The Implications of Emerging Technologies in The Euro-Atlantic Space: Views From The Younger Generation Leaders Network Julia Berghofer

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The Implications of
Emerging Technologies
in the Euro-Atlantic
Space
Views from the Younger
Generation Leaders Network
Edited by
Julia Berghofer · Andrew Futter ·
Clemens Häusler · Maximilian Hoell ·
Juraj Nosál
The Implications of Emerging Technologies
in the Euro-Atlantic Space
Julia Berghofer · Andrew Futter ·
Clemens Häusler · Maximilian Hoell ·
Juraj Nosál
Editors
The Implications
of Emerging
Technologies
in the Euro-Atlantic
Space
Views from the Younger Generation Leaders
Network
Editors
Julia Berghofer Andrew Futter
Berlin, Germany Leicester, UK
Clemens Häusler Maximilian Hoell

Munich, Germany London, UK
Juraj Nosál
Vienna, Austria
ISBN 978-3-031-24672-2 ISBN 978-3-031-24673-9 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
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The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
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For Bob Berls
Introduction
This book is a joint project by members of the Younger Genera-

tion Leaders Network on Euro-Atlantic Security (YGLN), a network of
emerging leaders which draws its membership from the Euro-Atlantic
space. Rather than just presenting a compilation of different viewpoints
on emerging technologies and their immediate and longer-term impli-
cations for societies, security and economies in the region, the book
presents a broad range of perspectives. It includes a collection of ideas,
analyses and perspectives from a geographically diverse group of next
generation thinkers from Europe, Russia and North America, who have
collaboratively worked on their chapters.
24 February 2022 marked a sharp break in the relationship between
Russia and the West, and an even sharper break in the relationship
between Russians and Ukrainians—be it in the cultural, civil society, or
academic sphere. The work on this book, however, continued with a
remarkable spirit of collaboration between the contributors from east
and west. Even in the present circumstances, the YGLN brings together
experts from all sides. The YGLN is a place where Russians and Belaru-
sians talk to Ukrainians, Armenians talk to Azeris and where North Amer-
icans talk to their European colleagues on security matters, economic,
political and technological trends as well as threats to humanity like
climate change and nuclear war.
The Network started thinking about this book in late 2020, at a time
when relations between east and west were already strained but did not
vii
viii INTRODUCTION
yet appear as bleak as today. Following the publication of a first book co-
authored by YGLN members in 2020—Threats to Euro-Atlantic Security:
Views from the Younger Generation Leaders Network—the participants in
the Network shared a feeling that there would be value in joining forces
once again for another academic, cross-regional project. The book we
present here was also greatly motivated by the conviction that by collabo-
rating on academic work, the YGLN creates and protects a safe space for
scholars and professionals to meet and exchange ideas.
At the same time, the book aims to spread fresh, next generation
thinking across the academic, think tank and policy communities. We
sense that the implications of emerging technologies for our collective
future would be a timely and important topic for a Network as the YGLN
to address. Henceforth, the collection that we brought together mirrors
different trends in the wide field of emerging and disruptive technologies
and puts them in the context of various social, political and economic
settings, from military applications, export controls, the struggle between
liberal and illiberal forces on the Internet, to new trends that can help to
tackle climate change—to name but a few.
The YGLN as a next-generation project is a natural hub for nourishing
new ideas and for offering its members platforms to share them with a
wider public. Since 2014, when the Network was launched in the wake
of the emerging Ukraine crisis, it has provided a forum for exchange for
the younger voices of emerging leaders across Europe, Russia and North
America. Leaders come from a broad variety of professional and cultural
backgrounds.
While the YGLN has doubled its membership since the establishment
of the Network to more than 100, the tradition of strong interper-
sonal links, formal and informal meetings between members, intimate
discussions in-person and online, as well as frank and open exchange,
has persisted. Those members who have risen to influential positions
and consider themselves alumni of the YGLN—working for instance at
NATO, the U.S. State Department, as advisors for the United Nations
or pursuing political careers—are role models for existing members and
remain part of the YGLN family to support their peers.
Against this background, the book is to be understood as a project
realised by colleagues who are closely collaborating with each other and
who assist each other in developing their thinking—across cultural and
political barriers.
INTRODUCTION ix
Finally, the YGLN would not be as powerful as it is today without

the tremendous support of senior leaders and experts from across North
America, Russia and Europe. The Network continues to be extremely
grateful for their help and advice. Amongst them, the co-editors would
like to particularly thank Lord Des Browne, Ambassador (ret.) Jim
Collins and Sir Adam Thomson for their passion for the network and
their continued steadfast commitment to support the next generation of
leaders. Above all, Robert E. Berls Jr. who was, until his passing in 2021,
the staunchest supporter of the YGLN and a good friend and colleague
to its members, deserves our highest gratitude.
Contents
Part I Politics and Geopolitics

1 Digital Illiberalism and the Erosion of the Liberal
International Order 3
Pavel Kanevskiy
2 The Emergence of E-participation Tools:
Strengthening Democracy Through Inclusive Debates 23
Julia Berghofer
3 The US–China 5G Race in Europe’s Western Balkans 43
Gent Salihu
4 The Role of Export Controls in Managing Emerging
Technology 57
Maria Shagina
5 The Geopolitics of Energy Transition: New Resources
and Technologies 73
Marco Siddi
Part II Strategic Stability and Military Affairs

6 Technological Uncertainty and Strategic Stability 89
Igor Istomin
xi
xii CONTENTS
7 Emerging Technologies and “Green-Friendly”

Military Conflict? 109
Lucia Gavenčiaková
8 Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Command, Control,
and Communications: Implications for the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty 123
Maximilian Hoell and Sylvia Mishra
9 Contemporary Cybersecurity Challenges 143
Pavel Sharikov
10 Autonomous Weapons Systems in Armed Conflicts:
New Challenges for International Law 159
Verena Jackson
Part II Economy and Society

11 Crime in the Digital Age: A New Frontier 177
Juraj Nosál
12 Emerging Technologies as an Opportunity
for a Sustainable and Carbon-Neutral Future 195
Ivana Vuchkova
13 Cyber Sovereignty: Should Cyber Borders Replicate
Territorial Borders? 209
Tinatin Japaridze
14 Tracing Accountability: Product Sourcing Technology
and Implications for Conservation and Human
Rights Initiatives 227
Carolyn Forstein
Index 241
Notes on Contributors
Julia Berghofer is a Policy Fellow with the European Leadership

Network where she focuses on nuclear arms control and deterrence in the
Euro-Atlantic space. Her position also includes coordinating the activities
of the Younger Generation Leaders Network on Euro-Atlantic Security
(YGLN). Prior to joining the ELN, Julia was a Research Assistant with the
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin
and a Project Assistant in the organisational team of the Munich Security
Conference (M.SC.).
Julia holds a Bachelor in Political and Communication Sciences from
the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich and the University of
Vienna, and completed her Master in Political Science at the University
of Hamburg.
Carolyn Forstein is an Attorney practising trial and appellate litigation
at a U.S. law firm. She previously clerked for U.S. District Court Judge
Timothy Burgess and Justice Edwin Cameron of the Constitutional Court
of South Africa. Carolyn has worked on a range of international law and
rule of law issues, including projects based in Ukraine, Bangladesh and
Peru. Before law school, Carolyn researched rule of law development as a
Fulbright fellow in Ukraine and studied in Russia on an academic schol-
arship. Carolyn holds a J.D. from Columbia Law School and a B.A. in
International Relations from Stanford University.
xiii
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Lucia Gavenčiaková is a Policy Assistant at Globsec, and a Master’s

degree student in Security and Strategic Studies in the Czech Republic.
She became interested in the field of climate security as a high school
student and developed her passion for the topic into the main focus of her
studies. She was an active contributor to Czecho-Slovak security portal,
where she has published several analyses on climate security and military
decarbonisation. She currently focuses on the challenge of climate security
among the leaders and citizens of the Slovak Republic.
Maximilian Hoell is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Leadership
Network in London, where he works on issues pertaining to nuclear arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation as well as transatlantic secu-
rity. He earned a Ph.D. in International Relations from University College
London. He also studied at the Universities of Oxford, Yale and Montpel-
lier, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) as
well as the London School of Economics and Political Science. Max has
held academic appointments at Université Paris Dauphine—PSL, London
campus as well as Northeastern University—London.
Igor Istomin is an Acting Chair at the Department of Applied Inter-
national Political Analysis and a Leading Research Fellow at the Center
for Advanced American Studies, at Moscow State Institute of Interna-
tional Relations. He holds Ph.D. and M.A. degrees from MGIMO as
well as undergraduate degree from St. Petersburg State University. In
2020–2021, Igor was a Senior Fellow at the Davis Center for Russian
and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University.
Verena Jackson is a Researcher and Lecturer at the Center for Intelli-
gence and Security Studies (CSIS) at the University of the Armed Forces
of Germany in Munich (UniBW). Prior to that, she worked for interna-
tional law firms and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen Germany. She is a fully qualified lawyer
in Germany holding a degree with specialisation in International Law.
Her research focuses on Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and National
Security Law. In particular, on the challenges that emerging technologies
pose to the law. She also focuses on the transatlantic comparison of law.
Tinatin Japaridze is the Vice President of Business Development at The
Critical Mass and Special Advisor on Eurasian security at Eurasia Group.
She previously worked for the City of New York and the United Nations
as Bureau Chief for Eastern European media. In 2019, she became a
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xv
Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs Ambassador on Cyber

Ethics and Digital Leadership. Tinatin served as a “Go Big” Officer at
ELN focusing on the New START Treaty extension, and later became a
member of the YGLN. Her book Stalin’s Millennials was published to
critical acclaim by Rowman & Littlefield in 2022.
Pavel Kanevskiy is an Associate Professor of political science and inter-
national relations at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Since 2014
he has been a member of the Younger Generation Leaders Network on
Euro-Atlantic Security (YGLN), being chair of the YGLN in 2018–2022.
In 2015–2016 he was an EASI Hurford Next Generation Fellow at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is an expert at the
Russian International Affairs Council, focusing on Russia–West relations.
He regularly writes for academic journals and think tanks on Russian and
American politics, international relations and comparative politics.
Juraj Nosál works at the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna where he is currently an Associate Project
Officer for combating cybercrime in the Transnational Threats Depart-
ment. Prior to that, he served in the OSCE Secretariat’s Conflict Preven-
tion Centre (2020–2022), Transnational Threats Department (2017–
2020) and the Office of the Secretary General (2014–2017) where
he supported various projects on the topics such as security sector
governance and reform, intelligence-led policing, cybercrime and pan-
European security dialogue. He holds a Master’s degree in Terrorism
and Political Violence from University of St Andrews and in International
Relations from Masaryk University.
Gent Salihu is a J.D. Candidate and Allen and Erika Lo Endowed Tech-
nology Law Scholar at Georgetown Law. Previously, Salihu worked on
justice reforms through USAID Kosovo programming, including util-
ising technology to improve access to justice and streamline services.
Gent taught public policy at the Rochester Institute of Technology in
Kosovo, and served as an Advisor to the President of Kosovo and Minister
of Justice. Salihu graduated A.B., magna cum laude, in Philosophy and
Government from Dartmouth College, and as a recipient of Weidenfeld
and Chevening scholarships, he holds a Master of Public Policy from the
University of Oxford.
Dr. Maria Shagina is a Diamond-Brown Research Fellow for Economic
Sanctions, Standards and Strategy at the International Institute for
xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Strategic Studies (IISS). Her research interests cover economic statecraft,

international sanctions and energy politics, with a particular focus on the
post-Soviet states.
Pavel Sharikov is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Europe,
Russian Academy of Sciences, and Associate professor at Lomonosov
Moscow State University. In 2019–2020 Pavel worked at the Center for
International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. In 2015
he authored the book Information security in a multipolar world. Pavel
has published over 100 articles in Russian and English, and regularly
appears in Russian media with commentaries on American politics and
Russian-West relations.
Marco Siddi is a Montalcini Assistant Professor at the University of
Cagliari (Italy) and a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute
of International Affairs. He focuses primarily on EU–Russia relations,
European energy and climate policy and European identity and memory
politics. He has published in some of the most renowned peer-reviewed
journals in his research field. Previously, he was a Marie Curie fellow at the
University of Edinburgh and a DAAD fellow at the Institute of European
Politics (IEP) in Berlin. He has a Ph.D. in Politics from the Universities
of Edinburgh and Cologne.
Ivana Vuchkova is a Program Coordinator at the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung Office in Skopje, where she leads the portfolio of activities in
the field of economy, energy and sustainable development. Ivana holds
a Master’s degree in Economic Governance and Development from the
OSCE Academy, and is an author and co-author of number of papers and
publications in the mentioned fields, including the first Manual of Argu-
ments for a Fair and Ecological Society. As part of her professional and
personal development, she is committed to promoting just economic and
energy policies that are in harmony with the planetary boundaries and
social needs.
PART I
Politics and Geopolitics

