to intervene by using informal powers has
never been investigated, with the result that it is hard to affirm that they
have no or few political powers in every specific context. This is espe-
cially the case if one considers that formal powers cannot fully explain
presidential activism (Köker, 2017; Morgenstern et al., 2013) and often
informal powers prove important i.e. in setting the legislative agenda or
in government formation.
In particular, the powers of the president identify a relationship that
involves the will of the president and the compliance of other actors
(PM, citizens) or institutions (cabinet, parliament). Generally, presiden-
tial powers are related to the functions presidents perform according
to the constitution (Elgie, 1999; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Basically,
their powers come with the position they hold. However, constitutions
list—but especially constrain—the power of presidents, since they usually
pinpoint a system of check and balances where different actors and institu-
tions need to be activated to accomplish specific goals. So far, presidential
activism has been understood as it perfectly coincides with prerogatives
written in constitutions (namely formal powers). However, as Blondel
(1987) suggested, the position is important but cannot include all the
possibilities at disposal of leaders and office-holders. In fact, in Blondel’s
terms “having power” cannot always be equated to “being in power”.
In other words, not all leaders occupy a constitutionally defined position,
despite position helping to define leadership. In other words, political
leaders can have different resources of power but may not necessarily have
authority, which is a specific kind of power strictly connected with the
establishment of a role (Grimaldi, 2021).
1 INTRODUCTION 17
As a consequence, presidents activism has been so far seen only as a

result of presidential authority. However, presidential activism cannot be
limited or restricted to this, and therefore the acts of the Presidents which
cannot be derived from the Constitution should rely on another source of
power. Following Uphoff (1989), we can say such acts should derive from
legitimacy. In fact, being power a general category, Uphoff (1989) distin-
guished authority and legitimacy as specific resources of powers. This
distinction is useful when dealing with presidential powers since, in the
case of formal powers, compliance remains on the idea that presidents
can do something because, according to the formal role they embody by
law, they have the right to do so. This means that presidential formal
powers are an expression of authority that “derives from the existence,
exercise and maintenance of certain roles whose incumbents claim a right
to have people’s obedience” (Uphoff, 1989: 310). In the case of informal
powers, compliance is based on the president doing something reputed
good, right or moral. This means that informal powers stem from another
resource of power that is legitimacy, which “derives from the beliefs and
judgements of persons who are subjects to those roles, and they accept
such roles, their incumbents, and the resulting decisions or commands as
right and proper” (Uphoff, 1989).
In this book, presidential activism corresponds to all presidents’ acts
and behaviours that can be identified as powers. This means that I refer
to those acts where the emergence of an actual presidential will over other
actors or institutions can be identified. Especially, in semi-presidential
and parliamentary democracies such presidential will is not always easy
to detect. In fact, in a fused power system, different wills are likely to
emerge when major decisions are at stake. In such systems, the choices
of the president are often constrained by other actors, such as the PM or
the parliamentary majority. Conversely, in separation-of-power systems,
certain decisions are exclusive president’s choice—that is, the cabinet
formation. In assessing whether presidential power exists, one can imagine
a power relation as a continuum where, on the one side, the president’s
will clearly predominates and, on the opposite side, the president needs to
be compliant with the will of other actors or institutions. Which will end
up prevailing in such institutional confrontation can be harder, but not
impossible, to detect. In any case, a power exists only when a presidential
will emerged (by partly or fully dominating the power relation). Other-
wise, one should better talk about presidential functions, attributions, and
so on. For example, In most European Constitutions, the president can
18 S. GRIMALDI
appoint the PM. However, this prerogative is usually constrained by the

result of the elections as in order to enter and/or stay in office, the PM
needs the support of the parliamentary majority. Therefore, when elec-
toral results are clear enough, the appointment of the PM is a presidential
attribution rather than a power, since their will has no space to emerge
but, conversely, presidents must conform to the will of the leaders or
of the parties of the parliamentary majority. However, when government
formation becomes less predictable, the presidential will may emerge and
then such prerogatives may become actual presidential powers. This book
looks at these latter cases of presidential activism.
Furthermore, presidential activism is investigated by considering two
specific spheres of actions: government-building and policy-making
among other spheres where the president can have a say.
First, the book focuses on presidential activism that may be related to
formal powers by distinguishing weaknesses and strength of presidents
according to their respective constitutions in government formation and
policy-making spheres. Then, the concrete and discretional use of formal
powers by weak presidents is mapped to understand the consistency of
the phenomenon.
Secondly, this book aims at unveiling presidential informal powers. In
particular, from a theoretical point of view, the most important contri-
bution of the book is providing a definition of informal powers by
relying on international literature on informal politics (Darden, 2008;
Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Lauth, 2012; Tsai, 2006) and on previous
research (Grimaldi, 2021) that identified different crucial elements that
need to be taken into account when pinpointing presidential powers: such
as codification; publicity; enforcement; type of sanctions for abuse and
legitimation. Moreover, it also provided a classification of such informal
powers by investigating their relationship with formal powers and by
looking at what purpose they can be used for. From an empirical point
of view, the most important achievement consists of mapping presiden-
tial informal interventions both in government formation and in the
policy-making spheres in Western Europe. Indeed, through the infor-
mation collected—by exploring multiple sources (biographies, academic
secondary sources, press articles, polls data etc.)—an original dataset
has been drafted consisting of 148 informal interventions, 36 related
to government formation and 112 related to the policy-making and
involving 27 presidents.
1 INTRODUCTION 19
As a consequence the book addresses the following questions: How

