ELECTRONICALLY FILED

2024 Jun 01 12:04 PM

CLERK OF COURT - CIRCUIT

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE

FOR THE THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT MEMPHIS
______________________________________________________________________________

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

Plaintiff,

v. Docket No. CT-1890-24

Div. I

WANDA HALBERT,

Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________

DEFENDANT WANDA HALBERT’S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF, STATE OF

TENNESSEE’S PETITION TO REMOVE THE SHELBY COUNTY CLERK,
WANDA HALBERT, FROM OFFICE PURSUANT TO TITLE 8,
CHAPTER 47 OF THE TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED
______________________________________________________________________________

COMES NOW Defendant Wanda Halbert (hereinafter “Defendant”), by and through

counsel of record, pursuant to Rules 8.02 and 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and

in Answer to the Petition filed by Plaintiff, states as follows:

Defendant denies each and every allegation in Plaintiff’s Petition not specifically admitted

herein as though each such detail thereof was set forth word for word herein. To the extent that a

response is deemed necessary, Defendant denies that the Plaintiff’s Petition states a cause of action

under any of the referenced legal provisions, or that the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief as sought

herein. In support of a more detailed answer, Defendant states as follows:

I. STATUTORY BASIS FOR PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF OFFICERS

1. Paragraph 1 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent that a Response is deemed necessary, Defendant neither admits nor denies paragraph

1 but would demand strict proof if her interests are to be affected.

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2. Paragraph 2 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent that a Response is deemed necessary, Defendant neither admits nor denies paragraph

2 but would demand strict proof if her interests are to be affected.

3. Paragraph 3 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent that a Response is deemed necessary, Defendant neither admits nor denies paragraph

3 but would demand strict proof if her interests are to be affected.

4. Paragraph 4 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent that a Response is deemed necessary, Defendant neither admits nor denies paragraph

4 but would demand strict proof if her interests are to be affected.

II. JURISDICTION

5. Paragraph 5 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent that a Response is deemed necessary, Defendant neither admits nor denies paragraph

5 but would demand strict proof if her interests are to be affected.

6. Paragraph 6 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent that a Response is deemed necessary, Defendant neither admits nor denies paragraph

6 but would demand strict proof if her interests are to be affected.

7. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 7 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

8. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 8 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

9. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 9 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

III. BASIS FOR REMOVAL AND ALLEGATIONS

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10. Paragraph 10 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent that a Response is deemed necessary, Defendant neither admits nor denies paragraph

10 but would demand strict proof if her interests are to be affected.

11. Defendant denies paragraph 11 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

12. Defendant denies paragraph 12 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

13. Paragraph 13 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent paragraph 13 requires a Response, Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 13

but would demand strict proof if her interest are to be affected.

14. Paragraph 14 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent paragraph 14 requires a Response, Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 14

but would demand strict proof if her interest are to be affected.

15. Paragraph 15 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent paragraph 15 requires a Response, Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 15

but would demand strict proof if her interests are to be affected.

Inaccurate and Untimely Financial Reporting

16. Defendant admits that she was sworn into office on September 1, 2022, with a four (4) year

term. Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 16 as stated and would demand strict

proof thereon because it is a matter of public record that this was Defendant’s second four

(4) year term in office, Defendant was re-elected as Shelby County Clerk on September 1,

2022, and that Defendant’s second term began on September 1, 2022 and will end on

September 1, 2026.

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17. Paragraph 17 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent paragraph 17 requires a Response, Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph

17 but would demand strict proof if her interest are to be affected.

18. Paragraph 18 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent paragraph 18 requires a Response, Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph

18 but would demand strict proof if her interest are to be affected.

19. Admitted.

20. Paragraph 20 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent paragraph 20 requires a Response, Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph

20 but would demand strict proof if her interest are to be affected.

21. Paragraph 21 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent paragraph 21 requires a Response, Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph

21 but would demand strict proof if her interest are to be affected.