CHAPTER 1
Digital Illiberalism and the Erosion

of the Liberal International Order
Pavel Kanevskiy
Introduction
The Internet was one of the most important technological innovations
of the twentieth century, originating at the core of liberal international
order (LIO). Three decades ago, the Internet was presumed to become
a technology that would strengthen global liberalism because open infor-
mation flows were seen as a natural continuation of freedom, supporting
basic liberal and democratic principles. The creation of the Internet
should be seen as a logical continuation of technological progress that
is deeply interconnected with the spread of liberalism. But the liberal-
ising promise of the Internet was put at risk by political authorities inside
both authoritarian and democratic countries, as well as by “Big Tech”
and populist, illiberal groups of different kinds. This chapter provides
an overview of the underlying reasons that have led to the emergence
of both digital liberalism and digital illiberalism, what implications these
P. Kanevskiy (B)
Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: pskanevskiy@gmail.com
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

Switzerland AG 2023
J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies
in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_1
4 P. KANEVSKIY
processes have on the liberal international order, and proposes policy

recommendations for how to reverse illiberal tendencies in the digital
sphere.
Technological Progress and the Emergence

of Liberal Internationalism
Technological progress and the evolution of liberalism can be seen as
naturally interdependent. Liberties and liberal institutions deriving from
the era of the Enlightenment established conditions for human creativity,
social and political progress. Liberalism created the premises for innova-
tion and inventions that provided people with new means to do things,
increased benefits and lowered costs. Innovation became the driving force
of the industrial revolution in the West and laid the foundations of
modern economies.
The strong link between liberalism and technological progress was the
key factor behind the evolution of liberal democracies and the liberal
international order. From the liberal colonial empires of the nineteenth
century to the post-Cold War order, the technological superiority of
the Western countries was the foundation of their central role in global
politics and the global economy. Technological progress had steadily
increased monetary and political returns for industrialised and liberal
states and created preconditions for stronger connectivity inside the liberal
core. Globalisation, the internationalisation of the chains of production,
and improved links between capitalist hubs across the world technologi-
cally drove the liberal order in the second half of the twentieth century.
Hence, technologies were shaping and strengthening liberalism both
domestically and globally. The interconnection between globalisation and
technological progress also explains the remarkable stability of the post-
WWII Western order and its ultimate technological superiority by the end
of the millennium. It facilitated economic growth, encouraged the flow
of knowledge and technology and drew states together.1 The spread of
liberalism resulted in the emergence of the truly integrated global system
1 G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?”, International Affairs,

94:1 (2018), p. 17.
1 DIGITAL ILLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION … 5
in the nineteenth century even though not all members of this system
were fully open and democratic societies.2
At the same time, members of the liberal order had to adjust to a
growing technological complexity. A grand debate on who controls tech-
nologies and, in whose interest, dates back to the early stages of industrial
capitalism, although it was not until the twentieth century that widely
accepted regulatory frameworks were created by states.3 Had the modern
regulatory state not developed, the negative effects of industrialism would
likely have overshadowed its positive ones. However, the exact balance
between regulation and freedom has changed over time. Technological
progress has had both benefits and drawbacks for liberal societies because
of its strong impact on labour markets, distribution of resources and social
inequality.
Waves of industrial progress strengthened the link between liber-
alism, technological progress and capitalism. One of the key reasons why
technological development became highly interconnected with liberalism
was the adoption of experimental methods within liberal communities.
But whereas in most parts of the world science and innovation existed
without much practical application, in early liberal societies, primarily
in Great Britain, it became an element of industrial production when
business people understood the benefits of relying on experiments and
scientific research. As Jack Goldstone argues, England in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries was the first country in which a combina-
tion of “educated workforce, freedom of ideas, technological innovation,
and the application of scientific engineering to industry” created a new
model of economic growth and set an example for other nations to
follow.4 States that managed to build strong institutional and cultural
ties between liberty, creativity, innovations, inventions and the market
economy benefitted the most. They became more developed economically
and technologically which in turn amplified their power and capabilities
2 Ronald Findlay & Kevin H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World
Economy in the Second Millennium, (Princeton University Press: 2007) pp. 395–414.
3 Larry Neal & Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds.), The Cambridge History of Capitalism
(Cambridge University Press: 2014), pp. 82–126.
4 Jack Goldstone, Why Europe? The Rise of the West in the World History, 1500–1850
(George Mason University: 2009), p. 172.
6 P. KANEVSKIY
globally. These processes also fostered the emergence and strength-

ening of more inclusive institutions that made societies more open and
promoted the culture of innovation.5
The deep interconnection between liberalism, technological progress
and the economy was one of the centrepieces of Modernisation Theory of
the twentieth century.6 This theory was criticised multiple times, mainly
from a Marxist and Dependence Theory viewpoint.7 Doubts have also
been raised about whether capitalism and technological innovation can
survive without liberalism.8 The major weakness of such criticism is that
although it poses many deep questions on the nature of capitalism,
democracy and societal development, it doesn’t really break the logical
tie between liberalism and technological progress.
For example, Germany was economically and technologically backward
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but had managed to reach
high levels of scientific and industrial development in the second half of
the nineteenth century while remaining a predominantly authoritarian
state. As noted by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Germany’s
economic institutions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
became more inclusive even as its polity remained largely authoritarian.9
To understand the German phenomena, it is worth remembering that
although not being a part of the liberal order in the strict sense of
the word, Germany was not completely illiberal. Centres of economic
and technological progress in the Western parts of Germany had long-
standing traditions of decentralised governance, trade and science. Civil
codes like Prussia’s Allgemeines Landrecht had protected private prop-
erty since at least the late eighteenth century, and in the early nineteenth
century the Code Napoleon with its ideas of constitutionalism and the
rule of law were becoming particularly visible in places like Rhineland
5 Trygve R. Tholfsen, “The Transition to Democracy in Victorian England”, Interna-

tional Review of Social History, 6:2 (1961), pp. 226–248.
6 Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, (Cambridge University Press: 1960).
7 Herbert Marcuse, One-dimensional man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial
Society, (Beacon Press: 1991), p. 260; Andre Gunder Frank, Barry K. Gills, The World
System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? (Routledge: 1996), p. 344.
8 Branko Milanovic, Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World
(Harvard University Press: 2019), p. 304.
9 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty, (Crown Business: 2012), p. 546.
and Westphalia.10 Furthermore, the pre-WWI autocratic regimes with

their growing middle classes and fast urbanisation had to integrate and
accept elements of freedom and plurality without which it would’ve been
impossible to sustain the necessary levels of scientific knowledge and
entrepreneurship. The same logic is applicable to a certain degree to Japan
or Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Centralised illiberal states of the twentieth century like Nazi Germany
and the Soviet Union made a new series of attempts to build compet-
itive technological infrastructures in the twentieth century. They were
successful in the military domain and in using technologies for mass
mobilisation and total state control. For totalitarian regimes, technologies
were used largely for the coercive needs of the state and became multi-
pliers of their power at home and abroad. Innovations were allowed to the
extent that they contributed to regime survival. This level of technological
progress was enough to compete with the Euro-Atlantic liberal powers
on the global stage but had limited potential for societal and economic
development at home.
The Communist system was the longest-standing illiberal and undemo-
cratic alternative to the liberal order. Soviet science was able to produce
ground-breaking success in space technologies, nuclear physics and chem-
istry. However, despite high levels of education, scientific breakthroughs
and a stable if modest quality of life, innovation and technology never
became drivers of societal and economic change under Communism. As
Chi Ling Chan rightfully argues, that was mainly because of the “exten-
sive military-industrial black hole exhausting the Soviets of key resources”
as well as “the ideological capture of science… and structural disincen-
tives against innovation.”11 The domination of a top-down approach and
the absence of markets never allowed for the creation of a proper link
between science, innovation and the economy. Loren Graham suggests
that this is because the Soviet Union (as well as contemporary Russia to a
certain degree) never “fully adopted the modern view that making money
from technological innovation is an honorable, decent, and admirable
thing to do.”12 The Soviet Union was able to compete with the West
10 Ewald Grothe, “Model or Myth? The Constitution of Westphalia of 1807 and Early
German Constitutionalism”, German Studies Review, 28:1 (2005), pp. 1–19.
11 Chi Ling Chan, “Fallen Behind: Science, Technology, and Soviet Statism”, Intersect,
8:3 (2015), p. 1.
12 Loren Graham, Lonely Ideas: Can Russia Compete? (The MIT Press: 2013), p. 103.
8 P. KANEVSKIY
primarily because it created modern weaponry, but it never became a true

competitor in the global economy. Gaps in key areas such as microchips
and mechanical engineering only accelerated Soviet technological and
economic decay. The Soviet example demonstrates that while innovations
and technologies may serve the narrow purposes of the autocracy, the
inability to link innovations and technologies with societal and economic
progress inevitably weakens illiberal regimes from the inside.
Contemporary China represents the latest example of the predom-
inantly authoritarian system that managed to build a strong economy
and to be able to compete with the West in many technological areas.
According to Global Innovation Index, in 2021 China ranked 12th
among the 132 economies, up 22 positions from ten years earlier.13 China
heavily invests in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, semi-
conductors and the space industry, although it is still far from being a
leader in any of these areas.14 China is just another example of when
modernisation, economic and technological progress become possible
after a series of semi-liberal reforms. The new thinking of Deng Xiaoping
as well as favourable geopolitical, trade and demographic conditions of
the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s resulted in significant economic growth and
boosted China’s technological potential. However, just like the Soviet
Union before China faces serious challenges in building a truly competi-
tive technological economy in a situation when Xi Jinping and the ruling
elite appear unwilling to reform the system further.15
The Rise of Digital Liberalism

With the rise of the Internet and digital technologies championed by the
West, the structural leadership of liberal democracies in the global system
became ever more evident. The Internet surfaced as the game-changing
13 Global Innovation Index 2021. China, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/

wipo_pub_gii_2021/cn.pdf (Accessed 10 August 2022).
14 Dennis Normile, “A Beijing Think Tank Offered a Frank Review of China’s
Technological Weaknesses. Then the Report Disappeared”, Science (8 February
2022), https://www.science.org/content/article/beijing-think-tank-offered-frank-review-
china-s-technological-weaknesses-then-report (Accessed 10 August 2022).
15 Hal Brands, “The Dangers of China’s Decline”, Foreign Policy (14 April 2022),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/china-decline-dangers/ (Accessed 10 August
2022).
technology at the turn of the millennium. When Tim Berners-Lee

invented the World Wide Web in 1989 for the purpose of information
exchange between scientists and institutions, few could have imagined
the revolutionary impact it would soon have on communication and the
global economy. The Internet played a crucial role in the expansion of
the liberal international order not only through increased returns, but it
also created a new communication infrastructure that allowed the LIO to
strengthen and expand in the post-Cold War era.
According to Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, the post-1945
international liberal order was comprised of several key elements: secu-
rity and economic co-binding; the consensual, cooperative and integrative
nature of the American hegemony; the availability of mutual gains
through the expansion of capitalism and free trade; the role of the Western
liberal civic identity; the presence of semi-sovereign powers like Germany
and Japan that reinforced the liberal order rather than the balance of
power.16 It is through these elements that the liberal international order
became the foundation for solidarity, cohesion and cooperation between
states.
The Internet successfully supported these elements in a number of
ways, especially during the “golden era” of globalisation and liberalisa-
tion of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Foremost, it became a crucial
tool for democratisation, and the expansion of liberal views and ideas.
For the United States an open and free Internet was crucial for ensuring
peace and prosperity at home and abroad as it helped to sustain Amer-
ican economic and political hegemony. The Internet was part of the
“end of history” zeitgeist because it was considered as a natural continu-
ation of the Western ideological, economic and technological superiority.
Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman point out that the United States had
managed to restructure the LIO with the use of the Internet, believing
that “open communication would become self-reinforcing over time,
strengthening democracy within liberal states and spreading democracy
and liberal values to autocratic regimes.”17
16 Daniel Deudney & G. John Ikenberry, “The Nature and Sources of Liberal
International Order”, Review of International Studies, 25 (1999), pp. 179–196.
17 Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, “The Janus Face of the Liberal International
Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining?”, International
Organization, 75 (2021), p. 337.
10 P. KANEVSKIY
According to Larry Diamond, the Internet had great advantages

compared to earlier technologies. Its decentralised character and ability
to reach large segments of the population were well-suited to grass-
roots movements. The Internet’s capability to empower citizens in their
desire to play a bigger role in politics and combat authoritarian regimes
made it a perfect “liberation technology.”18 Indeed, this new commu-
nication infrastructure became one of the pillars of the Euro-Atlantic
security model based on a combination of military force, economic
and technological power and attractiveness of the Western model of
development.
The principles of open access and the unrestricted flow of information
were crucial in supporting the growth of interconnected global liberal
networks. It created a platform for improved communication within the
global civic and capitalist communities. It was the driving force behind the
strengthening of what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye called “complex
interdependence:”19 that the unwinding informational revolution funda-
mentally changes the world in which force matters less and countries are
increasingly interconnected.20 The neoliberal approach towards global
networks was based on the assumption that their existence resulted in
reciprocal dependence that made coercive behaviour less effective, while
stimulating mutually beneficial cooperation between states, corporations
and civic groups. A network-based liberal order led to the creation of
multiple information and communication hubs which made it harder for
separate states to control them.21 This, in turn, fostered decentralisation,
more freedom in international agenda-setting and hence strengthened
the key principles of the LIO. Liberal networks existed long before the
Internet, but digital liberalism reinforced their strength and efficacy while
creating new communication channels for them. This is especially relevant
in regard to international businesses and non-governmental organisations
that received a new tool for communicating and advocating their agendas
in the transnational and supranational space.
18 Larry Diamond, “Liberation technology”, Journal of Democracy, 21:3 (2010),

