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The Palgrave Handbook
of German Idealism and
Feminist Philosophy
Edited by
Susanne Lettow · Tuija Pulkkinen
Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism
Series Editor
Matthew C. Altman
Philosophy & Religious Studies
Central Washington University
Ellensburg, WA, USA
Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism is a series of comprehensive and
authoritative edited volumes on the major German Idealist philosophers and their
critics. Underpinning the series is the successful Palgrave Handbook of German
Idealism (2014), edited by Matthew C. Altman, which provides an overview of the
period, its greatest philosophers, and its historical and philosophical importance.
Individual volumes focus on specific philosophers and major themes, offering a
more detailed treatment of the many facets of their work in metaphysics,
epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, and several other areas.
Each volume is edited by one or more internationally recognized experts in the
subject, and contributors include both established figures and younger scholars with
innovative readings. The series offers a wide-ranging and authoritative insight into
German Idealism, appropriate for both students and specialists.
Susanne Lettow • Tuija Pulkkinen
Editors
The Palgrave Handbook of

German Idealism and
Feminist Philosophy
Editors
Susanne Lettow Tuija Pulkkinen
Institute for Philosophy Gender Studies
Freie Universität Berlin University of Helsinki
Berlin, Germany Helsinki, Finland
ISSN 2634-6230 ISSN 2634-6249 (electronic)

Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism
ISBN 978-3-031-13122-6 ISBN 978-3-031-13123-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13123-3
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
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Acknowledgments
Our most sincere thanks go to our authors, who have written the powerful chapters
which make up this volume and who have also fantastically kept to the agreed
schedules, which made it possible for us to do our part of the work. What we ini-
tially considered to be a frighteningly ambitious plan, inviting leading experts in
both German idealism and feminist theory simultaneously, to write 22 individual
chapters, succeeded beyond our expectations: the authors of the chapters delivered
more than we could ever have expected. We warmly thank every one of them.
We had earlier come to know of the work of many of the authors in this volume
through various networks of scholars who work on German idealism and feminist
philosophy. The most important of these for us has been the International Association
of Women Philosophers (IAPh), through which the two of us also initially became
acquainted with each other while we both served as board members. The IAPh bien-
nial symposia have also structured the volume’s development: The Beijing sympo-
sium in August 2018 gave us the chance to meet up for planning, and the Paderborn
symposium in 2021 provided an ideal space for a workshop on German Idealism
and feminist philosophy in which several of the authors participated. We thank the
IAPh for the inspiring intellectual atmosphere, and we look forward to future gath-
erings and discussions.
Other networks which have been important for the volume include the Politics of
Philosophy and Gender (PPhiG) research team at the University of Helsinki. Tuija
was the PI of PPhiG, and it brought together many of the authors of this volume
through various conferences and publications over a number of years, well before
this volume was developed. The PPhiG research was funded by Academy of Finland,
and we would like to thank the Academy for their support. Susanne thanks the
German Research Foundation (DFG) which funded a three-year research project
entitled, “Genealogy and Belonging: Concepts of Reproduction, Descent and
Kinship in Post-Kantian Naturphilosophie”. In many respects, this project—as well
as some previous research on philosophical articulations of biology in the period
around 1800 (funded be the Austrian Science Fund)—laid the groundwork for the
present volume on German Idealism.
v
vi Acknowledgments
We also wish to thank the University of Helsinki Faculty of Arts for funding a
week-long intensive planning meeting in Helsinki in 2019, as well as covering the
travel costs for several meetings in Berlin for Tuija. We also wish to thank the
Institute for Philosophy and the Margherita von Brentano Centre for Gender Studies
at Freie Universität Berlin, which provided a productive working atmosphere and
institutional support for Susanne’s research and the editing of this volume. We
worked together on this volume alternately in Berlin and in Helsinki, before the
Covid-19 pandemic brought its new challenges. Despite this demanding period
which forced us all to reorganize our work as well as daily life, the editorial process
continued smoothly because of the small extension that our publisher Palgrave gen-
erously granted us.
Most importantly, we are extremely grateful for Franziska Lisa-Marie Wohlfarth
who supported the editorial process as a student assistant of the Margherita-von-
Brentano Center for Gender Studies at Freie Universität Berlin. Franziska’s careful
checking of the chapters was of immense help and made an extraordinary contribu-
tion to the realization of the volume. In addition, we are also extremely grateful to
Penelope Krumm for her careful and insightful language editing of many of the
chapters of this volume. Her work certainly added to the quality of the final result.
Lastly, our warm thanks go to thank Matt Altman, who as the series editor sug-
gested the idea of a volume of German idealism and feminist philosophy, and who
initially invited us to take on the task. Matt was great support throughout the jour-
ney, right up to the final stages. We could always rely on his support. The Palgrave
production team, Brendan George and Eliana Rangel, then took the project in their
hands for production, and led us to completion of the printed outcome. Our warm
thanks to all.
Note on Sources and Key to Abbreviations
Works by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are referenced in the text parentheti-
cally, using the abbreviations listed below. When citing an English translation, the
German source is also indicated. Where there is no mention of an English version,
the translation is the author’s own.
Brentano von Arnim
SG “Selections from Günderode.” In Women Philosophers in the Long

Nineteenth Century: The German Tradition. Trans. Anna Ezekiel, ed.
Dalia Nassar and Kristin Gjesdal. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2021.
WB Werke und Briefe. Ed. Walter Schmitz and Sibylle von Steinsdorff.
Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1986.
Fichte
Parenthetical citations of English translations of Fichte’s work are followed by cita-

tions of the corresponding German originals, from Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften (GA).
FNR Foundations of Natural Right, According to the Principles of the
Wissenschaftslehre (1796–1797). Trans. Michael Baur, ed. Frederick
Neuhouser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. (GA I/3–4)
GA J. G. Fichte—Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften. ed. Reinhard Lauth, et al. 42 vols. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:
Frommann-Holzboog, 1962–. References to this edition are given in the
vii
viii Note on Sources and Key to Abbreviations
form GA I/7:13, indicating part, volume, and page number; or, in the case
of correspondence, are given in the form GA III/2, no. 189, indicating part,
volume, and letter number.
SE The System of Ethics, According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre
(1798). Trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale and Günter Zöller. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005. (GA I/5)
WL The Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) (1794). Trans. and ed.
Peter Heath and John Lachs. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970.
(GA I/2)
WL1804 The Science of Knowing: J. G. Fichte’s 1804 Lectures on the
Wissenschaftslehre (1804). Trans. Walter E. Wright. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2005. (GA II/8)
Günderrode
SWuS Sämtliche Werke und ausgewählte Studien. Ed. Walther Morgenthaler,

3 vols. Frankfurt: Roter Stern, 1990–1991.
Hegel
Parenthetical citations of English translations of Hegel’s work are followed by cita-

tions of the corresponding German originals, from Werke in zwanzig Bänden (HW).
References to an “addition [Zusatz]” are indicated with a “A” following the page or
section number.
BH Briefe von und an Hegel. 4 vols. Ed. Johannes Hoffmeister and Friedhelm
Nicolin. Hamburg: Meiner, 1969.
D The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy
(1801). Trans. and ed. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1977. (HW 2)
EL The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical
Sciences with the Zusätze (1830). Trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and
H. S. Harris. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991. (HW 8) References to Hegel’s
Encyclopaedia Logic are given by section number. In these cases, the
German original is not cited.
EPM Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the
Philosophical Sciences (1830), Together with the Zusätze. Trans. William
Wallace and A. V. Miller, ed. M. J. Inwood. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003. (HW 10) References to Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind are given
by section number. In these cases, the German original is not cited.
Note on Sources and Key to Abbreviations ix
EPN Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the

Philosophical Sciences (1830). Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon,
1970. (HW 9). References to Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature are given by
section number. In these cases, the German original is not cited.
EPS Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline, and Critical
Writings (1817). Trans. Arnold V. Miller, Steven A. Taubeneck, and Diana
I. Behler, ed. Ernst Behler. New York: Continuum, 1990. (HW 8) References
to Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline are given
by section number. In these cases, the German original is not cited.
GW Gesammelte Werke, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der
Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Meiner, 1968–.
HL Hegel: The Letters. Trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler. Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 1984.
HW Werke in zwanzig Bänden, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel.
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970.
IPH Introduction to “The Philosophy of History”. Trans. Leo Rauch.
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988. (HW 12)
JR “Jenaer Realphilosophie” (1805–1806). In Frühe politische Systeme, ed.
Gerhard Göhler, 201–289. Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1974.
LA Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. 2 vols. Trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1975. (HW 13–15)
LHP Lectures on the History of Philosophy. 3 vols. Trans. R. F. Brown.
J. M. Stewart, and H. S. Harris, ed. Robert F. Brown. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1990. (HW 18–20)
LPR Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. 3 vols. Trans. R. F. Brown,
P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart, ed. P. C. Hodgson. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1984.
LPW Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, Reason in
History. Trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1975.
MisW Miscellaneous Writings. Ed. Jon Stewart. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 2000.
PhG Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977. (HW 3)
PR Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1821). Trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed. Allen
W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. (HW 7)
References to the Preface are indicated with page numbers. All other refer-
ences to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right are given by section number. In these
cases, the German original is not cited. References to “remarks
[Anmerkungen],” which are Hegel’s elucidatory comments appended to
some of the main numbered paragraphs of PR, are indicated with an “A”
following the section number.
SL The Science of Logic (1812, 1813, 1816). Trans. and ed. George di
Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. (HW 5–6)
x Note on Sources and Key to Abbreviations
VPR Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte, Vol. 5:

Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Band III. Die vollendete
Religion, ed. Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg: Meiner, 1984.
VPW Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Band I. Die Vernunft
in der Geschichte, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamburg: Meiner, 1955.
Kant
Parenthetical references to Kant’s writings give the volume and page number(s) of
the Royal Prussian Academy edition (Kants gesammelte Schriften), which are
included in the margins of the translations.
A/B Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787). Trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and
Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. (Ak 3, 4)
The volume number is not included in references to the Critique of
Pure Reason.
Ak Kants gesammelte Schriften. 29 vols. Ed. Preussische Akademie der
Wissenschaften and successors. Berlin: Reimer, later de Gruyter, 1900–.
References to this edition are given in the form Ak 3:4, indicating volume
and page number. Where applicable, the number of the Reflexion (R) is
given in addition to the volume and page number.
An Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798). Trans. Robert
B. Louden. In Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller
and Robert B. Louden, 231–429. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007. (Ak 7)
ANM Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy
(1763). In Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770. Trans. and ed. David
Walford and Ralf Meerbote, 203–241. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992. (Ak 2)
C Correspondence. Trans. and ed. Arnulf Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999. (Ak 10–13)
CB “Conjectural Beginning of Human History” (1786). Trans. Allen W. Wood.
In Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert
B. Louden, 163–175. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007. (Ak 8)
CF The Conflict of the Faculties (1798). Trans. Mary J. Gregor and Robert
Anchor. In Religion and Rational Theology, ed. Allen W. Wood and
George di Giovanni, 233–327. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996. (Ak 7)
CJ Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790). Trans. Paul Guyer and Eric
Matthews. Ed. Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000. (Ak 5)
Note on Sources and Key to Abbreviations xi
CPrR Critique of Practical Reason (1788). In Practical Philosophy. Trans. and

ed. Mary J. Gregor, 137–271. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996. (Ak 5)
DCR “Determination of the Concept of a Human Race.” Trans. Holly Wilson
and Günter Zöller. In Anthropology, History, and Education, 143–159.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
EAT “The End of All Things” (1794). Trans. Allen W. Wood. In Religion and
Rational Theology, ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni, 221–231.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. (Ak 8)
G Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). In Practical Philosophy.
Trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, 41–108. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996. (Ak 4)
ID On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World
[Inaugural Dissertation] (1770). In Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770.
Trans. and ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, 375–416. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992. (Ak 2)
IUH Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784). Trans.
Allen W. Wood. In Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. Günter
Zöller and Robert B. Louden, 107–120. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007. (Ak 8)
LAn Lectures on Anthropology. Trans. Robert R. Clewis, Robert B. Louden,
G. Felicitas Munzel, and Allen W. Wood. Ed. Allen W. Wood and Robert
B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. (Ak 25)
LE Lectures on Ethics. Trans. Peter Heath, ed. Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind.
LF Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces (1746–1749). Trans.
Jeffrey B. Edwards and Martin Schönfeld. In Natural Science, ed. Eric
Watkins, 1–155. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. (Ak 1)
LM Lectures on Metaphysics. Trans. and ed. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon.
LO Lectures on Logic. Trans. J. Michael Young. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992. (Ak 24)
LP Lectures on Pedagogy (1803). Trans. Robert B. Louden. In Anthropology,
History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, 437–485.
LPP Lectures on Drafts on Political Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Frederick
Rauscher and Kenneth Westphal. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2016.
LRT Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion (1817). Trans. Allen
W. Wood. In Religion and Rational Theology, ed. Allen W. Wood and
1996. (Ak 28)
MFS Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786). Trans. and ed.
Michael Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. (Ak 4)
xii Note on Sources and Key to Abbreviations
MM The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). In Practical Philosophy. Trans. and

ed. Mary J. Gregor, 363–602. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996. (Ak 6)
NCR “On a Discovery whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Is to Be
Made Superfluous by an Older One” (1790). Trans. Henry Allison. In
Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath,
283–336. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. (Ak 8)
NE A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition
(1755). In Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770. Trans. and ed. David
Walford and Ralf Meerbote, 3–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992. (Ak 1)
OBS Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764). Trans.
Paul Guyer. In Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller
2007. (Ak 2)
OBSn “Selections from the Notes on the Observations on the Feeling of the
Beautiful and Sublime” (1764–1765). In Notes and Fragments. Trans.
Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher, ed. Paul Guyer,
1–24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. (Ak 20) Because
this translation does not include the Akademie pagination in the margins,
references to OBSn include the page of the translation followed by the
Akademie volume and page number.
ODR “Of the Different Races of Human Beings.” Trans. Holly Wilson and
Günter Zöller. In Anthropology, History, and Education.
OP Opus Postumum (1804). Trans. Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen. Ed.
Eckart Förster. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. (Ak 21–22)
OT “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” (1786). Trans. Allen
W. Wood. In Religion and Rational Theology, ed. Allen W. Wood and George
di Giovanni, 7–18. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. (Ak 8)
PG Physical Geography, published in English in the Cambridge volume enti-
tled Natural Science. Ed. Eric Watkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012.
PP Toward Perpetual Peace (1795). In Practical Philosophy. Trans. and ed.
Mary J. Gregor, 315–351. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996. (Ak 8)
Pro Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come
Forward as a Science (1783). Trans. Gary Hatfield. In Theoretical
Philosophy after 1781, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath, 49–169.
Rel Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). Trans. George di
Giovanni. In Religion and Rational Theology, ed. Allen W. Wood and
1996. (Ak 6)
Note on Sources and Key to Abbreviations xiii
TelP “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy” (1788). Trans.

Günter Zöller. In Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller
2007. (Ak 8)
TP “ On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No
Use in Practice” (1793). In Practical Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Mary
J. Gregor, 277–309. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. (Ak 8)
UNH Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755). Trans. Olaf
Reinhardt. In Natural Science, ed. Eric Watkins, 182–308. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012. (Ak 1)
WE “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” (1784). In Practical
Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, 15–22. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996. (Ak 8)
Leibniz
Mon Monadology, and Other Philosophical Essays. Trans. Ann Marin

Schrecker. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
Rousseau
DI A Discourse on Inequality. Trans. Maurice William Cranston

Harmondsworth, UK; New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1984a.
SC Of the Social Contract and Discourse on Political Economy. Trans. Charles
M. Sherove. New York-London: Harper & Row, 1984b.
Schelling
Parenthetical citations of English translations of Schelling’s work are followed by

citations of the corresponding German originals, from Schellings sämmtliche Werke
(SW) or from the critical edition Werke. Historisch-kritische Ausgabe (W), ed. Hans
Michael Baumgartner, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, and Hermann Krings. Stuttgart:
Frommann-Holzboog.
AW I Ages of the World (1811). Trans. Joseph P. Lawrende. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2019. (WA)
AW II Slavoj Zižek, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: The Abyss of Freedom/
Ages of the World (1813). Trans. Judith Norman. Ann Arbor: Michigan
University Press, 1997. (WA)
xiv Note on Sources and Key to Abbreviations
AW III Ages of the World (1815). Trans. Jason M. Wirth. Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2000. (SW I,8)
EHF Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809).
Trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt. Albany: State University of
New York Press, 2006. (SW I,7).
FO First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799). Trans. Keith
R. Peterson. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. (W I,7).
Int “Einleitung zu seinem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie”
[Introduction to his First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature,
1799]. In Werke, vol. 8. Ed. Manfred Durner, Wilhelm G. Jacobs with
assistance by Peter Kolb, 29–86. Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 2004.
IPN Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature as Introduction to the Study of This
Science (1797). Trans. Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988. (SW I,2)
SW Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings sämmtliche Werke. Ed. Karl
Friedrich August Schelling. Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1856–1861.
T Schellingiana 4. Timaeus (1794). Ed. Hartmut Buchner with an essay by
Hermann Krings: Genesis und Materie—Zur Bedeutung der “Timaeus”-
Handschrift für Schellings Naturphilosophie. Stuttgart: frommann-holz-
boog, 1994.
W Werke. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe. Ed. Hans Michael Baumgartner,
Wilhelm G. Jacobs, and Hermann Krings. Stuttgart: frommann-holz-
boog, 1976–.
WA Die Weltalter: Fragmente, in der Urfassungen von 1811 und 1813. Ed.
Manfred Schröter. Munich: Biederstein, 1946.
WS Von der Weltseele—Eine Hypothese der höhern Physik zur Erklärung des
allgemeinen Organismus [On the World Soul, 1798]. In Werke, vol 6-. Ed.
Kai Torsten Kanz, Walter Schieche. Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 2000.
Schlegel
Ath “Athenaeum Fragments.” In Philosophical Fragments. Trans. Peter

Firchow, 18–93. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.
Lu “Lucinde.” In Lucinde and the Fragments. Trans. Peter Firchow, 41–140.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971.
KFSA Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, ed. E. Behler, J. J. Anstett, and
H. Eichner. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1958.
Note on Sources and Key to Abbreviations xv
Schleiermacher
Briefe Aus Schleiermacher’s Leben: In Briefen. Ed. Ludwig Jonas and Wilhelm
Dilthey, 4 volumes. Reprint Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1974.
Brou Brouillon zur Ethik (1805–1806). Ed. Hans-Joachim Birkner based on the
edition of Otto Braun. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1981; English trans-
lation Brouillon zur Ethik/Notes on Ethics 1805/1806: Notes on the Theory
of Virtue 1804/1805. Trans. John Wallhauser and Terrence N. Tice.
Lewinston, Queenston, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003.
Ch Christian Faith. Volume One. Trans. and ed. Terrence N. Tice, Catherine
L. Kelsey, and Edwina Lawler. Louisville: Westminster John Knox
Press, 2016.
Eth Ethik 1812/1823. Ed. Hans-Joachim Birkner. Hamburg: Felix Meiner
Verlag, 1990.
KGA Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Ed. Lutz Käppel, Andreas Arndt, Jörg Dierken,
André Munzinger and Notger Slenczka. Section I. Writings and Drafts,
II. Lectures, III. Sermons, IV. Translations, V. Correspondence and
Biographical Documents. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1980–.
OR On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. Trans. Richard Crouter.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
S Soliloquies. Trans. Horace Leland Friess. Chicago: Open Court, 1926.
Contents
1
Introduction: German Idealism and Feminist Philosophy�� 1
Susanne Lettow and Tuija Pulkkinen
Part I Kant and Feminist Philosophy 11

2
Black Feminism and Kantian Universalism�� 13
Jameliah Inga Shorter-Bourhanou
3 Kant and Feminist Political Thought, Redux: Complicity,
Accountability and Refusal �� 31
Dilek Huseyinzadegan and Jordan Pascoe
4 Feminist Perspectives on Kant’s Conception of Autonomy: On
the Need to Distinguish between Self-Determination and
Self-Legislation�� 51
Herta Nagl-Docekal
5 Reason and the Transcendental Subject: Kant’s Trace in
Feminist Theory �� 73
Tuija Pulkkinen
6 Rethinking the Sublime in Kant and Shakespeare: Gender,
Race and Abjection�� 91
Tina Chanter
7
Anthropology and the Nature-Culture Distinction�� 113
Friederike Kuster
8
The Taxonomy of ‘Race’ and the Anthropology of Sex: Conceptual
Determination and Social Presumption in Kant �� 131
Stella Sandford
9
Kant on Sexuality and Marriage�� 151
Lina Papadaki
xvii
xviii Contents
Part II Fichte, Schelling, and Feminist Philosophy 169

10 Woman: The Natural Contradiction—Outlines of Fichte’s
Philosophical Gender Theory �� 171
Christoph Binkelmann and Marion Heinz
11 Life, Matter and Gender. Schelling’s Philosophical Projects from the
Philosophy of Nature to the Ages of the World�� 189
Susanne Lettow
Part III Hegel and Feminist Philosophy 211

12
Hegel, Schelling and Günderrode on Nature�� 213
Alison Stone
13
Family, Civil Society and the State �� 231
Kimberly Hutchings
14 Antigone’s Dissidence: Bringing Hegelian Dialectics and
the Kantian Sublime to the Limit �� 249
Elena Tzelepis
15 The Hegelian Master-Slave Dialectic from a Feminist
Standpoint�� 271
Mara Montanaro and Matthieu Renault
16
Ethical Life and the Feminist Critic�� 293
Shannon Hoff
17 Hegel on Political Economy and Property: Feminist
Genealogies and Critiques�� 309
18 Race, Feminism and Critical Race Theories: What’s Hegel
Got to Do with It?�� 329
Jamila Mascat
Part IV Feminist Philosophy and Thinkers Connected to