can formal and informal powers be distinguished theoretically? How can
informal powers be used in relation to government formation and policy-
making? When and why are informal powers used by presidents? Are
informal powers successful? And what are the conditions that explain the
success of presidential informal activism?
All these core issues will be theoretically and empirically investigated
by trying to combine two different approaches: neo-institutionalism
literature, which encompasses Presidency-Centred explanations and the
“leadership approach”, which favours President-Centred explanations.
The first strand of literature has explained presidents’ activism by relying
on both constitutional factors (i.e. the mode of election; the presidential
formal powers; the electoral cycle) and the political environment (i.e. the
presence or absence of cohabitation, parliament fragmentation, cabinet
fragmentation, the seat share of the government, electoral volatility)
as well as on intra-executive relations (i.e. Elgie, 2018; Köker, 2017;
Sedelius & Raunio, 2020; Tavits, 2009). However, a political leadership
approach (Greenstein, 1969; Hargrove, 1993; Kavanagh, 1990; Lasswell,
1948) also emphasizes the need to focus on presidential political back-
ground, personal skills, vision; communicative performances, personal
approval and reputation as key dimensions to understand when presidents
decide to act or refrain (Bennister et al., 2017; Blondel & Thiebault,
2010; Davis & Gardner, 2012; Greenstein, 2010; Helms, 2012, 2016).
In this book, when informal powers are analysed I rely on both
perspectives. In particular, I tried to disentangle when and how informal
powers are used by different presidents and if their activism led to a posi-
tive or negative outcome. Namely, if presidents’ wishes and preferences
are accepted or not by other actors (mainly the PMs and their cabinets).
Moreover, to asses this aspect, I identify the explicative factors of such
successful or unsuccessful use of presidential informal powers by relying
on the so-called—“opportunity structure” theory (Tavits, 2009) and on
certain personal and reputational factors (Bennister et al., 2017; Grimaldi,
2017). As far as the former is concerned, I consider the following contex-
tual factors: parliamentary fragmentation (ENEPs); cabinet fragmentation
(N of parties in cabinet); cohabitation, the PM’s control of his own party
and coalition. To recall, the most important assumptions related to such
aspects are that the opportunity structure is open and therefore pres-
idents have wider room of manouvre when parliamentary and cabinet
fragmentation are high, thus when governments are heterogeneous and
20 S. GRIMALDI
unsteady often as a result of highly volatile and polarized elections; when

there is a cohabitation in place, namely the PM and the president belong
to opposing parties and the party of the president is not in the ruling
coalition; when the PM does not control his or her party and or the
coalition. Alternatively, the opportunity structure is closed and presidents
are severely constrained and limited.
In line with President-Centred explanations, I focused on the following
personal and reputational factors that can be relevant in explaining the
positive or negative outcome of presidential informal activism: (1) popular
approval of presidents as huge popular approval can be used as a source
of power vis-a-vis PMs and their cabinets. As certain case studies show
(Grimaldi, 2017), even though presidential preferences diverge from
those of the executive or the parliamentary majority, it is very difficult
for these latter not to consider the warnings of such popular and beloved
presidents. This is especially true in the context of personalization of poli-
tics (Karvonen, 2010) and in the new media age (Brody, 1991; Helms,
2012); (2) political professionalism which can be measured both by the
duration of presidents’ political career and by the type of offices they
covered before being elected. Here, the idea is that political professionals
have a better vision and understanding of party politics and logic that
often go beyond the application of constitutional and formal provisions;
(3) reputation which is related to president’s adherence and defence of
core democratic values and on their perceived neutrality as well as to
their international credential and contacts. The former aspect is often
related to presidents’ opposition to past experiences of dictatorship, i.e.
in countries that gained freedom after 2WW (such as Austria, Germany
and Italy) or with the so-called third democratization wave (such as in
the case of Portugal). On the other hand, presidents’ perceived neutrality
(Grimaldi, 2017) seems to be important especially in parliamentary and
semi-presidential systems where the president as Head of State is called
to represent the whole nation and therefore all people disregarding their
party preferences. More recently, also the international credential or pres-
idents seem to have a weight in structuring their reputation, especially in
Europe where the majority of countries are members of the EU. Here,
the idea is that, if a president’s reputation is strong, he or she are more
likely to obtain what they want and PMs are less likely to oppose such
presidents. (4) Personal relations with PM can be positive or negative
despite belonging to the same or different party. Generally, when they are
positive, presidents are more likely to achieve what they want.
1 INTRODUCTION 21
The main line of reasoning is that president’s use of informal powers is

more likely to lead to a positive outcome when the opportunity structure
is open and when presidents enjoy high public support, they are political
professionals, with a strong reputation and positive personal relations with
the PM. However, at times presidents’ informal activism led to a positive
outcome despite the opportunity structure being quite closed, meaning
that personal and reputational factors are key to explaining the success of
informal activism.
Coherently with the strands of literature discussed above, I expect that
(a) When presidents’ use of informal powers increases, the use of

formal powers decreases.
(b) The positive outcome of presidential informal activism is especially
triggered by certain personal favourable conditions of presidents
such as their high public approval and their political profession-
alism.
(c) The positive outcome of presidential informal activism is often due
to a combination of favourable personal and contextual factors.
Notwithstanding the book focuses on informal powers in government

formation and the policy-making, going public strategies and in partic-
ular presidential speeches, have been ousted from the explicative analysis
of presidential informal powers, despite being definitely informal acts at
disposal of the president. Indeed, presidential speeches can be impor-
tant informal means to influence the policy-making and the government’s
agenda. However, there are two problems related to presidential speeches:
the first is that through public speeches presidents often act in two
different spheres: the policy-making and the polity-definition spheres and
therefore there would be the need to expand the research to another
sphere of presidential action. The second problem is that in the cases
of presidents’ public speeches, it is often hard to evaluate their impact
in terms of positive or negative outcomes. However, a first exploratory
analysis to understand if weak presidents actually use public speeches to
step in the policy-making or not is developed in this book. In other
words, when it comes to presidential public speeches the focus of the
investigation is not related to their impact but to their content only. The
idea here is to understand if and to what extent policy issues prevail on
values and polity issues in presidential public interventions. In fact, as
22 S. GRIMALDI
weak presidents are considered a sort of figureheads not involved in day-

to-day politics their public speeches should be predominantly related to
aspects affecting their responsibility to promote national integration, the
core values of the political community and the redefinition and strength-
ening of the myths of a national foundation. Conversely, if the content
of their speeches is highly devoted to policy issues and day-to-day poli-
tics, it means that they definitely use such informal tools to step in the
policy-making.
Finally, the aim of this book is to present a complete overview of
formally constrained presidents; therefore it also addresses other aspects
such as the personal characteristics and the political careers of Presidents
as well as their mode of election. On the one hand, presidents’ socio-
economic background and political careers and expertise may have an
impact on the assessment of their behaviour and are worth to be better
investigated. On the other hand, the mode of the election has often
been correlated with presidential activism or inactivity, and looking at
presidential elections can be useful to address other interesting points.
For instance, is cross-party support easy to reach for indirectly elected
presidents? Or, in the case of directly elected presidents, do presidential
elections present first or second-order traits? Finally, when and under what
circumstances is re-election more likely to happen?
1.4 Research Design, Methods and Data

