The Structure of Tort Law Nils Jansen

Visit to download the full and correct content document:

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-structure-of-tort-law-nils-jansen/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Law of tort 12. ed. Edition Cooke John

https://ebookmass.com/product/law-of-tort-12-ed-edition-cooke-
john/

Tort Law 6th Edition, (Ebook PDF)

https://ebookmass.com/product/tort-law-6th-edition-ebook-pdf/

Rights, Wrongs, and Injustices: The Structure of

Remedial Law Stephen A. Smith

https://ebookmass.com/product/rights-wrongs-and-injustices-the-
structure-of-remedial-law-stephen-a-smith/

Gravitational-Wave Astronomy: Exploring the Dark Side

of the Universe Nils Andersson

https://ebookmass.com/product/gravitational-wave-astronomy-
exploring-the-dark-side-of-the-universe-nils-andersson/
The Politics of Social Cohesion: Immigration,
Community, and Justice Nils Holtug

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-politics-of-social-cohesion-
immigration-community-and-justice-nils-holtug/

Narratives of Community in the Black British Short

Story 1st ed. Edition Bettina Jansen

https://ebookmass.com/product/narratives-of-community-in-the-
black-british-short-story-1st-ed-edition-bettina-jansen/

The Structure of Complex Words Empson

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-structure-of-complex-words-
empson/

The Structure of Argument 9th Edition, (Ebook PDF)

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-structure-of-argument-9th-
edition-ebook-pdf/

The Structure of Argument 9th Edition Annette T.

Rottenberg

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-structure-of-argument-9th-
edition-annette-t-rottenberg/
The Structure of Tort Law
The Structure of Tort Law
History, theory, and doctrine of non-contractual
claims for compensation

N I L S JA N SE N

Translated by
S A N DY ST E E L

1
 3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.

It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Nils Jansen 2021
© for the English translation, Sandy Steel 2021
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2021
Impression: 1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Public sector information reproduced under Open Government Licence v3.0
(http://​www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/​doc/​open-​government-​licence/​open-​government-​licence.htm)
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2021937967

ISBN 978–​0–​19–​870505–​5

DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780198705055.001.0001

Printed and bound in the UK by

TJ Books Limited

Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
 Preface

I have acquired many debts of gratitude in the many years in which this translation
was in gestation. Nils Jansen has been a patient collaborator across these years (at one
point, the Oxford University Press website, somewhat ungenerously if perhaps not en-
tirely without evidential foundation, described the translation as forthcoming in 2999).
I thank Nils for his wise advice, discussions from which I have learned a great deal,
and for his and Andrea Nicolaus Jansen’s kind hospitality in Münster in 2013 when
I was a visiting scholar at the Exzellenzcluster at WWU. Particular thanks are also
due to Kristin Boosfeld, who has constantly supported and improved the project. The
translation would never have been completed without the excellent joint efforts of sev-
eral other members of the Lehrstuhl Jansen, including Celine Babakan, Vincent Eich,
Dominique Ferreira, Arian Hackmann, Simon Kleuters, Henrik Köster, Constantin
Luft, Selin Özgüc, Clara Paul, Sarah Popp, Maurice Martins Santana, Jana Schaumburg,
Christian Schmidt, and Lisa Simonis. Thank you also to Jeffrey Hackney and Tim Koch
for their helpful comments. Finally, I am grateful to Laura Seymour and my mother,
who provided enormous encouragement and support throughout.
 Abbreviations

ABGB Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (A)

AC Law Reports, Appeal Cases (GB)
AcP Archiv für die civilistische Praxis
AD Appellate Division Reports (SA)
ALR Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten, cit §, Theil, Titel
Am J Leg Hist The American Journal of Legal History
art articulus
B&C Barnewell and Cresswell’s Reports, KB (GB)
B&S Best & Smith’s Reports, QB (GB)
BAG Bundesarbeitsgericht
Bell J Ec The Bell Journal of Economics
BGB Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (D)
BGH Bundesgerichtshof
BGHZ Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (Decisions of the
Federal Court in Civil Matters)
BIDR Bullettino dell’istituto di diritto romano
Bing (NC) Bingham’s New Cases, Common Pleas (GB)
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court)
BVerfGE Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court)
BVerwG Bundesverwaltungsgericht
BW Burgerlijk Wetboek (NL)
C Codex Iustinianus
Cal LR California Law Review
Cam LJ Cambridge Law Journal
Can Bar Rev The Canadian Bar Review
Can J Law & Jur Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
cap caput
Cc Code civil (F); Codice civile (I); Código civil (PRT)
CCC Constitutio Criminalis Carolina
Cels Celsus
Ch Kent LR Chicago Kent Law Review
CLP Current Legal Problems
Col LR Columbia Law Review
Coll Mosaicarum et Romanarum legum collatio
const constitutio
Corp Iur Can C Corpus iuris canonici, Decretum Gratiani, Causa, cit. causa,
quaestio, canon
Corp Iur Can X Corpus iuris canonici, Decretum Gregorii IX, cit. liber, titulus, capitulum
CT Codex Theodosianus
D Digesta
xvi Abbreviations
def definitio
disp disputatio
DM Deutsche Mark
dub dubitatio
Edinb LR The Edinburgh Law Review
EGBGB Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch
Einl Einleitung
ER The English Reports (GB)
ERPL European Review of Private Law
Eur J Law & Ec European Journal of Law and Economics
Exch Law Reports Exchequer (GB)
exerc exercitatio
G Wash LR The George Washington Law Review
Gai Gaius; Gaii Institutiones
GG Grundgesetz (D)
Gl Glossa
GRUR Int Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil
GS Großer Senat (special panel of judges at the highest courts in Germany to
facilitate uniformity of jurisdiction)
Harvard LR Harvard Law Review
HLC Clark’s Reports, House of Lords
Hofstra LR Hofstra Law Review
HR Hoge Raad (NL)
HRG Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte
Iav Iavolenus
IECL International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law
Index Quaderni camerti di studi romanistici
Inst Institutiones Iustiniani
Int R Law & Ec International Review of Law and Economics
Iowa LR Iowa Law Review
IP Intellectual Property
Iul Iulianus
IVRA IVAR Rivista internazionale di diritto romano e antico
J Ec Persp Journal for Economic Perspectives
J Lab Ec Journal of Labor Economics
J Law & Ec Journal of Law and Economics
J Pol Ec The Journal of Political Economy
JBl Juristische Blätter
JLSt Journal of Legal Studies
JW Juristische Wochenschrift
JZ Juristenzeitung
KB King’s Bench
KG Kort Geding (NL)
Lab Labeo
Labeo Labeo Rassegna di diritto romano
Law & Soc Inq Law and Social Inquiry
Leg Th Legal Theory
LG Landgericht
 Abbreviations xvii
lib Liber
LM Lindenmaier-​Möhring –​ Kommentierte BGH-​Rechtsprechung
Lofft Capel Lofft, Report of Cases, KB (GB)
LQR The Law Quarterly Review
LR Law Reports (GB)
Marc Marcellus
MDR Monatszeitschrift des deutschen Rechts
Miss LR Missouri Law Review
MLR Modern Law Review
Mod Modestinus
Muc Mucius
NE The Northeastern Reporter (USA)
NedJur Nederlandse jurisprudentie
Ner Neratius
NF Neue Folge
NJW Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
NJW-​RR Neue Juristische Wochenschrift Rechtsprechungs-​Report
Notre Dame LR Notre Dame Law Review
NW The Northwestern Reporter (USA)
NZW Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht
OAG Oberappellationsgericht (Court of Appeal)
OG Obergericht (Court of Appeal)
OGH Oberster Gerichthof (A)
OJLSt Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
OLG Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeal)
OR Obligationenrecht (CH)
Osg Hall LJ Osgoode Hall Law Journal
OTr Entscheidungen des Königlichen Geheimen Ober-​Tribunals (Prussia)
(Decisions of the Royal Supreme Court)
P The Pacific Reporter (USA)
partic particulum
Paul Paulus
Ped Pedius
Peg Pegasus
PflVG Pflichtversicherungsgesetz
Ph R Philosophical Review
Pomp Pomponius
pr principium
Proc Proculus
Prol Prolegomena
PSI Pubblicazioni della Società italiana per la ricerca die papiri greci e latini in
Egitto, Papiri greci e latini
QB Queen’s Bench; Law Reports Queen’s Bench Division (GB)
qu quaestio
RabelsZ Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht
Rand J Ec Rand Journal of Economics
RG Reichsgericht
xviii Abbreviations
RGSt Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen (Decisions of the
Imperial Court in Criminal Matters)
RGZ Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (Decisions of the
Imperial Court in Civil Matters)
RIDA Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité, 3e série
RTD civ Revue trimestrielle de droit civil
RvdW Rechtspraak van de Week (NL)
s sentence
Sab Sabinus
SDHI Studia et documenta historiae et iuris
SeuffArch Seufferts Archiv für die Entscheidungen der obersten deutschen
Staaten (D)
StGB Strafgesetzbuch (D)
StVG Straßenverkehrsgesetz (D)
StVO Straßenverkehrsordnung (D)
Style Style, Modern Reports (GB)
Theor Inqu Theoretical Inquiries in Law
tit titulus
TR Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis
tract tractatus
Trans Am Phil Ass Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association
Tul LR Tulane Law Review
U Ch LR University of Chicago Law Review
U Penns LR University of Pennsylvania Law Review
U Tor LJ University of Toronto Law Journal
UCLA LR UCLA Law Review
Ulp Ulpianus
VersR Zeitschrift Versicherungsrecht
Virg LR Virginia Law Review
WLR The Weekly Law Reports (GB)
WM Wertpapier-​Mitteilungen, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-​und Bankrecht
Yale LJ The Yale Law Journal
ZPO Zivilprozessordnung (D)
ZRG Zeitschrift der Savigny-​Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (romanistische
Abteilung)
ZRG (germ) Zeitschrift der Savigny-​Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (germanistische
Abteilung)
XII T Twelve Tables
2nd, 3rd Second Series, Third Series
 Legislation

Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB) (Austria)—Austrian Civil Code

Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten (ALR)—Prussian Civil Code
Arzneimittelgesetz—Medicinal Products Act
Atomgesetz—Nuclear Power Act
Bauforderungssicherungsgesetz—Building Contract Securities Act
Bundesbeamtengesetz—Federal Civil Service Act
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz—Federal Data Protection Act
Bundes-​Immissionsschutzgesetz—Federal Pollution Control Act
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)—German Civil Code
Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) (Netherlands)—Dutch Civil Code
Code civil (Cc) (France)—French Civil Code
Codice civile (Cc) (Italy)—Italian Civil Code
Código civil (Cc) (Portugal)—Portuguese Civil Code
Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (EGBGB)—Introductory Act to the
German Civil Code
Einführungsgesetz zum Reichsstrafgesetzbuch—Introductory Act to Criminal Code of
the Reich
Eisenbahngesetz—Railways Act
Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz—Continued Salary Payment Act
Gentechnikgesetz—Genetic Engineering Act
Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb—Unfair Competition Act
Gewerbeordnung—Trade Regulations
Grundgesetz (GG)—German Basic Law
Haftpflichtgesetz—Liability Law
Haustürwiderrufsgesetz—Cancellation Rights for Doorstep Sales Act
Insolvenzordnung—Insolvency Ordninance
Luftverkehrsgesetz—Aviation Act
Obligationenrecht (OR) (Switzerland)—Swiss Law of Obligations
Pflichtversicherungsgesetz (PflVG)—Mandatory Insurance Act
Produkthaftungsgesetz—Product Liability Act
Reichsgewerbeordnung—Reich Business Act
Reichshaftpflichtgesetz—Reich Liability Act
Reichsstrafgesetzbuch—Reich Criminal Code
Sozialgesetzbuch X—Social Code, Book 10
Strafgesetzbuch (StGB)—German Criminal Code
Straßenverkehrsgesetz (StVG)—Road Traffic Act
Straßenverkehrsordnung (StVO)—Road Traffic Ordinance
Umwelthaftungsgesetz—Environmental Liability Act
xx Legislation
Urhebergesetz—Copyright Act
Verbraucherkreditgesetz—Consumer Credit Act
Versicherungsvertragsgesetz—Insurance Contracts Act
Wasserhaushaltsgesetz—Water Management Law
Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO)—Civil Procedure Ordinance
 Logical Symbols

¬ not (negation)
^ and (conjunction)
→ if . . . then (conditional)
(x) for all x, (universal quantifier)
O it is required (deontic proscriptor)
F it is prohibited (deontic prohibitor)
P it is permitted (deontic permissive)
C there is the right/​claim that
 Introduction to the English Translation

Every legal system has to make decisions about whether, and under which conditions, the
victims of injuries and accidents are expected to bear their losses themselves, or whether,
and to what extent, they may shift these losses to either a person who caused the acci-
dent or is otherwise responsible for it, or to a collective security system, such as an insur-
ance or a national health system. In most legal systems, such decisions are made on the
basis of a body of non-​contractual rules and principles that give expression to historically
grown conceptions of individual responsibility. These bodies of rules shall be referred to as
tort law (albeit the implicit connection between ‘torts’ and ‘wrongs’ makes this term non-​
ideal). In Germany, the heart of those rules in their entirety (Haftungsrecht) is the law of
delict, that is liability for damage caused by fault. In its long history, the originally Roman
rules on delicts have been complemented with rules on culpa in contrahendo, with diverse
instances of strict liability, such as strict liabilities for risk, sacrifice liability in situations
of necessity (Aufopferungshaftung), product liability including liability for medical drugs,
and with the law of damages which concerns the extent of liability.
In every modern legal system, these rules and principles on tort law are embedded in
larger systems of private and public insurance and other compensation schemes. Although
tort law is typically formulated as if an individual victim would sue an individual tort-
feasor, in reality, it is usually first-​and third-​party insurers disputing or, more often, set-
tling cases with one party or among themselves, often in large bulk agreements. The rules
on tort law cannot be understood and applied appropriately without taking those larger
pictures into consideration. Thus, to present an introductory example, compulsory (third-​
party) insurance schemes were usually introduced in order to make sure that citizens were
compensated if they became victims of accidents. Jurists, of course, have to ‘translate’ such
legislation on insurance law into the operation of their private law rules on tort law, so far as
they are relevant. It is not obvious, however, how this should be done as the duty to insure a
specific risk has nothing to do with fault or wrongfulness in causing damage. Nevertheless,
it would be absurd if tort law could not respond to such changes in its legal environment.

I. Structuring Tort Law

In many legal systems, judges have reacted to such legislation by extending negli-
gence liability; hence, they usually formulated stricter duties of care or supported the
victims of accidents with shifts of the burden of proof. In this respect, developments in
Germany are representative of what can be observed throughout the modern world:1

1 Jansen, ‘Development’, 1–​45.

The Structure of Tort Law. Nils Jansen, Translated by Sandy Steel, Oxford University Press. © Nils Jansen 2021. © for the English translation,
Sandy Steel 2021. DOI: 10.1093/ oso/ 9780198705055.001.0001
xxiv Introduction to the English Translation
in accordance with the twentieth-​century legislators’ intentions, though probably not
with those of the fathers of the German Civil Code (BGB), German judges made sure
that the losses in question ultimately fell on the insurance.
Now, one consequence of such developments was that the meaning of concepts such
as negligence, duty, and fault, has changed. Today, ‘duties’ in the law of delict are often
no longer ‘real’ duties which could be enforced by law; rather they become standards
of care defining the extent of individual responsibility. In Germany such standards
may be described as Obliegenheiten: ‘duties’, which are not obligatory, but rather for-
mulate requirements which their addressees have to fulfil in order to avoid negative
consequences, such as liability. The classical example is an insured party’s obligation
of information to the insurer: the insurer may not be able to force the insured party
to reveal the information in question, but the party will lose claims against the in-
surer if it did not comply with the obligation in question. Liability for negligence can
often be described along similar lines. Unfortunately, the English legal language does
not possess a specific term for such obligations. In any event, such Obliegenheiten of
care often do not restrict the individual liberty of their addressees any more than a de-
nial of liability would restrict the liberty of typical victims: tortfeasors have to bear the
loss, or they must buy an insurance or refrain from the dangerous activity, just as typ-
ical victims would either have to buy first-​party insurance or better avoid situations in
which they would be exposed to the risk in question.
In view of such observations (§ 1), the purpose of the book is first to analyse the
‘structure’ of tort law, that is its normative, conceptual, and doctrinal anatomy (see § 2).
In particular, I am interested in the interplay between considerations of corrective and
distributive justice. Here, corrective-​justice theories, such as those by Epstein, Weinrib,
and Ripstein, compete with distributive approaches that purport to take seriously the
distributive effects of tort law.2 None of those approaches, however, so I will argue,
provides a fair reconstruction of what modern tort law is really about: on the one hand,
the basic structure of tort law is determined by a framework of corrective justice; one
cannot deny this,3 and one should not easily dismiss this basic structure and replace,
rather than complement, tort law with collective insurance schemes. Tort law is much
more than an interchangeable cog in the state’s security machine, or a device to prevent
damaging activities. It gives expression to societal conceptions of individual responsi-
bility; and the idea of individual responsibility is a highly important social resource in
any liberal society. It makes a huge difference whether an insurer has to pay because its
client is responsible, and should feel so, for damage caused, or whether compensation
schemes are paying directly for some damage because it is regarded as an adversity of
life. On the other hand, no fair picture of tort law can ignore that what legislators and

2 The most important of such theories is still Calabresi, Costs of Accidents.

3 Arnold seems to deny the very possibility of a formal, categorical distinction of corrective and distributive
justice: Vertrag und Verteilung, 50 ff. But the fact that all legal concepts, including those, of course, of distributive
and corrective justice, are ultimately grounded on basic normative assumptions does not entail the impossibility
of categorical distinctions. Corrective and distributive justice are different things, independently of the criteria for
the relevant distributions or corrections.
 Introduction to the English Translation xxv
judges are concerned about when further developing tort law mainly concerns issues of
distributive justice. During the twentieth century, they were dealing for example with
the situations of workers at their workplaces, with environmental damage, with the
risks of dangerous enterprises, of products and modern technologies, and with the re-
sponsibility of state institutions for damage caused by their officials when dealing with
citizens.
In what follows, I argue that tort law is about distributive decisions relating to indi-
vidual responsibility for damage; it thus concerns distributive decisions embedded
in a framework of corrective justice. Tort lawyers would misunderstand, and indeed
misuse, tort law, if they employed it to address problems of an unfair distribution of
wealth or risks of accidents tout court. Yet, they should likewise be aware that their task
is not simply to correct wrongs or to compensate losses. Rather, their task is correction-​
related distributions between the victims of injuries or accidents and those who may be
responsible for those misfortunes. Tort law is structured by a basic framework of cor-
rective justice; yet, to apply this framework, a number of distributive decisions are nec-
essary: decisions have to be made about which interests to protect (decisions relating
to the scope of liability) and about the extent of responsibility. Indeed, responsibility
may be limited to harm caused intentionally or recklessly, it may be strict, extending
also to the consequences of perfectly careful behaviour, and negligence includes a great
number of different grades of carelessness.
It is important to understand that the basic claims I am making in this part of the
book are descriptive as far as the substance of tort law is concerned: I present what
I regard as a fair picture of current tort law and I analyse its normative structure. In
particular, I do not intend to make any normative statements that might change the law
as it stands: I will not argue that there should be more or less liability,4 or that strict li-
ability would be superior to liability for fault, or vice versa. What I take as my object of
analysis is the law as it stands and as it is actually applied by the courts, rather than the
conceptual inheritance of nineteenth-​century jurisprudence, as it had been restated in
1900 by the legislator of the German civil code. Thus, the aim of the book is not to give
the best interpretation of the law as it was laid down in 1896 in §§ 823–​853 BGB and in
accompanying statutes on more or less strict forms of strict liability. In view of the cur-
rent state of the law, I do not think that such an approach would be particularly helpful.
During the twentieth century, German tort law, like most other European tort laws,
went through fundamental transformations. Today, the code’s provisions have been
fleshed out, complemented with, and even superseded by, thick layers of judge-​made
law, which quite clearly have fundamentally changed the significance and meaning
of the original provisions. Ignoring the relevant judgments and statements by judges
would mean drawing an inappropriate picture of the present law.
Similarly, I do not believe that an appropriate idea of the structure of tort law could
be derived from conceptual analysis of terms such as fault, wrong, corrective justice,

