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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/10/21, SPi
The Limits of Europe

The Limits of Europe

Membership Norms and the Contestation of
Regional Integration
DA N I E L C . T HOM A S
1
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Daniel C. Thomas 2021
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2021
Impression: 1
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a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
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rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
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ISBN 978–0–19–920671–1
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199206711.001.0001
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Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
Preface and Acknowledgements
This book was conceived out of a hunch that the construction of Europe,
including the evolving community’s territorial expansion, was more deeply
contested than one would conclude from the official narrative in recent decades
about enduring commitments to democracy and human rights. The challenge was
two-fold—how to use the theories and methods of political science and the vast
resources available in the EU’s many historical archives to analyse and explain the
arc of EU constitutionalization and enlargement over time, and how to do so in a
manner that also speaks to regional integration processes in other parts of the world.
To this end, I decided to focus not on states’ decisions to seek membership nor
on the community’s readiness to admit particular applicant states, but on the
more fundamental and long-neglected question of how a regional community
decides which states are eligible for membership. This focus would reveal a great
deal, I suspected, about how political actors understand the nature and the limits
of the regional community that they are building and re-building with every
decision they make. Such a study of the conceptual and geographic limits of
Europe acquired a whole new significance as debates over cultural identity gained
salience across the community.
Of course, no such ambitions could ever be pursued, much less achieved,
without the support and cooperation of many individuals and organizations.
When the project was in its infancy, Yves Mény welcomed me back to the
European University Institute’s Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,
where I was able to explore ideas with Thomas Risse, Philippe Schmitter, and
other EUI scholars and to work in the EUI’s Historical Archives of the European
Union. Several years later, an International Affairs Fellowship from the Council
on Foreign Relations allowed me to spend a year in Brussels working at the
European Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations, which gave
me new insights into the dynamics of EU decision-making. Toward the end of
that year, the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Centre in Brussels gave me a
desk and time to read through countless papers in the official archives of the
European Commission, the European Council, and the European Parliament, as
well as the archives of the Belgian, French, and German foreign ministries. In
later years, I also worked in the Barbara Sloan European Union Document
Collection at the University of Pittsburgh, and repeatedly with two first-rate
online archives—the Archive of European Integration (www.aei.pitt.edu) hosted
by the University of Pittsburgh and the Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur
l’Europe (www.cvce.eu) hosted by the University of Luxembourg. I will forever be
vi Preface and Acknowledgements
grateful for the help provided by these organizations, academic colleagues, and
archivist-historians.
In addition, colleagues at the universities where I have worked provided
further ideas and encouragement, including especially Alberta Sbragia and
Gregor Thum at the University of Pittsburgh, and Brigid Laffan and Ben Tonra at
University College Dublin. At Leiden University, when I decided that the book
needed a multi- method statistical chapter to complement the archive- based
process-tracing that was its core, Patrick Statsch co-authored Chapter 4 and the
Appendix while simultaneously writing his PhD dissertation at the University of
Amsterdam. I am deeply grateful for his contribution to the book. Last but
certainly not least, Frank Schimmelfennig has been an invaluable source of critical
comments and friendly encouragement over the years, even when my arguments
departed from his own ground-breaking work on similar questions.
Just as important as these many colleagues and archivists has been the undying
confidence in the project shown by Dominic Byatt, legendary editor at Oxford
University Press. Though I missed deadline after deadline due to parenting
responsibilities overlapping with a move from the USA to Ireland, then a move to
The Netherlands followed by learning Dutch and my duties as chair of a growing
department that left no time for scholarly pursuits, Dominic repeatedly assured
me of his commitment to the project. In the end, when my work was done, he and
his OUP colleagues Céline Louasli, Kim Allen and Saravanan Anandan expertly
transformed the manuscript into a book.
All epigraphs under copyright are reprinted with permission from their respective
publishers or copyright holders. The epigraph by Pierre Werner in the heading of
chapter 4 is reprinted by permission of the Pierre Werner Family archive. The
epigraph by Walter Hallstein in the heading of chapter 7 is reprinted by permission
of HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, © Walter Hallstein 1972.
Above all, I am grateful to Susanne, who supports and inspires me in ways
I could scarcely have imagined when we met years ago in the hills overlooking
Florence, and to our son Julien, who amazes me more with every passing year.
Leiden, December 2020

Contents
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Note on Archival Sources xiii
PA RT O N E Q U E S T IO N S A N D A R G UM E N T S
1. The Question of Membership 3

2. Explaining Membership Eligibility 27
PA RT T WO M E M B E R SH I P OU T C OM E S
3. The Evolution of EU Membership Norms 49

4. EU Membership Eligibility in Statistical and Comparative
Perspective (with Patrick D. Statsch) 85
PA RT T H R E E M E M B E R SH I P P R O C E S SE S
5. Membership Eligibility in a Europe of Non-Communist States,

1957–1961 119
6. Membership Eligibility in a Europe of Parliamentary
Democracies, 1962–1969 137
7. Membership Eligibility in a Europe of Liberal Democracies,
1970–2005 159
8. Membership Eligibility in a Divided Europe, 2006–2020 194
PA RT F O U R C O N C LU SIO N S A N D I M P L IC AT IO N S
9. Rethinking Europe, Rethinking Regions 219
Appendix: Imputing missing Freedom House data from V-Dem data 243
(with Patrick D. Statsch)
Bibliography 247
Index 257
List of Figures
A.1. Comparison of Freedom House and V-Dem country-year scores 244

A.2. Correlations between country-year scores in Freedom House
and V-Dem datasets 244
List of Tables
2.1. Summary of explanations and hypotheses 45

4.1. EU decisions on the membership eligibility of aspirant states 87
4.2. Hypothesis 1: Membership norms 94
4.3. Hypothesis 4: Geographic location (Encyclopædia Britannica) 95
4.4. Hypothesis 5: Geographic location (United Nations) 96
4.5. Hypothesis 6: Geographic contiguity 96
4.6. Hypothesis 7, test 1: Treaty rules (change 1986) 98
4.7. Hypothesis 7, test 2: Treaty rules (change 1992) 98
4.8. Hypothesis 8, test 1: Liberal democracy (EU minimum) 99
4.9. Hypothesis 8, test 2: Liberal democracy (EU mean) 99
4.10. Hypothesis 9: Well-regulated markets 100
4.11. Hypothesis 10: Non-competitive markets 100
4.12. Hypothesis 11, test 1: Low risk states (global) 101
4.13. Hypothesis 11, test 2: Very low risk states (global) 101
4.14. Hypothesis 11, test 3: Low risk states (European) 102
4.15. Hypothesis 11, test 4: Very low risk states (European) 102
4.16. Hypothesis 12, test 1: NATO membership 103
4.17. Hypothesis 12, test 2: NATO membership or prospective membership 103
4.18. Summary of cross-tabulation analyses 105
4.19. Predicting EU membership eligibility in bivariate settings 110
4.20. Predicting EU membership eligibility in multivariate settings 111
4.21. QCA truth table 113
4.22. Analysis of causal configurations leading to EU membership
eligibility114
A.1. Imputed regime scores for country-years not covered by Freedom House data 245
Note on Archival Sources
Research for this book included extensive consultation of documents in various

official and private archives, both physical and online. Footnote references to
documents from these archives begin with the abbreviations listed below fol-
lowed by a file identifier and in most cases by a document identifier. Documents
in Dutch, French, German, Italian, and Spanish were translated to English by
Daniel Thomas or Susanne Boesch-Thomas.
Physical archives
ACCUE: Archives Centrales, Conseil de l’Union Européenne (Brussels)

(formerly: Archives Historiques du Conseil de l’Union Européenne)
ACE: Archives, Conseil de l’Europe (Strasbourg)
AHCE: Archives Historiques, Commission Européenne (Brussels)
AHPE: Archives Historiques, Parlement Européen (Luxembourg)
EUDC: Barbara Sloan European Union Document Collection, University of
Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh)
FPHS: Fondation Paul- Henri Spaak (Brussels). All contents now trans-
ferred to HAEU
HAEU: Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence)
MAEB: Archives Diplomatiques, Ministère des affaires étrangères, Royaume de
Belgique (Brussels)
MAEF: Archives Diplomatiques, Ministère des affaires étrangères, République
de France (Paris)
PAAA: Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt, Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(Berlin)
WB: Private collection of Willi Birkelbach (Frankfurt)
Online archives
AEI: Archive of European Integration: http://aei.pitt.edu/

CVCE: Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe: https://www.cvce.eu/
PART ONE
QUE ST ION S A N D A RG UM E NT S
1
The Question of Membership
Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community.

—Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1957
The term ‘European’ has not been officially defined.
—European Commission, 19921
Europe, yes, but until where? What should be the geographic limits of
the European Union? The question has never been addressed funda-
mentally in any of the European institutions: it’s a taboo subject.
—Alain Lamassoure, Member of the European Parliament, 19992
Let’s just say for once: this is it.
—Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Eurogroup president, on EU
enlargement, 20163
By way of introduction, this chapter discusses the importance of understanding

how regional communities such as the European Union decide which states are
eligible to join and which are not. It surveys insights and gaps in existing scholar-
ship. It then introduces the argument that membership norms shape these deci-
sions by empowering certain political positions and compares its logic to
explanations derived from alternative theories of regional integration. It outlines
the empirical methods used to test the influence of membership norms against
treaty rules, geographic location, regime type, economic and security interests.
Finally, it surveys the aims and content of the chapters that follow.
1. The question and its significance
This book begins with a deceptively simple question: where does Europe begin
and end? The significance of this question reaches far beyond cartographic
debates. A recent report on the future of the European Union (EU) argues that
the European Commission should establish a new ‘Directorate General Europe’
focused on completing the unification of Europe while assigning relations with
neighbouring states without any prospect of membership to other parts of the EU
1 AEI: Europe and the challenge of enlargement (24 June 1992), p. 11.
2 Jusqu’où ? Le débat interdit, Le Monde, 9 décembre 1999.
3 Jeroen Dijsselbloem calls for end to EU expansion, Politico.eu, 10 June 2016.
The Limits of Europe: Membership Norms and the Contestation of Regional Integration. Daniel C. Thomas,
Oxford University Press. © Daniel C. Thomas 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199206711.003.0001
4 The Limits of Europe
bureaucracy (Cvijic et al. 2019). What the report avoids, though, is the critical
issue of which states are eligible to participate in the integration process led by the
EU and which are not.
If it so decides, the EU has plenty of room to expand beyond its current 27
member states. The Council of Europe, a non-EU body designed to promote
democracy and human rights, currently has 47 member states. The Eurovision
song contest has accepted contestants from 52 states over the years. And the
European Broadcasting Union, which sponsors the song contest, has member
organizations in 56 countries. So how does the EU, which does not hesitate to
identify itself with Europe as whole, define its own limits?
This is not a new question. Struggles over the geographic limits of ‘Europe’ as a
political community have been a salient feature of European integration from the
beginning. Within months of the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome in 1958,
governments elsewhere in Europe began to talk about joining or at least preparing
for eventual membership in the new European Economic Community (EEC).4
Over the following decades, the community—later renamed the European
Union—grew from 6 to 28 member states. And despite the United Kingdom’s
recent exit from the community, neighbouring states continue to seek
membership and the European Commission continues to negotiate with them on
behalf of the Union.
Yet notwithstanding the EU’s apparently endless tendency to expand, a closer
look at the historical records reveals that over the years, some neighbouring states
were encouraged to apply, some were told to wait, and others were told definitively
that they were ineligible for membership. In some cases, the same applicant state
received positive and negative messages in relatively quick succession. This record
cries out for explanation. As Bahar Rumelili (2004: 28) asked, ‘How is it that with
respect to certain states, the EU constructs firm lines of boundary between self
and other, and with regard to others, fluid and ambiguous frontiers?’
For example, why did the EEC encourage Spain to pursue membership and
then refuse for years to offer it a path to accession? Why did the EU recognize the
Czech Republic as a membership candidate but refuse for several years to do the
same for the neighbouring Slovak Republic? Spain and the Slovak Republic are
both undeniably located on the European continent but this was not enough to
ensure their recognition as eligible to join the European Union. Similar questions
have been asked about Ukraine, whose governments have tried to place their
country on a path to EU membership since the country gained independence in
1991. When President Viktor Yanukovych seemed to abandon this goal in 2013,
4 When referring specifically to the European Economic Community, this book uses that term or
the abbreviation EEC. When referring to the entire period from the creation of the EEC through the
present, or just to the period since the entry into the effect of the Treaty on European Union, the book
uses the term European Union or the abbreviation EU.
The Question of Membership 5
demonstrators in Kiev’s Maidan Square braved sniper fire to wave EU flags and
demand closer ties to Europe. Yet despite these appeals, the EU has consistently
rebuffed Ukraine’s pursuit of what Brussels calls a ‘membership perspective’.
Meanwhile, after years of delay, the EU formally recognized Turkey as a candidate
state and began accession negotiations, but this did not quell debate among and
within the member states regarding Turkey’s suitability for membership.
These puzzles cannot be resolved simply by consulting treaties or formal
declarations. Both the 1951 Treaty of Paris and the 1957 Treaty of Rome declared
that ‘Any European state may apply to join the community’ but neither treaty
defined what makes a state ‘European’. Three and a half decades later,
the European Commission offered its own quasi-definition: ‘The term “European” . . .
combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to
the European identity. The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values and his-
torical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and it is subject to
review by each succeeding generation.’ Perhaps deliberately, the Commission’s
open-ended definition provided no clear guidance as to whether a particular state
is actually eligible for membership: ‘The Commission believes that it is neither
possible or opportune to establish new frontiers of the European Union, whose
contours will be shaped over many years to come.’5
According to Kalypso Nicolaïdes, this vagueness is not accidental: ‘the lack of
explicit political ends to the journey has gone along with an equal indeterminacy
in terms of geographical ends. Precisely because the European project is an open-
ended process rather than a frozen structure, it has also been an open-ended
space’ (2014: 237). In fact, she argues, this open-endedness applies to both
the ultimate shape of the community’s external border, by which she means the
definition of ‘which countries should become members of the EU’, and the nature
of that border, by which she means how the border mediates between societies on
both sides. The sum of these two dimensions, says Nicolaïdes, constitutes the
fundamental ‘constitution of Europe as a political community’ (2014: 238).
How then can we begin to understand this most fundamental aspect of
European integration, or for that matter, of any regional integration project? The
formal membership rule now prevailing in the EU—that it will only consider
applications from European states with stable institutions that ensure democracy,
the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the protection of minorities, as well
as a market economy able to withstand the competitive pressures of the Single
Market—was not established even informally until many years after the EEC
Treaty. And notwithstanding the apparent clarity of this rule, the eligibility
of some applicant states—including most notably Turkey—remains deeply con-
tested. As such, the much-vaunted ‘Copenhagen criteria’ are neither an original
5 AEI: Europe and the challenge of enlargement (24 June 1992), p. 11.
and immutable aspect of European integration nor a complete explanation of the