Before dealing with the major aspects of the research design, a clarifi-
cation is in order. This work is a medium range comparative analysis,
namely bounded in time and space (Morlino et al., 2017). In fact,
the macro context is that of Western Europe—a choice that addresses
a problem emphasized by scholars dealing with informal institutions,
namely that most of the studies have so far investigated the patholog-
ical outcomes of informality, whereas works that focus on how informal
institutions and powers can positively substitute or integrate formal ones
are still very limited. As a consequence, when it comes to informality,
a growing body of research is related to developing countries such as
Latin America, post-communist Eurasia, Africa, and Asia, whereas North
America and Western Europe are notably absent. Even considering presi-
dential studies, Western European presidents are considerably less-studied
than Central-Eastern presidents (i.e. Elgie & Moestrup, 2008 and 2016;
Köker, 2017; Sedelius & Mashtaler, 2013; Sedelius & Linde, 2016)
1 INTRODUCTION 23
with the only exception of French presidents (i.e. Bucur & Elgie, 2012;
Gaffney, 2012; Grossman & Sauger, 2014; Kuhn, 2010; Passarelli, 2010;
Stacey, 2013; Thiébault, 2016) who are consequently excluded in this
work. Moreover, by focusing on Western European cases where demo-
cratic institutions are consolidated, one should be able to avoid the risk of
shifting the analysis only to informal powers which produce pathological
outcomes.
This is a Small-N comparative research of most-similar cases built
according to a double-level selection. On the one hand, six country-
cases with formally weak presidencies have been selected in Western
Europe, namely with a prespow1 score below the mean value of 0.214.
More precisely, two cases (Germany and Italy) are parliamentary systems
with a consistent constitutional design; four are semi-presidential systems
with inconsistent constitutional design, and among these latter three are
premier-presidentialisms, namely Finland, Ireland and Portugal, and one
is a president-parliamentarism, namely Austria.
Further consideration should be expressed for Finland and Portugal. In
fact, according to Doyle and Elgie’s evaluation (2016) both the Finnish
and Portuguese presidencies have witnessed certain important changes
over time. In particular, the score of presidential power in Finland was
higher than the current one (0.05) in both the period 1957–1994 (0.157)
and in the period 1995–1999 (0.162). However, in both cases, these
scores are under the mean value, and therefore the president is evaluated
as formally weak for the whole time period. In Portugal, the first phase
of semi-presidentialism foresaw a relatively strong president, and from
1976–1982 the prespower1 score was above the mean value (0.264).
Therefore, President Eanes’ first term is generally not considered, with
the exception of Chapter 2, which deals with the socio-economic charac-
teristics and political career of presidents. Table 1.2 summarizes the main
characteristics for the selection of the country cases.
The country cases selected comprise a number of similarities: they
all belong to the EU, even though Germany and Italy are founding
members, whereas Ireland and Portugal have accessed later (in the mid-
70s and mid-80s, respectively) and Finland and Austria in 1995; they
are all democracies since the Second World War, with the only exception
of Portugal which has become a democracy in 1974; as far as foreign
policy is concerned, half of them have a pro-atlanticism position and are
consequently members of NATO (Germany, Italy and Portugal), whereas
the other half shares a neutral position given the peculiar history or the
24 S. GRIMALDI
Table 1.2 The main characteristics for the selection of the country cases
Country Prespow1 score Election Constitutional Regime type

design
Austria 0.092 Direct Inconsistent President-parliamentarism

Finland 0.157/0.162/ Direct Inconsistent Premier-presidential
0.05
Germany 0.029 Indirect Consistent Parliamentarism
Ireland 0.062 Direct Inconsistent Premier-presidentialism
Italy 0.1 Indirect Consistent Parliamentarism
Portugal 0.197 Direct Inconsistent Premier-presidentialism
Source Adaptation from Doyle and Elgie (2016) and from Fruhstorfer (2019)
geopolitical position during the Cold War (Austria, Ireland and Finland).
Further, from a historical point of view, before reaching their demo-
cratic age, four countries experienced an authoritarian phase. This is the
case of Austria, Germany, Italy and Portugal, whereas two, Ireland and
Finland, were democracies well before the Second World War. In addi-
tion, four countries took part in the Second World War with a clear impact
on their polities such as Austria, Germany Italy and Finland, whereas
two remain neutral—Portugal and Ireland. Finally, two countries experi-
enced a change in their polity definition after international reconfiguration
processes: Germany, with the reunification, and Ireland with the Good
Friday Agreement. However, in most of these countries conflicts on how
to define political community and its values have often raised in connec-
tion with the bitter legacies of the past (i.e. in Austria, Germany and Italy
in relation to their Nazi or fascist past, in Ireland and Finland after the
Civil War).
When looking at their political systems, some indicators reveal certain
differences especially if adopting a longitudinal perspective. In fact, in
the post-war period and until the 1990s, Austria, Germany and Ireland
showed a low level of polarization and party fragmentation, whereas
Finland and Italy presented a higher level of polarization and party
fragmentation. From the 1990s onwards, the political environment has
changed in most countries. Electoral volatility has increased everywhere
(especially in Italy), and so has party fragmentation (especially in Finland
and Italy); polarization has increased in half of the cases, and especially in
Austria (in Italy it decreases but it is still the highest). Portugal is the only
country in countertrend, since all these indicators have decreased from
1 INTRODUCTION 25
the 90s onwards, even though this is probably due to the consolidation
of democracy and of the Portuguese party system.
The second-level selection comprises 53 presidents, namely all those
in power after the Second World War, with the exception of Irish and
Portuguese presidents which were considered from 1938 and 1975,
respectively. However, on certain occasions, this universe has been
restricted to a lower number of presidents per country, depending on data
availability. This problem has arisen specifically when studying presiden-
tial informal powers such as secondary sources or press releases as well as
presidential speeches delivered during the time frame under consideration
aren’t always available. Therefore, justifications for the selection of the
cases are provided in Chapters 4, 5 and 7 in detail. Table 1.3 shows the
share of presidents per country as well as of those related to presidential
terms.
Finally, when focusing on informal presidential interventions, the
explicative analyses is conducted by relying on 148 observations affecting
the government building and policy-making. Such informal interventions
involved 27 presidents in Western Europe.
The timeframe of this work is basically related to the establishment of
democratic regimes from the Second World War to 2021. However, there
are certain exceptions. In the case of Ireland, the whole democratic repub-
lican period which started in 1937 has been taken into account, since the
country did not take part in World War II and the time frame 1937–
1945 corresponds to the term of the first President (Douglas Hyde).
At the same time, in the case of Finnish presidents, the time frame
considered is 1944–2020, even though the democratic regime started
Table 1.3 Presidents and presidential terms per country. (Absolute and
percentage values)
Presidents N % Terms N %
Italy 11 20.8 Italy 12 15.0