4 In particular, I am not in favour of expanding liability as some critics fear; see Münchener Kommentar8/​

Wagner, § 823, [12].

xxvi Introduction to the English Translation
or equality. Those concepts have often changed their meaning in the course of his-
tory and they continue to be open to interpretation. They are too weak a ground to
erect a doctrinal building on them. Thus, while fault liability for wrongs, on the one
hand, and strict liability for risks and sacrifice liability, on the other, may be clearly
distinguished in the conceptual realms of legal theory and doctrine,5 comparative and
doctrinal lawyers have often observed the sliding scale between, and functional inter-
changeability of, those different types of liability.6 More importantly, strict liabilities
as well as liability for fault are likewise legal expressions of individual responsibility.7
Hence, they follow a basic logic of corrective justice; at the same time similar distribu-
tive arguments apply with regard to fault liability and strict liability for risks and to sac-
rifice liability. As Jane Stapleton has observed many years ago regarding English law,8
and as has been confirmed by German judges,9 courts deciding on issues of negligence
often consider arguments such as the better insurability of the relevant risk for one of
either the claimant or defendant, or their weak or strong position, such as in particular
their financial or social situation. Rather than simply asking whether the defendant
acted in accordance with the relevant safety standards, they assign risks of accidents.
The most basic claim I am making in the book is that an appropriate theory of tort law
should be able to explain why the same arguments apply as far as fault liability and strict
liabilities are concerned, and why fault liability and strict liability are not fundamen-
tally different things. I therefore reject the traditional approach of German doctrine re-​
constructing tort law on the basis of a ‘twin-​’ or ‘pluri-​tracked’ model. According to this
doctrine, tort law consists of two, viz many, independent groups of causes of actions,
each following a different normative logic. This doctrine regards liability for fault as an
expression of corrective justice and strict liability as an expression of distributive prin-
ciples. While German scholars usually have taken this doctrine as a starting point for
further argument, I regard it as a basic problem. Tort law, so I will argue, is one coherent
body of rules that in their entirety give expression to individual responsibility.10
It may be argued, of course, that my approach does not perfectly fit with the orig-
inal conception of the BGB.11 For reasons to be explained below (Section II), the fa-
thers of the BGB wanted to keep strict liabilities outside the BGB. For them, strict

5 Canaris, ‘Grundstrukturen’, 577 ff.

6 See, as far as strict liability for risks is concerned, Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 610 f (§ 84 I.3.b). The
comparative perspective provides a particular clear picture; see Zweigert/​Kötz, Comparative Law, 649 ff; von Bar,
Common European Law of Torts II, [306], [311], [316 ff]; Werro, Palmer, and Hahn, ‘Cases and Results’, 406 ff, 409 ff,
446 ff; Koziol, Grundfragen des Schadenersatzrechts, 2010, [1/​20 f]. For a general picture, see Jansen, ‘Principles’,
741 ff; below, 408 ff.
7 Canaris, ‘Grundstrukturen’, 580; Jansen, ‘Legal Responsibility’, 221–​252. The issue is disputed as far as sacrifice

liability in favour of a third party is concerned, where one person A interferes with the property or else right of B in
order to prevent larger injury or damage to C. Here, some authors argue that liability falls not upon A, who caused
the damage, but rather upon C, who benefits from B’s loss. But this does not accord with the provision’s intention;
see Münchener Kommentar8/​Brückner, § 904, [16]–​[19].
8 Stapleton, ‘Duty of Care Factors’, 93 f and passim.
9 Hauß, ‘Entwicklungslinien’, 151–​ 167; Steffen, ‘Verkehrspflichten’, 410; id, Karlsruher Forum 1985, 33; id,
‘Haftung im Wandel’, 13–​37; further id, Reichsgerichtsräte-​Kommentar/​Steffen, § 823, [114 ff].
10 See also Historisch-​kritischer Kommentar/​Schermaier, before § 276, [17 f]; Historisch-​kritischer Kommentar/​

Schiemann, §§ 823–​830, 840, 842–​853, [3]‌–[​ 6], [155], and passim.

11 See, in particular, Canaris, ‘Grundstrukturen’, 577 ff; Münchener Kommentar8/​Wagner, § 823, [12].
 Introduction to the English Translation xxvii
liabilities were political law and hence should be kept separate from the—​apolitically
conceived—​codification. Yet, time has long passed by such considerations. It would not
be particularly helpful still today to criticize decades of case law of abusing the BGB’s
provisions on delict,12 and even scholars disagreeing with my approach admit that it
offers a fair reconstruction of such case law.13 Indeed, while it is true that considerations
of risk distribution were not present when the law of delict was codified in 1896, such
considerations have played an increasingly significant role since third-​party insur-
ance has become available and was made obligatory as early as in 1922 for aircraft and
in 1939 for cars. Clearly, the purpose of such legislation was to protect the victims of
accidents; the same was true for the new action directe of victims against their injurer’s
insurance.14 The twentieth century’s case law may be difficult to reconcile with the orig-
inal conception of the BGB’s law of delict; yet, with its transformations of the law of de-
lict, it was clearly in conformity with the intentions of subsequent legislation on issues
such as insurance, social security systems, and risk liability.

II. Transformations of Tort Law

The book thus focuses on what I perceive as important tensions between the wording of
the BGB’s provisions and current conceptions of non-​contractual responsibility under-
lying the actual practice of courts. Again, with such tensions between the conceptual in-
heritance of tort law and its modern functions, German law is representative for many
other legal systems. Nevertheless, it is one thing to assert such tensions, and quite another
one to explain them, that is to show that the BGB’s provisions on delicts were drafted with
inappropriate conceptual and doctrinal material. Here, the book’s main historical thesis is
that the concepts and doctrines underlying modern tort law were designed for purposes
quite different from those of modern laws.
This explanation starts from what is generally regarded as the origin of modern
European tort law: the Roman lex Aquilia. When this plebiscite was held at the end of
the third century bc, however, the law of delict was quite a different thing than modern
tort laws. In particular, it was not primarily about compensation, but rather about ret-
ribution for wrongs suffered from the defendant’s hands. Although the sanction of
the actio legis Aquiliae was measured on the damage suffered by the claimant, those
damages were not meant to compensate the victim, but rather to sanction the wrong
done by the defendant. The Aquilian poena—​originally a ransom paid in a settlement
concerning the victim’s right of legal revenge—​was a means of economic retaliation:15
the defendant should suffer economically to the same extent to which she had made
the claimant suffer. Still for Cicero, only revenge, rather than financial interests, was

12 Canaris, ‘Grundstrukturen’, 579.

13 Münchener Kommentar8/​Wagner, § 823, [12].
14 Cf Historisch-​kritischer Kommentar/​Schiemann, §§ 823–​830, 840, 842–​853, [5 f].
15 Cf Historisch-​kritischer Kommentar/​Schiemann, §§ 823–​830, 840, 842–​853, [31], [39 f].
xxviii Introduction to the English Translation
a legitimate motive for bringing an action.16 This conception of liability explains why
the defendant’s heirs were not liable under the action,17 why joint tortfeasors were all
liable for the whole damage,18 or why the owner of a slave who had been killed by the
defendant had to decide whether she wanted to claim Aquilian damages or start crim-
inal proceedings.19 The Aquilian concepts of wrongfulness and fault were perfectly
designed for such purposes of legal retaliation. Punitive sanctions are appropriate only
where the defendant culpably commits a wrong.
Compensation is not a modern invention. In Rome, of course, as in modern times,
victims of accidents were not only concerned about retaliation, but also about eco-
nomic compensation. The Roman jurists therefore began to consider such interests
when they further developed the actio legis Aquiliae and thus initiated fundamental
transformations of delictual liability. Thus, the action’s sanction was measured on
the claimant’s loss and could easily be transformed into compensation;20 likewise the
concept of culpa left ample room for interpretation already in Roman times. Similarly,
in early modern times, learned jurists in all Europe made the lex Aquilia the basis of
a general clause of non-​contractual liability, as it was later codified in Art 1382 Code
civil (today Art 1240).21 Indeed, during the eighteenth century, the action seemed
to have fully lost its punitive nature. It ensured a comprehensive protection of the
claimant’s interests and at the same time became the basis for a strict liability for risks
avant la lettre.22 Jurists used the Roman concept of liability for culpa levissima23—​or
‘smallest fault or neglect’ viz ‘slightest fault’ in Scotland24—​to construct far-​reaching
principles of strict liability for ‘negligence without fault’.25 Such culpa levissima had
nothing to do with misconduct; indeed, a highly influential doctrine employed the
idea of a quasi contract to explain such liability. Sometimes, pursuing a dangerous
action was only allowed, so the argument went, if one tacitly promised making good
all resulting damage, even if caused without fault. Thus, to pursue a dangerous ac-
tion without being prepared to do so amounted to culpable unlawfulness.26 Other
jurists illustrated culpa levissima with examples that made quite sure that what they
had in mind was not genuine standards of conduct.27 All those jurists knew that the

16 For a detailed analysis, see Kunkel, Entwicklung des römischen Kriminalverfahrens, 124 ff.
17 Gaius, Institutiones IV, 112 (= Inst 4,12,1); Inst 4,3,9; Ulp D 9,2,23,8.
18 Ulp D 9,2,11,2, referring to Julian.
19 Gaius, Institutiones III, 213.
20 The legal nature of the actio legis Aquiliae has remained a matter of debate until the present day; see Sirks,

‘Actio damni iniuriae legis Aquiliae’, 303–​353. However, Sirks does not reflect the possibility of a functional shift;
neither does he consider the possibility of shifts in the meanings of the action’s basic concepts.
21 This development has often been described and been interpreted in quite different ways; see below, 206 ff and

219 ff; Jansen, ‘Development’, 5–​7.

22 Below, 219 ff; Ogorek, Gefährdungshaftung, 37.
23 Ulp D 9,2,44 pr: ‘In lege Aquilia et levissima culpa venit’.
24 MacQueen/​Sellar, ‘Negligence’, 524 ff.
25 Ehrenzweig, Negligence, 1951.
26 de Molina, De iustitia, tract II, disp 698, n 3: liability ‘ratione pacti, seu quasi pacti’. This argument was received

by leading commentators, such as Brunnemann, Commentarius in Pandectas, ad D 9,2,44, n 1, 5; Struve, Syntagma

Jurisprudentiae Secundum ordinem Pandectarum, ad D 9,2, exerc XIV, § 20; Lauterbach, Collegium theoretico-​
practicum, lib IX, tit II, § 9.
27 Höpfner, Theoretisch-​practischer Commentar, §§ 757 f; Heineccius, Academische Reden, §§ 786 f; id,

Recitationes, §§ 786 f; Gundling, Pandecten, lib IX, tit II, § 2; Bauriedel, Theoretisch-​praktischer Commentar, § 322.
 Introduction to the English Translation xxix
inherited concepts of the lex Aquilia did not fit well with the purposes of their actio
de damno dato.28 Christian Thomasius therefore even suggested tearing the ‘Aquilian
mask’ off this action.29
The BGB, however, is a restatement of nineteenth-​century doctrine, and around 1800,
the winds had changed again.30 Indeed, legislators and scholars significantly restricted
tort law claims leaving the victims of accidents with increasingly poor protection. Those
new winds could be felt everywhere in Europe outside the realm of the Code civil;31 yet, in
the German-​speaking world, they blew particularly bitterly.32 The Prussian Allgemeines
Landrecht (ALR) and likewise the Austrian Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB)
were telling examples of the new approach; here even the ‘presumption’ was laid down in
§ 1296 that ‘damage was caused without another person’s fault’.33 At the same time, aca-
demic doctrine focused again on the Roman sources;34 indeed, although no court would
apply the penal elements of Roman delicts, leading authors again presented those elements
as good law.35 It was a consequence of this approach that the principle of fault became an
‘axiom’,36 which, so it seemed, obviously excluded liability for negligence without fault or
culpa levissima.37
Now those doctrines could draw on earlier natural law theories, in particular on those
of Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Wolff. In those theories, delictual liability had been
a sanction necessary to prevent violations of private law duties of conduct.38 During
the twentieth century, this model of delictual responsibility was usually explained with
ideas of political and economic liberalism.39 Indeed, contemporary observers had un-
derstood the changes of legislation as politically motivated restrictions of elder law40
meant to support the equally dynamic and dangerous industries.41 Nevertheless, one
should not too quickly identify the fault principle with early modern liberalism. Writers
such as Immanuel Kant in particular had justified delictual liability as an obligatio ex

28 The point was made eg by Hugo, Lehrbuch, 282 ff.

29 Thomasius, Larva legis Aquiliae; see below, 255 f.
30 For a slightly different picture Bürge, ‘Gefährdungshaftung’, 59 ff, 75 ff. According to Bürge, the change in
approach happened during the 1860s, in particular with Jhering, Schuldmoment. But this picture probably
underestimates the importance of authors other than Kant and Savigny.
31 Here, the concept of fault in Art 1382 Code civil continued to extend to culpa levissima; see Rotondi, ‘Lex

Aquilia’, 549 ff; Hoffmann, Abstufung der Fahrlässigkeit; Halpérin, ‘French doctrinal writing’, 75 ff. The translation
of Art 1382 Code civil into the German Badisches Landrecht was therefore formulated without a requirement of
fault, because it was meant to apply broadly; see Brauer, Code Napoleon V, 372 f.
32 Jansen, ‘Development’, 8–​15.
33 See Hausmaninger, ‘Roman Tort Law’, 126–​128, 130.
34 Ernst, ‘Negligence’, 343 ff; more generally Zimmermann, Roman Law, 11 ff.
35 Thibaut, Pandekten-​Recht I, §§ 66–​68; Puchta, Pandekten, §§ 230, 261; Windscheid, Pandektenrecht II, § 326.
36 See, quite early, Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium, lib I, cap V, § 5: ‘axioma in moralibus’; Thibaut,

Pandekten-​Recht I, § 250; Puchta, Pandekten, §§ 264–​267; Jhering, Schuldmoment, 6, 40, and passim; Motive,
Mugdan II, 15: ‘höheres juristisches Axiom’.
37 Thibaut, Pandekten-​Recht I, § 253; Puchta, Pandekten, § 266. The leading authority was Hasse, Culpa,

65 ff, 90 ff.
38 Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium, I, III; id, De officio hominis, lib I, cap VI; Wolff, Institutiones iuris na-

turae, §§ 87, 88; see below, 251 ff and 261 ff.

39 Esser, Gefährdungshaftung, 54 ff; Kötz, ‘Besondere Gefahr’, 1 ff; Brüggemeier, ‘Schadensverteilung’, 393 ff; see

also Dilcher, ‘Beitrag der Rechtsgeschichte’, 263 f, 274; Katzenmeier, Arzthaftung, 2002, 154–​156 (for the BGB).
40 Ludwig, Schadens-​Ersatz I, 15 f; see also von Wächter, Handbuch II, 783 ff.
41 Von Zeiller, Commentar, § 1295, fn 5. Similarly Zeiller’s statements in the hearings for the codification; see

Hausmaninger, ‘Roman Tort Law’, 126 f. See, for all, Benöhr, ‘Verschuldensprinzip’, 11–​15.
xxx Introduction to the English Translation
dominio arising from the violation of the claimant’s right;42 hence, Kant and contempo-
rary natural lawyers argued that liability arising from an infringement of a right should
normally be strict.43 Also the Historical School was not as much politically opposed to
strict liability as twentieth-​century jurists believed. To the contrary, Friedrich Carl von
Savigny was the ‘father’ of the modern German concept of strict liability for risks (§ 25
of the Prussian statute on railways, 1838)—​acting, however, not in his role as a scholar,
but rather as a Staatsminister (secretary of the state).44
All in all, the restrictive approach of nineteenth-​century scholarship was not prima-
rily politically motivated. Rather, the decisive point was the scholars’ vision of a private
law that should be conceived in juristic, that is in a-​political, terms. Hence the attrac-
tion of the natural law idea of delicts as a laesio viz injury. The proposition that whoever
had unlawfully and culpably violated his neighbour’s right seemed evident; yet beyond
this proposition, the dangerous fields of political controversy and normative insecurity
opened up. Moreover, from the Historical School’s perspective, the natural law model
of the law of delict was plausible, because it fitted much better with the Roman sources
than the eighteenth-​century pragmatism. Scholars apparently did not ask whether the
model was ultimately convincing as far as legal policy was concerned. Rather, they saw
their task to further develop the Roman natural law concept of iniuria into a doctrinal
category.
It may be doubted whether this model was really in conformity with the actual law
at the end of the nineteenth century. In any event, in the 1870s, the fault principle again
lost its axiomatic status. Indeed, the vivid debate on the normative foundations of tort
law at the turn of the century clearly shows that this principle was rather regarded as a
problem and that an appropriate new legal policy was to be found.45 Also the courts had
long reacted to the presence of asymmetrical risks in social life introducing increas-
ingly far-​reaching duties of care (Verkehrspflichten).46 Nevertheless, the codification
was drafted in the spirit of the natural law model of delict, and it was formulated in the
language of pandectistic doctrines of unlawfulness.47 Quite early, it had been decided
that strict liabilities for risk should not be included into the codification but rather be
provided for by special legislation,48 and this has remained the state of law until the

42 Wolff, Ius naturae, §§ 578–​580; id, Institutiones iuris naturae, §§ 269 f. In this point, Wolff ’s theory was not

very clear, however. It seems that the protected property rights were only protected with duties of non-​interference
(neminem laedere); violations of those duties were then sanctioned with second-​order duties to pay compensation.
At the same time moral judgements are present everywhere in his argument. Hence, liability sometimes seems to
be tied to fault (damnum dolo vel culpa datum: Ius naturae, § 580; Institutiones iuris naturae, § 270), while in the
German translation of the book (Grundsätze des Natur-​und Völckerrechts), he seems to speak about strict liability;
see more detailed Gisawi, Totalreparation, 71 ff, and in particular 81–​84.
43 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 31; similarly other Kantian authors such as Hepp or von Zeiller; see below,

262, at fn 555; Bürge, ‘Gefährdungshaftung’, 61 ff.