politics of eligibility for EU membership.
In fact, the definition of ‘European’ is deeply contested by the continent’s
leading politicians. For some, such as former French president Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing (2000), Europe is a space whose geographic and cultural limits are
stable and plainly seen, so eligibility for EU membership is a simple question of
location. Others, such as former EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn (2006: 4),
have pushed back, insisting ‘the EU is defined by its values more than by sheer
geography’ and ‘we should not draw in Indian ink some thick “fault line”
according to some notional historical borders between civilisations’. It is therefore
not surprising that Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, while holding the
EU’s rotating presidency, would plead: ‘Please don’t ask me where the borders of
Europe are, that’s something we didn’t want to put on the agenda’.6
And just like the broader phenomenon of regional integration, the puzzle of
membership eligibility is not limited to Europe. Consider the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose 1967 Bangkok Declaration announced
that ‘the Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian
Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes.’ But as
the organization’s former Secretary-General noted, ‘This raises the question: what
precisely is Southeast Asia?’ (Severino 2006: 41). In practice, ASEAN has been
inconsistent: it accepted Brunei’s application for membership barely a week
after that country’s independence, but Timor-Leste’s repeated assertions that
‘[g]eographically we are very much part of Southeast Asia’ (Ramos-Horta 2011)
have not convinced ASEAN that it qualifies for membership (Talesco 2016). The
same is true for neighbouring Papua-New Guinea, which has also long tried but
failed to gain recognition as being eligible for ASEAN membership.
Similarly, the Gulf Cooperation Council invited Jordan and Morocco to join,
but not Iraq, although of the three, only Iraq actually borders the gulf after which
the organization is named (Al Tamamy 2015). The construction of the Caribbean
region is equally puzzling: some states are members of both the Association of
Caribbean States and the Caribbean Community, while others in the same area
belong only to the former, and Cuba is not welcomed in either organization.
Similarly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization recently invited India and
Pakistan to join original members China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, but other neighbouring states have not been given any
prospect of accession.
These European and non-European examples demonstrate that we cannot rely
on ‘geographical eyeballing or legalistic inspection’ to make sense of how regional
organizations make decisions on the eligibility of neighbouring states (Cederman
6 Les négociations d’adhésion UE-Turquie pourraient être en danger, Le Monde, 29 juin 2006.
2001: 2). Instead, we need a clear definition of membership eligibility, a theoretical

framework attuned to the complex political dynamics surrounding this issue, and
an empirical basis for assessing both general patterns and the specificities of
rhetoric and mobilization around individual cases. By examining the politics of
EU membership eligibility over seven decades in this manner, this book offers
new insights into European integration and into the general process by which
regional communities define their borders and decide which applicant states are
eligible for accession. In so doing, it contributes both theoretically and empirically
to the growing literature on the dynamics and complexity of membership in
international organizations (Droesse 2020).
This book aims to explain how regional communities, defined as groups of
states that identify with a particular geographic space and organize inter-
governmental and/or supranational institutions to promote shared interests or
values, decide which states are eligible for membership and which are not. To be
more precise, it aims to identify the factors that determine how the member states
and supranational officials of a regional community decide on the eligibility of
particular states aspiring to membership (hereafter, aspirant states).
These decisions matter: whether or not the European Union (or any other
regional community) welcomes another state that wishes to join the club can have
major implications for flows of labour, products, and investment, the life chances
of individuals, the political fortunes of governments, and the identities and
interests that shape international politics. The book’s inquiry is thus key to
understanding the nature of regional communities and the process of regional
integration and governance, both in Europe and elsewhere in the world.
To be clear, the book does not attempt to explain why non-member states apply
to join the EU: it takes their expressions of interest in membership as given. It
also does not attempt to define where on a map the ultimate limits of Europe
might lie, nor to assess the wisdom of the EU’s past decisions on enlargement, nor
to prescribe whether a particular state should be offered membership in the
future. Instead, it focuses on explaining how regional communities—in this case,
the EU—understand the potential geographic limits of their joint endeavour and
how these understandings affect their decision-making over time on which states
are welcome to join. (For further discussion of eligibility, see Section 3 below.)
In brief, I argue that the geographic limits of regional communities are
determined by norms that define the characteristics expected of member states
and thereby distinguish potential members from states that have no prospect of
accession. These norms shape the legitimacy of various membership scenarios
and thereby influence which aspirant states are considered eligible for
membership and which are not. As the norms change over time, the ultimate
limits of a regional community may expand or contract. Furthermore, the content
and effect of these ‘membership norms’ cannot be reduced or attributed to the
economic or geopolitical interests of the community’s member states, nor to their
type of government or physical location, nor to the treaty obligations that they
have assumed. To demonstrate the explanatory power of this argument, I test it
empirically across multiple phases of European integration and multiple cases of
EU decision-making with varying outcomes over seven decades. While the book
focuses empirically on Europe, I have designed the argument and analysed the
findings to speak as well to developments in other regions of the world.
2. Insights and gaps in the scholarly literature
The politics of membership eligibility deserves far more attention from scholars
of international organization, regional integration, and community building than
it has received thus far. There is extensive and insightful scholarship on why states
create regional institutions and policies (Moravcsik 1998, Mattli 1999,
Pevehouse 2003), why states apply to join an existing regional organization
(Mattli and Plümper 2002, Emmers 2005, Gray 2009), and how membership in
regional organizations influences domestic political reform, especially the
consolidation of democracy and respect for human rights (Glenn 2004,
Pevehouse 2002, Schimmelfennig 2005, Vachudova 2005, Donno 2010).
In comparison, relatively few scholars have focused on the politics that shape
the geographic limits of regional communities and in particular which applicant
states are considered eligible for membership. Some have trivialized the issue
entirely: ‘A state is coded as an eligible potential member . . . for any regional IGO
that is based in its home region (for example, Bolivia is eligible for membership in
a regional IGO based in Latin America, but not one based in sub-Saharan Africa)’
(Donno et al. 2015: 257). But the reality is far more complex than the names of
continents or the wording of treaties.
One way to conceptualize the issue is to distinguish between an inclusive
approach to building a multilateral organization that involves all potential
members from the outset and a sequential approach that begins with a core group
of states most committed to cooperation and then incorporates others as their
preferences converge with the founders. The inclusive approach is less likely to
yield deep integration because it increases the heterogeneity of integration
preferences in the decision-making process. In contrast, rather than waiting until
all potential members have adopted similar preferences, the sequential approach
allows core states to create an institution to their liking while remaining open to
any like-minded states that present themselves for membership. In this case,
expansion will be ‘a multi-step process in which the multilateral expands only
gradually as potential members or the multilateral itself attains some property not
originally possessed at the time the institution was created’ (Downs et al.
1998: 399).
The problem here is the argument regarding which states are potentially
covered by an inclusive approach, which might be temporarily excluded by a
sequential approach, and which have no prospect of participation. According to
Downs et al., these distinctions depend entirely on functional policy preferences:
all states with identical preferences regarding policy integration will be included
regardless of whether the organization opts for an inclusive or sequential
approach, while those with divergent preferences will be excluded under a
sequential approach, regardless of other considerations. This may be accurate
with respect to potentially global organizations focused on a functional issue-area
such as trade or environmental protection, but it is hard to reconcile this
expectation with the pattern evident in the course of European integration:
starting with an inclusive approach in treaty rules and practice, then becoming
more selective in practice with a considerable lag before treaty rules are adapted
to the new practice, then more recently welcoming some states (like Bosnia-
Herzegovina) while excluding others (like Ukraine) with very similar policy
preferences and administrative capacities.
In similar terms, Judith G. Kelley (2010) distinguishes between a ‘convoy’
model of membership that in principle allows all regional states to participate and
a ‘club’ model that subjects aspiring members to strict admissions criteria. The
two models have distinct implications for how a regional organization relates to
states in the region: ‘Clubs can leverage higher entry criteria to solicit behaviour
changes prior to admission for any late joiners [while] convoys, with lower entry
barriers, can take a less confrontational approach to outlier states, interacting
with them within the organization rather than erecting barriers’ (2010: 2).
Unfortunately for the purposes of this study, Kelley focuses on how the convoy
versus club choice affects the likely success of regional organizations, rather than
on how such organizations choose between a convoy and a club model or decide
on the eligibility or accession of applicant states.
In contrast, Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal (2001a,
2001b) examine the possible relationship between the enforcement difficulties
faced by an international organization and the restrictiveness of its membership
rule. Their conjecture is that membership restrictiveness increases with the
severity of enforcement problems, which one might assume would increase with
additional members (Koremenos et al. 2001a). If this were true, then one would
expect international organizations to become less open to non-member states as
the number of member states increased, and to prefer applications from individual
states over applications by groups of states. Unfortunately, these conjectures do
not fit their project’s empirical findings (Koremenos et al. 2001b) nor do they
offer a good explanation for the pattern in EU history described briefly above.
Of course, it is not necessary to conceive of regional organization simply as an
interaction of self-interested states weighing the costs and benefits of behavioural
options: the identities of states and their relationship to shared norms matter as
well. Inspired by social identity theory, Iver B. Neumann (1999) and Bahar
Rumelili (2004) argue that no group of states can claim that certain characteristics
distinguish its members without referring implicitly or explicitly to other states
that lack the same characteristics, either entirely or in sufficient measure.
Eligibility for regional membership is thus a rhetorical construction in which
certain characteristics are attributed to an Other (in this case, non-Europeans) in
order to provide meaning and coherence to the Self (in this case, Europeans). For
example, Dainotto (1997), Neumann (1998), Morozov and Rumelili (2012), and
Todorova (1997) have highlighted the reframing of Europeanness over time in
juxtaposition to the purported characteristics of various neighbours, especially
Muslims, Russians, Turks, and Mediterranean peoples. It is nonetheless difficult
to judge this approach’s contribution to explaining the politics of membership
eligibility because few of its advocates have specified causal mechanisms or scope
conditions for their arguments or tested competing hypotheses.
There is an extensive and more methodologically explicit literature on EU
enlargement in the post-Cold War period yet even the best works here suffer
from considerable shortcomings. For example, Moravcsik and Vachudova (2005)
propose a parsimonious liberal explanation of how the EU makes enlargement
decisions, but then offer only a thin empirical narrative limited to the eastern
enlargement. In a similar rationalist spirit, Skålnes (2005) proposes that
enlargement decisions are driven by geopolitical calculations, but he too pays
little attention to alternative explanations and offers little direct evidence to
support some of his key claims. Sedelmeier (2005) proposes an alternative,
constructivist explanation focused on commitments made to eastern Europe
during the Cold War, but it is not clear how his argument could apply to
other cases.
Of this genre, the most influential has been Frank Schimmelfennig’s (2001,
2003) investigation of EU and NATO enlargement. In his conceptualization, the
‘collective identity’ of a region is composed of the values of its political leaders,
the norms that they share, and the regional organization’s formal rules on
accession. He thus explains the eastern enlargement as a result of ‘rhetorical
action’: when the states of central and eastern Europe framed their applications in
terms of the Union’s multi-dimensional identification with liberal democracy, EU
member states approved their quest for full membership despite the availability of
less-costly alternatives. This argument and the evidence that Schimmelfennig
amassed to support it offer a powerful explanation of why regional communities
sometimes make membership decisions that seem inconsistent with material
incentives.
However, Schimmelfennig’s work does not associate distinctive causal
mechanisms or scope conditions with his three components of regional identity
and thus cannot separate their respective contributions to the outcome in
question. Furthermore, instead of exploring how EU values, norms, and rules