German Idealism 351
19 Beyond Complementarity: Nature, Gender and Plants in
German Romanticism and Idealism�� 353
Elaine P. Miller
20 Staging History: Bettina Brentano von Arnim’s Günderode
and the Ideal of Symphilosophy�� 373
Dalia Nassar
Contents xix
21 Sister, Spouse and a Subversive Split: The Ambiguous

Place of Gender in Schleiermacher’s Philosophy�� 389
Heleen Zorgdrager
22 Schopenhauer’s Metaphysics and Ethics: Mapping Influences
and Congruities with Feminist Philosophers�� 411
Christine Battersby
23 Conclusion�� 431
Bibliography�� 433
Index�� 459
Notes on Contributors
Christine Battersby is Reader Emerita in the Department of Philosophy and an

Associate Fellow of the Centre for Research in Philosophy, Literature and the
Arts (CRPLA) at the University of Warwick, Coventry, UK. Her research focuses
on literature and the visual arts, as well such topics as the sublime; women and
creativity; the Anthropocene; living with dying; trauma; twenty-first-century
cosmopolitanism.
Christoph Binkelmann is the coordinator of the project “Schelling in Munich

(1811–1841). Hybrid Edition of the Literary Bequest” at the Bavarian Academy of
Sciences and Humanities. 2021 Habilitation degree at Albert-Ludwigs-University
of Freiburg; 2006 Ph.D. at Ruprecht-Karls-University of Heidelberg. Research
focus: classical German philosophy (Fichte, Maimon, Friedrich Schlegel, Hegel,
Schelling), philosophical anthropology.
Tina Chanter has published on contemporary French philosophy, drawing inspi-

ration from a range of sources, including feminist theory, race theory, psychoanaly-
sis, art, politics, film and tragedy. She taught in the US, most recently in Chicago,
before returning to the UK, where she worked and taught in Bristol and London
before joining Newcastle University.
Marion Heinz Professor of Philosophy, University of Siegen; 2006 Research

Professor Sidney Sussex College Cambridge; 1990 Habilitation degree Bergische
Universität Wuppertal; 1980 PhD at Bergische Universität Wuppertal. Research
focus: classical German philosophy (Reimarus, Kant, Herder, Reinhold), Heidegger,
feminist philosophy.
Shannon Hoff is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Memorial University in

Canada. She has published numerous articles in continental philosophy, political
philosophy, and feminism. She is currently working on a book that mobilizes
insights from the philosophical tradition to speak to ongoing issues in feminism.
xxi
xxii Notes on Contributors
Dilek Huseyinzadegan is Associate Professor of Philosophy, and Affiliated

Faculty of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, and Global and Postcolonial
Studies at Emory University. Her work on Kant, political theory, feminism, and
Continental philosophy appeared in Kantian Review, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly,
Hegel Jahrbuch; Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, and Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kimberly Hutchings is Professor of Politics and International Relations at Queen

Mary University of London. Her research interests include the philosophies of Kant
and Hegel, feminist philosophy, ethics and political theories of violence.
Friederike Kuster is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wuppertal,

Germany. Her research fields are political philosophy, social philosophy, post-
structuralism, history of philosophy with a focus on the eighteenth century, Rousseau
research, philosophical gender theories and feminist philosophy.
Susanne Lettow is Senior Researcher at the Margherita-von-Brentano-Center for

Gender Studies and teaches philosophy at Freie Universität Berlin. Her research
focuses on classical philosophy from German Idealism to Heidegger, feminist phi-
losophy, gender studies, history and theory of biopolitics, critical social philosophy,
environmental humanities.
Jamila M. H. Mascat is Assistant Professor of Gender and Postcolonial Studies at

Utrecht University. Her research focuses on Hegelian philosophy and contemporary
Hegelianism, Marxism, feminist theories and postcolonial critique.
Elaine P. Miller is Professor of Philosophy at Miami University of Ohio. She

researches and teaches nineteenth-century German philosophy, contemporary
European feminist theory, aesthetics, and the philosophy of nature.
Mara Montanaro is Associate Researcher at the Laboratory of Gender and

Sexuality Studies (LEGS) at the University of Paris 8 and independent curator. She
is working on contemporary French philosophy, gender studies, postcolonial and
decolonial studies, contemporary feminist philosophy. Since July 2019 she has been
programme director at the International College of Philosophy.
Herta Nagl-Docekal is Professor (emerita) at the Department of Philosophy,

University of Vienna, Austria. She is a full member of the Austrian Academy of
Sciences and membre titulaire of the Institut International de Philosophie. She
was vice-president of FISP (2008–2013), and is currently a member of the FISP
Gender Committee. She was a visiting professor at the University of Utrecht, the
Netherlands; Free University Berlin, the University of Konstanz and J.W. Goethe
University of Frankfurt, Germany, and at the University of St. Petersburg, Russian
Federation.
Notes on Contributors xxiii
Dalia Nassar is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney.

Her research sits at the crossroads of the history of philosophy, especially eigh-
teenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of nature and
environmental philosophy.
Lina Papadaki received her Ph.D. from the Department of Philosophy of Sheffield
University, UK. She is currently an Assistant Professor at the Department of
Philosophy and Social Studies of the University of Crete, Greece. Her research
interests focus on Kant’s moral philosophy, analytic feminism, and bioethics.
Jordan Pascoe is Associate Professor of Philosophy, and Affiliated Faculty of

Women and Gender Studies, and Critical Race and Ethnicity Studies at Manhattan
College. Her work on Kant and feminist philosophy appeared in Kantian Review,
Journal of Social Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, The Society for
German Idealism and Romanticism Review, and The Kennedy Institute for Ethics
Journal.
Tuija Pulkkinen is Professor of Gender Studies at the University of Helsinki. Her

research area includes German idealism, the twentieth century French philosophy,
political theory, the history of concepts, and the politics of philosophy in contempo-
rary feminist theory, and she also works on the history of feminist thought and
gender studies.
Matthieu Renault is an Associate Professor in philosophy at the University Paris

8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis, and a member of the Laboratory of Studies and Research
on Contemporary Logics of Philosophy (LLCP). His research focuses on the rela-
tions between philosophy and non-European societies, the (post)imperial history of
knowledge formations and their reappropriation from minority standpoints
(class-gender-race).
Stella Sandford is Professor in the Centre for Research in Modern European

Philosophy, Kingston University. Her research focusses on philosophies of sex and
gender, critical philosophy of race and philosophy and psychoanalytical theory.
Jameliah Inga Shorter-Bourhanou is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the

College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts. She has forthcoming works
in Hypatia:A Feminist Journal of Philosophy and the Kantian Review. She has a
book on Kant and race that is under contract with Oxford University Press.
Alison Stone is Professor of European Philosophy at Lancaster University,

UK. She specializes in feminist philosophy and post-Kantian European philosophy.
xxiv Notes on Contributors
Elena Tzelepis completed her doctoral studies in philosophy at the New School
for Social Research, New York. She has taught at Columbia University, New York,
and at various universities in the world. She is an Assistant Professor at the Public
University in Greece—University of Thessaly, Volos. She has been a research fel-
low at the Center for Research on Social Difference at Columbia University and at
the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities of the University of London.
Heleen Zorgdrager is Professor of Systematic Theology and Gender Studies at

the Protestant Theological University in Amsterdam.
Chapter 1
Introduction: German Idealism
and Feminist Philosophy
German Idealism and feminist philosophy are both complex and diverse fields of
thought that are put into conversation in today’s philosophical landscape in multiple
ways. Since the emergence of feminist philosophy as a distinct field of philosophi-
cal reflection in the second half of the twentieth century, many concepts and ideas
which were formulated within the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel,
and other thinkers of German Idealism have been deployed, discussed, and re-
interpreted by feminist philosophers. Feminist philosophers have also critically
engaged with ideas on gender relations as formulated by the thinkers of German
Idealism, including notions of gender, sexuality, family, and marriage. In these phil-
osophical encounters the intersections between constructions of gender relations,
Eurocentrism, and the modern discourse on race that shaped the thought of German
Idealism have increasingly gained critical attention in recent decades, and as a result
the understanding of both German Idealism and feminist philosophy have signifi-
cantly expanded.
The aim of the Handbook of German Idealism and Feminist Philosophy is to give
a comprehensive overview of the ways in which the relation between German
Idealism and feminist philosophy have been explored. It demonstrates the signifi-
cance of German Idealism for feminist philosophy, and simultaneously brings out
the relevance of feminist readings and interpretations for a critical understanding of
German Idealism. The chapters of the volume present original work on German
S. Lettow (*)
Institute for Philosophy, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
e-mail: susanne.lettow@fu-berlin.de
T. Pulkkinen
Gender Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
e-mail: tuija.pulkkinen@helsinki.fi
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
S. Lettow, T. Pulkkinen (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and
Feminist Philosophy, Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13123-3_1
2 S. Lettow and T. Pulkkinen
Idealists and the authors consider legacies within feminist thought from different
philosophical perspectives. Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of the philosophical
backgrounds and commitments of the authors, the chapters converge toward the
conclusion that it is not possible to simply adapt the conceptual worlds of these texts
which were written more than two centuries ago; rather, exploring the legacy of
German Idealism always involves criticism, and the subversion and transformation
of meanings and conceptual arrangements. Accordingly, the question of how to read
and how to engage with the problematic sides of the philosophies of German
Idealism is a central thread that runs through the volume, as does the question of
how to challenge the epistemic boundaries of philosophy. The latter is particularly
relevant in the chapters focusing on the intellectual production of women philoso-
phers in the context of German Idealism, such as Bettina von Arnim and Karoline
von Günderrode; or the chapters on the larger archive of feminist thought in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, such as Black feminism and its impact on dis-
cerning of “what is alive and what is dead” in German Idealism today. Collectively,
the volume can be read as a record of the ongoing process of reworking philosophi-
cal heritage.
1 Feminist Research on Gender Relations