pp. 69–83.
19 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence (Longman:
2001).
20 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the
Information Age”, Foreign Affairs, 77:5 (1998), p. 83.
21 Ibid.
The deep connection between online technologies and networks of

interdependence challenges the opinions of some authors claiming that
digital liberalism did not fulfil its main objective—that of increased inter-
national liberalisation.22 New communication spaces allowed major civic
and capitalist forces around the world to better coordinate their activities,
strengthened business ties and played a huge role in the development of
international civil society. That of course didn’t mean that the Internet
was able to change the structure of world politics. After all, as Keohane
and Nye rightfully observed, “information does not flow in a vacuum but
in political space that is already occupied.”23 Hence, the Internet was just
an additional layer of the complex interdependence that made communi-
cation and transnational flows easier but didn’t become fully independent
of politics. This also posed a dilemma—largely unsolved to this day—of
whether the Internet is a technology of freedom or it is a technology of
control.24
Consequently, one of the biggest challenges for many Western and
especially American experts and policymakers since the 1990s was to make
sure that the Internet and its underlying communication system stayed
within the liberal agenda. This challenge shaped the American approach
towards Internet governance. At the core of that thinking was the idea
that the Internet—with all the benefits it creates for the liberal order—
must not include any barriers or strict norms. In other words, it should be
left as a largely unregulated technology because that was the only way for
it to support the LIO naturally; to remain as a tool of the invisible hand
of democratisation and liberalisation; and on top of that to let the United
States strengthen its role as the key stakeholder in LIO. This goal was
meant to be reached under two main conditions: the open and unregu-
lated nature of the Internet, and American “smart supervision” designed
to guarantee that no other state had the capacity to shape the virtual space
according to their views and national interests. Greater multilateralism
in governance of the Internet was traditionally perceived by American
decision-makers as a threat to its democratic and liberal nature.
22 Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, “The Janus Face of the Liberal International
Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining?”, International
Organization, 75 (2021), p. 342.
23 Keohane & Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age”, p. 84.
24 Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, “Liberation vs. Control: The Future of
Cyberspace”, Journal of Democracy, 21:4 (2010), p. 44.
12 P. KANEVSKIY
These ideas were behind the logic of US President Bill Clinton’s deci-
sion in 1998 to shift governance of the Internet from multilateral bodies
such as the UN-affiliated International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),
a California-based private company.25 As the American domain name
market was the largest in the world, and the United States controlled the
root server system that sits on top of the Domain Name System (DNS).
This decision allowed the United States to shape Internet governance to
their political and economic advantage as well as to multiply American
hegemony within the liberal order.
ICANN is not a formal regulatory institution, it is a private supervising
body whose main function is to maintain the unregulated, open and inter-
connected character of the Internet. This approach coincided perfectly
with the dynamic of the American-led liberal order because it restricted
possibilities for states to shape the norms and rules of the virtual space
and left it within the self-regulatory framework. The Internet was, hence,
a double-edged technology that rested on principles of deregulation but
was never meant to be fully neutral, because its main purpose was seen
in supporting a certain set of ideas and multiplying American political
and business influence globally. This situation created a paradox when a
key new technology deriving from within the liberal system with tremen-
dous potential to influence economies, civil societies and security was
left outside of the normative and institutional structure. Such a paradox
predetermined the anarchic nature of the Internet, which soon became
a double-edged sword for digital liberalism and the liberal order it was
supposed to support.
Virtual Anarchy and Digital Illiberalism

The liberalising function of the Internet focussed attention away from
its darker illiberal side. But how and why, in a matter of just two
decades, did this alternate world become so powerful that it began to
contest the original image? There is no single answer: power misbalances
created by the unipolar system, the impact of democratic interventions,
the economic crisis of 2008 and its aftershocks, accelerating migration
flows, cultural clashes, rising populism, nativism and anti-globalisation
25 David Bach, “Varieties of Cooperation: The Domestic Institutional Roots of Global

Governance”, Review of International Studies, 36:3 (2010), pp. 578–579.
sentiments provoked a perfect storm for liberal internationalism in the

twenty-first century. The political, economic, value and communicative
foundations upon which the LIO was grounded were put into doubt
by many non-Western polities as well as different groups at the heart
of the liberal community. Together with structural problems, such as
the unequal distribution of resources and the disproportional role of the
corporate sector, these factors created new challenges for the liberal order.
The Internet, which was a major communication platform within the
liberal order, became crucial in the rise of illiberalism. There were several
fundamental shifts in world politics that strengthened the illiberal side
of the Internet. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 led to an era
of surveillance systems penetrating all aspects of life. Together with the
growing power of big technological corporations this resulted in an inva-
sion of personal privacy and the evolution of surveillance capitalism based
on micro-targeting of the audience and marketing and advertising busi-
ness.26 Another important reason behind the rise of digital illiberalism
was the gradual rise of autocratic regimes and autocratic tendencies both
outside and inside the Euro-Atlantic community. It took time for these
actors to accommodate to the new information technologies used by
pro-democratic forces, but mobilisation against it accelerated during the
second decade of the twenty-first century. Finally, the culture of polit-
ical activism itself started to change with growing anti-elitist and populist
sentiments gaining ground globally.
Hence, digital liberalism was facing rising pressure from three different
but deeply interconnected sides: the state (from both liberal and illib-
eral camps), “Big Tech,” and a new type of grassroots political activism.
The combination of these pressures led to a number of disruptions in the
relationship between the Internet and the liberal order.
One thing that could have hardly been predicted in the early days of
digital liberalisation was that online technologies would reinforce rather
than undermine the domestic and global influence of the illiberal regimes.
The role of illiberal states in controlling the virtual agenda had indeed
long been relatively low. In the 1990s and early 2000s, they lacked the
motivation and means to influence the evolution of the Internet and to
compete with the United States as well as global networks that promoted
digital liberalism. Tectonic shifts in political cultures and new waves of
26 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future
at the New Frontier of Power (Profile Books: 2019), p. 704.
14 P. KANEVSKIY
civic activism at the beginning of the twenty-first century resulted in a

political tremor, legitimacy crises and colour revolutions in developing
regions, from the post-Soviet space to the Islamic world and the Asia–
Pacific. The Internet played a crucial role in this wave of democratisation.
As Philip Howard argued in 2010, the Internet played a key role in
nearly all democratic transitions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries.27 The World Web became a basis for civic coordination and was
able to successfully compete with the state media in agenda-setting.
However, new protests and legitimacy crises pushed many ruling elites
into defensive positions. Liberalism and extensive freedoms were quickly
blamed as universal causes of all misfortunes by illiberal politicians and
autocrats. The Internet was at the centre of the new battleground for
human minds. Its open nature and strong connection to the liberal world
were perceived as a threat to national interests in the eyes of many illiberal
political elites. Hence some states started pushing harder to contest and
ideally control the virtual agenda. The example of Belarus vividly demon-
strates how the regime’s response to pro-democratic Internet activism
evolved in the first decade of the twenty-first century.28
Attacks on digital liberalism by authoritarian regimes became more
solidified and concentrated in the 2010s as a response to such events
as the Arab Spring and new civil unrest in the post-Soviet space. More-
over, as authoritarian regimes started to view digital liberalism as a threat
to their legitimacy and survival, they decided to shift those tactics used
against dissent at home to fighting digital liberalism globally by mobilising
illiberal forces of all kinds and undermining democratic institutions. Those
tactics that worked at home turned out to be applicable in the global anar-
chic and unregulated virtual space. Fake news and the creation of illiberal
networks based on social media had become unexpectedly strong tools
that were able to compete with liberal agendas and discourses, influence
public opinion and sow social and political mistrust. Digital illiberalism
became a compensatory strategy for those political forces who saw the
US-led LIO as the source of all troubles, from an unfair distribution
of power to the existential threat to the illiberal regimes themselves. A
27 Philip N. Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information

Technology and Political Islam (Oxford University Press: 2010), pp. 3–4.
28 Volodymyr V. Lysenko & Kevin C. Desouza, “The Use of Information and Commu-
nication Technologies by Protesters and the Authorities in the Attempts at Colour
Revolutions in Belarus 2001–2010”, Europe-Asia Studies, 67:4 (2015), p. 639.
new kind of illiberal counter-propaganda produced plentiful outputs at a

minimum cost, and allowed for illiberal sentiments to be spread both at
home and abroad.
Illiberal states also introduced an array of methods to put the Internet
under stricter governmental control. Simple solutions to this day include
blocking or slowing down of the Internet supported by legislative actions
best seen in China, Russia and Iran. Longer-ranging visions suggest it
is possible to disconnect from the global network and create a sepa-
rate state-controlled root system. Russia and China have made the first
steps in this direction in 2018 and 2019, respectively. Russia went ahead
by enacting a law that would someday allow it to create a “sovereign
Internet,”29 whereas China started experimenting with independent DNS
root servers.30 Today it is possible to imagine a world where the Internet
is divided into different regulatory segments.31 The spread of content-
filtering from both illiberal and liberal states violates the very philosophy
of the Internet as an open space.
But it is not only illiberal states that are witnessing the erosion of
digital liberalism. Democratic states, either through governmental agen-
cies or private entities, are collecting enormous amounts of metadata
to be used for national security reasons. Political parties and politicians
of different kinds use private companies to collect and analyse private
data without a strict judicial oversight. This raises a question about the
moral limits of personal data management and the purposes it can be
used for. The notorious example of Cambridge Analytica, a firm that was
involved in multiple political campaigns in the United Kingdom and the
United States, including the support of Donald Trump and pro-Brexit
29 Roman Goncharenko, “Russia Moves Toward Creation of an Independent Inter-

net”, DW (17 January 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/russia-moves-toward-creation-
of-an-independent-internet/a-42172902 (Accessed 25 January 2022).
30 “China Greenlights Establishment of Root Server”, Xinhua (8 December
2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/08/c_138613999.htm (Accessed
25 January 2022).
31 Ronald J. Deibert, “The Geopolitics of Internet Control: Censorship, Sovereignty,
and Cyberspace”, in: Andrew Chadwick/Philip N. Howard (eds.), Routledge Handbook of
Internet Politics (Routledge: 2009), p. 334.
16 P. KANEVSKIY
organisations. But this is just a drop in the ocean of unregulated data

gathering.32
Illiberal civic activism is another dilemma for digital liberalism. The
anarchic nature of the Internet created natural premises for a wide variety
of opinions that were not necessarily liberal. The liberalising effect of
the Internet was most evident among globalised elites, well-educated,
rational, cosmopolite citizens, and those aspiring to liberal values in the
developing world. However, as a mass technology available to every
citizen in the world with access to a computer or a smartphone, the virtual
world can also be shaped by very different actors.
As Larry Diamond noted a decade ago, “even in the freest environ-
ments, the new digital means of information and communication have
important limits and costs… The proliferation of online media has not
uniformly improved the quality of public deliberation, but rather has
given rise to an “echo chamber” of the ideologically like-minded egging
each other on.”33 Radical, populist, illiberal voices on both sides of the
political spectrum, with little chance of setting agendas through tradi-
tional representation, have found the Internet a perfect ideological tool.
While mainstream politicians and political parties were slow in exploring
the possibilities of online communication, illiberal movements were early
adopters. The emergence of illiberal movements has rational explanations
but it is doubtful whether they would have had such an impact on the
wider public without the Internet. Examples of both Trump and pro-
Brexit campaigners demonstrate the malicious side of online media and
its potential to empower illiberal movements.
Major tech corporations have often been blamed for the rise of digital
illiberalism. After all, they created the infrastructure through which states
gather data and illiberal regimes and movements spread hatred and fake
news. Considering the Internet is largely unregulated, Big Tech was free
to set the rules and norms to their advantage with minimal public control.
The evolution of regulatory regimes across the world, with the noticeable
example of the EU and its General Data Protection Regulations (GDRP)
implemented in 2018, have made some difference but haven’t stopped
illiberal forces from exploiting the open nature of the Internet.
32 Billy Perigo, “The Capabilities Are Still There. Why Cambridge Analytica Whistle-
blower Christopher Wylie Is Still Worried”, Time (8 October 2019), https://time.com/
5695252/christopher-wylie-cambridge-analytica-book/ (Accessed 10 August 2022).
33 Diamond, “Liberation Technology”, p. 80.
Big Tech didn’t have all these political dilemmas in mind when it
evolved into the digital universe. The main goal of these companies was
and remains profit. Facebook and Twitter were not created for propa-
ganda and the spread of fake news. As David Runciman argues; “The
architects of the system are stumbling across the pitfalls with the rest of
us… It is just a side effect of being in the advertising business.”34 In
the end, the corporations were handmaids in shaping both digital liber-
alism and digital illiberalism. According to Francis Fukuyama “network
economies guarantee that the power to distribute or supress information
becomes concentrated in the hands of just two or three gigantic internet
platforms.”35 This shows once again that institutions designed to enhance
market efficiency and reduce transaction costs can be used for coercive
needs.36
All this leads to the broader question of why the Internet and
social media have made liberal democracies more vulnerable rather than
strengthening them. Traditional media in liberal societies has to a certain
degree been subject to the public interest, regulations and ethical codes.
By contrast, the anarchic virtual world is a perfect breeding ground for
a cacophony of voices, competing narratives and partisanship. As Anne
Applebaum notes, “the social media algorithms themselves encourage
false perceptions of the world.”37 Algorithms have the ability to radi-
calise those who use them and favour primitive emotions like anger and
fear because emotions keep people online. Recent revelations by Face-
book whistle blower Frances Haugan show that the corporation knew its
algorithms were fuelling polarisation, hate speech and misinformation.38
Still, the underlying problem of digital illiberalism is not Big Tech,
populist politicians or illiberal movements per se. Rather it is the changing
nature of democracy and the way that politics is made in the digital era.
34 David Runciman, How Democracy Ends (Profile Books: 2019), p. 158.