Germany 12 22.6 Germany 16 20.0
Austria 9 17.0 Austria 14 17.5
Ireland 9 17.0 Ireland 14 17.5
Finland 7 13.2 Finland 15 18.8
Portugal 5 9.4 Portugal 9 11.3
Total 53 100.0 Total 80 100.0
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Well—Leda was still Rayth's hostage. He shook himself,
straightened his back, and walked boldly up to the gate.
Two pikes slanted across his path. "Hold! What do you wish?"
"I have to see the Chief Engineer."
"This is not the time for audiences. Come back after the sunrise
ceremonies."
"It won't keep. I bear special news from the Lands-that-see-not-
Earth."
The guards captain's face lit with a flicker of interest. "What is it?"
"It's for the ears of his Wisdom alone."
"Then wait your turn."
"Look here," said Rikard, "you can send him a message that it
concerns certain newly found ores of power. If his Wisdom isn't
interested, I'll go my way. But if you don't do this much, I'd hate to be
in your skin when he learns what you've kept from him."
"Hmmm—well—" The captain rubbed his chin. There was a
superstitious awe deep within his eyes, and the other sentries
gaped. "Well, all right." He peered narrowly at the barbarian, "You're
not of the city. Where are you from?"
"Moonburg, if you must know. But my message!"
The captain blew a whistle, and an acolyte came forth from within to
receive the word and run back with it. Rikard stood waiting, trying not
to shiver with the gathering tautness of the moment. Rayth had told
him to give this message, and it seemed to work. The prince had
added that the Temple was seeking to recover the lost secret of the
legendary Tommic's Power, so immensely more potent than the
sunlight batteries, but had not gone far for lack of the necessary
metals. To Rikard, Tommic had merely been a local god worshipped
by some towns, though in other stories he was the devil responsible
for the Fall.
"Your sword," said the captain.
Rikard shrugged. It was understandable that no visitor should bear
weapons within the Temple, especially after Rayth's last few
attempts. He unslung his glaive and handed it over, and permitted
them to search him for concealed knives. It did not seem to occur to
them, in spite of his hard-thewed size, that hands and shod feet have
killed men.
The acolyte returned, a full Engineer with him. The latter spoke
hurriedly. "Who are you, stranger, and what is this word you bear?"
"I am Atli Athur's son of Moonburg, your Knowledge," said Rikard,
bowing as low as his stiff-necked soul permitted him. "If it please
you, this word I have should not be discussed out in public."
"No—no—certainly not. I'll take you to his Wisdom. Follow me."
Rikard went after the swirling red robe, his narrowed eyes taking
careful note of everything they passed. Down a long muraled
corridor, opening into rooms which seemed oddly little like religious
centers—they glittered with metal and glass and plastic, and
Engineers in drab, stained smocks labored with a bewildering variety
of instruments, past a couple of guardsmen—
The thing to do, he thought grimly, was to break the old fellow's neck,
grab a sword from the nearest armed man, and try to cut his way
out. None of Rayth's men were allowed inside the Temple, but if they
were waiting just beyond the gates he might have some chance.
The corridor ended in a tall doorway where four sentries in gold and
scarlet stood by rigidly held pikes. Beyond was the great audience
chamber.
It was lavishly furnished, gold and jewels and velvet and the lovely
ancient works. The far side was a great sheet of plastic opening on
the raw splendor of landscape and an Earth at the full, its eerie blue
radiance streaming in to blend with the soft glow of fluorotubes.
Rikard had little time for esthetics; his gaze roved in search of
enemies.
No soldiers in this room, and the Engineer who guided him was
closing the massive door on the sentries—praise the gods, it gave
him a chance to kill the Chief and burst out and surprise those men!
About a dozen Engineers stood around the Throne of Wisdom—
high-ranking to judge from their robes, most of them young and
burly, not a one of them bearing sword or dagger.
Rikard knelt before the Throne until a voice that was almost a
whisper said: "Rise, my son, and say your message."
"Thank you, your Wisdom." The rebel got up and moved closer to
the old man who sat before him. A very old man, he saw, thin and
stooped and frail, with a halo of white hair about the gaunt face and
the luminous eyes and the wonderful dome of a forehead. For an
instant, Rikard despised himself.
But Leda, Leda of the fair tresses and the low sweet laughter and the
undaunted gallantry, Leda was hostage to Rayth.
"You brought word of ores of power found on the far side of Luna,"
said the Chief Engineer. He pursed his lips and tapped his knee with
the jeweled slide rule of his office. "But how would the heathen there
know what to look for?"
"They weren't looking for anything, your Wisdom," replied Rikard. He
stood some five feet away—one easy jump. "It was a certain
Engineer-educated trader from this city, Borsu by name, who several
years ago was captured by Moonburg men attacking a caravan of
his. I had him for slave, but he was so bold and wise a man that
soon we were more friends than master and servant, and it was he
who organized an expedition to the heathen lands. He thought their
ores, which we on Earthside have little exploited, could be obtained
for our manufactured goods at a fine profit and sold here in Coper
City. It was he who saw those deposits and had them mined. On our
return, we found that Moonburg had been brought under your city's
rule, but nevertheless—"
They were relaxing their wariness, intent on his account.
"—we thought that we could still do business, especially with the
Temple. As Borsu was ill, I left him in Moonburg and came myself to
—"
He hit the Chief Engineer with a smack of bodies and his hands
closed around the thin neck.
Thunder and stars exploded in his skull. He reeled aside, falling to
the ground, and the Engineer rushed on him with the club he had
pulled from his long sleeve.
Rikard kicked out, and the Coper flew backward, grunting. The
barbarian snarled and lurched to his feet. Swords and daggers
gleamed as the others yanked them from concealment.
Trapped. They weren't stupid, these Engineers, and now he was
trapped!
Rikard hurled himself forward in a flying tackle, hit the nearest man
and rolled over on the floor with him. Wrenching the fellow's dagger
loose, he bounded back to his feet and rushed another Engineer.
"Alive!" screamed the old man. "Take him alive!"
For the torture cells—no! Rikard closed with the Engineer, stabbing
him in the shoulder before he could slash with his sword. He pulled
the glaive loose and backed toward the wall, growling, sword in one
hand and dagger in the other. The men formed a defensive line
around their Chief and brandished their blades.
The wounded Engineer rose suddenly and sprinted for the door.
Rikard threw the knife after him, missed, and groaned as the door
was swung wide and the four guardsmen entered.
"Ha, Nyrac!" he yelled and threw himself upon them. His sword
whistled, clanged off the metal shaft of the nearest pike, and raked
the cuirass beyond. Another guard hit him with the butt of his pike
and he staggered. Now the blows rained on him, smashing thunder
of violence and lightning-shot darkness. The sword fell from his hand
and he toppled, still cursing. Someone kicked him as he fell.
He lay there, half conscious, mumbling through a mask of blood
while they bound him. When the reeling and the blurring ended, and
only the thumping pain and the slow drip of red were left, he sat up
and glared at them where they stood around him.
"I thought Rayth was wiser than that," muttered an Engineer.
"It wasn't a bad trick." The old man fingered his throat with a wry
smile. "He almost made it. But who are you, so bold as to go alone
and unarmed in war against the Temple?"
Rikard shook his ringing head. The sickness in him was as much
from stupefied dismay as from his hurts. That he should have failed
—that he should have been captured and bound like a pig for
slaughter the second time!
"Hm—now let me think." The Chief Engineer stroked his chin.
"Obviously Rayth would only have tried this with an assassin so bold
and strong that there would be some chance of success, and at the
same time one over whom he had enough of a hold to drive him to
this desperate mission. Now it is only ten or fifteen hours since we
heard that the mighty Rikard of Nyrac had been captured by this
same Rayth."
"Rikard of Nyrac—aye, your Wisdom, they said he was big and dark,