in German Idealism
Gender and sexuality were central concerns for the German Idealists from Kant to
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher and Schopenhauer. These authors inten-
sively reflected on topics such as love, marriage, the family, and the political status
of women, as well as on the meanings of sex, gender, and the role of the natural
sciences for conceptualizing the differences and hierarchies within ‘humanity.’ The
central attention they paid to these issues was largely due to the fact that gender
relations were highly contested both in the German and the wider European con-
texts in the period around 1800. The claims for political and social equality for
women that had been raised in the context of the French Revolution by thinkers such
as Olympe de Gouges and Mary Wollstonecraft resonated with the philosophical
attempts to reformulate gender differences and hierarchies in the early nineteenth
century.
While moral, religious, and legal justifications waned, references to ‘nature’,
natural research, and anthropology gained prominence, and correlated with the
emergence of modern discourse on race. At the same time kinship relations and the
organization of the household in Europe underwent significant change when mar-
riage became increasingly be understood as a matter of love and individual choice.
Although the practice of pre-arranged marriage and the relevance of broader kinship
networks for everyday life certainly did not disappear in the European region, the
model of the ‘conjugal’ or ‘nuclear’ family that consists of the marriage partners
and their children emerged in that period. Hegel’s notion of the family and the way
1 Introduction: German Idealism and Feminist Philosophy 3
he distinguished it from civil society and the state are probably one of the most
prominent examples showing that the philosophers of German Idealism engaged in
these processes. Hegel was not alone: Kant’s reflections on marriage and sexuality,
Fichte’s musings on female sexuality, the more ambivalent views of Schleiermacher
on women’s roles as sisters and spouses, or Schelling’s understanding of nature as a
dynamic based on sexual dualism, and conceptual links between women and plants
can also been seen as contributions to the cultural process of renegotiating gender
relations and the meaning of gender itself. The emergence of a biological and binary
notion of sex in the period around 1800 has been highlighted in feminist intellectual
histories written since the 1990s, and these inspired crucial criticisms of naturaliza-
tion. Yet there is more to be said: the study of German Idealism reveals that this
process was more complex and involved a wide range of epistemic and political
positions that go far beyond the assumption of the emergence of a monolithic “two-
sex-model” (Thomas Laqueur).
In particular, the picture gets more complicated once the contributions of women
intellectuals who took an active part in discussions on gender, nature, the family,
equality, and difference more broadly, are taken into account. They show that the
views of the male authors of German Idealism were controversial and contested,
and that conceptual alternatives already existed in the period around 1800. In addi-
tion, post- and decolonial perspectives and critical race theory, all of which have
gained momentum in feminist philosophy in the last two decades, show that ideas
about gender relations in German Idealism are closely entangled with Eurocentric
views and, for some authors, with the concept of race and respective hierarchical
classifications. The notions of gender, sexuality, marriage, and family as they were
formulated in the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and other authors
of German Idealism thus need to be understood as being situated within the wider
contexts of European colonialism and the processes of nation building in Europe in
the early nineteenth century. Many of the authors of German Idealism shared an
interest in non-European cultures and non-Christian religions, particularly in terms
of what came to be called ‘the Orient,’1 but they selected and arranged the available
knowledge about non-European societies in highly problematic ways. Hegel’s read-
ing of the literature on African societies that he integrated into his philosophical
narrative about progress and world history for which he thought Europeans, and in
particular the Germans, to be particularly well pre-disposed, is a prominent case in
point.2 Both the criticism of race and colonialism and the integration of the positions
of the women intellectuals of the period into the realm of German Idealism help to
contextualize and deepen the understanding of what is at stake in the articulations
of gender relations in German Idealism.
While critical philosophy of race as well as post- and decolonial approaches are
relatively new developments within present-day philosophy that date back to the
last decades of the twentieth century, until recently, authors such as Bettina von
Arnim, Karoline von Günderrode or Dorothea Veit-Schlegel have largely been
neglected within philosophy. This is the case because they have been regarded as
literary writers and thus not true philosophers. However, in the period around 1800
no clear demarcations between philosophy and literature existed. On the contrary,
the distinction between German Romanticism and German Idealism seems to be a

retrospective one as von Arnim’s engagement with Fichte’s philosophy, for exam-
ple, makes perfectly clear. In today’s (Western) academic contexts the distinction
between literature and philosophy is institutionalized through the division of depart-
ments and institutes. However, a fresh look at the intellectual landscapes around
1800 reveals the historicity of this distinction and the fact that philosophy itself was
still in the making at the time.
Since the late eighteenth century, “there was agitation throughout the German
universities for promotion of philosophy from its traditional role as a ‘lower’ pre-
paratory faculty to that of a higher ‘scientific’ faculty on a par with law, medicine,
and theology”.3 Kant’s essay on the Conflict of the Faculties (1798) is certainly one
of the most powerful interventions in these debates, and as in many other respects,
the philosophers of German Idealism built on Kant’s views and propositions which
they simultaneously altered and modified. In any case, the founding of the
University of Berlin in 1810 and the respective reform that was led by Wilhelm von
Humboldt and inspired by contributions from Fichte, Schleiermacherand
Hegel contributed significantly to the rise of the cultural status of philosophy and
the formation of philosophy as an academic discipline as we know it. From the
perspective of feminist philosophy, it is particularly relevant to remember and scru-
tinize this process of the institutionalization of philosophy, because the discipline
of philosophy was then shaped through disciplinary and exclusionary structures,
which only slowly began to change by the end of the twentieth century. These
structures made it particularly hard for women to take part in philosophy, let alone
for feminist perspectives to appear in the field, for well over a century after the
period of German Idealism. As a result, feminist philosophy has constantly ques-
tioned the academic rules and boundaries of philosophy, and a large amount of
feminist philosophical work takes place outside the confines of the discipline of
philosophy within which it remains situated at the margins. Judith Butler has asked
provocatively “Can the ‘Other’ of philosophy speak?”,4 insinuating that it can only
if academic philosophy unlearns the boundary practices upon which it was founded,
and comes “closer to its place as one strand among many in the fabric of culture.”5
Accordingly, in this volume, we thus understand feminist philosophy as a complex
field that is not confined to the discipline but comprises multiple traditions of femi-
nist thought.
2 Legacies of German Idealism in Feminist Philosophy
The influence of German Idealists on feminist philosophy extends well beyond criti-
cal engagements with what Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and their contemporaries wrote on
the topic of gender in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. After half a
century of academic feminism, and in light of an active field of feminist theory with
its own intellectual traditions now established, it makes sense to ask whether some
of the issues and concepts deriving from German Idealists continue to be part of
feminist discussions. It also makes sense to reflect on the specific ways in which
they have been adapted and altered. In addition to the critical exploration of articu-
lations of gender relations in German Idealism, the volume therefore also looks at
feminist thought through identifying concepts and issues which have traveled from
the authors of German Idealism to feminist thought in its diverse forms.
There are some obvious candidates for concepts of German Idealism that have
prominently informed feminist thought. Hegel’s figures of master and slave and
Antigone are two good examples. Both figures have inspired copious feminist theo-
rizing that has worked both with and against Hegel’s views. At the same time, sev-
eral key concepts of German Idealism have been central targets of feminist and
queer theorising. These include concepts such as subject, reason, universalism,
enlightenment, autonomy and the sublime. Several chapters of this book focus on
that kind of feminist re-signification of these and other concepts. Although these
figures and concepts cannot be easily disentangled from the gendered and racialized
meanings that are often more explicit in other parts of the philosopher’s works,
many of the subsequent chapters show that they cannot be easily dismissed either.
Philosophers such as Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray have built on Hegel’s
figures of master and slave and Antigone in order to formulate their theoretical
analyses of patriarchal power, which have in turn given rise to a wide range of femi-
nist re-interpretations of these figures. Similarly, feminist rearticulations of the con-
cept of the subject have been central to feminist thought since the 1970s, and
feminist philosophers have explored Kant’s ideas on reason, autonomy and subjec-
tivity in myriad ways. The same holds for the Kantian understanding of the
Enlightenment and the public use of reason as well as for the tension between uni-
versalism and particularism that shapes Kant’s political philosophy. Feminist
engagements with these concepts and the ways in which they have circulated in
philosophy since the early nineteenth century contribute to the debates about the
most pressing and systematic questions of contemporary social and political phi-
losophy concerning agency, equality and justice in a global world.
Another aspect of the legacy of German Idealism in feminist philosophy and
theory refers to the methods of philosophizing and, even more profoundly, the status
of philosophy itself. The particular ways of doing philosophy in the field of German
Idealism are reflected in many chapters of this handbook. Some authors explore
whether there are particularly profitable methods for contemporary feminist phi-
losophy. For example, Hegel’s dialectical method of including and changing differ-
ent perspectives, and Bettina von Arnim’s understanding of sym-philosophy, which
differs from that of Friedrich Schlegel, are explored in terms of the degree to which
they can inspire feminist theoretical practices. Other chapters address more explic-
itly the question of what doing feminist philosophy today means or could mean. The
volume in its entirety displays the diversity that characterizes feminist philosophy,
including its critical and productive affiliations with the many branches of contem-
porary philosophy. While some authors build on analytical philosophy, others are
inspired by phenomenology, post-structuralism, critical theory, or traditions beyond
the disciplinary archive such as Black feminist thought. Various reading strategies
are employed, and the ways in which authors relate to the classical texts and the
questions posed differ widely. Some authors approach the texts in terms of the ‘phil-
osophical present,’ and enter into direct discussion with the authors; others empha-
size the historical and epistemic contexts and their distance from the present. The
volume thus includes both chapters that build on approaches from the history of
ideas, genealogy, or conceptual history, and chapters that focus on abstract philo-
sophical arguments. However, all authors bring German Idealism into some rela-
tionship with the present, and aim to intervene in contemporary philosophical
debates, even though there are different understandings of philosophy and critique
involved. The volume thus reflects the fact that feminist philosophy today is plural,
and as such it can easily serve as an introduction to the field of contemporary femi-
nist philosophy.
The Handbook follows in the tracks of previously published work in feminist
philosophy on German Idealism. The pioneering volumes of feminist perspectives
on Kant (Schott 1997) and Hegel (Jagentowicz-Mills 1996) which appeared in the
‘Re-Reading the Canon’ series edited by Nancy Tuana, introduced new critical per-
spectives on these philosophers and stimulated respective research and debate.
Since the late 1990s, the field of feminist thought has been shaped by many develop-
ments such as queer theory, critical philosophy of race, new materialism, post- and
decolonial theory. Accordingly, many re-readings of the philosophers of German
Idealism approach the canonical texts from these perspectives, and present new
insights. In particular, the idea that gender relations are always entangled with mul-
tiple other forms of power and domination, most obviously with race and class,
which now appears to be a truism in gender studies, has certainly become more
prominent in feminist philosophy during the last two decades. The Handbook thus
also contributes to a self-reflection of feminist philosophy and its correlation with
the wider field of gender studies.
3 Structure of the Book
The body of the volume is divided into four parts that focus on the main philoso-
phers or groups of philosophers of German Idealism: Kant (Part I); Fichte and
Schelling (Part II); Hegel (Part III); and thinkers connected to German Idealism
(Part IV) including contributions on Schleiermacher, Karoline von Günderrode,
Bettina von Arnim, Novalis, Goethe, Hölderlin, Schlegel, and Schopenhauer.
Each part of the volume is divided into chapters that focus on the key concepts
and theoretical figures of the respective authors. The concepts and figures have been
chosen according to their relevance for the various debates within the field of femi-
nist philosophy. Each chapter gives a thorough overview and in-depth coverage of
the relevant concept or figure and provides readers with an introduction into cutting-
edge scholarship. We have asked the authors to explore both the significance of
feminist readings and interpretations for a comprehensive understanding of German
Idealism and the impact of German Idealism on feminist philosophy.
Part I deals with feminist readings of Kant’s philosophy. It begins with chapters
that discuss concepts that have circulated widely, whether as a general, almost
unquestioned background, or as the key targets of feminist critique. In the first chap-
ter Jameliah Shorter-Bourhanou critically explores Kant’s notion of universalism
from the perspective of Black feminism. She argues that universalism can become
“truly inclusive” if it is re-read from a perspective that challenges and overcomes
Kant’s sexist and racist views. Dilek Huseyinzadegan and Jordan Pascoe also
argue that it is crucial to actively engage with the problematic, non-ideal aspects of
the Kantian ideal of a politically mature subject and citizen. By showing that this
ideal is based on intersectional exclusions they scrutinize feminist adaptations of
Kant’s philosophy.
In the following chapter, Herta Nagl-Docekal discusses the concept of auton-
omy. She introduces the distinction between Kant and Kantianism, and problema-
tizes feminist discussions of autonomy that often refer to Kantianism in a broad
sense, and which depart from Kant’s original writings. In addition, she develops a
definition of moral autonomy in terms of ‘self-legislation’ which, as she argues,
addresses genuinely moral concerns of feminism. In a similar vein, although from a
genealogical point of view, Tuija Pulkkinen follows the ‘trace’ of Kant’s concepts
of reason and transcendental philosophy as they appear in discussions within
twentieth-century feminist theory. She first explicates Kant’s own use of the concept
of ‘reason’ and then explores how different contemporary feminist theorists have
either incorporated or rejected it in discussions where the use of the term ‘subject’
often indicates a relationship with the Kantian trace. Tina Chanter’s chapter on
Kant’s distinction between beauty and the sublime takes up feminist criticism that
has revealed Kant’s misogynist implications, and argues that this criticism also needs
to consider race. By drawing on Julia Kristeva’s notion of abjection and Sylvia
Wynter’s interpretation of Shakespeare’s The Tempest, Chanter discusses an example
of Kant’s gendered and racialized aesthetics and presents a subversive reading of it.
In the sixth chapter, Friederike Kuster discusses feminist readings of Kant’s
nature-culture distinction in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Kuster
situates Kant’s take on anthropology in the wider epistemic context in which philo-
sophical anthropology emerged as a specific field in the late eighteenth century. In
addition, Kuster critically explores Kant’s idea of a teleology of women’s nature and
Kant’s role within the modern discourse on qualitative gender difference as well as
its correlation with theories of race. In the following chapter, Stella Sandford takes
up this issue and shows how Kant treated the concepts of race and sex differently.
Through her analysis of Kant’s essays on race and of the scientific and philosophical
debates in which Kant intervened, Sandford makes clear that these concepts have a
completely different epistemic status in Kant’s philosophy. While he considered
‘race’ to be a philosophical problem that required justification, he took largely for
granted the meaning of ‘sex’. This of course does not mean that he did not reflect on
gender relations in different parts of his work. In the final chapter on Kant, Lina
Papadaki analyses Kant’s ideas about marriage and sexuality as they are most
clearly expressed in his Metaphysics of Morals and the compendium volume
Lectures on Ethics. Papadaki argues that Kant gives a coherent account of sexual
objectification. She discusses his account both in relation to Kant’s ‘solution,’ i.e.
marriage, and in light of feminist theories of sexuality that have addressed the ques-
tion of how far, in sexuality or through specific sexual practices, persons are reduced
to the status of mere tools for the satisfaction of sexual desire.
Part II is dedicated to the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling. In the first chap-
ter, Christoph Binkelmann and Marion Heinz analyse the way in which Fichte, in
his theory of marriage, circumvents the egalitarian principle of modern natural law.
The authors show that Fichte develops a concept of woman’s nature as a contradic-
tory being, an idea that he draws upon to build his argument for the submissive
status of women in marriage. In the second chapter, Susanne Lettow explores how
Schelling’s philosophical projects from the philosophy of nature to Ages of the
World have contributed to the formation of new conceptualizations of gender, gen-
eration, and organic nature. She analyses Schelling’s articulation of sexual dualism
and the patriarchal narrative that guides his de-centering of the transcendental sub-
ject as well as his understanding of temporality. She argues that a critical reading of
Schelling’s temporal-material turn can help to overcome blind spots of the present
turn towards vitalist materialism.
Part III focusses on feminist readings of central concepts and figures in Hegel’s
philosophy. In the first chapter, Alison Stone compares the philosophies of nature of
Schelling, Hegel, and Günderrode. In contrast to Schelling and Hegel, who both use
conceptual dualisms that have gendered connotations, Stone argues that Günderrode’s
ideas on birth, death and rebirth anticipate crucial insights of feminist philosophy.
While Hegel’s construction of gender in his philosophy of nature has received much
criticism in feminist philosophy, his theory of the family, civil society, and the state is
more ambivalent. In the following chapter on these concepts, Kimberly Hutchings
explores Hegel’s conceptual arrangement in the Philosophy of Right, and discusses
why Hegel’s ethical and political theory continues to be a resource for feminist think-
ers, in spite of his misogyny. As positive examples, she takes up the relational and
dynamic character of Hegel’s conceptual categories as well the fragility of the condi-
tions of the modern state, such as it appears in Hegel’s description.
Elena Tzelepis focusses on the role that Antigone plays in Hegel’s texts and
argues that this figure requires us to rethink Hegel’s notion of sublation (Aufhebung).
Moreover, she shows how this tragic figure of disobedience and revolt unsettles not
only Hegel’s understanding of dialectics but also Kant’s notion of the sublime. Like
Antigone, the figure of master and slave has been adapted and interpreted in myriad
ways in feminist thought. The two most prominent adaptations are those by Simone
de Beauvoir and Judith Butler. Mara Montanaro and Matthieu Renault recon-
struct these two feminists’ versions of the master and slave dialectics and situate it
within the context of anthropological interpretations of Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Spirit inspired by Alexandre Kojève. In her chapter on Hegel’s notion of ‘ethical
life’ (Sittlichkeit), Shannon Hoff argues that this concept provides crucial insights
today for feminist philosophy and transcultural feminist practice. According to
Hoff, this is the case because Hegel captures the basic structures of belonging or of
membership in interpersonal worlds and offers insights into both the dangers and
positive possibilities of ethicality.
Tuija Pulkkinen and Susanne Lettow analyse Hegel’s thought on economy in