35 Francis Fukuayama, Liberalism and Its Discontents (Profile Books: 2022), p. 104.
36 Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global
Networks Shape State Coercion”, International Security, 44:1 (2019), pp. 46–47.
37 Anne Applebaum, Twilight of Democracy. The Failure of Politics and the Parting of
Friends (Allen Lane: 2020), p. 113.
38 Loveday Morris, Elizabeth Dwoskin & Hamza Shaban, “Whistleblower Testimony
and Facebook Papers Trigger Lawmaker Calls for Regulation”, The Washington Post (25
October 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/25/facebook-
papers-live-updates/ (Accessed 25 January 2022).
18 P. KANEVSKIY
Whereas traditional representative democracy was meant to work through

discussion and compromise, democracy in the digital era is built on the
short-term desires, fears and biases of the electorate. The Internet with
its data-harvesting machines, online advertising and social media algo-
rithms, is a perfect environment for quick decisions and what people see
as quick solutions. Brexit was based on the idea of a quick solution to a
range of complicated challenges, just like the election of Donald Trump.
Populists and illiberal politicians build their agendas on short-lived occa-
sions rather than long-term visions. This tendency is also spreading to
mainstream centrists. Digital democracy is not necessarily equal to digital
liberalism, because participation and political perceptions work differently
in the virtual universe, not always in the name of reason, respect of norms
and basic liberal values.
What Is to Be Done?
There is no simple solution to the problem of digital illiberalism. It
will require a lot of work from political elites as well as a politically
conscious public. The core task is to harness digital technologies again
for democratisation. One example is a wave of deliberative democracy,
a form of democracy that is based on public consultation with citi-
zens, that continues to gain momentum across the globe. One of the
leading researchers in this area, Hélène Landemore, argues that citi-
zens’ assemblies and juries have become vivid examples of how the direct
participation of citizens can make policies more informed, efficient and
legitimate.39 Today’s political deliberation extensively relies on online
technologies with the trend becoming particularly evident in the wake
of the COVID-19 pandemic.40 Citizens’ assemblies have great potential
to channel public activity into meaningful decision-making and connect
it to representative democracy. Apart from that, online voting spreading
from Canada to Estonia is used to help politicians decide on key issues
of local communities. Big data and machine learning can also be used to
scan social problems and improve feedback loops rather than be exploited
solely for the sake of successful political campaigns.
39 Hélène Landemore, Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First
Century (Princeton University Press: 2020), p. 272.
40 Claudia Chwalisz, “The Pandemic Has Pushed Citizen Panels Online”, Nature, 589
(2021), p. 171.
Changing the nature of social media requires more sophisticated

responses. Combating fake news and fact checking are good starting
points that are already high on the agenda. The problem is that they
haven’t prevented polarisation and cognitive biases. The example of the
United States shows that citizens tend to interpret political issues through
a partisan perspective and use the term “fake news” when “referring to
information uncongenial to one’s own beliefs.”41 As Francis Fukuyama
argued “the Internet has allowed people to mistake speech acts for acts
that affect outcomes in the real world… This is not to say that social
media cannot lead to meliorative outcomes in the real world. Most
people, however, are satisfied with the simulacrum of reality that they
get through their online interactions.”42 To change such attitudes would
mean changing the way people see the Internet as a tool of responsible
political actions based on norms of civil society, verification of information
as well as respect for private opinions and zones of privacy. Recalibrating
corporate algorithms is another vector but that would require a lot of
work from lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic as well as public discus-
sion on forms and limits of regulation. GDPR is a great example of data
protection, however, it is necessary to watch carefully that GDPR’s safe-
guards do not compromise freedom of speech that is already endangered
in such EU countries as Hungary or Poland.43
In illiberal countries the situation is more one-dimensional. Digital
illiberalism is rooted in the nature of such political regimes. Bureaucracies
and special services tend to interfere much deeper into the digital space
seeing it as a potential threat to the stability of the state. In countries like
China and Russia governments control what their citizens can and cannot
see online and shrink and destroy the space for independent thought on
the Internet.44 “Sovereign Internet” approaches won’t reverse to a more
41 Chau Tong, Hyungjin Gill, Jianing Li, Sebastián Valenzuela & Hernando Rojas,
“Fake News Is Anything They Say!”—Conceptualization and Weaponization of Fake News
Among the American Public”, Mass Communication and Society, 23:5 (2020), p. 760.
42 Fukuayama, Liberalism and Its Discontents, pp. 112–113.
43 Nani Jansen Reventlow, “Can the GDPR and Freedom of Expression Coexist?”,
AJIL Unbound, 114 (2020), p. 34.
44 Yaqiu Wang, “In China, the ‘Great Firewall’ Is Changing a Generation”, Politico.com
(9 January 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/01/china-great-
firewall-generation-405385 (Accessed 10 August 2022); John Thornhill, “Russia’s Digital
Iron Curtain Will Fail”, Financial Times (10 March 2022), https://www.ft.com/con
tent/26e88a2b-c7ba-46c7-8191-490188f4757b (Accessed 10 August 2022).
20 P. KANEVSKIY
open digital political culture unless pushed by political transformations

from the inside.
The underlying issue is how the Internet could be governed to remain
part of the liberal order and to reduce the risks of descending into greater
illiberalism. The biggest dilemma is that Internet governance has two
faces; one of a democratic nature and another of a coercive and manipu-
lative one. Both digital liberalism and illiberalism are rooted in the global
web’s open nature. The absence of clear rules and norms has created a
vacuum that was filled by radical populists of all kinds, private corporate
interests and illiberal regimes, and it allowed governments and political
parties to exploit unregulated flows of big data.
That leads to the next question: Who should be responsible for
creating a more structured, understandable and legitimate set of rules?
Illiberal states would obviously want a more multilateral approach like
the revival of the ITU mandate, but that would most likely legalise and
legitimise the partition of the Internet along geopolitical and ideological
lines. One possible answer is that the current deregulated regime with
ICANN at its core should be reformed. Internet governance should be a
multi-stakeholder process with international civil society having more of a
voice within the regulatory mechanism. That also requires a more robust
action from politicians, lawmakers and civil societies across the world
who should acknowledge the risks of the Internet remaining an informal
and therefore highly politicised space. That requires a lot of balancing
because giving too much regulative power to national governments will
only further depreciate its original liberal nature. Whether through the
comprehensive reform of ICANN or the creation of new institutions, we
need to make sure that any new attempt to regulate the Internet and the
way information is spread online doesn’t undermine basic freedoms and
is used for the benefit of liberal democracy.
Conclusion
The connection between digital liberalism and illiberalism is ambiguous
because the Internet itself is both a liberation technology and technology
of control. Realistically it is hard to disconnect one from another. The
biggest challenge in dealing with digital illiberalism is the open and dereg-
ulated nature of the Internet. The Internet is different from information
technologies of the past because it potentially gives every citizen and
social group the power to shape public opinion and influence political
actions. Platforms of digital communication allow the spread of any kind

of information and disinformation, but their strengths are easily turned
into weaknesses; they are vulnerable to excessive control and manipula-
tion. Reversing digital illiberalism will require a new approach to Internet
governance, to the ways social media algorithms are organised, and to the
Internet’s function in a modern democracy. At the same time digital illib-
eralism is not the cause but the effect of the larger illiberal wave in the
Euro-Atlantic community and beyond that has deep roots in economic,
demographic, political and cultural shifts across the globe. If and when the
liberal international liberal order is fixed and the next global wave of liber-
alisation arrives digital illiberalism will not fade away completely but it can
at least lose its current impact. The power of the Internet lies in its ability
to open the way to critical thinking, to accelerate economic and social
development, to build cultural, economic and political ties among groups
and nations, to break stereotypes, and to foster the spread of democratic
ideas. This is why any attempt to introduce more regulation in the digital
sphere requires careful treatment. An overregulated Internet will not solve
the problems of the liberal order but likely make things worse.
CHAPTER 2
The Emergence of E-participation Tools:

Strengthening Democracy Through Inclusive
Debates
Julia Berghofer
Introduction
Direct democracy is not part of the political process in most countries,
which is one reason why participation in the public political discourse
for citizens who are not part of the political establishment is traditionally
limited. This can lead to discontent with citizens who do not have access
to these debates. Likewise, the bureaucratic process around some available
tools is complex and may lead to lesser engagement. However, leaders in
countries like Germany have started to understand that broader and more
inclusive participation by citizens can contribute to strengthen demo-
cratic structures and the legitimacy of the decision-making processes.
E-participation, whose “tools and approaches are constantly evolving
J. Berghofer (B)
European Leadership Network (ELN), London, UK
e-mail: juliab@europeanleadershipnetwork.org
Younger Generation Leaders Network (YGLN), Berlin, Germany
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 23

Switzerland AG 2023
J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies
in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_2
24 J. BERGHOFER
parallel to new technologies and the digitalization of various services”1 is

an effective way to increase the inclusivity of participation. Thanks to the
availability and widespread reach of digital technologies—the use of social
media platforms, videoconferencing, etc.—in most parts of the world it
offers an opportunity for engaging a larger part of the citizenship in policy
processes.
Given the limitations of this contribution it is not possible to provide
a holistic assessment of e-participation tools. Therefore, an assessment
of the strengths and weaknesses of three specific initiatives—the Dialog
Endlagersicherheit, the Bürgerrat—Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt, and
the Bundestag’s (public) e-petition platform—is used to exemplify the
opportunities and challenges linked to e-participation tools from the view-
point of their reach, their contribution to the decision-making process
and user-friendliness. These initiatives have been selected because of their
popularity and relevance. They have certain aspects in common and other
aspects in which they differ. Their commonality is the timeliness of their
respective focal area; the concreteness of their output; a combination of
online and offline activities. The aspects where they partly differ are the
scope of participation and inclusiveness; the level of provision of informa-
tion; the ability of participants to take part in consultations; possibilities
for active participation; the accessibility of the tools provided by the
conveners; their timeline; and concrete outcomes.
The chapter begins by providing information on the concept of e-
participation as a tool to support e-government and enhance digital
democracy. Subsequently, it will look at Germany’s overall performance
in e-participation and e-government, before examining the three initia-
tives mentioned above and their respective approach. In the final section,
the chapter will provide some thoughts on the effectiveness of these
approaches based on principles laid down by the research services of the
United Nations (UN) and the European Parliament (EP).
1 Lita Akmentina, “E-participation and Engagement in Urban Planning: Experiences

from the Baltic Cities”, Urban Research & Practice (2022). https://doi.org/10.1080/
17535069.2022.2068965.
2 THE EMERGENCE OF E-PARTICIPATION TOOLS: … 25
E-participation: Definition
and the Situation in Germany
The 2020 E-Government Survey, published by the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA),2 defines e-
participation as both a subfield of participation and part of e-government,
the latter being one component of the broader framework of digital
democracy. More precisely, the UN study, describing itself as the “only
global report that assesses the e-government development status of all
United Nations Member States”,3 refers to e-participation as a concept
that “revolves around the use of information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) to engage people in public decision-making, administration
and service delivery”. Alongside pointing out the “intrinsic and instru-
mental value” of this specific form of participation, the publication also
highlights the importance of e-participation for the implementation of the
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In particular, target 16.74
of the UN SDGs calls for ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory, and
representative decision-making at all levels.5
The intrinsic value, the report further explains, “is based on the idea
that participation (…) is a desirable goal because it contributes to inclu-
sive societies”, while the instrumental value lies in “the role it can play
in increasing government accountability, making public services more
responsive to people’s needs, and improving the quality of policies and
2 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government

Survey 2020”, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Docume
nts/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%20Report).pdf
(accessed 27 July 2022).
3 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey
2020”, see section “About this Survey”.https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Por
tals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%
20(Full%20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
4 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government
Survey 2020”, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Docume
nts/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%20Report).pdf
5 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, SDG Indicators, https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/?Text=&Goal=16&
Target=16.7 (accessed 27 July 2022).
26 J. BERGHOFER
legislation”.6 According to the concept laid out by the E-Government

Survey, the core elements of e-participation as an intersection of partici-
pation and e-government are: provision of information, consultation, and
decision-making.7
This approach cannot be seen as a general definition. In a 2016 study
on the “Potential and Challenges of E-Participation in the European
Union”, the European Parliament states that the term e-participation
“suffers from a lack of an all-inclusive definition, as it comprises a
wide range of initiatives”.8 According to this paper, there is neverthe-
less a “general consensus” that it comprises the following interactions
between governments and citizens: e-information, e-consultation, and e-
decision-making.9 Macintosh/Whyte (2008) are using a similar “working
definition” when describing e-participation along the lines of provision of
information, the engagement of citizens through government-led initia-
tives (“top-down”), as well as efforts to empower citizens and civil society
to reach out to their elected representatives (“ground-up”).10 For the
purpose of this chapter—which is not aimed at finding a new defini-
tion—the working definitions provided by the EP and the UN, which also
align with the Macintosh/Whyte definition, will be used. In this sense, e-
participation can be broadly defined as a combination of three aspects: (i)
the provision of information, (ii) consultation of citizens, and (iii) engage-
ment of citizens in the decision-making process through digital means
(which does not exclude a combination of digital and offline tools as will
be shown later in this chapter).