vary and maybe conflict over time, his research design treats them as unitary and
fixed: ‘European’ is equated with liberal democracy. This lack of variation in the
explanatory variable, presumably due to the project’s limited historical scope,
makes it difficult to determine whether rhetorical commitment to liberal
democracy was sufficient or even necessary to explain the outcome in question.
These shortcomings limit the study’s explanatory power in the case of Europe and
its generalizability to other cases. A less context-bound investigation of this topic
could therefore have important implications for how we understand regional
integration and the creation of supra-national political communities in Europe
and beyond.
Thomas Plümper and Christina Schneider (2007) offer an explicitly rationalist
alternative to Schimmelfennig’s constructivist explanation of the EU’s eastward
enlargement. Whereas Schimmelfennig used the costs of enlargement to frame
his puzzle, Plümper and Schneider focus their argument on the bargaining
between enlargement’s winners and losers. As they note, ‘the potential losers of
enlargement can always decide to reject the admission of further states if the
gains and costs are not redistributed to compensate them for their losses. . . . The
settlement of enlargement conflicts [thus] requires the redistribution of
the enlargement gains from the applicants and/or the relative winners among the
Union members to the relative losers’ (2007: 573). According to Plümper and
Schneider, ‘The EU’s Eastern enlargement was accomplished because after long
and heated debates, most of the accession countries agreed to be temporarily
excluded from agricultural subsidies, structural aid, and the free movement of
labor’ (2007: 569). However plausible, this argument is very difficult to test:
‘Compensation of enlargement losers through . . . discrimination of new members
is not necessarily inconsistent with Schimmelfennig’s framework’ as long the
value of compensation is less than the costs anticipated by the losers, which
Plümper and Schneider concede is ‘almost impossible’ to measure (2007: 585,
note 4). Most important here, their analysis focuses entirely on the bargaining
that occurs after a non-member state is recognized as eligible for accession, not
on how eligibility is determined in the first place.
Other studies, including Karen Smith (1998), Frank Schimmelfennig and
Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004, 2005), Gwendolyn Sasse (2008), Tina Freyburg (2013),
and Eli Gateva (2015), have examined the political conditionality that is central to
EU decision-making on applicant states. However, these works focus p redominantly
on the period between the non-member state’s formal application for member-
ship and the signature of an accession treaty. Negotiations during this period are
undeniably important, but these studies do not recognize their own selection
bias: long before submitting a formal application for membership, governments
interested in accession discuss their intentions with EU institutions and member
states, which have various ways of encouraging, discouraging, and guiding a
formal application. In many cases, the states involved have long been parties to
EU association agreements that establish strong incentives for reform. So given
that most states that submit a formal application for accession have been pre-
screened and even counselled by the community itself, the application is best
understood not as a start but as an intermediary step on the path to membership.
Thomas Plümper, Christina Schneider, and Vera Troeger’s (2006) study of the
EU’s 1993 Copenhagen summit is not framed explicitly in terms of membership
eligibility but it does address the EU decision to place ten of the formerly
Communist states ahead of others in the accession process. Their theoretical
expectation is that the EU would welcome applicant states whose policy
preferences resemble their own, as revealed by the applicants’ level of democracy
and the extent of market reforms. To test this argument and to eliminate selection
bias due to the possibility that the EU criteria may have deterred less-democratic
states from applying in the first place, they use a dynamic Heckman selection
model that distinguishes the factors that lead states to apply for membership from
the factors that shape the EU’s response to these applications. Their finding that
the EU is more open to more democratic and market-oriented states thus offers
robust insights into the politics of membership eligibility in the early post-Cold
War period. However, its generalizability is limited: the study only covers the
1993 summit and as documented later in this volume, there is strong evidence
that democracy has not always been a significant consideration in EC/EU
decision-making.
Ivan Katchanovski’s (2011) analysis of EU and NATO enlargement following
the Cold War is more explicit about membership eligibility, using an ‘EU
Accession Index’ that codes states annually from 1997 to 2010 as non-member/
not potential EU member, potential EU member, official EU candidate, and EU
member. Katchanovski’s conclusion that EU decisions on enlargement are
strongly affected by the applicants’ level of democracy and economic development
echoes that of Plümper et al. (2006), but his four-step index is hard to apply to
earlier periods because the formal designations ‘potential candidate’ and
‘candidate state’ did not exist before the 1990s. In addition, his use of country-
year data brings in country-years where there was no risk of an EU decision and
blinds the analysis to cross-temporal interdependencies: EU decisions in year 1
may affect EU decisions in year 2, etc. Finally, as Katchanovski (2011: 316)
concedes, ‘the regression analysis cannot rule out reverse causation between EU
membership and democratisation’.
In sum, the existing literature contains valuable insights into the factors that
influence how regional communities make enlargement decisions, but few
scholars have distinguished decisions on membership eligibility from decisions
on accession. Most importantly here, the literature does not offer a persuasive
explanation of how a regional community assesses the membership eligibility (as
distinct from readiness for accession) of non-member states, nor does it provide a
theoretical or methodological framework for studying this in a manner conducive

to cross-regional and cross-temporal analysis.
As a first step toward addressing this gap, the following section defines
membership eligibility and discusses empirical indicators that can be used to
study it.
3. Defining membership eligibility
To say that a non- member state is eligible for membership in a regional

community is to say that it fulfils the community’s most fundamental expectations
of all members. Membership eligibility is thus not an objective material
characteristic: it is a social status dependent upon collective recognition by the
community’s members. This consensus does not require that all member states’
governments agree on the desirability of a particular applicant—simply that they
accept a community position on its eligibility. Furthermore, recognition of
membership eligibility is distinct from assessments of whether the non-member
state’s legal code, administrative capacity, or economic competitiveness make it
ready for membership, and therefore what delays or other technical conditions
must be imposed on its accession. But only after an applicant is deemed eligible
do the potentially detailed and lengthy negotiations on the terms of accession
begin. Recognition of membership eligibility is thus the gateway through which
all states seeking membership must first pass. In social science terms, it is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for accession.7
This focus on member states reflects the predominantly inter-governmental
character of decision-making on membership in regional organizations. For
example, although supranational institutions play a key role in the drafting,
approval, and enforcement of EU legislation, the Treaty on European Union (like
its precursors) assigns principal authority for assessing and approving membership
applications to the member states. As a result, non-member states’ expressions of
interest in accession are addressed to the Council of the European Union (for-
merly the Council of Ministers), which typically comprises the foreign or
European affairs ministers of all the member states, and/or the European Council,
which comprises the heads of state or government. The intergovernmental aspect
is reinforced by the fact that the adoption of formal membership criteria, the
opening of preliminary talks or formal negotiations with an applicant state, and
the conclusion of association or accession treaties all require the unanimous sup-
port of the member states.
7 Standards of membership eligibility are also relevant in principle to current member states, but
decisions on whether the community should impose sanctions on norm-violating member states are
subject to different dynamics and thus are not theorized here.
The intergovernmental focus does not deny the important agenda-setting and
advocacy roles that the EU’s supranational bodies have always played in
enlargement decision-making (these feature prominently in the process-tracing
of EU decision-making in Chapters 5–8). Nonetheless, final decisions on the
eligibility of non-member states are made collectively by the member states. The
European Commission makes recommendations to the Council and negotiates
with non-members on its behalf, but it does not have a vote on the eligibility or
accession of any state. The original EEC treaty did not give the European
Parliamentary Assembly any role in membership decision-making, while the
1986 Single European Act and subsequent treaties require only that the European
Parliament give its assent to accession treaties.
General principles of membership eligibility are often discussed when
governments or non-state actors deliberate on the construction of a new regional
community or re-examine the foundational principles of an existing community.
However, the question of whether a particular non-member state is eligible for
accession—the ultimate focus of this book—arises most clearly when its
government communicates to a regional community its interest in joining the
club. This communication could involve a formal declaration of interest in
accession, an application to negotiate an association treaty focused explicitly on
preparation for membership (hereafter, a ‘pre-accession treaty’), or an application
to negotiate full accession.8
An applicant state is eligible for membership in a regional community when
the community’s member states conclude collectively that it possesses the
fundamental characteristics required of all members. Indicators that a regional
community considers a non-member state to be eligible for membership include
any of the following acts by the community:
• the decision to hold unconditional preliminary talks on membership with a

non-member state that has explicitly declared its interest in accession;
• the formal designation of a non-member state as a ‘pre-candidate’ or ‘candi-
date’ state;
• the decision in principle to begin formal negotiation of a pre-accession or
accession treaty;
• the start of formal negotiations on a pre-accession or accession treaty.
Regarding the first point above, a decision to hold talks with representatives of a
state that has expressed interest in closer ties to the community would not
constitute evidence of eligibility if such talks were intended to clarify whether the
8 These ‘pre-accession treaties’ are a distinct class of association treaties, which also include purely
contractual accords without any membership perspective.
non-member state seeks ultimately to gain membership or just to develop func-

tional links to the community.
As this list of indicators suggests, not all positive statements by community
institutions or officials constitute a positive position on the eligibility of a non-
member state aspiring to accession. For example, European Commission
‘opinions’ and European Parliament declarations on the ‘vocation’ of particular
non-member states may be part of a political process leading to recognition of
membership eligibility, but neither can substitute for a Council position. In
addition, a statement that is clearly intended to encourage a group of non-
member states to develop the characteristics required for accession cannot be
construed as recognition of their individual eligibility for membership. For
example, the European Council’s June 1993 statement that ‘the associated
countries of Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of
the European Union’ was accompanied by a list of standards (the ‘Copenhagen
criteria’) that aspiring states had to meet before they could be eligible for
membership. The same is true of the EU’s June 2000 statement on the Western
Balkans, which declared that ‘its objective remains the fullest possible integration
of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of
Europe through the Stabilisation and Association process, political dialogue,
liberalisation of trade and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. All the
countries concerned are potential candidates for EU membership.’9
By the same logic, a negative position on eligibility is a regional community’s
collective conclusion that an applicant state lacks the fundamental characteristics
necessary for membership. Indicators that a regional community considers a
non-member state to be not eligible for membership include any of the following
acts by the community:
• an explicit refusal to hold preliminary talks on accession or a failure to issue