conjunction with feminist thought. They focus on two aspects: Hegel’s reading and
adaption of ‘political economy,’ and his concept of property. On the one hand they
highlight how some of Hegel’s ideas—mediated through Marx and Engels—grew
into parts of feminist thought, and, on the other hand, how feminist critique has
targeted some of his basic ideas on property. In the following chapter Jamila
Mascat examines to what extent feminist interpretations of Hegel philosophy help
in thinking differently about the meanings and implications of the category of race
and how they add to recent debates and scholarly contributions on racial relations
and racial justice. The chapter includes an overview on Hegel’s understanding of
race(s) across his works and provides a critical review of the literature on the topic.
Part IV is dedicated to thinkers that belong to or refer to German Idealism, such
as Friedrich Schleiermacher and Schopenhauer. This part also includes chapters that
mainly deal with authors who are usually regarded as literary writers but have in fact
contributed to German Idealism. In her chapter on nature, plants, and gender in
Romantic biology, Elaine Miller compares the views of Goethe to those expressed
by Bettina von Arnim and Karoline von Günderrode. She argues that in the intel-
lectual exchange between von Arnim and von Günderrode, a notion of erotic femi-
ninity unfolds that is unmediated by masculine desire. In the following chapter,
Dalia Nassar examines the way in which Bettina von Arnim articulated and per-
formed “symphilosophy” in her book Günderode. She shows that von Arnim departs
from Schlegel’s understanding of symphilosophy as a form of communion and
instead highlights discord, discontent and difference. Heleen Zorgdrager first
gives a thorough introduction to Schleiermacher’s philosophy, and then presents a
deconstructive reading of his Brouillon on Ethics. Her analysis of Schleiermacher’s
gender theory reveals the subversive dynamics and the unresolved tensions of his
thinking. In the final chapter of the volume, Christine Battersby reconstructs the
ways in which women philosophers and writers have drawn on Schopenhauer’s
metaphysics and ethics despite his overtly misogynist views. She presents two case-
studies, May Sinclair and Simone de Beauvoir, and reveals the relevance of
Schopenhauer to post-1968 feminisms.
Notes
1. Suzanne Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire. Religion, Race and Scholarship
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009).
2. Robert Bernasconi, “Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti,” in Hegel After Derrida, ed. Stuart
Barnett (London, New York: Routledge 1998), 41–63.
3. Nicholas Jardine, “Naturphilosophie and the kingdoms of nature,” in Cultures of natural his-
tory, ed. Nicholas Jardine, J.A. Secord, Emma Spary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1996), 243.
4. Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004), 232–250.
5. Ibid., 250.
Part I
Kant and Feminist Philosophy
Chapter 2
Black Feminism and Kantian Universalism
Jameliah Inga Shorter-Bourhanou
It is well known that Kant does not have many good things to say about women.
Even the times that he does say something positive about them are tinged with sex-
ism. Women are cast in a positive light whenever they complement and remain in a
subordinate position to their husbands. Whenever women are considered on their
own, they are always found to be lacking in some way—in intelligence, moral
capacity, or social and political standing. Scholars who focus on Kant and the
woman question from the perspective of the history of philosophy have struggled to
adjudicate his sexism with his universalism. To what extent ought Kant’s universal-
ism continue to inform our thoughts about these topics? If Kant’s views are no
longer helpful in illuminating our current issues, then why continue to apply them?
There is no question that Kant’s ideals are still relevant today insofar as they con-
tinue to inform our ideal of universalism. Yet Kant’s sexism is a clear violation of
the tenets of universalism, it seems, especially when considering that universalism
should also grant equality.
Black feminist philosophy1 provides an example of how to appeal to the univer-
salism of the dominant discourse while challenging systems of oppression such as
racism and sexism. Voicing their philosophy from the margins, black feminist phi-
losophers show how asserting the needs of marginalized people can make the “all”
of the universal truly inclusive. Black feminist philosophers, particularly those of
the nineteenth century, demonstrate that for a claim to be truly universal, marginal-
ized voices need to be included in the discourse on equality. During and after the
period of enslavement, their work and words have focused on bringing black and
white people together by asserting that black people deserve the same economic,
social, and political rights as white people. In the 1980s, the heyday of their
J. I. Shorter-Bourhanou (*)
College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA, USA
e-mail: jshorter@holycross.edu
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 13