2020”, see Chapter 5 “E-Participation”, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/
Portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20S
urvey%20(Full%20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
7 Ibid.
8 European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, “Potential and Chal-
lenges of E-Participation in the European Union”, (2016), https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556949/IPOL_STU(2016)556949_EN.pdf (accessed
27 July 2022).
9 Ibid.
10 Ann Macintosh and Whyte, Angus, “Towards an Evaluation Framework for ePar-
ticipation.” Transforming Government People Process and Policy, 2:1 (2008). https://doi.
org/10.1108/17506160810862928.
Besides the lack of clear definition of the term “e-participation”,

there are also no clear benchmarks as to what defines “successful” e-
participation tools. Taking the UN and EP publications as a basis,
responsiveness of governments to the needs of their citizens, account-
ability, inclusiveness/accessibility, and effectiveness appear to be dominant
aspects when it comes to assessing the success of e-participation initiatives.
The UN Survey ranks countries according to an E-Participation Index
(EPI) based on the features of national e-government portals. A summary
of these features provided by the study includes 14 points, starting with
the “[a]vailability of online information (on policies and budgets) in the
areas of education, health, social protection, employment, environment
and justice” and ending with “[e]vidence of Government’s publication of
outcomes of policy consultations online”.11 The countries assessed in the
UN publication have been allocated to four distinct EPI levels since 2016,
ranging from “low” to “middle”, “high”, and “very high” EPI values. In
2020, Germany ranks among the countries with a very high EPI level
according to the study,12 which indicates that most of the e-participation
features identified by the UN are present in Germany. Compared by
its E-Government Development Index (EGDI)—a measurement that
includes the Online Service Index (OSI), Telecommunications Infrastruc-
ture Index (TII), and Human Capital Index (HCI)—Germany is ranked
25, thus falling behind, inter alia, the Nordic countries, Estonia, the
UK, France, and the Netherlands. Compared to 42 other countries in
Europe that were assessed by the authors of the study, Germany’s perfor-
mance is therefore only moderately satisfactory. Although Germany still
holds a very high EDGI value (rating class V3—which equals 15 out
of 16 possible ranks), the survey states that “focusing on improvements
in online services provision could greatly accelerate progress in overall
e-government development”.
With regard to citizens’ preparedness to engage politically via online
tools, there have been only a few German-speaking studies published in

2020”, see p. 118, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Doc
uments/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%20Repo
rt).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
2020”, see p. 119, Table 5.1, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/ego
vkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%
20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
28 J. BERGHOFER
recent times. One insightful study on e-democracy has been conducted by

Germany’s digital association Bitkom.13 It was presented in September
2021, ahead of the general elections. The study investigates to what
extent citizens consume information about political topics online, whether
they appreciate online dialogue opportunities with politicians, and
whether there is appetite for more e-participation tools. According to
the study, while the younger generation is most likely to gather polit-
ical information online, there is a huge interest among almost half of
the respondents across all age groups to engage in an online dialogue
with politicians, thus implying a greater desire for active involvement.
Also, more than a third of the respondents have already tried out e-
participation tools, be it in a regional, federal, or European context. More
than half of the respondents would like to do so in the future. The
study also flags divergencies regarding the approval for e-participation in
different contexts: while 33% of the respondents have already engaged
in e-participation on a federal level, and 31% indicated an interest to do
so in the future, actual participation and interest is considerably lower
regarding the EU level (9% and 22%, respectively). The authors of the
study add that the higher engagement rate and interest with regard to
the federal level might be due to the availability of several existing tools,
for instance e-petitions.
Dialog Endlagersicherheit
The topic of Endlagersicherheit (repository safety) is one of the most
controversial themes in post-War Germany, as it is linked to another
contentious issue, nuclear energy. While there was some optimism in the
early days of nuclear energy, huge demonstrations in the 1970s and the
Chernobyl incident in 1986 have stirred more criticism among the popu-
lation.14 The Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats continued to
reassure the German public of the safety of nuclear power plants, while
in sharp contrast, the Green Party established itself as a key opponent of
13 Bitkom, “Bitkom stellt Studie zu E-Democracy vor”, (9 September 2021), https://

www.bitkom.org/Presse/Presseinformation/Bitkom-stellt-Studie-zu-E-Democracy-vor
14 BUND, “AKW in Deutschland”, https://www.bund.net/themen/atomkraft/akw-in-
deutschland/ (accessed 27 July 2022).
atomic energy, and the Social Democrats slowly embarked on a similar

route.15
After more than a decade of hard struggle among opposing political
forces about a possible nuclear phase-out, the tragic reactor incident in
Fukushima in 2011 led to a rethinking among nuclear energy propo-
nents. The German government eventually decided to gradually eradicate
atomic energy. Chancellor Merkel, once known as “enthusiastic supporter
of nuclear energy”,16 made a remarkable “180-degree turn”17 when she
announced only four days after the incident plans for Germany to phase
out until 2022, adding in a public statement that “the world has changed
through Fukushima”.18 Her decision was backed by a broad majority in
the Bundestag. The incident also strengthened public mistrust against the
continued reliance on nuclear energy.19
However, identifying a final repository for spent nuclear fuel proved
a difficult issue to solve. Indeed, Germany has been struggling with the
problem of finding a final storage since the late 1970s. While the small
municipality of Gorleben in Lower Saxony has been treated as possible
long-term storage site, public resistance and protest marches have led to
a growing awareness among politicians that a top-down approach would
not be feasible and that an involvement of citizens might lead to increased
15 SWR2, “Bundestagsdebatte zu Tschernobyl und Atomkraft” (25 April 2022),

https://www.ardaudiothek.de/episode/archivradio-geschichte-in-originaltoenen/bundes
tagsdebatte-zu-tschernobyl-und-atomkraft/swr2/88310820/ (accessed 27 July 2022).
16 “Out of Control: Merkel Credibility with Nuclear U-Turn”, Der Spiegel (21
March 2011), https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/out-of-control-merkel-gam
bles-credibility-with-nuclear-u-turn-a-752163.html (accessed 27 July 2022).
17 NTV, “Merkel verteidigt 180-Grad-Wende in Atompolitik Schwarz-Gelb wirbt um
rot-grüne Zustimmung”, (15 March 2011), https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Schwarz-Gelb-
wirbt-um-rot-gruene-Zustimmung-article2850061.html (accessed 27 July 2022).
18 WDR, “15. März 2011 - Merkel verkündet Abkehr von Atomenergie”, (15
March 2021), https://www1.wdr.de/stichtag/stichtag-fukushima-merkel-abschaltung-
akw-atommoratorium-100.html (accessed 27 July 2022).
19 Deutschlandfunk, Endstation Fukushima, (25 November 2011), https://www.deu
tschlandfunk.de/endstation-fukushima-100.html (accessed 27 July 2022); for a more
detailed assessment of the loss of trust in atomic energy in Germany against the back-
ground of media framing, see Wolling, Jens (Ed.); Arlt, Dorothee (Ed.), “Fukushima
und die Folgen - Medienberichterstattung, Öffentliche Meinung, Politische Konse-
quenzen”, (2014), https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/49390/
49390_1.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 27 July 2022).
30 J. BERGHOFER
acceptance among the population.20 Gorleben today is no longer an

option, and the government is now planning to identify an alternative
by 2031.
Against this background, the Federal Ministry for Environment,
Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety, and Consumer Protection (BMUV)
ran the Dialog Endlagersicherheit from July to November 2019. The aim
was to comprehensively involve citizens as laid down in the Repository
Site Selection Act (Standortauswahlgesetz—StandAG)21 which entered
into force in 2017.22 The StandAG regulates the search for a suitable
repository site for highly radioactive waste in Germany. The first step
in the process consisted of further strengthening the security require-
ments of the StandAG through a new regulation.23 The BMUV involved
experts, relevant stakeholders as well as interested citizens without expert
knowledge in the in-person and virtual discussions about the new regula-
tion.
The website of the BMUV further explains the various steps of
the dialogue, starting in July 2019. The steps include, inter alia, an
online dialogue in August 2019 which preceded a public symposium in
September and the amendment of the StandAG in May 2020.24 In sum,
the entire dialogue process can be described as a combination of three
elements: (i) provision of information on the website (www.dialog-end
lagersicherheit.de): explanatory videos, information about relevant legis-
lation and other publications, and a specific youth module; (ii) virtual
consultation and active participation online: opportunity to comment
the regulation, virtual dialogue, submission of written statements, and;
20 DW, “Der lange Weg zum Atommüll-Endlager”, (28 September 2020), https://
www.dw.com/de/der-lange-weg-zum-atommüll-endlager/a-55080914 (accessed 27 July
2022).
21 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbrauch-
erschutz, “Dialog Endlagersicherheit”, https://www.bmuv.de/themen/bildung-beteil
igung/beteiligung/dialog-endlagersicherheit (accessed 27 July 2022).
22 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbraucher-
schutz “Endlagersicherheit: Der Weg zum sicheren Einschluss”, (August 2019), https://
www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Endlagerprojekte/endlagersich
erheit_bf.pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
23 Ibid.
erschutz, “Dialog Endlagersicherheit”, https://www.bmuv.de/themen/bildung-beteil
igung/beteiligung/dialog-endlagersicherheit (accessed 27 July 2022).
(iii) in-person consultation: symposium over two days in Berlin. The

final report25 of the BMUV published in the aftermath revealed some
interesting data: The website counts 5,530 visitors and 116 comments
to Articles 1 and 2 of the draft regulation that were under considera-
tion. Furthermore, the ministry reports almost 19,000 page views for the
online platform, alongside more than 1,600 downloaded materials, which
appears to be a high number.
From a technical perspective, the online platform seems to have been
easily accessible as the final report shows. The participants were able to
insert their comments directly into a text box next to the draft regulation
on the website. In addition, they were able to submit more comprehen-
sive written reactions via email, which happened in 24 cases. The process
was open to everyone and is described on the BMUV’s website as “low-
threshold”. However, the final report reveals that only 40 persons made
use of the opportunity to comment the regulation. The numbers are even
lower for the online dialogue which counted only four contributions.
After the Dialog ended, the BMUV collated the comments and reac-
tions submitted by the participants providing them for evaluation by
experts. Based on these evaluations, there have been some changes
to the draft regulation (Verordnung über Sicherheitsanforderungen und
vorläufige Sicherheitsuntersuchungen für die Endlagerung hochradioaktiver
Abfälle).26
Bürgerrat Demokratie
Unlike the Dialog Endlagersicherheit, which was designed to combine in-
person elements with e-participation tools, the second round of the Bürg-
errat —Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt (Citizens’ Assembly—Germany’s

erschutz, “Schlussbericht: Dialog Endlagersicherheit”, (July 2020), https://www.bmuv.
de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Pools/Forschungsdatenbank/fkz_4718E03290_schlussber
icht_bf.pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
erschutz, “Verordnung des Bundesministeriums für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare
Sicherheit”, (6 April 2020), https://www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_
PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/19._Lp/endlsianf_verordnung/Entwurf/endlsianf_vo_refe_vero
rdnung_bf.pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
32 J. BERGHOFER
Role in the World)27 was moved into the virtual space as a response to the
pandemic. Initially, it was designed as a format in which participants meet
and discuss physically. Hence, the first round of the Bürgerrat took place
in the form of in-person gatherings. The project has been realised by the
initiative Mehr Demokratie e.V., which describes itself on its website as the
largest NGO for direct democracy globally, as well as “non-partisan and
charitable”, comprising 10,000 members and “informing 200,000”.28
Moving into the virtual space, the conveners of the discussion plat-
form brought together a group of 160 randomly selected citizens from
different socioeconomic and professional backgrounds via an online
platform. Over the course of ten meetings, the organisers provided partic-
ipants with detailed information on topics such as trade and EU, with
inputs by renowned experts like Timothy Garton Ash and Nicole Deit-
elhoff. Likewise, participants had the opportunity to actively engage and
debate during the video sessions.
The Bürgerrat started with a first “preparation” phase in the Autumn
of 2020. This phase was dedicated to drafting a working programme,
including a selection of topics, implementing institutes, parliamentary
groups of the Bundestag, and civil society organisations.29 This initial
process was accompanied by online discussion rounds with randomly
selected participants. The initiative came up with five focal areas: sustain-
able development, economy and trade, peace and security, democracy
and the rule of law, and the European Union. During the second of the
process,30 ten virtual meetings took place between January and February
2021, both in the form of plenary as well as working group sessions.
The discussions were supported by professional moderators and experts
who provided their insights as “living libraries”. During these meetings, of
which some have been live streamed, the participants worked on concrete
proposals in the five fields.
27 Bürgerrat, “Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt”, https://deutschlands-rolle.buergerra