it must be he. Right?" A foot kicked the prisoner.
"Gently, Wanno, gently. There is no cause to maltreat him when he is
helpless. Nobody was killed in this little affair." The Chief Engineer
stooped over Rikard and smiled. "See here, my friend, I have no ill
will for you. I've chuckled for a long time over your impudent
bearding of the Coper lords, and I wouldn't mind doing you a good
turn if you'd let me."
"But first I have to do something for you, eh?" Rikard grinned without
humor. "It seems to be a city custom."
"Be reasonable, man. You've failed your mission; Rayth will have no
further use for you, and only here is there protection. I daresay
you've no love for Rayth, and he is our greatest enemy as well."
Rikard was silent.
"Now what reason did you have to do his foul work for him? I cannot
quite imagine Rikard of Nyrac turning assassin for hire."
"They say a woman was captured with him, your Wisdom," said one
of the Engineers thoughtfully.
"Ah, so. And Rayth holds her. Hm." The Chief Engineer paced back
and forth, the robes swirling around his thin stooped form. Suddenly
he said: "Bring this man a bowl of wine."
It was a fire coursing in his veins, the leaden haze lifted from his
mind and he looked at his captors with cleared eyes. The Chief
Engineer said to him:
"Rikard, this is the situation in Coper City. The old bold dynasty of
the Mayors has faded till the last of them sits bibbing in his
apartments with little interest in anything save a new wench.
Meanwhile the struggle for the real power over this growing empire
lies between the great nobles, of whom Rayth is chief, and the
Temple, which recruits from all ranks and is thus closer to the people
and more alive to their wants. The world has come down far since
the Fall. What was a wise and glorious and adventurous civilization
has been destroyed, and this, its successor, is stagnant and cruel
and ignorant; it has done little which was new or decent in a
thousand years. I do not say that the Temple is blameless; the early
Chief Engineers found it convenient to monopolize what true
knowledge was left and to ally themselves with the nobles in
crushing the commons. But in the past generation we have tried to
make some amends, we have spoken against human slavery and
unjust laws, and we would like to teach all men enough to make
them more than walking bellies. Temple and nobles agree that man
must be united—"
Rikard snarled at him.
"—but it is rather for us to learn freedom from the barbarians, in
exchange for our order and culture, than for them to be enslaved by
us; and there is a sharp split between the parties. Furthermore, we
have tried to regain the ancient knowledge by the methods with
which it was won in the first place—that is, by trying our ideas to see
if they work, rather than by blind acceptance of ancient authority. You
must have noticed our laboratories as you entered. But this leads to
heretical questioning of everything, and the nobles do not like it.
"Thus Rayth has several times sought to have me assassinated.
There is little I can do save guard against it—I would get no
satisfaction in the courts. If he should succeed, he could use his
influence and very likely get one of his own hand-picked Engineers
named to my office. For we—scientists—are a small party in the
Temple, and only the more or less accidental fact that I was
converted to such views shortly after assuming the slide rule has
given us our success. If we could somehow overcome him, there
would be a chance to make some improvement in human life,
perhaps even to reach Earth eventually. If we fail, as seems all too
probable, the long night will descend completely."
He stopped, and there was a moment's silence in the great chamber.
Then Rikard said: "I suppose you're telling me more or less the truth.
I don't really care, one way or the other. But why? What do you want
of me?"
"I don't know," said the Chief Engineer frankly. "I really don't know
whether it wouldn't be safer all around just to return your head to
Rayth. But—Rikard, the Temple has been at one grave
disadvantage. Its younger men are often doughty fighters, as you
have seen, but they are still mostly technicians, intellectuals, people
without practical experience in warfare. You, on the other hand, have
fought all your life. If you have any suggestions, they will be carefully
considered."
"And what do I get from this?"
"Your life, of course, and your freedom. Likewise your woman's, if we
can save her. We can talk later of other rewards. You may find it
worthwhile to work with us."
Rikard leaned back against the wall, letting his mind slide over the
facts and the chances. Presently he nodded his blood-matted head
and began to talk.
The Temple gate burst open and the big man shot out in a flying leap
that carried him over the heads of the sentries to land on the plaza
grass. A spear flew after him. He grabbed it and whirled about and
threw it back.
"Stop him!" roared an Engineer. "Kill him! He killed the Chief!"
The guards sprang at Rikard, yelling, and others boiled out of the
Temple in their wake. He was already fleeing toward the corridor
beyond. A shrieking laborer sought to bring him down—he kicked the
man in the teeth, beat another aside with the flat of his sword, and
pushed a way into the suddenly milling throng.
Half a dozen armed men were around him, blades flashing out. One
grinned savagely in his beard. "We thought you were dead," he
gasped. "You were in there so long—"
"We'll all be dead if we don't get out of here," snapped Rikard.
The raging Temple warriors were crowding through the press of
humanity toward them. And from the swirling mob there seemed to
rise one great groan.
"The Chief is dead.... The Chief is dead.... They killed him, the dirty
murdering nobles—"
The old fellow's claim to be beloved of the people was not a lie,
thought Rikard tautly, and crammed a fist into the mouth of the
nearest man who rushed, weeping and cursing at him.
Swords and pikes clattered together as the guards hit the tight circle
of Rayth's warriors. Rikard led the retreat, his sword whistling and
thumping—he did not cut, but he hammered a way through the mob,
and it fell back before his great bloody shape.
"The ramp—over there—"
They braced themselves and leaped, ten feet straight up, arcing
forward to land on the upward-curving surface. Then they ran!
A hurled spear flashed, and one of Rayth's men toppled. Two more
had been pulled down by the bare hands of the commons, and
another had fallen in the retreat. The crowd, half angry, half
frightened, moved slowly after them.
They dashed into a corridor on the noble level, and the two city
guardsmen posted there clanged the gate shut in the face of pursuit.
Panting, they stopped and looked at each other.
"There'll be Mars to pay down there," said the leader hoarsely. "Riots
—"
"Take me to his Excellency," said Rikard.
"Aye—at once—and good work, barbarian! You did a job that we've
tried to do for the past five years."
They went swiftly down the long passageways, up ramps and stairs,
past the sumptuous apartments of the rich where men and women,
children and servants and slaves cowered at sight of drawn weapons
and at the faint, rising noise of the lower levels. When they came to
Rayth's door, they entered without ceremony.
The prince leaped to his feet, spilling his wine-glass, and the lean
bearded face blazed at Rikard. "Is it done?" he yelled. "Did you really
do it?"
"Aye—aye—" The rebel leaned wearily on his sword and let his eyes
rove the chamber. There were seven or eight other men seated
around the table, mostly older and fatter than Rayth but all with the
rich dress and the inbred hauteur of the rulers. There was also a
high-ranking Engineer, a sly-faced elderly man whose heavy-lidded
eyes barely flicked over the newcomers before retreating back to
their own dreams. But it was to Leda that Rikard's gaze went first,
Leda who had been sprawling sullen and splendid on a couch and
who now started up and ran to him and clung wordlessly to his
bleeding form.
"Aye, he's dead," nodded the barbarian.
"It took you several hours," said Rayth. "I was sure you had failed."
"They made me wait a long time while the Chief finished an—an
experiment, they called it. But I got at him, broke his neck, and
grabbed a sword and chopped my way out." Rikard strode boldly
over to the table and grabbed up a glass and drained it.
"Do you hear that?" Rayth turned on the others and his voice rose to
a shout. "Do you hear that?" His laughter was loud and wild. "He's
dead! His Wisdom Laon XIII, Chief Engineer of Coper City, is dead!
Are you ready to assume the post, Jastur?" he cried to the Engineer,