44 Baums, ‘Einführung der Gefährdungshaftung’, 277 ff; Bürge, ‘Gefährdungshaftung’, 59 f.
45 Below, 280 ff.
46 Kleindiek, Deliktshaftung, 41–​ 81; Bilstein, Schadensersatzrecht der Lex Aquilia, 25 ff, 39 ff; Seiler,
‘Schadensersatzrecht’, 255 f; Zimmermann/​ Verse, ‘Deliktsrecht’, 333 f; Historisch-​kritischer Kommentar/​
Schiemann, §§ 823–​830, 840, 842–​853, [96 f].
47 Historisch-​kritischer Kommentar/​Schiemann, §§ 823–​830, 840, 842–​853, [16]–​[30].
48 See, critically Kötz, ‘Gefährdungshaftung’, 1792 ff. For the political debates preceding and during the drafting

process, see Benöhr, ‘Verschuldensprinzip’, 10–​31.

 Introduction to the English Translation xxxi
present day. Strict liabilities are treated as political law that shall be kept separate from
the not-​so-​political system of private law enshrined in the codification. Scholars still
give expression to this approach with their metaphor of a ‘twin-​track’ tort law and try to
explain it with the contrast of corrective and distributive justice.49
It was feared in the 1970s and 1980s that this state of doctrine would ossify tort law, as far
as the codification was concerned,50 but this never happened. Even if German judges did
not follow the Austrian example51 of applying strict liability rules by means of analogy,52
they did not leave the victims of accidents without protection. Rather they granted com-
pensation by means of liability for negligence or sacrifice liability.53 Hence, the main
problem of current law consists in the fact that its traditional doctrinal instruments are
no longer able to appropriately describe the law as it is actually applied in daily legal prac-
tice. Indeed, the observation of a shifting scale between fault liability and stricter liabili-
ties for risk and sacrifice liability54 is general knowledge today, and it is widely understood
that all those subgroups of tort law are likewise expressions of individual responsibility.55
Nevertheless, those quite basic features of modern tort law can only be described from an
external observer’s perspective; there is no doctrinal language to give expression to it.56
The unity of tort law simply does not match with the current twin-​track approach to the
subject and, more fundamentally, with the concepts of fault and unlawfulness. As a matter
of legal doctrine, there cannot be a gradual transition between lawful behaviour and a
culpably unlawful violation of legal limits. This explains why it is so difficult to translate
considerations of risk-​distribution, such as the better position, or even an obligation, to
buy an insurance, or the introduction of direct claims against third-​party insurers, into the
doctrinal framework of negligence liability. The better position to insure a risk has nothing
to do with the measures necessary to prevent damage, and yet, since 100 years ago, it
cannot be denied: assurance oblige.57 Jurists not finding a place for such arguments within
their doctrine, however, resemble people who cannot control their obsessive behaviour
because they do not know their subconscious motives.
It may be objected that I am describing processes that went in a wrong direc-
tion. Already in the nineteenth century, and increasingly during the twentieth cen-
tury, German scholars have been quarrelling with the courts. Scholars tend to ignore

49 See Esser, ‘Zweispurigkeit’, 129–​134; today eg Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 604–​609 (§ 84 I.2.).
50 Wolf (a leading ministry official), (1982) 182 AcP 80, 90.
51 Koziol, ‘Gefährdungshaftung’, 51–​61; id, Apathy and Koch, Österreichisches Haftpflichtrecht III, 371–​384.
52 See Münchener Kommentar8/​Wagner, before § 823, [26].
53 Historisch-​kritischer Kommentar/​ Schiemann, §§ 823–​830, 840, 842–​853, [87]; Münchener Kommentar8/​
Wagner, before § 823, [27]. Also the many cases in which courts applied § 906 II 2 BGB by means of analogy, be-
long into this context.
54 Above, fn 6.
55 Above, fn 7.
56 See, as an example the quite contradictory formulations in: Stoll, ‘Haftungsverlagerung’, 154 ff, 161 ff,

195: ‘duty of care (Verkehrspflicht) including a certain element of strict liability’.

57 Ehrenzweig, ‘Assurance oblige’, 445–​454; see von Caemmerer, ‘Wandlungen des Deliktsrechts’, 63 f; von Bar,

Verkehrspflichten, 46 ff; id, ‘Trennungsprinzip’, 301, 313 ff; Stürner, ‘Schadenszuweisung’, 297 ff; Brüggemeier,
‘Schadensverteilung’, 412 ff.
xxxii Introduction to the English Translation
important statements of judges outside court;58 still today they are confronting the
complex and untidy legal reality with their doctrinally simple natural law system.59 The
usual arguments are that duties should not be too strict;60 that tort law should honour
the ‘principles of self responsibility and self determination’; and that citizens are them-
selves responsible for the risks to which they are exposing their goods.61 I do not want
to argue with such positions as a matter of normative principle. Tort law should of
course be able to reflect such concerns. Nevertheless, those arguments give expression
to nineteenth-​century liberalism policy. They may be disputed or balanced with other
policies and hence should no longer be enshrined within the basic doctrinal structure
of tort law. In any event, the underlying fiction of free and equal citizens was nowhere
as contra-​factual as in tort law. Indeed, as far as mutual exposure to risk is concerned,
citizens are never in positions of equality. Also in everyday life people are not equally
vulnerable; they expose their fellow citizens (viz neighbours) to quite different dangers,
examples being traffic accidents with children or water escaping from one’s washing
machine and causing damage in a lower flat. The law could not even claim to be fair, if it
did not even try to address such issues of unequal risk distribution.62
What is more, tort law doctrine must reflect the fact that tort law has been connected
in most legal systems with instruments of public regulation and collective security sys-
tems much more closely than other parts of private law.63 Today, its social function
is primarily to divide the risks of accidents between victims and tortfeasors and to
shift individual losses to those who should bear the relevant risk.64 It is important to
understand that tort law thereby also opens up spaces of personal liberty—​this is an
aspect often ignored in the European discussion. The liberal policy that risks can be
permitted as long as, and because, there is at least a mechanism ensuring that there will
be compensation if the risk materializes, pervades the law. Liability may be the price
which has to be paid for the permission of dangerous activities or for an exemption
from the imposition of even more expensive safety measures.65 This is the reason why
the courts were right in detaching liability conceptually from standards established by
public law.66
All in all, it would therefore be a mistake to reconnect delictual liability doctrinally
with the requirement of damage unlawfully caused. Of course, duties of care need to

58 See the references above, fn 9. Although Hauß was the Courts Vice President and Steffen was presiding the

Supreme Courts VIth Senate, which was competent in tort law cases, scholars usually ignored those contributions,
which still are remarkably helpful for understanding the relevant case law.
59 Hofacker, Verkehrssicherungspflicht, 1929, passim; id, ‘Über Verkehrssicherungspflicht’, 366; Esser,

‘Zweispurigkeit’, 130 ff; Fraenkel, Tatbestand und Zurechnung, 20 ff.

60 Today Wagner, Deliktsrecht14, [79 ff], arguing that decisions imposing economically inefficient standards of

care could be explained with the judges’ hindsight bias. Yet, judges discussing their decisions outside court have
very clearly explained the relevant considerations of risk distribution which Wagner ignores.
61 Zöllner, (1988) 188 AcP 85, 95.
62 Jansen, ‘Legal Responsibility’, 236–​248.
63 Historisch-​kritischer Kommentar/​ Schiemann, §§ 823–​830, 840, 842–​853, [5 f], [107 ff]; for an overview
Münchener Kommentar8/​Wagner, before § 823, [28]–​[33]; for a comparative perspective, id, ‘Grundstrukturen’,
305–​338. For a critique (‘alien to private law’) Zöllner, (1988) 188 AcP 85, 96.
64 Historisch-​kritischer Kommentar/​Schiemann, §§ 823–​830, 840, 842–​853, [6]‌.
65 Jansen, ‘Legal Responsibility’.
66 Münchener Kommentar8/​Wagner, § 823, [358 ff] with a comprehensive analysis of case law.
 Introduction to the English Translation xxxiii
be reasonable: the law must not impose unreasonable standards of care; and liability
may be limited by principles of mutual trust.67 Yet, only with daily activities, lawful
behaviour can always exclude liability.68

III. Doctrine

Every attempt to reconstruct tort law doctrinally has to address the two basic issues of
tort law, namely first the scope of protected interests, such as property, bodily integrity,
or specifically defined economic interests, and secondly the range of legal responsi-
bility. It will be seen that both issues can be, and should be, addressed independently
of one another—​although both issues have often been mixed up with one another,
the range of responsibility can be described independently of the scope of protected
interests in question.
Now, one result of the history I am telling in Part II of the book is that, in view of the
function of modern tort law, the traditionally central concept of unlawfulness has largely
become dysfunctional, as far as the range of liability is concerned. In actual legal prac-
tice, unlawful behaviour is not a necessary requirement of delictual liability (rather, its
central field of application is injunctions against imminent dangers). Hence, despite the
traditionally central place of unlawfulness in the German law of delict, liability should
no longer be tied to unlawful behaviour viz a violation of a genuine legal duty.69 In par-
ticular, duties of care (Verkehrspflichten) and the concept of negligence should be devel-
oped independently of the idea of unlawfulness. A side view to contributory negligence
may confirm this argument.70 Here, it is perfectly clear today that similar standards
apply as far as responsibility for oneself (contributory negligence) and responsibility for
one’s neighbour (liability for negligence) are concerned.71 Yet, where a claim is reduced
for reasons of contributory negligence, this cannot be so because the victim’s careless-
ness was unlawful72—​contrary to what natural law doctrine assumed,73 there is general
agreement today that there are no genuine legal duties to protect oneself. Hence, as far
as contributory negligence is concerned, nobody doubts that standards of care should
be conceived of as Obliegenheiten,74 which are independent of legal obligations. Thus,

67 Münchener Kommentar8/​Wagner, § 823, [338]–​[346].

68 Cf OLG Hamm (2002) NJW-​RR 90 f; LG Arnsberg (2006) VersR 422 f (no liability for injury caused by taking
a step back); AG Siegburg (2001) NJW-​RR 1390 f (no liability, where stones in one’s shoes sole damage a wooden
floor). Scholars have welcomed those decisions because of proving the enduring relevance of fault in tort law; see
Kolb, Verschuldensgrundsatz, 51 ff.
69 But see Münchener Kommentar8/​Wagner, § 823, [11 f].
70 See Historisch-​kritischer Kommentar/​Jansen, § 254, [38]–​[49].
71 Oftinger, Haftpflichtrecht I, 160; Looschelders, Mitverantwortlichkeit, 116 ff, 126 ff.
72 Lange/​Schiemann, Schadensersatz, 550 f; Looschelders, Mitverantwortlichkeit, 180 ff; see also BGHZ 33, 136,

142 f; BGH (1984) NJW 354.

73 Wolff, Philosophia practica, pars I, § 724; id, Ius naturae, cap II (§§ 169 ff): ‘De officiis hominis erga seipsum’;

id, Institutiones iuris naturae, §§ 133, 255, 269. For the BGB, see von Liszt, Deliktsobligationen, 81 ff, 84. Also Nazi
jurisprudence assumed that such duties would exist; see Baur, Entwicklung und Reform, 68 f, 74 f; Larenz, Vertrag
und Unrecht II, 101.
74 Schmidt, Obliegenheiten, 105 ff; Soergel10/​ R Schmidt, § 254, [14]; Ballerstedt, Review of Schmidt, Die
Obliegenheiten (1958) 121 ZHR 78–​86, 83; Deutsch, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht, [567 ff]; Staudinger13/​Schiemann,
xxxiv Introduction to the English Translation
modern forms of factory farming may be regarded as contributorily negligent, if the
stock thereby becomes oversensitive to noise even if such farming is perfectly in ac-
cordance with the relevant regulations.75
Nevertheless, the traditional unlawfulness doctrine is relevant as far as it makes clear
that liability may be excluded where the tortfeasor was justified in causing damage.
Remarkably, however, those justifications apply also as far as strict liability for risks is
concerned,76 even if strict liability, according to traditional German doctrine, does not
require the defendant to have acted unlawfully. Moreover, elements of the traditional
unlawfulness doctrine are helpful as far as they help to describe the scope of tort law,
that is the first basic issue of tort law. Jurists have often found it difficult to disentangle
issues concerning the scope of protection and the range of liability. Indeed, in cases
such as fraud, liability seems to be triggered by the violation of a legal duty, whereas in
other cases, such as damage done to property or physical injury, the point seems to be
protection of specific goods or ‘rights’. I will argue that the law in both cases likewise
defines individual spheres of legally protected reliance. In the same way in which cit-
izens may rely on other people respecting their property, they may rely on them not
deceiving one another. In both instances the protected legal position may therefore be
described as an individual right (property right viz right not to be deceived)—​hence,
the concept of unlawfulness has proved much more helpful in this respect than with
describing standards of care. Claims for damages thus require an infringement with
such a legal position (the Zuweisungsgehalt of a right);77 they are appropriate where the
right-​holder was deprived of her exclusive power to dispose of the protected legal po-
sition.78 Relying on an English concept, for which an appropriate German equivalent
is difficult to find, it can be said that a case for liability is given where the defendant is
outcome responsible (Honoré) for such an infringement. Standards of care relating to
this outcome responsibility can then describe the range of responsibility in tort law in
further detail.
This is not the place to develop those issues in further detail (see below, § 9). Here, it
suffices to conclude with the observation that the book, despite its now nearly twenty
years of age, is still up to date as far as its basic arguments are concerned. Thus, al-
though a couple of provisions of German (and French) law I am referring to have been
updated or shifted to a different place in the codification, since the book appeared, the
substance of those norms has been left unchanged. Likewise, there is no recent case

§ 254, [30 f]; Looschelders, Mitverantwortlichkeit, 195 ff, 219 ff. See also id, 208 f, 211 ff: standards of care as ‘hypo-
thetical imperatives’; in agreement Lange/​Schiemann, Schadensersatz, 551 f.

75 BGHZ 115, 84, 86 ff.

76 See below, 432 ff.
77 See below, 422 ff; Helms, Gewinnherausgabe, 10 f. Such legal positions can be described on a scale between
(never fully) ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ rights, with the decisive issue being whether the right or duty in question aims
to protect the individual claimant’s economic interests. I have further developed the matter in Jansen, ‘Gesetzliche
Schuldverhältnisse’, 203–​227.
78 In exceptional cases of legal paternalism, however, the right owner may be denied such a power. An example

may be forced prostitution. A prohibition on trafficking would be meant to protect women; quite clearly the
women should therefore be entitled to the gains made by their human traffickers or procurer.
 Introduction to the English Translation xxxv
law which would have fundamentally changed the nature or structure of tort law or
which would otherwise have affected my argument. Indeed, while the European tort
laws went through their main transformations already during the first two-​thirds of
the twentieth century, those transformations have not yet been doctrinally reflected
in any sufficient detail. While the two proposals for restatements of European tort law
therefore both saw the necessity to opt for a wholly new approach,79 they chose quite
different methods of systematization and suggest quite different terminologies; yet nei-
ther of the two groups could agree on particularly clear rules.80 In view of this state of
present law and current discussions, Sandy Steel and I decided to leave my original text
largely unchanged. What we did, however, was to update the relevant provisions (as the
reader may wish to look them up on the internet and may not find it easy to discover
their exact wording at the beginning of the century).

79 European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law. Text and Commentary, 2005; Study Group

on a European Civil Code/​von Bar, Non-​contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another (PEL Liab
Dam), 2010.
80 Jansen, ‘Principles’. The Study Group’s proposals (fn 79) were already available online when I discussed them

in 2006.
 Translator’s Note

As Nils Jansen observes in his introduction, all legal systems are faced with the question
of when, if ever, to grant interpersonal compensation claims when one person causes
another harm, and when, if ever, to grant individuals rights against the state to com-
pensation for harm. A morally justified legal system will likely do both. In some cases,
individuals can reasonably demand that particular others compensate them, and can
reasonably demand the legal system’s support in making that demand. In other cases,
individual claims for compensation are inappropriate because, for instance, no partic-
ular individual is suitably responsible for another’s harm—​at most, there is a collective
duty to assist those whose harms are no individual’s responsibility.
The idea of a wrong, standardly understood as a breach of a legal duty, is considered
an important determinant of interpersonal compensation claims. Some writers ap-
pear to consider a legal wrong as a necessary condition of interpersonal compensatory
liability, as a descriptive matter.1 Others (also) hold that a moral wrong of some kind,
for instance the breach of a duty correlated with a particular kind of moral right, is a
necessary condition of justified interpersonal compensatory liability, as a normative
matter.2
This book takes a different view. One of its central claims is that, in German law,
compensatory liability in tort law is not necessarily conditioned upon unlawfulness—​
the breach of a legal duty. Although the book accepts that the results in judicial
decisions are still typically framed in terms of unlawfulness, it argues that this lan-
guage is at odds with the normative justifications de facto relied upon to generate li-
ability. The book’s introduction gives an intuitively persuasive example. A person
leaves an apparently sound washing machine unattended. It leaks and causes damage
to a downstairs neighbour in an apartment block. The Oberlandesgericht (OLG)
Düsseldorf held the upstairs neighbour liable on the basis that her conduct in leaving
the machine unattended was unlawful.3 On the face of it, it seems implausible that
leaving a washing machine unattended for a short period of time is in breach of a legal
duty. This is not, Jansen argues, an isolated example. Others discussed by the book
are: liability for justified harm inflicted in cases of necessity (Aufopferungshaftung),

1 See Birks, ‘Civil Wrong’.

2 These writers take wrongdoing, which is understood in terms of Kantian rights to freedom, to be necessary for
justified compensatory claims in tort law: Weinrib, Idea of Private Law; Ripstein, Private Wrongs. It might seem
surprising to describe Weinrib as insisting upon a moral wrong. The point is this: Weinrib insists that there is a nor-
mative standard to which the positive law must adhere and this standard involves tort liability hinging upon breach
of a certain kind of duty that is not fully specified by the positive law (even if the positive law partly constitutes the
content of the duty).
3 At 2.