t.de (accessed 27 July 2022).
28 Mehr Demokratie, “Profil von Mehr Demokratie e.V”, https://www.mehr-demokr
atie.de/ueber-uns/profil (accessed 27 July 2022).
29 Bürgerrat, “Phase 1: Preparation”, (Autumn 2020), https://deutschlands-rolle.bue
rgerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/preparation/ (accessed 27 July 2022).
30 Bürgerrat, “Phase 2: Meetings”, (January/February 2021), https://deutschlands-
rolle.buergerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/meetings/ (accessed 27 July 2022).
The third phase31 in March 2021 involved presenting the proposals

which were then published in a “Citizens’ Report”. The report has been
handed over to the President of the Bundestag and to parliamentary
groups. The final phase32 began in March 2021 and was dedicated to
“civil society monitoring” by which the organisers mean the process of
evaluating the implementation of the report’s recommendations through
continued discussions with parliamentarians. The list of the meetings is
long and reveals a high level of ambition: In April, the Bürgerrat has
presented its report to then-foreign minister Heiko Maas; in July, there
has been a discussion with the Bundestag Committee on Economic Coop-
eration and Development; in August, the group convened for workshops
at the Federal Academy for Security Policy and the Chancellor’s Office,
to name but a few.
The Bürgerrat initiative is characterised by a high level of profession-
alism, a creative website, and a coherent agenda. The access, however, was
restricted since the project was only open to 160 selected participants.
Since the agenda of the Bürgerrat was much broader than the Dialog
Endlagersicherheit, it offered a wider scope for deliberation, consultation,
and exchange of ideas between participants in an online format. While the
aim of the Dialog was to work on a very specific regulation with a narrow
focus, the Bürgerrat was more about developing visions and a larger set
of recommendations on Germany’s future role in the world. At the same
time, both processes can be described as result oriented.
(Public) E-Petitions
The UN E-Government Survey 2020 notes that while the use of e-
participation tools continues to spread over more countries, there is
also “a trend towards multi-function participation platforms”,33 which
31 Bürgerrat, “Phase 3: Handover to the Bundestag”, (March 2021), https://deu

tschlands-rolle.buergerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/handover-to-the-bundestag/ (accessed
27 July 2022).
32 Bürgerrat, “Phase 4: Implementation Phase”, from March 2021 on, https://deutsc
hlands-rolle.buergerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/implementation-phase/ (accessed 27 July
2022).
2020”, see Executive summary, p. xxx, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Por
tals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%
20(Full%20Report).pdf, (accessed 27 July 2022).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
CHAPTER X
INSPECTION. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF
ARRIVING IMMIGRANTS
The immigrant first comes under the official control of the United
States government when he arrives at the port of destination. There
are a number of seaports on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts
designated by the Bureau as ports of entry for immigrants. Entry at
any other ports is illegal. The facilities for the inspection and care of
immigrants differ in extent in the different ports with the demands
placed upon them, but the general line of procedure is the same in
all. As New York has the most elaborate and complete immigrant
station in the country and receives three quarters or more of all the
immigrants, it may be taken as typical of the fullest development of
our inspection system.
A ship arriving in New York is first subject to examination by the
quarantine officials. Then the immigrants are turned over to the
officers of the Immigration Bureau. All aliens entering a port of the
United States are subject to the immigration law, and have to submit
to inspection. First or second class passage does not, contrary to a
common impression, secure immunity. Cabin passengers are given a
preliminary inspection by the officials on board the vessel, and if
they are plainly admissible, they are allowed to land without further
formality. If there is any question as to their eligibility, they are taken
to Ellis Island, and subjected to a closer examination. While there,
they have to put up with the same accommodations as are accorded
to steerage passengers. During three months of the spring of 1910
twenty-five hundred cabin passengers were thus taken over to Ellis
Island, and the commissioner in charge at that port was led to
recommend that better facilities be provided for this class of
immigrants.[144] This recommendation was repeated in 1912.
The steerage passengers are loaded on to barges, rented by the
steamship companies, and transferred to the immigrant station. This
is located on Ellis Island, a group of small islands in the harbor, not
far from the Statue of Liberty. It consists of two main parts, on one of
which is located the main building, containing offices, sleeping
rooms, restaurant, inspection rooms, ticket offices, etc.; on the other
are the hospitals, etc. This temporary disembarkment does not
constitute a legal landing; the immigrants are still nominally on
shipboard, and the transportation companies are responsible for
their support until they are legally landed.
After landing on the Island, the immigrants pass through a
detailed process of examination, during which all the facts required
by the statutes are ascertained and recorded, as far as possible. This
examination consists of three main parts. The first is the medical
examination made by officers of the United States Public Health and
Marine Hospital Service. These inspect the immigrants for all
physical weaknesses or diseases which make them liable to
exclusion. The next stage is the examination by an inspector who
asks the long list of questions required by the law, in order to
determine whether the alien is, for any nonphysical reason,
inadmissible. If the immigrant appears to be “clearly and beyond a
doubt” entitled to admission, he passes on to the discharging
quarters, where he is turned over to the agents of the appropriate
transportation company, or to a “missionary,” or is set free to take
his way to the city by the ferry.
If any alien is not clearly entitled to admission, he must appear
before a board of special inquiry, which goes into his case more
deliberately and thoroughly, in order to determine whether he is
legally admissible. Appeal from the decision of these boards, in cases
provided for by the statutes, may be made either by the alien or by a
dissenting member of the board. Such appeal goes through the
Commissioner and the Commissioner General of Immigration to the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor, whose decision is final.
Many aliens must of necessity be detained on the Island, either
during investigation, or, in case they are excluded, while awaiting
their return to the country from which they came. The feeding of
these aliens, along with certain other services, is intrusted to
“privilege holders,” selected carefully by government authority.
The volume of business transacted on Ellis Island each year is
immense. There are in all about six hundred and ten officials,
including ninety-five medical officers and hospital attendants,
engaged in administering the law at this station. The force of
interpreters is probably the largest in the world, gathered under a
single roof. At other immigrant stations the course of procedure
follows the same general lines, though the amount of business is very
much less.[145]
This is obviously one of the most difficult and delicate of all the
branches of government service. Questions involving the breaking up
of families, the annihilation of long-cherished plans, and a host of
other intimate human relations, even of life and death itself, present
themselves in a steady stream before the inspectors. Every instinct of
humanity argues on the side of leniency to the ignorant, stolid,
abused, and deceived immigrant. On the other hand, the inspector
knows that he is placed as a guardian of the safety and welfare of his
country. He is charged with the execution of an intricate and iron-
bound set of laws and regulations, into which his personal feelings
and inclinations must not be allowed to enter. Any lapse into too
great leniency is a betrayal of his trust. One who has not actually
reviewed the cases can have no conception of the intricacy of the
problems which are constantly brought up for decision.
Is it surprising that the casual and tender-hearted visitor who
leans over the balcony railing or strolls through the passages,
blissfully ignorant of the laws and of the meaning of the whole
procedure, should think that he detects instances of brutality and
hard-heartedness? To him, the immigrants are a crowd of poor but
ambitious foreigners, who have left all for the sake of sharing in the
glories of American life, and are now being ruthlessly and
inconsiderately turned back at the very door by a lot of cruel and
indifferent officials. He writes a letter to his home paper, telling of
the “Brutality at Ellis Island.” Even worse than these ignorant and
sentimental critics are those clever and malicious writers who,
inspired by the transportation companies or other selfish interests,
paint distorted, misleading, and exaggerated pictures of affairs on
Ellis Island, and to serve their own ends strive to bring into disrepute
government officials who are conscientiously doing their best to
perform a most difficult public duty.[146]
It would not be safe to say that there never has been any brutality
on Ellis Island, or that there is none now. Investigators of some
reputation have given specific instances.[147] It would be almost
beyond the realm of possibility that in so large a number of officials,
coming in daily contact with thousands of immigrants, there should
be none who were careless, irritable, impatient, or vicious. How
much of maltreatment there may be depends very largely upon the
character and competency of the commissioner in charge. The point
is, that no one is qualified to pass an opinion upon the treatment of
immigrants, except a thoroughly trained investigator, equipped with
a full knowledge of the laws and regulations, and an unbiased mind.
One thing in particular which impresses the dilettante observer is
the haste with which proceedings are conducted, and the physical
force which is frequently employed to push an immigrant in one
direction, or hold him back from another. It must be admitted that
both of these exist—and they are necessary. During the year 1907 five
thousand was fixed as the maximum number of immigrants who
could be examined at Ellis Island in one day;[148] yet during the
spring of that year more than fifteen thousand immigrants arrived at
the port of New York in a single day. It is evident that under such
conditions haste becomes a necessity.
The work has to be done with the equipment provided, and greater
hardship may sometimes be caused by delay than by haste. As to the
physical handling of immigrants, this is necessitated by the need for
haste, combined with the condition of the immigrants. We have seen
that the conditions of the voyage are not calculated to land the
immigrant in an alert and clear-headed state. The bustle, confusion,
rush, and size of Ellis Island complete the work, and leave the
average alien in a state of stupor and bewilderment. He is in no
condition to understand or appreciate a carefully worded explanation
of what he must do, or why he must do it, even if the inspector had
time to give it. The one suggestion which is immediately
comprehensible to him is a pull or a push; if this is not administered
with actual violence, there is no unkindness in it. An amusing
illustration of the dazed state in which the average immigrant goes
through the inspection is furnished by a story told by one of the
officials on the Island. It is related that President Roosevelt once
visited the Island, in company with other distinguished citizens. He
wished to observe the effect of a gift of money on an immigrant
woman, and fearing to be recognized, handed a five-dollar gold piece
to another member of the party, requesting him to hand it to the first
woman with a child in her arms who passed along the line. It was
done. The woman took the coin, slipped it into her dress, and passed
on, without even raising her eyes or giving the slightest indication
that the incident had made any different impression on her than any
of the regular steps in the inspection. It would be a remarkable man,
indeed, who could deal with a steady stream of foreigners, stolid and
unresponsive to begin with and reduced to such a pitch of stupor, day
after day, without occasionally losing his patience.
The information collected at the port of entry is sufficient, when
compiled and tabulated, to give a very complete and detailed picture
of the character of the arriving immigrants, in so far as that can be
statistically portrayed. The reports of the Commissioner General
contain an elaborate set of tables, which are the principal source of
accurate information on the subject. In the following pages these
tables will be summarized, with the intent of bringing out the most
important facts which condition the immigration problem in this
country. Data from other reliable sources will be added as occasion
requires.
During the period 1820 to 1912 a total of 29,611,052 immigrants
have entered the United States. Of these, the Germans have made up
a larger proportion than any other single race, amounting in all to
5,400,899 persons from the German Empire. Until very recently the
Irish have stood second; but as far as can be determined from the
figures the Italians and natives of Austria-Hungary have now passed
them. There have been, in the period mentioned, 3,511,730
immigrants from Austria-Hungary, 3,426,070 immigrants from
Italy, including Sicily and Sardinia, and 3,069,625 from Ireland. But
if the 1,945,812 immigrants from the United Kingdom not specified
could be properly assigned, it would probably appear that Ireland
could still lay claim to second place. The other most important
sources, with their respective contributions, are as follows: Russian
Empire, 2,680,525; England, 2,264,284; British North American
possessions, 1,322,085; Sweden, 1,095,940.[149] When it is considered
how recent is the origin of the immigration from Italy, Russia, and
Austria-Hungary, the significance of these figures becomes apparent.
The figures for a single recent year show very different proportions.
Thus in the year 1907, 28.2 per cent of the total European
immigration came from Austria-Hungary, 23.8 per cent from Italy,
[150]
and 21.6 per cent from the Russian Empire, while only 3.2 per
cent came from the German Empire, 1.7 per cent from Sweden, 2.9
per cent from Ireland, and 4.7 per cent from England.[151] What the
ultimate effect of this sweeping change in nationality will be it is
impossible to predict with any certainty; it is one of the greatest of all
the problems connected with immigration, and can better be
discussed in another connection. Suffice it to say for the present, that
it has put an entirely new face on the question of the assimilation of
the immigrant in this country.
In regard to the sex of the immigrants, the males have always had
the predominance. During the period from 1820 to 1910, 63.8 per
cent of the immigrants were males, and 36.2 per cent females.[152]
This is what might naturally be expected. The first emigration from a
region is almost always an emigration of men. They have the
necessary hardihood and daring to a greater extent than women, and
are better fitted by nature for the work of pioneering. After the
current of emigration becomes well established, women are found
joining in. Early emigrants send for their families, young men send
for their sweethearts, and even some single women venture to go to a
country where there are friends and relatives. But in the majority of
cases the number of males continues to exceed that of females. In the
long run, there will be a greater proportion of men than of women,
because of the natural differences of the sexes. In this respect,
however, there has also been a change in recent years. The
proportion of males is considerably larger among the new
immigrants than among the old. In the decade 1820–1830, when
immigration was still in its beginning, there was a large proportion of
males, amounting to 70 per cent of the total. In the decades of the
forties and fifties, however, the proportion of males fell to 59.5 per
cent and 58 per cent, respectively. But in the decade ending 1910,
69.8 per cent of all the immigrants were males. There is a general
tendency for the proportion of males to rise in a year of large
immigration, and fall as immigration diminishes. This can be traced
with a remarkable degree of regularity throughout the modern
period. It is well exemplified in the last six years. In the year 1907,
when the total immigration reached its highest record, the
proportion of males also reached the highest point since 1830, 72.4
per cent. After the crisis of that year the total immigration fell off
decidedly, and in 1908 the proportion of males was only 64.8 per
cent. In the next year the percentage of males rose to 69.2, while the
total immigration decreased slightly; but since the net gain by
immigration increased in that year,[153] this is not a serious exception
to the rule. In 1910 the total immigration again showed a marked
increase, and the percentage of males rose to 70.7.[154] In 1911 there
was another marked decline in immigration and the percentage of
males fell to 64.9, while a further slight decline in 1912 was
accompanied by a fall in the percentage of males to 63.2.[155] This
phenomenon is undoubtedly accounted for by the fact that the men
come in more direct response to the economic demands of this
country than the women, and hence respond to economic
fluctuations more readily. Many of the female immigrants come to
join men who have established themselves on a footing of fair
prosperity in this country, and are able to have them come even in a
year of hard times.
An examination of the sex distribution of some of the leading races
shows how thoroughly characteristic of the new immigration this
excess of males is. The following table shows the percentages of the
two sexes of certain chosen races for the eleven-year period 1899 to
1909:
SEX DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS OF SPECIFIED RACES, BY PER CENTS, 1899 TO 1909
Per Cent
Race or People
Male Female
Bulgarian, Servian, Montenegrin 96.0 4.0
Croatian and Slovenian 85.1 14.9
English 61.7 38.3
German 59.4 40.6
Greek 95.4 4.6
Hebrew 56.7 43.3
Irish 47.2 52.8
Italian, north 78.4 21.6
Italian, south 78.6 21.4
Lithuanian 71.1 28.9
Magyar 72.7 27.3
Polish 69.2 30.8
Ruthenian 74.0 26.0
Scandinavian 61.3 38.7
Slovak 70.3 29.7
Comparing the entire old immigration for the period specified with
the entire new immigration (European only), we find that of the
former 58.5 per cent were male and 41.5 per cent female; of the latter
73 per cent were male, and 27 per cent female.[156] It is evident that
the new immigration is in no sense an immigration of families, but of
men, either single men, or married men who have left their wives on
the other side. This is due in part to the very fact that it is a new
immigration, partly to the fact that it is, to such a large degree,
temporary or provisional. An immigrant who expects to return to his
native land after a few years in America is more likely to leave his
wife behind him than one who bids farewell to his old home forever.
The typical old immigrant, when he has secured his competency,
sends for his wife to come and join him; the typical new immigrant,
under the same circumstances, in many cases returns to his native
land to spend the remainder of his days in the enjoyment of his
accumulated wealth. The only exception to this rule is that furnished
by the Hebrews, among whom the sexes are nearly equally
distributed. This is one of the many respects in which they stand
apart from the rest of the new immigration. The only race in which
the female immigrants exceed the males is the Irish, and this has
been the case only within recent years. During the years of the great
Irish immigration the males predominated.
The matter of sex is one of the greatest importance to the United
States. It is one thing to have foreign families coming here to cast in
their lots with this nation permanently; it is quite another to have
large groups of males coming over, either with the expectation of
returning ultimately to their native land, or of living in this country
without family connections, for an indefinite number of years. Such
groups form an unnatural element in our population, and alter the
problem of assimilation very considerably. They are willing to work
for a lower wage than if they were trying to support families in this
country, and are not nearly so likely to be brought into touch with the
molding forces of American life as are foreign family groups. Their
habits of life, as will appear later,[157] are abnormal, and tend to result
in depreciated morals and physique. Many of the most unfortunate
conditions surrounding the present immigration situation may be
traced to this great preponderance of males.
The one thing that can be said in favor of this state of affairs is that
such a group of immigrants furnishes a larger number of workers
than one more evenly distributed between the sexes. This is an
argument which will appeal to many; but to many others, who have
the best welfare of the country at heart, it will appear wholly
inadequate to offset the serious disadvantages which result from the
situation. The Immigration Commission expresses its opinion that,
in the effort to reduce the oversupply of unskilled labor in this
country by restricting immigration, special discrimination should be
made against men unaccompanied by wives or children.[158]
In regard to the age of immigrants the most striking fact is that the
great bulk of them are in the middle age groups. In the year 1912 the
distribution of the total immigration among the different age groups
was as follows: under fourteen years, 13.6 per cent; fourteen to forty-
four years, 80.9 per cent; forty-five years and over, 5.5 per cent. In
the total population of the United States the respective percentages
in these groups are about 30, 51, and 19. There is only a slight
difference in this respect between the new and the old immigration.
Of the total European immigration for the years 1899 to 1909, the
old immigration had 12.8 per cent in the first age group, 80.4 per
cent in the second, and 6.8 per cent in the third; the new
immigration had 12.2 per cent in the first, 83.5 per cent in the
second, and 4.3 per cent in the third.[159] There is, however, a very
marked difference between the races. This will be brought out by the
following table, which shows the age distribution of certain selected
races, for the year 1910:
DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS OF SPECIFIED RACES AMONG THE AGE GROUPS, BY PER
CENTS, 1910
Age, Per Cent
Race or People
Under 14 Years 14 to 44 Years 45 Years and Over
Croatian and Slovenian 4.7 91.0 3.3
German 17.0 75.9 7.1
Greek 2.6 96.0 1.4
Hebrew 25.9 67.9 6.2
Irish 7.4 88.3 4.3
Italian, south 10.4 83.5 6.1
Polish 7.6 89.7 2.7
Here, again, the Hebrews appear as an exception to the general
rule as regards the new immigration and, in this case, as regards the
total immigration.
The showing in regard to age substantiates the observation already
made that our modern immigration is in no sense an immigration of
families. This, too, affects the chances for assimilation very
considerably. As regards the economic efficiency of the immigrants,
the age distribution, added to the sex distribution, marks them as a
selected group. When it is further considered that the physically and
mentally feeble, and those who are unlikely to be able to earn their
own living are weeded out in the process of inspection, it appears
that those who look upon the immigrant as nothing more than a
source of cheap labor have much reason to be pleased with the
quality of our immigration. The productive power of a group of
immigrants averages very much higher than a corresponding number
of persons taken from the general population of the race from which
they come.
Herein lies perhaps the greatest and most popular argument for
immigration. It is claimed that without our foreign laboring force it
would have been impossible to develop the resources of the country
so rapidly and completely as they have been developed, and that if
the supply were cut off now, it would seriously cripple the entire
industry of the country. It is certainly true that under the present
organization of industry in this country, production in many lines
depends to a very important degree upon foreign labor. How much of
truth there is in the deduction that without the immigrants this
country would be much farther back in the industrial race than it is
to-day, will be considered in another connection.[160]
There are many citizens of the United States, however, who look
upon the immigrant as something more than a mere productive
machine. To them the proof of his economic efficiency is not
sufficient. They wish to know something of his adaptability to
assimilation into the American life, and of his probable contribution
to the ethnic type of the United States. To such as these, there are a
number of further conditions which must be considered, and which
are of at least equal significance in determining the final effects of
immigration upon this country.
Prominent among these is the intellectual quality of the
immigrant. This is naturally a very difficult thing to measure. Beyond
actual feeble-mindedness, the only test of intellectual capacity which
has received wide application is the literacy—or, as it is more
frequently expressed, the illiteracy—test. This concerns the ability to
read and write, and is given a great deal of weight by many students
of the subject. It is not, however, necessarily an indication of
intellectual capacity, but rather of education. The inability to read or
write may be due to lack of early opportunity, rather than to inferior
mental caliber. Nevertheless, the matter of literacy has received
sufficient attention, and is in fact of sufficient importance, so that it
is desirable to have the facts in this respect before us.
Two forms of illiteracy are recognized by the immigration
authorities, inability to either read or write, and inability to write
coupled with ability to read. The latter class is a very small one, and
for all practical purposes those who are spoken of as illiterates are
those who can neither read nor write. For the period of 1899–1909
the average illiteracy of all European immigrants fourteen years of
age or over was 26.6 per cent. There is a marked difference between
the old and new immigrants in this respect. Of the former class,
during the period mentioned, only 2.7 per cent of the immigrants
fourteen years of age or over was illiterate; of the latter class, 35.6
per cent. The same difference is brought out by the following table,
showing the illiteracy of certain specified races:
PERCENTAGE OF ILLITERACY[161] OF IMMIGRANTS OF THE SPECIFIED RACES, 14
YEARS OF AGE OR OVER, FOR THE YEARS 1899 TO 1909[162]
Race or People Per Cent
Scandinavian 0.4
English 1.1
Irish 2.7
German 5.1
Italian, north 11.8
Magyar 11.4
Hebrew 25.7
Greek 27.0
Roumanian 34.7
Polish 35.4
Croatian and Slovenian 36.4
Italian, south 54.2
Portuguese 68.2
161. Those who can neither read nor write.