an invitation to such talks within two years of a non-member’s expression of
interest in accession;
• an explicit refusal to start negotiations on an accession treaty or pre-
accession association treaty or failure to start such negotiations within one
year of opening preliminary talks;
• a deliberate blockage of progress toward accession, including a failure to
start pre-accession or accession negotiations within one year of a declaration
of ‘candidate’ status, a freeze of all accession negotiations already underway,
or an explicit and unconditional cancellation of all accession negotiations.
9 CVCE: Conclusions of the Santa Maria da Feira European Council (19–20 June 2000).
All of these time windows (‘within two years’ etc.) are chosen to be large enough
to ensure that the indicated non-action was deliberate and not a result of the
community’s busy agenda or its need to gather information before making a
decision.
However, none of these developments would constitute evidence of non-
eligibility if it were clearly due to circumstances unrelated to the characteristics or
actions of the aspirant state, such as a diplomatic or institutional crisis that
prevents the community from responding to aspirants in a timely or normal
manner. For example, the de facto suspension of negotiations with Denmark,
Ireland, and Norway in 1963 and 1967 cannot be viewed as the result of a negative
decision on their eligibility because they were clearly due to the turmoil following
France’s veto of negotiations with the UK.
Once adopted, a regional community’s position on the eligibility of an aspirant
state is resistant but not impervious to change. In general, reputational costs and
the difficulty of achieving consensus militate against revisiting a decision on a
particular aspirant’s eligibility. However, new circumstances in the aspirant state,
within the community, or in the outside world, perhaps in conjunction with the
efforts of non-governmental or supranational policy entrepreneurs, may lead
member states to revisit an earlier conclusion. As such, the longer an aspirant
state that has been deemed eligible for membership waits before completing
accession, the more it risks having its eligibility challenged. Likewise, an aspirant
that the community has judged ineligible may be reconsidered later if its
characteristics or the community’s expectations change significantly. As a result, a
single aspirant state may be the subject of multiple eligibility decisions over time.
However, as the second list of indicators suggests, critical statements by
community institutions or officials do not necessarily constitute a negative
position on the eligibility of a particular aspirant or candidate state. For example,
European Commission ‘opinions’ and European Parliament declarations on
particular states may be part of a political process leading to a denial of membership
eligibility, or even to the retraction of a prior recognition of membership eligibility,
but neither can substitute for a collective decision by the member states in deter-
mining eligibility.
Some might argue that a community’s decision to freeze certain parts (‘chap-
ters’ in contemporary EU parlance) of accession negotiations also constitutes a
negative decision on eligibility, even if negotiations continue on other parts. After
all, accession does not have to be accomplished by any given date: negotiations
can proceed slowly if the applicant is not making the necessary reforms. As such,
a decision by the community to deny the applicant a possibility of progress in
certain areas is a political decision that calls into question the applicant state’s
eligibility for membership. If so, then eligibility would be restored when all
blockages are lifted and the progress of negotiations is limited only by the aspirant
state’s political will and administrative capacity. However, this logic does not
outweigh the fact that accession negotiations are only held with states that are
considered eligible for membership, so we consider the continuation of any such
negotiations as an indicator that the community has not revoked its prior
confirmation of membership eligibility.
Having clarified the nature of membership eligibility and ineligibility and how
they can be recognized empirically, the chapter now turns to a brief summary of
the book’s core argument and alternative explanations.
4. The argument and alternative explanations, in brief
So how can we best understand a state’s eligibility for membership in a political

community that is regional in scope and supranational in scale? This section
briefly presents a range of explanations, each informed by a different theoretical
tradition and centred on a different explanatory variable. The book’s core
argument, focused on the evolution and power of membership norms, is
summarized first, followed by five plausible alternatives focused respectively on
physical geography, treaty rules, regime type, commercial interests, and
geopolitical threats.
1. Membership norms. Membership norms express a regional community’s

collective expectations regarding the characteristics that should distinguish
community members from other states. They emerge in deliberations
among a regional community’s member state governments and supranational
officials and thereafter bolster or weaken the legitimacy of a campaign for
accession, depending on the non-member state’s fit with the prevailing
norm. A regional community will therefore recognize the membership eli-
gibility of non-member states that fit the membership norms prevailing
among its member states and regional institutions, and reject others. If no
membership norm prevails within the community, then hard bargaining
over the eligibility of non-member states would be expected. For example,
regardless of the interests or preferences of its member states, a regional
community whose membership norm limits the community to states guar-
anteeing the rule of law will not accept a non-member state that fails to
provide this guarantee within its borders.
2. Physical location. A regional community’s decisions on membership
eligibility are determined by the location of the non-member state’s terri-
tory in relation to that of the current members. This may be a matter of
territorial contiguity or location within the geographic space conventionally
associated with the region in question. Territorial contiguity increases the
likelihood of economic interdependence and thus creates a strong motive
for including the outsider in the club (Mattli 1999), and it tends to reduce
transportation costs, which have an inverse relationship with the net gains
of economic integration (Frankel et al. 1997). By this logic, a regional
community would welcome all non-member states with which a current
member state shares a land border or close proximity across water. Shifting
the focus to social purpose, which John Gerard Ruggie (1982) considers
key to understanding the costs that states are willing to bear in international
organization, casts territorial location in a new light. Quite simply, if a
regional organization aims to integrate or govern a particular geographic
space, such as a continent or portion thereof, one might expect that any
state located fully or even partly within this space would be considered
eligible for membership, and states outside this space would be ineligible.
For example, any state located in Europe would be eligible for membership
in the European Union.
3. Treaty rules. Regional communities are founded on intergovernmental
treaties that establish formal rules regarding which states may join. The
community’s decisions on the membership eligibility of non-member states
may be determined by the content of these rules. If so, then a regional
community will recognize the membership eligibility of non-member states
that fit the formal rule on memberships established by the community’s
treaty, and reject others. For example, a regional community whose
founding treaty requires that all member states must also belong to a
particular military alliance would exclude a non-member state that was not
part of the alliance.
4. Regime type. The member states of a regional community may view its
evolution as an opportunity to consolidate their own position domestically
and/or to spread their values by ensuring the prevalence of states like theirs
within the community and keeping dissimilar regimes out. A regional
community’s decision on the membership eligibility of non-member states
may therefore be shaped by variations in the member states’ form of
government. If so, then a regional community will recognize the
membership eligibility of non-member states whose regime type is similar
to that of the member states, and reject those that are dissimilar. For
example, a regional community composed of hereditary monarchies will
not consider a parliamentary democracy eligible for membership, regard-
less of the other interests of its member states.
5. Commercial interests. In regional communities including a customs union
or single market, which are likely to influence the economic profile and
competitiveness of their members, there is a strong incentive for member
states’ governments to base their preferences regarding possible
enlargement on calculations of how integrating an applicant state would
affect their own state’s economic welfare. For example, if they prefer to keep
states with inferior administrative capacities out of the customs union/

single market, then they would likely exclude applicants with a lower level
of economic development. Conversely, if they view enlargement as an
opportunity to benefit from cheaper labour, they would likely exclude
applicants with a higher level of economic development.
6. Security interests. Members of a regional community may base their
enlargement preferences on their expectations regarding how a potential
new member would affect their geopolitical security. Individual member
states would oppose any applicant states whose accession would reduce
their own security. A regional community will therefore deem a non-
member state eligible for membership if its accession would reduce all
member states’ geopolitical vulnerability or improve their capability for
resisting geopolitical threats.
It is also important to explain why the book does not give equal status to an
explanation of membership eligibility focused on socio- cultural identity.
Identities are ‘relatively stable, role-
specific understandings and expectations
about the self ’ that provide a basis for both social distinctiveness and social
solidarity (Wendt 1992: 397). Some scholars define regions as groups of states
whose populations or elites share a cultural identity (Kupchan 2010, Acharya
2011). One could therefore attempt to explain eligibility for membership in a
regional organization with reference to the socio- cultural identities of the
applicant state and the member states.
From this perspective, one might expect regional communities to welcome
membership applications from states whose cultural characteristics they share
and to reject applications from states with different cultural characteristics.
Prescriptive versions of this logic are widely heard in public debates. Former
French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (2000) argues that Turkey is ineligible
for EU membership because it does not share Europe’s cultural heritage, while
former Dutch politician Frits Bolkestein (2011) goes a step further, stressing the
Christian roots of European civilization. Hence Thomas Risse’s suggestion that
‘one cannot even begin to understand EU enlargement without taking identity
politics into account’ (2012: 92).
However, in order to test the identity explanation of EU decision-making over
time, it would first be necessary to determine what historical memory or set of
cultural values were shared by Europeans at various points in time since the
1950s. The problem is that apart from the claims of political entrepreneurs, ‘a
meaningful common European historical identification barely exists’ (Mayer and
Palmowski 2004: 575). As a result, scholars tend to treat the joint legal
commitments of European states as a proxy for European identity even though
the cultural sources of these commitments are ambiguous at best.
And even if it were possible to observe European cultural identity at particular

moments in time, this could not explain why regional communities distinguish
between applicant states with very similar cultural characteristics. For example,
why was the Czech Republic offered an EU membership prospect in 1994 while
the neighbouring Slovak Republic was not? Nor could this explain sudden but
consequential changes in how a regional community responds to the membership
aspirations of a single state, whose cultural characteristics presumably remained
the same. For example, why did the EEC encourage Spain to prepare for
membership in the late 1950s, reject its eligibility when it sought an association
treaty in 1962, and then reverse itself again after 1975? Why did the EEC sign a
treaty with Greece in 1961 that recognized Athens’ eligibility for eventual
membership, then close the door in 1967, and re-open it in 1975? Socio-cultural
identity is therefore not treated here as an independent explanation for the EU’s
collective decisions on membership eligibility.
5. Empirical design and methods
This part of the chapter outlines the empirical research design used to explain
how regional communities decide which states are eligible for membership. It
starts with a justification of the focus on Europe—why it makes sense to
investigate the politics of EU enlargement and why doing so should yield valid
insights with broader applicability. It then discusses how the country-cases are
identified and introduces the 48 country-cases that are the focus of the book’s
empirical investigation. It then distinguishes three distinct dependent variables
and the analytical methods used to explain them: discursive-process tracing of
EU membership norms over seven decades, statistical analysis of eligibility
outcomes in 48 country-cases, and causal-process tracing of eligibility decision-
making in three countries over time.
Regional case selection—why study Europe?
As indicated above, this book is focused empirically on regional community

building and membership decision-making in Europe. In addition to the intrinsic
importance of European integration for life within Europe and its relations with
the outside world, there are two reasons why it provides a good basis for
understanding the general dynamics of regional membership eligibility.
First of all, the strong pressures favouring alternative factors make post-1957
Europe a hard test of the membership norms argument. Given the novelty of the
European integration project, there were strong incentives for member states to
bolster their collective credibility by adhering closely to solemn commitments
they had made in the treaties. At the same time, the EU was born as an economic
community and always had economic integration as its core project, so
governments of the member states faced strong incentives to base their
membership decisions on assessments of economic fit or gain. On the other hand,
given how the rise of fascism in the 1930s had demonstrated the fragility of
democratic rule, the strength of communist parties in the post-war period created
a strong incentive for EEC member states to do whatever they could to bolster
democracy, such as limiting membership to democratic states that protect human
rights. Finally, with the Cold War raging, the Warsaw Pact’s forces never far away,
and the United States constantly pressuring its allies to reinforce NATO solidarity,
west European governments faced strong incentives to base their EC membership
decisions on geopolitical calculations. These incentives were sustained after the
Cold War by intense ethnic conflict in states bordering the EU, massive refugee
flows, and Russian military adventurism. In this complex and potentially over-
determined environment, it is far from obvious that membership norms would
have any significant impact on member states’ decisions regarding enlargement.
The second reason is purely empirical. If one aims to test competing
explanations of decision-making on membership eligibility, there have to be
enough cases to provide variation on the dependent variable and on possible
explanatory variables, as well as sufficient transparency for the researcher to
access the relevant data. The EU is ideal in both respects, given the large number
of non-member states that have sought to join the club over seven decades, some
successfully and some not, plus the relative accessibility of official records and the
intense media coverage of these developments since the beginning.
The study thus rests on a deep and varied empirical foundation. At its core lie
the most primary of primary sources in EU scholarship: preparatory studies and
preliminary drafts (travaux préparatoires) and transcripts (procès verbaux) from
meetings of the member states, the internal notes of member states and EU
institutions, as well as diplomatic correspondence and position papers found in
the historical archives of the Belgian, French, and German foreign ministries, the
Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European
Parliament, plus the Historical Archives of the European Communities located at
the European University Institute in Florence and the European Union Delegation
Collection held at the University of Pittsburgh. Other important documents were
found in the University of Pittsburgh’s online Archives of European Integration
(aei.pitt.edu), the University of Luxembourg’s online Centre Virtuel de la
Connaissance sur l’Europe (www.cvce.eu), and the Fondation Paul-Henri Spaak,
an independent but now-defunct institute in Brussels. These archival sources
were supplemented by interviews with senior EU officials, memoirs, speeches,
and other statements by key decision-makers, as well as print and electronic
media reporting on events as they unfolded, statistical data from the World Bank
and the Center for Systemic Peace, and some secondary historical sources.
Country-case selection—which cases and why?
As discussed above, this book aims to explain EU decision- making on

membership eligibility in situations where a non-member state has communicated
its interest in joining the club. Unfortunately, although the EU has more
experience with such situations than any other regional organization, there is no
official list of cases and outcomes that can be downloaded for analysis. The
identification of EU decisions on membership eligibility is therefore an act of
historical interpretation: the analyst must determine why a particular set of
behaviours and communication constitutes a case and what was the outcome of
each case.
Working with the aforementioned sources, I have identified 48 cases during
the period 1957–2019 in which the EU took a position on the membership
eligibility of a non-member state, including 37 cases where the state was deemed
eligible for membership and 11 cases where it was deemed ineligible. The book
uses three statistical techniques to analyse all 48 cases, and then examines in
detail EU decision- making on four states whose pursuit of community
membership extended over decades: Greece, Spain, Turkey, and Ukraine.
Dependent variables and analytical methods
In the simplest sense, the dependent variable and key unit of analysis in this study
is the EU position on the membership eligibility of an applicant state. But in order
to evaluate the various possible explanations introduced above, the study distin-
guishes between two dimensions of EU decision-making: the content of positions
on membership eligibility since 1957 and the process by which these decisions
were made in critical cases over time. Studying both dimensions yields more valid
insights into EU decision-making than studying either one alone. In addition, as
a foundation for testing the membership norms explanation, it is necessary first
to trace the evolution of EU membership norms over time. Addressing these
three empirical challenges necessitates a broad range of analytical methods whose
rationale and application are elaborated below.
Genealogy of membership norms