The Structure of Tort Law. Nils Jansen, Translated by Sandy Steel, Oxford University Press. © Nils Jansen 2021. © for the English translation,
Sandy Steel 2021. DOI: 10.1093/ oso/ 9780198705055.001.0002
xxxviii Translator’s Note
liability for the materialization of inherent risks associated with certain activities
(Gefährdungshaftung), and extensions to liability based upon the breach of duties of
care (Verkehrssicherungspflichten).4
Although the book argues that tort liability in German law is not necessarily condi-
tioned upon a wrong, and so countenances both wrong-​based and non-​wrong-​based
liability, it rejects the prevailing ‘twin-​track’ view that tort law is constituted by two
fundamentally distinct grounds of liability, each with their own normative foundation.
According to the twin-​track view, or one version of it, fault-​based liability is based on
corrective justice, while strict liability is based on distributive justice. Instead, the book
proposes that the unifying normative thread of tort liability is individual outcome re-
sponsibility. According to Jansen, the causal implication of a person’s agency in the
infringement of another’s legally protected interest generates a pro tanto duty to com-
pensate.5 The law sometimes adds further conditions beyond outcome responsibility,
such as enhanced risk, or wrongfulness, but these are, indeed, add-​ons to the basic po-
sition as a matter of individual responsibility.6 Strict liability and fault-​based rules are
equally, according to Jansen, grounded in this basic notion of outcome responsibility,
and the law gradates liability from especially strict standards in certain contexts to
fault-​standards in other contexts.7 On this picture, the normative unity of tort liability
lies in the notion of individual outcome responsibility, which is a form of strict moral
responsibility for an outcome.
There are at least three ways in which the book’s arguments are relevant to theorists
of tort law in other jurisdictions. First of all, the legal phenomena Jansen analyses in
German law are not unique to Germany, and so the theoretical analysis of these phe-
nomena has application to other systems too. For instance, liability in the tort of neg-
ligence also sometimes appears to outstrip the breach of legal duties, and courts have
drawn upon considerations, such as the ability to insure, which are difficult to rec-
oncile with a wrongs-​based framework.8 Second, Jansen’s theoretical argumentation
is, in part, a direct engagement with the work of theoretical writers in common law
jurisdictions; the book’s analysis of the relationship between corrective and distributive
justice, individual responsibility, and the role of deterrence considerations will speak
to those working on these issues elsewhere.9 One of the book’s central theses—​that
the breach of a legal duty should not be considered a unifying necessary condition of
compensatory liability in tort law—​is of particular interest in the context of contem-
porary non-​consequentialist theories of tort law, which typically give wrongdoing a
central place.10 Non-​consequentialist theories of compensatory liability in the absence

4 At eg 12–16, 293–302.
5 See esp 91–103.
6 Cf Honoré, ‘Responsibility’, 530.
7 See generally Chapter 9.
8 See the references at 87.
9 See esp §2 and §3.
10 Eg Ripstein, Private Wrongs; Goldberg and Zipursky, Recognizing Wrongs.
 Translator’s Note xxxix
of wrongdoing are much less developed.11 Third, the book traces the development in
European legal systems of basic structuring normative concepts, such as rights, and
patterns of justification, especially for strict liability, which bear upon the role these
concepts and justifications might be able to play in normative arguments about tort law.
In the remainder of this note, I explain the translation of some terms in the book. In
some cases, I explain the concept to which an English word refers, in others, the con-
cept to which an untranslated German word refers.
Allocative content of a right. This aims to translate Zuweisungsgehalt eines Rechts. This
term refers to what a right exclusively allocates to its holder. The allocative content of
ownership over a thing includes, for instance, control over use of the thing.
Auskunftshaftung. This refers to liability for misleading or false statements. It covers
similar territory to liability for negligent misstatement in English law.12
Betriebsrisiko/​Betriebsgefahr. This refers to a concept that is typically employed in
strict liability for risk rules. It refers to the inherent risks of a certain kind of activity or
operation, as opposed to risks which are not inherently connected with the activity or
operation.
Cause(s) of action. This is the term used typically to translate Tatbestände when it
refers to rules which trigger a duty to compensate, and liability to be required to com-
pensate. In one way, the translation is slightly misleading. Tatbestände in itself has no
connotation of rights in relation to a court or legal proceedings, whereas cause of action
refers either, generally, to the abstract conditions which trigger a claimant’s power to
enliven a court’s jurisdiction to make private law remedial orders, or to the specific facts
which give rise to a particular individual’s right against a court in relation to remedial
orders. However, the rules referred to in the book by Tatbestände do also trigger powers
to sue, and a court’s jurisdiction to make an order, so there seems to be no harm in this
translation, which is often a more natural one in the context. Tatbestand is also used,
like the term ‘cause of action’, to refer specifically to the elements of a rule which pro
tanto generate a legal consequence, in contradistinction to those legal consequences
(in this usage an element of the ‘cause of action’ contrasts with an element relevant to
‘defences’). Finally, Tatbestand can also refer to the factual elements of a rule which
generates liability—​in this usage, the Tatbestand of § 823 I BGB does not include ‘fault’
(Schuld) and ‘unlawfulness’ (Rechtswidrigkeit).

11 Typically, wrongs-​based theorists understand moral and legal duties in such a way that a duty may be breached

in a non-​culpable manner. John Gardner, for instance, held that a person, P, could have a duty to X even if (a) P
ought not, all-​things-​considered, to X, (b) it was physically impossible for the duty-​bearer and virtually all human
beings in the circumstances not to X, (c) a reasonable person would not have known that they were x-​ing in the
circumstances (see Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs). With such a broad understanding of ‘duty’, it is virtually al-
ways possible to argue that a person’s liability is based on a breach of a duty. The theoretical motivation for insisting
that breach of such a duty is a necessary condition of justified compensatory liability is not obvious, however. It may
be that the appropriate linguistic usage of the term ‘tort law’ refers only to legally impermissible conduct. But surely
the matter of theoretical interest is the substantive question of whether liability may be justified in the absence of
morally impermissible conduct.
12 See Hedley Byrne v Heller and Partners [1964] AC 465.
xl Translator’s Note
Enrichment claim for the infringement of a right. This translates Eingriffskondiktion.
It refers to the enrichment-​based right to insist upon payment for the wrongful use of
another’s right-​protected goods.
Immaterialgüter. This normally refers to intellectual property rights, but it can also
refer, more broadly, to other rights that protect non-​tangible interests.
Liability for sacrifice. This translates Aufopferungshaftung. This is a term used to
refer to duties and liabilities arising from damaging right-​protected goods in order to
prevent damage to another person’s right-​protected goods. The person whose good is
damaged is, so to speak, sacrificed for the benefit of the other. It includes what might
be termed ‘private takings’, when an individual’s right is non-​consensually taken for the
benefit of others by another individual.
Obliegenheit, Sorgfaltsobliegenheiten. The ‘duty’ to mitigate, or the ‘duty’ to take
reasonable care for one’s own safety is an ‘Obliegenheit’ in English tort law. These are
not true duties in the sense that failure to mitigate does not amount to a legal wrong.
An ‘Obliegenheit’, then, refers to conduct which, if done or not done, makes a person
unable to take advantage of another legal rule, which would otherwise accord them
a benefit, or which renders a person under a duty or liability to bear a burden, in ab-
sence of breach of a genuine legal duty. Sorgfaltsobliegenheiten are conditions relating
to precautions which a person must take if the person is to avoid being under a duty to
compensate for damage caused by not taking those precautions, but those precautions
are not mandated by the law.
Other right. § 823 I BGB imposes a duty to compensate on a person who, in breach
of a legal duty, intentionally or negligently infringes the right to life, body, health,
freedom, property, or other right of another person. ‘Other right’ translates the words
‘sonstiges Recht’ in this provision. The main examples discussed in the book are the
right to an established and operating business (Gewerbebetrieb) and personality rights,
such as the right to privacy.
Schutzrechtsverwarnung. This is a warning issued by the (putative) holder of a right,
such as an intellectual property right, to a potential infringer. Action taken contrary to
the warning then has certain legal consequences. If the warned person suffers loss as a
result of the warning being issued when, it transpires, the warning was unjustified, this
may give rise to a compensatory duty on the part of the person warning (Verwarner).
Strict liability for risk. This translates Gefährdungshaftung. It refers to duties and lia-
bilities to compensate for risk created by certain specified sources of danger, such as the
use of vehicles, railways, water supply, and so on.
Tort law. This translates Haftungsrecht. English legal writing does not have straight-
forward terminology to recognize a distinction between a supposedly core part of tort
law, which is based on ‘wrongs’, and a satellite area which bears an uncertain relation-
ship to that supposed core. The book refers to the part considered to be based on un-
lawful conduct as Deliktsrecht, translated as the law of delict, or delict. Haftungsrecht
refers to both liability that is explicitly framed as based on unlawful conduct and to
strict liability for risk rules, and liability for sacrifice.
 Translator’s Note xli
Vertrauenshaftung, Vertrauenstatbestand. This is translated as ‘reliance-​based lia-
bility’ and ‘reliance cause of action’. It refers to the rules which constitute the core of
what is typically considered non-​contractual liability for pure economic loss. Mere reli-
ance, in the sense of an expectation that another person will behave in such a way as not
to cause economic loss, is obviously insufficient to generate such liability. As the book
explains, liability hinges upon facts that, in English law, would typically constitute an
‘assumption of responsibility’.13

13 See 395–400.
 Introduction—​The Aim of the Inquiry

In 1861, the Munich Oberappellationsgericht (OAG, Court of Appeal) had to decide

the following question: is a railway company liable for losses caused by sparks escaping
from its trains even if the sparks could not be avoided, given current technical capa-
bility? The case fell to be decided according to the gemeines Recht (the nineteenth-​
century pre-​codification ‘common law’) since the Reichshaftpflichtgesetz (the German
Reich Liability Law), whose first section imposes strict liability for railroad accidents,
only came into force in 1871. The Court first turned to the actio negatoria, an action
for relief from interference with rights in land. However, since it was not entirely clear
whether damages could be awarded without proof of fault under this action,1 the ques-
tion essentially turned on whether a claim could be made out under the actio legis
Aquiliae. Such a claim, as with today’s § 823 I Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), required
there to be loss caused by unlawful, culpable conduct.
The Court apparently considered that justice strongly demanded a remedy in
damages. As a result, it found itself bound to find that the operation of a railway—​
despite its being authorized by the relevant public body—​was ‘from a purely civil law
perspective, an unlawful action’. Moreover, it was also ‘unmistakeably a culpable action,
in civil law terms, since an action is such whenever the person undertaking it ought to
know that his action could cause loss, and he nonetheless continues in it’. It followed that
‘the operation of a railway necessarily and inseparably [constitutes] culpable conduct’.2
The (now notorious) decision sounds absurd—​and it was criticized to that effect:3 How

1 However the Court assumed, in line with the dominant view at that time, that such a claim could lie: OAG

München 14 SeuffArch 355, no 208. In contrast to Roman law, the nineteenth-​century courts had frequently
awarded damages without proof of fault under the actio negatoria. The view that there was a fault requirement for a
damages claim prevailed towards the end of the 1860s, though at first only in the literature. See, in outline: Ogorek,
‘Actio negatoria’, 44 ff, 57 ff; Picker, Beseitigungsanspruch, 71 ff; Bürge, Römisches Privatrecht, 158 ff; and more fully,
below, 274.
2 OAG München 14 SeuffArch 358, no 208. This was not an isolated decision: Ogorek, Gefährdungshaftung, 64 ff.

Another example is the decision of the Obergericht Mannheim 12 SeuffArch 330, no 235 (1859): Aquilian liability
arising out of an infringement with property rights, similar to appropriation—​even if undertaken without fault
by the defendant. See also OLG Bayern 41 SeuffArch 404 ff, no 271 (1886): liability in respect of damage to a horse
whose shoe got stuck in a tramline constructed under a statutory concession. The OLG Stuttgart (52 SeuffArch, no
19) did however reach the opposite result in a similar case some years later (1895). The Court based its decision
on the fact that the Reichshaftpflichtgesetz only covered injuries to persons (at 38) and on the fact that claimant
had created the risk of injury to the horse (at 35): it was the claimant’s responsibility to modify the horse’s shoe to
modern conditions. An important decision is RGZ 17, 103 (1886): losses caused by foreseeable risks incidental to
a hazardous activity were to be attributed to that activity. The person undertaking the activity was liable (under
the actio negatoria) even if the loss occurred without fault. A similar result was reached in: RGZ 58, 130 (1905,
under the BGB): strict liability as compensation for statutorily excluded injunctive relief. For substantially similar
decisions in the common law at that time, see Simpson, ‘Coase v Pigou’, 77 ff.
3 M Rümelin, Schadensersatz, 23; id, Verschulden, 10; Ehrenzweig, Schuldhaftung, 41. Cf positively: Adler,

Unverschuldetes Unrecht, 12; and see also, on such ‘fault theories of liability without fault’, Bienenfeld, Haftungen
ohne Verschulden, 100 ff.

The Structure of Tort Law. Nils Jansen, Translated by Sandy Steel, Oxford University Press. © Nils Jansen 2021. © for the English translation,
Sandy Steel 2021. DOI: 10.1093/ oso/ 9780198705055.003.0001
2 The Structure of Tort Law
could it be unlawful, never mind culpable, to do what is authorized by the state?4 The
academic discussion of such questions5 did not, however, have much of an influence
upon the legal doctrine applied by the courts around the time of the decision.6
In 1906, Brodmann bemoaned the tendency in the decisions of the Reichsgericht to
stretch the boundaries of negligence liability far beyond the legally required standard
of care of the diligens paterfamilias through the use of the recently created duty of care
(Verkehrssicherungspflicht) doctrine:

‘I would describe myself as a “diligens paterfamilias”. Despite or perhaps because of

that, it sometimes happens that I can sit for hours at my desk, with my documents and
books, and it can quite pass me by that the weather has changed and it is now very cold
and rainy. And if then someone who comes to deliver something suffers damage as a
result of falling on my frozen doorstep, perhaps he will seek compensation from me.
Perhaps I have asked the housekeeper to spread sand over the steps in such an instance
but at the time she is out on an errand for my wife. Or perhaps the housekeeper is ill
and I have not yet acquainted the replacement with all of her duties. Perhaps she was
too busy with other tasks and had not yet had the time to attend to the matter. In all of
these cases, I would think that one would hardly say that a person is not a diligens pater
familias. Rather I would consider myself blameless—​and even if judgment were given
against me in all three instances.’7

This kind of criticism had little effect upon the judiciary. However, in 1975, for
the first time, one court openly stated what it considered the ratio for strict liability
of this kind. A housewife left her house, leaving her washing machine on, for around
fifteen minutes. Whilst away, the machine malfunctioned, with water overflowing to
the downstairs apartment, causing substantial damage. The woman was held liable
in damages on the basis that leaving her house was in breach of a duty of care. The
Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Düsseldorf reasoned thus:

‘The Court does not deny that this holding approximates to strict liability . . . Even
careful housewives leave the house whilst a washing machine completes its cycle: one
could not demand that they stay in to see that they can prevent further overflow when
water begins to flow out of the washing machine. Yet these women are generally con-
scious of the fact that they must compensate for damage caused in such an instance and
that the victims of the damage should not bear the consequences.’8

4 For this reason, South African courts, which had to decide similar cases on the basis of Aquilian liability,

rejected the liability of the railway: Union Government (Minister of Railways) v Sykes [1913] AD 156. From 1943
(altered in 1981) a strict liability regime was introduced after a reversal of the burden of proof in respect of fault did
not prove satisfactory. See generally, Neethling, Potgieter, and Visser, Law of Delict, 91 f, 317 f.
5 On the academic controversy over whether the liability should exist in the absence of fault in certain situations,

see below, 280 ff.

6 Cf also Esser, Gefährdungshaftung, 65.
7 Brodmann, ‘Haftung des Schiffers’, 344.
8 OLG Düsseldorf (1975) VersR 159 f (emphasis added); cf also OLG Hamm (1984) MDR 668; OLG Karlsruhe

(1992) VersR 113; OLG Hamm (1995) VersR 457; LG Gießen (1997) VersR 1023: The increased reliability of
washing machines and their tubes does not alter this liability.
 Introduction—The Aim of the Inquiry 3
The Court clearly, then, acknowledged the possibility that liability under § 823 I BGB
may arise even if the conduct which caused the damage is permissible. No doctrinal ex-
planation, however, was given for this conclusion.

I. Problems

Similar cases are also found in the case law of other European countries. Skiing in
Switzerland (!) is only lawful in so far as it does not endanger other persons;9 and it is no
defence to a finding of carelessness that even the best skiers can sometimes fall.10 In the
Netherlands, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has recognized that it may be perfectly
understandable that a car manufacturer cannot check that every single part is func-
tional. But if it does not make such checks, the manufacturer is liable on the ground
that he should bear the risk resulting from his decision.11 German law takes much the
same approach in cases between neighbours. At first the courts appealed to unrealistic
standards of care,12 but there has been a shift to drawing an analogy with § 906 II 2 BGB,
which is said to provide a ‘blue print’ for other cases.13 This reasoning leads to a wide-​
reaching strict liability between neighbours14 whose boundaries are not yet clear.15

1. Delict, Risk Distribution, and Liability

These decisions are based upon the possibility of uncoupling tort liability from the
breach of a duty owed to another person—​and so, without there being delictual con-
duct in the true sense. This is, in fact, commonplace in modern law. Thus a person
imprisoned pending trial can be held liable for injuries suffered by a police officer who

9 Entscheidungen des Schweizer Bundesgerichts (CH) 82 II, 25, 28 ff (1956). Austrian (cf Schilcher,

Schadensverteilung, 27) and German courts have reached similar results. See BGHZ 58, 40, 43: guarantee of not
imposing of risk upon another. Cf also Will, Quellen erhöhter Gefahr, 295 f: liability in respect of legally permissible
risks imposed upon others. French law also allows liability under Art 1384 Cc (liability of the guardian of a thing,
today Art 1242 I Cc) to arise in cases of damage caused with the limbs/​body of the defendant himself.
10 Entscheidungen des Schweizer Bundesgerichts (CH) 82 II, 25, 29.
11 Hof Amsterdam (1958) NedJur 297, no 104; on negligence liability as determining what counts as at one’s

own risk and what counts as another’s, see, for an account around that time, Wiethölter, Rechtfertigungsgrund des
verkehrsrichtigen Verhaltens, 49 f.
12 BGH (1979) NJW 2515: the engagement of a specialist firm to reduce groundwater level does not itself suffice

to fulfil one’s duty as a neighbour to preserve the foundations necessary for the neighbouring building. Beyond
that there is a need to ‘encourage the work to be done with care’. On the more realistic requirement under the cur-
rent law, see Staudinger13/​H Roth, § 909 [48 f].
13 Hagen (quondam presiding judge of the 5th Senate of the BGH), ‘Der nachbarrechtliche Ausgleichsanspruch’,

495 ff, 507; cf eg BGH (2001) JZ 1084 f (analogous application for cases of excavation); for further references see
Schlechtriem, ‘Nachbarrechtliche Ausgleichsansprüche’, 413 ff; and below, 367 ff, 375 f.
14 See for instance BGHZ 142, 66 ff (house fire); 142, 227, 235 f (contamination of water due to an oil leak);

144, 200, 208 ff (interference caused by a centre for recovering drug addicts); BGH (1985) WM 1041 (burst
water pipe); BGH (2001) JZ 1084 f (excavation). For further references, see: Schlechtriem, ‘Nachbarrechtliche
Ausgleichsansprüche’, 413 ff and see below, 275.
15 Schlechtriem, ‘Nachbarrechtliche Ausgleichsansprüche’, 416 ff and H Roth, Aufopferungsanspruch, 9 ff are crit-

ical of the law on this ground. The dominant doctrinal view is nonetheless favourable to this line of cases: Larenz/​
Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 664 ff; Münchener Kommentar/​Säcker, § 906 [138]; Palandt/​Bassenge, § 906 [42 f]. For
extensive references to debate in this area: Süss, Haftung analog § 906 Absatz 2 Satz 2 BGB, 19 f, 72 ff.
4 The Structure of Tort Law
pursues them during an escape attempt—​if the officer reasonably felt ‘provoked’ to
give chase.16 The attempt to escape is, however, legally permissible (in Germany17).18 It
forms part of a legal privilege the citizen enjoys against the state’s administration of the
criminal law19—​if it were otherwise, the police offer could use his gun in self-​defence
(!) to avoid the break-​neck pursuit of a suspect (§ 227 BGB).
The sale of fireworks to children is a normatively parallel case. Although the sale
is not prohibited, the seller can be liable to the child if the latter is injured by playing
with them. The clear permissibility, in public law, of selling fireworks to children of the
victim’s age does not free the seller of liability.20 Similarly, according to the new Dutch
Civil Code, an important public interest can preclude the award of an injunction—​but
claims for damages due to ‘unlawful conduct’ remain unaffected.21 Such a situation was
held to exist in a case where Greenpeace activists blockaded the business of a chlorine
manufacturer.22 The manufacturer had to put up with suffering losses but could then
sue for damages. In German law, a comparable rule has recently23 been developed in
the law between neighbours. For example, an injunction was refused, on grounds of
public interest, against a drug rehabilitation centre which was causing substantial inter-
ference due to the activities of drug dealers and addicts (which were legally attributable
to the centre). The neighbour could, however, be compensated under a claim made by
analogy to § 906 II 2 BGB.24 The refusal of German courts to utter such considerations

16 BGH (1967) JZ 639 with commentary by Deutsch (person driving without a licence fleeing from a routine

stop); OLG Düsseldorf (1973) NJW 1929 (a sixteen year old held in remand leapt from a four-​metre high window
onto asphalt—​the requirement of ‘being incited’ not made out); BGH (1990) NJW 2885 (liability denied for want
of ‘being incited’ due to absence of proof that the defendant knew he was being pursued); see on the ‘incitement’
cases in particular, Zimmermann, ‘Herausforderungsformel’, 10 ff; Reichsgerichtsräte-​Kommentar/​Steffen, § 823,
[95 ff].
17 The Austrian case law, however, holds that the escape attempt is ‘prohibited by the legal order’. See on this: von

Bar, European Law of Torts II, [422].