162. Rept. Imm. Com., Emig. Cond. in Eur., Abs., p. 17.
Where there is such a marked difference between races as is
exhibited in the foregoing table, it seems fair to assume that there is
a corresponding difference in the intellectual condition of the
respective peoples—if not in their potential capacity, at least in the
actual mental equipment of the immigrants themselves.[163] In fact, it
is quite customary to take the degree of illiteracy as a reasonable
index of the desirability of a given stream of immigration. There
seems to be considerable basis for this idea, for it appears probable
that an immigrant who has had the ability and the opportunity to
secure, in his home land, such a degree of education as is indicated
by the ability to read and write, is better equipped for adapting
himself to life in a new country than one who has not. On the other
hand, there is considerable testimony to the effect that the
immigrants who have the hardest time to get along in this country
are those who have a moderate degree of education, bookkeepers,
mediocre musicians, clerks, etc. They are either unable or unwilling
to do the menial work which their less educated countrymen
perform, and are not able to compete with persons trained in this
country in the occupations which they followed at home. There are
relatively few of the occupations into which the typical immigrant of
to-day goes, and for which he is encouraged to come to this country,
in which the ability to read and write adds to the efficiency of the
worker to any considerable degree. It is possible that the ability to
read and write may hasten the process of assimilation somewhat; it is
questionable whether it adds appreciably to the economic fitness of
the immigrant for life in this country.
The question of literacy as a test of immigrants has received a large
amount of attention recently through its inclusion in the proposed
immigration bill which barely failed of becoming a law early in the
year 1913. This bill was the result of the investigations of the
Immigration Commission, and embodied several of the
recommendations of that body. The one upon which most of the
opposition was centered was a clause providing a reading test for
adult aliens. There were certain exceptions to the rule, however, so
that in its actual application the exclusion would have been limited
almost wholly to adult males. The bill passed both houses of
Congress, but was vetoed by the President, after a careful and judicial
consideration. The Senate promptly passed the bill over the veto, but
a similar action in the House failed by the narrow margin of half a
dozen votes.
The agitation for a literacy test rests upon two main groups of
arguments. The first class includes the efforts to show that literacy,
in itself, is a desirable qualification for citizenship, economically,
socially, and politically. The second group rests on the belief that the
total number of immigrants ought to be cut down, and that a literacy
test is a good way to accomplish the result. It is not unlikely that this
latter set of opinions predominated over the former in the minds of
the adherents of the proposed measure, though it was not necessarily
expressed openly. And there is much to be said in favor of the literacy
test from this point of view. In the first place, it is a perfectly definite
and comprehensible test, which could be applied by the immigrant to
himself before he left his native village. In the second place, it is a
test which any normal alien could prepare himself to meet if he were
willing to make the effort. It does not seem too much to require of
one who wishes to become a member of the American body politic,
that he take the pains to equip himself with the rudiments of an
education before presenting himself. Finally, as Miss Claghorn has
pointed out,[164] it is a test which would react favorably upon the
immigrant himself. It is impossible to tell, as noted above, just how
much value attaches to literacy in the effort of the alien to maintain
himself in this country. Yet without doubt there is some advantage.
And perhaps there would be even more in the strengthening of
character and purpose which would result from the effort to attain it.
A glance at the preceding table will show which of the immigrant
races, as the immigration stream is now constituted, would be most
affected by such a test. But it is not at all impossible that the passage
of a literacy test by this government would have the effect of
materially stimulating the progress of education in some of the more
backward countries of Europe.
This tendency to illiteracy on the part of immigrants is apparently
well overcome in the second generation, for among the employees in
manufacturing studied by the Immigration Commission the
percentage of illiteracy was lower among the native-born
descendants of foreign fathers than among the native-born of native
fathers.[165]
In the year 1910 information was collected for the first time in
regard to the conjugal condition of immigrants. The figures on this
point are summarized in the following table, which gives the
percentages of each sex, in the different age groups, who are in the
different classifications as to conjugal condition.
CONJUGAL CONDITION OF IMMIGRANTS, 1910
PERCENTAGES
Sex 14 to 44 Years[166] 45 Years and Over
Single Married Widowed Divorced Single Married Widowed Divorced
Male 55.3 44.2 0.5 [167] 5.2 86.8 7.9 [167]
Female 57.7 39.9 2.3 [167] 6.6 52.8 40.5 0.1