Switzerland AG 2022
S. Lettow, T. Pulkkinen (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and
Feminist Philosophy, Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13123-3_2
14 J. I. Shorter-Bourhanou
academic and literary work, black feminist scholars argued for the inclusion of their
voices in the academy, which paved the way for not only their own inclusion but that
of others as well.2 As such, the engagement of black feminist voices with respect to
universalism and equality is two-pronged. The first prong involves thinking about
how to challenge universalism in the effort to make it as inclusive as it purports to
be. The second prong regards including the voices of black feminists in the feminist
philosophical discourse regarding Kant and sexism. All people who identify as
women are victims of sexism. However, the conversation about sexism does not
always engage the voices of marginalized women. By engaging the thoughts of
black feminists, I aim to offer their philosophy as a new theoretical framework for
discussing Kant and sexism—a theoretical framework that opens the door for the
inclusion of all victims of sexism.
This chapter is divided into three main parts. First, by considering the Groundwork
of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), I offer background on Kant’s perspective of
universalism. Second, I consider the ways in which his universalism is interpreted
by feminist philosophers and by philosophers who engage Kant and race. I argue
that approaches that somehow diminish or ignore Kant’s racism and sexism are
problematic and that in contrast, direct acknowledgement, or even acceptance, of
the fact that Kant is sexist and racist provides a basis from which to work with the
universal theory itself. Third, I argue, black feminist philosophy reveals the possi-
bilities for a construction of a Kantian perspective that pushes the limits of the
notion of the universal beyond Kant’s original words to the notion that he perhaps
intended to create. I present the claims of black feminist philosophers regarding
universalism, and by doing so, I show that they have been able to make universal
theory more inclusive by focusing on the minoritized and the need for action on
their behalf.
1 What Is Universalism?
Universalism is a cornerstone concept in Kant’s scholarship. In the Groundwork of

the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Kant positions the universal as the shared prin-
ciple amongst rational beings of what one ought to do when facing an ethical
dilemma. When an action is universalizable, according to Kant, the will is not in
conflict with itself (G, Ak4: 437). In its formal and theoretical sense, universaliz-
ability points to the autonomous law-giving nature of the will. However, it also
suggests that that which holds as law also holds as universal; that is, as a law for all
human wills (G, Ak4: 425). Given that law and lawfulness undergird universalism,
this claim points to two critical aspects regarding the nature of the human being who
can act in accordance with the law and derive its universality. First, rationality is a
prerequisite for the ability to derive the universal law. Second, the human being
must see himself as an autonomous—that is, self-legislating—being, or what Kant
deems a “person.” Adrian Piper aptly notes that “when we refer to someone as a
person, we ordinarily mean to denote at the very least a social being whom we
2 Black Feminism and Kantian Universalism 15
presume—as Kant did—to have consciousness, thought, rationality, and agency.”3

These two aspects of human nature are normative insofar as they are, at base, neces-
sary for the human being to be a participant in the universal. In this regard, I follow
Charles Mills’ claim that “whether explicit or tacit,” there is consensus amongst
normative beings who are white men who share a common understanding and rec-
ognition of one another as full persons and citizens.4
In this regard, then, that which is universal is reflexive. The universal is, on the
one hand, held to be so by persons who are able to identify that which is universal
as such. On the other hand, when something is considered universal or universaliz-
able, it has been deemed as such by those persons who identify it that way. Thus, the
criteria Kant places on the human being regarding reflexivity are theoretical in
nature to the same degree that phenotypical features of the human being such as race
and gender are. That is to say, universalism has to do with a shared rationality that
presupposes shared rational capacity. Kant states that only rational beings have the
capacity to conform to representations of laws. This qualification of the human
being is critical in that it demonstrates that Kant does not think that all beings, even
human beings, have rational capacity or, in a more generous register, the same ratio-
nal capacity. Kant emphasizes the importance of rational capacity because human
beings must be able to derive the moral law as autonomous beings who are then able
to bring their subjective nature into conformity with the moral law (G, Ak4: 413).
Kant argues that individual rational human beings conclude on their own what they
should do, considering the moral law as the result of their rationality. For this rea-
son, then, all rational human beings ought to come to the same conclusions about
that which is moral and rational. Again, the notion of universality demonstrates a
reflexive nature in that there is a shared and tacit understanding that one’s individual
rational capacity is to be recognized by others. It is not that one person or group tells
others what to do. Rather, there is tacit recognition amongst rational beings about
their rational capacity. That is, one’s rational capacity is recognized by others to be
the same. It is on this basis that universality is able to function as a universal prin-
ciple. For example, when one makes use of the categorical imperative, the corner-
stone of Kant’s ethics, Kant encourages them to test the morality of a certain action
on its universalizability. The single categorical imperative reads thus: “Act only in
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
become a universal law” (G, Ak4: 421). Thus, if a maxim can be universalized, it is
a moral action, but if the action cannot be universalized, it is an immoral action (G,
Ak4: 403).
The tacit moral laws that identify and create the context in which persons can
recognize each other grant legitimacy to the autonomy of the rational human being
and provide a moral, social, and political framework. That is to say, the recognition
of these tacit moral laws forms the foundation for how rational human beings inter-
act with one another in the practical sphere. The second version of the categorical
imperative, the humanity imperative, claims: “So act that you use humanity, whether
in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end,
never merely as a means” (G, Ak4: 429). Rational human beings, as autonomous,
self-legislating human beings, have dignity. Dignity is a characteristic of the
rational being “who obeys no law other than that which he himself at the same time
gives” (G, Ak4: 434). Regarding the characteristic itself, dignity is “the condition
under which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth,
that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity” (G, Ak4: 435). People are inher-
ently priceless and should be treated as such. For Kant, this means that no one
should be treated as though they are dispensable. No one should be harmed or dis-
posed of as though they were an inanimate object (G, Ak4: 430). This tacit recogni-
tion of the dignity of others is therefore mutual, at least amongst rational human
beings. There is thus the mutual recognition of the worth of other rational human
beings, which is relevant because such recognition is to have an impact on the
intended action and interaction of one rational human being on another.
From these imperatives, it is clear that the moral system that Kant promotes in
the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is one in which there is a shared
rational capacity. This shared rational capacity is a prerequisite to the tacit and
shared recognition amongst rational human beings about how they ought to regard
one another, which in turn dictates how they interact with one another in the social
and political spheres. From this discussion, it should be increasingly clear why the
woman question is such a crucial one for Kant’s universalism. Kant subscribes to a
normative view of the human being who is capable of rationality and consequently
included in the universal. Unfortunately, minoritized people such as women are
demeaned and excluded.
I am aware that there are concerns about how far such a discussion can and
should go with respect to concerns about the normativity of Kant’s universalism.
That is, to some, it would seem improper to introduce concerns about normativity
regarding Kant’s universalism, especially with respect to race and gender, because
it would seem that generally speaking, insofar as his universalism is a theory, it
transcends any and all concerns about the physiological characteristics of a human
being. It is important to reiterate that Kant himself makes such distinctions amongst
human beings even in these theoretical works. Kant’s shaming of the South Sea
Islanders who are incapable of contributing to the human species is critical to his
discussion about human progress. That is, the human species ought to develop his
capacities “since they serve him and are given to him for all sorts of possible pur-
poses” (G, Ak4: 423). Women are also placed in a subordinate position, that is,
women ought not to become more rational despite their capacity for it due to the fact
that: “Laborious learning or painful grubbing, even if a woman could get very far
with them, destroy the merits that are proper to her sex” (OBS, Ak2: 229). Indigenous
Americans and Blacks lack a rational capacity called Geistesanlagen (WE, Ak8: 62).
All of these claims are examples of the fact that Kant makes distinctions amongst
human beings that preclude their ability to be equally included. These distinctions
that Kant makes amongst human beings have bearing on how Kant’s universalism
ought to be regarded if it is the case that “universalism” is a term meant to refer to
every single human being in the world. Allow me to restate the point another way:
The universal character of Kant’s universalism has not changed. It is indeed univer-
sal insofar as it relates to every single human being. However, some human beings
are not included in the universal because they are not tacitly recognized and are
therefore not on equal footing with the others who are part of the dominant group.
In this regard, the standard interpretation that Kant’s universalist theory includes all
people universally must be revised. The task set before the philosopher is to reinvent
the ways in which the universal requires normativity to form a new kind of universal
that is truly inclusive.
2 “Nasty Women”: Kant’s Sexism
What did Kant say about women that was sexist? Appearing in several texts spanning
almost all his career, for Kant, women are always lacking in some way unless they
are caring for their children or their husbands. His earliest and most infamous com-
ments about women appear in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the
Sublime (1764).5 There, he claims that women are lacking in moral capacity and in
their ability to exercise reason. For example, he argues, “The fair sex has just as much
understanding as the male, only it is a beautiful understanding, while ours should be
a deeper understanding, which is an expression that means the same thing as the
sublime” (OBS, Ak2: 230). Women are inclined to like things that are “beautiful” or
adorned and decorated. The beautiful is deceptively charming, whereas the sublime
allows one to subordinate “sentiments to principles” (OBS, Ak2: 220). Due to its
focus on principles, the sublime is the kind of moral reasoning that makes the man
more moral than the woman, who is more inclined to the sensible. Women are thus
more sympathetic than men and have an innate sense for compassion and good-
heartedness. Because of their natural inclinations, women are also trivial, overly sen-
sitive, and desirous of more attention than that which is necessary (OBS, Ak2: 230).
Kant did not think that women are incapable of reason, however. There are times
in which he even encourages women to push the limits of their capacity to reason.
In “What is Enlightenment?” (1784), Kant states that the “fair sex” should join in
the process of growing and developing one’s reason (WE, Ak8: 36). In his musing
about two female scholars in Observations, Kant acknowledges that there are
women who are capable of very high academic achievement. Kant states:
Deep reflection and a long drawn out consideration are noble, but are grave and not well
suited for a person in whom the unconstrained charms should indicate nothing other than a
beautiful nature. Laborious learning or painful grubbing, even if a woman could get very far
with them, destroy the merits that are proper to her sex, and on account of their rarity may
well make her into an object of a cold admiration, but at the same time they will weaken the
charms by means of which she exercises her great power over the opposite sex. A woman
who has a head full of Greek, like Mme. Dacier, or who conducts through disputations
about mechanics, like the Marquise de Chastelet, might as well also wear a beard; for that
might perhaps better express the mien of the depth of which they strive. (OBS, Ak2: 229–230)
Despite having knowledge about women that should have contradicted his assump-
tions about them, Kant maintained his sexist beliefs. In this way, Kant is a good
example of how having knowledge about something may not lead to changed
thoughts about that something. Kant was seemingly bent on engaging in
disparaging thoughts about women even though they demonstrated the capacity for
reason and morality that contradicted his assumptions. Kant’s knowledge about
women and their ability did not have an impact on what he thought that they ought
to do with their ability. Rather, Kant suggested that women should not push the
limits of their reason because doing so would disrupt what makes them perfect,
which is their ability to complement men. In fact, the only times in which Kant had
anything positive to say about women were when he was considering what women
can do for men and/or for their families. Kant states, “In marital life the united pair
should as it were constitute a single moral person, which is animated and ruled by
the understanding of the man and the taste of the wife” (OBS, Ak2: 242). Women
are the beginning of moral cultivation in the family for the greater good of society,
which springs from their wombs. Transposing Kant’s sexism to the social and politi-
cal realms, it can be said that women lack personhood that is necessary to be con-
sidered full persons in the social and political space. The primary way in which
Kant builds to this is by locking in women’s subordinate status in the institution of
marriage. Kant states that women use their womanly ways to control men, to engage
in “domestic warfare” in their homes due to their chattiness (An, Ak7: 304).
Moreover, marriage does not elevate the social and political status of women but
rather ensures that they do not have a status at all. In the Anthropology from a
Pragmatic Point of View (1798),6 Kant states:
Woman regardless of age is declared to be immature in civil matters; her husband is her
natural curator. However, if she lives with him and keeps her own property, then another
person is the curator.—It is true that when it comes to talking woman by the nature of her
sex has enough of a mouth to represent both herself and her husband, even in court (where
it concerns mine and thine), and so could literally be declared to be over-mature. But just as
it does not belong to women to go to war, so women cannot personally defend their rights
and pursue civil affairs for themselves, but only by means of a representative. And this legal
immaturity with respect to public transactions makes woman all the more powerful in
respect to domestic welfare; because here the right of the weaker enters in, which the male
sex by its nature already feels called on to respect and defend. (An, Ak7: 209)
Women, according to Kant, are weak. Their moral capacity is in a lesser register
than that of men, their rational capacity ought not compete with that of men, and
their social and political status is nonexistent. Therefore, women are not considered
full citizens of the commonwealth but are only what Kant calls “passive citizens.”
“Passive citizens” are not really citizens at all: in fact, “the concept of a passive citi-
zen seems to contradict the concept of a citizen as such” (MM, Ak6: 314). Occupying
the same status as a child, a domestic servant, or a gardener for hire, women do not
have the right to vote. Moreover, in light of Kant’s previous comments about the
intellectual ability of women and the fact that they ought to downplay their intelli-
gence, it seems that women lack the right to make use of public reason as well.
Women thus lack “civic personality” and only inherit their limited rights to citizen-
ship through men, the heads of the households (MM, Ak6: 315).
The social and political claims are solidified against the backdrop of a congenital
and teleological claim about the place of women. Kant argues that this subordinate
position is natural for women. In his late work, Kant shifts his claims about women
to consider how their womanly “nature” justifies their subordinate social and
political status and in fact has purpose. In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of
View, Kant states that the relationship between man and woman with the woman as
the subordinate partner is natural and teleological. Kant argues:
One can only come to the characterization of this sex if one uses as one’s principle not what
we make our end, but what nature’s end was in establishing womankind; and since this end
itself, by means of the foolishness of human beings, must still be wisdom according to
nature’s purpose, these conjectural ends can also serve to indicate the principle for
characterizing woman—a principle which does not depend on our choice but on a higher
purpose for the human race. These ends are: (1) the preservation of the species, (2) the
cultivation of society and its refinement by womankind. (An, Ak7: 305–306)
Kant indicates in his other writings that women are to some degree aware of this
natural, subordinate position. In another essay, Kant states that “the woman foresaw
the hardships to which nature had subjected her sex, and additionally still those
which the more powerful man would lay upon her” (CB, Ak8: 114).
Despite finding these sensitive qualities commendable in women, Kant shows
personal disdain for them in his writing. The most striking example of this is in his
correspondence, namely in letters Kant exchanged with a young Austrian woman,
Maria von Herbert. Between 1791 and 1794, Herbert wrote three letters to Kant (C,
Ak1: 273–74; 401–403; 485–86). After the loss of a friendship, Herbert is tormented
and contemplating suicide and does not understand why Kant would not find it per-
missible in some cases where people are experiencing great misery to commit sui-
cide (C, Ak11: 274). Kant responds to Herbert’s first letter (C, Ak11: 331–34) but
ignores her other letters. To add insult to injury, Kant makes inquiries into Herbert’s
life through his friends, commenting that she is besotted by her “curious mental
derangements” (C, Ak11: 411). Regardless of whether Kant had well-founded con-
cerns about Herbert (she did die by suicide in 1803), the fact that he disregarded her,
making her letters a spectacle for others to gaze upon, may provide important insight
into how he regarded women and their ideas. Rae Langton argues that Kant’s treat-
ment of Herbert’s correspondence with him demonstrates that he saw her as a “thing.”
Langton argues that Herbert’s letters are “not the speech of persons, to be understood
and debated; this is derangement, to be feared and avoided.”7 If one were to consider
Kant’s claim in Observations that it is best for a woman to demonstrate “sensitivity”
in her life, then it seems to be that he desires women cultivate lesser sensibilities such
as happiness. These are the womanly qualities that he encourages in women. If one
were to read Herbert as possessing these qualities insofar as she desires to gain hap-
piness in her life through suicide, one would see that, in an unfair turn of events,
these are the same qualities that Kant abhors.
3 Approaches to Kant’s Sexism and Racism
Regardless of whether it is easy to admit, Kant is guilty of being sexist. His sexism
and the extent to which it is used to support the argument that only certain human
beings with certain normative qualities are able to participate equally and be equally
regarded in society constitute a direct challenge to his universalism. As I have