The first challenge is to establish the empirical reality and historical evolution of
the book’s core explanatory variable, the EU’s membership norms. To that end,
the study draws on extensive archival evidence of the language used by member
states’ representatives, European Commission officials, and members of the
European Parliament, speaking publicly or behind closed doors in official
deliberations regarding the characteristics that distinguish the Union’s member
states from others in the international system. To supplement these archival

sources, we turn to interviews, memoirs, speeches, and other statements by key
decision-makers, as well as print and electronic media accounts of the events in
question. The latter are especially important for more recent periods, where
access to primary sources is very limited.
The most promising approach to interpreting this evidence is a genealogical
method. In the social sciences, genealogy is used ‘to illuminate the contingency of
what we take for granted, to denaturalize what seems immutable, to destabilize
seemingly natural categories as constructs and confines articulated by words and
discourse and to open up new possibilities for the future’ (Crowley 2009: 341).
The particular genealogical method used here is discursive-process tracing. The
discourse analysis in this study involves reading confidential papers, speeches,
debates, and declarations from EU institutions, member states, and senior officials
in order to identify which representations of the nature and purpose of the
political community prevail in various periods of time (Neumann 2008). The
process tracing aspect involves identifying the conditions that appear to
strengthen or weaken prevailing norms, as well as the rhetorical manoeuvres that
key political actors use to maintain the salience of a dominant representation, to
promote an alternative or insurgent representation, and to frame particular
political choices in terms of their preferred representation (Blatter and Haverland
2012, Bennett and Checkel 2015). Discursive-process tracing is thus ideally suited
to investigating how political actors conceive and reconceive of eligibility for
membership in a supranational regional community.
Using this technique, we would conclude that an EU membership norm exists
when we observe that the collective deliberations and public pronouncements of
member states express a consistent definition of the constitutional, policy, or
other characteristics that current and aspiring member states are expected to
have. A change in membership norms is evident when such pronouncements
express a new definition, including when community members choose not to
contradict a novel definition by a relevant actor and then adjust their discourse
on membership eligibility to suit the new definition. However, exceptional
discourse by a minority within the community does not invalidate a norm as long
as it is criticized or at least not adopted by other community actors. Such evidence
is especially powerful when the normative discourse contradicts the material
interests or demonstrated policy preferences of the actors involved. The opening
of Chapter 3 provides more details on this analysis.
Statistical analyses of eligibility positions

The second analytical challenge is to assess the explanatory power of the
membership norms argument against that of competing arguments regarding the
membership eligibility of applicant states. This assessment is framed in terms of
the relative fit between the expectations of the various arguments and the
positions observed in the 48 country-cases (i.e. episodes where the EU took a
position on the eligibility of a particular state). Notwithstanding the nuances of
each decision, these outcomes are reduced to a binary variable (eligible–ineligible)
in order to facilitate comparison of the various arguments. Data on the outcome
in each case comes from the same sources indicated above for the genealogy of
membership norms. Variations over time in the membership norms themselves
are drawn from the preceding analysis. Data on the other arguments’ explanatory
variables comes from the EUR-Lex database (treaties), Polity IV and V-Dem
(regime type), the World Bank (commercial interests), and secondary sources
(geopolitical threats).
Once the data are assembled, we evaluate each case to determine whether the
outcome fits the expectations derived from the various hypotheses in light of the
relevant values on their respective explanatory variables. The cases are then
analysed using three complementary methodologies. First, the correlations
between explanatory variables and outcomes are presented in cross- tab or
contingency table format: this provides an initial assessment of their relative
explanatory power. Second, as a check on the robustness of the initial findings, we
analyse the same cases and outcomes using logistic regression. Third and finally,
the cases and outcomes are analysed using Qualitative Comparative Analysis,
which offers yet another robustness check. This combination of techniques is well
suited to maximizing the validity of conclusions regarding each argument’s
explanatory power. The opening of Chapter 4 provides more details on this
analysis.
Causal-process tracing of eligibility decision-making

Notwithstanding their clarity, the statistical techniques described above have
significant limitations. First of all, depending upon the alignment of explanatory
variables, competing theories may generate identical expectations about the
outcome of particular decisions, and this makes it hard to weigh their relative
explanatory power. More fundamentally, correlation is a poor indicator of
causation, especially in a relatively small population of cases. It is therefore
sensible to investigate the second face of community decision-making: the process
(rather than the outcome) by which EU member states and institutions make
decisions on the membership eligibility of applicant states.
The technique of causal- process tracing—as distinct from the discursive-
process tracing described above—focuses on the predictive accuracy of a theory’s
expectations regarding the mechanisms that link explanatory variables to key
outcomes. This technique is well established in the literature on European
integration (Schimmelfennig 2015), and it has recently been subject to extensive
methodological refinement (Blatter and Haverland 2012, Bennett and Checkel
2015). Causal- process tracing is therefore ideally suited to assessing the
explanatory power of various theoretical arguments regarding membership

eligibility.
Each of the six explanations introduced above includes certain expectations
about how a regional community (in this case, the EU) makes decisions on
membership eligibility, ranging from normative empowerment to legal
entrapment to selection by identity to rational calculation with veto option. Each
of these expectations has observable implications that are subject to empirical
verification. One can therefore weigh a theoretical argument’s explanatory power
by assessing how closely its expectations regarding causal mechanisms fit the
processes observed in a set of cases. To do so, we depend on empirical evidence of
EU decision-making processes—how agendas were crafted, who participated and
what arguments they used in negotiations, what information was available to
decision-makers, etc.—found in official archives, media reports, and participants’
memoirs. However, given the quantity of evidence necessary to conduct such an
analysis, and the limitations on access to this evidence in some cases, it is not
feasible to trace the decision-making process in all 48 of the country-cases.
This is why the process-tracing narrative is structured by the evolving norms of
membership eligibility: each of the process- tracing chapters (Chapters 5–8)
examines a single normative era and investigates how the norm prevailing in that
era shaped decision-making on several applicant states. Such a structure makes it
easier to identify the similarity in EU positions across countries within the same
normative era and to judge the historical interdependence of contemporaneous
country-cases. Of course, developments regarding these countries are not truly
independent of each other: EU decision-making on one country is likely to
influence subsequent decision- making on another country. To capture this
dynamic, the discussion of one country sometimes includes brief references to
decisions on another country. Finally, to assess whether (and if so, how) the EU’s
position on the eligibility of particular applicant states changed in response to
changes in membership norms, one has to compare decisions on that state across
historical chapters.
6. Plan of the book
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 is the theoretical heart of the book. It

elaborates the foundations, expectations, and observable implications of the
aforementioned theoretical arguments regarding how regional communities
decide on the membership eligibility of non-member states.
The next two chapters involve empirical analysis of EU membership outcomes
over time, starting with the membership norms themselves and then their relative
impact on EU decision-making. Chapter 3 uses genealogical methods to identify
four eras in the evolution of EU membership norms over seven decades. From
the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 through the end of 1961, the EEC
defined itself as a community of non-Communist states and expected any state
seeking membership to fit this norm. Through the remainder of the 1960s, the
EEC defined itself as a community of non- Communist parliamentary
democracies. Starting about 1970 and continuing for another thirty-five years,
the EEC (and later EC then EU) defined itself as a community of liberal
democracies. Most recently, since about 2006, the EU has lacked a dominant
conception of itself as a political community and thus of what type of state is
eligible for membership.
Chapter 4 then uses three empirical methods—cross-tab correlation, logistic
regression, and crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis—to test the fit between
the six theories’ expectations regarding EU decisions on membership eligibility
and the actual decisions that were taken in the 48 cases. Both individually and
collectively, the three methods provide a strong empirical basis for the argument
that membership norms play a significant role in decision-making, arguably even
more significant than commercial or geopolitical interests. (The book’s Appendix
elaborates the techniques used to impute a small number of missing values for the
statistical analyses in this chapter.)
Building on this finding, Chapters 5–8 trace the process of EU decision-making
regarding the membership eligibility of four countries—Greece, Spain, Turkey,
and Ukraine—across four time periods. Chapter 5 examines decision-making on
Greece, Turkey, and Spain in the years 1957–1961, when the prevailing
membership norm defined Europe as a community of non-Communist states.
Chapter 6 examines decision-making on Greece, Turkey, and Spain in the years
1962–1969, when the prevailing membership norm defined Europe as a commu-
nity of parliamentary democracies. Chapter 7 examines decision-making on
Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Ukraine in the years 1970–2005, when the prevailing
membership norm defined Europe as a community of liberal democracies.
Chapter 8 examines decision-making on Turkey and Ukraine since 2006, when
no single normative definition of Europe has prevailed. Overall, these chapters
reveal a strong fit between the procedural expectations of the membership norms
argument and the actual decision-making process as it unfolded over time.
In conclusion, Chapter 9 summarizes the empirical findings and considers
their implications for the future course of EU decision-making on enlargement,
for the behaviour of regional organizations in other parts of the world, and for
future scholarship on inter-governmental decision-making and the construction
of regional communities.
2
Explaining Membership Eligibility
[A region] is not a geographic fact that has sociological consequences,

but a sociological fact that takes geographic form.
—Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, 20021
Despite the broadening and deepening of regional cooperation and integration

across Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe over the last seven decades, scholars
differ on the meaning of ‘region’ and ‘regional community’ and on how regional
communities determine which or what kinds of states are eligible for membership.
This chapter elaborates the book’s argument on these points, with a particular
focus on the limits of regional community and thus on eligibility for membership.
After elaborating this logic and its observable implications, the chapter then
compares it to alternative explanations of membership eligibility focused on
physical geography, treaty rules, regime type, commercial interests, and geopolitical
threats.
In short, the book defines a regional community as a group of states that
identifies with a particular geographic region and acts collectively through an
inter-governmental organization. It argues that the potential geographic limits of
such communities are defined by membership norms prevailing amongst the
leaders of the member states and senior officials within the regional organization.
And like a physical border, but perhaps more so, a membership norm ‘defines
who you are and how you relate to those on the other side’ (Timmermans 2016:
8). These norms legitimate certain states’ membership in the club and distinguish
them from other states. Membership norms also shape decision-making within
regional organizations by empowering advocates of applicant states that fit the
norm and disempowering advocates of applicant states that do not fit the norm.
Yet notwithstanding their importance, the membership norms of regional
communities are often contested and subject to change over time.
1. A constructivist theory of regional community
This section of the chapter outlines a constructivist theory of regional community

and membership eligibility according to which the EU is best conceived as the
1 Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 587.
The Limits of Europe: Membership Norms and the Contestation of Regional Integration. Daniel C. Thomas,
Oxford University Press. © Daniel C. Thomas 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199206711.003.0002
organizational representative of an imagined community of states whose limits

are defined by membership norms that change over time. The theory is
constructivist in the sense that it emphasizes the intersubjective interpretation of
geography as the basis for community formation and assumes that political actors
are sensitive to community norms when making behavioural (i.e. policy) choices.
However, its focus on social facts and the assumption that actors are sensitive to
norms should not be mistaken for the stronger constructivist claim (not made
here) that actors’ interests and policy preferences derive simply or largely from
their roles and interactions within the community.
The nature of regions and regional community
Many social scientists emphasize geographic proximity in their definitions of