166. All the immigrants under 14 were single, with the exception of one
female.
167. Less than one tenth of 1 per cent.
This table furnishes further verification of the fact that our present
immigration is in no sense an immigration of families. More than
half of all the immigrants fourteen years of age or over, of both sexes,
are single. This affects the problem of assimilation very deeply. One
of the greatest forces for Americanization in immigrant families is
the growing children. Where these are absent, the adults have much
less contact with assimilating influences. If there was a large degree
of intermarriage between these single immigrants and native
Americans, the aspect of the case would be very different; but thus
far, this is not the case.
Much has been said and written about the absolute economic gain
to this country through immigration. It is pointed out that each year
an army of able-bodied laborers, in the prime of life, is added to our
working force. To the expense of their rearing we have contributed
nothing; they come to us as a free gift from the nations of Europe.
Various efforts have been made to estimate the actual cash value of
these alien laborers. Professor Mayo-Smith enumerates three
different ways of attacking the problem. The first is by estimating the
cost of bringing up the immigrant, up to the time of his arrival in the
United States. The second is by estimating his value as if he were a
slave. The third is by estimating the amount of wealth he will
contribute to the community before he dies, minus the cost of his
maintenance—in other words, his net earnings.[168]
The lack of uniformity in the results obtained by different methods
and by different investigators gives weight to the opinion that it is,
after all, a rather fruitless undertaking. To estimate the monetary
value of a man seems to be, as yet, too much for economic science.
There is one economic contribution, however, which the
immigrants make to this country which is capable of fairly accurate
measurement. This is the amount of money which they bring with
them when they come. For many years immigrants have been
compelled to show the amount of money in their possession, and this
information has been recorded, and incorporated in the annual
reports. Up to 1904, immigrants were divided into those showing less
than $30 and those showing that amount or more. In that year this
dividing line was raised to $50. The total amount of money shown is
also given. Thus it is possible to estimate the average amount of
money shown by the immigrants of different races, and also to
ascertain what proportion of them showed above or below the
specified amount. Unfortunately for the conclusiveness of the
statistics, immigrants very commonly do not show all the money in
their possession, but only so much as they think is necessary to
secure their admission. So the total amount of money shown does
not represent the total amount brought in; all that can be positively
stated is that at least so much was brought in.
In 1909 the total amount of money shown was $17,331,828; in
1910, $28,197,745; in 1911, $29,411,488; and in 1912, $30,353,721.
The average per capita showings of the European immigrants for the
period 1905 to 1909 was as follows:[169]
Average per Capita
Class
Based on Total Coming Based on Total Showing
Old immigration $39.90 $55.20
New immigration 15.83 20.99
Total $22.47 $30.14

Those not showing money were for the most part children and
other dependents. This shows how baseless is the impression, quite
prevalent among Americans and aliens alike, that a certain specified
amount of money is necessary to secure admission to this country.
Thirty dollars or fifty dollars are the amounts commonly mentioned.
But since the average based on the total number showing money is
barely over thirty dollars, it is plain that there must be a large
number showing less than thirty dollars. In fact, some races, as, for
instance, the Polish, Lithuanians, and south Italians, have an average
of from twenty to twenty-five dollars for all showing money. There is
no monetary requirement for admission to the United States. While
the possession of a certain amount of money is considered to add to
the probability of an immigrant being able to support himself
without becoming a public charge, a sturdy laborer with ten dollars
in his pocket is more likely to secure admission than a decrepit old
man with a good-sized bank account.
Against these large amounts of money brought in by immigrants,
which represent a net gain to the total wealth of the country, must be
set off the enormous amounts of money annually sent abroad by
alien residents of the United States. Various efforts have been made
to estimate these sums. The best is probably that of the Immigration
Commission which sets the figure at a total of $275,000,000 for the
year 1907, which was a prosperous year.[170]
The following table gives the distribution of immigrants among the
different classes of occupations.
OCCUPATION OF EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS FOR THE YEARS 1898 TO 1909,

PERCENTAGES[171]
Occupation Per Cent
Professional 1.0
Skilled laborers 15.2
Farm laborers 15.7
Farmers 1.0
Common laborers 27.8
Servants 10.8
Miscellaneous 2.1
No occupation[172] 26.4
171. Ibid., Emig. Cond. in Eur., Abs., p. 15.

172. Including women and children.
These figures are taken from the statements of the immigrants
themselves, and represent, in so far as they are correct, the economic
position of the immigrant in the country from which he came. They
are not a reliable indication of the occupation into which he goes in
this country.
It is evident that the great majority of the immigrants belong in
general to the unskilled labor class. This is the class of labor for
which there is a special demand in this country, and for which the
immigrants are desired. At the same time, as Professor Commons
has pointed out,[173] there is also a considerable demand for skilled
artisans in this country, as the peculiar conditions of American
industry prevent the training of a sufficient number of all-round
mechanics at home. This demand is also met from European sources.
There is a great difference in this respect between the different races.
[174]
For instance, 29.8 per cent of the English immigrants were
skilled laborers, 37.9 per cent of the Scotch, and 35.2 per cent of the
Welsh, while only 4.7 per cent of the Croatians and Slovenians, 2.7
per cent of the Roumanians, 1.8 per cent of the Ruthenians, and 3.5
per cent of the Slovaks belonged to that class, during the period
mentioned. The highest proportion of professional is shown by the
French, with 6.2 per cent. In general, the old immigration has a
larger proportion in the professional and skilled groups than the
new, and this difference would be much more marked if the Hebrews
were excepted, as they again furnish a marked exception to the
general rule of the new immigration, with 36.7 per cent in the skilled
labor group.
Thus far, the facts which have been brought out all have to do with
the condition of the immigrants upon their arrival. They furnish a
sort of a composite picture of the raw material. This is about as far as
the regular statistics go. After the immigrants have left the port of
arrival, the Bureau furnishes practically no information about them
until they leave the country again, except an occasional special
report, and, in recent years, figures concerning naturalization. This is
typical of the general attitude which characterizes the entire
immigration system and legislation, and rests on the assumption that
if sufficient care is exercised in the selection of immigrants, all will
thenceforth be well, and no attention need be paid to them after they
are in the country. The final piece of information furnished in the
reports is the alleged destination of the immigrants. This is of course
somewhat uncertain, but in so far as it is conclusive it furnishes a
preliminary clew to the distribution of our alien residents throughout
the country.
The significance of the figures regarding destination, or intended
future residence, may best be brought out by showing the
percentages destined to the different territorial divisions of the
United States. In 1910 these were as follows:
PER CENT OF TOTAL IMMIGRATION DESTINED TO EACH OF THE SPECIFIED
DIVISIONS, 1910
Division Per Cent
North Atlantic 62.3

South Atlantic 2.5
North Central 26.1
South Central 2.3
Western 6.1
Total 99.3[175]
175. Balance to Alaska, Hawaii, Philippine Islands, and Porto Rico.

The fact that in a typical year 88.4 per cent of the total
immigration gave their intended future residence as the North
Atlantic or North Central divisions, introduces us to some of the
peculiarities of the distribution of immigrants in the United States,
which will be further considered later.
Before closing our consideration of arriving immigrants it will be
well to glance briefly at those who arrive, but are not admitted—in
other words, the debarred. We have seen that the law has grown
more and more stringent in its conditions for admission, and each
new statute has tended to raise the standard. These laws have had a
powerful influence in improving the character of the applicants for
admission, and with the coöperation of the transportation companies
have operated to check the emigration of the manifestly undesirable
to an ever greater extent. Yet there are every year considerable
numbers of would-be immigrants who have to be turned back at the
portals of the United States. The lot of these unfortunates is
undeniably a hard one, and they are the objects of much well-
deserved sympathy. Everything possible ought to be done to limit the
number of inadmissible aliens who are allowed to present themselves
at the immigrant stations of this country. The farther back on the
road they can be stopped, the better will the interests of humanity be
served. At the same time, pity for the rejected alien ought not to be
allowed to express itself in unreasonable and unwarranted attacks
upon our system of admission, and the officials who administer it, as
is sometimes done.[176]
The statistics of debarments may be indicative of the character of
the applicants, of the stringency of the laws and the faithfulness of
their enforcement, or of the care of the transportation companies in
prosecuting their examination on the other side. It is impossible to
tell from the figures themselves which of these factors account for the
different fluctuations. It is undoubtedly true that there has been, in
general, a steady improvement in the care with which immigrants are
selected. If, next year, a million immigrants of the same general
character as prevailed sixty years ago should present themselves at
our gates, the proportion of refusals would soar tremendously. The
following table gives the proportion of debarments to admissions
since 1892.
PROPORTION OF ALIENS DEBARRED, EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES OF IMMIGRANTS
ADMITTED, 1892–1912
Year 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898
Per cent .37 .24 .49 .94 .62 .70 1.32
Year 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905
Per cent 1.22 .95 .72 .76 1.02 .98 1.15
Year 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912
Per cent 1.12 1.02 1.18 1.09 2.33 2.54 1.92
In the years 1892 to 1912, 169,132 aliens were refused admission to
the United States. Of these, 58.2 per cent were debarred on the
grounds of pauperism or likelihood of becoming a public charge, 15.8
per cent were afflicted with loathsome or dangerous contagious
diseases, and 12.7 per cent were contract laborers. These three
leading causes account for 86.7 per cent of all the debarments. The
other classes of debarred aliens specified in the reports are as
follows: idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded, epileptics, insane,
tuberculosis (non-contagious), professional beggars, mental or
physical defects likely to affect ability to earn a living, accompanying
aliens, under sixteen years of age unaccompanied by parent, assisted
aliens, criminals, polygamists, anarchists, prostitutes, etc., aliens
who procure prostitutes, etc., under passport provision, Section 1,
under provisions Chinese exclusion act, supported by proceeds of
prostitution.

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The Implications of Emerging Technologies in The Euro-Atlantic Space: Views From The Younger Generation Leaders Network Julia Berghofer

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The Implications of Emerging

Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic

Threats to Euro-Atlantic Security: Views from the

The Space Age Generation William Sheehan

Small Baltic States and the Euro-Atlantic Security

The Younger Wife Hepworth

Emerging Technologies in Engineering Mahesh P. K.

Ten Thousand Eyes: The Amazing Story of the Spy Network

Performance and Security for the Internet of Things:

The Problem of Evil: Eight Views in Dialogue N N

Clemens Häusler Maximilian Hoell

ISBN 978-3-031-24672-2 ISBN 978-3-031-24673-9 (eBook)

Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com

This book is a joint project by members of the Younger Genera-

Finally, the YGLN would not be as powerful as it is today without

Part I Politics and Geopolitics

Part II Strategic Stability and Military Affairs

7 Emerging Technologies and “Green-Friendly”

Part II Economy and Society

Julia Berghofer is a Policy Fellow with the European Leadership

Lucia Gavenčiaková is a Policy Assistant at Globsec, and a Master’s

Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs Ambassador on Cyber

Strategic Studies (IISS). Her research interests cover economic statecraft,

Politics and Geopolitics

Digital Illiberalism and the Erosion

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

processes have on the liberal international order, and proposes policy

Technological Progress and the Emergence

1 G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?”, International Affairs,

globally. These processes also fostered the emergence and strength-

5 Trygve R. Tholfsen, “The Transition to Democracy in Victorian England”, Interna-

and Westphalia.10 Furthermore, the pre-WWI autocratic regimes with

primarily because it created modern weaponry, but it never became a true

The Rise of Digital Liberalism

13 Global Innovation Index 2021. China, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/

technology at the turn of the millennium. When Tim Berners-Lee

According to Larry Diamond, the Internet had great advantages

18 Larry Diamond, “Liberation technology”, Journal of Democracy, 21:3 (2010),

The deep connection between online technologies and networks of

Virtual Anarchy and Digital Illiberalism

25 David Bach, “Varieties of Cooperation: The Domestic Institutional Roots of Global

sentiments provoked a perfect storm for liberal internationalism in the

civic activism at the beginning of the twenty-first century resulted in a

27 Philip N. Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information

new kind of illiberal counter-propaganda produced plentiful outputs at a

29 Roman Goncharenko, “Russia Moves Toward Creation of an Independent Inter-

organisations. But this is just a drop in the ocean of unregulated data

34 David Runciman, How Democracy Ends (Profile Books: 2019), p. 158.

Whereas traditional representative democracy was meant to work through

Changing the nature of social media requires more sophisticated

open digital political culture unless pushed by political transformations

actions. Platforms of digital communication allow the spread of any kind

The Emergence of E-participation Tools:

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 23

parallel to new technologies and the digitalization of various services”1 is

1 Lita Akmentina, “E-participation and Engagement in Urban Planning: Experiences

2 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government

legislation”.6 According to the concept laid out by the E-Government