18 Kötz and Wagner, Deliktsrecht, [162]. Schiemann explains the liability here with the somewhat artificial dis-

tinction between ‘direct lawfulness’ and ‘indirect unlawfulness’ of the escape attempt; more generally, he rightly—​
though without developing what is otherwise a doctrinally surprising claim—​makes the observation that the
fact that conduct is permissible does not exclude liability based upon the breach of a duty of care: Staudinger13,
§ 249 [50].
19 BGHZ 132, 164, 168; see also Schneider, Strafrechtliches Selbstbegünstigungsprivileg, 1 ff. The privilege does

not, of course, allow commission of further criminal offences or infringement of the rights of third parties; the
privilege exists only against the state. However, the ‘escapee’ is not criminally liable for the endangerment of those
who pursue him: the pursuit is treated as a voluntary self-​endangerment which cannot be attributed to him. In the
criminal law, more is required for such an attribution than the fact that the victim reasonably felt ‘incited’ to give
chase. Rather, the defendant must have had control over the circumstances which led to the injury due to superior
knowledge. Cf Leipziger Kommentar/​Hirsch, § 229 [10]; Roxin, Strafrecht I, § 11, [91 ff]; Roxin even doubts the
possibility of attribution where someone pursues a burglar who is caught in the act, despite the fact that this would
come within the scope of self-​defence.
20 BGH (1999) JZ 48, 50. See further on this: Jansen, ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’. Cf, similarly: BGH (1963) NJW 101

(darts); BGH (1984) NJW 182 f (matches). On the problem of conduct being permissible in public law but the sub-
ject of liability for breach of a duty of care in tort law, see further: below, 8 f.
21 Art 6:168 1 Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW): ‘The judge can deny injunctive relief in respect of unlawful conduct

for the reason that the conduct must be carried out due to a significantly weightier public interest. The victim
maintains his right to compensation under this article.’
22 Rechtsbank Roermond KG 1993 no 411, 824.
23 In the ‘Frog Case’ (BGHZ 120, 239, 251 f) the BGH rejected a claim for damages on the ground that injunctive

relief against an unusual, apparently unbearable, loud croaking noise was precluded for reasons of environmental
protection. If the creator of the interference could not stop it, it would be unfair to burden him with a claim for
compensatory damages. For criticism: H Roth, Aufopferungsanspruch, 3.
24 BGHZ 144, 200 ff; the drug centre was nonetheless held to be a lawful activity, 208.
 Introduction—The Aim of the Inquiry 5
outside of the law relating to neighbours makes their decisions in similar cases
difficult.25
Apparently, the issue in these cases is not whether the defendant has behaved
blameworthily and wrongfully. Rather the decisions express a judgment about who,
between the parties to the event which caused the loss, should bear certain risks. And
these particular distributions of risk are far from obviously unfair: the railway operator
and the car manufacturer should bear the costs of damage foreseeably caused by their
activities; the escapee and the political activist should conduct their activities at their
own risk and bear the costs of it26—​just as the person who damages another’s property
in a situation of necessity.
To provide a doctrinal grounding for this kind of reasoning is difficult, however.
The idea of distributing risks arising from lawful activities seems flatly to contradict
the BGB’s conception of delictual liability, which makes compensation dependent
upon ‘unlawful’ causation of loss, and whose section in the code is entitled ‘Unlawful
Conduct’. Structurally these cases have more in common with the strict liability rule
in § 904 s 2 BGB. This rule arose, historically, from within tort law, but is currently un-
derstood in doctrinal writing as an Aufopferungshaftung—​a liability to compensate for
‘sacrificing’ another’s rights—​and so as something entirely different from a delictual
liability.27
Reasons which have nothing to do with actual requirements of conduct are in-
creasingly, however, adduced to justify delictual liability.28 This is perhaps the most
significant indication of the way in which tort law has come apart from breaches of
interpersonal duties. A particularly clear example is the relevance of the ability to in-
sure against a loss:29 that the person who caused the damage can easily or cheaply take
out insurance can serve as a good reason for them to do this but also for the imposition
of liability upon them. It does not, however, justify more severe duties of conduct or
duties to take care. Rather someone who endangers others’ goods will take particular
care if he knows that he cannot compensate for any loss caused. Similarly, the fact that

25 Cf BGHZ 137, 89, 98 ff: persons protesting against the construction of an industrial estate blocked the building

site for two days and, without use of any (other) force, stayed beside the construction equipment. Despite the ju-
risprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht to the effect that merely mentally caused effects do not constitute a
prohibited use of force under § 240 StGB (BVerGE 92, 1 ff), the conduct was prohibited in private law (under § 823
I BGB) and not protected by Art 5 and Art 8 GG. Conversely, interferences, which are permitted as a matter of con-
stitutional law, must be borne. This is unfortunate. The decision of the Constitutional Court involved the blockade
of a barracks which lasted a full day. The distinction between this case and the BGH case is ultimately only that
entry to the barracks was frequently granted. Thus both cases concerned similar interferences with the claimant’s
rights—​each time with the same motive—​and both should either be permitted or prohibited. In substance the
BGH also, then, grants a claim for damages here where the defendant’s conduct is lawful. Such awards may become
more pressing the more the Constitutional Court holds that interferences with private rights are permissible under
the Constitution.
26 For more detail on the ‘escape’ cases: Reichsgerichtsräte-​Kommentar/​Steffen, § 823 [95].
27 See Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 654 ff.
28 Cf also Wiethölter, Rechtfertigungsgrund des verkehrsrichtigen Verhaltens, 18 f, 23 ff, 49 ff: ‘an obligation to

compensate is still justified even if it would be unfair to punish the action with imprisonment’ (51).
29 von Bar, European Law of Torts II, [225]; id, ‘Trennungsprinzip’, 325 ff; Münchener Kommentar/​Mertens,

§ 823, [48] and § 829, [21]; Kötz and Wagner, Deliktsrecht, [228 ff], [300], [523]. See also Looschelders,
Mitverantwortlichkeit, 368 ff (on §§ 254, 829 BGB); not wholly unequivocally, Deutsch, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht,
[16], [490]. Thoroughly against insurance considerations: Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 416 f; see further,
below, 88 ff, 467 f.
6 The Structure of Tort Law
the person who caused the damage profits from the activity which caused it can ground
his liability to compensate: those who profit from risky activities should also bear the
burdens imposed by those activities. It does not follow, however, that if one is engaged
in a particularly lucrative enterprise that one should take extra care30—​and, conversely,
is not the economic futility of a risky enterprise a reason for not doing it entirely? At any
rate, one ought not unnecessarily to endanger others.
Linked to this detachment of tort law from wrongful conduct, the courts increas-
ingly conceive of tort law as an instrument for the fair distribution of loss. Thus Erich
Steffen, then presiding judge of the Haftungssenat (the Chamber which deals with
civil liability) of the Bundesgerichtshof, emphasized that the cases principally un-
derstand the function of liability for breaches of duties of care (Verkehrspflichten) as
lying in ‘distribution of the burdens of loss’. Judges are aware that many duties of care
cannot be fulfilled but do not see this as relevant. Duties of care are ‘not a question of
blame’ but rather of ‘protected positions where the claimant can seek compensation
for loss’. Duties of care are thus an instrument both for the expansion and restriction
of liability.31 This stands in stark opposition to the conduct-​guidance model which
underpins doctrinal understandings of delictual duties of care. Reasons which justify
the existence of a claim for damages clearly do not have to be identical with reasons
which justify a duty to behave in a particular way. The conduct element of strict liability
causes of action demonstrates this. It is conceivable and often justifiable to permit risky
activities on condition that compensation is paid to those who suffer loss as a result. An
important normative question is therefore when a risk-​creating activity should be pro-
hibited and when it should be permissible (on condition of compensation being paid
to victims). This question cannot even be formulated, however, within the modern,
conduct-​guidance model of tort law, with its insistence that liability be underpinned by
impermissible conduct.
The washing machine and similar cases show this all too clearly. The question of
whether a duty of care exists in a particular situation is to be answered, on current doc-
trinal understandings, by reference to considerations as to whether the defendant could
reasonably have taken precautions against the risk created: whoever ‘creates a source
of danger must take necessary precautions to avoid damage to another so far as pos-
sible’.32 Yet this statement leads to an erroneous understanding of the law—​and leads to
error even a prediction of courts’ decisions. In reality, the courts have imposed stricter
liability in cases of permissible risks, as in the railway sparks and washing machine
cases.33 This is not addressed, however, at least expressly, in the cases. The Düsseldorf

30 von Bar, European Law of Torts II, [204]; Leonhard, ‘Höhere Gewalt’, 16. See also: Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht

II/​2, 413: self-​interest as a reason for imposition of a duty of care; similarly Stoll, Handeln auf eigene Gefahr, 278: ec-
onomic circumstances of the parties should be taken into account in determining the duty of care.
31 Steffen, ‘Verkehrspflichten’, 410; Steffen, ‘Haftung im Wandel’, passim; cf also Steffen, Contribution to the

discussion, Karlsruher Forum 1985, 33; Hagen, ‘Der nachbarrechtliche Ausgleichsanspruch’, 499 ff. The OLG
Düsseldorf expressed its understanding of duties of care in much the same way in the washing machine case.
32 BGHZ 14, 83, 85; similarly, RGZ 54, 53, 56 f; see, comprehensively, von Bar, Verkehrspflichten, 112 ff; Larenz/​

Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 400. Cf also Edenfeld, ‘Verkehrssicherungspflicht’.

33 Cf Ogorek, Gefährdungshaftung, 7 ff.
 Introduction—The Aim of the Inquiry 7
Court of Appeal merely pronounces that it is generally accepted that there may be lia-
bility despite the causative conduct being legally permitted. But it would be helpful to
know the requirements for liability in respect of permissible conduct. These are diffi-
cult questions.34 In the railway sparks case it was probably the foreseeable, unavoid-
able, and inevitable risk35 of severe damage which led to liability: it was not possible, at
the time, to run the railway without that kind of damage occurring. However, the high
dangerousness of the activity can hardly explain the decision in the washing machine
case—​washing machines were not particularly dangerous (even) in 1975. Possibly it
was the unavoidability of the (rather low) risk, possibly also the judgment that a stricter
standard of liability is appropriate in relations between neighbours, and the judge may
also have considered there to be an asymmetry in the risk imposed in an apartment
block and the self-​interested motive in causing the danger.36
It has long been recognized that these kinds of decision raise fundamental doctrinal
questions;37 these questions have not yet, however, been adequately answered. Frequently
such cases are simply treated as part of a general development towards stricter standards of
liability,38 the causes of which are then sought:39 probably, different societal expectations—​
a shift in public morality. So some say that the ancient conviction that casum sentit dominus
has transformed into damnum sentit auctor.40 Of course it is important to recognize such
developments; and they may be welcomed or bemoaned.41 These kinds of contribution
are, however, of little assistance for the juridical problem of offering a satisfactory, system-
atic doctrinal description and explanation of the existing law. This work is concerned only
with this juridical question.

2. The Problem of Unlawfulness

The concept of ‘unlawfulness’ poses a particular problem. The meaning of this con-
cept has become particularly unclear in the course of the ‘metamorphoses of
the law of delict’ and the uncoupling of liability from breaches of duties to be-
have. This is rarely explicitly the subject of discussion since problems of unlaw-
fulness are often distortedly seen as questions of fault.42 Yet uncertainty over the

34 For a critical overview, cf Blaschczok, Gefährdungshaftung, 45 ff.

35 On the criterion of ‘inevitability’, see Esser, Gefährdungshaftung, 90 f; Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 606.
36 Cf on this idea, Fletcher, ‘Fairness’, particularly at 543 ff.
37 Ehrenzweig, Negligence; Esser, Gefährdungshaftung.
38 See T Honsell, ‘Entwicklungstendenzen’.
39 Cf in particular, Meder, Schuld, esp 26 f, 84 ff, 195 ff.
40 Keller, in Honsell and Rey (eds), Neuere Entwicklungen im Haftpflichtrecht, 47.
41 On this question (with substantial divergences of viewpoint), see eg: Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, 479 ff,

488 ff; Laufs, ‘Unglück’, 10 ff; Mansel, ‘Eigen-​und Fremdverantwortung’; Schmidt-​Salzer, ‘Verschuldensprinzip’,
435 ff.
42 According to the general understanding, ‘unlawfulness’ goes to the question of the permissibility of the con-

duct which caused the damage, fault to the question of the appropriate standard of care. Where the question is not
one, then, of whether ‘too much effort’ is being asked of the defendant to conform to a legal demand, but rather
of whether the defendant may behave as he did, it is a question of unlawfulness not fault. Nonetheless normally
both types of question are dealt with under the heading of fault. Cf the argumentation of Brodmann, above, 2.
8 The Structure of Tort Law
concept of unlawfulness is extremely problematic: it is the central element of delictual
liability.43
In essence, the problem is this. It is almost always very odd to say that breach of a duty
of care is unlawful. At any rate, the meaning of ‘unlawful’ here is quite different to the
ordinary meaning of the concept. Ordinarily, ‘unlawful’ implies that the relevant con-
duct is prohibited:44 unlawful conduct is prohibited, lawful conduct is permitted.45 On
this meaning, a prohibition normally presupposes the availability of a prohibitory or
mandatory injunction (be it in public law or in private law).46 This conception is gener-
ally also presupposed in tort law47—​even by those who endorse an outcome-​based un-
derstanding of unlawfulness.48 This is implicit, for example, in Canaris’ argument that
strict liability cannot require unlawfulness because ‘otherwise specific orders [should]
in principle be granted against those who maintain the source of risk’.49 Similarly it is
possible to enforce adherence to all prohibitive laws in the sense of § 823 II BGB by
analogy with § 1004 I 2 BGB, where damage is impending.50

Debates as to the (over-​)expansion of duties of care have also been conducted as debates about fault. See: Larenz/​
Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 426 ff; Laufs, ‘Haftung ohne Verschulden’, 250 ff. The reason for this may very well lie in
the difficulty of clearly delineating the difference between fault and unlawfulness by reference to current doctrinal
understandings.

43See in detail on what follows, Jansen, ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’.

44Here, and in what follows, we are not concerned, then, with the abstract question of the ‘unity’ of judgments as
to unlawfulness in a legal order, but rather with the concrete question of whether something is legally permitted or
not. However, it may be noted that even those who take the view that there may be functionally distinct concepts
of unlawfulness still maintain that conduct is always either allowed or prohibited: Spickhoff, Gesetzesverstoß,
196 ff, 198.
45 See Zitelmann, ‘Widerrechtlichkeit’, 6; H A Fischer, Rechtswidrigkeit, 16; Zippelius, ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’,

393 ff; Münchener Kommentar/​Hanau, § 276, [27]; and at length, below, 310 ff. And normally this means real
prohibitions—​not mere Obliegenheiten (duties compliance with which is not obligatory but rather in the best in-
terest of the bearer of the duty—​the paradigma being the Obliegenheit to comply with the requirements of an insur-
ance contract) or natural obligations (for different usage, see however R Schmidt, Obliegenheiten, 78 ff [different
again however at 314] and seemingly also Deutsch, Fahrlässigkeit, 58 f). Thus Zimmermann considers § 823 I
BGB to contain a prohibition against ‘laying a hand’ upon the protected interests mentioned there: Zimmermann,
‘Herausforderungsformel’, 11.
46 Stoll, ‘Unrechtstypen’, passim, esp 209 f. As a matter of logic, however, this is only so if the duty/​prohibition is

relational in character—​ie if it is owed to a particular person. See the discussion in Alexy, Constitutional Rights, 128
ff, 131 ff, relying upon Hohfeld.
47 This conforms to the original conception of the BGB; cf Motive, Mugdan II, 725 f: ‘what is not unlawful is

permitted’. See more recently, Deutsch, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht, [303], where the author draws a distinc-
tion between norms going to the cause of action in delict and norms regulating the legal consequences of in-
fringement, describing the former as protecting ‘the interest or right against infringement through prohibition
of abstract, or undue concrete, endangerment’ (emphasis added). Cf also ibid, [226], [236 ff], [246]; and id,
‘Gefährdungshaftung: Tatbestand und Schutzbereich’, 318.
48 Since, on this view, it is impermissible to bring about a certain result. One’s duty is an ‘outcome-​avoidance pro-

hibition’: Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 366; Zitelmann, ‘Widerrechtlichkeit’, 4 ff.