22. Paragraph 22 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent paragraph 22 requires a Response, Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph

22 but would demand strict proof if her interest are to be affected.

23. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 23 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

24. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 24 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

25. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 25 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

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26. Defendant denies paragraph 26 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

27. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 27 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

28. Defendant denies paragraph 28 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

29. Defendant denies paragraph 29 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

30. Defendant denies paragraph 30 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

31. Defendant denies paragraph 31 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

32. Defendant denies paragraph 32 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

33. Defendant denies paragraph 33 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

34. Defendant denies paragraph 34 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

35. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 35 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

36. Defendant denies paragraph 36 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

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37. Defendant admits that “Ms. Halbert was not aware for a period of months that the updated

wheel tax resolution had passed through the Commission and had become effective…” but

denies the remainder of paragraph 37 and would demand strict proof if her interests are to

be affected.

38. Defendant denies paragraph 38 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

39. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 39 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

40. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 40 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

a. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 40 (a) but would demand strict proof if

her interests are to be affected.

b. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 41 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

41. Defendant denies paragraph 41 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

42. Defendant admits that she is understaffed but denies the remainder of paragraph 42 and

would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are to be affected.

Strain on Auto Dealerships

43. Defendant denies paragraph 43 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

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44. Paragraph 44 does not require a Response because it calls for a legal conclusion. To the

extent that a Response is deemed necessary, Defendant neither admits nor denies paragraph

44 but would demand strict proof if her interest is to be affected.

45. Defendant denies paragraph 45 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

46. Defendant denies paragraph 46 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

47. Defendant denies paragraph 47 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

48. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 48 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

49. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 49 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

50. Defendant denies paragraph 50 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

51. Defendant denies paragraph 51 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

52. Defendant denies paragraph 52 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

Comptroller Deficiencies

53. Defendant denies paragraph 53 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

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54. Defendant admits that, “In March of 2024, the Office of the Tennessee Comptroller of the

Treasury, Division of Local Government Audit, performed an audit and revenue

reconciliations for the period of July 1, 2023 to February 29, 2024 on Ms. Halbert’s

office”…“The Comptroller’s Office visited and spent time with Ms. Halbert’s office in

March of 2024 in order to ascertain what the deficiencies were and also assist the office in

addressing the deficiencies. This visit resulted in the Comptroller issuing a ‘Revenue

Report Reconciliation and Operational Analysis’” … “the Comptroller” … “made six

formal recommendations for the Clerk to follow in order to ‘ensure that a process would

be implemented to properly submit revenue reports going forward’”…“The Comptroller

assisted Ms. Halbert’s office,” and that, “As part of the assistance, the Comptroller

provided a new template to Ms. Halbert and her office to be used for revenue reports. The

Comptroller also assisted Ms. Halbert with the March report,” but denies the remainder of

paragraph 54 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are to be affected.

55. Defendant admits that she submitted her March 2024 revenue report on April 11, 2024, that

“Ms. Halbert sent the report to the Comptroller for review before submitting it to the

Trustee’s office for reconciliation” and that, “while minor compared to previous

inaccuracies, there were errors,” but denies the remainder of paragraph 55 and would

demand strict proof thereon if her interests are to be affected.

Office Closures

56. Admitted.

57. Defendant admits that, “The official website for the Shelby County Clerk’s Office states

that the clerk’s office has seven branch offices throughout the county” … but denies the

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 remainder of paragraph 57 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are to be

affected.

58. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 58 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

59. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 59 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

60. Defendant neither admits nor denies paragraph 60 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

61. Defendant neither admits nor denies paragraph 61 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

62. Defendant admits that “The Poplar Plaza location closed on November 9, 2023” but denies

the remainder of paragraph 62 and would demand strict proof if her interests are to be

affected.

63. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 63 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

64. Defendant denies paragraph 64 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

May 1, 2024 County Commission Meeting

65. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 65 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

66. Defendant admits that “Ms. Halbert was present for the May 1, 2024, Shelby County

Commission meeting” but denies the remainder of paragraph 66 and would demand strict

proof thereon if her interests are to be affected.

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67. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 67 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

68. Defendant denies paragraph 68 and would demand strict proof thereon if her interests are

to be affected.

69. Defendant admits that “On May 1, 2024, at the Shelby County Commission budget

committee meeting, Ms. Halbert announced her proposed resolutions and was asked very

few, if any, questions by Commissioners…” but denies the remainder of paragraph 69 and

would demand strict proof it her interests are to be affected.

IV. PROCEDURE FOR REMOVAL OF OFFICERS UNDER TITLE 47,

CHAPTER 8

70. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 70 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

71. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 71 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

72. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 72 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

73. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 73 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

74. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 74 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

75. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 75 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

76. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 76 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

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 77. Defendant admits that she is entitled to a trial by jury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-119(c).

Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 77 and would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

78. Defendant neither admits or denies paragraph 78 but would demand strict proof if her

interests are to be affected.

79. Admitted.

V. SUSPENSION REQUESTED

80. Paragraph 80 does not require a Response. Defendant reincorporates paragraphs 1-80 word

for word as though set forth verbatim herein. To the extent that a Response is required,

Defendant would deny that the State of Tennessee is entitled to suspend Defendant from

the performance of her duties of her office until a final hearing is conducted and a

determination of this matter is entered and would demand strict proof thereon if her

interests are to be affected.

81. Admitted.

82. Paragraph 82 does not require a Response. Defendant reincorporates paragraphs 1-81 word

for word as though set forth verbatim herein. To the extent that a Response is required,

Defendant would deny the remainder of paragraph 82 and would demand strict proof

thereon if her interests are to be affected.

VI. RELIEF REQUESTED

83. Paragraph 83 is the Request for Relief paragraph. Defendant denies Plaintiff is entitled to

any relief whatsoever.

NOW, HAVING ANSWERED FULLY, Defendant states the following Affirmative Defenses:

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1. Plaintiff’s Petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) because if all of Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant are

taken as true, and all reasonable inferences are given to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s Petition fails

to state a cause of action against Defendant Halbert because at best, its allegations against

Defendant are at best simple negligence, mere mistakes in judgment, and good faith efforts

of Defendant Halbert to perform her duties as enjoined to her. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6);

Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tenn. 2005)

(quoting Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tenn. 2004)); Vandergriff, 206 S.W.2d at

397; Jordan, 397 S.W.2d at 399; Crosby, 255 S.W.3d 593, 598. Plaintiff’s Petition is

contradictory, stating that somehow Defendant should be removed for “willful neglect”

under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101, but admitting that there were several instances that

look an awful lot like simple negligence—where Defendant was unaware, didn’t know

information, didn’t understand, didn’t have the help required for her to facilitate her duties,

or was faced with circumstances involving other moving parts of Shelby County

Government that failed her. Jordan v. State, 397 S.W.2d 383, 399 (Tenn. 1965); Vandergriff

v. State ex rel. Davis, 206 S.W.2d 395, 393 (Tenn. 1947); State ex rel. Carney v. Crosby,

255 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); Pet’n, ¶¶ 7, 33, 53-55, 58-60, 64, 68. “As

used in reference to the ouster statute, the terms ‘knowingly’ and ‘willfully’ have been

defined as encompassing ‘a mental attitude of indifference to consequences or failure to

take advantage of means of knowledge of the rights, duties or powers of a public office

holder.’” Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Wright, 622 S.W.2d 807, 817 (Tenn. 1981) (citing

Jordan v. State, 397 S.W.2d 383, 398 (Tenn. 1965); Crosby, 255 S.W.3d 593, 598. The

Jordan court also noted that the terms “knowingly” and “willfully” as used in ouster