"Would you like to take the name of Laon XIV?"
"It might be a good idea to wait for some confirmation," said the
other imperturbably.
Rayth paced the chamber, restlessly, eyes smoldering, and the
guests muttered to each other. Rikard and Leda paid no attention;
they were holding close, and his hands and lips caressed her with a
new and desperate tenderness.
Someone else entered, a strong young acolyte who saluted and said
between gasps for air: "He's dead, sirs, he's been killed, and it's
Mars down there! The commons are running wild!" There was a
knife-slash across his face; blood dripped slowly to the red of his
gown.
"What did you see?" snapped Rayth. He sprang over and grabbed
the acolyte by the shoulders and shook him, "What did you see?"
"I—I heard a great uproar in the audience chamber, through the
closed doors. That must have been something else, though, for his
Wis—old Laon came out and went into a laboratory. Then some
hours later he returned to the chamber, and—and presently there
was another noise, louder and lasting longer—then I saw this man
here burst out, knock down a guard in his way, and go down the hall,
I looked in—they were lying heaped in blood, and an Engineer came
in and lifted the old man and shrieked that he was dead. Then there
was panic, everyone running, guards fighting to get out after the
killer—I slipped away and came here as you told me, sir—"
"Dead!" Rayth's shout echoed between the walls. "Dead, d'you hear?
After five years I've killed the old swine, and Temple and commons
alike are rioting—What more excuse do we need?"
"Excuse?" whispered a noble.
"Certainly!" Rayth grinned. "As a public-spirited gesture, we
assemble our personal guards and march them down there to
restore order. With the Temple occupied by us, your election to the
slide rule becomes a certainty, Jastur."
"There'll be fighting," said the Engineer nervously. "The young
Engineers are—were—almost all on his side, you know; they won't
receive you kindly—and then there are the commons—"
"Bah! Engineers and mobs against trained blades? Certainly there'll
be bloodletting, but it won't be our blood—at least, if we can get
down there before they have time to organize."
Rayth lifted his voice to a shout, and a guards officer stepped in and
saluted. There was something like terror under his hard-held mask.
Rayth snapped swift orders and he ran off.
"We'll unite all our personal forces," said the prince, biting the words
out as he paced from wall to wall. "The Mayor's men and the regular
city guards aren't to be relied on; I wouldn't be surprised if half of
them swung to the Temple's side if they get a chance. Most of the
regular army is out of the city, on garrison or combat duty, and it
wouldn't be too safe either. But between us we've got three hundred
trained bold men ready to follow us down there."
"Us?" squeaked a noble.
"Oh, stay if you want. I'm going down!" Rayth turned to clap Rikard's
shoulder, "You too, my friend. You've done well, oh, excellently well,
and you'll have a rich reward!"
The Nyracan shrugged. Inwardly, he was filled with a sudden wonder
as to whether he had done the right thing or not. He didn't much
care, really, who won; they were all Copers to him—but the prince's
payment was more certain and tangible than the Temple's, and—
Too late now.
He went into the bathroom, where Leda washed and bandaged his
hurts and whispered to him: "There is more behind this than you say,
my dearest, I know you too well."
"Aye, there is, but I can't tell you now. Stay close by me and don't be
too surprised at anything I may do."
Leda went back to Rayth and said: "Give me a blade too."
"You—a woman?" he asked.
"I've sent more men to Earth than you ever did," she snapped. "From
here on, Rikard and I fight together."
"Well—I hate to risk such beauty being hacked up—but far be it from
me to oppose that beauty's lightest wish," laughed the Coper.
"Remember, though—you'll be among my own troops, and they don't
take kindly to traitors."
She smiled at him. "How could anyone betray you?" she whispered.
"The oldest trick in the world," sighed Rayth, "and it still works. Very
well, take what you wish from the armor chest over there."
She and Rikard equipped themselves with weapons—a sword for
her, an ax for him—cuirasses, and helmets. By that time they could
hear the sound of marching feet. Rayth buckled on his own armor,
lifted his sword in a mocking salute to his timorous comrades, and
walked out into the hall.
It was a strong and well-trained force, filling the corridor with hard
bodies and edged steel, pikes and axes aloft, raising a shout that
roared and boomed down the hall as Rayth appeared. He put
himself in the van, with the barbarians in the second rank behind his,
and the troop started off to battle.
Clang of booted feet slammed echoing on the metal floor, rattle and
clash of armor, grim jests tossed from lip to bearded lip. These were
the killers, the professionals without fear of man or Earth, the trained
elite which formed an army within an army and the fulcrum of the
noble power. Watching them, marching with them, Rikard felt a
sudden sick doubt within him. Untrained barbarians had toppled
before this iron weapon—
They came to the closed gate, and Rayth unlocked it and led the
way down the ramp beyond. Level after level dropped past them,
deserted now, silent and empty, but the broken roaring from below
had grown, screaming its outrage, screaming for blood.
When they emerged on a landing at the ceiling of the Temple level
and looked down twenty feet, it was to a boiling pool of humankind,
gray workers, naked slaves, velvet merchants, leather artisans,
women and children, howling and trampling until the din shook the
walls and rattled the teeth in a man's skull. The surge of white,
hating faces reached beyond vision, mouths agape, eyes red and
running, animal voices barking and clamoring. Rikard had never
seen a true mob before, and the elemental violence of it shook even
his calloused soul. It did not occur to him to regret the fact that many
of these people must die.
Rayth stood for an instant stroking his beard, thinking, and then he
lifted his sword and sprang over the rail. The lines followed him,
jumping one by one, a dozen men simultaneously floating down with
pikes reaching beneath them.
They landed among the mob, hewing a clear way even as they fell,
and struck out. The crowd surged back, leaving red remnants
underfoot, and the troopers continued to leap—forward ranks
pressing toward the Temple, while the rearward lines were still
jumping. Rayth's blade whistled and butchered; his face was alight
with a dark glee. Rikard and Leda, sandwiched between others,
could do nothing but add the weight of their bodies to the mass of
the troop. The pack howled and bayed and cursed around them.
Missiles began to fly, hammers, ore-lumps, crowbars, wrenches,
anvils hurled by brawny arms. A guardsman staggered and fell, his
face cracked open. Another was seized by the cloak, dragged into a
group of women, and carved with butcher knives. A third had his pike
snatched from him, and a big smith jabbed it into the throat of a
fourth before he was killed. The crowd gave way before the
ruthlessly advancing soldiers, but it closed behind them and filled the
air with noise and flying death.
"They killed the Chief!"
Leda's eyes were wide and her breast rose and fell behind the
binding corselet. Her voice came dimly to Rikard under the boom
and howl of raw voices. "They hate us!"
"So they do." He smiled bleakly.
Now the Temple was before them, its high wall looming over the
trample and clamor, a thin line of its own guards holding back the
rioters. Rayth's red blade lifted anew, and his bugler wound a single
harsh note. The troop moved forward on the double.
Vaguely, Rikard heard the prince calling to the guards, "Let us
through—Mayor's order—protect you—"
"No one goes in—you bloody swine!"
The bugle screamed again and the soldiers locked ranks and
charged.
Swords and pikes clanged at the gate; the sudden recoil hurled the
rear lines backward. Rikard grabbed Leda's flowing hair and pulled
her ear close to his lips and muttered swiftly, "Listen, we're with the
Temple. First chance you get, break free and go over to them—once
we're inside!"
She clasped his hand, briefly, and then the sentries were down and
the troop rushed inside.
Beyond was a long narrow darkness of corridor. Nothing stirred,
nothing spoke; they hastened through a fumbling gloom with only
their footfalls and hoarse breathing and clash of metal for company.
Rikard heard Rayth's voice, puzzled. "Where are the others? The
Temple has plenty of its own guardsmen, where are they? Has