49 Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 610. Contrariwise, Stoll contends that conduct becomes unlawful not at the

point where a duty of care is breached but already at the point where risk is created which gives rise to the duty
of care. See Stoll, Fortbildung des Deliktsrechts, 11. Shortly after he notes, however, that the civil law contains no
prohibition against creating risk in general. Such prohibitions are found only in public law: ibid, 13. However also
according to public law many kinds of risk are permissible, yet such risks give rise to a duty of care in private law
(the classic example being the creation of traffic by building a road). How then can it be unlawful to do what is
permitted under both public and private law?
50 See Palandt/​Bassenge, § 1004, [4]‌with further reference therein; Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 704 (§ 87

I.1 and § 86 VII). An injunction arising in private law is not a necessary condition of considering conduct to be un-
lawful, however: a corresponding public law injunction suffices.
 Introduction—The Aim of the Inquiry 9
By contrast, it is normally impossible to enforce adherence to a duty of care as such—​
in the same way as it is impossible to compel others not to create permissible sources of
risk under strict liability causes of action.51 Duties of care are not true conduct-​guiding
duties. A person who disregards their duty of care is not thereby in breach of a legal
duty.52 Often it will be the case, however, that a public law or contractual duty exists
whose content is the same as the delictual duty of care. However, the correspondence
between public law duties and private law duties of care is largely accidental; the ex-
istence of a private law duty of care is not dependent upon the conduct not being au-
thorized, nor is any private law duty limited by public law safety standards53—​the case
involving the sale of fireworks to children illustrates this clearly. So the civil law duty
of care is itself not a true prohibition. Just as we see that liability is not always premised
upon the breach of a duty owed to another person to behave in a certain way, it is also
clear that it is possible to breach a duty of care with legally permissible conduct.
Even in areas not regulated by public law, it is often the case that a simple duty of
care is not a true prohibition; this is true of a variety of legal domains. The washing
machine case from the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal and the cases involving escaping
prisoners are illustrations. The position is similar in cases of interference with intel-
lectual property rights: if someone unintentionally infringes such a right, a favourable
expert opinion will not suffice to exonerate them54—​yet little more can be realistically
asked. The owner of a building has a claim against his neighbour to stop a precarious
tree from collapsing onto his land (§ 1004 I 2 BGB). But he does not have a claim that
the neighbour makes regular checks that the tree is safely rooted in the ground. A claim
under § 1004 I 2 BGB does require there to be a concrete risk of interference with the
claimant’s property.55 Yet it is the abstract danger that gives rise to a duty of care.56
Whilst the Reichsgericht originally denied the existence of a duty to take precautions
against unforeseeable risks, it has long been the case that the foreseeability of some ab-
stract risk does give rise to a duty of care.57 Yet this ‘duty’ cannot be enforced by a claim

51 Kleindiek, Deliktshaftung, 33. This is rarely noted and sometimes ignored (Leser, ‘Rechtsgüterschutz’, 583).

Exceptions in the law of patents are based upon the idea that the breach of the duty of care is constituted only
by the infringement of the right or by a concrete, specific (rather than abstract) risk, cf von Bar Verkehrspflichten,
76. Stoll is of the opposite view on the basis that a judgment of unlawfulness implies that the conduct is prohib-
ited: ‘Unrechtstypen’, esp 231 ff. Mertens also suggests the ‘enforceability’ of duties of care, but gives not a single
decision in support of this: ‘Verkehrspflichten’, 405.
52 Kleindiek, Deliktshaftung, 33. Kleindiek does not then discuss the resulting difficulty of understanding the

nature of liability for breaches of duties of care. See also, the earlier observations of von Tuhr, Allgemeiner Teil I,
98 f, who doubts whether the ‘duty of diligence’ is a real legal duty. For Tuhr, it made sense ‘to treat the conduct of
the defendant as a breach of duty’ (emphasis added) if the law required fault. In the case of liability of the keeper of
animals and railways for everything but acts of God, one could ‘hardly speak of the duty . . . to take all the theoreti-
cally possible but practically unfeasible measures to avoid the risk materialising’. If liability is decoupled from real
requirements of conduct, the concepts of breach of duty and unlawfulness are thus stretched to their limits.
53 BGHZ 99, 167, 176 (the Honda case); BGH (1987) NJW 372, 373; BGH (1985) NJW 620, 621; BGH (1976)

VersR 776; Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 416; Erman/​Schiemann, § 823, [156]; von Bar, ‘Entwicklungen’, 172;
Spickhoff, Gesetzesverstoß, 64 ff. For a comprehensive treatment, see Wagner, Öffentlich-​rechtliche Genehmigung,
73 ff; cf also Karollus, Schutzgesetzverletzung, 136 ff. The earlier, contrary, jurisprudence (BGHZ 62, 265, 270) is
now superseded.
54 Krasser, ‘Schadensersatz’, 260 f.
55 See Palandt/​Bassenge, § 1004, [32]; Staudinger12/​Gursky, § 1004, [153 f].
56 RGZ 52, 373, 379; cf also BGHZ 123, 102.
57 BGHZ 123, 102; cf also von Bar, Verkehrspflichten, 115 ff.
10 The Structure of Tort Law
under § 1004 I 2 BGB. It has now been recognized that the owner should take steps to
check (indeed twice in the same year) the safety of the outer aspects of the property58—​
but the neighbour clearly cannot enforce this ‘duty’. Similarly there is not a true legal
duty but only a Verkehrspflicht (a duty of care) to make arrangements in case of one’s
being ill for snow to be cleared away.59
Frequently duties of care are recognized which require the person under them
to guarantee that a certain outcome does not occur60 or that some source of risk be
neutralized.61 These ‘duties’ cannot be understood, however, as genuine duties to be-
have in certain ways since they exist independently of the possibility of the outcome
actually being avoidable. Yet the existence of a duty presupposes that it can be complied
with: ought implies can; impossibilium nulla est obligatio.62 A fortiori, this holds true for
the ‘organization-​duties’ of companies and other legal persons, to appoint upper man-
agement employees to take precautions against risks, and for whom they are vicariously
liable, under §§ 31, 89 BGB.63 This duty is independent of the employee’s particular
expertise; hence it cannot be understood as a genuine duty effectively to control risks.
The fact that the employee in charge of the danger does not belong to the upper man-
agement for which the company is liable does not increase any risk—​hence the duty
cannot be understood as geared towards managing risk.64
Nor is the doctrinal distinction between ‘permissible risk-​creation’ and ‘prohibited
infringement’ helpful in this context.65 It suggests that permissible risk must not lead
to an infringement of victims’ rights and conceals the normative logic of the cases we
have discussed: the unavoidable consequences of permissible risks are indeed lawful
and must be borne by citizens—​however, the exposure to such risks is balanced with
duties to compensate eventually resulting damage.
The upshot of the foregoing is that there are duties of care whose breach seems to be
legally permissible. Their breach only leads to liability under § 823 I BGB in the event
that damage is caused.66 These ‘duties’ give rise to a liability, and not a duty to behave in

58 OLG Düsseldorf (1997) VersR 463, 464; cf also OLG Hamm (1997) VersR 1148.
59 Cf BGH (1970) VersR 182.
60 See von Bar, Verkehrspflichten, 48, 53, 114 f, 128 ff for a detailed discussion of the cases; Münchener

Kommentar/​Mertens, § 823, [206]. Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 429, emphatically opposed to such cases.
61 Cf von Bar, Verkehrspflichten, 114. Very critical here: Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 403, 407.
62 Thus it can even be argued that the objective standard of care (such as that imposed in § 276 II BGB) cannot

be a genuine duty because it simply demands too much of the ‘shortcomer’: Honoré, ‘Responsibility’, 532 ff. In this
vein, Karollus contends that the violation of a protective statute should only be considered unlawful (in the sense
of unlawful conduct—​the theory of unlawfulness which he defends more generally) if at least an idealized citizen
could comply with the obligation: Schutzgesetzverletzung, 159 ff.
63 RGZ 55, 24; BGHZ 24, 200, 213; for discussion, see Kleindiek, Deliktshaftung, 314 ff; Matusche-​Beckmann,

Organisationsverschulden, 89 ff, 134 ff. [Translator’s explanation: German law does not recognize a general vicar-
ious liability for employees.]
64 The only purpose of this duty is to ensure that the legal person is liable in the event of damage occurring; cf

Brüggemeier, Prinzipien des Haftungsrechts, 117 ff; Steffen, ‘Haftung im Wandel’, 27 f; Kleindiek, Deliktshaftung,
427 f. This approach means ‘circumventing’ §§ 831, 31 BGB (cf Steindorff, ‘Repräsentanten-​und Gehilfenversagen’,
104) in order to attribute the damage to the legal person. Cf also Schlechtriem, ‘Organisationsverschulden’, 286 f.
Professor von Bar has for this reason described this duty of organization as a duty to protect the victim’s purely
economic interests: Verkehrspflichten, 96. That is somewhat misleading, of course, since liability always requires
the interference with a specific, legally protected interest. Yet it does capture an aspect of the truth, as the duty of
organization serves only to protect the economic interest of the victim.
65 Stoll, ‘Rechtfertigungsgrund des verkehrsrichtigen Verhaltens’, 142.
66 See similarly, Esser, Gefährdungshaftung, 28, 41; Esser was extremely critical of this case law (vii and passim).
 Introduction—The Aim of the Inquiry 11
a particular way. So to speak of ‘unlawfulness’ in this context is, on the face of it, odd.
As we observed, it does not reflect the ordinary usage of the word. The modern law
of delict recognizes therefore not only ‘negligence without fault’,67 but also negligence
without unlawfulness. And thus the conceptual focus of doctrinal thinking upon the
permissibility of the relevant conduct obfuscates the decisive normative questions at
stake.68 This view is also supported by the fact that the ‘triggers’ for the existence of a
duty of care, that is to say, the circumstances which lead judges to impose such duties,
substantially overlap with those adduced to justify strict liability; Professor von Bar has
shown this clearly.69

3. On Tort Law’s Twin-​Track Nature

These results are difficult to square with the so-​called ‘twin-​track’ nature of tort law:70
that is, the doctrinally fundamental, systematic separation of delictual causes of action
on the one hand and strict liability causes of action on the other. This dualist claim is
that strict liability causes of action are distinct in nature and purpose from delictual
causes of action based upon breaches of duty, and that considerations of risk distribu-
tion should have no place in the latter.
This is not, however, reflective of legal reality. Fault liability merges into strict lia-
bility,71 and the same is true of liability for sacrificing another’s rights.72 Indeed there
does not appear to be a clear boundary in any modern legal system between fault and
strict liability.73 This tends to suggest that thinking in terms of a duality (or plurality)
of distinct domains within tort law is not particularly helpful.74 And this is all the more
true when one considers particular causes of action like products liability which are
not easily pigeon-​holed within either fault or strict liability.75 More importantly, how-
ever, this distinction actually leads to difficulties in the context of liability for sacrificing
another’s rights and with strict liability. Let us consider these briefly.

67 Ehrenzweig, Negligence.
68 Above, 1 ff.
69 von Bar, Verkehrspflichten, 112 ff.
70 Esser, ‘Zweispurigkeit’, 129 ff; most relevant textbooks follow this distinction. Cf largely in agreement with

it: Köndgen, Haftpflichtfunktionen, 37 ff; Wiethölter, Rechtfertigungsgrund des verkehrsrichtigen Verhaltens, 47 ff.
71 von Bar, Verkehrspflichten, 103 ff, 128 ff; see further, below, 408 ff.
72 See on this the Dutch code provision noted above, Art 6:168 I BW. The normative judgment underpinning this

provision is paralleled in the earlier decision that the failure of the manufacturer to test parts warrants the impo-
sition of resultant costs upon him (becomes ‘his risk’) (Hof Amsterdam (1958) NedJur 297, no 104). This decision
is also in line with the German washing machine and flight cases. See further immediately below, 12 ff on justified
endangerment of another’s protected interests in cases of necessity.
73 See, in outline, Zweigert/​Kötz, Comparative Law, 649 ff; Palmer, ‘Strict Liability’, 130 ff and passim; and see, at

length, below, 408 ff.

74 Of course, not everyone will agree: cf for instance Schwab, ‘Das BGB und seine Kritiker’, 350; Zimmermann

and Simpson, ‘Liability among Neighbours’, 632.

75 Cf Marburger, ‘Grundsatzfragen des Haftungsrechts’, 10 ff for an overview of the debate; the same is true in

other systems with, for instance, strict liability for dangerous activities (Art 2050, Italian Cc; Art 493 II Portuguese
Cc). On the difficulty of placing particular causes of action within fault or strict liability: von Bar, European Law of
Torts I, [126 ff]; II, [346 f].
12 The Structure of Tort Law
3.1 Liability for sacrificing another’s rights
Invasive actions taken in situations of necessity—​that is actions which cause damage to
others’ legally protected interests in order to protect one’s own, higher-​ranking, protected
interests—​and generally, the permissibility of invading another’s legally protected interests
to protect one’s own higher-​ranking interests, raise very interesting problems for the law of
tort. The problem brings to the fore the core normative issues in tort law and so provides a
useful test case for any theoretical and doctrinal explanation of it.
In American common law, the law on necessity is the same as the rule in § 904
BGB: interference with another person’s legally protected interest is allowed; but com-
pensation should be paid for any damage thereby caused.76 In English law, however,
at least in cases where the person is not at fault for being in the emergency situation,
the justified nature of the interference with another’s interest is a ground for denying
liability entirely.77 From the perspective of wrongs-​based understanding of the law of
tort, this is logical: the action is permissible and so the damage is not unlawful. This was
also the position in classical Roman law78 and also of the nineteenth-​century German
Pandectists and cases.79 Only in the case of damaging another’s protected interests for
the sake of the common good was a partial claim for damages granted80—​by analogy
with the necessitous overthrowing of cargo regulated by the lex Rhodia.81
All this was hardly convincing however. Even if the causing of damage were not im-
permissible, it is hard to understand why the necessitous situation should allow one to
offload the costs of protecting one’s own interests to another. Yet, it was not until 1888
that von Tuhr would convincingly argue that the exclusion of liability did not sit well
with the then current compensatory understanding of the law of tort.82 And then, of
course, the BGB departed from the nineteenth-​century position with § 904 s 2. However,
the nature of this liability was not properly described from the outset. For von Tuhr the
interference with another’s interest should be classed as ‘unlawful’—​since the person
causing the interference acted outside of his (subjective) rights83—​and the Motive to the
BGB also consider the interference as unlawful ‘in the civil law’84 in order to ground the
liability.85

76 Vincent v Lake Erie Transport Co, Supreme Court of Minnesota, 124 NW 221 (1910). In agreement: Fleming,

Torts, 105 f.
77 Southport Corp v Esso Petroleum Co [1954] QB 182, 197 f (Denning LJ); Markesinis and Deakin, Tort Law,

395; see too Lawson and Markesinis, Tortious Liability, 20 ff.

78 See below, 165 f.
79 von Jhering, Schuldmoment, 44; RGZ 5, 160 ff (with further citations): no liability of a captain who damages

a telegraph cable at the mouth of the river Elbe by anchoring there, the captain was permitted to damage it; cf in
general, Wacke, ‘Notwehr’, 497 ff.
80 For an overview of the rules in various systems and also of special cases like the law relating to embankments

and dams, see Steinbach, Vermögensschäden, 79 ff; see also von Jhering, ‘Reflexwirkungen’, 348 ff: this was also true
of cases involving the spread of fire on the basis that the judge could not determine ex post whether the fire would
only have affected the neighbour’s house or also other houses too.
81 On which see below, 165, fn 250.
82 von Tuhr, Nothstand, 118 f, 128 ff, 133 ff.
83 von Tuhr, Nothstand, 134. This is highly problematic since the victim should not be permitted to prohibit or

prevent a justified interference. Differing, perhaps on that ground, cf von Tuhr, Allgemeiner Teil II/​2, 456 fn 15; cf
also Unger, Handeln auf eigene Gefahr, 27: neither permissible nor prohibited but simply ‘not prohibited’.
84 Motive, Mugdan II, 407.
85 Cf Staudinger13/​Seiler, § 904, [10] on this point and also generally on the legislative history of the rule creating

liability for sacrificing another’s rights. The drafting of § 904 BGB was later altered (in revisions made to the second
draft) to ensure that actions taken in necessity could not legitimately be prevented.
 Introduction—The Aim of the Inquiry 13
Subsequently the modern, distinct, doctrinal category of ‘liability for sacrificing the
rights of another’ was developed,86 according to which, unlawfulness is not a require-
ment of liability and for which § 904 s 2 BGB is the ‘paradigm case’.87 This simple con-
ceptual separation does not solve any problems however. It leaves entirely open, for
example, how cases of merely excusable (as opposed to justified) action taken in ne-
cessity, and similar cases, should be dealt with.88 On the one hand, there is no room
for the liability for sacrificing another’s rights if the person who caused the damage
acted without privilege.89 Thus the Bundesgerichtshof decided that the excusable fear
for one’s own interests—​the unreasonableness of complying with legal duties—​can ex-
clude liability for intentionally interfering with another’s right. In the case itself, the
defendant, who was deeply enmeshed in the Staatssicherheit, not only informed them
of his uncle’s plan to flee the country, but also acted as an agent provocateur in it—​so
as to see that he obtained an aggravated sentence for flight from the republic.90 On
the other hand, can it truly be correct that the victim should go without compensa-
tion simply because the person who caused the damage did not have the privilege to
do so91—​whilst the victim who is injured by someone who did act with such privilege
to protect their genuinely higher-​ranking interest obtains compensation?92 In the law
between neighbours, an unlawful, in itself opposable, interference for this reason gives
rise to a claim by analogy to § 906 II 2 BGB.93 Yet this not only contradicts the wording
of the provision but also its doctrinal basis.94
The legal position is similarly highly problematic in situations where the damage
does not arise from an intentional interference but only through the materialization of a

86 Hubmann sought to provide a basis for a general civil law liability for sacrificing the rights of an-

other: ‘Whoever, in pursuit of their own interest, gains a particular advantage for themselves through sacrificing
another’s interests, in order to avert a restriction on their own interests, should pay compensation to the victim
thereof ’: ‘Aufopferungsanspruch’, 491 f. This reasoning would also suggest strict liability for the materialization of
certain risks (Horst, Aufopferungsanspruch und Gefährdungshaftung, 71 f, 76 f, 80 f, an expansion which Hubmann
clearly wants to avoid: cf Hubmann, ‘Aufopferungsanspruch’, 492). It raises the question of why the fact that taking
a higher level of care would be unreasonable excludes a finding of negligence. Why should a person who caused
(often, foreseeable) harm to the victim be allowed to offload its costs to the latter? The harm-​causer also obtains
an advantage by being privileged to expose others’ protected interests to risks. If a general civil law liability for
sacrificing the rights of others were to be established on a unitary normative basis, it would become very difficult
to see such liability as distinct from other instances of tortious liability. The dominant view is correspondingly that
any such general liability should not be recognized—​rather liability for sacrificing the protected interest of another
should only be recognized where explicitly acknowledged by legislation: Konzen, Aufopferung, 154 ff. Larenz/​
Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 670.
87 Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 655, with further references.
88 Particularly clear on this point is Münchener Kommentar/​Grundmann, § 276, [168 f]: § 904 s 2 BGB applies

with § 35 StGB a maiore; with other cases of excusable infringement, § 829 BGB applies, and in other necessity
situations, liability should depend on the reasonableness of complying with legal expectations.
89 Staudinger13/​ Seiler, § 904, [49]; Weimar, ‘Haftung bei strafrechtlichem Notstand’, 2093 f; Deutsch,
‘Aufopferung’, 109 f.
90 BGHZ 127, 195, 208 ff; in agreement, Deutsch, ‘Unzumutbarkeit’, 6 f; see below, 332 ff.
91 For this kind of argumentum a maiore, see similarly Dölle, ‘Deliktsrechts-​ Gutachten’, 133, cf also Wilts,
‘Haftung bei Notstand’, 1852 f; Diurni, Notstand, 35 f. Simply to state that the civil law conception of fault differs
from that in the criminal law (for this move: Thorn, ZEuP 2000, 953; Weimar, ‘Haftung bei strafrechtlichem
Notstand’, 2093 f; and cf too Palandt/​Heinrichs, § 228, [2]‌) is unconvincing to the extent that it does not explain
exactly what civil law fault consists in.
92 See further below, 332 f.
93 Cf, eg, BGHZ 142, 66 ff (house fire); 142, 227, 235 f (contamination of water due to an oil leak); BGH (1985)

WM 1041 (burst water pipe); BGH (2001) JZ 1084 f (excavations).