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 proceedings are “not confined to a studied or deliberate intent to go beyond the bounds of

the law.” Jordan, 397 S.W.2d at 399. However, it requires more than “simple negligence”

to constitute willful or knowing misconduct. Id. (holding that “simple negligence in

discharging the duties of an officer does not constitute or amount to an officer acting

knowingly or willfully”); State ex rel. Carney v. Crosby, 255 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2008) (affirming the lower court’s ruling that the State lacked clear and convincing

evidence that the mayor knowingly or willfully committed misconduct in office.). The

question is, “whether the acts or actions complained of were done with such indifference

or such an entire want of care as would raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to

consequences or the law.” Jordan, 397 S.W.2d at 399. “Shreds of human imperfections

gathered together to mold charges of official dereliction should be carefully scanned before

a reputable officer is removed from office. These derelictions should amount to knowing

misconduct or failure on the part of the officer if his office is to be forfeited; mere mistakes

in judgment will not suffice.” Vandergriff, 206 S.W.2d at 393 (emphasis added). There is

a high threshold for ouster in the absence of a criminal conviction. Id. at 397.

2. Plaintiff’s Petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) because Plaintiff’s Petition fails to plead allegations against

Defendant that display “a mental attitude of indifference to consequences or failure to take

advantage of means of knowledge of the rights, duties or powers of a public office holder.”

Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Wright, 622 S.W.2d 807, 817 (Tenn. 1981) (citing Jordan v. State,

397 S.W.2d 383, 398 (Tenn. 1965); Crosby, 255 S.W.3d 593, 598. For instance, Plaintiff

pleads that Defendant “failed to charge or collect wheel tax fees properly” because “Ms.

Halbert was not aware for a period of months that the updated wheel tax resolution had

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passed through the Commission and had become effective. Glaringly missing is any

allegation that Ms. Halbert received written notification or any notification of the change

in the wheel tax. Plaintiff’s position is that Defendant should have known. Unfortunately,

for them that is not “willful” because Defendant’s lack of knowledge about the wheel tax

change does not display “a mental attitude of indifference to consequences or failure to

take advantage of means of knowledge of the rights, duties or powers of a public office

holder.” Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Wright, 622 S.W.2d 807, 817 (Tenn. 1981) (citing

Jordan v. State, 397 S.W.2d 383, 398 (Tenn. 1965); Crosby, 255 S.W.3d 593, 598.

However, Plaintiff pleads that “[i]n September of 2023 Ms. Halbert’s office finally realized

that they were not collecting the proper amount of wheel tax from residents of Shelby

County,” but Plaintiff also pleads that, “Ms. Halbert and her employees do not seem to

understand the significance of accurate financial reporting,” and that “Ms. Halbert’s

neglect reflects a lack of knowledge and consideration for how Shelby County

Government, or any government for that matter, operates.” “When asked why there have

been discrepancies in the $200,000-$300,000 range, Mr. Smith” (a Shelby County Clerk

employee) “commented that $200,000-$300,000 is not significant given the total amount

of the County’s annual budget.” Pet’n, ¶¶ 34-35; 64, 68. Interestingly, Plaintiff also does

not allege how or why Ms. Halbert realized the change in the wheel tax. Based on these

facts, the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate willful neglect under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-

101 because it fails to demonstrate that Defendant possessed ‘a mental attitude of

indifference to consequences or failure to take advantage of means of knowledge of the

rights, duties or powers of a public office holder.’” Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Wright, 622

S.W.2d 807, 817 (Tenn. 1981) (citing Jordan v. State, 397 S.W.2d 383, 398 (Tenn. 1965);

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 Crosby, 255 S.W.3d 593, 598. Plaintiff’s facts further fail to demonstrate that “the acts or

actions complained of were done with such indifference or such an entire want of care as

would raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences or the law.” Jordan,