everyone fled?" Then, he laughed. "If so, why, it makes our task all
the easier. Forward!"
They burst into the great audience chamber, and it was lighted and
the Temple was waiting for them.
The young Engineers were reinforced by commoners, weapons in
hand and armored in spacesuits.
The invaders let out one roar and the forward ranks hurled spears
that bounced off metal and plastic and tough cord. From the
Engineers, arrows suddenly darkened the air, the whistling death
flamed among the soldiers and the lines sagged amidst their toppling
members.
There was a press from the rear, men driven forward, and in the
instant's bawling panic only Rikard knew what it was—the Temple
guardsmen, aided perhaps by armed commoners themselves,
throwing their power out of the rooms and side passages where it
had lurked, blocking the troop's retreat and falling on it from the rear!
The line eddied and swirled about him, spears flying, arrows and
hurled throwing-axes, the ranks of Rayth buckling under pressure
from both ends. Time to get out of here, before anyone suspected
that he, Rikard of Nyrac, had led them into the trap.
He turned on the man beside him and his ax hewed low, shearing
through flesh and bone of a leg. As the screaming warrior fell, he
brought his weapon up, a backhanded blow crashing into the face
beyond. The man behind him thrust from the side; he took the spear
on his cuirass and kneed viciously. Stooping over, he undercut
another of his late companions, and Leda reached over his back to
slash down the soldier beyond.
Rikard bent his knees and leaped, soaring over the fallen, a dozen
pikes stabbing up after him. He hardly noticed the sharp bright pain
where one raked his thigh; he was through their line and Leda was
with him. They drifted down among the Engineers.
A big red-faced young man snarled behind his space helmet and
lifted an ax as Rikard descended. Someone else grabbed his arm.
The helmets were left propped open, and his voice could reach. "No,
Shan, those are friends!"
"Oh, sorry—I forgot." Shan swung about and spattered the brains of
the nearest trooper.
The fight was now pressed into the audience chamber; men jammed
together, slashing and hacking at arm's range—there'd soon be
more room, thought Rikard grimly, and took his place in the Engineer
line. The Temple, though, had order and plans of a sort, however
relatively untrained its fighters were, while the invaders were broken
up into knots and fragments where their discipline could not exist.
The important thing was to hit them, and keep hitting them, so they
didn't get a chance to reform.
His ax smote, clanging off metal, raking the face and the arm behind.
A blade hacked at him; he caught it on his helve and turned the blow
and hewed back. Leda was beside him, her clear war-cry raising as
she stabbed and struck; Shan the Engineer was chopping and
roaring pious mottoes on his other flank: the Temple men pushed
against the roiling soldiers, took their blows on their heavier armor,
and gave them back with murder behind. The clamor of men and
metal was a roar as of sundering worlds.
Rayth was fighting like a demon, his blade whirling and shrieking, his
voice lifted in a rallying-cry that drew his scattered followers together.
He had courage, thought Rikard above the snarl of combat—
perhaps he was a fitter chief after all. But too late now!
Ha, there went another, tumbling with his head half off his shoulders
—so, a helmet crumpled, and the skull beneath it.
Back and forth the battle raged, breaking and tearing, ruining the
chamber and the lives of men, and over it lifted the great calm disc of
Earth and the million scornful stars. Back and forth, trampling,
sundering, killing and laming, and Rikard was painted with blood and
his arms grew weary from swinging the ax.
The chamber began to clear as men fell; it was floored with corpses
and one had room to cast a spear or take a flying leap down on the
head of an enemy. The soldiers had suffered hideously, but there
were many Temple dead, ordinary guardsmen, scantily armored
commoners, Engineers with their spacesuits pierced or their helmets
cloven. The fight was breaking into knots and clusters, small
whirlpools of murder swaying back and forth over the great blood-
wet space, men springing through the air at each other. It seemed to
Rikard, as he raised blurred eyes toward holy Earth, that the disc
had grown noticeably gibbous—had they fought that long?
"Over here! Stand and fight, men of Coper!"
It was Rayth, backed into a corner above a high heap of fallen
Temple men, foremost in a grim and haggard line of troopers hurling
back wave after wave. Rikard shook his head, a sudden dark sense
of destiny on him, and moved across the floor with lifted ax.
"You," said Rayth, very softly. "You—the triple turncoat—" Suddenly
he threw back his head and laughter pulsed in his throat. "Oh, it was
lovely, man, lovely, I never thought you had that kind of brains! Shall
we play the game out?"
He stepped from his line, tossing his sword and catching it again,
kissed his hand to Leda, and fell into an alert position before Rikard.
The barbarian growled, squared off, and fell on him.
Rayth danced aside from the shrieking ax, and his blade whipped in
against Rikard's throat. The rebel rolled, barely ducking the thrust,
and Rayth grinned without much malice and sprang at him. His
sword clattered and yelled, biting the Nyracan's arms, bouncing off
the hard-held guard to sing around his opponent's ears. Rikard fell
back, grunting in surprise, and Rayth pursued him, lightfooted,
leaping, playing with him.
Scream and clangor of steel, hoarse gasps for breath, bounding
human forms in a strange and terrible grace of murder, clash and
bite and two faces staring into each other's eyes across the web of
flying metal. Rikard hewed out again and again, cleaving empty air;
his phantom enemy was somewhere else to rake him until he
staggered and splashed his blood on the floor.
Leda yelled and sprang on Rayth from behind. His sword whirled
around, caught in the guard of hers and sent it spinning free, and
slewed back to meet Rikard's charge. He retreated before the rebel's
rush, laughing, parrying blow after clumsy blow, waiting for the end.
It came swiftly. Rikard's bull charge forced Rayth back into a corner
where he braced himself and smiled. As the ax whirred down toward
his skull, he lifted his blade to parry it as he had done before—and
the steel broke across.
Rikard stood gasping, reeling on his feet, looking down at the body
of his foe with a numbness stealing over him. He hardly noticed the
sobbing girl who flung herself into his arms; he stood mute for a long
while and when he spoke at last it was dully.
"That wasn't right. I didn't kill him—a flaw in his blade did—it isn't
right, somehow."
The Chief Engineer came to Rikard where he stood watching the first
harsh glare of sunrise creep over the heights of Copernicus. The
barbarian leaned heavily on his woman. He had taken many hurts.
Laon's old face was drawn with weariness; there was no great
triumph in him. "It's over," he said. "It was a bloody, horrible
business, but we hold the entire city now, all levels; the nobles are
our prisoners and the Mayor is our puppet and the Temple is
victorious. Thanks to you, my friend."
"There is more to do," said Rikard. "The armies will hear about this,
out in the conquered provinces, and many of them, at least, won't
like it. There'll be hard fighting to hold what we have."
"Oh, yes. Though I think with some diplomacy, and with the
provinces restless at their backs, they may decide—well, we must
see. And afterward there is much more to do, generations of work—
Are you with us, Rikard?"
"I suppose so. I'll have to think about it. Nyrac should not be a mere
province, but—well—I'll think about it."
"At least," said Laon, "we can rest a little while now."
"It's over, darling, darling," whispered Leda. "The fight is over."
Rikard held her close, but he was thinking of the armies beyond the
city, and the restlessness of the conquered towns and the ruthless
will of those still free; of the long task of raising men turned into
brutes by centuries of injustice and oppression, of making them free
and fit to use their freedom, and of all the evil elements which would
be seeking to thwart that goal; of the still greater war to be fought by
quiet men. In the Temple, the war to regain the lost wisdom of the
ancients, the battle which would hammer out the long road back to
Earth.
"No, Leda," he said, very softly, "it's just beginning."
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The Informal Powers of Western