94 For criticism on that basic ground: H Roth, Aufopferungsanspruch, though Roth is in agreement with the case

law so far as it concerns air pollution (16) and in relation to excavation proposes an analogy to § 912 II BGB (20).
See also Stoll, Haftungsfolgen, 30: ‘the doctrinal standing of this liability [is] not yet secure’.
14 The Structure of Tort Law
risk—​where risking damage was permissible in the circumstances of necessity. The refusal
to allow a claim for damages here95 is fully in accordance with the original intention of
the BGB, which sought to separate liability for sacrificing another’s rights strictly from the
rest of tort law.96 Yet this stands in stark contrast to the position in other legal systems, like
Holland and the United States, where this type of situation is the paradigm case for liability
in cases of necessity—​and in the latter instance also falls within the general tort of negli-
gence.97 Moreover it is not clear, under German law, what distinguishes such cases, nor-
matively, from the washing machine case or the flight cases. In those cases, however, the
permissible risking of harm to another gives rise to negligence liability. More importantly,
the exclusion of liability is highly unsatisfactory98 as the relevant interests of the parties are
exactly the same as in the case of a direct, intentional, interference.99 Nevertheless under
the current law the victim has no right to compensation in a case where the person who
causes the damage in a situation of necessity erroneously underestimated the risk to the
victim’s interests or hoped that he could ultimately avoid interfering with them; conversely,
dolus eventualis suffices for liability. But this kind of factual error or the hope of avoiding
the interference is as a matter of principle irrelevant to liability and should also count as the
risk of the person causing the injury. The fact that the latter consciously exposed others to
risks and did so in pursuit of his own interest should suffice.

3.2 Strict liability for risk

There are also significant problems in relation to strict liability for risk. This form
of liability has long been thought of by doctrinal writers as a kind of anomalous ex-
ception to the more ‘usual’ fault liability, which should only be recognized where
there is specific legislative provision for it. In this vein, Professor Canaris argued
that strict liability for risk is, today,100 ‘inferior, from the point of view of legal
ethics’.101 In view of the ubiquity of strict liability, for example, in road traffic accidents,
this thesis has of course been doubted,102 and it will be shown that it is indeed mistaken.
Both kinds of liability are based upon structurally similar considerations of justice.103

95 BGHZ 92, 357, 359 ff: the driver of a motor-​bike had to swerve to the other side of the road to avoid an-

other unidentified vehicle which suddenly approached him in the opposite direction—​in doing so he struck the
claimant’s vehicle. The claim was rejected. Even § 7 I StVG was not applicable since it was an ‘unavoidable event’. It
may be possible to justify the absence of liability in this situation on the ground that the defendant was not acting
simply in his own interest but rather also in the interests of others. Accidents should be avoided also in the interest
of the other party to the accident.
96 Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​ 2, 668; Deutsch, ‘Unzumutbarkeit’, 9; for a different view, Konzen,
Aufopferung, 113 f.
97 A ship was tied to a dock before a storm as a protective measure; the dock was damaged by the ship during the

storm: Vincent v Lake Erie Transport Co, Supreme Court of Minnesota, 124 NW 221 (1910); Fleming, Torts, 105 f.
98 Deutsch thus argues for an application of § 829 BGB by analogy: ‘Unzumutbarkeit’, 9.
99 Horst, Aufopferungsanspruch und Gefährdungshaftung, 49 f.
100 His earlier view is somewhat less strongly put. See Canaris, Systemdenken, 54: the ‘liability for culpable un-

lawfulness . . . always takes a certain priority’.

101 Canaris, ‘Gefährdungshaftung’, 1792; Larenz/​ Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 608 f; similarly, Marburger,
‘Grundsatzfragen des Haftungsrechts’, 28 f; cf also, Rohe, ‘Gründe und Grenzen deliktischer Haftung’, particularly,
124 ff, 148.
102 See, eg, Kötz, ‘Gefährdungshaftungs-​ Gutachten’, 1792; Deutsch, ‘Gefährdungshaftung: Tatbestand und
Schutzbereich’, 317; id, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht, [636], [642 f]; Freise, ‘Änderungen des Schadensersatzrechts’,
541; Schmidt-​Salzer, ‘Verschuldensprinzip’, 434 f; Widmer and Wessner, Revision und Vereinheitlichung des
Haftpflichtrechts, 136 f; contra Canaris, cf von Bar, European Law of Torts II, [306], [330]; and see further, below,
68 ff, 91 ff, 278–​287, 408 ff.
103 Below, 91 ff.
 Introduction—The Aim of the Inquiry 15
In any event, the result of conceiving of strict liability for risk as exceptional and
so as subject to casuistic, ad hoc, legislative development has been to create a highly
fragmented regime. This gives rise to a number of inconsistencies, as Professor Kötz,
in particular, has shown.104 Thus, for example, dealings with bacteria or viruses neither
fall within the strict liability for the keepers of animals nor within the Gentechnikgesetz
(statutory liability for damage caused by genetically modified organisms).105
Nonetheless, judicial decisions and the dominant doctrinal view have maintained the
position that strict liability for risk is exceptional and thus there can be no expansion of
particular legislative provisions through reasoning by analogy.106 This has long been in
opposition, however, to a major part of doctrinal writing.107 Proposals are increasingly
made in favour of a unified regime in the future.108 The current boundaries of liability
are considered outdated and the compensation of non-​pecuniary loss is one particular
goal.109 It is quite correctly pointed out that the availability of such damages is accepted
law in other jurisdictions.110 At least, compensation for non-​pecuniary loss is the aim
of the current reform of the law of damages111 (it was introduced after the date of pub-
lication of the German monograph). The reform does not, however, challenge the strict
distinction between fault liability and strict liability. Rather the legislator entrenches
this division, in line with dominant academic writing. Thus the Second Law for the
Reform of the Law of Damages will remove the ‘foreign body’ constituted by the de-
fence of an ‘unavoidable event’, in order to avoid the infiltration of fault-​based ideas into
strict liability.112
This is very much reflective of the fact that one finds practically no concrete doc-
trinal proposals seeking to overcome this bifurcation, even although it is often observed
that the distinction does not map onto legal reality. The distinction is also maintained
in relation to proposals for a European tort law.113 Only a few have argued in favour

104 Kötz, ‘Haftung für besondere Gefahr’, 14 ff; id, ‘Gefährdungshaftungs-​ Gutachten’, 1786 ff; Will, Quellen
erhöhter Gefahr, 259 ff; Zimmermann, Obligations, 1134 f: ‘a confusingly patchy picture’. This criticism is an old
one: Unger, Handeln auf eigene Gefahr, 94 f; see also Larenz/​Canaris, Schuldrecht II/​2, 60 ff.
105 The BGH does not permit an analogous application of § 833 BGB but gives considerable assistance

to claimants through a wide-​reaching use of presumptions ([1989] NJW 2947 f); similarly Larenz/​Canaris,
Schuldrecht II/​2, 613 f: no analogous application but a high standard of care and a reversal of the burden of proof.
Critical of this is Deutsch, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht, [652]. In effect, this means that there is also strict liability
under § 823 I BGB.
106 RGZ 78, 171, 172; BGHZ 55, 229, 232 ff; BGH (1960) NJW 1345, 1346; BGH (1975) NJW 117, 118; OLG

Hamburg (1982) VersR 561, 562; Canaris, ‘Gefährdungshaftung’, 10 ff; for an extensive overview of the various
views here, cf Staudinger13/​J Hager, introduction to § 823, [29].
107 M Rümelin, Schadenszurechnung, 55.
108 On which, below, 413 ff.
109 von Bar, European Law of Torts II, [331 ff]; Kötz, ‘Besondere Gefahr’, 19 ff; id, ‘Gefährdungshaftungs-​

Gutachten’; Stoll, Fortbildung des Deliktsrechts, 23; comprehensively id, Haftungsfolgen, 21 ff; Will, Quellen erhöhter
Gefahr, 277 ff, 305 ff, 319 ff; Hehl, Verschuldens-​und Gefährdungshaftung, 129 ff; see also Brüggemeier, Prinzipien
des Haftungsrechts, 79 ff.
110 Stoll, Fortbildung des Deliktsrechts, 21 ff; Kötz, ‘Besondere Gefahr’, 32 f, 37 f; von Bar, European Law of Torts II,

[350 ff], [364 ff], [366]; Hehl, Verschuldens-​und Gefährdungshaftung, 129 ff, 213 ff.
111 According to Art 2 no 2, Art 4 no 5, Art 5 no 3, Art 6 no 2, Art 9 II no 1, III no 1, IV no 1, and Art 10 of the

government bill for the Second Law on the Reform of the Law of Damages, non-​pecuniary losses should be recov-
erable in cases involving invasions of body, health, freedom, or sexual autonomy; see (on the former proposal by
the ministry) Deutsch, ‘Zukunft des Schmerzensgeldes’, 292 ff; Freise, ‘Änderung des Schadensersatzrechts’, 539 ff.
112 Art 4 no 1b and Art 5 no 1 of the Draft; see 72 f for the explanation: ‘The alteration of this defence returns the

risk-​based strict liability of the driver of a motor vehicle closer to the German doctrinal system of strict liability.’
For criticism, see below, 454 ff.
113 Wagner, ‘Gemeineuropäisches Deliktsrecht’, V 1 c; cf also Jansen, ‘Auf dem Weg’, 54 ff.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Mainz war Sitz des römischen Statthalters von Obergermanien
und daher auch der Verwaltung mit zahlreichen Beamten. Die
Zivilisten, die Händler und der Troß des Heeres wohnten vor der
Stadt. Auch die entlassenen Soldaten, die sog. Veteranen, schlugen
daselbst ihr Heim auf, nachdem sie sich mit eingeborenen Frauen
verheiratet hatten. Die Kolonie, die auf diese Weise heranwuchs,
erhielt erst unter Diokletian, nach 293, Stadtrechte und ward von da
ab Civitas genannt.

Abb. 30. Friedberg.

Nach Luib, Der Taunus. Verlag der Kesselringschen Hofbuchhandlung in Frankfurt a. M.
(Zu Seite 38.)

So fluten die Erzählungen der ältesten Geschichte von Mainz

durch unsern Geist, wie dort unten die Wogen des Stromes sich
drängen, die da kommen und gehen und keine dauernde Gestalt
annehmen, oder wie die Rheinnebel aus dem Strome aufsteigen, die
den Glanz des Goldenen Mainz verdunkeln wollen. Vierhundert
Jahre dauerte die Herrlichkeit der Römerherrschaft, dauerte auch die
Herrlichkeit des römischen Mainz. Die über den Limes, über den
Rhein drängenden Germanen legten es in Trümmer. Aus dem
Dunkel der Geschichte taucht dann das Mainz des Mittelalters, fast
glänzender noch als das der Römerzeit, auf. Zwar melden
glaubwürdige Nachrichten, daß die Anfänge des Christentums bis
ins vierte Jahrhundert, bis zum Jahre 368 zurückreichen. Aber erst
im achten Jahrhundert gewann das christliche Mainz wieder eine
beherrschende Stellung in der neu sich bildenden Kulturwelt. Der
heilige Bonifatius (Winfried, gest. 755) erhob das dortige Bistum zu
einem Erzbistum und verlieh dem neuen Erzbischof zugleich das
Primat über ganz Deutschland. Durch das ganze Mittelalter hindurch
behielt die Stadt eine hohe, besonders politische Bedeutung. Ihre
zentrale Lage in dem damaligen Deutschland ermöglichte es den
Erzbischöfen von Mainz, die zugleich zu den sieben Wahl- oder
Kurfürsten des Deutschen Reiches gehörten, enge Beziehungen
nach allen Seiten zu unterhalten. Ihr Einfluß war unter den
deutschen Fürsten daher sehr groß. Die Stadt selbst wußte sich die
Rechte einer freien Reichsstadt zu sichern. Im Jahre 1254 wurde in
ihren Mauern der deutsche Städtebund zur Sicherung des
Landfriedens gegründet. Derselbe umfaßte während seiner kurzen
Blütezeit über 100 Städte von Basel bis zum Meere. Mainz war sein
Haupt. Der Handel der Stadt blühte mächtig auf, ihr Reichtum
wuchs, und mit Recht hieß sie das „Goldene Mainz“. Zwei
Jahrhunderte dauerte diese Zeit der Hauptblüte. 1462 verlor Mainz
seine meisten Rechte. Die frühere freie Reichsstadt wurde jetzt den
Erzbischöfen untertan, und über ihr thronte, Gehorsam fordernd, die
kurfürstliche Burg.
 Abb. 31. Schloß Friedrichshof.
Nach Luib, Der Taunus. Verlag der Kesselringschen Hofbuchhandlung in Frankfurt a. M.
(Zu Seite 38.)

Die strategische Wichtigkeit der Lage von Mainz am

Zusammenflusse von Rhein und Main machte die Stadt zu einem
Zankapfel der Völker. In Kriegszeiten ward sie fast niemals
verschont. Im Dreißigjährigen Kriege eroberten nacheinander die
Schweden (1631), die Kaiserlichen (1635) und die Franzosen (1644)
dieselbe. Ihre starken Festungswerke wurden von letzteren auch
1688 eingenommen, und 1792 wurde sie von ihnen ohne Kampf
zum dritten Male besetzt. Nach der französischen Herrschaft, von
1816 bis 1866, war Mainz deutsche Bundesfestung. Im neuen
Deutschen Reiche hat Mainz zusammen mit Köln die Sicherung der
Rheinlinie übernommen. So ist es noch heute ein Waffenplatz ersten
Ranges und seiner Geschichte treu geblieben bis zur Gegenwart.
 Abb. 32. Königstein.
Nach Luib, Der Taunus. Verlag der Kesselringschen Hofbuchhandlung in Frankfurt a. M.
(Zu Seite 38.)

Abb. 33. Soden.

Nach einer Photographie von Sophus Williams in Berlin. (Zu Seite 39.)

Am Rheinufer hat Mainz sich in jüngster Zeit durch Anlagen

bedeutend verschönert. Die Rampe der prächtigen Brücke, das
unterhalb derselben sich erhebende alte kurfürstliche Schloß (Abb.
16), ein aus rotem Sandstein aufgeführter, umfangreicher Bau, der
schon 1627 begonnen, aber erst 1754 vollendet wurde, ferner die
riesige Stadthalle und die nach dem Rhein sich öffnenden Torbauten
geben der Rheinpromenade einen malerischen Rahmen und
Schmuck. Die Konzerte, die an mehreren Abenden der Woche in der
Stadthalle (Abb. 17) abgehalten werden, locken besonders in der
Sommerzeit zahlreiche Spaziergänger zu der Rheinpromenade hin.
Vielbesucht sind auch die „Neuen Anlagen“, die weiter oberhalb, am
Sicherheitshafen und an der Eisenbahnbrücke, am Rheinufer auf
einer kleinen Anhöhe geschaffen wurden. In umgekehrter Richtung
gelangt der Spaziergänger zu den großen Hafenanlagen von Mainz,
dem Zollhafen, dem Allgemeinen Hafen und einem zweiten
Sicherheitshafen, der zugleich als Floßhafen dient. Gleich
Mannheim, Cöln und Ruhrort ist Mainz heute wieder ein wichtiger
Stützpunkt der Rheinschiffahrt.

Abb. 34. Eppstein im Taunus, vom Malerplatz aus gesehen.

Nach einer Photographie von Ludwig Klement in Frankfurt a. M. (Zu Seite 39.)
 Aus der Rheinpromenade führen uns zahlreiche, quer zum
Rhein laufende Gassen in die unansehnliche, enggebaute, aber
doch wieder interessante Altstadt von Mainz. Bald stehen wir auf
dem Markt vor dem ehrwürdigen Dom (Abb. 19 und 20). Gewaltig
ragt der Bau mit den sechs Türmen vor uns auf, in dessen einzelnen
Teilen eine seltsame Stilmischung, die von so vielen Jahrhunderten
erzählen will, zum Ausdruck kommt. Unter den drei großen
romanischen Domen von Mainz, Speier und Worms ist er der
älteste. Schon im Jahr 978 begann der Erzbischof Willigis seinen
Bau, dicht neben einer älteren Kirche. Noch am Tage der
Einweihung, im Jahre 1009, wurde das Werk ein Raub der
Flammen. Durch Erzbischof Bardo wurde der Dom wiederhergestellt.
Aber eine gewaltige Feuersbrunst zerstörte ihn 1081 von neuem. Die
hölzerne Decke wurde nun, um die Feuersgefahr zu vermindern,
durch eine steinerne ersetzt. Das Langhaus erhielt damals seine
heutige Form. Dohme nennt es in seiner „Deutschen Baukunst“ ein
„Werk, gewaltig in den Massen, einheitlich in der
Gesamterscheinung, aber einfach, wie es Bauten zu sein pflegen, in
denen der Architekt noch mit den konstruktiven Gedanken ringt“. In
den Kämpfen des Erzbischofs Arnold mit der Bürgerschaft (1155 bis
1160) wurde der Dom von der letzteren als Festung benutzt. Wieder
zerstörte dann im Jahre 1191 ein Brand seine oberen Bauteile. Mit
der Reparatur wurde eine großartige Erweiterung des Baues
verbunden. Das westliche Querschiff mit dem Hauptchor und der
achteckigen Kuppel, sowie der Kapitelsaal wurden angefügt. Die Zeit
der Gotik erdachte für das bis dahin romanische Bauwerk noch
einen herrlichen Schmuck: Sie umgab das Langhaus mit einem
gotischen Kapellenkranze, wodurch dasselbe aus einem
dreischiffigen in einen fünfschiffigen Bau umgewandelt wurde,
schmückte den Dom mit einer glänzenden Fensterarchitektur und
mit Ziergiebeln und gab Türmen und Dächern ein mehr gotisches
Gepräge. Noch viele Wandlungen, zum Teil wieder durch
Brandschäden veranlaßt, hat der wundervolle Bau durchgemacht,
der durch alles, was die Jahrhunderte beigefügt oder in ihrem Sinne
verändert haben, eins der interessantesten Bauwerke für die
Geschichte der Baukunst geworden ist. Aus dem verwüsteten
Zustande, in dem ihn die französische Zeit hinterlassen hat, ist er mit
großen Opfern gerettet worden, so daß er nun wieder in einer
Vollendung dasteht, wie ihn keine Zeit seit den Tagen des höchsten
Glanzes gesehen hat.
 Abb. 35. Malerisches Motiv von der Burg in Eppstein im Taunus.
Nach einer Photographie von Ludwig Klement in Frankfurt a. M. (Zu Seite 39.)
 Vom Dome wandern wir weiter zu dem nahe gelegenen
Gutenbergplatz, auf dem seit dem Jahre 1837 ein Denkmal (Abb.
21) des Erfinders der Buchdruckerkunst steht, das von Thorwaldsen
in Rom modelliert wurde. Zwischen den Jahren 1450 und 1455
stellte Gutenberg in Mainz zuerst gedruckte Bücher mit
Metallbuchstaben her. Wie seine Erfindung nach mancher Richtung
in Dunkel gehüllt ist, so läßt sich auch nicht bestimmt sagen, ob so
viele Häuser in Mainz mit vollem Grund mit der Ausübung der neuen
Kunst in Verbindung gebracht werden.
Mainz besitzt viele historisch oder architektonisch interessante
Gebäude. Hingewiesen sei auf den Holzturm und den Eisenturm, die
von der alten Stadtbefestigung noch übrig geblieben sind, auf das
Haus „zum Boderam“ (Abb. 22) am Markt, auf das alte Gymnasium
(Abb. 23), den ehemaligen Kronberger Hof, der zwischen 1604 und
1626 erbaut wurde, auf den ehemaligen Knebelschen Hof, der sich
durch einen reichen Renaissance-Erker im inneren Hof auszeichnet,
auf die frühgotische St. Stephanskirche, die als doppelchörige
Hallenkirche von 1257 bis 1328 auf einem der höchsten Punkte der
Stadt erbaut wurde, sowie auf die doppeltürmige Peterskirche, die in
der französischen Zeit, insbesondere der heutige Kreuzaltar (Abb.
24), dem Kultus der Göttin der Vernunft diente. Diese letztere Kirche
erhebt sich unmittelbar an dem großen, baumgeschmückten
Schloßplatze, und vor uns liegt das schon erwähnte kurfürstliche
Schloß (Abb. 16), dessen ausgedehnte Räume seit 1842 als
römisch-germanisches Zentralmuseum dienen und eine
hochbedeutende Sammlung römischer und germanischer Original-
Altertümer enthalten. Beim Durchwandern der Säle und beim
Betrachten der interessanten Fundstücke wird die ganze Geschichte
der Stadt Mainz und des rheinischen Landes noch einmal in uns
wach. Die prächtige, mit schönen Anlagen geschmückte
Kaiserstraße, in die wir durch einen nordwestlichen Ausgang des
Schloßplatzes einbiegen, aber zaubert uns das Bild des neuen
Mainz (90000 Einw.) vor, wie es sich nach dem Hinausschieben des
engen Festungsgürtels zu gestalten begonnen hat. Prächtige
Gebäude fesseln den Blick, und am Ende der Kaiserstraße taucht
der Hauptbahnhof vor uns auf.
 Abb. 36. Schloß Biebrich.
Nach einer Photographie von Sophus Williams in Berlin. (Zu Seite 39.)