region and regionalism. By this logic, a region is composed of states whose
borders touch or lie close to each other. However, ideas, institutions, and political
practice play a critical role in constituting the identity and limits of regions
(Mansfield and Milner 1997: 3–4; Barnett 1998; Buzan and Waever 2003: 27;
Katzenstein 2005: 6–13; Powers and Goetz 2011). The geographic extent of a
region thus cannot usefully be conceived in materialist terms, as if physical
location alone defined it. As Rumelili (2004: 39–40) explains, ‘the geographical
parameters of Europe have not only shifted throughout the centuries but also
within the short history of the European “community” as well. Therefore,
demarcating a certain geographic area as Europe has only been possible by
discourses and practices of differentiation that have also historically shifted and
changed.’
In fact, geographic proximity cannot explain some of the most puzzling aspects
of European (regional) community building. To start, states that are direct
neighbours of EU member states and not plausibly part of any continent other
than Europe have been excluded at various points from joining the process of
regional integration embodied in the EU. Europe also lacks any topographical
border that separates it indisputably from Asia, which creates intense
controversies over the Europeanness of Turkey and Ukraine, to cite just two
examples. And while the European continent may seem to be clearly distinguished
from Africa and southwest Asia by the Mediterranean and the Bosphorus, and
from the Americas by the Atlantic, this cannot explain why Greenland was once
part of the EEC or why Cyprus, the Canary Islands, and even New Caledonia
are part of the EU today.
These puzzles reflect the fact, as Edward Said (1978) recognized in his critique
of Western views of the East, that geography is meaningful and thus politically
consequential principally through the ways in which it is imagined. In turn, he
argued, the discourses that frame and reproduce these ‘imaginative geographies’
Explaining Membership Eligibility 29
are themselves sources of power for political actors with their own motives and
goals. In the same spirit, Benedict Anderson (1983: 7) defined the nation, one of
the most familiar building blocks of political geography, as ‘an imagined political
community . . . imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’. Limits are thus
inherent to the definition and the lived experience of community: ‘The nation is
imagined as limited because even the largest of them,’ said Anderson, ‘has finite, if
elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.’
But to assert that all political communities have imagined limits is not to claim
that these limits are somehow false: they are ‘distinguished not by their falsity/
genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined,’ wrote Anderson (1983:
6–7). Similarly, William Rogers Brubaker (1990: 380) defines the nation as ‘an
idea—and an ideal: it is a distinctive way of characterising and evaluating political
and social membership’. More recently, Roger M. Smith (2003: 20) defines a
‘political people or community [as] a potential adversary of other forms of human
association [whose] obligations legitimately trump many of the demands made
on its members in the name of other associations’. In other words, the imagined
limits of a political community may be near or far, and they may change over
time, but they shape the behaviour of its members and those who seek to join.
Anderson, Brubaker, and Smith were speaking principally about communities
composed of individuals, but their logic helps us to understand the construction
and limits of groups or communities of states. A regional community is a group of
states who identify collectively with a particular area of the world and whose
norms and rules compete with and override some of the demands on those states
deriving from other identities or institutions. These norms and rules are typically,
though not necessarily, embedded in a formal international organization designed
to govern the community and represent it to the outside world. The limits of such
a regional community are determined by the collective imagination of the
governments that comprise the community at any given time.
The nature of membership norms
So how do regional communities define which states are eligible for membership
and which are not? The governments that create a regional community often
emphasize what they have in common, such as location, cultural heritage, values,
or material interests, but building and sustaining a regional community of states
is as much about establishing difference as it is about reinforcing commonality.
After all, no group of states can claim that certain characteristics distinguish its
members from others without referring implicitly or explicitly to other states that
lack the same characteristics, either entirely or in sufficient measure. However,
this differentiation need not assume the irreconcilability of identities: the
community of states that differentiates itself from others in terms of certain
characteristics may be actively involved in overcoming the distance between itself

and the others that it considers potentially assimilable (Rumelili 2004: 37–8).
To analyse this process, we must look beyond the classical definition of
membership norms as ‘standards for including or accepting a person within a
group or social position’ (Cancian 1975: 3). The problem with the classical
definition is that the standards to which it refers could take the form of beliefs
widely held by political elites, convergent expectations that may or may not be
grounded in beliefs, or treaty rules whose negotiation was shaped neither by
beliefs nor by convergent expectations, and each of these has a different source
and different consequences for action (see Sartori 1970 on the danger of ‘concept
stretching’). Only by replacing this amalgamated concept with a more precise
definition can we possibly assess the content and effects of membership norms in
an actual community of states.
As scholars have long recognized, a key role of international organizations is to
define, communicate, implement, and enforce the shared values of the states that
they represent (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 24). The most authoritative constructions
of regional commonality and difference emerge from deliberations within the
international organization connected to the regional community in question. The
limits of a regional community—that is, which states are currently or potentially
eligible for membership—are thus defined in concrete terms by discourse and
debates within the regional organization over principles of membership eligibility
and their application to particular states.
Membership norms are best defined as the characteristics by which the
members of a regional community collectively define what they have in common
and what distinguishes them from other states in the international system. These
distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are socially convergent, and thereby qualify
as norms, as long as member states’ governments, regardless of their beliefs and/
or policy preferences, recognize them as the agreed definition of the community’s
identity and thus as the standards by which other members of the community will
judge their choices regarding membership and enlargement.
In concrete terms, a membership norm exists when the community’s
pronouncements express a common definition of the shared identity of the
community’s members and thus of the characteristics that membership applicants
are expected to have. A change in membership norms is evident when most such
pronouncements express a new definition, including when community members
choose not to contradict a novel definition by a high-profile actor and then begin
to speak about membership in similar terms. A regional community ceases to
have a membership norm when its members signal in their discursive behaviour
that they no longer recognize a shared definition of membership eligibility that
they are bound to respect.
Membership norms may be related to formal membership rules such as those
found in inter-governmental treaties, but the two are distinct logically and often
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APPENDIX III
INVENTORY OF THE SALE AT BREWOOD NUNNERY
(Exchequer Augmentation Office; Miscellaneous Books, Vol. 172)

Note.—The volume from which this and the two following extracts are
taken begins as follows:
Herafter Ensueth the names of all and euery suche pson and psons
as was by Thomas Ligh Doctor in the lawe and Wyllms Cauendyshe
Auditor Commissionours appoynted by the King our soueraigne lorde for
the dyssolucion of thes monasteryes foloweng by them Indiferently
chosyn and sworne of and for the valuying ratyng and apprisyng of all and
singler the gooddes and catelles cummyng and beyng found at the
surrenders taken in the same late dyssoluyd Monasteries and priories
within sundry sheres or Counties the names as well of the seyd howses
as of the psons so sworne foloweng hervnder wryghten in order.
That ys to say
[Then follow the jurors of “Meryvale.”]
John Rychard John
Broune Whyt Shyrborne
William John Baker Thomas
Barnes Clarke
Brewode Jurors Jurors Jurors
Henry William Anthony
Holte Turner Palmer
Thomas William George
Willes Atwill Wilkyns
Raffe John Hyll Nycholas

Mynors Bagshaw
Seint John John Rychard
Thomas Langley Lyenshaw Rawson
Jur. Jur. Jur.
bysyde Roger Willm. John
Staff Alayn Whitill Fyssher
George Roger Willm.
Bowgley Gratwych Blythe
Delacres William Jurors John Arden Jurors Henry Jurors

Butler Barber
Thomas Hugh Thomas
Johnson Latham Jacson
Henry Rychard William
Atkyns Luther Tanner
John John Thomas
Flynte Thomson Morris
[Here follow jurors of Lylleshull and Darley. And on f. 2 jurors of Dale,
Repton, Gracedue, Pypwell and Barnwel.]
Priory of Brewood
Hereafter folowyth all suche parcelles of implementes or houshold

Stuff, Corne, Catell, ornamentes of the church and such other lyke founde
within the late priory there at the tyme of the Dissolucion of the same
house, Soulde by the Kinges Commissioners to Thomas Gyfforde, esqr.
The Churche
Fyrst, one table of alebaster, owlde formes and settes, ij. particions of
carvyd woode, pavyng of the church and quere, xxviij. panes of glas, and
on masboke
xxs.
The Vestrye
It’ ij. payr of grene dornyx[230] westmentes, j. olde cope of sendall, one
serples, j. altercloth and j. towell, j. litell bell, and a sensure of latynne
iiijs.
The Chapter House
It’ iij. panys of glasse and ij. long formes soulde for
xijd.
Belles in the Stepull
It’ ther remayneth unsolde in the stepull iij. belles.
The Hale
It’ there ij. tabulles and a forme soulde for xijd.
The Parlore
It’ j. foldyng tabull, j. forme, j. chayre, j. cubborde, and the hangyngs of
payntyd clothe
ijs.
The Cheffe Chamber
It’ one fetherbedd, ij. oulde coverlettes, j. oulde blankett, j. tester of
whyght lynen clothe, ij. bed-steddes, ij. formes, j. cubborde, one joynt
chayre, ij. oulde coffers, j. boulster, ij. pyllowis, and iiij. payre of shettes
xs.
The Baylyffes Chamber
It’ one mattres, j. coverlet, one blankett, and one axe
xijd.
The Buttery
It’ ij. ale tubbes, j. oulde chest, j. borde, j. tableclothe, and ij. candlestykys
of latenn
xijd.
The Kechyn
It’ ij. dressyngbordes, ij. stoles, j. forme, j. ladder, j. bz [] di’ of salte, iiij.
porrengers of peuter, iiij. platters, ij. saucers, and ij. braspottes
vs.
The Larder
It’ one great chest, j. troffe, and two little barrelles
vjd.
The Brewhouse
It’ v. tubbes, j. keler, j. olde tubbe, j. olde table, j. olde whele, and one
chese presse
xvjd.
The Yelyng House
It’ iij. colyng[231] ledes, ij. brassepannes, and vij. oulde tobbes
vs.
The Boultyng House
It’ iij. troffes, j. watering fate, j. boulting huche, j. busshell, and ij. tubbes
soulde for
viijd.
The Cheslofte
It’ ij. litell tubbes, ij. chese rakkes, ij. charnes, j. lytell whele, and ij.
shelves
viijd.
The Kylhouse
It’ j. hercloth and j. lader hengyng upon the wall of ye seid house
xjd.
Grayne
It’ one quarter of whete vjs. ijd., quarter of munke corne viijs., j. quarter of
ottes xxd., j. quarter of pese ijs. viijd. In all
xviijs. iiijd.
Catell
It’ one horse iiijs. soulde to the said Thomas
iiijs.
Waynes
It’ j. wayne and j. dungcarte sould for
xvjd.
Heye
It’ for x lode of hey
xvs.
Plate Soulde
It’ soulde to George Warenn j. chales and iij. spounys all whytt weing viij.
ounces at iijs. iiijd. the ounce
xxvjs. viijd.
Dette receyvyd
It’ receyvyd of an olde dett dwe to ye seid late priorye
xxvjs. viijd.
The sume totall of all the guddis of thys seid late priory with xxvjs. viijd.
for dett receyvyd and xxvjs. viijd. for plate
viili. vjs. jd.
Rewardes gyvene to the late Abbes and the Covent ther at ther
departure
Fyrst to Isabell Launder xls.
It’ to Christabell Smith xxs.
It’ to Alice Beche xxs.
It’ to Felix Baggshawe xxs.
cs.
Rewardes gyvene to the servantes ther at theyr lyke departure

Itto William parker, Chapelan, xxxs.
Itto Robert Baker xiijs. iiijd.
Itto Margarett Burre ijs.
Itto Thomas Bolde iijs.
Itto William Morre ijs. vjd.
It to Thomas Smith xs.
It to Kateryn Alate xiijs. iiijd.
It to Philip Duffelde iiijs.
lxxviijs. ijd.
It’ in cates boughte and spente at the tyme of the commissionours being
there for the dissolucion of the seid late priory, and for the saffe kepyng of
the guddes and catell there found duryng the seid tyme
lxs.
The sum of the paymentes aforeseid is, xj. li. xviijs. ijd. and so
remayneth in the seid comissionour’s handes nil, for they have payd more
then they for the goodes of the seid late priory have receyvyd by iiij. li. xijs.
jd.
Md. that the Prioresse of the seid late Priory hath receyvyd of
Michaelmas Quarters Rente dwe to the seid Priory these Parcelles
folowing, and none other as sche sayth.
Fyrst, of Mr. Thomas Gyfford for Blythbery for halfe a yere xxxiijs. iiijd.
It’ of Mr. Thomas Moreton for le feldes for half a yere xxvjs. viijd.
It’ of T ... Tunkes for the rente of hys ferme for halfe a yere vjs. viijd.
It’ of John Penford for halfe a yeres rent viijs.
It’ of Thomas Pitt for a hole yeres rente ijs.
It’ of Cristofer Alatt, for one quarters rente vjs. viijd.
iiij. li. iijs. iiijd.
Summa
Md. that ther is owyng to the seid late Priory of Michaelmas Rente by
the confession of the foreseid these parcelles.
Fyrst, of Barnaby Clarke for iij. yeres quiet rent xviijs.
It’ of the balyff of Tonge for j yeres rente ijs.
It’ of Willm Wydowes for j yeres rente xijd.
It’ of the lordshype of Brome for j quarter rente lxs.
It’ of Rychard Gowgh for halfe a yeres rente viijd.
It’ of Mathew Parker for halfe a yeres rente xvd.
It’ of John Staunton for halfe a yeres quiet rente vjd.
It’ of ... Blakeman for halfe a yeres rente xijd.
It’ of ... Whytemore for ij yere vjd.
It’ of Thomas Johnson for halfe a yeres rente iijd. ob.
It’ of the churchwardens of Brewode for iij yeres rente iijd.
It’ of Robart Bromhall for halfe a yeres rente iiijd.
xxxiiijs. ixd.ob
Suma
Penc’ and Porc’ grauntyd and alottyd to the late Prioresse and
Convent’ there by the seid Commissionours.
Fyrst, to Isabell Launder, late prioresse lxvjs. viijd.
It’ to Cristabell Smyth xxxiijs. iiijd.
It’ to Alys Beche xxxiijs. iiijd.
It’ to Felix Baggeshawe xxxiijs. iiijd.
viijli. vjs. viijd.
APPENDIX IV
INVENTORY OF SALE AT ST. THOMAS’S PRIORY, STAFFORD
(Augmentation Office. Miscellaneous Books, Vol. 172)