European Presidents: A Way out of

A Wellness Way of Life

The European Union and the Paradox of Enlargement: The

Out of the Fire: A Military Sci-Fi Series (Out of the

Out of the Sky: A Military Sci-Fi Series (Out of the

Out of the Darkness Mckee

Theatre: A Way of Seeing 7th Edition

Fitness and Wellness: A Way of Life

The Moral Powers: A Study of Human Nature P. M. S.

The Informal Powers

● Contemporary presidencies and presidential powers

The series focuses on presidents throughout the world, including both

● Commissioning Editor Ambra Finotello ambra.finotello@palgrave.

The Informal Powers

Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics

Cover illustration: Andrey Maslakov/Alamy Stock Photo

My sincerest gratitude goes to colleagues that helped me in searching

4 Constitutional Strength and the Use of Formal Powers 161

6.4 Informal Activism in Italy 348

Annex: List of the Political Parties Quoted in the Book 503

Fig. 2.1 Presidents’ level of education per country (percentage

Fig. 2.11 High and low prestige cabinet portfolios previously

Fig. 3.5 Type of presidential majority compared to parliamentary

Fig. 7.8 Distribution of specific domestic issues per presidents’

Fig. 7.25 Intersection between global terrorism references and issue

Table 1.1 Presidential powers, type of presidential election, type

Table 2.9 Presidents who performed as party leader per country

Table 6.3 Contextual factors and Personal features related

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

1.1 What Are Weak Presidents?

As a consequence, to distinguish between weak and strong presidents,

Table 1.1 Presidential

Table 1.1 (continued)

Slovakia 0.189 Direct Inconsistent

as strong as it is generally assumed (see Blondel, 2015; Cheibub

selection of the cases based exclusively on regime types or on certain

1.2 Why Study Weak Presidents?

institutions within democratic systems, such as the work of government

protests. These examples clarify that, even though well-established consti-

function of reputation and prestige (Neustadt, 1990) and their ability

possibility to send bills back to parliament is not foreseen in both constitu-

1.3 Aim, Research Questions

As a consequence, presidents activism has been so far seen only as a

appoint the PM. However, this prerogative is usually constrained by the

As a consequence the book addresses the following questions: How

unsteady often as a result of highly volatile and polarized elections; when

The main line of reasoning is that president’s use of informal powers is

(a) When presidents’ use of informal powers increases, the use of

Notwithstanding the book focuses on informal powers in government

weak presidents are considered a sort of figureheads not involved in day-

1.4 Research Design, Methods and Data

Country Prespow1 score Election Constitutional Regime type

Austria 0.092 Direct Inconsistent President-parliamentarism

Italy 11 20.8 Italy 12 15.0

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

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