shown, Kant’s moral, social, and political theory is often interpreted as promoting
the idea that all individuals are equal. For philosophers, there is something critical
to retaining this view. In fact, it seems that one ought to retain this view. In fact, it
seems that if Kant himself had been a good Kantian, he would not have associated
himself with sexist views in the first place. This leads some scholars to argue that
Kant’s views about universalism should be enough to protect even him from sexist
allegations; after all, some scholars argue that Kant’s philosophy is “more progres-
sive” than he was.8 But this view that Kant’s work can save itself is problematic.
Addressing his sexism, as I will show, constitutes the primary stumbling block for
feminist philosophers. This is demonstrated by the fact that they have, in most cases,
resorted to downplaying the importance of Kant’s sexism.
To be sure, a conundrum exists when it comes to reading sexist statements such
as Kant’s while wanting to retain the universalism of his work. Drawing on Richard
Rorty’s work, Genevieve Lloyd points out that a key issue facing scholars in the
history of philosophy is the ability to be both “present-centered” and “past-
centered.” A “present-centered” approach refers to an attempt to reconstruct the
theories of philosophers to suit the conversations of the present day. In contrast, a
“past-centered” approach is an attempt to understand philosophers in their own
time and context. Lloyd argues that these two approaches are best conjoined: that
is, to “unite two concerns which might initially seem at odds: the desire to know
ourselves as different from the past, and the desire for continuity.”9 In addressing
the sexism of those philosophers included in the canon, feminist philosophers have
opened up new avenues of discussion that offer more robust understandings of the
past and that reveal new ways to understand past philosophers for the present
moment. For Lloyd,
[f]emale experience of unease in the modes of conversation prevailing in living philosophy
finds expression in a desire to return to the past precisely as a means of engaging with the
present. “Present-centeredness” is here not so much a matter of taking back to the past the
philosophical agenda of the present as it is a way of opening up present philosophy to a
wider agenda.10
Kant’s sexism presents a challenge to feminist philosophers of history because of