Abb. 37. Wiesbaden, vom Neroberg gesehen.

Nach einer Photographie von Sophus Williams in Berlin. (Zu Seite 39.)

Nachdem wir in den beiden Städten Frankfurt Umgebung von

und Mainz, die die Ausgangspunkte unserer Mainz.
Rheinwanderung bilden sollen, Umschau gehalten
haben, wollen wir einen Blick auch in das sie umgebende Land
werfen, um den Boden, auf dem sie erwuchsen, genauer kennen zu
lernen. Es ist ein weites, meist flaches, stellenweise aber hügeliges
Land, das sie umbettet. Fruchtbare Äcker dehnen sich meist vor uns
aus; stellenweise aber trat an die Stelle des Ackerbaues die
Gemüsezucht, für deren Erzeugnisse die beiden Städte eine gute
Absatzquelle bilden, so südwestlich von Mainz, wo auch eine
bedeutende Spargelzucht betrieben wird; große Obstanlagen schaut
ferner das Auge, die uns schon verraten, daß wir uns in der Gegend
befinden, wo der beste Apfelwein herkommen soll; auch
Rebenschmuck fehlt nicht der Landschaft, in der hier und da große,
wohlhabende Dörfer auftauchen, und deren Bild endlich
vervollständigt wird durch dunkle Kiefernwaldungen, die zwar selten,
in weiten Abständen voneinander erscheinen und meist die
niedrigen Anhöhen bedecken, diese von weitem schon als
Sandhügel kennzeichnend. Bei schönem, klarem Wetter braucht der
Blick nicht bei diesen nahen Bildern zu verweilen. Er schweift in die
nebelige Ferne, wo rings sich die Linien von höheren Erhebungen
abzeichnen. Im Nordwesten säumt der hohe Zug des Taunus, der
„Höhe“, wie man im Lande sagt, den Horizont, von Norden streichen
die Ausläufer des Vogelsberges, der gewaltigsten Basaltmasse
Deutschlands, heran, im Osten grüßen des Spessart waldbedeckte
Höhen, im Südosten erscheinen des Odenwaldes liebliche Abhänge,
im Südwesten läßt das freundliche Bergland der Pfalz den Blick
weiter schweifen, einerseits nach dem hochgewölbten Donnersberg
und anderseits nach dem Soonwald des Hunsrück, und nur im
Süden bleibt der Horizont frei, dem Rheine den Lauf zu diesem
schönen, reichen Lande öffnend. Rings also Höhen und in der Mitte
ein eingesenktes, ein eingesunkenes Land, ein Becken, das nach
der ziemlich in der Mitte gelegenen Stadt Mainz das Mainzer Becken
genannt wird. Diese Bezeichnung drückt nicht bloß, den plastischen
Bau der Landschaft anzeigend, einen geographischen Begriff aus,
sondern ist zugleich ein geologischer Begriff. Das „Tertiärbecken von
Mainz“ reiht sich den Tertiärbecken von Wien, von Paris und London
mit ihrer reichen Kulturentwicklung würdig an. Die
Süßwasserbildungen, die in dem seichten Meeresbecken
entstanden, sind meist fruchtbare Bodenarten. Am wichtigsten sind
die Mergelschichten, die die glücklichste Bodenmischung darstellen,
indem sie sowohl den nötigen Sandgehalt, der sie locker macht, als
auch den nötigen Tongehalt, der sie wasserhaltig, und endlich auch
einen bedeutenden Kalkgehalt, der sie fruchtbar macht und ihre
schnelle Erwärmung fördert, besitzen. Andere Bodenarten sind die
Taunusschotter, die weniger fruchtbar sind, aber dem Weinbau
genügen, Geschiebelehm, der als Ackerboden wertvoll ist, Sand, der
nur stellenweise dem Anbau dient, und Löß, der wieder von großer
Fruchtbarkeit ist. Der Sand, der bei Mainz und Darmstadt auftritt, ist
echter Flugsand. Dünenzüge sind erkennbar. Auch das Auffinden
von dreikantigen Steinen, deren Form nur durch Windwirkung
entstanden sein kann, beweist den Dünencharakter. Nach oben
gehen die Dünenzüge allmählich zu dem feineren Löß über. Aus
diesen Erscheinungen müssen wir folgern, daß Deutschland im
späteren Diluvium teilweise, wenigstens im nördlichen Teile der
Oberrheinischen Tiefebene, Steppencharakter hatte. Auf den
höheren Abhängen schlossen sich an die Steppe Waldgebiete an;
denn im Löß werden neben echten Steppentieren auch andere Tiere
in Überresten gefunden, deren Leichen durch Wasserfluten
angeschwemmt wurden.
 Abb. 38. Kaiser Wilhelm-Denkmal in Wiesbaden. (Zu Seite 40.)

Verlassen wir hiermit das Bild früherer Das Mainzer

Erdzeiten, die noch nicht lange hinter uns liegen, Becken.
und wenden wir uns der Betrachtung des heutigen Bildes der
Landschaft zu! Von allen Randgebieten des Mainzer Beckens lockt
uns keines so wie der Rheingau, der sich so sonnig zu den Füßen
des hochragenden Taunuszuges bettet, über den der warme Hauch
der südlichen Winde weht, und wo noch mehr die Glutstrahlen der
Mittagssonne helfen, ein goldenes Weinland, vielleicht das
gepriesenste auf Erden, zu schaffen. Und zu den Vorzügen, die
Windeshauch und Sonnenschein der reich gesegneten Landschaft
bringen, gesellt sich ein dritter, der dieselbe nicht minder berühmt
gemacht hat. An vielen Stellen sprudeln aus dem Erdboden warme
Quellen, die schon von den Römern als Heilquellen benutzt wurden,
und die in unserer Zeit das Land der Reben zum Ziele von
Tausenden machen, die entweder Genesung suchen oder in den
zahlreichen, mit allen Annehmlichkeiten des Lebens ausgestatteten
Badeorten nur ein angenehmes und genußreiches Leben suchen.

Abb. 39. Königliches Theater in Wiesbaden. (Zu Seite 40.)

Für den Besuch der zahlreichen Badeorte, die am Südabhange

des Taunus oder auf dem Taunus selbst, anmutig in die Täler
gebettet, liegen, ist teils Frankfurt, teils Mainz der geeignetste
Ausgangspunkt. Als solcher kommt für einige auch Höchst (16000
Einw.), die erste Station der schon 1839 eröffneten Taunusbahn von
Frankfurt nach Mainz, wo sich die großartigen Höchster Farbwerke
befinden, in Betracht.
Das vornehmste unter den Taunusbädern ist
Homburg vor der Höhe (10000 Einw.) (Abb. 25), Homburg vor der
das in jüngster Zeit auch ein Lieblingsaufenthalt Höhe.
des deutschen Kaisers Wilhelm II. geworden ist. Das dortige Schloß
(Abb. 26), das seit 1866 für die preußische Königsfamilie
eingerichtet ist und bis zu diesem Jahre Residenz der Landgrafen
von Hessen-Homburg war, wurde 1680 bis 1685 von dem
Landgrafen Friedrich II. aufgeführt und 1820 bis 1840 umgebaut.
Das glanzvoll eingerichtete Kurhaus stammt aus den Jahren 1841
bis 1843, wurde aber 1860 bedeutend vergrößert. Es enthielt früher
auch ein vortrefflich geordnetes Saalburg-Museum mit zahlreichen
Fundstücken von der etwas mehr als eine Stunde entfernten
Saalburg und anderen römischen Taunuskastellen, sowie mit einem
Modell jenes berühmten Kastells, von dem später noch die Rede
sein soll, und eines römischen Wachtturmes. Die wertvolle
Sammlung befindet sich jetzt in der Saalburg selbst. Glänzende
Festsäle und die Gartenterrasse hinter dem Kurhause sind die
Sammelplätze der eleganten Welt. Schöne Promenaden und der
große Kurpark laden zu Spaziergängen ein. Die eisenhaltigen
salinischen Trinkquellen, die besonders gegen Unterleibsleiden
wirksam sind, treten an der Brunnenallee schäumend zutage. Die
bedeutendste unter ihnen, die Elisabethquelle, ist kochsalzreicher
als der Kissinger Rakoczy. In ihrer Nähe liegen inmitten eines
herrlichen Blumenflors zwei Trinkhallen, ferner der Musikpavillon und
das Palmenhaus. 1887 bis 1890 wurde in italienischem
Renaissancestil das große, luxuriös ausgestattete Kaiser Wilhelm-
Bad erbaut.
 Abb. 40. Das Rathaus in Wiesbaden. (Zu Seite 40.)

Eine elektrische Bahn führt uns bequem von Die Saalburg.

Homburg zu der 420 m über dem Meere gelegenen
Saalburg. Dort grüßt uns ein lebenswahres Bild der Römerzeit. Das
in seiner ganzen Anlage freigelegte Römerkastell ist wieder in seiner
früheren Gestalt hergestellt worden. Es bildet ein Rechteck von
221 × 146 m, mit einem Flächeninhalt also von über 32000 qm. Die
Ecken sind abgerundet. Vier Tore führten in das Kastell. Auf der
Südseite öffnet sich uns die 8,2 m breite Porta decumana. Eine 3 m
hohe Mauer und zwei Spitzgräben umgeben die Anlage. Am 11.
Oktober des Jahres 1900 wurde durch Kaiser Wilhelm II., der ein
hohes Interesse für den Wiederaufbau der Saalburg bekundete, der
Grundstein zum Hauptgebäude in der Mitte, zum Praetorium (Abb.
27), unter Veranstaltung eines glanzvollen Festes gelegt. Vor diesem
Bau, der als Limes-Museum dient, wurde dem ersten Erbauer der
Saalburg, dem römischen Kaiser Antoninus Pius, ein Denkmal
errichtet.
 Die Saalburg bildete ein Glied der 542 km
langen Befestigungslinie, mit welcher die Römer Der Limes.
den unterjochten Teil Germaniens umzogen, um
das Land vor den Einfällen der übrigen germanischen Stämme zu
schützen, des Pfahlgrabens oder Limes. Derselbe begann bei
Kehlheim an der Donau, lief als rätischer Limes von dort nach Lorch
bei Stuttgart und als obergermanischer Limes über Miltenberg am
Main, über den Taunus und über Ems und endete am Rhein bei
Rheinbrohl. Er bestand aus einer Grenzmarkierung, aus einem
Erddamm mit aufgesetzter Mauer und davorliegendem Graben und
aus etwas zurückliegenden Wachttürmen und Kastellen. Die
Grenzmarkierung bestand entweder nur aus Steinen oder
streckenweise auch aus Palisadenreihen. Ursprünglich war wohl nur
diese Anlage, die man einen limes perpetuus nannte, vorhanden. Die
Palisaden bildeten ein Annäherungshindernis und für die Patrouillen
einen Schutz. Als später der Erdwall angelegt wurde, verlor die
Grenzmarkierung ihre Bedeutung. Die Wachttürme waren anfangs
Holz-, später Steintürme. Sie lagen gewöhnlich 30 m hinter dem
Erdwall und etwa 750 m, also auf Signalweite, voneinander. Kastelle
waren überall dort angelegt, wo ein Flußlauf die Befestigungslinie
kreuzte. Am rätischen Limes waren sie, weil dort die Bodenform eine
günstige war, selten, um so zahlreicher am obergermanischen.
Bisher sind etwa 70 Kastelle bekannt. Die größten hatten einen
Innenraum von etwa 60000 qm und eine Besatzung von 1000 Mann,
die mittleren waren 20000 bis 35000 qm groß und mit 500 Mann
belegt, die kleinsten maßen nur 5000 bis 8000 qm und hatten nur
eine kleine Besatzung. Alle hatten die Aufgabe, Flußtäler und
Straßen zu sperren. Sie waren also Sperrforts und als solche
festungsmäßig mit Türmen versehen und mit Ballisten, d. h.
Wurfgeschützen ausgerüstet. Die Besatzung mußte imstande sein,
kleine Feindesscharen zurückzuweisen, größere aber so lange
aufzuhalten, bis die Legionen herankamen.
 Abb. 41. Das Kurhaus in Wiesbaden.
Nach einer Photographie von Hofphotograph Karl Schipper in Wiesbaden. (Zu Seite 40.)

Auf das Verhalten der unruhigen, kriegs- und wanderlustigen

germanischen Volksstämme übte die Anlage des römischen
Pfahlgrabens eine bedeutende Wirkung aus. Der Grenzverkehr
wurde scharf überwacht, und bewaffnete Überschreitung der
Grenzlinie war verwehrt. Die Bewegung des germanischen Volkes
wurde dadurch vorläufig zum Stillstand gebracht. Da es aber für die
in starker Vermehrung begriffene Bevölkerung an weiteren
Weideplätzen bald fehlte, waren die Westgermanen gezwungen, von
der Viehzucht zum Ackerbau überzugehen und feste Siedelungen
anzulegen. So nahm die Not den zum Nomadenleben neigenden
Germanen in eine harte und um so nützlichere Schule. Erst als
seßhafter Ackerbauer konnte er die zivilisatorischen Elemente in
sich aufnehmen und verbreiten (Mommsen).
Von der Saalburg aus würde uns der
Pfahlgraben zum Fuße des Feldbergs, der Kronberg.
höchsten Erhebung (880 m hoch) des Taunus, Altkönig.Feldberg.
hinführen. Es hat einen gewissen Reiz, so einen
Patrouillengang römischer Soldaten nachzuahmen. Genußreicher ist
aber die Besteigung des Feldbergs von dem westlicher gelegenen
Kronberg aus. Darum kehren wir nach Homburg zurück und statten
von dort noch mittelst der Eisenbahn dem Städtchen Friedberg (Abb.
30) und dem Badeorte Nauheim (Abb. 28) einen Besuch ab.
 Nach Kronberg (Cronberg, Abb. 29) führt von Frankfurt eine
Eisenbahnlinie, die bei Rödelheim von der Homburger Bahn
abzweigt. Das Städtchen liegt, umgeben von Obstpflanzungen und
Kastanienwäldern, an einem Hügel und wird von dem im dreizehnten
Jahrhundert erbauten Schloß überragt. Der weit sichtbare Turm
bietet eine prächtige Aussicht dar. Wir schauen hinab auf die
zahlreichen zierlichen Landhäuser, die meist Eigentum Frankfurter
Familien sind, zum Teil die Frankfurter Malerkolonie bildend.
Nordöstlich grüßt uns das Schloß Friedrichshof (Abb. 31), der
ehemalige Witwensitz der Kaiserin Friedrich.

Abb. 42. Der Kochbrunnenplatz in Wiesbaden. (Zu Seite 40.)

Von Kronberg sind viele besuchenswerte Punkte leicht zu

erreichen. Nordwestlich steigen die Burgruine Falkenstein, das
Stammschloß des gewaltigen Erzbischofs Kuno von Trier, sowie die
Trümmer der Bergfestung Königstein (Abb. 32), die 1796 von den
Franzosen geschleift wurde, vor uns auf. Weiter nördlich ragt, in der
Richtung auf den Feldberg zu, die 798 m hohe Bergkuppe des
Altkönig empor. Sein Gipfel ist von zwei riesenhaften Ringwällen
umgeben, die aus vorrömischer Zeit stammen und wohl von einem
keltischen Volke herrühren, das dort seine Opfer- und seine
Zufluchtsstätte in Kriegszeiten hatte. Der äußere Wall hat einen
Umfang von 1389 m, der innere von 982 m. Der Große Feldberg
(880 m), dem sich links der 827 m hohe Kleine Feldberg vorlagert, ist
ganz von Wald bedeckt. Nur der Gipfel, auf dem drei Gasthäuser
stehen, und von dem man bei hellem Wetter einen ausgedehnten
Rundblick genießt, ist frei. Auf ihm liegt ein riesiger, 12 m breiter und
3 m hoher Quarzblock, der schon in einer Urkunde vom Jahre 812
genannt und 1043 als Brunhildenbett bezeichnet wird.
Eine dritte Taunusfahrt, die wir von Frankfurt
aus unternehmen, führt uns nach dem kleinen Soden. Eppstein.
Badeort Soden (Abb. 33). In dem Tale, in welchem Biebrich.
es gebettet ist, entspringen 24 kohlensäurereiche, 9 bis 22 Grad
warme Kochsalzquellen, deren Wasser zusammen mit der milden
Luft des Ortes besonders Kehlkopfleidenden Linderung bringt. Und
als eine vierte Tour sei die nach dem in tiefem Tale gelegenen
Eppstein (Abb. 34) empfohlen, das durch seine alte Burg (Abb. 35)
und seine malerischen Fels- und Waldpartien ein Lieblingsaufenthalt
für Maler geworden ist.
Die übrigen schönen Punkte am Südabhange des Taunus und
in dem Rebengarten des Rheingaues erreichen wir am bequemsten
von Mainz aus. Eine kurze Stromfahrt führt uns zwischen zwei
langgestreckten Rheininseln, der Ingelheimer Aue und der
Petersaue, auf der 840 Kaiser Ludwig der Fromme starb, hindurch,
immer im Anblicke der Taunushöhen, nach der am rechten Rheinufer
gelegenen Stadt Biebrich (20000 Einw.), deren rege Gewerbtätigkeit
zahlreiche Fabrikschornsteine ankünden. Unser Ziel ist das von
1704 bis 1706 im Barockstil erbaute Schloß (Abb. 36) des früheren
Herzogs von Nassau, späteren Großherzogs von Luxemburg, und in
dem Schloßpark bewundern wir die schöne Kastanienallee, deren
alte Bäume sich durch eine ungewöhnliche Größe auszeichnen, und
betrachten, den Geist in die Vergangenheit versenkend, die kleine
Moosburg. Zwar wurde diese erst 1806 aufgeführt, jedoch auf den
Trümmern der alten Kaiserpfalz Biburk, die 874 Ludwig der
Deutsche bewohnte.