Herafter folowyth all suche pcelles of Implementes and housholde
The late Stuffe Corne Catell ornamentes of the Churche and suche other lyke
Priory founde wythin the seid late Monastery at the tyme of the Dissolucon
of Saint of the same house Soulde by the Kynges Commissionors to the
Thomas Reuerend father in God Bysshope of Couet and Lychefelde the
nygh
Staff xviiith Day of October in the xxxth yere orf [sic] our Soueraigne lorde
Kyng Henry the viiith.
That ys to saye
Fyrst j Tabull of woode at the hye alter iiij Candulstykes
of latyn j Crosse of latyn the deskys in the quere j olde
alter in our lady Chapell j Imag of our lady one payre of
The
olde Organes ij syde alters j Rode the flatt Roffes ouer cxs.
Churche
the Churche and Crosse yeles wyth all the Glasse and
the pauenement j Rode in the Churche ij Images and
one Cloke soulde for
It. iiij Tynacles of oulde redd Baudkynn iij oulde

Vestmentes j oulde Cope of Crymsonn Veluett iij oulde
Copes of redd Baudkynn j of grene and Redd sylke vij xlvs.
The Vestry
other oulde Copes iij Fruntes for the alter of Dune
yelowe and grene Sylke v olde alter clothes towel and
tow sacryng Belles soulde for
The It. the glasse Iroun pauementes tyle and shyngull wyth
Cloyster the Roffes ther j lauer of leade i Cundyth
and the It. the glasse in the Chapter house and pauyng stounes cs.
Chapter ar soulde for
house
The Dorter It. all the Selles ther ar soulde for xjs.
The Frater It. ij Bordes ther soulde for xijd.

xs.
The newe It. j olde Wynde for Stone the Iroun in the Walles the
Halle. smale Cundyth in the Courte ij Bordes and tow Formes
in the oulde halle soulde for
The Priors It. ther j foulden tabull ij formes iiij chayres and the xvjd.
parler hengynges of lynyon ar soulde for
The Water It. Bedstedes the hengynges paynted ij fetherbeddes ij xxs.

Chamb. boulsters ij pyllowes and iiij couerlettes sould for
The Great It. a beadsteadd j fetherbedd j Couerlett ij fustyon xxxiijs.

chamb. blankettes and a boulster soulde for
The ij iner It. ij fetherbeddes iiij oulde Couerynges ij boulsters ther xxs.
chambs. founde solde for
The It. ther j bedstedd j Couerlett j payre of blankettes j payre

Chamb of shetes j fetherbedd j Cupborde j forme j smale borde j xijs.
ouer the Chayer and the hengyng of lynyon clothe soulde for
Chapell
The It. ther j bedstedd j payr of shettes j materes and iij oulde
Carters Couerlettes soulde for ijs.
chamb.
It. ther ij Napkyns iiij ould Borde clothes j wesshyng

The vs.
towell j kyffe[232] ij pewter Saltes xij lomes ij
Buttery
Costrelles[233] iij oulde tubbes soulde for
It. ther iiij Brasse pottes j Broche[234] ij Brasse pannes j

brasynn morter ij Cobbordes j pott beme of Tymber j
The musterd queren[235] j kemnell j Skymer j fleshehoke ij xijs. vjd.
Kechenn payr of henges ij payr of potthokes vij platers j
voyder[236] iij dysshes iiij saucers iiij potyngers and j
Shuffnett sould for
It. ther ij Brewing leadds ij fattes vj wortleades j panne in

The
a Furneshe j steping Sesterne j here for the kill in the
Brewhouse xls.
Brewhouse chamb j bedstedd j matres j Couerlett j payr
and
of Shetes j Blankett j borde iij trowes and j bultyng tubb
Bakhouse
whyche ar soulde for
Tymber It. Tymber lying about the Scite of the seid late priory ys xiiijs.
sould soulde for
Grayne and It. in Whete there iij qrt at vijs. le qrt xxjs. xvjli.
Heye at It. in Rye and Munkencorne xj qrt at vjs. lxxiijs. xiiijs.
Orb’toun viijd. the qrt iiijd. iiijd.
Grayunge It. in Barley xl qrt. at iijs. iiijd. the qrt. vjli.
It. pese x qrt at vjs. viijd. the qrt whyche xiijs.
amountyth to the Sume of It. of hey ther iiijd.
founde xx lodes at ijs. the lode amountyng lxvjs.
to the Sume of viijd.xls.
It. in Rye ther xij qrt. at vjs. viijd. the qrt.

Grayne att iiijli. xiijs. iiijli. xiijs.
amountyng to the Sume of
Barkeswhiche iiijd. iiijd.
It. in Barley iiij qrt at iijs. iiijd. the
Graunge
qrt.amountyng to the Sume of
It. of hey ther founde xij lodes at ijs. the lode
Hey att the Priory xxiiijs.
soulde for
It. ther j Iroun bound Wayne and j other

Waynes att Orb’ton xs. viijd.
onbounden wyth yokes and temes thereto
Graunge wt other
belongyng and ij harrowes
Waynes and It. ther ij Waynes j Ieronbound and the other

harrowes at vnbounde ij harrowes ij plowes wt yokes and xiijs. iiijd.
Barkeswych temes to them belongyng
Graung
It. ther founde xij Oxenn soulde for xli.

It. ix kyne soulde for iiijli.
It. ther founde viij wening Calues at ijs. the xs.
pece on wyth an other xvjs.
Catell soulde xxvj.
It. lx yewes soulde for iijli.
att Orbtoun li
It. lxx lambes at xd. the pece lviijs.
Graunge iiijs.
It. iij carthorses and ij mares wt a Carte and xxxs.
gere belongyng to them soulde for xs.
It. vj Swyne oulde and yonge sould for xls.
It. vj Wynter bestes soulde for
It. ther founde at the tyme of the dyssolucion x. li.

Catell att of the seid late priory xij Oxen soulde for xvli.
cvjs.
Barkeswyche xiijs.
Graunge It. iiijxx Wethers at xvjd. the pece viijd.
viijd.
It. ix Swyne soulde for vijs.
The sume total of all the guddes founde iiijxx

within the seid late mon att the tyme of the vijli.
dyssolucion is
ixs.
vjd.
Fyrst to Rychard
Whytell late prior
It. to Ric. Haruy
subprior
vjli.
It to Sr. Xpofer
xls.
Simson
xls.
Rewardes gyuen to the It. to Sr. Thomas xvij
xls. xxixli.
Couent ther at ther Departure Bageley li.
xls.
It. to Sr. William
xls.
Pykstok
xxs.
It. to Sr. William
Stapulton
It. to Sr. William
Bovdon
Rewardes It. to Philip xvs. xijli. xxixli.

gyuen to the Chetwyn xs.
seruantes It. to George xs.
late apperteynyng Bowghey xvs.
to the seid It. to Peter Sponer xvs.
priory at the It. to Edmund Sale xs.
dissolution It. to Roger Cokes vijs.vjd.
therof It. to James Coke iiij.s.iij.d.
It. to Richard iijs.iiijd.
Turner vijs.vjd.
It. to John Coke xvjs.viijd.
It. to Willm vjs.viijd.
Loncome iijs. iiijd.
It. to Thomas iijs. iiijd.
Stapulton xs.
It. to Thomas xiijs.iiijd.
Beche xiijs.iiijd.
It. to iiij plowgh xiijs.iiijd.
dryuers iijs.iiijd.
It. to Alis Bech iijs.iiijd.
It. to Agnes xvs.
It. to Hewe Baker iijs.iiijd.
It. to Susan Turner xxd.
It. to Katerin xxd.
Whyttyll xvs.
It. to Richard Baker xxs.
It. to Henry Baker
It. to Nicholas
Wood
It. to Richard
Whytell
It. to Grola
Hordram
It. to Denys
Rochson
It. to John Bache
It. to Raufe Hales
It. to Elizabeth
Grene
It. in Cates bought and spente at the tyme of the

viijli.
Cates Commissionors beyng there for the dissolucon of the seid late
xixs.
bought priory and for the saffe kepyng of the guddes and Catell there
xd.
duryng the same tyme
xxxvijli.
The summe of the paymentes aforseid ys
xixs. xd.
Md. the Remayneth a specialite of xl. li.

ixs. ijd. vpon the Reuerend father in God Rowland bisshop
of Couentry and Lych for the guddes of the seid late priory xl.
by hym bought and not yet payed for as apperyth by on li
obligacon beryng date the xviijth day of October in the xxx ixs.
yere of our Souerayngne lorde King Henri the viijth ijd.
paiabull at the feast of Saint Andrewe the appostyll which
shalbe in the yere of our lorde God MDXXXIX
And so Remayneth in the seid Commissionors handes ixli. ijd.
Certyn guddes or stuffe founde at the seid late priory whiche

Remayneth vnsolde
Fyrst 1 Chales all gylte wayeng xix

It. 1 Chales all whyte wayeng oz.
Gylte plate
It. ther ys estemed to be xliiij ixoz.
Whyte plate Lead
fothers of leade valued at di.
remayn eng vnsould
xl. li.
Belles remayneng It. ther found iiij belles valued liiijli.

vnsoulde at
Md. there remayneth all the howses edyfyed wythin the precincte
of the seid priory except the flatte roffes ouer the Churche the
crosse ylez wyth the glasse and pauement in the Churche wt.
the Roffes glasse yron pauement tyle shingull of the Cloyster
and Chapter house whych ys soulde.
Fyrst in the handys of Syr Gryme at acton j Stondyng Cuppe

Morgagyd for——It. in the handes of Willm Stamforde at Rowhaye
Plate
ij syluer saltes for xli. In the handes of Mr. Lytelton j Bason and on
morgagyd
ewer of syluer for xli. In the handes of Willm Litleton of Stafford on
to Dyuers
senser of syluer for lxvjs. viijd. In the handes of Vmfrey fox thelder
parsons
of Opton j Crosse of woode platyd wt. syluer and sett aboute wt.
stones for xxli.
Pencions and stypendes appoyntyd and allottyd to the late prior

and Couent of the seid priory by the forseid Commissionors.
Fyrst to Rychard Whytell late prior xxvjli. xiijs. iiijd.

It. to Rychard Haruey vjli.
It. to Xpofer Symsoun vjli.
It. to Thomas Bagley Cvjs. viijd.
It. to Willm Pykestoke Cvjs. viijd.
It. to Willm Stapulton Cs.
Sum liiijli. vjs. viijd.

Fees and Annuites grauntyd out to dyuerse persons before
the dyssolucon of the seid late priory
Fyrst to my lorde Ferres hygh stuard xls.

It. to Mr. Robert Browne xvs.
It. to Mr. Phylypp Chewynn xxvjs. viijd.
It. to Edward Whytell xxxiijs. iiijd.
It. to Hugh Baker xxs.
It. to Willm Harney [sic] xs.
It. to Willm Bagley xs.
It. to Rychard Torner Baker xs.
It. to Jamys Cocke xxs.
It. to George Bougley xxs.
It. to Thomas Stapultoun xs.
It. to Alexander Rattclyff xiijs. iiijd.
It. to Ottes Hollande xiijs. iiijd.
It. to Rychard Whytell xxs.
Summ xiij li. xxd.
Dettes owyng by the late prior and Couent of the forseid priory
befor the dyssolucon therof
Fyrst to Mr. Edward Lyteltoun Esquier ixli. xs.