397 S.W.2d at 399.

3. Plaintiff’s Petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) because based on Plaintiff’s own facts, if Plaintiff’s facts are taken

as true and Plaintiff’s factual allegations are given all reasonable inferences, the facts

alleged in Plaintiff’s Petition do not amount to willful neglect to perform any duty enjoined

to Defendant, but “mere mistakes in judgment,” which will not suffice to prove with clear

and convincing evidence that an ouster is required under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6); Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512,

516 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tenn. 2004)); Vandergriff,

206 S.W.2d at 393; Crosby, 255 S.W.3d 593, 597-98; (quoting Tennessee ex rel Thompson

v. Walker, No. 01A01-9311-CR-00486, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 245 at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1994)); State ex rel. Wolfenbarger v. Moore, No. E2008-02545-COA-R3-CV, 2010 Tenn.

App. LEXIS 109 at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2010); Pet’n, ¶¶ 7, 33, 53-55, 58-60, 64,

68. In Plaintiff’s Petition, Plaintiff pleads that the Shelby County Clerk has failed “to

submit accurate and timely monthly revenue reports from July 2021 to March 2024,” and

“Since July of 2021 there has not been one revenue report that Ms. Halbert has turned in

timely and accurately” although Plaintiff admits in its Complaint that Defendant was not

re-elected as Shelby County Clerk until September 1, 2022. Pet’n, ¶¶ 13, 15, 27, 30.

Although Plaintiff pleads that, “Several employees in Shelby County Government have

offered assistance and support to Ms. Halbert to no avail. These individuals have tried to

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assist Ms. Halbert because it only makes everyone’s job easier. Ms. Halbert rejects the

assistance and has even threatened to kick other Shelby County employees out of her

office,” Plaintiff detrimentally pleads that the first time that Defendant ever received help

from the proper office—the Office of the Comptroller on her revenue reports, was March

of 2024, this year. Pet’n ¶¶ 33, 54. Plaintiff pleads that allegedly, the Comptroller was

placed on notice in 2022 when “her offices were suddenly and without notice closed to the

public for a week (August 22, 2022 to August 26, 2022) while her employees were working

to ‘clear backlogs,’” Pet’n, ¶ 53. Although the State alleges that, “[i]t was at this time that

Comptroller Jason Mumpower, along with Shelby County Commissioners and Shelby

County citizens, first mentioned removal from office,” Plaintiff also admitted that when

the Comptroller finally stepped in to help with Defendant’s revenue reports, it was almost

a year later in March of 2024, and that the Comptroller’s recommendations contained in

Exhibit D of Plaintiff’s Petition did not include ouster. Pet’n, ¶¶ 53, 54, 55; Pet’n, Ex. D.

Plaintiff further pleads that once Defendant received help from the Comptroller, the March

2024 revenue report contained “minor inaccuracies,” and “was one day late.” Pet’n, ¶¶ 53,

54, 55; Pet’n, Ex. D. Moreover, Plaintiff detrimentally pleads that less than two (2) months

after Defendant received the proper help from the Comptroller and acknowledged that her

revenue reports improved and were turned in only one (1) day late, that she was

recommended for ouster proceedings. Pet’n ¶¶ 54, 55, Pet’n, Ex. D. Again, these facts fail

to demonstrate ‘a mental attitude of indifference to consequences or failure to take

advantage of means of knowledge of the rights, duties or powers of a public office holder.’”

Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Wright, 622 S.W.2d 807, 817 (Tenn. 1981) (citing Jordan v. State,

397 S.W.2d 383, 398 (Tenn. 1965); Crosby, 255 S.W.3d 593, 598. Plaintiff’s facts further

16
 fail to demonstrate that “the acts or actions complained of were done with such indifference

or such an entire want of care as would raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to

consequences or the law.” Jordan, 397 S.W.2d at 399.