the very duality that Lloyd points out. That is, how can one account for his sexism
yet simultaneously consider the ways in which his philosophical thought, especially
that about universalism, might continue to have value? The degree that Kant’s
thoughts still influence current thoughts about universalism is representative of the
“present-centeredness” of Kant’s thought. His ideals on universalism, for example,
are still held up as exemplary. The thoughts of Kant are not just in the past; they are
also in the present. The critical question is to what extent this should be the case and
to what degree philosophers ought to attempt to reconstruct the thoughts of the past
to make them useful for the present. That is, what are the ethical and hermeneutical
obligations of philosophers when it comes to the problematic ideas of a thinker?
Based on those obligations, what is the best way to reconstruct problematic ideas for
the present? Questions such as these hint at the practical implications that the act of
philosophical interpretation has for the profession, especially when it comes to the
teaching of philosophy.
Kurt Mosser notes that there are three ways in which feminist thinkers have
attempted to address Kant and his sexism: reconciling the claims, eliminating the
offending statements, and rejecting the offending statements.11 In what follows, I
loosely follow Mosser’s distinctions as I aim to show that feminist thinkers have
resorted to protecting Kant from his sexism and/or to protecting his philosophy
from allegations that it is tainted with sexism. They aim to operate within the con-
fines of what Kant should have said or what he may have meant by what he wrote.
Approaches to Kant and race tend to take the same tactic. I introduce sexism and
racism here in tandem to show that universalism has more or less been critiqued the
same way and to show that although there are critiques about Kant, race, and gen-
der, to date there are no conversations that join together the identities/oppressions to
create a theoretical framework in which one can have robust conversations about
black women and other women of color.
Seen only in the context of discussions about race and Kant is an approach that
suggests Kant’s so-called universal egalitarianism unequivocally excludes and
dehumanizes non-white people such that Kant contradicts himself.12 Scholars who
adopt this approach argue that Kant is a racist and that this fact raises concerns
about his egalitarianism. They do not think that Kant ever changed his mind about
race and indeed that doing so would have been impossible given the pervasiveness
of his racist thinking. There are, however, some critical distinctions regarding which
parts of Kant’s philosophy are impacted by his racist views. Charles Mills contends
that Kant’s social and political philosophy are infected with respect to consider-
ations about the extent to which Kant’s ideas of equality are in fact justly extended
to all people of color. Known for his idea of the “Untermenschen,” Mills argues that
Kant’s racist views show that in Kant’s work people of color are unequal to whites
and cannot equally partake in social and political benefits.13 Emmanuel Eze con-
tends that Kant’s racism is a principle of his philosophy resulting from his meta-
physics and epistemology.14 Robert Bernasconi, arguably the most prolific scholar
on Kant and race, argues that Kant’s racism is both a philosophical problem and one
that emanates from his scholarly resources and philosophical approach. Bernasconi
claims that Kant invented the scientific concept of race. He supports this argument
not by considering the nature of Kant’s negative comments toward people of color,
but by arguing that Kant has a “philosophical motivation for his definition of race”
that results in a racial distinction.15
The second approach seeks to diminish the importance of Kant’s racism and sex-
ism by arguing that his universal egalitarianism can be seen in a more positive,
redemptive and self-correcting, light.16 For example, scholars such as Allen Wood
contend that despite the negative views that Kant holds about people of color and
women, that “it might even be expected that the greatest philosophical insights will
be those that furthest outrun the philosopher’s own ability to absorb and apply them.
Kant’s assertion of the equal dignity of rational nature in all persons is a striking
example of this, when we come to some of his opinions about the family, political,
and economic relations, and the concept of race.”17 Some of the scholars in this
group claim that Kant’s sexist and racist statements do not hold any real importance
in his work because Kant’s ideas on race and gender are categorically unrepresenta-
tive of his serious philosophical scholarship. Others claim that Kant’s more serious
views are the ones that offer support for an egalitarian perspective toward all beings
regardless of their identities. The result is that these philosophers subscribe to the
idea that Kant’s work and his thinking can be somehow neatly bifurcated and as a
result, one can thus diminish the problematic statements that Kant makes and rather
focus on and augment the better and more “serious” parts of his philosophy.
Some feminist philosophers have taken the perspective that some of Kant’s
claims pertaining to women’s rationality can be “bracketed off” due to their “incon-
sistency” with Kant’s general claims about humanity. For example, Mari Mikkola
argues that the specific claims that Kant makes about what women ought to do (e.g.,
engage in moral education as described in the Observations) are merely normative
standards he has set for women.18 However, since these claims are inconsistent with
the “general” claims that Kant makes regarding the need for moral education,
Mikkola suggests that these more specific claims can be “bracketed off” from Kant’s
thought. This is because it is not the case that Kant thinks that women “innately fail
to possess the qualities required for morality”; rather Mikkola argues that Kant
thinks that women still ought to be treated with the same inherent dignity and worth
as men although he maintains that women are unable to obtain the same moral edu-
cation as men.19
Another perspective aims to reconcile Kant’s racism and sexism with his univer-
salism in order to “read Kant against himself.” The scholars who take this approach
are invested in reconstructing Kant’s views in order to create a Kantian philosophy
that is amenable to present needs.20 These philosophers are not arguing that Kant
himself had the ability to see his own faults and correct them; rather, they are sug-
gesting that the philosophers who are working on Kant today reconstruct his
thoughts to address present-day sexism. In their essay, Thomas Hill, Jr. and Bernard
Boxill contend that the so-called more central tenets of Kant’s philosophy such as
the categorical imperative, especially its second version that argues that people
should be treated as ends in themselves and never as a means to an end, demonstrate
that Kant could not have been a racist, at least not in a deeply philosophically impor-
tant way.21 The scholars in this group argue that the idea that people should be
treated as ends in themselves offers a strong rebuttal to racist beliefs and institutions
such as enslavement in which Africans, for example, lacked the social and political
autonomy representative of persons. The emphasis of this approach is that the uni-
versalist theory can overcome Kant’s racism and sexism with some ingenuity from
scholars who work on Kant.
Some feminist philosophers emphasize another perspective that I identify as the
“neutrality” approach. These scholars argue that Kant does not actually mean to
exclude minoritized people despite what he says. This position is slightly different
from the previous group of scholars in that in “reading Kant against himself,” they
concede that Kant makes sexist statements yet suggest the theory itself can be read
as gender-neutral. Whereas the “read Kant against himself” scholars emphasize the
promise of the universal theory with scholarly engineering, the neutrality scholars
emphasize the perfection of the theory as it is, despite what Kant actually says. For
example, feminist scholar Carol Hay argues that that there is no need to think that
Kant’s anthropological views about women “fully infect” his “central philosophical
views.” Kant, she states, was writing in a time period that took women’s subordina-
tion to men to be a given. In light of these concerns, it is appropriate to read Kant’s
work in a gender-neutral fashion and to use his philosophy for feminist purposes.22
According to Hay, Kant himself “recognized that the tenets of his theory committed
him to the view that all people are fundamentally equal and deserve to be treated as
such.”23
A third perspective that has become standard for interpreting Kant and race
argues that Kant is philosophically committed to egalitarianism, which means that
his racism falls out of use in specific areas or eras. This final argument takes at least
two different forms. That is, some scholars take the approach that Kant either
‘changes’ his mind about race24 or that he gradually incorporates the marginalized
equally into his idea of human progress.25 Robert Louden, in earlier works, contends
that Kant’s philosophy allows for people of color to be included gradually.26 For
Louden, it is the “cosmopolitan conception” of Kant’s philosophy whereby people
of color can improve themselves with hard work.27 Other scholars argue that there
is a set point at which Kant’s thinking on race “changed” from previously held racist
views to an entirely new view which upholds his universalism. Susan Shell and
Sankar Muthu, for example, identify Kant’s shift in thinking as occurring after the
publication of the “A” edition of the First Critique in 1781.28 Pauline Kleingeld’s
claim that Kant “changed” his mind about race is now the standard interpretation
regarding Kant’s racism and his universalism. The nuance in her argument is that
Kant’s idea of race did have influence on his moral philosophy through the 1780s.29
Kleingeld argues that she is in a category of her own because of this concession, but
I place her in the same category as Shell and Muthu because she argues that Kant
made a shift in his thinking about race. However, Kleingeld’s concession that race
is important to Kant’s thinking, at least for a time, is indeed a caveat that separates
her from the others in the category.
These views whitewash and malewash Kant’s moral, social, and political phi-
losophy. That is, by merely asserting in some way the race and gender neutrality of
Kant’s claims or by granting him clemency for the racist and sexist claims that he
makes, Kant can be argued to have actually meant to include all people equally,
regardless of their differences, in his universalist theory.
I do concede that approaches to save Kant and promote the importance of his
universalism have merit. Returning to Lloyd’s description of the dual challenges
facing the history of philosophy, I find that the merit of the eliminativists and rejec-
tionists is that they assert that scholarly efforts should emphasize the value of Kant’s
philosophy, which is in his universal views. Those who assert the notion to read
Kant against himself demonstrate the value of pushing the limits of Kant’s thought
to make the it more useful for addressing the concerns of today. Yet what is missing
from these challenges is an acknowledgement and acceptance of the fact that Kant
was sexist and that it may have had some impact on how he described his universal-
ism. Also important is acceptance of the fact that Kant’s sexist statements cannot be
changed. One can engage with the ideals that Kant put forth even while acknowl-
edging that as they are written, such ideals may not be wholly relevant, useful, help-
ful, or illuminating for current concerns. It is not a question of whether Kant was
sexist. He most certainly was. Yet the effort to redeem him from his sexism need not
interfere with the important philosophical work of accepting the bad as reality and
strengthening conversations about universalism for the present day. Kant would not
support bifurcating his own work, and the attempt to lop off the unsavory bits of his
work does not change the fact that he is sexist. Rather than attempting to work
around this issue, it may be useful to consider a different perspective. Adding the
voices of black feminists would expand the argument into something entirely new.
4 In the Lurch: Black Feminism and Kant Scholarship
The very fact that black women have been overlooked in the conversation about
universalism underscores the degree to which the claims of feminist philosophers
toward equality are not about all women. Feminist philosophizing that aims to
address the degree to which Kant’s work is not universal fails to become more uni-
versal when all of the theorizing is done by white women and overlooks concerns
about race, for example. Of similarly great importance is the loss of theoretical
frameworks that could help scholars appropriately address concerns about Kant’s
sexism. Black feminist philosophy is written from the perspective of feminists who
understand what it means to be excluded. Because of their exclusion, black femi-
nists can offer a new perspective on how to push the limits of the universal. By
including the voices of black feminists and, I hope, others, feminist philosophers
with varying points of view will be able to create a universalist viewpoint in Kantian
scholarship that addresses Kant’s sexism. However, it is necessary to avoid being
constrained by arbitrary divisions of Kant’s work or being blinded by Kant’s own
myopia. Kant’s work is incapable of saving itself, but a reconstruction of his work
also need not save him. Rather, stepping outside of the confines of Kant’s own
thoughts and engaging the notion of universalism may allow for new possibilities of
Kantian thought that are fit for present-day concerns.
One notable contribution to this endeavor is Dilek Huseyinzadegan’s essay, “For
What Can the Kantian Feminist Hope? Constructive Complicity in Appropriations
of the Canon.”30 Huseyinzadegan argues for an approach inspired by Audre Lorde’s
claim to “dismantle the master’s house.” According to Lorde, one cannot claim to
make the necessary changes to a theory by using the same theoretical “tools” that
the architect of the theory, the “master,” created. In the case of Kant, feminist phi-
losophers who try to merely reconstruct Kant’s thinking by asserting that his univer-
sal notions can be separated from his sexist statements or that his universal thoughts
can save him from sexism are attempting to use the “master’s tools” to “dismantle
the master’s house.” These approaches are ineffective because they aim toward
recycling old “tools” to create a new perspective, even though these tools are inher-
ently insufficient for this purpose. Lorde’s claim is that one must be willing to step
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(Download PDF) The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Feminist Philosophy Susanne Lettow Full Chapter PDF

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The Palgrave Handbook of German

Idealism and Feminist Philosophy

The Palgrave Handbook of German Romantic Philosophy

The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and

The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and

The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and

The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the

The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the

The Politics of German Idealism Christopher Yeomans

The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Philosophy Kim Q. Hall

The Palgrave Handbook of

ISSN 2634-6230 ISSN 2634-6249 (electronic)

Brentano von Arnim

SG “Selections from Günderode.” In Women Philosophers in the Long

Parenthetical citations of English translations of Fichte’s work are followed by cita-

SWuS Sämtliche Werke und ausgewählte Studien. Ed. Walther Morgenthaler,

Parenthetical citations of English translations of Hegel’s work are followed by cita-

EPN Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the

VPR Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte, Vol. 5:

CPrR Critique of Practical Reason (1788). In Practical Philosophy. Trans. and

MM The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). In Practical Philosophy. Trans. and

TelP “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy” (1788). Trans.

Mon Monadology, and Other Philosophical Essays. Trans. Ann Marin

DI A Discourse on Inequality. Trans. Maurice William Cranston

Parenthetical citations of English translations of Schelling’s work are followed by

Ath “Athenaeum Fragments.” In Philosophical Fragments. Trans. Peter

Part I Kant and Feminist Philosophy 11

Part II Fichte, Schelling, and Feminist Philosophy 169

Part III Hegel and Feminist Philosophy 211

Part IV Feminist Philosophy and Thinkers Connected to

21 Sister, Spouse and a Subversive Split: The Ambiguous

Christine Battersby is Reader Emerita in the Department of Philosophy and an

Christoph Binkelmann is the coordinator of the project “Schelling in Munich

Tina Chanter has published on contemporary French philosophy, drawing inspi-

Marion Heinz Professor of Philosophy, University of Siegen; 2006 Research

Shannon Hoff is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Memorial University in

Dilek Huseyinzadegan is Associate Professor of Philosophy, and Affiliated

Kimberly Hutchings is Professor of Politics and International Relations at Queen

Friederike Kuster is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wuppertal,

Susanne Lettow is Senior Researcher at the Margherita-von-Brentano-Center for

Jamila M. H. Mascat is Assistant Professor of Gender and Postcolonial Studies at

Elaine P. Miller is Professor of Philosophy at Miami University of Ohio. She

Mara Montanaro is Associate Researcher at the Laboratory of Gender and

Herta Nagl-Docekal is Professor (emerita) at the Department of Philosophy,

Dalia Nassar is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney.

Jordan Pascoe is Associate Professor of Philosophy, and Affiliated Faculty of

Tuija Pulkkinen is Professor of Gender Studies at the University of Helsinki. Her

Matthieu Renault is an Associate Professor in philosophy at the University Paris

Stella Sandford is Professor in the Centre for Research in Modern European

Jameliah Inga Shorter-Bourhanou is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the

Alison Stone is Professor of European Philosophy at Lancaster University,

Heleen Zorgdrager is Professor of Systematic Theology and Gender Studies at

Susanne Lettow and Tuija Pulkkinen

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

1 Feminist Research on Gender Relations

the distinction between German Romanticism and German Idealism seems to be a

2 Legacies of German Idealism in Feminist Philosophy

3 Structure of the Book

Tuija Pulkkinen and Susanne Lettow analyse Hegel’s thought on economy in

Jameliah Inga Shorter-Bourhanou

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 13

Universalism is a cornerstone concept in Kant’s scholarship. In the Groundwork of

presume—as Kant did—to have consciousness, thought, rationality, and agency.”3

Part I Kant and Feminist Philosophy 11

Part II Fichte, Schelling, and Feminist Philosophy 169

Part III Hegel and Feminist Philosophy 211

Part IV Feminist Philosophy and Thinkers Connected to

21 Sister, Spouse and a Subversive Split: The Ambiguous

1 Feminist Research on Gender Relations

2 Legacies of German Idealism in Feminist Philosophy

3 Structure of the Book

2 “Nasty Women”: Kant’s Sexism

3 Approaches to Kant’s Sexism and Racism

4 In the Lurch: Black Feminism and Kant Scholarship