It. to Vmfrey fox thelder xvijli.
iiijs.
It. to Willm Chamber of Westoun Cxvjs.
jd.
It. to Syr Henry Slany vycar of Busbury xls.
It. to Willm Stamford xli.
It. to Syr Edward Astoun knyght xxiijli.
xjs.
viijd.
It. to Edward Lyteltoun Esquyer xlli.
It. to Peyes Sponer xiiijli.
xviijs.
id.
It. to Agnes Daryngton of Stafford Gent lxvjs.
viijd.
It. to Willm Gylbert vjli. xiijs.
iiijd.
It. to Sr. Robert Gryme lxvjs.
viijd.
It. to Willm Mydeltoun of Stafford lxvjs.
viijd.
It. to Willm Russell lxxiijs.
iiijd.
It. to Rychard Homersley of Stafford for money borowed and other xijli. vs.
warres of hym bowght ixd.
It. to Mr. Strethay Commessary vjli. xiijs.
iiijd.
It. to my lorde of Chester for the pencions of Busbury Westoun and lxvijs.
Barkeswych at Michaelmas last and procuracions in visitacions last iiijd.
It. to the Deane and Chapeter of Lych for certyn pencions Due at the xijli. vjs.
feast of Seint Michael tharchangell last past viijd.
It. to Walter Wortesley xviijli.
It. to the Bysshopp of Chester xlli.
Sum ccxxxvli.
xixs.
vijd.
APPENDIX V
INVENTORY OF THE SALE OF DIEULACRES ABBEY
(Augmentation Office. Miscell. Books. Vol. 172, ff. 41–49)

The late Mon. of Delacres in the Counte of Stafford
Herafter foloweth all such pcelles of Implementes or houshoulde
Stuffe Corne Catell Ornamentes of the Churche & suche other lyke
founde wyth in the late Monastery ther at the tyme of the Dyssolucon
of the same howse soulde by the Kynges Commissionors to the
honrable Edward Erie of Derby the xxj day of October in the xxx yere
of Kyng Henry the viijth.
Fyrst halfe a dosoun of oulde Antyke clothes, j fayre table
of Aler Baster, ij Candlestykes of latenn on the Alter, j great
lectroun of latenn, ij great Candlestykes of latenn the
The Mounkes seattes in the quere, j oulde laumpe in the quere,
xliiijs.
Churche iiij ould alters in the Iles, iiij alters of Alebaster in the body
of the Churche the Crusifyx, xij Candulstykes of latenn
before the same, j pticion of Tymber in the body of the
Churche sould for
It. the pauyng of the Churche & the Iles wythe the
xiijli.
grauestones And all the glasse Jeroun[237] & the tymber vjs.
Roffes of the same churche & also the Iles ther of ar sould viijd.
for
The It. one sute of vestmentes of blue sylke inbroderyd wyth lxs.
Vestrye goulde & j Cope of the same, j cope of oulde redd veluet &
ij tow tynacles set wyth grene & whyte j sute of branched
sylke imbroderyd wyth goulde, j sute of Branchyd sylke
spotted wyth whyte & grene wt. byrdes of goulde & j Cope
of the same, j sute of yelow Sylke imbroyderyd wt. redd
sylke & on Cope of the same, j suyt of redd saye &
fustyoun spotted lx. s. Roses & a Cope of the same, j
Cope of oulde redd Veluett spotted wyth sters, j Cope of
grene and redd sylke imbroydered to gether spottyd wyth
lyans, j oulde cope of cloth peinted wt. youle,[238] j
vestment of grene baudekyne, j vestment of whyte
baudekynne, j vestment of grene and dune sylke, j
vestment of ij Tynacles of Cranecoleryd sylke
It. the glasse Jeroun the Mounkes settes, the Roffes of the
The lxvjs.
Cloyster seid Cloyster & a lauar[239] glasse & Jeron in the Chapiter viijd.
house ar sould for
The It. glasse Jeroun & oulde deskes in the dorter

Dorter It. the tymber of the frater & farmery ar soulde for lxvjs.
frater viijd.
& farmery
It. ther, j matres, j fetherbed, j Boulster, j Blankett, ij

The
pyllowes, j couerlett, j Tester of dornyx, j fouldyng table, j xvjs.
Corner
Chayr wyth a Cusshyon the hengyng of say wt. one viijd.
Chamber
matres in the inner Chamber ar soulde for
The It. ther, ij Bedsteddes, j Cupborde, j Chayre wt. j Cusshyon

Ryders a Tester & the hengyng of payented clothe soulde for iijs.
Chamber
The It. j matres, iiij Couerlettes, ij pyllowes, j fetherbedd, j

Butelers boulster soulde for xs.
Chamber
It. ther, iij Tables, iij formes, j Cupborde & j oulde hengyng
The Hale iiijs.
soulde for
It. ther, v borde Clothes v napkyns, iij peuter saltes wt. i

The
Cyner, j oulde Cheste & j shorte borde wt. ij Trestulles vijs.
Buttery
soulde for
The It. ther, j saltyngfatt, j Troffe, iiij Bordes & ij Tubbes soulde
iiijs.
larder
It. v great braspottes & iiij smale pannes, j Cauderoune, iij

spyttes, j skyelett[240], ij Cupbordes, j fyerforke, j fleshoke,
The j fryengpanne, ij cressettes[241], j gryderoune, xxxviij iiijli.
Kechynne platters, dysshes & saucers, j brasen morter wt. a pestell, ij xxd.
Choppyngknyues, j dressyng knyffe, j Almery, j grater, ij
dressyng bordes, ij Chafyngdyshys & Skimmer of brasse
soulde for
The It. ther, iij leades, j masshyng fatt, xij kelers[242] of leade, ij vjli.
brewe xjs.
yelyng fattes, j table before the ouenne & j sestyroune[243]
house xd.
soulde for
The It. ther, j Boultyng huche & certein oulde troffes & tubbes
boultyng xijd.
house
The It. ther, ij materes, ij couerlettes, j borde & j forme sould for
laborars xxd.
Chamber
It. vj Oxenne, iiijli. xs., It. lx. Ewys & lammes lxvj. s. viijd. It. ixli.
Catell
iij horses xxs. It. xiij Swynne soulde for xiijs. iiijd. xs.
Grayne It. vijxx[244] xix bz. of otes xjli. xixs. It. j quart. ij bz. di. of xvjli.
Rye xxjs. It. xxix lodes of haye soulde for lxs
The summe totall of all the goodes aforeseid is lxiijli.

xiiijs.
xd.
Wherof
Fyrst to Thomas Whitney

abbott ther vjli.
Rewardes It. to Sr. Henry Benett ls.
gyuen to It. to Sr. George Ferny ls.
Abbott and It. to Sr. Rauffe
Conuent of Motessott7emsp;xls.
the seid Mon. It. to Sr. Randall Barnes xls. xlvli. xvs.
xxxjli. xs.
at the tyme of It. to Sr. Willm Crosse xls. xd.
the It. to Sr. Robt. Cheryngton xls.
dissolucon It. to Sr. Edmund bolton xls.
of the It. to Sr. Willm prowdluffe xls.
same It. to Sr. Thomas loke xls.
It. to Sr. Richard Cordon xls.
It. to Sr. John Bykerton xls.
Rewardes It. to Anthony Colclegh xxs. xiiijli. vs. See above.

gyuen to the It. to John Jorell xs. xd.
seruantes It. to John Wood xvs.
ther the It. to John feirfeld xvs.
same tyme It. to Hughe palyn xvs.
It. to Will’m Rudeyerd xvs.
It. to Thomas Vygours vijs. vjd.
It. to Robt. Hardyng iijs. ixd.
It. to Thomas Calcott vs.
It. to [sic] bartram xvs.
It. to Edmud plumber xxs.
It. to Roger Tatten iijs. ixd.
It. to peter Woodworte vs.
It. to Robt. Wardell xs.
It. to Jamys Dadam xvs.
It. to Richard Vigours vijs. vjd.
It. to Henry Symson vijs. vjd.
It. to Thomas Tatten vs.
It. to John Fyney vijs. vjd.
It. to John Stele vs.
It. to Roger Cocker vijs. vjd.
It. to Rychard Dale iijs. iiijd.
It. to John banne vs.
It. to Ric. Heygrevez xvs.
It. to John newlys xvs.
It. to Thomas Walle
It. to Thomas Masse vijs. vjd.
It. to Ric. Buchyngham
It. to Rauffe Chester vijs. vjd.
It. to Jamys Hardyng xvijs. vjd.
Almes It. to Agnes Whytt, to the Wyffe of John Strettell, to

gyuen Margery poole, to Secily brempett, to Jone Coke, to
to the Matild Wyburley, to the Wyffe of Flyxton, & to the
xxvjs.
anders and Wyffe of Robt. Rudyer
viijd.
pore Bede
Women
ther
It. in Cates bought & spente at the tyme of the

Cates Commissionors being ther for to dyssolue the seid
xli. xvijs.
bought Mon & for the saffe kepyng of the Guddes and Catell
ther founde &c.
The summe of the paymentes aforeseid is lvijli.

xixs. vjd.
Md. ther remayneth a specialtie of xxli. upon the xxli.

honorable Edward Erle of Derby for the goodes &
Catell ther by hym bowght payable at the feast of
Seynt Andrewe thappostill wch shalbe in the yere of
our lorde god MI. Dxxxix
And so remayneth in the seid Commissionours Handes nl. for they xiiijli.
haue payed more then the [sic] haue Receuyd by ye sume of iiijs.
viijd.
Certeyn guddes or stuffe Remaynyng vnsould late belongyng to

the seyd late Monastery
It. iij Chalesys and the head of a Crosestaffe all gylt iiijxx vij
Gylte plate wayeng oz.
Whyte It. broken plate whych was ouer a Crosse of wood & xj
xxx oz.
plate spounes all whytt weyng
leade It. ther ys estemyd to be Ciiijxx foters[245] of leade

remaynyng valued at [sic] the fother DCCxxli.
vnsold
Belles It. ther remayneth vj belles weyng 1 hundreth valued

xxxvijli.
remayneng at
xs.
vnsould
Md. ther remayneth all the howses edyfyed upon the scite of the
seid late Mon. the pauement the grauestones glasse Jeroune tymber
& Roffes of the Churche & Ilez to yt adioynyng the glasse Jeron and
Roffes of the Cloyster the glasse Jeron of the Chapiter house the
glasse & Jeron in the Dorter & ye tymber of the fratreter & farmery
only excerp and soulde
Md. that the seid honerable Erle of Derby was put in possession
of the seid late Mon & the Demaynez to yt Apptenyng to our
soueraygne lorde the Kynges vse the xxj day of Octobr in the xxx
yere of or. seid soueraigne lorde Kyng Henry the viijth
Pencions & stypendes appoynted & allotted to the late abbott and Couent of the
forseyd late Monastery by the forseid Commissionors
Fyrst to Thomas Wytney late abbott lxli.

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The Limits of Europe: Membership

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Preface and Acknowledgements

vi Preface and Acknowledgements

Leiden, December 2020

1. The Question of Membership 3

3. The Evolution of EU Membership Norms 49

5. Membership Eligibility in a Europe of Non-­Communist States,

9. Rethinking Europe, Rethinking Regions 219

A.1. Comparison of Freedom House and V-­Dem country-­year scores 244

2.1. Summary of explanations and hypotheses 45

Note on Archival Sources

Research for this book included extensive consultation of documents in various

ACCUE: Archives Centrales, Conseil de l’Union Européenne (Brussels)

AEI: Archive of European Integration: http://aei.pitt.edu/

Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community.

By way of introduction, this chapter discusses the importance of understanding

1. The question and its significance

4 The Limits of Europe

The Question of Membership 5

6 The Limits of Europe

and immutable aspect of European integration nor a complete explanation of the

The Question of Membership 7

2001: 2). Instead, we need a clear definition of membership eligibility, a theoretical

8 The Limits of Europe

2. Insights and gaps in the scholarly literature

The Question of Membership 9

10 The Limits of Europe

The Question of Membership 11

question. Furthermore, instead of exploring how EU values, norms, and rules

12 The Limits of Europe

The Question of Membership 13

theoretical or methodological framework for studying this in a manner conducive

3. Defining membership eligibility

To say that a non-­ member state is eligible for membership in a regional

14 The Limits of Europe

• the decision to hold unconditional preliminary talks on membership with a

The Question of Membership 15

non-­member state seeks ultimately to gain membership or just to develop func-

• an explicit refusal to hold preliminary talks on accession or a failure to issue

16 The Limits of Europe

The Question of Membership 17

4. The argument and alternative explanations, in brief

So how can we best understand a state’s eligibility for membership in a political

1. Membership norms. Membership norms express a regional community’s

18 The Limits of Europe

The Question of Membership 19

states with inferior administrative capacities out of the customs union/

20 The Limits of Europe

And even if it were possible to observe European cultural identity at particular

5. Empirical design and methods

Regional case selection—why study Europe?

As indicated above, this book is focused empirically on regional community

The Question of Membership 21

1. The Question of Membership 3

5. Membership Eligibility in a Europe of Non-Communist States,

A.1. Comparison of Freedom House and V-Dem country-year scores 244

2.1. Summary of explanations and hypotheses 45

To say that a non- member state is eligible for membership in a regional

non-member state seeks ultimately to gain membership or just to develop func-

Country-case selection—which cases and why?

As discussed above, this book aims to explain EU decision- making on

Causal-process tracing of eligibility decision-making