4. Plaintiff’s Request for Suspension fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) because while Defendant does not dispute that under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 8-47-116, the State can request a hearing on whether Defendant should be

suspended from her official duties as Shelby County Clerk pending resolution of this

matter, Plaintiff has not shown nor demonstrated good cause under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-

47-117 as to why this Court should suspend Defendant Wanda Halbert from her duties as

Shelby County Clerk. The ouster laws reflect the general assembly’s deep concerns

regarding allegations of misconduct by public officials. State ex rel. Jones v. Looper, 86

S.W.3d 189, 198 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis added). Recognizing the gravity of such

allegations, they established special, expedited judicial procedures for the removal of unfit

officers. State ex rel. Byrge v. Yeager, 472 S.W.3d 657, 663 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015); Looper,

86 S.W.3d at 198 (emphasis added). Here, the “gravity” of the allegations contained in

Plaintiff’s Petition do not amount to “allegations of misconduct” or malfeasance, nor do

they amount to “willful neglect,”—the State is essentially accusing Defendant Halbert of

simple negligence and attempting to cloak said simple negligence as “willful neglect.”

Pet’n, ¶¶ 7, 33, 53-55, 58-60, 64, 68. Defendant is now term limited from running for

Shelby County Clerk for another consecutive term because in its Petition, Plaintiff states

that Defendant was re-elected on September 1, 2022, which inadvertently admits that

Defendant Halbert is in her final term as Shelby County Clerk, with only two (2) years left

in her term. Pet’n ¶¶ 7, 13, 16; 58. Plaintiff also admits in its Petition that Defendant was

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 not re-elected as Shelby County Clerk until September 1, 2022. Pet’n, ¶¶ 13, 15-16; 58.

See SHELBY COUNTY, TENN. CHARTER, art. V, § 5.25 A., Ord. No. 361 (2008).

https://shelbycountytn.gov/82/Shelby-County-Charter/ (“County charter officers elected

pursuant to Article VIII herein shall not be eligible to hold, or be elected to, the same county

charter office for more than two consecutive four-year terms.”); Pet’n ¶ 7, 13, 16, 58. Thus,

the State has not demonstrated “a cause that comports with the purposes of the . . . statute,”

or “[a] legally sufficient reason’” to suspend Defendant Halbert of her duties as the Shelby

County Clerk pending resolution of this matter. Wallace v. Sullivan, 561 S.W.2d 452, 455

(Tenn. 1978), Estate of Vickers v. Diversicare Leasing Corp., No. M2021-00894-COA-R3-

CV, 2022 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229, *30-31 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2022); Est. of

Blankenship, No. E2021-00714-COA-R10-CV, 2022 Tenn. App. LEXIS 122, *8 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Mar. 30, 2022).

5. Defendant reserves the right to amend this Answer to conform to any additional proof and

discovery.

WHEREFORE, HAVING FULLY ANSWERED, Defendant respectfully requests that

Plaintiff’s Petition be dismissed with prejudice and that they be allowed to go hence with their

reasonable costs.

Respectfully Submitted,

s/ Darrell J. O’Neal
___________________________
Darrell J. O’Neal (BPR #20927)
Misty L. O’Neal (BPR #37332)
LAW OFFICE OF DARRELL J. O’NEAL
2129 Winchester Road
Memphis, Tennessee 38116
(901) 345-8009 telephone
(901) 345-8014 facsimile
domemphislaw@darrelloneal.com

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 misty@darrelloneal.com
Attorney for Defendant Wanda Halbert

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Darrell J. O’Neal, hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document has been sent

via email and the Shelby County Circuit Court’s ECF electronic filing to the following counsel

of record:

Coty Wamp, Esq.

District Attorney General
Kevin Loper, Esq.
Executive Assistant District Attorney General
11th Judicial District, Tennessee
600 Market Street, Suite 310
Chattanooga, TN 37402
Coty.wamp@hcdatn.org
Kevin.loper@hcdatn.org

On this, the 1st day of June 2024.

/s/Darrell J. O’Neal
_______________________________
Darrell J. O’Neal

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